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File: Records, 1981-1985  
**Folder Title:** Korea, South (01/22/1981-  
02/27/1981)  
**Box:** RAC Box 9

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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 2/27/2007

**File Folder** KOREA, SOUTH (1/22/81-2/27/81)

**FOIA**

F06-048

**Box Number** 9

KYUNG

1

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description  | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|---|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 34659 | CABLE    | 221004Z JAN 81<br><b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b><br><del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del> | 2           | 1/22/1981 | B1           |
| 34660 | CABLE    | 210927Z JAN 81<br><b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b><br><del>DOCUMENT PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233</del> | 2           | 1/21/1981 | B1           |
| 34661 | MEMO     | ALEXANDER HAIG TO PRESIDENT<br><b>PAR 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>  | 1           | 2/2/1981  | B1           |
| 34662 | MEMO     | HAIG TO THE PRESIDENT AND SEC OF DEFENSE, RE DISCUSSION...<br><b>PAR 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>                       | 1           | 1/29/1981 | B1           |
| 34663 | CABLE    | 120243Z FEB 81<br><b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>   | 6           | 2/12/1981 | B1           |
| 34664 | CABLE    | 132228Z FEB 81<br><b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>   | 3           | 2/13/1981 | B1           |
| 34665 | MEMO     | JIM LILLEY TO RICHARD V. ALLEN,<br>ATTENDANCE AT KOREAN INAUGURATION<br><b>R 7/6/2012 F2006-048/1</b>               | 1           | 2/25/1981 | B1           |
| 34666 | MEMO     | JOHN HOLDRIDGE TO THE SECRETARY, RE REPRESENTATION AT THE KOREAN INAUGURATION<br><b>R 3/27/2008 NLRR06-048</b>      | 2           | 2/23/1981 | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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**Collection Name** EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT, NSC: COUNTRY FILE

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**FOIA**

F06-048

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KYUNG

1

| ID    | Doc Type | Document Description   | No of Pages | Doc Date  | Restrictions |
|-------|----------|--|-------------|-----------|--------------|
| 34669 | MEMO     | DONALD GREGG THROUGH CHARLES TYSON TO RICHARD ALLEN<br><i>R 7/6/2012 F2006-048/1</i> | 1           | 2/20/1981 | B1           |

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.



~~\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*~~

DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP  
EOB:EA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE  
DE RUEHUL #0845 0221018  
O 221004Z JAN 81 ZFF-4  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1525

~~SECRET~~ SEOUL 00845NDDIS  
E.O. 12065: RDS-1 01/22/01 (GLEYSTEN, W. H.) OR-M  
TAGS: PINT, SHUM, KS  
SUBJECT: KIM DAE JUNG VERDICT  
REF: SEOUL 00773

1. (S) ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AT THE BEGINNING OF A CONVERSATION TODAY REGARDING PREPARATIONS FOR THE MEETING BETWEEN PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND CHUN, FOREIGN MINISTER SINYONG LHO (M-R: NO SIN-YONG) TOLD ME THAT THE KIM DAE JUNG (M-R: KIM TAE-CHUNG) ISSUE HAS BEEN "REMOVED AS A PROBLEM BETWEEN US." AFTER THE SUPREME COURT PUBLICIZES ITS VERDICT, THE PRESIDENT WILL HOLD A CABINET MEETING AND THEN ANNOUNCE HIS DECISION. LHO DID NOT SAY EXPLICITLY THAT THE SUPREME COURT WOULD UPHOLD THE DEATH SENTENCE OR THAT THE PRESIDENT WOULD COMMUTE THE DEATH SENTENCE; HE ONLY MADE CLEAR THAT THE PRESIDENT HAS DECIDED THAT KIM DAE JUNG WILL NOT BE EXECUTED AND THAT THIS WILL BE MADE KNOWN BEFORE CHUN'S DEPARTURE FOR THE SUMMIT MEETING.

3. IN RUMINATING ABOUT THE STRUGGLE WITHIN THE GOVERNMENT OVER THE KIM ISSUE, LHO EMPHASIZED THAT THERE WERE STILL STRONG FEELINGS WITHIN THE MILITARY AND "CERTAIN INTELLECTUAL CIRCLES" THAT KIM SHOULD BE EXECUTED. ALTHOUGH THE PRESIDENT SEEMED ALWAYS TO HAVE LEANED IN FAVOR OF SPARING KIM'S LIFE, IT HAD TAKEN MUCH PERSUASION TO BRING HIM TO A DECISION. AS PEOPLE WHO HAD BEEN

DECLASSIFIED

~~\*\*\*\*\*SECRET\*\*\*\*\*~~

NLRR 106-018 #34659

BY W NARADATE 3/27/08



DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

EXTREMELY HELPFUL THROUGHOUT THIS PROCESS, LHO IDENTIFIED THE FOLLOWING: DEFENSE SECURITY COMMANDER NO TAE-U (M-R) WHO HAD HAD GREAT INFLUENCE AS A "THOUGHTFUL SOLDIER," SPECIAL FORCES COMMANDER CHONG YONG-HO (M-R) WHOSE MODERATE POSITION WAS EXTREMELY HELPFUL BECAUSE OF HIS HARD-LINE IDENTIFICATION WITHIN THE MILITARY, PRIME MINISTER NAM DUCK WOO (M-R: NAM TOK-U), BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY GENERAL KIM KYUNG WON (M-R: KIM KYONG-WON), AND THE FOREIGN MINISTER HIMSELF. LHO EMPHASIZED THAT RESTRAINED U.S. HANDLING OF THE ISSUE HAD PLAYED A CRUCIAL ROLE. HE EXPRESSED HOPE THAT WE WOULD MAINTAIN THIS POSITION DURING THE FINAL STAGES.

4. COMMENT: IN VIEW OF THE ANNOUNCEMENT OF A SUMMIT MEETING, I THINK IT LESS ESSENTIAL THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN WRITE PRESIDENT CHUN ON THE KIM DAE JUNG CASE, ALTHOUGH IT WOULD STILL BE VERY APPROPRIATE. IN TERMS OF ANY U.S. PUBLIC STATEMENT, HOWEVER, I URGE THAT WE STICK WITH THE KIND OF STATEMENT I OUTLINED REPTEL PARA 4. I KNOW THAT WE CANNOT TAKE A VERY POSITIVE STAND, BUT IF WE TAKE A MORE CRITICAL POSITION THAN I HAVE SUGGESTED, I DON'T THINK WE WILL GAIN ANY REAL BENEFIT AND WE WILL ANNOY IMPORTANT KOREANS WHO HAVE TRIED HARD TO ACCOMMODATE OUR CONCERNS. THE DECISION TO SPARE KIM DAE JUNG'S LIFE IS A SENSIBLE, MATURE ACTION BY THE CHUN GOVERNMENT. WE SHOULD TREAT IT AS SUCH. GLEYSTEN

PSN: 029218

TOR: 022/12:56Z

BTG: 221004Z JAN 81



DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

AA NAN COL VP  
EOB:CSCE,EA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

IMMEDIATE

DE RUEHUL #0773 0210930

O 210927Z JAN 81 (SUBJ MSG BEING SVC'D BY WH COMMCEN)

FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 1503

~~S E C R E T~~ SEOUL 00773

NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 1/21/01 (GLEYSTEN, W.H.) DR-M

TAGS: PINT, SHUM, KS

SUBJECT: ANNOUNCEMENT OF SUPREME COURT DECISION ON  
- KIM DAE JUNG JANUARY 231. ~~(S)~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE HAVE TWO FURTHER INDICATIONS THAT THE ROKG WILL RESOLVE THE KIM DAE JUNG (M-R: KIM TAE-CHUNG) CASE IN A SATISFACTORY MANNER. ON LEARNING THAT THE SUPREME COURT WILL MAKE ITS ANNOUNCEMENT JANUARY 23, I CONTACTED BLUE HOUSE SECRETARY GENERAL KIM KYUNG WON (M-R: KIM KYONG-WON) TO ASK HIM IF I SHOULD BE GEARING UP FOR AN URGENT REPRESENTATIONAL EFFORT OR WHETHER I COULD CONTINUE CONFIDENT THAT THE ROKG WOULD NOT TAKE ACTION UNFAVORABLE FROM OUR POINT OF VIEW. KIM REPLIED THAT THE SUPREME COURT DECISION WAS ONE OF A NUMBER OF INTER-RELATED DEVELOPMENTS OF WHICH WE WOULD BE INFORMED IN DUE COURSE. THE TACTICAL SITUATION WAS STILL FLUID, BUT HE COULD ASSURE ME THAT THE EVENTUAL OUTCOME WAS SUCH THAT I COULD REMAIN RELAXED.

