

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library
Digital Library Collections

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

Collection: Williams, Richard L.: Files
Folder Title: Drugs and Terrorism (4)
Box: OA 16992

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: reagan.library@nara.gov

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: WILLIAMS, RICHARD: Files
 OA/Box: OA 19050 *16992*
 File Folder: Drugs and Terrorism [4of6]

Archivist: gcc/bcb
 FOIA ID: F97-053, Korsmeyer
 Date: 10/30/00

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. list	National War College Strategic Studies Projects (p.1-5, partial), 5p. <i>P 2/23/01 NLSF97-053 #1</i>	4/2/85	SECRET , P3, B3

RESTRICTIONS

P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
 B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
 B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
 B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
 B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
 B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

CHAPTER IV
NEGOTIATED PROGRESS

"If the two forces are ever to be called upon to cooperate, the time to determine what each shall do, and the time for each to learn what the other can do, is before the exigency arises."

Secretary of War, Elihu Root, 1903 ¹

Thusfar this study has defined a set of circumstances, methodically accumulated relevant facts, and looked at what some of the relationships stemming from those facts mean. To further understand the possible implications as the national security aspects of international drug trafficking come to elicit greater concern, this chapter will explore further relationships and indicated abiding truths evidenced by recent events. The title of this report could have been any combination of the terms "national security", "national strategy" and "international drug trafficking". One possible title is something like: What Role Does National Security Have in the National Strategy on Illicit International Drug Trafficking? If this report is successful in answering such an inquiry on the question of whether international drug trafficking is a national security issue, it would provide a timely reply to questions that must have been guardedly asked before from the shadows of the bureaucracy. If not answered with finality, even this attempt to answer such a question sheds some light on what may constitute future policy

formulation considerations. That light, or the abiding truths, is the subject of the remainder of this chapter.

Tendencies

Four variables have been discussed that tend to dictate much of the policy and ultimately operational implementation phases of the effort to stem the flow of drugs across our borders; these were:

- o Threat (perceived or actual)
- o Cost (budget)
- o Strategy ('what' and 'who' makes it)
- o Resources (optimally structure to support strategy)

When these four are balanced, policy decisions are less risky, but where is the balance? A national strategy against drug abuse and international trafficking must be in line with the threat, a threat that seems to be linked to national security. Such a strategy is evolving, and as it evolves, the ^{quest?} drive for additional resources drives up the costs and erodes any realistic balance between the threat and the strategy. The competition also exists between the needs of other threats and strategies with the net result that the many players in the drug interdiction effort develop institutionally preferred and quite varied menus of priorities.

The players' tendencies are predictable without a form of strong coordinative guidance that is institutionally supported and is provided by key strategists found at the highest levels of the executive and legislative branches. In the effort to stem the flow of drugs, the relatively large number of departments and

agencies having a portion of the action without properly constituted guidance tends to diffuse responsibility. The spinoffs from such multi-agency efforts results in management by committee where nobody louses up and the key players are transient. Amateurism can result from such a process with the symptoms appearing as inappropriate threat assessments, faulty strategy formulation, and non-optimal resource mixes that do not reflect the high cost of implementing policy. Consensus of any type under such circumstances is not sustainable, however, institutional interests are more easily protected. Since the formation of NNBS, there is a growing trend towards operational jointness, and this nurtures the positive aspects of proven interoperability, resource pool sharing, and displayed potential cost reductions with a likely improvement in a monitored measure of effectiveness. Monitoring to insure a fair distribution of recognition and shared responsibility tends to be additional negative aspects of jointness scenarios.

When looking at individual agency responsibilities, they are usually based in law and a perception of the intent of those laws by the branches, departments, and agencies of our government. The customary and recognized bounds of authority may very well be different than those intended. An example of this is provided in Chapter III where it is evident how the intelligence community views law enforcement needs based on historical considerations. In this case even a recent executive order remains partially unsuccessful in its attempts to modify the old way of providing intelligence support to a relatively new consumer. As if by

boolean logic, individual agency responsibilities may or may not overlap, and thus become subject to various efforts to exclusively retain, to ignore, or to negotiate a workable least conflict arrangement of existing or new potential responsibilities. When the responsibilities come with all the proper political trappings keyed to a budget, and they in turn are in the best institutional interest of the agency, the outcome is subject to another predictable pattern of interplay, cooperation and frictional non-performance between agencies having traditional overlaps in responsibility or resources.

This concept is common throughout government, and when it comes to law enforcement or to national security, applies equally as well whether comparing responsibilities of the Drug Enforcement Administration and the U.S. Customs Service, * or the U.S. Army and the U.S. Air Force.

Organizations missioned with law enforcement responsibilities that also maintain expensive capabilities to bring to bear on the international drug situation, for example the Coast Guard, are particularly concerned about budget decisions and the budgeting implications of policy decisions. Other law enforcement organizations having low-cost capabilities, such as the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, in comparison may be relatively unconcerned about the budget implications but extremely concerned over the immediate implications of specific policy decisions. The DOD and Department of State are similarly

* An illustration of such interplay between agencies is documented in the White Paper on Drug Abuse published in 1975 by the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force, pp. 44, 45, and 93.

2

at opposite ends of this same spectrum. The result is that increased resource capability in the hands of one department or agency may not promote the perceived interests of another.

A related phenomena is the willingness of an agency or department to accept new functions. That willingness is usually spurred on by one of two primary motivators. The first is a belief that to refuse to accept the new tasking would jeopardize its position with more senior officials, and the second relates to the assurance that the new tasking brings a larger budget and thus gives the department or agency a greater resource base from which to pursue its perceived higher interest activities.³ New responsibilities that have to be financed out of existing budgetary levels are usually not among the most popular. DOD objects to direct support of drug interdiction without new monies,⁴ however, DEA, Customs, or Coast Guard may find it in their best interests to take on additional drug interdiction tasking even without additional budgetary consideration. Depending on who the players are then, acceptance or resistance is usually predictable depending on whether a new function comes with new funds, and should probably be desired, or whether the new tasking requires the reallocation of old funds. The latter is likely to be resisted unless the new function is seen as being very closely related to existing law enforcement or other missioned functions.⁵

While a relatively large number of departments and agencies carryout a variety of functions in support of the interdiction of drugs, there is still the nagging question of who is in charge.

When this question is asked at congressional hearings, the Chief Executive is mentioned as the person who is ultimately overall in charge. When looking at the NNBIS coordinating effort, the Vice President's name comes to mind. The chief law enforcement officer of the land by law is the Attorney General, and this was recently highlighted by Congress when it passed the Narcotics Control Act of 1984. Implementation of the intended provisions of that Act is likely to be met with some institutional friction. That friction stems from the desire for organizational autonomy and the recognition that the Act does not clarify who is in charge of which resources in carrying out which responsibilities. This kind of friction is easy to see if you are using your agency's resources to meet a number of mandated missions, and then you perceive that the Attorney General may directly or indirectly, and very subtly, restructure your entire menu of priorities without regard for the impact beyond the mission to interdict drugs. The efforts to implement the provisions of the Narcotics Act of 1984 during the next year or two should be interesting to watch, and the process may reveal the President's commitment to stemming the influx of drugs while balancing the less obvious, but related, political and policy concerns. A more thorough analysis of how circumstances and presidential involvement create the images that promote certain agency or departmental actions is certainly beyond the scope of this study; however the mood or public 'will' addressed earlier is most certainly of importance.

The President promotes that 'will' and most certainly is the surrogate for what is in the national interest. Other policy-

makers and strategists look to him for clues as to prioritizing the various issues involving national security. His perception and judgment are dominant; if international drug trafficking grows to such proportions that the sheer magnitude requires NSC prescriptions to protect our national security, then that direct top level executive concern remains justified. His influence on the images shared by the bureaucracy, by Congress, and by the public as it relates to the drug interdiction effort have served that program well as we are to find out in the next section of this chapter.

Participants in the effort to stem the influx of drugs who look to organizational priorities to define national security interests can seldom be expected to engage in a true full-scale analysis of how international drug trafficking and national security interrelate. Based on this there may be a distinct tendency on the part of the DOD to reflect what Halperin labels "grooved thinking." Such thinking may be considered a natural reaction when it comes to considering the relationship between drugs and national security or the less threatening aspect of expanding the level of DOD involvement in support of the drug interdiction program. This "grooved thinking" denotes a sameness or responding to a particular stimulus in a set way. That consistency is evident in the various quotes attributable to the Office of the Secretary of Defense as found throughout this report.⁶ As this trickles down to the individual Services, it is not uncommon to still encounter the belief that drug law enforcement takes away from DOD missions, and the various Service

components do not understand that drugs are a national security issue that may warrant more DOD involvement.

Negotiation and Compromise

Whether international drug trafficking and national security are destined to run slowly converging paths for the remainder of history or not, depends on a willingness to let slow and consistent incremental policy evolve. That evolution relies upon filling enforcement voids, minimizing overlaps, and effective coordination of the entire national strategy directed against drug abuse and trafficking. The process of coordination itself relies upon negotiation and compromise. The accomplishment of attainable goals hinges on such a process starting with the formulation of policy. The following examples are used to represent a few of the many signs of progress to date and indicate the nexus of the conclusions and recommendations found in the last chapter.

EXAMPLE: Agency Coordination

Studies done in the 1960's and 1970's pointed to the alarming number of departments and agencies involved in the fight against drug abuse. The number of participating entities has not dropped and the resources dedicated to the various prongs of the National Strategy have steadily grown as have the other numbers providing mixed indicators of success, such as arrests, asset seizures, and emergency room cases. In the one prong of the strategy dedicated to supply reduction through interdiction there are now nine departments and a dozen federal agencies planning to

spend over \$1.2 billion in fiscal year 1985. This is a 75 percent increase since 1981.⁸ The competing agencies for the most part have evolved through a mission accretion process that has provided them with unique resources to conduct mandated missions. The radar sites of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), border inspections by the U.S. Customs Service, and special cutters of the U.S. Coast Guard are all examples of such a process that was not necessarily born of a concern for interdicting drugs. Each of these agencies has shown a degree of institutional responsiveness reflective of their perspectives on institutional priorities and health. So within the institutional envelope of responsibilities each has built upon an extant infrastructure which is necessarily protected.

During the last two years the institutional essence of each agency performing drug interdiction has been enhanced, and the various agencies are working more closely on a regular basis than before. The difference, evident since the summer of 1983, has been a coordinative effort, without additional funding, spearheaded by the White House through NNBIS and involving limited DOD participation. Other initiatives, such as the congressionally legislated National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, are expected to help further optimize resource utilization. How successful the integration of these coordinating bodies will be should be evident in the subsequent versions of the National Strategy.

EXAMPLE: International Cooperation

The effort to highlight the fact that international drug trafficking is an international problem warranting international

sanctions is coming to fruition. The view that such international problems demand international cooperation, commitment, and action (not just more involvement of the U.S. law enforcement agencies and DOD) is seeing progress through these few representative indicators:

- o The signing of bilateral and multi-lateral agreements to promote more effective law enforcement efforts;
- o The relative ease with which special arrangements are made with foreign countries claimed as countries of registry for vessels prior to boarding on the high seas;
- o The United Nations Commission on Narcotics Drugs efforts to expedite making international drug trafficking a recognized international crime (likened to piracy and slave trade);
- o The strong positive commitment of Colombia indicated by joint eradication and interdiction programs, the 1985 extradition of accused drug traffickers to the U.S. and an expressed creditable resolve.

EXAMPLE: Congressional Actions

In addition to the Narcotics Act of 1984, Congress has promoted a number of initiatives directed at wiping out such protective provisions as bank secrecy laws, protection of assets bought with revenue from drug trafficking, light sentencing, etc. One of the more controversial laws recently passed by Congress was sponsored by Senator Paula Hawkins and is referred to as the ⁹diplomacy against drugs amendment (Section 481 of the Foreign Assistance Act). This allows the President to suspend economic or military assistance, or both, for reasons of non-cooperation on narcotics control. ¹⁰The amended provisions have not been used for a variety of reasons tied to the cause and effect

relationship in our complex foreign policy commitments to our neighbors. The Justice Department is not inclined to use the law,¹¹ and DEA says "it will never happen."¹²

EXAMPLE: Measuring Success

In the interdiction of illicit drugs there is no recognized accurate measure of effectiveness. In the case of bulk drugs, before it is possible to say what percentage is interdicted, destroyed or deterred, one must know how much was shipped or intended to be shipped; this is a number that is not available for obvious reasons. If the absolute amount seized in tons goes up, that does not necessarily indicate more or less success if in fact a higher percentage made it to the U.S. market. Thus the success cannot be directly quantified. Indicators are not the amount of drugs, vessels or aircraft actually seized since the equation has too many variables. Probably the best indicator is to look at the response of the drug traffickers.¹² Kidnappings, murders, bounties, and hit squads sponsored by the traffickers during the past year indicate a degree of frustration on their part and success for the present effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs.

EXAMPLE: Intelligence Sources and Methods

The use of DOD and non-DOD intelligence assets in international drug interdiction dredged up fears in the intelligence community that there would be a much greater risk of compromise of intelligence sources and methods. This was viewed as a particularly sensitive situation if disclosure is requested through judicial proceedings. Those fears have thus far been groundless

as prosecutors are willing to give up cases if need be to protect the sources and methods. U.S. judges have to date supported the non-introduction and disclosure of such sensitive information.

The five preceding examples represent a wide range of policy indicators for the future. There are obviously many more examples, some of which may more graphically convey the implications, and there are plenty of new challenges facing the strategist and policymaker. Those challenges are complicated by the very factors that give us the 'will' to be strong against illicit drugs - our representative form of governance, our Constitution, and the many enduring virtues of the democratic process.

