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DRAFT EXECUTIVE ORDER

Title 3 Executive Order _____ of _____ 1984

The President International Narcotics Trafficking's
Threat to National Security

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There is a clear connection between profits from international narcotics trafficking and insurgent terrorist groups and guerrillas threatening the vital interests of the United States. The national defense and the ability to conduct effective foreign relations are threatened. The threat provides increased opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit important strategic areas of the world such as Middle Eastern and Latin American oil fields, Europe, areas of world-class reserves for scarce raw materials, and sealines-of-communication.

NOW, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Part 1.

International Narcotics Trafficking's Threat to National Security

Section 1.1 Relationship with International Terrorism and Insurgent Guerrilla Groups.

(a) International narcotics trafficking is a threat to national security. Marxist-insurgent group profits from international narcotics trafficking are funding guerrilla insurgency in the Caribbean basin. Further, purchase of illicit narcotics by US citizens supports our own adversary with the US economy. Soviet Union strategy in the Caribbean Basin exploits terrorist/querrilla activity to gain Cuban-like client states using two principal methods:

- o Arms-length distancing from Soviet visibility by use of surrogates.
- o Financially self-supporting revolutionary activity. Of the three primary self-supporting methods used to raise hard cash, (narcotics trade, kidnapping, and bank robbery), narcotics trafficking provides the highest cash value.

Stopping Marxist terrorist and guerrilla profits from international drug trafficking can significantly slow Marxist insurgency in Latin America, thereby permitting a more peaceful environment for reform and development to take place. The Soviet alternative to loss of insurgent, self-supporting financing is to fund it from the Soviet Block economy. Such an action would not only remove a burden from the US economy, but would also add to Soviet financial commitments, thereby placing a strain on a stressed economy.

Section 1.2 Deterrent Factor for US Foreign Policy Implementation

Marxist exploitation of revolutionary conditions in foreign countries places extreme risk to implementation of US foreign policy. Marxist terrorist and guerrilla participation in international narcotics trafficking to finance arms procurements, training, and insurrection has created a threat to US capability to implement foreign policy. Change of Latin America to a hostile neighbor status would also:

- o Place at risk the oil the US receives from Latin America—thirty-four percent of US imports

- o Place at risk one third of the US export market.

Section 1.3 The Threat to National Defense

Change of Latin America to a hostile neighbor status would:

- o Place at risk most of the US sealines of communication.
Except for a few great circle routes between the US east coast and Europe and the US west coast and Asia, virtually all merchantile and defense sealines of communications and commerce between the US and the world have choke points in Latin America, especially in the Panama Canal and in the Caribbean Basin. The question is not whether hostile nations would allow commerce to pass through choke points; rather, the question is whether the US could afford the increased military and naval forces necessary to assure the uninterrupted flow of commerce and the sealift necessary to support US forward-deployed forces. Sixty-six percent of all imported oil is within MIG fighter aircraft range from Cuba now.
- o Require a Defense Department review of resources needed to provide security from hostile southern neighbors.
- o Place at risk US sources for raw resources critical to the US economy and national defense.

Part 2.

Direction, Duties, and Responsibilities

Section 2.1 The National Security Council

(a) Oversight. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President and to coordinate matters of integrating domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The National Security Act of 1947 also provides strategic direction for the armed forces and their operation under unified control. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity for review, guidance, and direction of military tasking under section 2.3 of this Order.

The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was established to enhance coordination between federal agencies chartered with interdicting narcotics on the high seas, along US borders, and at ports of entry. The Office of the Vice President is responsible for NNBIS leadership.

Coordination is required between military and NNBIS operations and civil law enforcement to assure harmony and integration in the national effort to attack international narcotics trafficking. NNBIS is assigned the lead role for coordination.

(b) Committees. The NSC shall establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its functions and responsibilities under this Order. The NSC, or a committee established by it, shall consider and submit to the President information on special activities or operations, on policy review, including all dissents, and on a continuing review of the threat to national security posed by international narcotics trafficking.

Section 2.2 Civil Law Enforcement

International Narcotics Trafficking's deleterious impact upon the nation has surpassed the internal, social-and-civil, law-enforcement problem. The national requirements for social-and-civil, law-enforcement efforts are not diminished or changed; however, additional policy direction and military tasking are required to meet an external threat to national security imposed by the financing of Marxist insurgency from international narcotics trafficking profits.

Section 2.3 Military Tasking

Military tasking is assigned in three areas: Security Assistance Program, intelligence gathering, and surveillance and detection:

(a) Security Assistance Program — Tasking in this area involves equipment acquisition, logistics support, and training to operate a barrier to narcotics trafficking twelve miles off narcotics source

country's coast. Tasking also includes military training for source country military and police forces that must air- or sea-lift into remote areas and secure territory before enforcement action can be exercised.

(b) The initial barrier shall be a joint operation to interdict narcotics traffickers within twelve miles of Colombia's coast, using Colombian Navy vessels and US Coast Guard Cutters, enforcing Colombian law. Equipment will include, but will not be limited to, six aerostat radar platforms and fuel for the Colombian Navy barrier operation. Once the Colombian Navy is trained, the primary barrier operations will be Colombian. Monitoring of barrier effectiveness will be maintained by CINC US Southern Command and by occasional joint operations with US Coast Guard cutter participation.

(c) Intelligence Gathering — In addition to parent organization procedures, guidance will be provided by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). Emphasis on intelligence gathering is to detect narcotics trafficking for subsequent interdiction, especially trafficking intended to finance Marxist insurgency.

(d) Surveillance and Detection — Emphasis on surveillance and detection is to provide for interdiction, especially of trafficking intended to provide financing for Marxist insurgency. Focus will be on narcotics trafficking departing source countries and on trafficking approaching the US border.

Section 2.4 State Department tasking

State Department negotiation with source countries will be necessary to obtain a request, or permission, to conduct barrier operations described in section 2.3 above.

Part 3.

General Provisions

Section 3.1 Implementation

The NSC, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are necessary to implement this Order. Heads of Civil Law Enforcement Agencies shall issue appropriate supplementary directives and procedures consistent with this Order. The NSC may establish procedures in instances where the military or civil agency head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds.

Section 3.2 Purpose and Effect

Nothing contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer a substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.

APPENDIX B

US STRATEGIC DEPENDENCIES ON LATIN AMERICA

In broad terms, a nation's "vital interests" usually denote what a nation will wage war to protect. This is not to say that the United States will go to war over individual mineral deposits; however, the aggregate of mineral deposits becomes "vital."