3. MORE OR LESS SIMULTANEOUSLY, OUR PAO AND PRESS ATTACHE WERE TOLD BY KIM FONG JIN (M-R: KIM FONG-CHIN), FORMER INFORMATION MINISTER AND CURRENT HEAD OF THE GOVERNMENT'S YONHAP PRESS AGENCY, THAT THE SUPREME COURT WOULD UPHOLD THE DEATH VERDICT ON KIM DAE JUNG BUT THAT WITHIN HOURS PRESIDENT CHUN WOULD REDUCE THE

DECLASSIFIED

\*\*\*\*\*~~S E C R E T~~\*\*\*\*\*NLRR F06-048 <sup>17</sup> 34660BY CN NARA DATE 3/27/08



DATE 02/03/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SENTENCE.

4. COMMENT: WHATEVER THE PRECISE PATTERN OF EVENTS BEGINNING FRIDAY, I THINK WE CAN ASSUME WITH REASONABLE CONFIDENCE THAT PRESIDENT CHUN HAS DECIDED TO ACCOMMODATE FOREIGN CONCERNS OVER KIM DAE JUNG. IN A SEPARATE MESSAGE I HAVE URGED THAT WE NOT COMPLICATE CHUN'S SCENARIO WITH AN UNHELPFUL STATEMENT IF THE FIRST STAGE

(#) SAY PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY IF AND WHEN CHUN REVEALS A SATISFACTORY OUTCOME. PRIVATELY, I THINK IT WOULD BE MOST APPROPRIATE IF PRESIDENT REAGAN SENT CHUN A LETTER NOTING THE DIFFICULTY OF HIS DECISION, COMMENDING HIS WILLINGNESS TO REDUCE THE SENTENCE, AND EXPRESSING CONFIDENCE THAT HIS ACTION WILL PROVE A GOOD OMEN FOR THE HEALTHY EVOLUTION OF U.S.-ROK RELATIONS UNDER THE NEW GOVERNMENTS OF BOTH COUNTRIES. PUBLICLY, WE WILL BE IN MORE OF A BIND BECAUSE IT WILL BE HARD TO PRAISE COMMUTATION OF A DEATH SENTENCE INTO A LIFE OR EVEN A 20-YEAR SENTENCE. NEVERTHELESS, I WOULD HOPE THAT WE COULD SAY SOMETHING ALONG THE FOLLOWING LINES:

- BEGIN QUOTE: WE DO NOT INTEND TO MAKE ANY FURTHER COMMENT ON THE CHARGES AGAINST MR. KIM DAE JUNG OR THE JUDICIAL PROCESS IN WHICH HE WAS TRIED BY MILITARY COURTS AND GIVEN A DEATH SENTENCE UPHELD BY THE SUPREME COURT. HOWEVER, WE WELCOME THE DECISION OF PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN IN REDUCING THE SENTENCE AND HOPE THAT HIS ACTION WILL CONTRIBUTE TO DEVELOPMENTS BENEFITTING BOTH THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA AND THE UNITED STATES. END QUOTE. GLEYSTERN

PSN: 027964

TOR: 021/13:33Z

BTG: 210927Z JAN 81



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773 \*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

OP IMMED  
STU521  
DE RUEHUL #0911/01 0230856  
O 230847Z JAN 81 ZFF4  
FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1555

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7049  
SA CINCUNC KS  
CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS  
COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS  
CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
USICA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 02 SEOUL 00911

USICA FOR EA  
E.O. 12065: N/A  
TAGS: PINT SHUM KS

SUBJECT: SUPREME COURT UPHOLDS KIM DAE JUNG'S DEATH  
- SENTENCE; SUBSEQUENT CABINET MEETING RECOMMENDS  
- IT AND THOSE OF KIM'S CO-DEFENDANTS BE COMMUTED;  
- PRESIDENT ACCEPTS RECOMMENDATION

REF: SEOUL 730

1. THE ROK SUPREME COURT MET AT 2:00 LOCAL TIME JANUARY 23 AND SHORTLY THEREAFTER ANNOUNCED IT HAD UPHELD THE DEATH SENTENCE FOR KIM DAE JUNG (M-R: KIM TAE-CHUNG). ACCORDING TO THE KOREAN OVERSEAS INFORMATION SERVICE (KOIS) OF THE MINISTRY OF CULTURE AND INFORMATION (MCUI), IMMEDIATELY AFTER THE SUPREME COURT DECISION, PRESIDENT CHUN (M-R: CHON TU-HWAN) INSTRUCTED THE STATE COUNCIL (CABINET) TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF COMMUTING THE SENTENCE. KOIS SAID THAT THE STATE COUNCIL, CITING THE PRESIDENT'S THOUGHTS ON THE NEED TO END THE "CONFRONTATION-DOMINATED POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE 1970S," APPEALS FROM FRIENDLY NATIONS, AND A PETITION KIM DAE JUNG HAD SUBMITTED, UNANIMOUSLY PASSED A RESOLUTION THAT THE SENTENCES BE COMMUTED. IN THE PETITION, KIM "EXPRESSES REPENTANCE FOR ENDANGERING NATIONAL SECURITY, APOLOGIZES TO THE PEOPLE AND APPEALS FOR MAGNANIMITY AND GENEROUS CONSIDERATION OF HIMSELF AND THE OTHERS. THE BASIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT IS TO TREAT MAGNANIMOUSLY ANYONE WHO REPENTS OF HIS WRONGDOINGS,

\*\*\*\*\*WHSR COMMENT\*\*\*\*\*

RA NANCE COLSON VP

PSN:030319 PAGE 01 TOR:023/09127Z DTG:230847Z JAN 81

\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY



REGARDLESS OF THE GRAVITY OF THE CRIME OR HIS PREVIOUS IDEOLOGY."

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE KOIS RELEASE:

ANNOUNCEMENT BY THE GOVERNMENT SPOKESMAN,  
MINISTER LEE KWANG PYO

ON THE COMMUTATION FOR KIM DAE-JUNG

THE GOVERNMENT WAS INSTRUCTED BY PRESIDENT CHUN DOO HWAN TO STUDY THE QUESTION OF COMMUTING THE DEATH SENTENCE IMPOSED ON KIM DAE-JUNG AND UPHeld TODAY BY THE SUPREME COURT AFTER HE WAS FOUND GUILTY OF VIOLATING THE NATIONAL SECURITY LAW AND THE ANTI-COMMUNIST LAW AND OF CONSPIRING FOR INSURRECTION, AS WELL AS THE SENTENCES OF THE OTHERS CONVICTED IN THIS CASE. ACCORDINGLY, THE STATE COUNCIL (CABINET) WAS CALLED INTO SESSION TO DISCUSS THE MATTER.