The challenge to the strategist contains the recognition that any strategy conceived to stem the flow of drugs can never be a static set of objectives. Just like the concern for the magnitude of the national security implications, the strategy must be continually questioned. The citizenry demands a strategy that is dynamic, that defines, evaluates and integrates their changing interests and values. Finality of solution should not be a goal. That national strategy must continue to evolve, but in doing so the strategist can guide some of the events by thinking about international drug trafficking, urgently, comprehensively, correctly.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER IV (Pages 69 - 80)

1
Armed Forces Staff College, Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1984 [AFSC PUB 1] (Norfolk, Virginia: U.S. Department of Defense, National Defense University, 1984) p. 2-10.

2
Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 27.

3
Ibid., p. 40.

4
Found in the prepared testimony presented by Dr. Korb as referenced in preceding chapters of this study. Actual comment paraphrased from the interview with Colonel Dennis Corrigan, USA, Deputy Assistant for Legal and Legislative Affairs, JCS, Pentagon, 29 January 1985.

5
Halperin, Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, p. 57.

6
Ibid., p. 58.

7
Interview with Colonel Theodore Cummings, USA, U.S. Southern Command Liaison Officer to the JCS, Pentagon, 21 December 1984.

8
1984 National Strategy, Appendices A and B.

9
Letter from Senator Paula Hawkins to Newsweek, 11 March 1985, p. 4.

10
1984 National Strategy, p. 71.

11
"Crack Down on Drugs, U.S. Is Urged," The Washington Post, 20 March 1985, p. A3.

12
U.S. Congress, House, Committee on Government Operations, Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice, and Agriculture, Briefing by L.N. Schowengerdt, Jr., Staff Director NNBS. Drug Law Enforcement Operations, Prepared Statement for Hearings (Miami, FL: 16 March 1985), p. 20.

CHAPTER V

CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

The 5-pronged National Strategy against drug abuse and trafficking includes one prong involving supply reduction through efforts to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. The following conclusions and recommendations focus on how national security may relate to that one prong, and, to a lesser extent, to all aspects of the fully integrated national strategy against drug abuse and trafficking.

Conclusions

Comprehending the implications of the first conclusion of this research effort is essential for promoting and effectively monitoring the actions of policymakers and strategists. That essential conclusion is the finding that international drug trafficking contributes to a growing threat to U.S. national security. Until the 1980's social and legal policy dichotomized drug trafficking as either symptomatic of a "criminal" or "social" circumstance. With the growing national security concern, law enforcement activities should remain aimed at reducing the supply of drugs while continuing the coordinated efforts focused on reducing the demand. Supply and demand reduction programs can certainly expect to come under closer scrutiny as drugs are used to accomplish political ends and as other issues of national security surface. The effectiveness of

any future strategy to reduce both supply and demand has to consider the threat to national security and what implications there might be ^{to} hemispheric stability.

In developing narcotics smuggling threat assessments, related geopolitical, social and economic concerns must be woven into the national level evaluations. Strategically our American neighbors are of vital U.S. defense interest. Presently international drug trafficking does not provide a direct military threat to Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Islands. As the U.S. national security threat continues to grow and as definitions of vital national interests are reevaluated, the military threat perspective, as it relates to drugs, guns and insurgency must be viewed as reversible.

The relationship between drugs and arms trafficking is no longer a question of 'if'; now it is a question of magnitude. Insurgents and terrorists have made international drug trafficking inimical to the U.S. interests; these are the same interests DOD is missioned to serve; the development of a strategy to deal with the threat posed by international drug trafficking requires a strategy based on the best available threat assessments. However, it is not necessary to have terrorists and insurgency to make international drug trafficking a national security concern. The linkages and traditional problems of corruption spawned by such activity stands alone as being sufficient in destroying the fabric of our present society.

National security threat formulation on both the direct and indirect effects of international drug trafficking is an output of the intelligence community. Without NSC oversight on national

policy evolution, the national intelligence estimates from various member agencies of the recognized intelligence community, even when supplemented by the individual law enforcement agencies' strategic intelligence capabilities, provides a less than optimal mechanism for consistent national policymaking. NSC oversight is indicated and is expected to be of immense value in integrating the information flow into policy prescriptions. Once properly integrated by the NSC, it should permit consideration of prescriptions or related policy issues by not only by the NSC, but also by Congress, the DOD, State Department, DOJ and other departments and agencies providing resources to the law enforcement effort under the guidelines of the current National Strategy.

Developing threat analyses at individual agency levels and without NSC oversight on recommended policy direction is likely to result in more costly, long-term and less effective use of resources. Resource requirements to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. may better be determined by external national security threats. These threats are considered of grave concern at the highest levels of the U.S. government and our neighboring allies. Thus the required budget for such usage of available resources for law enforcement is becoming less a level-of-effort spending program of the past two decades, and is becoming a program requiring restructuring to buy a specific capability to also support national security policy goals.

While the threat in and of itself justifies NSC involvement, other considerations also support NSC policy development. As

long as the level-of-effort, in terms of resources to interdict illicit drugs in international trade, does not meet national security requirements and is spread out between several agencies in different departments, it is properly a NSC policy issue. As an issue of growing national security concern, the NSC prescriptions provided to the President, coupled with Congressional budget authorizations, offer the opportunity to develop a public consensus on how limited national resources are used.

Without a clear comprehensive national policy statement identifying international drug trafficking as an increasing threat to national security, the effective coordinated use of all available resources is limited, especially those available through the DOD.

Current DOD mission priorities and institutionally perceived restrictions tend to preclude both the timely recognition of evolving national security issues warranting DOD involvement and any abrupt increase in DOD resources to support the law enforcement effort against the international narcotics trade. DOD can provide some added level of support to the law enforcement effort, but institutional friction along with [international drug trafficking] not being identified by Congress and the NSC as an accepted national security issue [warranting a dedicated military mission level response] offers little hope of significant change. Even if Congress and the Chief Executive directed DOD to act, legal and budgetary hurdles coupled with predictable institutional friction outside of DOD are likely to reduce many expectations. Under varying conditions the use of

DOD resources may have an adverse affect on DOD's recognized mission priorities, and it is in this context that some aspects of military capability may be eroded. Thus, when prioritized, international drug trafficking as an issue of national security may be viewed as irrelevant by some policymakers. This view is less defensible today than at the beginning of the 1980's, and the rising public clamor is considerably more difficult to ignore.

Under the present Administration, the public "will" to support a long-term campaign against illicit drugs is strong, especially in terms that the U.S. is not ready to accept additional 'Cubas' in Central America at the expense of the well-being of its own citizens. Since our involvement in Vietnam, there is a view that the U.S. public probably will not support a long limited war. International drug trafficking does not contain all the traditional requisite characteristics of a war, however it does support, either directly or indirectly, a form of low intensity conflict. So long as that conflict remains extra-territorial to the U.S., and so long as it is not prioritized in the spectrum of threats to our national security, the public and media generally choose to remain unconcerned about what is meant by the potential long-term national security consequences previously forecast by some key members of the Administration. Forcing that awareness level higher, unlike Vietnam, and steadily implementing the provisions of the National Strategy are not fraught with the risk of public non-support. This public support arises from the proximity of the threat and the recent daily

spectre of actual terrorist activity in the U.S. supported by drug traffickers.

In implementing the portion of the National Strategy dealing with U.S. national security and international drug trafficking, strategists within the executive and legislative branches are of divided responsibility. Absent a continuation of an often evident strong coordinated resolve, bureaucratic inefficiency is inevitable. Part of that coordination relies upon continuing to make the best use of all available resources through federal, state and local efforts and the further development of mutually supporting strategies at all levels.

Any departmental or agency developed strategy to deal with the national security aspects of international drug trafficking issues should fit under and clarify the very broad policy guidelines found in the existing National Strategy. A balanced attack on both the supply and demand portions of the drug problem as outlined by the National Strategy is necessary and requires consistent policy modification reflective of developing trends and threats.

All strategies developed to support the National Strategy on international drug trafficking issues must consider and be consistent with economic, political, and diplomatic concerns and, in the case of the Defense Department, must not be limited to military elements. To further facilitate this effort all strategies should be clear, consistent, and provide a comprehensive set of guidelines supporting the National Strategy.

The remainder of this decade and into the 1990's are likely to follow the trend of the last couple of decades, and end up

being good times to move at least some distance in enhancing U.S. security while stemming the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. The political priority and associated political strength relative to linkages between national security and international drug trafficking continues to grow. Many of the recommendations made later in this chapter are actively being considered in one form or another; yet others seem to languish even when they may make good sense. The answer to why this is the case is probably a matter of ripeness.[?]

Overall this methodology of looking at trends has proven very time consuming. It succeeded in identifying a need for additional quantitative trend analysis and, most certainly, a more thorough form of option analysis by strategists in both the executive and legislative branches of government.

This process of cogitation has been long yet fruitful, has educated this author and many of those interviewed, and produced something capable of being judiciously determined. From that process has come several recommendations that rely upon competent leadership ~~in representing~~ ^{to promote} the gradual evolution of consistent policy directed at stemming the flow of illicit drugs into the United States.

Recommendations

In reviewing the threat and in formulating strategy to counter that threat, I have previously concluded that executive policy guidance related to international drug trafficking must consider national security. Recognizing that drug trafficking, as well as the related extensive corruption, terrorism and

insurgency, is likely to continue as a direct or indirect means to seek political goals, and in view of ample, easy targets in the U.S., the NSD should support the efforts of policymakers as they try to answer many of the items identified earlier. * Those answers leading to national policy should be incorporated in the next edition of the National Strategy.

Any unilateral, bilateral or otherwise international effort that would enhance our national security must promote a cooperative dialogue with all source and transit nations on the issue of international drug trafficking. Mutual security arrangements and the relationship to economic, social, and diplomatic ties are reflective of such dialogue providing a form of leverage promoting hemispheric security. U.S. participants, not unlike their international counterparts, are likely to find it difficult to develop a stand on international drug trafficking and how to reduce the supply and demand for illicit drugs by simply focusing on issues of national security. In such instances those tasked with representing the much broader range of national security interests of the United States must remain wary of those exploiting organizational or political interests for some institutional or personal gain possibly tied to illicit drug traffic in the international marketplace.

*
A recommended extension of this study would include an analysis of what, if any, effect the observed trends may have on mobilization. The subject of perceived threats as applied to mobilization and military capability, readiness and sustainability has been beyond the scope of this study (For a distinction between such terms as "readiness", "capability", and "sustainability" as used here and as inferred in the National Strategy, first look at Appendix D and then Appendix A.).

International drug trafficking should be added to the list of items warranting NSC review and policy prescriptions for consideration by the President. Once that is done and at the proper time an Executive Order should be signed to provide a clear comprehensive national policy statement that defines the national security threat imposed by international drug trafficking. The initial NSC involvement is indicated to establish threat priority in relation to other national security issues, and these should then be followed by NSC explored program and policy options. One of the larger tasks of the NSC should be to integrate the multi-agency threat assessments, and make pertinent information available for OMB and legislative use in institutionalizing legal and budgetary actions required to buy specific capability in support of national security policy goals. These policy goals should then be reflected by the White House Drug Policy Office in the next National Strategy.

Funding through Congress is essential if an effort is to be made to buy a specific capability different from what presently exists to support the range of national security goals. In the funding process all players must resist the tendency to base goals on the minimum level of effort to be bought with little or no new budgetary authority. In establishing resource justifications, the NSC, law enforcement agencies, DOD, Congress, and especially OMB must allow for other benefits to be gained when viewing the multiple threats against the U.S. In evaluating resource requirements it is germane to recall that national policy guidance on issues of international drug trafficking is

very broad with no specific goals, quite possibly because that policy is budget driven in the 5-pronged National Strategy.

Even under the best of circumstances, policy and budget development remain long, tedious and inter-related. Policymakers and the policy implementers must accept inherent risks and proceed anyway with a well coordinated executive and legislative effort...even if at a minimally acceptable floor. The Defense Department should remain a key player in establishing any DOD mission priority and use that priority along with the NSC integrated threat assessment to provide the proper defense guidance. All agencies and departments, DOD in particular, should review legal and self-imposed restrictions with a goal of maximizing support possibilities. This review should include a thorough effort to re-interpret the intent of the originators of present law in light of decades of change. In doing this review it is possible that the interests of both the executive and legislative branches are best served if they stress the need to promote legitimate enhancements to be gained in military capability by any recommended expansion of DOD support in stemming the flow of drugs. During this review process, throughout the law enforcement community it is necessary to continue to recognize the premise of the present National Strategy that implies international drug trafficking issues will not go away absent coordinated efforts to effectively weaken all links in the supply and demand chain.

After executive agencies have identified and polarized their agreement as to the magnitude of the international drug trafficking threat, each department and agency should be able to

explain their long-term portion of the coordinated strategy in terms which the Congress, media and the public can understand and support. Before this can be effectively done, each responsible department and agency should draft their own strategy to support law enforcement efforts directed at international drug trafficking. Since the National Strategy remains very broad, the drafters and implementers of each supporting departmental or agency strategy must be inclined to use the read-between-the-lines guidance of the National Strategy in its broadest sense to accomplish NSC interpreted national policy goals. Such supporting strategies have to recognize that the National Strategy may be dated or worded in such general (non-controversial) policy terms that it is not always leading the way and is necessarily playing policy catch-up when reissued.

In the process of tailoring a strategy for DOD use, DOD needs to clarify multiple meaning terms, such as strategy, policy and those terms associated with military readiness concepts as now used in the National Strategy. All such strategy crafting efforts would be facilitated if these terms were converted into more precise concepts in terms of goals, resources and means when discussing policy and striving for new Congressionally supported funding. The tendency for any agency or department to unwittingly first develop an internal institutional consensus limiting the intent of national policy and the effectiveness of the National Strategy must be resisted. One avenue is to establish a joint agency commission to define appropriate role and mission responsibilities for each participant based on various recognized

threat levels. Joint agency commission as used here needs to include representation from the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office, NNBIS and the new National Drug Enforcement Policy Board.