Some of the more vital US interests in Latin America are protecting strategic resources necessary to project military power or to defend the nation, to maintain open sealines-of-communications (SLOC's) for both mercantile and military supply vessels in times of crisis, to maintain a healthy economy during a national crisis, and to preserve friendly governments on our borders. It is also in the US interest to prevent large scale diversions of military resources from other intended areas of response such as NATO.

MINERAL DEPENDENCIES

The Strategic And Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 USC 98 et. seq. requires a list of those strategic and critical materials that the US is deficient in and needs to provide for the supply of essential military and civilian needs for national defense.¹ This appendix contains a 1983 summary view of US import dependency on Latin American

minerals, defined in percent of product imported and restricted to a strategic materials list critical for national defense:²

STRONTIUM	99%	MOLYBDENUM	40%
INDUSTRIAL QUARTZ	90%	ZINC	46%
BAUXITE	88%	SILVER	46%
COLUMBIUM	75%	COPPER	44%
LEAD	73%	BERILLIUM	38%
GRAPHITE	70%	SILICON	30%
BISMUTH	67%	TIN	16%
ANTIMONY	60%	MANGANESE	12%
FLOURSPAR	58%	CADMIUM	9%
ANTIMONY METAL	54%	ALUMINUM METAL	6%

The potential world reserves for strategic resources in the region is shown in Figure 16.

- Jamaica provides 39 percent of US bauxite requirements and has 9 percent of the total bauxite world reserves. Bauxite is needed for production of aluminum, industrial abrasives, and filters for petroleum production. One of the nine US alumina plants is in St. Croix, US Virgin Islands, and seven others are located on the US Gulf coast and in the Caribbean.



Figure 16. Major Minerals in Latin America

Source: Mineral Commodity Summaries 1984, US Bureau of Mines (with resource information by the Geological Survey), US Department of the Interior.

— Mexico provides 6 percent of US antimony metal, 20 percent of antimony ore, 33 percent of bismuth, 9 percent of cadmium, 58 percent of fluorspar, 63 percent of graphite, 23 percent of silver, 99 percent of strontium, 10 percent of zinc, and 22 percent of molybdenum. Mexico has 30 percent of the cadmium and measurable portions of the total world reserves of antimony, bismuth, copper, fluorspar, graphite, lead, mercury, and silver. Antimony is used in the production of electrical batteries, chemical pumps, pipes and tank linings, and cable sheaths. In metal alloys, antimony inhibits chemical corrosion. Nonmetallic antimony is used in plastics as a stabilizer and as a flame retardant. Antimony is also used in refining special glass such as optical glass. Bismuth is used in metallurgical additives where malleable iron castings are produced. Cadmium is used for coating and plating, batteries, pigments, plastics, and synthetic products and alloys. Fluorspar is used in the production of hydrofluoric acid, a key ingredient in aluminum, fluorochemical, and uranium industries. Fluorspar is also used to produce glass and enamel and is used in the steel industry as a flux. Graphite is primarily used in refractories, foundries, and steelmaking; however, it is replacing asbestos in producing packing and gaskets. Graphite fiber composites are increasingly becoming important for high-strength, low-weight, radar-masking aerospace stealth technology. Graphite fibers absorb rather than reflect radar waves. Silver is used in electrical contacts and conductors.

- Strontium is used as a radiological material, and chemical derivatives are used as pigments. Zinc is primarily used as a galvanizing material and corrosion-control material and as an element to produce zinc alloys, brass, and bronze metals. Molybdenum is used in steel and superalloy production; it is also used as a refractory metal, catalyst, lubricant, and pigment.

- Honduras provides 33 percent of US lead. Lead is used in the production of batteries, pigments, gasoline additives, glass, and plastics. Lead is also important to the munitions industry.

- Venezuela provides 6 percent of US aluminum, 13 percent of alumina, 39 percent of bauxite, 15 percent of iron ore, and 10 percent of silicon. Silicon is used in the production of steel and aluminum, silicones, silanes, and nonferrous alloys.

- Brazil provides 38 percent of US beryllium, 75 percent of columbium, 7 percent of graphite, 12 percent of manganese, 90 percent of industrial quartz crystal, 20 percent of silicon, and 8 percent of strontium. Brazil has 11 percent of the bauxite, 80 percent of the columbium, 13 percent of the iron ore, and measurable portions of the total world reserves of gold, manganese ore, and nickel. Columbium is an essential requirement for steel production where heat expansion must be controlled such as in jet engines and lasers. Copper-based beryllium alloys provide a physical property that allows use in

- a wide range of applications in cast and wrought forms such as connectors, springs, sockets, switches, bushings, bearings, noncorrosive and nonmagnetic housings, and temperature and pressure-sensing devices for aircraft and vehicles and for electronic and well-drilling industries. Manganese is used in the production of manganese-aluminum additives for steel and superalloy production and in production of dry-cell batteries. Industrial quartz crystal is used for industrial abrasives and glass making.

- Surinam provides 10 percent of US bauxite and has a measurable portion of the bauxite total world reserves.

- Peru provides 34 percent of US bismuth, 10 percent of copper, 40 percent of lead, 21 percent of silver, and 18 percent of zinc. Peru has 10 percent of the silver and measurable portions of the total world reserves of bismuth, copper, iron ore, lead, molybdenum, tungsten, and zinc. Copper is used for production of wire rod and of other electrical materials. Copper alloys such as brass and bronze are used in electrical components, building construction, industrial machinery and equipment, and transportation products. The main use for tungsten is production of cutting and wear-resistant materials such as tungsten carbide. Other uses include mill products, specialty steels, chemicals, superalloys, and hard-facing rods and materials.

- Bolivia provides 48 percent of US antimony metal, 40 percent of antimony ore, 16 percent of tin, and 18 percent of zinc. Bolivia has 8 percent of the antimony, 7 percent of the bismuth, 10 percent of the tin, and measurable portions of the total world reserves of silver and tungsten. The largest use of tin is for solder, tin plate, and brass production.

- Chile provides 34 percent of US copper, 18 percent of iodine, and 27 percent of molybdenum. Of the total world reserves, Chile has 20 percent of the copper, 33 percent of the iodine, 53 percent of the lithium, and 25 percent of the molybdenum. Lithium is principally used in the production of aluminum, grease, ceramics, glass, and synthetic rubber.