PRESIDENT CHUN ALSO DIRECTED THAT IN EXAMINING THE ADVISABILITY OF THE SUGGESTED COMMUTATIONS, THE STATE COUNCIL SHOULD PAY ATTENTION TO THE FOLLOWING CONSIDERATIONS.

THE FACT THAT THOSE CONVICTED, INCLUDING KIM DAE-JUNG, ENDANGERED NATIONAL SECURITY BY VIOLATING THE LAWS OF THIS COUNTRY, ESPECIALLY BY FORMING AN ANTI-STATE ORGANIZATION AND CONSPIRING FOR INSURRECTION, HAS BEEN CLEARLY PROVED BY THOROUGH EXAMINATIONS AND TRIAL PROCEEDINGS AT THE INITIAL, APPELLATE AND SUPREME COURT TRIALS.

BUT, VIEWING THE CASE AT THIS JUNCTION WHEN ALL JUDICIAL PROCEEDINGS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED, THE FOLLOWING FACTORS SHOULD ALSO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT.

FIRST, THE TIME HAS COME TO USHER IN A NEW HISTORICAL ERA BY ENDING THE CONFRONTATION-DOMINATED POLITICAL SITUATION OF THE 1970S AND THE NATIONAL CHAOS FOLLOWING THE OCTOBER 26, 1979 INCIDENT. THE AFFAIR OF KIM DAE-JUNG AND THE OTHERS IS A SAD POLITICAL LEGACY FROM THE OLD ERA. THUS THERE IS NO NEED TO BESMIRCH THE OPENING CHAPTER OF THE FIFTH REPUBLIC WITH A NIGHTMARE FROM THE PAST.

SECOND, FRIENDLY NATIONS AND PERSONS AT HOME AND ABROAD HAVE APPEALED FOR CLEMENCY FROM A HUMANITARIAN STANDPOINT.

THIRD, KIM DAE-JUNG HIMSELF HAS SUBMITTED A PETITION IN WHICH HE EXPRESSES REPENTANCE FOR ENDANGERING NATIONAL SECURITY, APOLOGIZES TO THE PEOPLE AND APPEALS FOR MAGNANIMITY AND GENEROUS CONSIDERATION IN FAVOR OF HIMSELF AND THE OTHERS. THE BASIC POLICY OF THE GOVERNMENT IS TO

BT



OP IMMED  
 UTS728  
 DE RUEHUL #0911/02 0230905  
 O 230847Z JAN 81 ZFF-4  
 FM AMEMBASSY SEOUL

TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1556

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO 7050  
 SA CINCUNC KS  
 CHJUSMAG SEOUL KS  
 COMUSKOREA SEOUL KS//BJ-IS  
 CINCPAC HONOLULU HI  
 USICA WASHDC

UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 02 SEOUL 00911

TREAT MAGNANIMOUSLY ANYONE WHO REPENTS OF HIS WRONGDOINGS,  
 REGARDLESS OF THE GRAVITY OF THE CRIME OR HIS PREVIOUS  
 IDEOLOGY.

IN CONSIDERATION OF THE ABOVE POINTS, THE STATE  
 COUNCIL HAS CONCLUDED THAT IT IS APPROPRIATE FROM THE  
 STANDPOINT OF NATIONAL RECONCILIATION TO GRANT COMMUTA-  
 TIONS TO KIM DAE-JUNG AND THE OTHERS CONVICTED IN THIS  
 CASE. THE COUNCIL THEREFORE RESOLVES THAT THE SENTENCES  
 BE COMMUTED AS SHOWN BELOW:

|    | CONVICTED                             | CONFIRMED<br>SENTENCE | COMMUTED<br>SENTENCE |
|----|---------------------------------------|-----------------------|----------------------|
| 1) | KIM DAE JUNG<br>(M-R: KIM TAE-CHUNG)  | DEATH                 | LIFE<br>IMPRISONMENT |
| 2) | LEE MUN-YONG<br>(M-R: YI MUN-YONG)    | 20 YEARS              | 15 YEARS             |
| 3) | MUN IK-HWAN (M-R)                     | 15 YEARS              | 10 YEARS             |
| 4) | KOH EUN-TAE<br>(M-R: KO UN-TAE)       | 15 YEARS              | 10 YEARS             |
| 5) | CHO SUNG-WOO<br>(M-R: CHO SONG-U)     | 15 YEARS              | 10 YEARS             |
| 6) | YEH CHUN-HO<br>(M-R: YE CHUN HO)      | 12 YEARS              | 8 YEARS              |
| 7) | LEE SHIN-POM<br>(M-R: YI SIN-POM)     | 12 YEARS              | 9 YEARS              |
| 8) | KIM SANG-HYUN<br>(M-R: KIM SANG-HYON) | 10 YEARS              | 7 YEARS              |



\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY

- 9) LEE HAE-CHAN  
 (M-RI YI HAE-CHAN) 10 YEARS 7 YEARS
- 10) SOL HOON  
 (M-RI SOL HUN) 10 YEARS 7 YEARS
- 11) SONG KI-WON  
 (M-RI SONG KI-WON) 10 YEARS 7 YEARS
- UNCLASSIFIED
- 12) LEE SUK-PYO  
 (M-RI YI SOK-PIYO) 7 YEARS 5 YEARS

3. THE BLUE HOUSE TOLD US THAT PRESIDENT CHUN ACCEPTED  
 THE RECOMMENDATION OF THE STATE COUNCIL. GLEYSTEN  
 BT

\*\*\*\*\*U N C L A S S I F I E D\*\*\*\*\*S COPY



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*105  
2/27/81*

RECEIVED 25 FEB 81 16

TO PRES

FROM HAIG, A

DOCDATE 02 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

CHUN DOO HWAN

SUBJECT: HAIG MEMO RE CONVERSATION W/ CHUN ON HIS ARRIVAL AT ANDREWS

ACTION: NOTED BY PRES

DUE:

STATUS C

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

GREGG ✓

LILLEY ✓

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG

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ACTION OFFICER (S)

ASSIGNED

ACTION REQUIRED

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COPIES TO

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MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

The President has seen

#211  
205  
9

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

February 2, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Memo on Korea

Herewith Secretary Haig's memorandum on Korea, which was just received by my office.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

105  
2/2-7/87

~~TOP SECRET~~

34661

211 10


THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

February 2, 1981


MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT

FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

Korea: All signs point to a very smooth visit with the Koreans today. The only worry we detected on President Chun's arrival yesterday was concern that he might have more pressure applied to him publicly on the Kim Dae Jung issue. We told Chun in the car coming in from Andrews, and later the Foreign Minister, that there would be no public advice from your Administration as to how the Koreans should handle the Kim case or run their internal affairs. If we had advice it would be private, focused on Korea's external relationships, and conveyed through established official channels. ~~(S)~~

We emphasized that with you as President the Koreans now have a friend in the White House and that we would conduct ourselves in accordance with our critical strategic interests. I said we would maintain and improve our military forces in Korea. 

B1

 We appreciated the ROK's current economic difficulties and would try to be helpful with foreign military sales credits and the supply of weapons. ~~(TS)~~

The Foreign Minister, who was obviously pleased with your policy, also asked if we could send a very high level delegation to Chun's inauguration on March 3. I said you would need to make that decision, but that we would do our best to see that we send a distinguished senior delegation. ~~(S)~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NJRR Feb-048 #34661

BY CW NARA DATE 3/27/08

RDS 2/3 2/2/01 (Haig, Alexander M. Jr.)