A National Strategy endorsed in concept in a bipartisan forum by Congress is indicated and would facilitate budgetary trade-offs with both social and defense programs. Such a strategy must represent a gradual evolution of a consistent policy rather than any abrupt departure. That strategy too must also retain clarity, and rather than use terms indicating a reduced military capability to justify DOD support levels, it must persuasively obtain public understanding and support of DOD involvement that will outlast successive national political administrations. Embodied in that strategy should be the positive elements of an enhanced military capability as a valuable and functional spinoff of responding to the existing threat.

Since the effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs is not perceived as a winnable war, it should not be viewed that way or approached as if it were by the armed forces. Any DOD strategy in support of the National Strategy should be focused against illicit international drug trafficking while being viewed as meeting the subversive level challenge. The Department of State should insure that the international community is aware of these concepts so they too can put other issues of foreign policy into better perspective.

Any strategy requiring DOD resource capability increases must be viewed as a strategy with funding requirements. Funding is not best gained by requiring a set percentage of the DOD

budget to be dedicated towards support of law enforcement efforts even with changes to the Economy Act. Neither is funding best gained by requiring law enforcement agencies to reimburse DOD for services which to varying degrees support DOD missions. The most successful money in gaining resource effectiveness is that money which is "new" money targeted specifically for DOD use in support of law enforcement. Legislative proposals should include both authorization under Title 10 and funding.

The bottom-line recommendation is a reflection of our representative form of government. That recommendation requires that strategists, policymakers and policy implementers not ^{despair} ~~dispare.~~ [?] Ripeness is all. The drug war may not be winnable, however it is one that can be lost. Who will want to be around to reap the benefits of such a loss?

APPENDIX A

^C
EXERPTS FROM THE 1984 NATIONAL STRATEGY
INVOLVING THE USE OF TERMS RELATED TO 'NATIONAL SECURITY'

Throughout the 1984 National Strategy, the terms 'national security', 'military resources', and 'readiness' are used in a sense reflecting the cautious, yet growing, concern of the policymakers. Here in their contextual use are those instances of using 'national security' related terms repeated (note that terms are underlined for emphasis or to indicate they are defined in Appendix D):

FIRST USAGE: Chapter I. Overview, Drug Law Enforcement, p.9.

"As a result of legislation in December 1981, the Department of Defense is providing valuable support to civilian law enforcement operations consistent with national security obligations."

SECOND USAGE: Chapter IV. Drug Law Enforcement, Principal Federal Agencies, Roles and Missions, p. 51.

"As a result of Congressional approval in 1981 of an exception to the Posse Comitatus Act, the U.S. Armed Forces are assisting in the drug interdiction effort. The military services are providing support in the form of equipment, intelligence and training. The Department of Defense (DOD) has taken an aggressive role, consistent with national security responsibilities, in providing support to civilian law enforcement efforts." *

THIRD USAGE: Chapter IV. Drug Law Enforcement, Drug Interdiction and Border Control, pp. 52 and 53.

"President Reagan has called for a 'border policy that will improve detection and interception of illegal drug imports. This will include the use of available military resources for detection whenever necessary.'....The border program emphasizes major cooperative interdiction efforts which utilize all available resources, including enhanced intelligence and military support, to detect and intercept illicit drugs before they are smuggled into the United States....Since February 1982 the....Department of Defense, and state and local authorities have each brought their unique resources....and expertise to the effort...."

*
The word 'exception' when used with the Posse Comitatus Act is not considered technically correct by some institutional semanticists and lawyers. Depending on the reader, substitute 'modification', 'clarification' or 'codification of existing practices'.

FOURTH USAGE: Chapter IV. Drug Law Enforcement, Military Support of Drug Law Enforcement, p. 53.

"While military personnel are prohibited from engaging directly in civilian law enforcement, e.g. search, seizure, etc., legislation enacted in December 1981 allows the use of available military resources in furnishing information and equipment support to civilian law enforcement agencies, providing that such support does not adversely affect military readiness. The military services have expanded their support of border interdiction efforts and a coordinator has been assigned within the Office of the Secretary of Defense." (See the informational note marked with an asterisk at the bottom of this page.)

FIFTH USAGE: Chapter IV. Drug Law Enforcement, Military Support of Drug Law Enforcement, p. 54.

"The Strategy calls for continuing cooperation and support from military resources, consistent with national security readiness requirements."

SIXTH USAGE: Chapter VIII. Drug and Alcohol Abuse in the Armed Forces, Introduction, p. 109.

"Drug and alcohol abuse by members of the Armed Forces is a continuing problem of great concern because of the potential impact on military readiness." (Note that while this is a concern of all the Armed Services, the subject of such abuse is beyond the scope of this study.)

* The term 'civilian law enforcement agency' is a misleading term stemming from definitions used in DOD Directive 5525.5 of March 1982 on the subject of DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials. By that definition, if you are not in the DOD, you are relegated to the position of a civilian. All Armed Services are not in DOD during peacetime; technically, on first glance, the Coast Guard does not fall under the 'civilian law enforcement agency' provisions implied in the DOD Directive or the 1984 National Strategy. However the "House Congressional Record" for 3 November 1981 is clear on this issue as it was trying to minimize confusion of intent when discussing military resources. Based on this the Coast Guard does fall under all provisions referring to civilian law enforcement [agencies or officials].

APPENDIX B

^A RELEVANT EXCEPTIONS TO THE POSSE COMITATUS ACT

The statutory exceptions to the Act (Title 18, U.S.C. Article 1385) are more numerous than generally realized. In addition to the UCMJ and the familiar civil disturbance provisions of Title 10, the following statutes could be considered to authorize activity which would otherwise be prohibited as law enforcement:

- o 21 U.S.C. Article 873(b) (assistance to Attorney General concerning traffic in controlled substances).
- o 42 U.S.C. Article 3756 (loan of services, equipment, personnel, and facilities to the Justice Department's Law Enforcement Assistance Administration).
- o 16 U.S.C. Article 593, 43 U.S.C. Article 1065, 16 U.S.C. Article 78, 16 U.S.C. Article 23 (preservation and protection of public lands).
- o 22 U.S.C. Articles 461-62, 22 U.S.C. Article 408 (enforcement of neutrality).
- o 50 U.S.C. Article 220 (enforcement of customs laws).
- o 16 U.S.C. Article 1861(a) (enforcement of the Magnuson Fishery Conservation and Management Act of 1976).
- o 18 U.S.C. Articles 112 and 1116 (assistance in the case of crimes against foreign officials, official guests of the U.S., and others internationally protected.)
- o 10 U.S.C. amended by adding Chapter 18 (1981) (military cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials). (See informational note designated with a double asterisk at bottom of this page.)

* The application of the provisions of the Posse Comitatus Act outside the territorial boundaries of the U.S. is in hushed debate. Institutional interests that find it advantageous to ignore the likely non-extra-territorial intent of the Act actually ignore it, and apply it universally. Rather than an EXCEPTION as used in this Appendix this could be viewed as an EXTENSION of the Act beyond the likely original intent.

** For a more detailed discussion of the provisions passed by Congress refer to the "House Congressional Record" for 3 November 1981, p. H7962. DOD Directive 5525.5 of 22 March 1982 (DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials) establishes the uniform DOD policy and procedures intended to implement this latest 'exception' to the Posse Comitatus Act.

APPENDIX C

*
CHARTER FOR THE DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
TASK FORCE ON DRUG ENFORCEMENT

Following the announcement by the White House establishing the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System in March 1983, the Secretary of Defense approved a DOD task force to:

- o Represent the Department in meetings with the Vice President's office, the Congress, other federal agencies, the National Border Interdiction System, and state and local governments;

- o Ensure that DOD policy in this area is adequate to address the needs of civilian law enforcement, the intent of the Congress and the concerns of the Administration;

- o Ensure that the Services are implementing both the letter and the spirit of DOD policy by contributing to the Administration's overall effort as effectively and efficiently as possible;

- o Ensure that the readiness of U.S. forces is not impaired through provision of this support to law enforcement agencies and that reimbursement policies are carried out;

- o Carry the message of DOD's drug enforcement commitment to the troops and to the general public as well; and

- o See to it that your office is kept abreast of all significant developments.

*
Charter approved by the Secretary of Defense in August 1985.

APPENDIX D
OF
TERMS FOR REFERENCE *

armed forces. The military forces of a nation or a group of nations. See also military service.

capability. The ability to execute a specified course of action. (A capability may or may not be accompanied by an intention.) See also military capability.

civilian agency. A government agency (other than the DOD) in the following jurisdictions: a. The U.S.; or b. A State (or political subdivision thereof); or c. A territory or possession of the U.S. (from DODD 5525.5 of 22 March 1981 on DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials).

civilian law enforcement official. An officer or employee of a civilian agency with responsibility for enforcement of the laws within the jurisdiction of the agency. (from DODD 5525.5 of 22 March 1981 on DOD cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials).

military capability. The ability to achieve a specified wartime objective (win a war or battle, destroy a target set). It includes four major components: force structure, modernization, readiness, and sustainability.

- a. force structure - Numbers, size, and composition of the units that comprise our Defense forces; e.g., divisions, ships, airwings.
- b. modernization - Technical sophistication of forces, units, weapon systems, and equipment.
- c. readiness - The ability of forces, units, weapon systems, or equipment to deliver the outputs for which they were designed (includes the ability to deploy and employ without unacceptable delays).
- d. sustainability - The "staying power" of our forces, units, weapon systems, and equipments, often measured in numbers of days. See also sustainability.

military posture. The military disposition, strength, and condition of readiness as it affects capabilities.

military requirement. An established need justifying the timely allocation of resources to achieve a capability to accomplish approved military objectives, missions, or tasks.

military resources. Military and civilian personnel, facilities, equipment, and supplies under the control of a DOD component.

*
All definitions are taken from the DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub. 1, 1 April 1984) unless otherwise noted.

military service. A branch of the Armed Forces of the United States, established by act of Congress, in which persons are appointed, enlisted, or inducted for military service, and that operates and is administered within a military or executive department. The military services are the U.S. Army, U.S. Navy, U.S. Air Force, U.S. Marines, and U.S. Coast Guard.

military strategy. The art and science of employing the armed forces of a nation to secure the objectives of national policy by the application of force or threat of force. See also **strategy.**

national intelligence. Integrated departmental intelligence that covers the broad aspects of national policy and national security, is of concern to more than one department or agency; transcends the exclusive competence of a single department or agency.

national intelligence estimate (NIE). A strategic estimate of capabilities, vulnerabilities, and probable courses of action of foreign nations that is produced at the national level as a composite of the views of the intelligence community.

national objectives. Those fundamental aims, goals, or purposes of a nation - as opposed to the means for seeking these ends - toward which a policy is directed and efforts and resources of the nation are applied. (Author's note: What **should** be done?)

national policy. A broad course of action or statements of guidance adopted by the government at the national level in pursuit of national objectives.

national security. A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the U.S. Specifically, the condition provided by : a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or b. a favorable foreign relations position, or c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert.

national strategy. The art and science of developing and using the political, economic, and psychological powers of a nation, together with its armed forces, during peace and war, to secure national objectives. See also **strategy.** (Author's note: What **can** be done?)

objectives. See national objectives.

readiness. See military capability.

security assistance. Group of programs authorized by the Foreign Assistance Act of 1961, as amended, and the Arms Export Control Act of 1976, as amended, or other related statutes by which the United States provides defense articles, military training, and other defense-related services, by grant, credit, or cash sales, in furtherance of national policies and objectives.

strategy. The art and science of developing and using political, economic, psychological, and military forces as necessary during peace and war, to afford the maximum support to policies, in order to increase the probabilities and favorable consequences of victory and to lessen the chances of defeat. See also **military strategy; national strategy.**

sustainability. 1. The ability to maintain the necessary level and duration of combat activity to achieve national objectives. Sustainability is a function of providing and maintaining those levels of force, material, and consumables necessary to support a military effort. 2. See **military capability.**

APPENDIX E

SUMMARY OF INTERVIEWS

- Andrews, Captain John T. (USCG). Special Assistant to the Commandant, U.S. Coast Guard, CG Headquarters, Washington, D.C. Interview, 11 December 1984.
- Corrigan, Colonel Dennis (USA). Deputy Assistant for Legal and Legislative Affairs, Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Interview, 29 January 1985.
- Cummings, Colonel Theodore (USA). U.S. Southern Command Liaison Officer to the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Interviews, 26 November 1984 and 21 December 1984.
- Fallon, Mr. Michael and Mr. Steve Peterson. Information Analysts, Rosslyn, Virginia. Interview, 25 January 1985.
- Monastero, Mr. Frank. Assistant Administrator, Operations Division, Drug Enforcement Administration, Washington, D.C. Interview 30 January 1985.
- Schowengerdt, Captain L.N., Jr. (USCG). Staff Director, National Narcotics Border Interdiction System, Offices of the Vice President, Washington, D.C. Interview, 19 September 1984.
- Thompson, Commander Paul (USN). Military Assistant and Deputy General Counsel to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, White House, Washington, D.C. Interview, 7 February 1985.
- Tice, Lieutenant General R. Dean (USA). Head of the DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement, OSD(MI & L), Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Interview, 29 January 1985.
- Tinsley, Commander Steve (USN). Plans and Policy Directorate (J-5) Staff of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Pentagon, Washington, D.C. Interviews, 21 December 1984, 4 and 8 January 1985.
- Williams, Mr. Richard L. Senior Staff Member, Drug Abuse Policy Office, White House, Washington, D.C. Interviews, 11 December 1984 and 14 January 1985.