Sealines-of-Communication

The essential US maritime trade routes and strategic sealines-of-communication to Latin American are shown in Figures 17 through 19. It is clear that these routes are vulnerable to choke points in the Panama Canal and at passages between islands of the Greater and Lesser Antilles.³ Cuba, the larger of the Greater Antilles, bases MiG aircraft and ships to block the SLOC's. In addition, except for a few great circle routes from the US east coast to Europe and Africa and the US west coast to Asia, all US routes to the rest of the world pass choke points in Latin America.

Petroleum Dependency on Sealines of Communication

One-third of the oil transported by tank ship to the US from the Middle East and from ports other than Latin America must pass through Latin American choke points. Sixty-six percent of imported crude oil and petroleum products bound for the US must pass within MiG aircraft range of Cuba. Without substantial military commitment to maintain open passage, governments unfriendly to the United States could cripple ocean-bound commerce and reinforcement of forward-deployed military forces. Imagine the turmoil produced in the event of national mobilization if ships could not be used for transport of munitions, aircraft, and aircraft parts from the west coast or if military cargoes could not be shipped from Gulf of Mexico ports to Europe or the Middle East.

Latin American Oil Dependency

The US gets thirty-four percent of its imported crude oil from Latin America.⁴ Finished petroleum products are also received from the region. The scale of dependence, as a percentage of each total product imported to the US, is illustrated in figure 20.




Figure 17. Trade Route 4, US Atlantic — Caribbean,
including Cristobal and east coast Mexico.

Source: United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, US Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.




Figure 18. Trade Route 1, US Atlantic — East Coast and South America.
 Source: United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, US Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.




Figure 19. Trade Route 2, US Atlantic — West Coast and South America.

Source: United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, US Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.

Region	Crude Oil Via Tank Ship	Crude Oil Via Pipe Line	Fuel Oil Via Tank Ship	Lubricating Oil Via Tank Ship
Bahamas/Caribbean	7 percent	0 percent	3 percent	1 percent
Central America	13 percent	9 percent	2 percent	1 percent
South America	3 percent	0 percent	8 percent	3 percent
TOTAL	23 percent	9 percent	13 percent	5 percent
Crude Oil Total	34 percent			

Figure 20. US Dependency on Latin American Oil

Source: Computer analysis of US Maritime Administration 1982 Trade datatape for petroleum shipped into the US by tank-ship. "USA: Origins of Direct Crude Oil Imports and Indicated Average Prices," Petroleum Economist, 51, No. 3 (March 1984), 105.

ENDNOTES

APPENDIX B

1. Stockpile Report to the Congress, October 1982-March 1983 (FFMA 36/October 1983).
2. Mineral Commodity Summaries 1984, US Bureau of Mines (with resource information by the Geological Survey), United States Department of the Interior; Mineral Industries of Latin America, Bureau of Mines, United States Department of the Interior, December 1981; Minerals Yearbook, Volume I, Metals and Minerals, United States Department of the Interior, 1982.
3. United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, United States Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.
4. Computer analysis of US Maritime Administration 1982 Trade datatape for petroleum shipped into the US by tank-ship: 333 - crude oil, 334.1 - jet fuel and gasoline, 334.2 - kerosene, 334.3 - fuel oil (light), 334.4 fuel oil (heavy), and 334.5 - lube oil from Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean, South America, and the Bahamas shipped to US ports.

"USA Origins of Direct Crude Oil Imports and Indicated Average
Prices," Petroleum Economist, 51, No. 3 (March 1984) 105.

Appendix C

CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LINKING TERRORIST/GUERILLA EVENTS

- 1959 — Fidel Castro takes charge of Cuba.
- 1961 — The Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI), or General Intelligence Directorate, is founded with Soviet KGB assistance. The DGI, essentially under control of the KGB since 1969, operates a special center for illegal immigrants to western countries, especially to the US. The purpose of the center is to train the potential illegal aliens to be DGI agents who then blend with other immigrants in day-to-day living.¹
- 1964 to
- 1975 — The Organization of American States (OAS) condemns Cuban "aggression and intervention" in Venezuela and votes to break all diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.²
- 1966 — Havana, Cuba, Tricontinental Conference of 513 delegates representing 83 groups from the third world. (The largest such conference since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.) The purpose of the conference is to "devise a global

revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism."³ The strategy agreed upon is "to undermine Western interests in the Third World and to destabilize Western societies while keeping Western governments and opinion makers anesthetized with a policy of peaceful coexistence, known in the West as detente."⁴

The Conference General Declaration advocates close cohesion between Soviet style "socialist countries," "national liberation movements," "democratic workers," and "student movements" in capitalist America and Europe. The African, Asian, and Latin American Solidarity Organization is chartered with a permanent secretariat based in Havana and chaired by Cienfuegos Coriaran, a member of Cuba's Communist Party central committee. Ten months after the conference, a chain of terrorist/querrilla training camps is established in Cuba under the oversight of Soviet KGB Colonel Vadim Kotchergine.⁵

Such activity was viewed by the Russians as a military operation.

Claire Sterling is correct in her comments about the PLO. The only amazing thing about public reaction to her work on the PLO is that anybody challenges it, because the PLO itself was the first to announce their link to the Soviets on national television and in interviews all over the place. They have announced not only their training in

the Soviet Union but their close working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Just in February, the Kuwaiti News Agency published a long interview with the PLO's man in Moscow who noted:

We have a signed treaty that requires that before we take any kind of serious action we sit down and discuss it with the Russians and coordinate our activities.⁶

— Ghana accuses Cuba of interference in its international affairs and breaks diplomatic relations.

1966+ — Graduates from Cuban training camps provide the nucleus for three, main, terrorist/querrilla training camp concentrations for the remainder of the 1960s in:

- Cuba,
- Palestinian Facilities in several countries, and
- The Soviet Union.