~~TOP SECRET~~



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Handwritten initials*

12

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
SUBJECT: President Chun's Inauguration

It has been recommended by the State Department and reinforced by James Lilley of the NSC staff that we send a representative to the inauguration of President Chun.

Jim Lilley suggests that Senator Hayakawa might be an ideal person, and he has apparently been sounded out and is favorable to the idea. Another person suggested might be Governor Milliken of Michigan.

Perhaps sending several people would be appropriate.

The preservation of the momentum that we have in our relationship with the Republic of Korea will benefit our policy toward that country and will assist in the development of our relations.

I concur with the suggestion that we send a special representative.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
✓ James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
NARA, Date 2/27/07



MEMORANDUM

The President has seen \_\_\_\_\_

1.6.9.  
13

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

January 31, 1981

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT  
FROM: RICHARD ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: Secretary Haig's Memo on Meeting  
with President Chun

For your information, Secretary Haig sends you a memo on nuclear weapons deployment and non-proliferation policy in Korea.

Since Secretary Haig will discuss these items in his private meeting with President Chun, they should not come up in your meeting.

TOP SECRET ATTACHMENT

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*YOS*  
*2/21/07*



B1


THE SECRETARY OF STATE  
WASHINGTON

January 29, 1981

~~TOP SECRET~~


MEMORANDUM FOR: THE PRESIDENT ✓  
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE


FROM: Alexander M. Haig, Jr. 

SUBJECT:   
Non-Proliferation with Korean President  
Chun Doo Hwan

During the Ford Administration we firmly dissuaded President Park from pursuing a nuclear weapons program, and these admonitions were strengthened again in recent years.




Now that President Chun has consolidated his position, I plan to utilize my separate meeting with him after lunch on Monday 

 to reconfirm with him our non-proliferation concerns. Although there is now no active Korean nuclear weapons program, some officials and scientists keep seeking to reactivate the effort, and the ROK has the technological capability to develop and produce a nuclear weapon in a relatively short period.

I will emphasize that:

-- The U.S. nuclear umbrella provides an extremely important reinforcement of the deterrent we provide for ROK security.



DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLRR F06-018 #34662

BY GI NARA DATE 3/27/08

~~TOP SECRET~~

RDS-3 1/28/01



\*\*\*\*\*~~S E C R E T~~\*\*\*\*\*

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

COL VP  
EOB:EA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

MESSAGE:

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O 120243Z FEB 81 ZFF6  
FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL IMMEDIATE 0000

INFO AMEMBASSY TOKYO IMMEDIATE 0000  
BT~~S E C R E T~~ STATE 036224  
NODIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 AND 2, 2/4/01 (HOLDRIDGE, J)

TAGS: OVIP (CHUN DOO HWAN), PEPR, KS, US

SUBJECT: PRESIDENT CHUN'S MEETING WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN  
FEBRUARY 2, 19811. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING A SMALLER MEETING IN THE OVAL OFFICE PRESIDENTS REAGAN AND CHUN MET WITH A LARGER GROUP IN THE CABINET ROOM FEBRUARY 2, 1981. PRESIDENT REAGAN EXPLAINED THAT HE AND PRESIDENT CHUN HAD EXCHANGED GREETINGS AND HAD BEGUN TO GET INTO SUBSTANTIVE MATTERS. HE EXPRESSED PLEASURE OVER CHUN'S VISIT WHICH SHOULD GIVE US AN OPPORTUNITY TO REAFFIRM FRIENDSHIP FOR THE REPUBLIC OF KOREA, RESTORE A PRINCIPAL ALLIANCE, AND SYMBOLIZE U.S. DETERMINATION TO MEET OUR OBLIGATIONS AS A PACIFIC POWER. IT WILL NOT BE THE POLICY OF THIS ADMINISTRATION TO SUGGEST WITHDRAWAL OF ANY U.S. TROOPS FROM KOREA. WE ARE COMMITTED TO THE SECURITY OF KOREA, AND WE BELIEVE WE SHOULD RESUME THE FULL RANGE OF CONSULTATIONS BETWEEN OUR GOVERNMENTS AS A MEANS OF IMPROVING RELATIONS. WE PROPOSE THAT WE HOLD A

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\*\*\*\*\*~~S E C R E T~~\*\*\*\*\*

NLRR F06-148 #34663

BY CA NARA DATE 3/27/08



DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

SECURITY CONSULTATIVE MEETING THIS YEAR LEAVING THE TIME AND OTHER DETAILS TO BE WORKED OUT BY OUR DEFENSE OFFICIALS. WE SUPPORT PRESIDENT CHUN'S PROPOSAL FOR RECIPROCAL VISITS

BY THE PRESIDENTS OF SOUTH AND NORTH KOREA. PRESIDENT REAGAN EMPHASIZED THAT IF THERE WERE ANY HINT OF UNILATERAL U.S. DEALINGS WITH NORTH KOREA, PRESIDENT CHUN SHOULD KNOW THAT THIS WAS NOT SO. IF SUCH MEETINGS EVER DEVELOP, THE U.S. AND ROK WILL GO SIDE BY SIDE. THE PRESIDENT THEN ASKED PRESIDENT CHUN FOR HIS ASSESSMENT OF THE SITUATION IN HIS COUNTRY AND IN NORTHEAST ASIA.

3. PRESIDENT CHUN THANKED PRESIDENT REAGAN FOR HIS WORDS REGARDING TROOP WITHDRAWALS AND THE SCM. THESE WERE, HE SAID, A WELCOME GIFT AND HE WOULD RETURN TO SEOUL WITH A "LIGHT MIND." THESE DECISIONS ARE IMPORTANT NOT ONLY FOR THE ROK BUT ALSO FOR ALL OF NORTHEAST ASIA. THE SECURITY OF KOREA INVOLVES THE MILITARY BALANCE IN NORTHEAST ASIA WHICH IS CURRENTLY OUT OF BALANCE. SOVIET FORCES HAVE GROWN ENORMOUSLY. THEY, FOR EXAMPLE, DEPLOY 46 DIVISIONS IN CONTRAST TO 80,000 MEN IN U.S. GROUND FORCES IN THE WEST PACIFIC AREA. THE SOVIETS HAVE BUILT UP THEIR NAVAL AND AIR POWER TO THE POINT WHERE THE GAP IN FORCES COULD LEAD TO MISJUDGEMENT BY THE NORTH KOREANS. LOOKING AT THE DIRECT BALANCE BETWEEN NORTH AND SOUTH KOREA, THE NORTH HAS 730,000 IN ITS REGULAR GROUND FORCES VERSUS 610,000 IN THE SOUTH. IN TERMS OF AIRCRAFT, ARTILLERY, TANKS, AND SHIPS THE NORTH ALSO HAS NUMERICAL SUPERIORITY IN THE GENERAL RATIO OF TWO TO ONE.