BIBLIOGRAPHY

A number of interviews were conducted as tabulated at Appendix E. All other identifiable sources consulted are found in this bibliography. A high proportion are quoted or cited in the text where they provide conceptual relevance to any developing linkage between national security and international drug trafficking.

Books

- Berkowitz, Morton and Bock, P.G. American National Security. New York: The Free Press, 1965.
- Brodie, Bernard. Strategy and National Interests - Reflections for the Future. New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1971.
- Brown, Harold. Thinking About National Security. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983.
- Central America in Crisis. 2nd ed. Washington: The Washington Institute for Values in Public Policy, 1984.
- Clausewitz, Carl Von. On War. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976.
- Clem, Harold J. The Environment of National Security. Washington: NDU Press, 1983.
- Gobson, Roy. Intelligence Requirements for the 1980's: Analysis and Estimates. New York: National Strategy Information Center, Inc., 1980.
- Gray, Anthony W., Jr. and White, Eston T. Military Strategy. Washington: NDU Press, 1983.
- Halperin, Morton H. Bureaucratic Politics & Foreign Policy. Washington: Brookings Institute, 1974.
- Heyns, Terry L., ed. Understanding U.S. Strategy. Washington: NDU Press, 1983.
- Hopkins, Jack W., ed. Latin America: Perspective on a Region. New York: Holmes and Meier, 1985.
- Levine, Barry B., ed. The New Cuban Presence in the Caribbean. Boulder, CO: Westview Press, 1983.
- Margiotta, Franklin D., ed. Evolving Strategic Realities: Implications for U.S. Policymakers. Washington: NDU Press, 1980.

- McIntyre, John J., ed. The Future of Conflict. Washington: NDU Press, 1979.
- Motley, James B. U.S. Strategy to Counter Domestic Political Terrorism. Washington: NDU Press, 1983.
- Schlesinger, James R. The Political Economy of National Security. New York: Frederick A. Praeger, Inc., 1960.
- Schroeder, Richard C. The Politics of Drugs. Washington: Congressional Quarterly, Inc., 1975.
- Skidmore, Thomas E. and Smith, Peter H. Modern Latin America. New York: Oxford Press, 1984.
- Taylor, Maxwell D. The Uncertain Trumpet. New York: Harper, 1960.

Articles

- Betts, Richard K. "Intelligence for Policymaking." The Washington Quarterly, Summer 1980, p. 118-129.
- "Bolivia vs. Drug Trafficking: An Uphill Struggle." The New York Times, 3 August 1984, p. A22.
- "Central America: A Clear and Present Danger." ROA National Security Report, July 1984, p. 10-12.
- "Colombia's Kings of Coke." Newsweek, 25 February 1985, p. 19-22.
- "Colombia's War on Drug Trade Falters." The Washington Post, 5 March 1985, p. A8.
- "Crack Down on Drugs, U.S. Is Urged." The Washington Post, 20 March 1985, p. A3.
- "Defense Policy and Programs." Defense 85, April 1985, p. 7-17.
- Department of State Bulletin, September 1984, p. 79 (treaties-Mexico) and p. 81 (chronology-18 and 24 July 1984).
- "Eight Latin Nations Vow Joint Fight on Drugs." The Washington Post, 13 August 1984, p. A1.
- "Feeding America's Habit." Newsweek, 25 February 1985, p. 22-23.
- "General Recommends Military Help in War Against Drug Trade." The Miami Herald, 16 March 1985, p. 5A.
- Gorman, Paul F., General (USA). "Low Intensity Conflict: Not Fulda Not Kola." Review of Book by Robert W. Komer on Maritime Strategy or Coalition Defense?, Handout, November 1984, p. 1-15.

- . "U.S. Southern Command: Sentinel of U.S. Interests in Latin America." Defense 84, November/December 1984, p. 16-23.
- "Governors Ask Pentagon to Help Curb Drug Traffic." The Washington Post, 19 January 1985, p. A6.
- Grabendorff, Wolf. "Interstate Conflict Behavior and Regional Potential for Conflict in Latin America." Journal of InterAmerican Studies and World Affairs, August 1982, p. 267-294.
- "Grenada Isn't Our Only Caribbean Problem." The Washington Post, 18 December 1983, p. C1.
- Ikle, Fred C. "The Three Elements of Our Caribbean Strategy." Defense 83, December 1983, p. 10-15.
- "International Security Relationships." Defense 84, September 1984, p. 44 and 45.
- "Is Drug War Merely a Holding Action?" The New York Times, 25 November 1984, p. E2.
- "KGB Suspected in Attack on Pope." The Washington Post, 15 February 1985, p. A32.
- Koch, Noel C. "Terrorism! The Undeclared War." Defense 85, March 1985, p. 7-13.
- Korb, Lawrence J. "DOD on the Drug War Front." Defense 85, February 1985, p. 17-25.
- Latimer, Thomas K. "U.S. Intelligence and the Congress." Strategic Review, Vol. 7, No. 3, 1979, p. 47-56.
- "Leftists Lose Optimism about Soon Prevailing in Central America." The Wall Street Journal, 15 October 1984, p. 1.
- "Officials Split on Shultz's Antiterrorism Speech." The Washington Post, 27 October 1984, p. A1 and A8.
- "Pepper: U.S. Needs Military Muscle to Fight Drug Traffic." The Miami Herald, 17 March 1985, p. 6A.
- "Peru: The Shadow of the Shining Path." Current History, February 1984, p. 78-82.
- "Perspectives on U.S. Intelligence." Washington Quarterly, Summer 1983, p. 15-48.
- Radu, Michael S. "Terror, Terrorism, and Insurgency in Latin America." Orbis, Spring 1984, p. 27-41.

"Rampant Drug Abuse Brings Call for Move Against Source Nations - Supply Soars as Traffic Corrupts Governments; Illicit Gains Are Said to Finance Terrorism." The New York Times, 9 September 1984, p. A1.

"Rangel Targets Foes of Antidrug War." The Washington Post, 16 February 1985, p. A6.

Schowengerdt, L.N., Jr. and Hart, T.P. "The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System." The Bulletin (U.S. Coast Guard Academy Alumni Association), November/December 1984, p. 24-29.

Semmel, Andrew K. "Security Assistance As an Instrument of Policy." Defense 83, December 1983, p. 16-21.

"Shultz Announces New Panel to Combat Terrorism." The Washington Post, 5 February 1984, p. A1.

"Soviets, Cubans Must Be Countered for Security of Central America and U.S." ROA National Security Report, July 1984, p. 1, 12-14.

"State-Sponsored Terror Called a Threat to U.S." The New York Times, 20 December 1983, p. A1 and A6.

"The Evil Empire." Newsweek, 25 February 1985, p. 14-18.

"U.S. Sees Democracy Rising in Latin American Nations." The Washington Post, 14 February 1985, p. A1 and A12.

"War Against Narcotics by U.S. Government Isn't Slowing Influx." The Wall Street Journal, 27 November 1984, p. 1.

Weinberger, Caspar W. "The State of Our Defenses." Defense 84, October 1984, p. 2-15.

Hearings and Prepared Statements

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Subcommittee on Europe. International Aspects of the Narcotics Problem. Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971.

U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Foreign Affairs. Task Force on International Narcotics Control. Recent Developments in Colombian Narcotics Control. Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984.

Statement of John C. Lawn. "Bulgarian Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking." Hearing. Washington: 3 May 1984.

- . Statement of John C. Lawn. "Recent Developments in Colombian Narcotics Control Efforts." Hearing. Washington: 24 May 1984.
- . Statement of Francis M. Mullen. "Cuban Government Involvement in Drug Trafficking." Hearing. Washington: 21 February 1984.
- U.S. Congress. House. Committee on Government Operations. Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture. Review of the Administration's Drug Interdiction Efforts. Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1983.
- . Statement of RADM Richard P. Cueroni. "Law Enforcement Operations in the Southeast U.S. and the Caribbean Basin." Hearing. Miami: 16 March 1985.
- . Statement of James N. Juliana. "Contributions of DOD to the Vice President's South Florida Task Force on Crime." Hearing. Washington: August 1982.
- . Statement of Dr. Lawrence J. Korb. "Department of Defense Support of Civilian Anti-Drug Efforts." Hearing. Washington: 6 September 1984.
- . Statement of Dr. Lawrence J. Korb. "Drug Law Enforcement Operations." Hearing. Miami: 15 March 1985.
- . Statement of Tidal W. McCoy. "Air Force Support to Civil Law Enforcement Agencies." Hearing. Miami: 16 March 1985.
- . Statement of Frank V. Monastero. "Drug Enforcement in the Bahamas." Hearing. Miami: 15 March 1985.
- . Statement of L.N. Schowengerdt. "Drug Law Enforcement Operations." Hearing. Miami: 16 March 1985.
- . Statement of Chase Untermeyer. "Department of the Navy Support to Interdict Drug Smugglers." Hearing. Miami: 16 March 1985.
- . Statement of William von Raab. "Drug Law Enforcement Operations." Hearing. Miami: 16 March 1985.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Armed Services Committee. Statement of Caspar W. Weinberger. "In Connection with the Fiscal Year 1986 Budget for the Department of Defense." Hearing. 4 February 1985.
- U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Foreign Relations. International Traffic in Narcotics. Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1971.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee to Investigate the Administration of the Internal Security Act and Other Internal Security Laws. Marihuana-Hashish Epidemic and Its Impact on U.S. Security: The Continuing Escalation. Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1975.

World Drug Traffic and Its Impact on U.S. Security. Hearings. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on the Judiciary. Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism. Statement of Francis M. Mullen. "Cuban Involvement in Drug Trafficking." Washington: 30 April 1983.

U.S. Congress. Senate. Committee on Labor and Human Resources. Subcommittee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse. Statement of Francis M. Mullen. "Drug-Related Terrorism." Hearing. Washington: 2 August 1984.

Other

A Report to the President from the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force. White Paper on Drug Abuse. Washington: 1975.

Armed Forces Staff College. Joint Staff Officer's Guide 1984 (AFSC PUB 1). Norfolk: 1984.

Drug Abuse Policy Office, Office of Policy Development. 1973 Federal Strategy on Drug Abuse. Washington: 1973.

Drug Abuse Policy Office, Office of Policy Development. 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. Washington: 1984.

Evans, Ernest. "Revolutionary Movements in Central America: The Development of a New Strategy." Paper presented during Public Policy Week, 5-8 December 1983, p. 167-193.

Letter from Elizabeth H. Dole to Robert C. McFarlane, 14 November 1983.

Letter from Senator Paula Hawkins to Newsweek, 11 March 1985.

Memorandum from Robert C. McFarlane to Elizabeth H. Dole, 14 December 1983.

"Narcotics." Special Edition of the Public Affairs Series "For Your Information." Agency for International Development. Washington: September 1984.

"Narcotics Newsletter." Drug Enforcement Administration.
Washington: August 1984.

National Bipartisan Commission. Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. Washington: 1984.

Office of the Vice President. Analysis and Policy Recommendations for the Surveillance and Detection of Narcotics Smugglers en route to the United States, August 1984 (Appendix B [unclas]). Washington: 1984 (draft).

Rand Report for the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency. Bureaucracy Does Its Thing: Institutional Constraints on U.S. - GVN Performance in Vietnam. Santa Monica: 1973.

Shultz, George P., Secretary of State. "The Campaign Against Drugs: The International Dimension." Address to the Miami Chamber of Commerce, Miami, FL: 14 September 1984.

Television interview of Secretary of State Shultz on the program "Good Morning America." Chicago, 4 March 1984.

U.S. Congress. House. "Evaluating the Federal Effort to Control Drug Abuse: Improving the Federal Strategy." Report by the Committee on Government Operations. Washington: 1973.

"The International Narcotics Trade and Its Relation to the United States." Report of Special Study Mission for the Committee on Foreign Affairs by Seymour Halpern. Washington and New York: 1972.

U.S. Congress. Senate. "Annual Report of the Senate Committee on Intelligence." Committee on Intelligence. Washington: 1977.

"Foreign and Military Intelligence." Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Washington: 1976.


"Intelligence Activities and the Rights of Americans." Select Committee to Study Governmental Operations with Respect to Intelligence Activities. Washington: 1976.

"Senate Committee on Intelligence Activities, a Report." Committee on Government Operations. Washington: 1976.

"The National Intelligence Estimates--A-B team Episode Concerning Strategic Capability and Objectives, a Report." Select Committee on Intelligence. Washington: 1978.

- U.S. Congress Staff Report. "Iran: Evaluation of U.S. Intelligence Performance Prior to November 1978." Senate Select Committee on Intelligence, Subcommittee on Evaluation. Washington: 1979.
- U.S. Department of Defense (JCS). DOD Dictionary of Military and Associated Terms (JCS Pub 1). Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984.
- . Military Posture FY 1986. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1985.
- U.S. Department of Defense (OSD). Annual Report to the Congress (FY 85). Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984.
- U.S. Department of Defense (MRA&L). DOD Cooperation with Civilian Law Enforcement Officials. DOD Directive 5525.5. Washington: 22 March 1982.
- . Disposal of Foreign Excess Personnel Property for Substantial Benefits or the Discharge of Claims. DOD Directive 4160.24. Washington: 24 July 1981.
- . Employment of Military Resources in the Event of Civil Disturbances. DOD Directive 3025.12. Washington: 19 August 1971.
- . Sale of Surplus Military Equipment to State and Local Law Enforcement and Firefighting Agencies. DOD Directive 4160.24. Washington: 27 January 1981.
- . Specialized or Technical Services Provided by the DOD Components to State and Local Units of Government. DOD Instruction 7730.53. Washington: 15 July 1970.
- . User Charges. DOD Instruction 7230.7. Washington: 12 June 1979.
- U.S. Department of Defense (DSAA). Foreign Military Sales, Foreign Military Construction Sales and Military Assistance Facts (as of 30 September 1984). Washington: 1985.
- U.S. Department of State. 1984 Annual Report on Human Rights. Washington: n.d.
- U.S. General Accounting Office. Stopping U.S. Assistance to Foreign Police and Prisons. Report to Congress. Washington: 1976.
- U.S. Laws, Statutes, etc. "The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972." Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1972.