Cuban instructors staff Fedaveen camps in the Middle East. The Soviet Union concentrates on training Palestinians first, and then branches out to include trainees from Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa, and Asia. Soviet training camps are located in the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea, Hungary, and South Yemen. Palestinian

training camps in Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Jordan (until the PLO is expelled in 1970) train terrorists/querrillas from Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and North America.⁷ One intelligence report estimates that 10,000 terrorist graduates will have completed training in camps located in the USSR, Cuba, and Arab countries between 1978 and 1984. In 1978, graduates are reported to be located as follows:

- o Mexico — 200
- o England — 400
- o West Germany — 600-700
- o France — 500
- o Holland — 400
- o Sweden — 200
- o Austria — 200
- o Italy — 200⁸

1967 — Cuba's Che Guevara and his small band of rural querrillas operate in Bolivia. He does not have the support of the Bolivian Communist Party, which sought legitimacy and participation through electoral and other conventional tactics. Guevara and his followers are hunted down and killed by a mixed team of US-trained Bolivian rangers and CIA agents. The loss of Guevara and his querrillas causes a basic change to terrorist/querrilla strategy in Latin America: emphasis shifts from rural to urban querrilla activity.

1968 — Dr. Waddih Haddad and Dr. George Habash, Palestinian physicians, establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The 1967 Six-Day War had demonstrated that Israel could not be defeated in a conventional war and that other means had to be established to find a Palestinian homeland. Habash's PFLP strategy is to internationalize the conflict and to connect with other terrorist groups for coordination and mutual support. Habash is quoted as saying that "We think that killing one Jew far from the field of battle is more effective than killing a hundred Jews on the field of battle, because it attracts more attention."⁹ In 1970, Habash declares himself and the PFLP to be an "armed Leninist Party."¹⁰ Right from the start, Habash establishes Palestinian training camps for terrorists with Cuban training graduates. At one time, Waddih Haddad, is the immediate supervisor of Venezuelan Marxist terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, also called Carlos Martinez, or Carlos, or Carlos the Jackal. Antonio Bouvier, an Ecuadorian Marxist terrorist, is Carlos' teacher in the mid-1960's training Camp Mantazas, operated by KGB General Viktor Simenov. Carlos also attends Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University in 1969. Carlos has extensive contacts with the Arab Fedayeen, the Japanese URA, Turkish guerrillas, Basque separatists, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Under Haddad, Carlos runs the International Terrorist Collective in Paris until 1975, when he escapes arrest with the help of Cuban diplomats.¹¹

1969 — February: Until this date, the Soviet Union has officially rejected terrorism in its public actions while covertly assisting terrorist groups. Like the US, the Soviets are vulnerable to hijackings, bombings, and other related terrorist attacks. But with very few exceptions, Soviet interests have not been attacked by terrorists. This is in marked contrast to the experience of Western nations experiences. A February 27, 1969 Pravda article, commenting on a Palestinian terrorist attack on Israel, marked the first, public, direct support for terrorism. It was: "Action carried out by patriots in defense of a legitimate right to return to their homeland." Yassir Arafat is invited to Moscow in 1970.

— Carlos Marighela publishes the Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas, which covers material taught in the Cuban training camps and more. Besides detailed information on demolition, illicit fund raising, infantry drill, liquidation of ranking officials, calligraphy, and other matters, it counsels that the urban guerrilla should first use revolutionary violence with popular causes for a popular power base so that

the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, and arrests of innocent people make life in the city unbearable. The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation

is transformed into a military situation, in which the militarists appear more and more responsible for errors and violence. When pacifiers and right-wing opportunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they join hands and beg the hangmen for elections and other tripe designed to fool the masses.

Rejecting the "so-called political solution," the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.

Early 1970s —Syrian national Henri Nikolake Arsan, long-standing KINTEX customer, is key morphine supplier to former "French Connection" traffickers.¹²

1970s and 80s —KINTEX smuggles arms to Marxist terrorist groups in exchange for morphine base sold in France and West Germany.¹³

1970 — Carlos establishes an international terrorist network under the sponsorship of Haddad and the PFLP. The network is called the "Arm of the Arab Revolution."¹⁴

— Terrorist hijacking of a Soviet aircraft by two Lithuanians convinced Moscow to support a United Nations Resolution condemning airliner hijackings. Arab countries oppose the resolution. Yassir Arafat is invited to Moscow in 1971 and is publicly promised USSR direct support in training, arms, and medical supplies.¹⁵

— International Revolutionary Congress, P'yongyang, North Korea, is attended by over 400 delegates; the Congress stresses an implied shared set of values and a shared mode of action among terrorists. Dr. George Habbash states to that Congress: "At this time of people's revolution against the worldwide imperialistic system, there can be neither geographic and political borders nor any moral prohibitions against the terrorist enterprises of the people's camp."¹⁶ The media reports of the 1970s and 1980s contain a large number of headlines treating brutal terrorist activities, conducted with "visiting terrorist participation" and international terrorist group logistic and monetary support—the "multinational terrorist" espoused by Habbash.¹⁷

Ten North Korean terrorist training camps operate in P'yongyang, Yangbysan, Sandwon, Haevu, Nampo, and Wonson. The Chilean newspaper La Prensa reports Latin American terrorist groups from Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela training in North Korean camps.¹⁸

— In an operation exchanging personnel between terrorist groups, a Nicaraguan terrorist is captured, and a Turkish People's Liberation Army terrorist is killed by Israeli security forces during a Palestinian attempt to capture an Israeli passenger jet.¹⁹

- 1971 — "Kommunist," an article by Boris Ponomarev, Soviet Director for International Communist Affairs, states that although the new terrorist groups are "neither ideologically nor organizationally homogeneous," their "overall anti-imperialistic direction is obvious" and that communist governments should lend logistical support.²⁰
- March: The KGB develops a plan to "create a new Vietnam" in Mexico. The KGB agent in charge of the operation, headquartered in the Mexico City Soviet Embassy, is Oleg Maksimovich Nechiporenko. Gomez Souza had been recruited earlier by Nechiporenko. In 1969 Souza recruits and takes 47 Mexicans to North Korea for guerrilla training. They return to Mexico in September 1970 and form the Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria (MAR).²¹
- 1972 — The Lod, Tel Aviv, airport massacre is a joint operation between the Japanese URA and PFLP terrorist groups. Yassir Arafat's Black September group plans the attack in revenge for Israel's spoiling an earlier attempt to hijack an airliner at Lod Airport. Until the 1980s, the URA has a headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, and works in the Palestinian Tel Zatar camp.²²

- Spring: PFLP leader Dr. George Habbash finances the First International Terrorist Meeting, Tripoli, Lebanon. Baader-Meinhof, Japanese UPA, Fritrean Liberation Front, Irish IRA, Basque separatists, French leftwing elements, and Turkish, Iranian, and Sudanese Liberation Fronts attend.²³