4. PRESIDENT CHUN EXPLAINED, HOWEVER, THAT THE PRESENCE OF U.S. TROOPS IN ADDITION TO KOREAN FORCES MAKES IT CERTAIN THAT THE ROK AND U.S. CAN STOP A NORTH KOREAN ATTACK. MOREOVER, IF THE SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC STRUCTURE OF THE COUNTRY CONTINUES TO DEVELOP, THE SOUTH HAS MUCH INHERENT STRENGTH. IT HAS RESERVE FORCES OF FIVE MILLION MEN, REFLECTING THE STRENGTH OF A POPULATION WHICH IS 38 MILLION IN CONTRAST TO 17 MILLION IN THE NORTH. WITH POLITICAL STABILITY AND ECONOMIC GROWTH THE ROK WILL BE ABLE TO ENHANCE ITS DEFENSE FORCES AND COPE WITH ITS SECURITY. APART FROM PROVIDING THE NECESSARY BALANCE OF FORCES ON THE KOREAN PENINSULA, THE 39,000



DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

U.S. TROOPS PRESENTLY STATIONED IN THE ROK HAVE A BROADER STRATEGIC SIGNIFICANCE, BECAUSE THEY KEEP SOVIET FORCES PINNED DOWN. THE SOVIET NEED TO DEPLOY FORCES IN EUROPE, THE MIDDLE EAST AND EAST ASIA MEANS THAT THEY CAN NOT CONCENTRATE OVERWHELMING FORCES IN ANY ONE AREA. THIS HELPS MAINTAIN WORLD PEACE AND STABILITY.

5. PRESIDENT REAGAN ASKED SECRETARY HAIG IF HE HAD ANY COMMENT. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WAS IN FULL AGREEMENT. THE PRESIDENT WENT ON TO SAY THAT WE UNDERSTAND THE ECONOMIC BURDEN ON THE ROK. WE WILL DO OUR BEST TO EXPEDITE THE TRANSFER OF WEAPONS SYSTEMS AND TECHNOLOGY, AND WE WILL ALSO MAKE EVERY EFFORT TO SUSTAIN AND POSSIBLY INCREASE FMS CREDIT LEVELS. IF THE ROK WISHES TO PROCEED WITH PROCUREMENT OF THE F-16, WE WILL SEND NOTIFICATION TO THE CONGRESS.

6. PRESIDENT CHUN REITERATED THAT THE ROK WILL CONTINUE ITS ROLE AS A STRATEGIC ASSET TO THE U.S. IN EAST ASIA. MOVING ON TO THE ECONOMIC AREA HE SAID THAT KOREA IS TRYING TO DEVELOP DEFENSE INDUSTRIES AND FOR THIS PURPOSE NEEDS TECHNICAL HELP. REVERTING TO THE F-16 ISSUE, HE NOTED THAT HE HAD MEANT TO RAISE IT HIMSELF AND WAS GRATEFUL FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S DECISION.

7. ON POLITICAL ISSUES CHUN COMMENTED THAT THE ROK HAS TRIED TO TRANSLATE VARIOUS U.S. DEMOCRATIC PRACTICES IN KOREA WITH VARYING DEGREES OF SUCCESS. THE FACT IS THAT IN PRESENT CONDITIONS KOREA CANNOT HAVE FULL-SCALE U.S.-STYLE DEMOCRACY. IF THE U.S. COULD, AS PRESIDENT REAGAN HAD OFFERED, BE UNDERSTANDING OF THIS PROBLEM, THE ROK COULD HELP RALLY FREE WORLD SOURCES TO WORK WITH THE UNITED STATES. NOTING THAT VIETNAM AND SOME OTHER COUNTRIES HAD SUCCUMBED IN THE 1970S CHUN SUGGESTED THIS HAD SOMETHING TO DO WITH A LACK OF CONSISTENCY IN U.S. POLICY. NOW WITH A NEW PRESIDENT IN THE UNITED STATES WHO HAD A CLEAR POLICY, COUNTRIES OF THE FREE WORLD WILL BE ABLE TO UNITE AND WORK TOGETHER.

8. PRESIDENT REAGAN AGREED. TURNING TO TRADE, HE SAID THAT WE ARE EXCELLENT TRADE PARTNERS. WE VALUE THE KOREAN MARKET INCLUDING THE OPPORTUNITY FOR LARGE U.S. AGRICULTURAL EXPORTS. WE HAVE SOME OF OUR OWN ECONOMIC



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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 004

MESSAGE (CONTINUED) :

PROBLEMS, BUT WE WILL CONTINUE TO EXTEND AGRICULTURAL AND FMS CREDITS, AND WE WILL CONTINUE TO MAINTAIN OUR TRADING RELATIONS TO THE BEST OF OUR ABILITY.

9. PRESIDENT CHUN REMARKED THAT CRITICS, INCLUDING OUR ADVERSARIES WHO HAVE NO HUMAN RIGHTS AT ALL, HAVE ATTACKED THE ROK AND COMPLICATED THE US-ROK RELATIONSHIP. IN THE PAST THIS CONFUSION ADDED TO KOREA'S DOMESTIC INSTABILITY. SOME PEOPLE HAVE NOT UNDERSTOOD KOREA'S REAL PROBLEMS. THEY HAVE NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, APPRECIATED THE MASSIVENESS OF THE NORTH KOREAN THREAT WHICH IS ONLY AS FAR AWAY AS ANDREWS AIR FORCE BASE FROM THE WHITE HOUSE. NOW SUCH

INSTABILITY IS A THING OF THE PAST. WITH THE MORAL SUPPORT OF THE U.S. THE ROK WILL DO ITS PART TO SHARE THE U.S. BURDEN IN EAST ASIA. ON THE DOMESTIC SCENE IN THE ROK, ORDER AND PEACE HAVE BEEN RESTORED -- PARTLY BECAUSE THE PEOPLE OF SOUTH KOREA DESIRE STABILITY AND PARTLY BECAUSE HIS GOVERNMENT HAS TAKEN CERTAIN STEPS WHICH HAVE BEEN HELPFUL. THE NEW CONSTITUTION HAS BEEN ADOPTED AND APPROVED BY THE PEOPLE. ELECTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENCY ARE SCHEDULED FOR THIS MONTH AND ELECTIONS FOR THE NATIONAL ASSEMBLY WILL BE HELD AT THE END OF MARCH. BOTH ELECTIONS ARE BEING LAUNCHED IN AN ATMOSPHERE OF STABILITY.

10. PRESIDENT REAGAN ACKNOWLEDGED THE CONTRIBUTION THE ROK MAKES TO THE U.S. IN THE EAST ASIAN AREA. WE KNOW, HE SAID, THAT OUR ABILITY TO PERFORM OUR ROLE HAS BEEN ALLOWED TO DETERIORATE, BUT WE WILL DO SOMETHING ABOUT IT. IN THE FUTURE WE WILL FOCUS ON HUMAN RIGHTS IN THE PROPER MANNER. IN THE PAST WE HAVE IGNORED THE GREATEST VIOLATORS MOST OF WHOM ARE BEHIND THE BAMBOO AND IRON CURTAINS.

11. NOTING THAT LUNCH WAS READY THE PRESIDENT COMMENTED THAT WE WERE ALSO VERY INDEBTED TO KOREA FOR SOMETHING ELSE NAMELY, SAMMY LEE IN CALIFORNIA, AN OLYMPIC CHAMPION WHO HAS DEVOTED HIMSELF TO TRAINING OTHER OLYMPIC ATHLETES. WE ARE VERY PROUD OF HIM.