- · "National Narcotics Act of 1984." Public Law 98-473, 98th Congress, 2d sess. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print. Off., 1984.
- · "The Presidential Protection Assistance Act of 1976." Public Law 94-524, 94th Congress. Washington: U.S. Govt. Print Off., 1976.
- · U.S. Code, Title 10--Armed Forces (amended by adding Chapter 18 [military cooperation with civilian law enforcement officials]), Washington: n.d.
- · U.S. Code, Title 18--Posse Comitatus Act, Washington: n.d.
- · U.S. Code, Title 21--The Controlled Substances Act and the Controlled Substances Import and Export Act, Washington: n.d.
- · U.S. Code, Title 31--The Economy Act, Washington: n.d.
- · U.S. Code, Titles 40 and 42--The Intergovernmental Cooperation Act of 1968, Washington: n.d.
- U.S. President. Executive Order 12333. "U.S. Intelligence Activities." 4 December 1981.
- U.S. President. Executive Order 12368. "Drug Abuse Policy Functions." 24 June 1982.
- Walt, Lewis W. "The World Drug Traffic; A Report to the Senate Subcommittee on Internal Security." Unpublished Paper. 14 September 1972.
- Workman, Robert B. "International Drug Trafficking: A Threat to National Security." Unpublished Research Paper. NDU Research Directorate, Washington, 1984.



NEWS

THE CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR

DATE: MAY 22 1985

Links grow between drug runners and terrorist groups

Exchange of profits for guns impairs enforcement effort

By Warren Richey
Staff writer of The Christian Science Monitor

Washington

The United States finds itself faced with growing links between terrorist organizations and international drug traffickers.

These links, observed most recently in Latin America, include a wider use of terrorist tactics by the narcotics traffickers themselves, as well as informal agreements between drug traffickers and established terrorist and insurgent groups.

This is an increasing concern among State Department and US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) officials. It was also raised in Senate committee hearings and in a symposium held by President Reagan's commission on organized crime last week.

The insurgent groups, such as the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia and Colombia's 19th of April movement, provide protection for drug-running operations in exchange for arms and money, according to a recent State Department

report.

The result, say government officials, is that US and other law-enforcement officers overseas find themselves increasingly outgunned, outmanned, and outfunded in their stepped-up war against narcotics smugglers.

"The DEA is attempting to fight a worldwide war on drugs with a force smaller than New York City's police department," Sen. Alfonse M. D'Amato (R) of New York told a Senate hearing last week.

US law-enforcement officials also point out that in some cases, part of the profits of the illicit narcotics trade is being channeled to groups that are using the money to wage politically motivated struggles to undermine and eventually overthrow governments. They are the same governments the US has urged to crack down on narcotics trafficking.

According to the State Department, the threat of terrorist tactics by drug runners is highest in Colombia and Peru. But offi-

cial note that there are concerns as well about activities in Bolivia, Jamaica, Mexico, and Burma.

US officials see the stepped-up use of terrorist tactics by drug runners as a counteroffensive to US successes in pursuing drug traffickers at home and overseas.

Of particular concern to Latin American drug traffickers has been Colombia's agreement last year to begin extraditing Colombian citizens to the US to face drug charges.

The traffickers are also concerned about American efforts in Colombia, Bolivia, and Peru aimed at destroying coca and other illicit crops in the fields, before they can be harvested and processed into narcotics.

The drug traffickers have responded in the past year with a series of bombings and shootings that US officials say are meant to intimidate US, Colombian, and other law-enforcement personnel.

The most recent examples of narcotics terrorism include the gunning down in April of Colombian Criminal Court Judge Alvaro Medina Ochoa; the February murder of DEA special agent Enrique Camarena Salazar in Mexico; and last year's slaying of Colombian Justice Minister Lara Bonilla.

There have also been reports of plots to assassinate the US ambassador to Bolivia and the former US ambassador to Colombia.

In addition, there have been intelligence reports that individual DEA agents have been targeted by Colombian "hit squads" in the US. Among those said to have been targeted is former DEA administrator Francis Mullen.

David L. Westrate, DEA's deputy assistant administrator, says that rather than being intimidated, the threats have acted as a catalyst for increased enforcement activity. To date, three of the four top suspects in the Camarena murder have been arrested by drug-enforcement authorities.

Nonetheless, US officials are concerned about the rise in the level of violence and what they see as a blurring of the distinction between criminal activities and insurgent groups.

In many countries in Latin America, the US is being portrayed by rebel groups as an imperialist force seeking to end coca production, which forms the economic backbone of many remote peasant villages.

US officials see the stepped-up use of terrorist tactics by drug runners as a counteroffensive to US successes in pursuing drug traffickers at home and overseas.

Carlos Lehder, a suspected major Colombian cocaine trafficker, told a Spanish television interviewer in January that cocaine is the "atomic bomb" with which to fight US imperialism and spark revolution of Latin America.

The issue arises at a time when Congress is debating the general question of whether the US should be involved in trying to counter terrorist threats with US-sanctioned terrorism. Last week the Washington Post reported Central Intelligence Agency involvement with a Lebanese group that subsequently carried out a car-bomb attack against an anti-American militant Shiite leader in Beirut. More than 80 people were killed.

There have been no reports of US drug-enforcement involvement in terrorist-like counterterrorism activities. But the Reagan administration has taken a more active role in working to head off potential terrorist attacks against US targets.

The blurring of the distinction between criminal groups and insurgent political organizations is a development that Secretary of State George Shultz observes as being part of a trend toward increased international lawlessness.

"Money from drug smuggling supports terrorists. Terrorists provide assistance to drug traffickers. Organized crime works hand in hand with these other outlaws for their own profit," Secretary Shultz said in a September speech.

"The sheer financial power of these trafficking organizations has threatened the political status quo," says Clyde D. Taylor of the State Department's Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

Mr. Taylor added during a recent Senate hearing that "a profit of \$20 million, even \$5 million — not large by international narcotics standards — can buy an election, finance a supply of arms for insurgency, and, in sum, destabilize legitimate governments and subordinate democratic processes."

NARCOTICS CONTROL DIGEST

Vol. 15 No. 11

May 29, 1985

Page 1

HOW ARE DRUG TRAFFICKING AND TERRORISM RELATED?

By David L. Westrate
Deputy Assistant Administrator
Drug Enforcement Administration
U.S. Department Of Justice

What is the nature of the relationship between terrorism and drug trafficking?

The terrorist/insurgent link to drug trafficking and the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations are matters of serious concern to the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA).

The mission of the DEA is to combat international drug trafficking and reduce the availability of illegal drugs in the U.S. Terrorism is not the primary focus of DEA operations. However, we are acutely aware of the threat terrorism poses to the U.S. and we aggressively pursue drug-related terrorist information.

Various terrorist and insurgent groups are either directly or indirectly involved in drug trafficking. Beginning in the 1970s, many of these groups began to generate funds through drug-related activities. This trend is especially prevalent in drug-source countries. To the best of our knowledge, however, no U.S.-based terrorist groups are involved in drug trafficking.

To put this drug-related terrorism and violence problem into perspective, I would first like to highlight examples of terrorist/insurgent organizations in various regions that we know are involved in drug-related activities. I will then discuss a situation of

(Continued on page two)

IN THIS ISSUE

DRUGS AND TERRORISM: What Are The International Connections?	1
REP. RANGEL: Wants Military Role Expanded	4
SEN. HOLLINGS: Wants Federal Interdiction Capabilities Upgraded	5
DEA: Training Moving To Quantico	6
LEGALIZATION: Minister Advocates It	6
NARC COMMITTEE: Meets With Spaniards	6
IN THE COURTS	7
RCMP: DEA Arrests Officer	8
WASHINGTON REPORT	9

U.N. SECRETARY GENERAL PROPOSES 1987 DRUG CONFERENCE

United Nations Secretary General Javier Perez de Cuellar, comparing drug abuse with the plagues of earlier ages, on May 24 proposed an international conference in 1987 to deal with all aspects of the problem.

"Illicit drugs, wherever they are produced or used, contaminate and corrupt, weakening the very fabric of society," he said in a speech to the U.S. Economic and Social Council. The time has come for the United Nations to undertake a "bold and new offensive" to combat drug trafficking and abuse, he told the 54-nation body concerned with social and economic issues.

An Independent News Summary & Information Exchange

heightened concern to DEA — the issue of the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug trafficking organizations to achieve their own limited political goals, whether it be the relaxation of enforcement efforts or the prevention of further extraditions.

It has become apparent to DEA that as we become more successful in combatting the drug trade, the level of violence and threats of violence have increased. Moreover, both the terrorists and the traffickers have immeasurably increased the level of anarchy and lethality through the acquisition of automatic weapons such as Uzis and other high firepower armaments. Not only does this endanger DEA and other U.S. employees in these countries, it also contributes to the destabilization of lawful governments.

Latin America

Our most revealing examples, based on DEA investigative activities, of terrorist/insurgent involvement in drug trafficking are in the drug-source countries such as Colombia in Latin America and Burma in the Golden Triangle.

Colombia is a major marijuana producer and a refinement and transshipment point for most of the world's cocaine. Colombia has been victimized by political violence for the last 30 years. Within the last 10 years, DEA has received information on the involvement of several Colombian terrorist/insurgent groups in the drug trade. The two groups most prominently involved with drug trafficking are the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia, commonly referred to as the FARC, and the terrorist group 19th of April Movement, or M-19.

The FARC is the armed wing of the Colombian Communist Party and is the oldest, largest, best armed and best disciplined insurgent group in Colombia. The FARC operates through approximately 25 fronts. Almost half of these fronts are based in coca and cannabis growing areas. The FARC cultivates some coca but derives more profit by collecting protection money from drug growers and traffickers. The traffickers will sometimes also furnish arms and ammunition. In return, FARC units protect drug growing and trafficking areas such as airfields, and provide a warning network for the traffickers.

In March 1984, Colombian authorities raided a group of cocaine laboratories known as Tranquilandia and seized 10 tons of cocaine and cocaine base. While landing at the clandestine airstrip, the authorities engaged in a firefight with approximately 30 people in fatigue type uniforms. These people are believed to be members of the FARC. Follow-up operations in the remote Llanos area of Colombia uncovered a FARC camp within one-half mile of a traffickers' cocaine laboratory site. Whenever drug traffickers and FARC

units operate in the same area, it is likely that a cooperative agreement has been reached between the two groups.

DEA has received various reports of the M-19 extorting money from drug growers and traffickers, along with cultivating drugs. In DEA's most significant investigation of the arms-drugs connection, the M-19 was identified as a recipient of arms from Cuba via the smuggling network of Colombian drug trafficker Jaime Guillot-Lara. Guillot had an arrangement with several high-level officials of the Cuban Government in which the Cubans provided a safe haven for Guillot's drug smuggling vessels from Colombia destined for the U.S. In return, Guillot agreed to pay the Cubans for this facilitation.

Guillot also assisted the Cubans by using his ships to smuggle arms to the M-19 in Colombia. In November 1981, one of Guillot's ships, the *Karina*, offloaded a large quantity of weapons onto another Guillot ship, the *Monarca*. Shortly after this, the *Karina* was sunk during a battle with the Colombian Navy and went down with an estimated 100 tons of weapons on board. Ten days later the *Monarca* was seized by Colombian authorities after it successfully delivered its weapons cargo to the M-19. In November 1982, Guillot, four high-ranking Cuban officials and nine others were indicted in Miami for violations of Federal drug laws. Guillot and the four Cuban officials are still fugitives.

Two other Colombian groups, the National Liberation Army (ELN) and the Popular Liberation Army (EPL) have been the subjects of reports asserting that they "tax" drug growers and traffickers in areas of ELN or EPL operation.

During the last three years Peru has been plagued by violence from members of the Sendero Luminoso or Shining Path. Although DEA currently has no evidence to prove Sendero Luminoso is directly involved in the drug trade, it does appear to be using the drug issue as a critical factor in the formulation of its tactics. During 1984, several anti-coca projects, including a U.S.-supported crop substitution program, were attacked by armed mobs, resulting in serious injury and several deaths. These attacks are likely the result of drug traffickers inciting the local peasants, who stand to lose their livelihood if coca production is halted.

Sendero Luminoso's ideology is to create a rural-based revolution that will rid the predominantly Indian population of the foreign and "imperialistic" influences of the U.S. and of the non-Indian governing classes. Many of the Indian peasants make their living from coca cultivation and the Sendero Luminoso has presented the anti-coca issue as an example of the central government attempting to take away the livelihood of the Indian population. This creates a climate that may be encouraging the attacks on anti-coca projects.

Burma

Halfway around the world in Burma, the Burmese Communist Party (BCP) has been trying to exert its control over the Shan State since Burma gained independence from the British in 1948. The Shan State is the primary opium poppy cultivation area in the Golden Triangle. For years the BCP was involved in the narcotics trade to some degree, such as taxing poppy growing farmers. BCP drug activity expanded greatly in the late '70s. The BCP now produces heroin in its own refineries.

In the 1960s and '70s the Shan United Army (SUA) was an insurgent group, fighting for the independence of the Shan State. The SUA used profits from the heroin trade to finance its insurgency. It now focuses on obtaining profits from the production, smuggling, and sale of heroin and heroin base. The SUA is now primarily engaged in the drug trade for profit. It is the clearest example of an insurgent group that has been corrupted by drug profits and has lost its political zeal.