- Fall: The Munich Olympics massacre by Palestinian terrorists damages Arab relations with the West. In a September 7, 1972 Pravda article, the massacre is termed "tragic," but Israel's retaliatory attacks are called "aggressive."²⁴

- December: One hundred fifty Cuban military advisors arrive in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Soviet and Cuban aid to South Yemen supports terrorism in adjacent countries that could strategically control the Red Sea at Bab el Bab. The Red Sea controls the approach to the Suez Canal joining the Arabian Sea and the Mediterranean.²⁵

1972-

- 1973 — Cuban diplomats, previously trained in the Soviet Union, coordinate DGI activities and training of terrorist groups for sabotage of refineries, oil and gas pipelines, tankships, and port facilities of the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea areas. These operations are controlled from the Cuban embassies in Baghdad and Algiers.²⁶

- 1973 — Israel raids the Nahar El-Bard camp in Lebanon and captures Turkish terrorist, Faik Hasan Bulut. Eighteen Turkish terrorists are also killed in southern Lebanon fighting.²⁷
- Three Jordanian and one English terrorist are caught smuggling explosives into France.²⁸
- A Japan Airlines aircraft is hijacked by two South American, two Arab, and two European terrorists.²⁹
- KINTEX was involved in the exportation of arms to Nigeria in the recent civil war with Biafra.³⁰
- 1974 — French newspapers L'aurore and L'arche are attacked by a multinational terrorist group.³¹
- Yasir Arafat is received by the United Nations, a sign of world recognition for the Marxist-Leninist terrorist PLO leader as the legitimate political leader for the Palestinian people. This recognition occurs without the election process, imposed through PLO actions of violence and fear.³²

— April: The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) is founded in the Tucuman province of Argentina by terrorist revolutionary groups from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay. Organizers of the JCR included the Cuban DGI and the Argentine Trotskyite terrorist group ERP.³³ The Argentine police later capture a document called the Tucuman Plan, drafted in May 1975. According to the Tucuman Plan, the charter of the JCR is to lead a South American continent-wide armed revolution for liberation.³⁴ The JCR headquarters is established in Buenos Aires, and a general command is established between 1975 and 1977. An Argentine police crackdown forces the JCR to move to Paris. The 1,500 strong Latin American Europe Brigade is then formed, and close ties are made with European terrorist groups and their activities, both financial and operational. There are four important organizational components of the JCR from the perspective of terrorist group coordinating activities:

- o The Foreign Bureau, which coordinates the West European Center for the terrorist network.

- o The front organization, Argentina Center for Solidarity and Information (CAIS), which maintains contacts with terrorist groups, financial transaction and coordination, aid to

refugees, foreign relations and propaganda. CAIS oversight comes from a general secretariat and its six committees. It is not clear whether the general secretariat is Rodolfo Mattarolo or Fernando Luis Alvarez (Pelado). Mattarolo is also a leader in the Argentine Trotskyists Partido Socialista de Trabajadores (ERP) guerrilla group. Alvarez is the husband of Che Guevara's sister Anna Maria Guevara.³⁵

o Solidarity Committee for Argentina, located in Mexico, and the Latin America Press Institute, located in Caracas; they publish the JCP media "Che Guevara."³⁶

o JCP urban guerrilla training camp in Cuba operated by the Cuban Ministry of the Interior.³⁷

1975 — Reports are heard about Mexican terrorist activity trading mainly heroin across the Mexican/US border for US military weapons. According to Jacques Kiere, Head of the El Paso, Texas, DFA National Intelligence Center, the weapons go to Mexico's Twenty-Third of September League, to other terrorists, and to private armies of drug traffickers to protect opium poppy fields, laboratories, and shipments. Other Mexican Marxist groups trading drugs for guns include: pesina de Ajusticiamiento (Guerrero, 1974); Frente Estudiantil

Revolucionaria (Mexico, DF, 1973); Liga Leninista Espartaco (Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas); Liga Comunista Espartaco (1970s, Monterrey, Saltillo); Fuerza de Liberacion Nacional (Monterrey et al); and Liga Comunista Armada (Monterrey, Saltillo).³⁸

- The Arm of the Arab Revolution kidnapped the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna and hijacked an Air France passenger jet to Entebbe in conjunction with Antonio Bouvier, Carlos' former Ecuadorian Cuban training camp instructor. In retaliation for the Israeli Entebbe rescue, Carlos' group blows up an Istanbul airport lounge, killing four people. (The West German newspaper Die Welt reports in 1976 that Muhamar Kadaffi of Libya rewarded Carlos with 10 million dollars for the Vienna OPEC attack.) Libya is reported to provide over 100 million dollars each year to support terrorist training and operations in Europe and the Middle East.³⁹

- In the Lisbon meeting of the JCR, terrorist revolutionaries from the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Paraguay, and Venezuela join the Junta. The formal alliance and charter of the JCR is approved by the members.⁴⁰ The Junta leader is Fernando Luis Alvarez (Pelado). In the first few JCR years, ransoms from kidnapped businessmen provide several hundred million dollars for coordinated Junta activities. Coordinational relationships are identified between the JCR, IRA, and Carlos of the PFLP.

- The Cuban Constitution is drafted. Within the preamble, Soviet/Cuban ties and support for Marxist-Leninist organizations in Latin America and the world are enshrined:

Basing ourselves on proletarian internationalism, on the fraternal friendship, help and cooperation of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, and on the solidarity of the workers and the peoples of Latin America and of the world

- Cuba dispatches 3,000 troops to Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) guerrilla war. By 1977, 27,000 Cuban military personnel are in Angola and in ten other African countries.
- 1977 — In Larnaca, Cyprus, a transnational terrorist summit is held, financed by the Palestinians, as a continuation of the 1972 Lebanon summit.⁴¹
- 1978 — Three Bulgarian State Security agencies are identified in delivering arms to Marxist insurgents in payment for narcotics. They are KINTEX, CORECOM, and TFXIM.⁴²
- 1979 — July: The Nicaraguan Government falls to the Sandinista Guerrillas. With the support of Cuba, the Sandinistas followed Castro's Cuban formula for revolution:
 - o Unify the extreme left.

- o Establish a broad coalition, including some non-communists as an ambiguous promise of a broad-based government after victory.
- o Obtain non-communist international support and isolate target governments from Western material and political help.

Systematic propaganda should play on the "broad coalition."

- o Provide Soviet block, Cuban, and anti-Western military support as an incentive for unity of the extreme left groups.