12. PRESIDENT CHUN ASKED IF HE COULD BRING UP ONE MORE



DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 005

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

ECONOMIC POINT BEFORE LUNCH. IN THE PAST THE U.S. HAD HELPED THE ROK INCREASE ITS ECONOMIC AND DEFENSE POWER. WITH SIMILAR SUPPORT JAPAN HAD BECOME AN IMPORTANT POLITICAL AND ECONOMIC POWER, BUT IN THE FUTURE THE JAPANESE SHOULD DO MORE TO HELP DEFEND THEMSELVES AND TAKE SOME OF THE BURDEN OFF KOREA AND THE U.S. SPECIFICALLY, HE HOPED THE U.S. WOULD URGE THE JAPANESE TO EXTEND ECONOMIC ASSISTANCE TO KOREA TO OFFSET KOREA'S HEAVY DEFENSE BURDEN IN AN AMOUNT EQUIVALENT TO WHAT IT WOULD COST TO SUPPORT TWO DIVISIONS (SUBSEQUENTLY, THE DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND OTHERS EXPLAINED THAT THE KOREANS HAD IN MIND TRYING TO GET THE JAPANESE TO PROVIDE ABOUT A BILLION DOLLARS WORTH OF CONCESSIONARY LOANS WHICH THEY ESTIMATED AS THE COST OF EQUIPPING AND MAINTAINING TWO KOREAN DIVISIONS. THE MONEY WOULD NOT GO DIRECTLY TO ROK DEFENSE BUT WOULD BE USED TO FREE OTHER FUNDS WHICH COULD THUS BE DIVERTED TO DEFENSE).

THE ROK DEFENSE BURDEN AT THE PRESENT TIME WAS 6 PERCENT OF GNP WHILE JAPAN'S WAS ONLY 0.9 PERCENT -- DESPITE THE HUGE SIZE OF ITS GNP. THE U.S. SHOULD, CHUN ARGUED, POINT OUT TO THE JAPANESE THAT THE ROK AND THE U.S. ARE THE FRONTLINE OF JAPAN'S DEFENSE. PRESIDENT REAGAN INDICATED THAT HE HAD NO DISPUTE WITH PRESIDENT CHUN'S POINT.

13. NOTE: DURING THE SMALLER MEETING IN THE OVAL OFFICE PRESIDENT REAGAN AND PRESIDENT CHUN EXCHANGED GREETINGS AND AMONG OTHER THINGS TALKED ABOUT THE NORTH KOREAN TUNNELING IN THE DMZ AREA. THE PRESIDENT MADE CLEAR THAT HIS ADMINISTRATION WOULD REFRAIN FROM PUBLIC CRITICISM AND COMMENT ON KOREAN INTERNAL DEVELOPMENTS.

14. PARTICIPANTS: U.S.: THE PRESIDENT, VICE PRESIDENT BUSH, SECRETARY OF STATE HAIG, SECRETARY OF DEFENSE WEINBERGER, COUNSELLOR TO THE PRESIDENT MEESE, CHIEF OF STAFF TO THE PRESIDENT BAKER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS ALLEN, DEPUTY CHIEF OF STAFF DEAVER, ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT AND PRESS SECRETARY JAMES A. BRADY, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL STAFF MEMBER DON GREGG, AMBASSADOR GLEYSTEN, ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF STATE FOR EAST ASIAN AFFAIRS-DESIGNATE JOHN HOLDRIDGE.



~~\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*~~

20

DATE 02/18/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 006

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

KOREAN SIDE: PRESIDENT CHUN, DEPUTY PRIME MINISTER AND  
MINISTER OF ECONOMIC PLANNING, BYONG HYUN SHIN, FOREIGN  
MINISTER SHIN YONG LHO, AMBASSADOR YONG SHIK KIM,  
MINISTER OF NATIONAL DEFENSE YONG BOCK CHOO, SECRETARY  
GENERAL TO THE PRESIDENT, DR. KYUNG WON KIM, ASSISTANT  
MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS RO-MYUNG GONG AND GENERAL  
HO HWA PYUN - BLUE HOUSE SECRETARIAT. HAIG

PSN: 056511

TOR: 043/04:18Z

BTG: 120243Z FEB 81

~~\*\*\*\*\*S E C R E T\*\*\*\*\*~~



DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 001

WHSR COMMENT:

RA NAN COL VP  
EOB:EA

MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS:

NO MESSAGE ANNOTATIONS

MESSAGE:

PRIORITY

DE RUEHC #0092 0450022

P 132228Z FEB 81

FM SECSTATE WASHDC

TO AMEMBASSY SEOUL PRIORITY 4935

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 036092

EXDIS

E.O. 12065: RDS-1 AND 3 2/12/01 (ARMACOST, MICHAEL)

TAGS: OVIP (CHUN DOO HWAN), PEPR, ASEC, KS, US

SUBJ: SIDELIGHTS ON PRESIDENT CHUN'S VISIT TO  
WASHINGTON1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FROM ALL EVIDENCE WE HAVE FROM BOTH THE ROK PRESIDENTIAL PARTY AND FROM THE KOREAN EMBASSY HERE, THE OFFICIAL VISIT TO WASHINGTON WAS A HIGHLY POSITIVE EVENT FROM THE KOREAN PERSPECTIVE.

3. FOR PRESIDENT CHUN, THE TONE OF THE VISIT WAS SET AT THE VERY BEGINNING BY SECRETARY HAIG DURING THEIR CHAT ENROUTE TO BLAIR HOUSE FROM ANDREWS AFB. THE SECRETARY'S FORTHRIGHT AND UPBEAT APPROACH MADE AN EXCELLENT IMPRESSION ON CHUN AND SUSTAINED HIS POSITIVE ATTITUDE THROUGHOUT DESPITE HEAVY PERSONAL FATIGUE AND A GRUELING SCHEDULE.

4. ACCORDING TO BOTH ROK EMBASSY SOURCES AND A MEMBER OF PRESIDENT CHUN'S STAFF, HOWEVER, ROK FOREIGN MINISTER LHO'S PERFORMANCE DURING THE VISIT RAISED SOME EYEBROWS ON THE PRESIDENT'S PART. CHUN AND HIS STAFF HAD NOT KNOWN THE

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NLRR F06-048 #34664

BY CN NARADATE 3/27/08



DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 002

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

REASON WHY LHO FLEW TO WASHINGTON ON SATURDAY JAN 31 ONE DAY BEFORE THE OFFICIAL ARRIVAL FROM NEW YORK. (WE INFER THAT THERE HAD BEEN CONSTANT CHANGES OF SIGNAL FROM WITHIN THE FOREIGN MINISTRY OVER COMMUNIQUE LANGUAGE, MAKING NEGOTIATIONS DIFFICULT HERE IN THE FINAL WEEK PRIOR TO THE PARTY'S ARRIVAL). ON SUNDAY EVENING, FEB 1, FOREIGN MINISTER LHO MET WITH THE SECRETARY AT BLAIR HOUSE AFTER THE PARTY'S ARRIVAL FROM ANDREWS (SEPTEL). AT THE SAME TIME, PRESIDENT CHUN AND AMBASSADOR KIM WERE REVIEWING THEIR DISCUSSION WITH THE SECRETARY ENROUTE FROM ANDREWS, AND AMB KIM AND POLITICAL COUNSELOR PARK WERE BRIEFING CHUN ON US-ROK RELATIONS. AT THE END OF THIS DISCUSSION, FOREIGN MINISTER LHO JOINED THE GROUP TO BRAG ON THE "CONCESSIONS" HE HAD ALLEGEDLY JUST "EXTRACTED" FROM SECRETARY HAIG. THE IMPLICATION WAS THAT LHO THROUGH PERSONAL SKILL HAD ACHIEVED A MAJOR ACCOMPLISHMENT. SINCE CHUN, KIM AND OTHERS PRESENT IN THE ROOM ALL KNEW THAT THE SECRETARY HAD ALREADY DISCUSSED THE RELEVANT POINTS WITH CHUN PRIOR TO THE MEETING WITH LHO, LHO'S SELF-AGGRANDIZEMENT WAS REPORTEDLY NOT VERY WELL TAKEN.