The Middle East

Another historical example of the relationship between traffickers and terrorists involves Noubar Sofoyan, a documented heroin and hashish trafficker connected with the Justice Commandos of the Armenian Genocide, one of several Armenian terrorist groups that are avowed enemies of the Government of Turkey. Sofoyan was arrested in Greece and subsequently released to Lebanese authorities. He remains a fugitive as the subject of a 1980 DEA investigation and his current whereabouts is unknown.

Using Terrorist Tactics

There is another issue I would like to discuss which is related to terrorism and which I mentioned earlier — the increasing use of terrorist tactics by drug traffickers to attain limited political objectives. This new development poses a significant threat to U.S. interests and to the stability of elected governments in drug-source countries.

Drug law enforcement has always been a high risk activity but this escalated violence goes far beyond the normal anticipated danger involved in drug investigations and arrests.

Certain drug traffickers have adopted terrorist tactics to fight anti-drug efforts. While these traffickers are not thought of as terrorists by definition, their use of threats, violence, assassination and kidnapping to dissuade a government from a strong drug law enforcement policy can certainly be characterized as terroristic. These intensified violent acts constitute attempts by drug traffickers to intimidate sovereign governments into weakening or abandoning their drug control policies that have resulted in recent successes against international drug organizations. The intended

aim of these threats is to alter the enforcement environment of our law enforcement presence overseas and render us incapable of performing our foreign mission. Since DEA has a significant presence in foreign countries, we are concerned that drug traffickers are increasingly resorting to violence to achieve their aims.

The use of these terrorist tactics is most evident in Colombia, where just over one year ago Colombian Minister of Justice Rodrigo Lara-Bonilla was assassinated on a Bogota street.

In an attempt to halt the extradition of Colombian drug traffickers to the U.S., Colombian traffickers have made many threats against the Government of Colombia, the U.S. presence in Colombia, and the DEA specifically.

Many of these threats have come from major Colombian cocaine violator Carlos Lehder. An outspoken opponent of extradition, Lehder stated in a January 1985 radio interview that if the extradition of Colombians was not stopped, he would have 500 Americans killed. Lehder said he had established contacts with the M-19 as well as elements of the police and army to form a force of 500,000 to defend the national sovereignty. In a January 1985 interview shown on Spanish television, Lehder stated that, although he was not involved in the assassination of Minister Lara, he could justify the killing. Lehder also stated that cocaine is the "atomic bomb" for the revolution of Latin America to use against U.S. imperialism.

Traffickers have not hesitated to follow up their threats with violence. In November 1984, a car bomb exploded outside the fence of the U.S. Embassy in Bogota, killing one Colombian woman. In January, 1985, a bomb exploded at the Meyer Institute, a language school in Bogota owned by a U.S. citizen. Three Colombians were injured. These bombings are believed to be the work of drug traffickers. DEA has recently received information from a number of sources that Colombian traffickers may attempt to attack DEA personnel and facilities in the U.S.

There are numerous other examples of drug-related violence. On March 16, the Spanish Embassy Chancery in Bogota was fired on by six men traveling in a jeep. This attack was believed to be in retaliation for continued incarceration in Spain of major Colombia cocaine violators whom the U.S. is seeking to extradite. In late April, an influential Colombian judge involved in the anti-drug fight was gunned down. He was the eighth judge murdered this year. Significantly, judges in Colombia are the primary investigating officials in drug cases. Therefore, the assassination of a judge is a clear attempt to not only intimidate the judicial process but to subvert the entire legal system. Nearly 24 judges have been murdered in the past two years.

Elsewhere in Latin America, DEA became aware of a plot by drug traffickers to assassinate the U.S. Ambassador to Bolivia last November. The traffickers were angered

by the Ambassador's leadership role in drug suppression in Bolivia and Peru. Drug violators in Bolivia pose a threat to the stability of that government. Violators have helped to arm campesinos in the principal coca growing regions, and helped to encourage resistance to central government authority and anti-drug efforts.

Shaping Public Opinion

Violence also is used to shape public opinion. For example, a Colombian public affairs network aired a show in January in which panelists debated extradition. Five of the panelists opposed extradition and only one expressed moderate support. This lack of support for extradition is not surprising since a legal advisor to the Justice Ministry was murdered after making a passionate plea for a treaty on the same TV program a year earlier.

In Mexico, DEA Special Agent Enrique Camarena and a Mexican pilot were kidnapped and brutally murdered in an attempt to intimidate DEA into weakening our enforcement pressure there. These tactics did not work, but rather strengthened our resolve. Three major traffickers believed to be involved in the heinous crime have been arrested.

These terrorist tactics are not limited to Latin America. In Sicily, a number of prominent police, judicial and other government officials investigating drug trafficking and traditional organized crime have been assassinated. In the most recent attacks, a car bomb in the Sicilian city of Trapani was targeted against Magistrate Carlo-Palermo, who recently oversaw an investigation into a large drugs and arms smuggling ring in Trento. The bomb injured Judge Palermo and five bodyguards. It killed a 30-year-old woman and her two six-year-old twin boys. On April 20, a powerful bomb destroyed the summer home of the Christian Democratic nominee for mayor of Palermo, who had identified a number of prominent Sicilian politicians as members of Sicilian organized crime. In Southeast Asia, DEA has recently received several threats against personnel in Thailand.

While the above events were not carried out by what we traditionally define as terrorist groups, the violent methods and planned effects of intimidation and fear are the same as those practiced by terrorists and are just as serious a threat to U.S. interests worldwide.

An Even Greater Threat

In summary, DEA believes that the relationship between drug trafficking and terrorism is expanding. While terrorist or insurgent groups are not a threat to established drug smuggling organizations and their operations, it is important to note that terrorist and insurgent groups do not need to compete with the major trafficking organizations to obtain significant drug-related profits.

DEA believes that subversive groups are beginning to acquire such profits which gives them the potential to

greatly increase the frequency and sophistication of their operations. This poses an even greater terrorism threat worldwide.

In the last several years DEA has received drug-related information on rural insurgents, urban terrorists, liberation movements, arms traffickers, left and right wing political groups and high-level officials acting on behalf of their governments. This emerging trend of using drug trafficking to support political ends represents a major change in the historical pattern of drug trafficking in which drug traffickers were only interested in profits. During the 1980s, political activists, subversives and even some high-level government officials have become involved in drug trafficking to finance political objectives. This expanding use of drug trafficking for political purposes has already had an effect on, and could have far-reaching implications for, drug law enforcement worldwide and U.S. foreign policy.

The rapidly expanded use of terrorist tactics by drug traffickers also indicates a significant change in tactics by some drug traffickers. Previously, traffickers viewed law enforcement successes as part of the cost of doing business and did not react violently to avoid provoking governments into more serious action. Now, in the wake of continued drug control and law enforcement success, especially in Latin America, the trafficking organizations have been disrupted and the traffickers are on the defensive. They have reacted not only with threats but with the commission of terrorist acts.

This violence is an attempt by traffickers to intimidate DEA, the U.S. and foreign governments and force a change in drug control policy and inhibit effective law enforcement action. Drug traffickers, with their vast financial resources and power, pose a significant threat to drug law enforcement efforts. DEA considers this to be the most significant issue facing drug law enforcement today. ■

MILITARY ROLE IN DRUG WAR NEEDS TO BE EXPANDED, BUT CAUTIOUSLY, REP. RANGEL SAYS



The chairman of a key House drug panel said on May 15 there is "no question" the military role in drug enforcement needs to be expanded but said he wants to "avoid a confrontation" with the Pentagon over the issue.


Rep. Charles Rangel (D-N.Y.) made the comments after a two-hour, closed meeting with members of his Select Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control and Defense Department representatives — including Lt. Gen. R. Dean Tice, director of the Defense Department's Drug Enforcement Task Force.






NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES PROJECTS
TOPICS AY 1984-85


2 April 1985

<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
01. Improving Night War Fighting Capabilities	AF/XOXIR COL Joe Redden	Mr. Stevenson (COL Andre) (ICAF) (ICAF)	COL Dula LTC Tobin LTC Goodrich LTC John Long
02. The Decision Process for Chemical Weapons Employment	COL Tadmey, HC, USA HQ 71516	LTC Alger (LTC Jacobs)	CAPT Steele
03. A Framework for Analysis: Understanding U.S. Strategy for Promoting Int'l Cooperation in Space Science and Technology	NASA: Int'l Affairs Div Jim Pederson 453-8440	Dr. Almond (Dr. Moulton)	LTC Helt
05. Regional Security in the Eastern Caribbean: Policy Direction and U.S. Coast Guard Involvement	CAPT Versau, USCG 426-2280	CAPT Thibault (CAPT Miller)	CAPT Cunningham CDR Saunders
06. The National Training Center: A Critique of Data Collection and Dissemination	Jack Hiller, ARI Presidio of Monterey, CA 929-8316/8308	COL Buckley (COL Andre)	LTC Hale COL Simpson LTC Sutherland
07. The National Security Planks of Major Party Platforms	NSC	MAJ Kozak (COL Siner)	Ms. McCloud LTC Roggero CDR Wittenberg
08. The Outlook for Afghanistan	 CIA, NESA	Amb Beyer (LTC Isom)	Mr. Flynn
09. <i>US - Tanzania Relation:</i> Eastern Africa and the SW Indian Ocean: Implications of the Islamic Revival <i>Background, Issues, Prospects</i>	 CIA, ALA	LTC Isom (AMB Beyer)	Mr. MacFarlane
10. Cuba in a Warsaw Pact Conflict	Jack Morrison, NSA 688-6602	COL Gardiner (COL Huser)	COL Heflebower

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
11.	Panama Canal Defense After 2000	 CIA, ACA	COL Huser (COL Cooper)	LTC Bailey
12.	China's Modernization Program: The Role of the Banking System	Marvin Strahan, NSA 688-7978	Mr. Eastman (COL Wilhelm)	Mr. McGrath LTC Voskuhl
13.	A Comparison of the Defense Policy Process in the House and Senate	Army L&L	MAJ Kozak (COL Stafford)	Mr. Bonanno Mr. Bozzelli CAPT Evans
14.	The War Powers Resolution and its Future	OSD L&L	MAJ Kozak (Dr. Almond)	LTC Hoherz CDR Korba
15A.	Congressional Attitudes on the Use of Military Power as an Instrument of U.S. Foreign Policy	OSD L&L	MAJ Kozak (LTC Alger)	Ms. Jenkins Mr. Miko
15B.	Effective Legislative Liaison and the United States Senate	OSD L&L	MAJ Kozak (COL Siner)	LTC Jones
16.	Department of Defense Support of United States Drug Control Efforts	Robert McBrien, Treasury 566-8534	LTC Walker (Dr. Pierson)	CAPT Barker COL La Grua Ms. Zimmer
17.	Korean Peninsula: The Unification Plan	LTC Williams, FCC, USA HQ 79459	Mr. Straus (COL Buckley)	CDR Meserve
18.	Cambodia: The U.S. Role	DIA/DB-2	Mr. Gilhooly (Mr. Straus)	Mr. Jameson
19.	The Strategic Implications of the FAR (Force D'Action Rapide) for the Defense of Western Europe	State (EUR/RPE)	CAPT Thibault (Dr. Szabo)	LTC Blanchette
20.	No Easy Answers: The Cyprus Problem and its Implications for NATO	MAJ Conn, EUCOM EC J2, 6285	COL Buckley (Dr. Pierce)	COL Adams

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
21.	Bundesmarine: Operational Capabilities and Contribution to the Alliance	CAPT Feran SHAPE-SPACOS 4990	CAPT Huhn (CAPT Thibault)	CAPT T. Brady CDR Foley CAPT Pate CDR Russell
22.	Lebanon: Lessons for Future Use of American Forces in Peacekeeping	State PM/Policy OSD	Dr. Davis (LTC O'Neill)	CDR Malone CDR Miller LTC Robben
23.	Prospects of a 500,000 Person Army National Guard by 1990	OASD (Reserve Affairs)	LTC Walker (COL Andre)	LTC Opsahl
24.	Congress and the European Troop Strength Question	EUCOM and NATO	LTC Walker (COL Stafford)	CAPT Pignotti
25.	NATO Burdensharing or How to Get There From Here?	 CIA, EURA	Dr. Davis (LTC Alger)	LTC Clarke
27.	Crisis in the Philippines and U.S. Alternatives	LTC Rice, FCC, USA HQ 79459	Mr. Straus (COL Buckley)	Mr. J. Adams
28.	The New GI Educational Assistance Bill: A Case Study of Bureaucratic Politics	LTC Pine, Spacecmd, MPT 692-5624	LTC Walker (LTC Alger)	LTC Harris
29.	U.S. Role in Saudi Arabian Security	 CIA, NESA	LTC O'Neill (COL May)	LTC G. Thomson
30.	Public Diplomacy and Foreign Policy	USIA	Mr. Coffey (COL Gardiner)	LTC Cook
31.	An Approach to the Army Active/ Reserve Force Mix Dilemma for the 1990's and Beyond	MAJ Dotsey, SSC, USA HQ 48242	LTC Walker (COL Wilhelm)	LTC Austin
32.	Brazil's Military Industry and Implications for U.S. Strategic Interests	 CIA, ALA	COL Huser (Mr. Coffey)	LTC Arrants