The partnership with Cuba continued after seizing control of the government. Many Nicaraguan guerrilla training camps were established for terrorist guerrilla groups in other Latin American countries. Command and control facilities were established in Nicaragua to unify and facilitate guerrilla operations in El Salvador.⁴³

— Late 1979: The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in El Salvador.⁴⁴

— Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba are greatly increased to 65,000 tons per year.⁴⁵

1980 — The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in Guatemala.⁴⁶

- June: Havana, Cuba, meeting between Soviets, Cuba, and terrorist guerrillas from El Salvador is held to define the strategy for an international propaganda and political campaign in support of El Salvador's insurgents. The agreed-upon strategy includes:
 - o Emphasizing in the news media that the El Salvador revolution represented its people fighting for freedom from oppression and that the US goal was military intervention to keep an oppressive government in power.
 - o Setting as a goal to gain international recognition and support from organizations and regional groups.
 - o Setting as a goal to gain sympathy and support from liberal US politicians and organizations.
 - o Calling for a dialogue for resolution of conflict so as to split and isolate the enemy.
 - o Establishing front organizations to funnel humanitarian organization's aid funds to the terrorist/querrilla camps.⁴⁷

1981 — The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in Honduras.⁴⁸

- Total terrorist/querrilla armed strength in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica in 1978 is estimated at 1,450. By 1981 it grew to nearly 8,000. Arms shipments are seized from querrilla forces enroute from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In April and July 1981, a large cache of weapons is captured from querrilla "safe houses" in Guatemala city. Seventeen are US M-16 and AR-15 rifles that had been shipped to US forces fighting in Vietnam, a Soviet surrogate state.⁴⁹

- Narcotics traffickers in Sofia, Bulgaria, and KINTEX are involved in the attempted assassination of the Pope.⁵⁰

- Bulgaria offered Italian Red Brigade "money and arms" during the kidnapping of General Dozier in order to destabilize Italy.⁵¹

- 1982 — The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in Costa Rica. Cuba funds a coalition leftist party in Costa Rica to unite insurgent factions. The Cuban government and the Sandinistas arm and train Costa Rican terrorist/querrillas. In March, police seize a large arms cache in San Jose and arrest nine terrorists: several Salvadorans, several Nicaraguans, one Argentine, one Chilean, and one Costa Rican. In July, Costa Rica arrests a Columbian M-19 terrorist who states that the bombing, earlier that month, of the Honduran Airlines office in San Jose was done by Nicaraguan Guerrilla direction.⁵²

- Most Honduran terrorist/querrilla groups are linked with and receive support from El Salvador terrorist/querrilla groups.⁵³
 - January-March: Arms from Cuba shipped via Nicaragua to El Salvador greatly increase in size and firepower. New weapons include M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 antitank weapons.⁵⁴
 - February: As a result of Cuban efforts to unify terrorist/querrilla groups within countries, Guatemala querrilla groups announce their unification of efforts.⁵⁵
 - Mid 1982: Cuban, Sandinista, and El Salvador querrillas meet on progress of activity against the Honduran government.⁵⁶
 - December: Honduran President Suazo's daughter is kidnapped in Guatemala by a Guatemalan terrorist/querrilla group.
- 1984
- KIMPEX involved in sale of embargoed high-tech US goods and illegal weapons for South Africa, including AK-47s and grenade and rocket type weapons from Communist Block nations.⁵⁷
 - March: In Bogota, Ambassador Tambs, US Ambassador to Columbia, describes the relationship between Colombia's narcotics traffickers and the FARC Marxist terrorist/querrilla group. The ambassador noted:

the FARC is the best equipped, best trained, and potentially most dangerous subversive group in Colombia and has revolutionary plans to take the country. It has approximately two thousand members with a support infrastructure to quickly support over five thousand. Of its twenty-five fronts, half operate in coca and marijuana cultivation areas. The relationship between the FARC and narcotics traffickers has probably existed for some time and appears to have been sanctioned by the FARC's national directorate in May 1982 at the FARC's seventh conference. Each FARC front has specific responsibilities with the fronts in Guaviare and Vaupes to operate with narcotics traffickers for money and arms. The FARC is collecting protection payments from COCA in their operating territory, often demanding ten percent of the profit. One front obtains 3.38 million dollars per month in taxing the coca industry. FARC leader Rigoberto Lozano Perdomo's, alias Joselo, front assignment is specifically to deal with coca traffickers and obtain arms and ammunition through them. The FARC obtains adequate funds, through narcotics, to purchase the latest in weapons. The FARC is recruiting coca transient laborers to their ranks. The FARC is also extorting protection money from marijuana traffickers on the north coast, particularly in the Macdilena department. It is estimated the FARC front in the Guaviare region has obtained 99 million dollars from their coca crops. Wherever a FARC front operates and narcotics plants are

own, it is fairly certain some arrangement exists between narcotics traffickers and the FARC. Colombia's communist party central committee member Hernando Hurtado states that plans for revolutionary takeover of Colombia include the NARC/FARC connection. The Colombian communist party (PCC) is also benefiting from the NARC/FARCC arrangement.⁵⁸

- April: The Wall Street Journal features a front page staff report on Cuban involvement with smugglers of drugs from Colombia to the US in return for currency to support Latin American revolution.⁵⁹




Figure 15. Soviet Subversion Training Centers

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report 6 010 5026 83.

Appendix C

1. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
2. Ninty-seventh Congress Hearings on Terrorism: Origins, Directions and Support, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, April 1981.
3. Spy for Fidel, by Castro Hidalgo (a defected DGI agent), Miami, 1971.
4. Ninty-seventh Congress Hearings on Terrorism: Origins, Directions and Support, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, April 1981.
5. Ibid. The ancient Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, is often referred to in KGB terrorist training courses for their guiding principles behind active measures: "Fighting is the most primitive way of making war on your enemies because the supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of

your enemies without ever having to fight them." Sun Tzu's strategy embraced four points:

1. Cover with ridicule all the valid traditions in your opponent's country.
2. Implicate their leaders in criminal affairs and then at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen.
3. Aggravate by every means at your command all of the existing differences in your opponent's country.
4. Agitate the young against the old.⁶

Defector Soviet General Jan Sejna tells Dr. Michael Ledeen of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies:

"The Soviet Union made a conscious decision at the level of the Politburo in the midsixties, and they so advised their Warsaw Pact partners, that they were going to increase spending in the field of what they called strategic intelligence and what we would call paramilitary or terroristic operations, by 1,000 percent."