5. WE ARE AWARE OF ONLY TWO MINOR INCIDENTS WHICH MARKED THE WASHINGTON VISIT. A KOREAN AMERICAN ELUDED SECURITY PRECAUTIONS AT THE SHERATON PARK HOTEL ON THE EVENING OF FEB 2 WHEN THE KOREAN AMBASSADOR WAS HOST FOR A MAJOR RECEPTION AND MANAGED TO GET WITHIN SEVERAL METERS OF PRESIDENT CHUN AS CHUN WAS ARRIVING FOR THE RECEPTION. THE INDIVIDUAL SHOUTED A NUMBER OF OBSCENITIES AT CHUN IN KOREAN BEFORE BEING ARRESTED AND LATER CHARGED WITH DISORDERLY CONDUCT. OTHERWISE, THE SMALL GROUPS OF ANTI-CHUN DEMONSTRATORS IN WASHINGTON WERE LARGELY INCONSPICUOUS AMIDST LARGER WELCOMING CROWDS AND WERE KEPT AT A SAFE DISTANCE BY SECURITY PERSONNEL.

6. WE UNDERSTAND FROM THE ROK EMBASSY THAT UNIFICATION CHURCH (MOONIES) PERSONNEL MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT THROUGHOUT CHUN'S TRAVEL IN THE UNITED STATES TO FIND AN OPPORTUNITY TO IDENTIFY WITH THE VISIT AND CAPITALIZE UPON IT (C.F. SEQU 1326). PRESIDENT CHUN'S PARTY WAS UNDER INSTRUCTIONS TO KEEP THE MOONIES AT BAY, AND THEY WERE SUCCESSFULLY AVOIDED UNTIL THE FINAL EVENT ON CHUN'S PROGRAM IN WASHINGTON.



DATE 02/25/81

WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 003

MESSAGE (CONTINUED):

7. AT THE NATIONAL PRESS CLUB ON MID-DAY FEB 3, A SMALL RECEPTION FOR THOSE TO BE SEATED AT THE HEAD TABLE AND A FEW OTHERS WAS HELD IMMEDIATELY PRIOR TO PROCEEDING TO THE LARGE DINING ROOM PACKED WITH PRESS CLUB MEMBERS FOR THE DINNER, SPEECH, AND QUESTION PERIOD. AN INDIVIDUAL PRESUMABLY REPRESENTING THE UNIFICATION CHURCH'S NEWS-PAPER MANAGED TO GET INTO THE SMALL PRESS CLUB RECEPTION AND MANAGED TO BE PHOTOGRAPHED GREETING PRESIDENT CHUN (A COPY OF THE UNIFICATION CHURCH NEWSPAPER WAS CLEVERLY HELD IN VIEW). WE CAN ONLY ASSUME THE CHURCH WILL ATTEMPT TO CAPITALIZE ON THIS PHOTOGRAPH BUT HAVE NO EVIDENCE YET. PRESIDENT CHUN'S AIDES WERE MOST UNHAPPY OVER THE EVENT, HAVING SUCCESSFULLY KEPT THE MOONIES AT A DISTANCE THERETOFORE, AND CHUN HIMSELF (HAVING PRESSED COUNTLESS HANDS) WAS UNAWARE UNTIL LATER THAT IT HAD OCCURRED.

8. PLEASE PROTECT INFO IN PARA 4 ABOVE. IT SHOULD NOT BE DISCUSSED WITH ANY FOREIGN PARTY. HAIG

PSN: 002601

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BTG: 132228Z FEB 81



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*405  
2/27/07*

RECEIVED 20 FEB 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

DOCDATE 20 FEB 81

TYSON

20 FEB 81

NANCE

23 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

CHUN DOO HWAN

SUBJECT: PRES CHUN INAUGARATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 25 FEB 81 STATUS X

FILES PA

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

TYSON

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*Reopened*

COMMENTS

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| ACTION OFFICER (S) | ASSIGNED      | ACTION REQUIRED                 | DUE         | COPIES TO     |
|--------------------|---------------|---------------------------------|-------------|---------------|
| <i>Allen</i>       | <i>X 2/26</i> | <i>For decision</i>             | <i>2/27</i> | <i>DG</i>     |
| <i>Allen</i>       | <i>- 2/27</i> | <i>Add on / For information</i> |             | <i>DG</i>     |
|                    | <i>C 2/2</i>  | <i>RVA noted both memos</i>     |             | <i>DG, CT</i> |

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *AA* (C) *W*



UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL  
OF CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 20 FEB 81 19

TO ALLEN

FROM GREGG

*2/27/81*

DOC DATE 20 FEB 81

TYSON

20 FEB 81

KEYWORDS: KOREA SOUTH

CHUN DOO HWAN

SUBJECT: PRES CHUN INAUGURATION

ACTION: FOR DECISION

DUE: 24 FEB 81 STATUS X FILES

FOR ACTION

FOR COMMENT

FOR INFO

ALLEN

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ACTION OFFICER (S) ASSIGNED ACTION REQUIRED DUE COPIES TO

*2/23* *allen of memo to Pres*

*DG* *S* *2/24* *Further Action* *2/25*

*JF* *S* *2/24* *Concur to Gregg* *2/25*

*RA* *K* *2/25* *For Decision* *2/27* *DG*

*C* *2/26* *OBE, return to sender, per Colonel [initials], DG*

DISPATCH

W/ATTCH FILE *PH* (C) *H.*



*[Handwritten signature]*  
24

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dick - I still have a  
"hold" on that Airplane.

Turn it loose<sup>2</sup>

|     |               |                 |
|-----|---------------|-----------------|
| yes | <u>✓</u>      | See my<br>notes |
| No  | <u>      </u> |                 |

Bud



## MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 27, 1981

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *CT*  
SUBJECT: Delegation to the Chun Inaugural

Following up on my earlier memo of today, the White House has cancelled all participation in the make-up of the Chun inaugural delegation. This includes the representative from Max Friedersdorf's office who had earlier been recommended to travel.



## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 26, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
 FROM: CHARLES P. TYSON *cm*  
 SUBJECT: Delegation to the Chun Inauguration

At a meeting this afternoon with Joe Canzeri and Conrad Hausman, special assistant to Under Secretary of State for Management Richard Kennedy, the following details were confirmed:

1. The White House (Mike Deaver et al) has approved the utilization of an Air Force 707 to transport the delegation from Andrews AFB to Seoul and return.

2. The State Department will pay for the cost of transportation and housing.

3. A list of those invited is as follows:

Senator and Mrs. Percy, delegation chairman, plus 2 staff  
 Senator Hayakawa  
 Congressman Derwinski  
 Congressman Zablocki plus 2 staff  
 General Jack Vessey, plus 1 aide  
 Michael Armacost, Acting Assistant Secretary of State  
 for East Asian Affairs  
 Robert Rich, Korean Desk Officer (State)  
 Protocol Officer (State)  
 Legislative management person (State)

A confirmed list will be received from State either this afternoon or tomorrow morning.

4. It has been recommended by State that Korean Ambassador Kim and his wife be invited to travel with the delegation to Korea and return. Who should invite the Ambassador if it is agreed that he should be invited?

State \_\_\_\_\_

White House   ✓  

5. Approximately 14 seats are available for the White House to fill. You should think about your recommendations immediately so as to have the proper input.

*now*



6. It was agreed by the three of us that in the future State will forward through this office any requests for planes, delegations, etc. The request will then be forwarded with recommendations to the White House for its approval. State will be advised that Canzeri will handle details, and State will provide protocol assistance. All of this will be cleared initially through the NSC for political and foreign policy approval.