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
33.	Does Training of Latin American Officers in U.S. Schools Provide Future Influence?	General Gorman Southern Command	Mr. Coffey (COL Huser)	LTC Carpenter
34.	What's in it for India? Indo-Soviet Relations and the Prospects Therefor	[REDACTED] CIA, NESA	Mr. Stevenson (Mr. Eastman)	Mr. Wollemborg
35.	Information Transfer in Soviet Science and Engineering	Bruce Black, NSA 688-7794	Mr. Eastman (Mr. Stevenson)	Mr. Watson
36.	The Comparative Peace Movements of Great Britain, West Germany, and France	Robert Baron, Chief West European Br, USIA 485-7143	Dr. Szabo (Dr. Pierce)	CDR Kilmer
37A.	Military Civic Action in a Counter-Insurgency Strategy: An Engineer Proposal	MAJ Herrly, SSP, USA HQ 72965	COL Cooper (COL Buckley)	COL Colan
37B.	US Army Strategy for Low-Intensity Conflict in Central America	MAJ Herrly, SSP, USA HQ 72965	COL Cooper (COL Buckley)	COL W. Johnson COL E. Russell
38.	Syria After Hafez Al-Assad	[REDACTED] CIA, NESA	LTC O'Neill (LTC Isom)	COL Sheetz
39.	Toward a Realistic Policy for Combatting Terrorism	COL Alcalá, FDQ, HQ USA 79570	Dr. Almond (LTC O'Neill)	COL Bryant CAPT Naro LTC Parrish
40A.	NATO: Strengthening the Strategy	[REDACTED] CIA, OGJ	COL Kuiper (Mr. Stevenson)	COL Andrews
40B.	The Terrorist Threat to U.S. Off-shore Petroleum Sites in the Gulf of Mexico and Refineries in the Louisiana Area	[REDACTED] CIA, OGJ	COL Cooper (Dr. Almond)	LTC Rollings
40C.	The Terrorist Threat to Economic Targets	[REDACTED] CIA, OGJ	Dr. Pierson (Dr. Almond)	Mr. R. Nicholson

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
41A.	Language and Demographic Problems Impacting on the Soviet Armed Forces	State	Mr. Stevenson (COL Kuiper)	LTC Moore
41B.	Sixteen Survivors: Non-Slavic General Officers of the Soviet Armed Forces	State	Mr. Stevenson (COL Kuiper)	LTC Kress
41C.	The Soviet Counter Propaganda Campaign	State	Mr. Stevenson (COL Kuiper)	CDR Zysk
42.	Soviet Military Policy: Subject of an Emerging Debate?		CIA, SOVA COL Kuiper (Mr. Stevenson)	LTC V. Nichols LTC Robertson
43.	Soviet Security Policy Toward China: The Limits of Change		CIA, SOVA Mr. Stevenson (COL Wilhelm)	Mr. Zinoman
44.	Zimbabwe: U.S. Policy Rationale		LTC Isom (Amb Beyer)	Mr. Barcas
45.	The Case for a Second-Class Navy: Military Reform and Reagan's Maritime Strategy		OP-60 CAPT Thibault (CAPT Huhn)	CDR Becker
46.	Combined Intelligence		COL Gardiner (Mr. Eastman)	COL Biddinger
47.	Conflict in the Western Sahara: A Dilemma for U.S. Policy		Dr. Deibel (LTC Isom)	LTC Bircher
48.	The Ethical Implications of Blinding Laser Weapons	CAPT Thibault	CAPT Thibault (COL Cooper)	CDR J. Brady ✓
49.	Cuban Influence in the Caribbean; Strategies for Containment		COL Huser (Mr. Eastman)	Mr. Brandon

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
50.	Roots of Terrorism in Shi'ite Islam		LTC O'Neill (COL Andre)	Mr. Briggs
51.	U.S. Military and Oil Security Options in the Persian Gulf	Mr. Bart House DOE	Dr. Deibel (LTC O'Neill)	Mr. Burns LTC Skidmore
52.	Examination of a Biennial Budget for the Department of Defense	Dept of Navy OPA	Mr. Eastman (MAJ Kozak)	CAPT Camden CAPT Grabowsky
53.	Productivity Using Japanese-Style Management: Any Defense Industry Applications		Dr. Moulton (COL Wilhelm)	CDR Campbell
55A.	Soviet Strategic Maskirovka and Active Measures: the Intelligence Response		COL Kuiper (Mr. Stevenson)	CAPT Vosilus
55B.	Soviet Active Measures		Mr. Gilhooly (Mr. Coffey)	Mr. Dandar
56.	U.S. Policy on Research, Develop- ment, Export and Acquisition of Supercomputers		Dr. Moulton (Mr. Gilhooly)	Mr. Darnell
57.	Special Operations Forces: Prospectives of Employment and Command and Control in Peace and War	COL Myerchin/LTC Seymour DAMO-ODSO, HQS, DA 697-1700/4140	LTC Alger (Dr. Pierson)	LTC Davis
58.	Some Implications for U.S. Army Security Assistance to China		COL Wilhelm (CAPT Miller)	LTC Derrah
59.	Telecommunications for National Security and Emergency Preparedness: Outlook for the Future	COL Anderson Defense Como Agency 692-2887	Dr. Pierson (Dr. Almond)	COL Donahue

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
60.	Trade with the PRC (COCOM and Related Policy Issues)	USDOC/ITA Office of Export Admin John Boydock, Director 377-4188	COL Wilhelm (Mr. Straus)	Ms. Ebeling
61.	Role of the Soviet Navy in the Indian Ocean		CAPT Huhn (Dr. Deibel)	CDR Eckley
62.	Large Caliber Sniper Threat on U.S. National Command Authority Figures		COL Cooper (COL May)	Mr. Edwards
63.	Needed: U.S. Military Man in Space	JPSS/JCS	COL Siner (LTC Jacobs)	LTC Farkas COL Koenigsberg
64.	The Irish Connection	FBI, H.B. Brandon	Mr. Gilhooly (LTC O'Neill)	LTC Finneran
65.	The Strategic Defense Initiative: A Case Study in National Security Planning		Dr. Moulton (COL M. Smith)	Mr. Fuller
66.	Who is NSA?		Mr. Gilhooly (Mr. Eastman)	Mr. Grantham
67.	Operation Urgent Fury: A Battalion Commander's Perspective		COL Andre (COL Gardiner)	LTC Hamilton
68.	National Security Organization: A Visionary Concept of a Nat'l Security Framework for our Third Century		LTC Jacobs (COL M. Smith)	LTC Higgins LTC Savarda COL Southerland
69.	Manning the OJCS--Are we Sending our Best?		LTC Jacobs (CAPT Miller)	LTC Karp
70.	Proposals for Strengthening the Nat'l Security Telecommunications Policymaking Process		LTC Alger (Dr. Almond)	Dr. Krell

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
71.	Technology Policy--Existence, Trends and Issues	COL Alan Gropman	Dr. Moulton (CAPT Thibault)	LTC Lyles COL Westover
72.	National Security Implications of the Soviet Manned Space Program		Dr. Moulton (LTC Isom)	Mr. Magnan
73.	Arms Control: Subject of Continuing Debate		COL Stafford (Dr. Pierce)	COL Maiocco Mr. Schanzer
75.	The Strategic Implications of Maritime Pre-positioning Ships as a Rapid Response Force		COL Cooper (CAPT Miller)	LTC Brooke LTC McCorkle
76.	Turkish Military Strength and Economic Development	Ms. ArmaJane Karaer Desk Officer, Turkey State Dept, 632-1562	COL Buckley (Dr. Szabo)	LTC Neill
77.	Containerization--Surface 1990's		Dr. Pierson (LTC Walker)	LTC Nix
78.	Spain and NATO Integration: Implications for U.S. Policy		COL Gardiner (Dr. Deibel)	Mr. Planty
79.	The Director of Central Intelligence Committee Structure-Purpose, Value and Shortcomings		Mr. Gilhooly (Mr. Eastman)	Ms. Richards
80.	The Soviet Attack Carrier-- Why, What, When, Where, and How?	CAPT Thibault	CAPT Thibault (CAPT Huhn)	LTC Richwine
81.	Soviet Policy Choices in Europe in 1985		Dr. Szabo (Dr. Deibel)	Mr. Riveles
82.	Antisatellite (ASAT) Weapons: Are They a Valid Bargaining Chip?	Dr. Kent Stansberry Dep Director, OASD/ISP	Dr. Moulton (COL Siner)	COL Schnelzer

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
84.	Working with NATO: Improving the DOD Coordination Process		COL Andre (Dr. Deibel)	LTC Shore
85.	Light Infantry Division in the Light Corps		LTC Jacobs (LTC Alger)	COL Starbird
86.	The Threat of Int'l Terrorism to U.S. Embassies and Foreign Policy		COL M. Smith (COL Stafford)	Mr. Taylor
87.	The Future Role of the U.S. Army Corps of Engineers in the Modernization of China	Mr. Frank DiMatteo Chief, Int'l Affairs, OCE 272-0006	COL Wilhelm (CAPT Miller)	COL Thomas
88.	OSD Centralization: Are Responsibilities of Military Planners and Programmers Being Assumed by Their Civilian Counterparts?		COL M. Smith (Dr. Deibel)	LTC T. Thompson
89.	The Two Way Street: US/European Armaments Cooperation Within NATO		Dr. Szabo (LTC Alger)	Mr. Von Zastrow
90.	The Latin American Debt Crisis		Dr. Pierson (COL Huser)	Mr. Whitney
91.	The US/UNESCO and the New World Information Order	Office of Commo & UNESCO Affairs, Department of State Ms. Jean Soso, Dep Dir	Mr. Coffey (Mr. Straus)	Mr. D. Williams
92.	Public Diplomacy and the INF Modernization		Dr. Szabo (COL Stafford)	Mr. J. Williams
93.	Illicit Drugs: A Cause for Concern		COL Siner (Mr. Gilhooly)	LTC Webster
94.	US Horizontal Escalation Options and Soviet Force Structure		COL Kuiper (Mr. Eastman)	COL Connell COL Fleming

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
95.	Threats to Political Stability in Argentina		COL Huser (Mr. Coffey)	Mr. Pillsbury
96.	Tensions in Crisis Management: From Demonstration to Engagement		Dr. Davis (Dr. Szabo)	COL Wolfe
97.	Allocation of Communications Satellite Systems During Crisis and Conflict		Dr. Almond (COL Huser)	Mr. Leidenheimer
98.	A Suggested National Strategy to Counter Terrorism		LTC Jacobs (COL Andre)	Mr. Olson
99.	The Future of the All-Volunteer US Air Force		COL Kuiper (COL Gardiner)	COL Iverson COL McBroom
100.	Recovery of Nuclear Weapons	COL Robert Linhard NSC Staff	Dr. Davis (COL May)	COL Cox
101.	The Cuban Missile Crisis		COL Gardiner (AMB Beyer)	LTC Lesley
102.	NATO and Out-of-Area Planning: Realism Without Blinders		COL M. Smith (Dr. Szabo)	LTC MacLaren
103.	Needed Changes to Senior Defense Organizations in Japan		Mr. Straus (COL Siner)	CDR Tande
104.	Manning the 600 Ship Navy: Toward a Higher Quality Sailor		CAPT Miller (CAPT Huhn)	CDR Cramer
105.	The U.S. Foreign Service: A Fit of Crisis or a Crisis of Fit?		Dr. Szabo (AMB Beyer)	Mr. Strickler

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
106.	Develop an Assessment of Future Correlation Between Mideast Oil and U.S. Maritime Strategy		CAPT Huhn (CAPT Thibault)	CDR Korbet ✓
107.	Public Awareness and the Strategic Defense Initiative		Mr. Coffey (COL M. Smith)	LTC Fabian
108.	The Interaction Between the Army and Congressional Staffs in the Authorization Process		COL Wilhelm (LTC Walker)	COL Ward
109.	Congressional Perspectives on Trends and Issues Affecting Nat'l Security: 1985-1989		MAJ Kozak (COL Cooper)	COL Tucker
110.	Congressional Oversight of DOD Activities by Non-Defense Committees		COL M. Smith (MAJ Kozak)	COL Hawley LTC Lillard COL McIlvoy LTC Todd
111.	Congressional Defense Committees: Structure, Procedures and Influences		COL M. Smith (LTC Walker)	LTC Hall COL Wallace COL Williford
112.	Robotics Competition--U.S. Vs. Japan	DARPA	Dr. Moulton (CAPT Miller)	LTC Holeman
113.	The C-17 and Congress		MAJ Kozak (COL Siner)	LTC Begert COL McAlear
114.	Special Operations		COL Gardiner (LTC Alger)	CDR Sandoz ✓
115.	Assessment of Man: A Requirement for Special Operations		LTC Jacobs (LTC Isom)	COL Whittle

<u>#</u>	<u>TOPIC</u>	<u>SPONSOR</u>	<u>FAC SPVR</u> (2nd Reader)	<u>STUDENTS</u>
RESEARCH SEMINARS				
401F.	Smaller, Heavy Divisions		COL McDevitt (COL May)	LTC Bergeron LTC Chapman LTC Goff
402E.	Navy Combat Medical Care in the Years 2000-2005: Projected Needs and Concept of Operations		MG Smith (Mr. Coffey)	CAPT Johnson
402F.	Methods and Techniques of Long- Range Planning		MG Smith (Mr. Coffey)	LTC Stewart
402G.	Coping With Alternative Soviet Futures: A Case Study in Strategic Planning		MG Smith (Mr. Coffey)	Mr. Whitehouse

1985

INDEPENDENT RESEARCH (IR) PROJECTS

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>RESEARCH FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓ IR 1	Defense Spending and War Fighting Capabilities-- U.S. Marine Corps, 1974 to Present	K. R. Burns	Dr. Losman
✓ IR 2	U.S. Navy Air-to-Air Missile Procurement: A Sustainable AAW Capability for Forces Afloat	D. T. Seder	CAPT Runzo
✓ IR 3	Air Force Basing in the Year 2000	S. L. Pamerleau J. Bannwart B. Ricks J. Richards	COL Scott
✓ IR 4	Management of Joint Programs: Roadmap to Success	C. N. Newill B. P. Prokuski R. D. Bleau	COL Mulkey
✓ IR 5	The DOD Laboratories: A Resource Used and Abused	E. A. Brown	Dr. Beckstead
✓ IR 6	Stockholm Syndrome: A Vital Component of Hostage Negotiations	H. C. Hawkins	Dr. Johns
✓ IR 8	Application of Artificial Intelligence for Command and Control of Ground Combat Vehicles	J. E. Longhouser	LTC Pachler
✓ IR 9	Current Military Sales and Security Assistance Programs: Their Impact on Construction in the Middle East During A Mobilization	B. Myerchin	Dr. Schandler
✓ IR 10	Mobilization of Chemical/Biological Decontamination Assets	G. Eifried	COL Harmon