This decision was communicated to the pact countries as well as to the Cubans, and every country was then tasked to do its part. In the case of Czechoslovakia, it was running these various Communist

training camps which, as Sejna explained, functioned on various levels. There was, if you will, a kind of "elementary school" camp, which taught: this is a hand grenade; this is how to throw it; or this is what Lenin said; this is how to repeat it.

Then there were the postgraduate schools where people were trained in coded messages and secret writing, political organization and clandestine communication, and so forth. It was this latter kind of camp where, according to Sejna, Feltrinelli was trained.

If what he says is right—and there is a great body of confirming evidence that has cropped up in the last few years—what we are dealing with is a conscious decision at the military level. General Sejna was, after all, a military officer and not an intelligence officer. So his knowledge of this activity, his participation in it, his role was as a military officer running military camps, often not under KGB control but under the GRU, that is to say, under Soviet military intelligence control.

6. Ibid. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.

7. The Terrorist and Sabotage Threat to United States Nuclear Programs, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Dunn Loring, VA, 1974.
8. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
9. The Terror Network; The Secret War of International Terrorism by Claire Sterling, Published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, Page 121.
10. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
11. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response, by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.
12. US Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.
13. Ibid.
14. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response, by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.

15. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
16. Soviet Pressures in the Caribbean, May 1973, Conflict Study Number 35, by Brian Crozier, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, England.
17. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.
18. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
19. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.
20. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
21. The KGB, by John Barron, New York, Reader's Digest Press, 1974, pp. 230-257; files of Colonel Juan Trotz, permanent secretary of the Organization of American States, Inter-American Commission on Security.

22. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response, by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.

23. Ibid.

24. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.

25. Soviet Pressures in the Caribbean, May 1973, Conflict Study Number 35, by Brian Crozier, Institute for the Study of Conflict, London, England; Spy for Fidel, by Castro Hidalgo (a defected DGI agent), Miami, 1971.

26. Ibid.

27. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response, by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.

28. Ibid.

29. Ibid.

30. US Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.

31. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
32. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response, by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.
33. Annual of Power and Conflict, 1976-77, London: Institute for the Study of Conflict.
34. Ibid.
35. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
36. Ibid.
37. Ibid.
38. Ibid.
39. Ibid.
40. International Terrorism: A New Mode of Conflict, by Brian M. Jenkins. Santa Monica, CA, Rand Corporation Paper, 198, 1974.
41. The Terror Network: The Secret War of International Terrorism, by Claire Sterling, Published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, Page 42.

42. US Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.

43. US State Department Background Paper: Central America, May 1984, a White Paper on Terrorism in Central America.

44. Ibid.

45. Ibid.

46. Ibid.

47. Ibid.

48. Ibid.

49. Ibid.

50. US Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.

51. Ibid.

52. US State Department Background Paper: Central America, May 1984, a White Paper on Terrorism in Central America.

53. Ibid.

54. Ibid.

55. Ibid.

56. Ibid.

57. US Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.

58. Cable from Ambassador Tambs, Bogota, Colombia, to Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama, April 3, 1984.

59. "Havana Haven: Smugglers of Drugs from Colombia to US are Protected by Cuba: In Return, It Gets Currency to Foment Revolution; Admiral's Odd Activities: Eaves Dropper at the Hilton, Wall Street Journal, front page, April 30, 1984; "Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking," US Department of State Bulletin on April 30, 1984 Senate hearings.

LATIN AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGACY AND EVOLUTION OF SMUGGLING NETWORKS

The Colonial Legacy

Since the arrival of Columbus, the Bahamas and the Central American, South American, and Greater and Lesser Antilles Islands of the Caribbean Basin have been in varying degree of political, social, and economic instability and armed conflict. Today, such upheaval is fueled by forces within and without. International drug trafficking is a significant destabilizing force in itself, also subsidizing both internal and external intervention interests.

Since the fifteenth century, the pre-Hispanic Amerindian culture has been decimated and replaced by colonialism. The poorly defended Greater and Lesser Antilles Islands were subsequently conquered by the North-West European powers of Britain, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Colonization was pressed through settlement and exploitation; the US sought to exert exclusive domain through the Monroe Doctrine. Colonial exploitation replaced existing agriculture and trade, a policy that provided balanced needs for the local region with crops for export and

dependency on the empire. In 1804, with the independence of Haiti, the process of nation building began. Colonialism was the stabilizing force for much of the world until World War II marked the end of European colonial empires. Marxist government was subsequently introduced to the Basin by the conclusion of Castro's revolution in Cuba in 1959.

Instability fueled from within the region is inherited from a colonial legacy that left an imbalance among the political, economic, and social models. The imbalance is recently defined in the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) to the President of the United States: "Chapter 2 of the report places the Central American crisis within its larger hemispheric context, with particular emphasis on the twin challenges of rescuing the hemisphere's troubled economies and establishing principles of political legitimacy."

Instability resulting from outside intervention is fueled by Soviet and Cuban strategy and actions. The Bipartisan Commission report further defines this area: "Chapter 6 explores the security dimensions of the crisis, including Soviet and Cuban involvement, the problems of guerrilla war, the situation as it is today, what can be done to meet it, and what we recommend that the United States do to help. Indigenous reform, even indigenous revolution, is not a security threat to the United States. But intrusion of aggressive outside powers exploiting local grievances to expand their own political influence and military control is a serious threat to the United States, and to the entire region."

Three aspects of the colonial legacy to Latin America are relevant to this study:

- o Substitution of agricultural crops intended to sustain the needs of the local region with crops grown to fuel a European or North American industrial economy in return for hard currency.
- o A history and lifestyle in some areas in piracy, slavery, and smuggling, evolved to the point that international drug trafficking is an accepted norm by a country or populous.
- o Local country banking laws inherited from the former empire and the financial network of empires.

Agribusiness in Latin America is dependent upon economic demand for crops in North America and Europe. Demand for illicit drugs in the industrialized Western world is high, especially in North America. Farmers cultivate crops to produce illicit drugs is started because they earn more profit than they do from planting traditional, legal crops. Ancient piracy, slavery, and smuggling families and networks have evolved into modern-day crime families and international trafficking networks. The Seminar of Narcotics Enforcement Officers, held under the auspices of the United Nations, concluded that international narcotics trafficking,

like piracy, should be an international crime. Finally, modern international banking systems and offshore banking laws, used as the financial conduit for conducting international narcotics trafficking business, grew out of older, empire financial systems—i.e., British banking laws used in the Bahamas and a US and Netherlands 1948 treaty to avoid a thirty percent US withholding tax on profits derived in the US, a treaty negotiated to protect investors nervous about upheavals as a result of the disintegrating colonial order following World War II.