*Good!  
never again!!*



RECEIVED

81 FEB 25 P 7. 15

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

DICK ALLEN

IRENE DERUS

JANET COLSON

BUD NANCE

KAY

CY TO VP

CY TO MEESE

CY TO BAKER

CY TO DEEVER

CY TO BRADY

*g*  
*Jan 25 1955*

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34665

28

673 Add-on

*Handwritten initials*

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

February 25, 1981

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~  
ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
FROM: JIM LILLEY *[Handwritten signature]*  
SUBJECT: Attendance at Korean Inauguration (U)

On Monday, 23 February I had a discussion with John Holdridge at State about attendance at the Korean Presidential Inauguration. I told Holdridge of your strong feelings that there should be American representation above the Ambassadorial level at the Inauguration. We discussed various candidates and came up with the name of Phil Habib, the former Ambassador to Korea and a senior American diplomat who has served several administrations very well. I knew that the Vice President had very high regard for Habib. (C)

Holdridge gave me a memo that he was preparing for Secretary Haig and I hand-carried this back and gave it to Bud Nance. The memo recommended that Habib be the U.S. representative at the Inauguration. (C)

*[Handwritten mark]*

I have since learned that Habib has reluctantly accepted so this matter seems to be under control. A question remains as to whether you would like Don Gregg or myself to accompany Haig. I am told that State/EA intends to send somebody with them.

RECOMMENDATION:

That NSC send a representative to accompany Habib to Seoul.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Declassify on Feb. 25, 1987

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F06-048 #34665

BY RW NARA DATE 7/6/02



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

29

This needs to  
get into the system.

J  
2/24/81



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1745  
23 Feb

34

30

Dick - State has  
decided to recommend  
Phil Habib as the President's  
special representative to the  
Korean Inauguration. Jim  
Lilley concurs. You may  
get a call from HAIG  
on this.

Bud  
I agree  
Why not take a  
Senator, too?



34666

J. Lelley

31



DEPARTMENT OF STATE  
ACTION MEMORANDUM

S/S 1981 FEB 23 PM 5 09

February 23, 1981  
BUREAU OF EAST ASIAN  
AND PACIFIC AFFAIRS

CONFIDENTIAL

TO: The Secretary  
FROM: EA - John Holdridge *JHO*  
SUBJECT: Representation at the Korean Inauguration

ISSUE

Whether there is any option available which will permit us to be represented with a special representative at the inauguration March 3 of Korean President Chun Doo Hwan.

DISCUSSION

I am becoming increasingly concerned that our failure to send a special representative to Chun's inauguration will significantly erode the confidence and positive relationships established during the recent official visit to Washington. Ambassador Kim Yong Shik urgently requested to see me today on instruction to reclama our decision to send no high-level USG delegation to Chun's inaugural. He emphasized that this decision could dissipate the goodwill generated by President Chun's recent Washington visit, jeopardize prospects of securing high-level representation from other countries, and stimulate questions regarding U.S. motivations behind what many Koreans would regard as a slight.

I explained to Kim the pressures on your time, and the difficulties other high-level Administration officials have in leaving the city during this critical opening phase of this Administration. I emphasized that our attitude toward the ROK had been fully demonstrated by the swift invitation to President Chun and the cordial reception he was given by the Reagan Administration. I offered him little encouragement that this decision would be reversed.

Nonetheless, I believe we should reverse it, and designate Phil Habib as the President's special representative to be accompanied to Seoul by someone from the EA

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NLRR EQ-018 #34666

CONFIDENTIAL  
GDS 2/23/87

BY CU NARA DATE 3/27/08



Bureau. As a former Ambassador to Korea and someone who has occupied the top professional slot in the Foreign Service, Phil is both well-known and widely respected by the Koreans. Though we have been unable to contact him to ascertain his availability for such an assignment, we can find out that information tomorrow. We expect that he would respond affirmatively to a White House request that he serve in this capacity.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you authorize us to explore with Phil his willingness to take on this task.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Drafted:EA:MHarmacost:mst  
2/23/81 Ext. 23368

Concurrence:EA/K:RGRich (in draft)



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

*Handwritten initials*

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN  
SUBJECT: President Chun's Inauguration

It has been recommended by the State Department and reinforced by James Lilley of the NSC staff that we send a representative to the inauguration of President Chun.

Jim Lilley suggests that Senator Hayakawa might be an ideal person, and he has apparently been sounded out and is favorable to the idea. Another person suggested might be Governor Milliken of Michigan.

Perhaps sending several people would be appropriate.

The preservation of the momentum that we have in our relationship with the Republic of Korea will benefit our policy toward that country and will assist in the development of our relations.

I concur with the suggestion that we send a special representative.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
✓ James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997  
By LOS NARA, Date 2/27/07





## DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

February 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RICHARD V. ALLEN  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Delegation to the Inauguration of  
the President of Korea -- Request for Aircraft  
Support

President Reagan will be sending a delegation to represent him at the inauguration of His Excellency Chun Doo Hwan, President of the Republic of Korea, March 2, 1981. In this regard, we would like to request the following aircraft support for the delegation:


SATURDAY  
FEBRUARY 28, 1981

11:00pm U.S. Presidential Aircraft (VC-137) to transport the delegation from Andrews Air Force Base to Seoul, Korea.

WEDNESDAY  
MARCH 4, 1981

8:00am U.S. Presidential Aircraft (VC-137) to transport the delegation from Seoul, Korea to Andrews Air Force Base.

We would appreciate your concurrence in this request. Mr. Ken Hays of the Office of Protocol will be the delegation coordinator; he can be reached at 632-1676.

*for*   
L. Paul Bremer, III  
Executive Secretary



MEMORANDUM

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

February 23, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD V. ALLEN *Allen*  
SUBJECT: President Chun's Inauguration *OB/E*

It has been recommended by the State Department and reinforced by James Lilley of the NSC staff that we send a representative to the inauguration of President Chun.

Jim Lilley suggests that Senator Hayakawa might be an ideal person, and he has apparently been sounded out and is favorable to the idea. Another person suggested might be Governor Milliken of Michigan.

Perhaps sending several people would be appropriate.

The preservation of the momentum that we have in our relationship with the Republic of Korea will benefit our policy toward that country and will assist in the development of our relations.

I concur with the suggestion that we send a special representative.

cc: The Vice President  
Ed Meese  
James Baker

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

*Review on 23 Feb 1987*

DECLASSIFIED  
White House Guidelines, August 23, 1997  
By LOS NARA, Date 2/27/07



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

34669

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MEMORANDUM

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~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

ACTION

February 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: RICHARD V. ALLEN

VIA: CHARLES P. TYSON *CPT*

FROM: DONALD GREGG *DG*

SUBJECT: President Chun's Inauguration (U)

President Chun's inauguration is the third of March, approximately ten days from now. We have not yet worked out a delegation. I understand that neither the Vice President nor Secretary Haig are interested in going. According to my instincts and information, former President Ford would be the next best choice; after that, a significant Senator (Percy, Baker, Nunn /D/, Glenn /D/, or *HEUMS*) or other Cabinet official (Secretary of Commerce). (U)

I think we do need to send a significant delegation -- not to do so in the immediate wake of Chun's visit here would be something of an affront. (U)

A senior member of the White House staff would also be a fine choice, but I am certain that everyone has a full plate. (U)

State is chagrined about the present state of affairs, and agrees Haig was a bottleneck. We are drifting toward an embarrassment and a decision does have to be made quickly. (C)

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Review on February 20, 1987

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR FD6-048#34669

BY RW NARA DATE 7/6/12



John

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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

Dick - Mike Deaver  
approved this. However, I  
told the military office  
to insure the State Dept  
paid for it. They said  
they would.

For info, State has  
to pay much more than  
we would for this trip.

Bud

John