Enclosure (1)

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>RESEARCH FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓ IR 11	Surge Assessment for the M107, 155MM HE Projectile	S. French B. M. Garnett W. R. Holmes R. P. Szydlo	COL Sabin
✓ IR 12	Policy and Organization Issues of a Unified Command for Space	T. Scanlan J. R. Morrell	COL Endicott (INSS)
✓ IR 13	Pre-Hostility Use of Naval Reserve Forces in the Caribbean	C. C. Karlsson M. C. White	CAPT Runzo
✓ IR 14	U.S. Specialized Weapons Designs for Foreign Military Sales (FMS)	M. L. Brazelton	Dr. Schandler
✓ IR 15	Emergency Mobilization of the Motor Carrier Industry	C. A. Hollingshead	E. White (Academic Affairs Directorate)
✓ IR 16	U.S. Strategic Force Modernization and Arms Control Programs: Mutually Supportive or Exclusive	H. Gordon	COL Lewis
✓ IR 17	Mobilization of the Integrated Undersea Surveillance System (IUSS)	G. M. Parrish	CAPT Eyler
✓ IR 18	Use of Merchant Marine Resources in Support of Peacetime and Crisis Defense Requirements	T. B. Ellsworth	CAPT Musgrove
✓ IR 19	Airline Deregulation and the Support of the Civil Reserve Air Fleet (CRAF)	P. V. Botelho	COL White
✓ IR 20	Use of Game Theory Computer Models to Assist in the Development of Tactical Air Force Procurement Strategies	R. E. Smith	COL Scott
✓ IR 21	Trapshot: Implications of a Near-Term SDI Concept	W. E. Belden	Dr. Smernoff (SCDC)
✓ IR 22	Risk Assessment in Systems Acquisition	R. Muldrow	LTC McWilliams

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>RESEARCH FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓ IR 23	A Professional Development Approach for the Army's Facilities/Contract Construction Management Officers	P. E. O'Neill	COL Sabin
✓ IR 24	Case Study--MX Missile: To Be or Not To Be	R. L. Morey	Dr. Waterman
✓ IR 26	The Missile X Case: Cost Growth During the First Year of Production	W. F. Hecker	Dr. Stekler
✓ IR 28	NATO Board of Auditors: Impact on Infrastructure Operations	G. Egan	COL Gaston Dr KYRIAKOPOULAS
✓ IR 29	Mobilization of U.S. Navy Cryptological Resources	J. E. Gourley	Mr. Eastman (NWC)
✓ IR 30	A Guide to Legislative Controls Over Defense Budget Execution	J. Coleman	COL Sabin
✓ IR 31	Strategic Implications of the Loss of U.S. Bases in the Philippines	R. A. Word S. H. Baker	Mr. Strauss (NWC)
✓ IR 32	Conflict of Interest and Military Retirees	D. R. Hunt	Dr. Hergenroeder
✓ IR 33	Human Resource Substitution Policies	J. E. Van Duyn	LTC Christensen
✓ IR 34	Drugs in the DOD	J. H. Brittingham	Dr. Johns
✓ IR 36	Fifth Generation Computing: Assessing R&D Options	W. B. Dixon W. M. Shiveley	COL Boozer (MCDC)
✓ IR 37	American Telephone and Telegraph (AT&T) Divestiture: Implications for Mobilization	K. R. Dirnberger F. S. Rawlerson	Dr. Singer
✓ IR 38	A Supply-Side Approach for Nuclear Waste Repositories	L. H. Harmon	COL Lewis

<u>NO.</u>	<u>TITLE OF RESEARCH PROJECT</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>RESEARCH FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓IR 39	Filling the Logistics Pipeline: O & M Dollar Responsiveness to Field Requirements	R. J. Templin	Dr. Waterman
✓IR 41	Industrial Capability in a Mobilization Environment: The MK-46 Torpedo	T. W. Triebel	CAPT Runzo
✓IR 42	Government & Industry System Development Models: A Review and Comparison	J. L. Chapin	COL King
✓IR 43	The Implications of the Contin- ued Expansion of the Soviet Merchant Fleet for U.S. and Other Western National Interests	L. F. Harlow J. C. Overton	CAPT Loser
✓IR 44	Understanding a New Capability in Rapid Response: Maritime Pre-positioning for Marine Brigades	W. E. Daniell	CAPT Musgrove
✓IR 45	Commercial Satellite Application During National Crisis Management	C. F. Stirling	LTC Grunstad
IR 46	Rosie, Will You Be There When We Need You Again?	E. T. Mattke	Dr. Kyriakopoulos
✓IR 47	Case of the Faculty Test	J. C. Ramsey	CAPT Loser
✓IR 48	Natural Resources Flow from Australia: An Open Sea Lane Strategy	G. J. Coakley	Mr. Fabrie (MCDC)
✓IR 49	Total Force Policy - Use of the National Guard and the Reserves for Industrial & Legislative Advocacy of National Defense Policy	P. B. Hoar	Mr. Muckerman (MCDC)
✓IR 50	Defining the Army Role of Space	R. M. Akerson	Dr. Almond (NWC)
✓IR 51	Latin American Border Disputes: Impact of U.S. Policy and Possible U.S. Role	F. L. Ciliberti	COL Huser (NWC)

✓ IR 52 Algeria: Relations with
the West

R. J. Munske

Dr. Deibel
(NWC)

✓ IR 53 Rapid Acquisition

T. P. Swanger

Dr. Singer

MOBILIZATION STUDIES PROGRAM (MSP)

<u>MSP NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>STUDENT</u>	<u>FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓ 2	U.S. Policies Toward Host Nation Support During Mobilization	L. Chaker J. A. Thomas	COL White
✓ 4	Pre-Mobilization Actions in Crisis Management	M. R. Barron J. T. Garner E. S. Clark	LTC Christensen
✓ 10	Mobilization Actions as Political Signals	R. S. Couch R. W. Phoebus W. T. Sloan	Mr. Rogers
✓ 13	Implications of Manufacturer Warranties on Readiness and Mobilization	R. T. Cote D. F. Basile L. D. Griffin L. D. Holcomb	COL Harmon
✓ 16	Fraud in DOD Microcircuit Acquisition	H. H. Carothers T. L. Erickson G. K. Iverson	Dr. Hergenroeder
✓ 20	Survivable Information Systems --USSR	K. A. Maxie	LTC Pachler
✓ 21	U.S. Space Defense Doctrine	J. L. Fowler W. R. Puffer R. H. Smith	COL Endicott
✓ 23	Policy Implications of Fraternization in the Armed Forces	H. A. Bondaruk G. A. Focht	COL Gaston Dr Sanders
✓ 24	The Efficacy of Pre-Positioning Programs	C. E. Franklin	COL King
✓ 25	The 20-Year Military Retirement System	C. F. Bogar J. D. Heard R. R. Jorgensen J. E. Middleton J. Rodes	Dr. Johns

Enclosure (2)

<u>MSP NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>STUDENT</u>	<u>FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓26	POMCUS Measurements of Readiness	R. J. Barnaby J. Cranton R. B. Tinsman D. P. Vasey	AMB Healy
✓27	Syria: Pro-Soviet or Anti-Israeli?	T. P. O'Brien	COL Johnson
✓28	Prepositioning of War Reserve Materiel in Southwest Asia	G. J. O'Donnell	Dr. Amstutz
✓29	Contracting Out and National Security: Criteria For application	W. K. Deen P. Heaney D. K. Hummel G. E. Leftwick J. G. Nicholas E. J. Stolark G. W. Wentz M. Z. Labovitz	COL Gest
✓31	Surge in the Defense Electronics Industry	J. M. Borky W. Gore W. H. Moos R. L. Staloch P. J. Turcotte B. L. Ziegler E. T. Mattke	COL Mulkey
✓32	What is the Future of the F-4 in the USAF?	A. B. Gill M. C. Short	COL Acree
✓33	The Effects of Smoking on Blood Chemistry/Health	W. J. Flaherty W. W. Byrd	LTC Grunstad
✓35	Soviet Doctrine - Rise of the Offensive	A. J. Canonaco S. T. Telford	AMB Healy
✓36	Industrial Organization for National Mobilization: Institutionalizing the Corporate Memory	J. L. Adams P. H. Carr T. M. Devanney M. J. Michlik J. Z. Stepien C. W. Fulford	COL Mulkey
✓38	Systems Acquisition for Top-Level Executives (SAFE) Improvement	E. M. Lee	CAPT Crouch

<u>MSP NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>STUDENT</u>	<u>FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓39	Relationship Between Stress and Fitness in Hot and Cold Reactors	J. L. Harford J. T. Ogle	COL Johnson
✓41	The DD 1519 System for Mobilization Planning: The M109A2 Propelled Howitzer Case	W. J. Sanchez J. N. Waxvik R. D. Wolff	Dr. Beckstead
✓42	Transportation Resource Allocation and Associated Problems	K. L. Kraus M. D. McManus	COL Ballantyne
✓44	Foreign Military Sales (FMS), Security Assistance (SA) and Mutual Security (MS) Programs	W. B. Greer	Dr. Schandler
✓45	Increasing Air National Guard and Reserve Readiness: Steps to Improve Pre-Mobilization Capabilities	J. L. McLaughlin J. P. McDevitt	COL Gest
✓49	The Biennial Budget: A Possible Alternative to the Present Government System of Budgeting	W. J. Davis L. P. Massaro P. O. Soderberg	CAPT Crouch
✓53	The Future Control of Strategic Technology Transfer	J. L. White D. Teller R. M. Callahan	Dr. Sanders
✓55	Impact of "GI Bill" Education Benefits Expiration	K. G. Boegler J. V. Ferry W. G. Fischer	Dr. Timbers
✓58	Mobilization Conference	M. W. Boudreau H. H. Fitzpatrick G. A. Frenn R. J. Gadwill L. W. Newton J. D. Gregory W. W. Stirling	Mr. McAleer
✓61	International Competitiveness of the Defense Industrial Base	P. P. Belch E. V. McCauley J. B. Young	Dr. Stekler Dr. Kyriakopoulos

<u>MSP NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>STUDENT</u>	<u>FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓62	Logistics (Service Logistics Concepts, Organization and Planning)	J. A. Delorie P. A. Hinneburg K. J. Holland T. C. Nettles	COL White
✓63	Supplying the Mobilization Train: Eighteenwheelers Don't Do Coal	J. P. Grippe	CAPT Eyler
✓64	Rail Service in the Year 2000 and the Potential Impact on Mobilization	J. F. Acquavella R. J. Schneider	CAPT Eyler
✓66	Defense Electronics and the Caribbean Basin Initiative (CBI)	J. R. Bremer T. J. Donovan R. S. Fernandez D. G. Mein S. R. P. Valerga	Dr. Timbers
✓69	The United States Shipyard Mobilization Base: Manpower Requirements	R. P. Dillman S. J. Major	CAPT Nace
✓70	Organization of U.S. Navy Logistics Resources	E. A. Arllen W. G. Fackenthall B. D. Lynch	CAPT Nace
✓72	Defense Spending and United States Air Force War Fighting Capabilities, 1974 to Present	J. L. Nystrom A. R. Thomas	Dr. Losman
✓73	A Research Approach to Ease the Command Transition Associated with Maritime Defense Zones	J. M. Loy J. B. Manley P. A. McNulty H. R. Bourland	CAPT Cavallaro
✓74	National Security Implications of International Drug Trafficking	H. B. Gehring	CAPT Cavallero
✓77	Student Progress and Evaluation System for the Industrial College of the Armed Forces	L. W. Jones J. A. Dubia	LTC Chapla
✓79	KC-135RE Program Stability	W. J. Lofink D. F. Rich G. M. Shelton	Mr. McAleer

<u>MSP NO.</u>	<u>TITLE</u>	<u>STUDENT</u>	<u>FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
√82	JCS Procurement Management Education for Senior Executives	L. O. Cox R. W. Lentner C. C. Schaaf M. E. Smalling	COL Acree

RESEARCH SEMINARS (RS)

<u>RS NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>RESEARCH FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓1	The Heavy Division: Should It be Smaller?	J. M. Castleberry C. W. Cheatham H. L. Lawson D. A. Measels J. R. Power	COL McDevitt (SCDC)
✓4	Technology Transfer	K. W. Crissman R. N. Davie R. A. Lancaster R. F. M. Hargue J. J. Stewart M. R. Lamb N. Thompson C. A. Griggs	COL Boozer Dr. Nunn (MCDC)
✓5	Medical Mobilization	J. R. Beaty R. E. Brady G. B. Clark D. A. Coronado G. S. Harris J. B. Noll W. M. Sandidge T. G. Scofield L. L. Sholdt	Mr. Moscato (ICAF)
✓6	Long-Range Planning	J. P. Allen	MG Smith (NWC)

NATIONAL WAR COLLEGE
STRATEGIC STUDIES PROGRAM (SSP)

<u>SSP NO.</u>	<u>TITLES</u>	<u>STUDENTS</u>	<u>RESEARCH FACULTY ADVISOR</u>
✓100-02	Improving Army-Air Force Warfighting Capabilities	W. R. Goodrich J. E. Long	Mr. Stevenson (NWC)

Enclosure (4)