Forces of External Intervention

Four aspects of Soviet and Cuban involvement and problems of terrorist/querrilla war are relevant to this study:

- o Increasing indications that profits from international drug trafficking are funneled back to Latin America to promote political instability.

- o Increasing indications that profits from international drug trafficking are funding weapons, training, and operational logistical support for Marxist terrorist/querrilla activity.

- o Increasing evidence that the logistics capabilities of international and local trafficking networks are used by Marxist

terrorist/querrilla groups for other activities like introduction of trained agents into the US along with smuggled illegal aliens, transport of terrorist and querrillas to and from Cuban training camps, and gun running.

- o Increasing evidence that migrant workers who raise narcotic crops are recruited to the ranks of Marxist terrorist/querrillas.

Evolution of Smuggling Networks

"A smuggler, he abides by the laws of nature—but it is by the laws of man that he is a smuggler."

Author Unknown

The relevance of the basic parts and the evolution of smuggling networks is not to make the claim that international drug trafficking is controlled by Moscow or by Cuba; rather, the relevance lies in understanding a criminal logistic and communications network, the way it has been used by terrorist/querrilla groups, and the way it corrupts individuals and governments. Understanding these concepts is a basic "knowledge-stone" for viewing the relationship of international drug trafficking as a threat to the national security of the US and its neighbors and allies.

A modern day law of nature is that human beings must purchase day-to-day necessities and that luxuries also require money. A second

modern law is that a large profit is derived from the sale of scarce, high-demand products. A third law is that high risk-taking is directly proportional to high rewards.

The rewards, in fact, are very high. As stated earlier, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) estimated the 1983 illegal drug sales in the US to be between 50 to 75 billion dollars, or 5 to 7 percent of all US retail sales. This figure also equates to 40 to 110 percent more than the sale of legal drugs in the US and equates to 25 to 90 percent more than the sales of all alcoholic beverages in the US. The 50 to 75 billion dollars does not include lost product from law enforcement seizures, so the value is at least 10 percent higher. Figure 11 shows the percentage make-up of US narcotics illegal sales.

DEA estimates the wholesale import value for 1983 of illicit drugs to the US (value at the national border) to be between 6 to 8 billion dollars, or 2 percent of all imported goods to the US. This figure also equates to a value slightly larger than all imported coffee to the US, or at least twice the value of all imported alcoholic and other beverages. Figure 12 shows the percentage break-down of 1983 imported illegal drugs to the US.

Although daily marijuana use appears to be less than that found in 1978, Figure 13 indicates the use to be still unacceptably high. "Daily

Use" figures are misleading for the 1983 5.5 percent mark. What is not said about the 1983 survey is that two-thirds of all those surveyed said they had bought and used marijuana at some time, and 40 percent said they had used it within the past year.


Figure 14 shows that use of cocaine also appears to be down for adults, but steady for high school seniors. However, Figure 15 reveals a dramatic rise in hospital emergency room activity for cocaine-involved life-threatening situations. The increase in cocaine-related emergency room activity is believed to be caused by more potent drug dosages available because of the 1983-84 market glut and by more dangerous administration methods such as laced marijuana cigarettes. Heroin data trends are similar to those shown for cocaine.

The significant point is that although risks for trafficking and dealing in illicit drugs may be high, the demand for illicit drugs is also high, as are profits.

Narcotics trafficking network parts are no different from those of legitimate agribusiness: crop growing, produce harvesting, produce collection, produce transportation, produce processing, produce wholesale, produce retail facilities and networks, and financial institutions to provide a conduit for business transactions.

Figure 11.

Illegal Drug Sales in the United States
(% of total)




\$50 - 70 BILLION

Figure 12.

Illegal Drug Sales.

Exports to the United States by Type of Drug


(% of total)



\$6 - 8 BILLION

Figure 13


Daily Marijuana Use,
U.S. High School Seniors, 1975-1983



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Data from Student Drug Use in America.

Figure 14


Current Cocaine Use, U.S. Household
Population and High School Seniors,
1974-1983



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Data from the National Survey on Drug Abuse and Student Drug Use in America.

Figure 15

Emergency Room Mentions for Cocaine
In the United States



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN).

A farmer in a Third World country may start growing coca bushes or marijuana because they earn more profit than do traditional, legal crops. A fisherman or mariner or private aircraft pilot may start transporting narcotics to a buyer nation because there is more profit for illegal than for legal trade. A freelance wholesaler may add narcotics to his imports, or his employees may use his facilities to receive narcotics because profit is increased or is better than a worker's salary. Such people are loosely bound together in an emerging trafficking network. It is not long, however, before the farmer must "buy" protection because of the value of his crop or because of fear of government law enforcement or big crime families. It is not long before the importer is involved with, or replaced by, organized crime. It is not long before the pilot, fisherman, or mariner joins, or is forced to belong to, a mutual organization controlled by organized crime for "protection" and for avoiding vessel and cargo seizure and arrest. Corruption of morals is complete. At this point terrorist/querrilla groups see an opportunity to gain hard currency for their "revolution of national liberation" and take over the "protection business" and the ground transportation facilities. Furthermore, they force their ideology on the farmer and his family and recruit him and his children to their ranks. They may also become directly involved in the acriprocessing business such as cocaine laboratories. Whole drug farm and processing communities develop as an entity unto themselves, controlled or protected by terrorists/querrillas.

The pilot, fisherman, or mariner turned narcotics trafficker now expands his horizons to include gun running and providing passage for illegal aliens. And just as the terrorist/querrillas see opportunities to obtain hard cash, so do nations like Cuba. These nations then provide safe harbor for vessel repairs and aircraft refueling and make intelligence and escort available to aid the traffickers in avoiding detection and arrest by the international community of nations. Hard currency, which, in turn, supports terrorist/querrilla activity in other countries, is obtained for their nation's economy. The international narcotics trafficking network has matured into a sophisticated logistics and communications network smuggling underworld and subversive cargoes for profit.

Next, the corruptive influence of money compromises law enforcement and high government officials in "growing," "buying," and "transient" countries. Finally, the same corrupting influence compromises the financial institutions upon which a nation's economy is dependent.