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- Bolivia provides 48 percent of US antimony metal, 40 percent of antimony ore, 16 percent of tin, and 18 percent of zinc. Bolivia has 8 percent of the antimony, 7 percent of the bismuth, 10 percent of the tin, and measurable portions of the total world reserves of silver and tungsten. The largest use of tin is for solder, tin plate, and brass production.
- Chile provides 34 percent of US copper, 18 percent of iodine, and 27 percent of molybdenum. Of the total world reserves, Chile has 20 percent of the copper, 33 percent of the iodine, 53 percent of the lithium, and 25 percent of the molybdenum. Lithium is principally used in the production of aluminum, grease, ceramics, glass, and synthetic rubber.

Sealines-of-Communication

The essential US maritime trade routes and strategic sealines-of-communication to Latin American are shown in Figures 17 through 19. It is clear that these routes are vulnerable to choke points in the Panama Canal and at passages between islands of the Greater and Lesser Antilles.³ Cuba, the larger of the Greater Antilles, bases MiG aircraft and ships to block the SLOC's. In addition, except for a few great circle routes from the US east coast to Europe and Africa and the US west coast to Asia, all US routes to the rest of the world pass choke points in Latin America.

Petroleum Dependency on Sealines of Communication

One-third of the oil transported by tank ship to the US from the Middle East and from ports other than Latin America must pass through Latin American choke points. Sixty-six percent of imported crude oil and petroleum products bound for the US must pass within MiG aircraft range of Cuba. Without substantial military commitment to maintain open passage, governments unfriendly to the United States could cripple ocean-bound commerce and reinforcement of forward-deployed military forces. Imagine the turmoil produced in the event of national mobilization if ships could not be used for transport of munitions, aircraft, and aircraft parts from the west coast or if military cargoes could not be shipped from Gulf of Mexico ports to Europe or the Middle East.

Latin American Oil Dependency

The US gets thirty-four percent of its imported crude oil from Latin America.⁴ Finished petroleum products are also received from the region. The scale of dependence, as a percentage of each total product imported to the US, is illustrated in figure 20.




Figure 17. Trade Route 4, US Atlantic — Caribbean,
including Christobal and east coast Mexico.

Source: United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, US Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.




Figure 18. Trade Route 1, US Atlantic — East Coast and South America.

Source: United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, US Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.




Figure 19. Trade Route 2, US Atlantic — West Coast and South America.

Source: United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, US Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.

Region	Crude Oil Via Tank Ship	Crude Oil Via Pipe Line	Fuel Oil Via Tank Ship	Lubricating Oil Via Tank Ship
Bahamas/Caribbean	7 percent	0 percent	3 percent	1 percent
Central America	13 percent	9 percent	2 percent	1 percent
South America	3 percent	0 percent	8 percent	3 percent
TOTAL	23 percent	9 percent	13 percent	5 percent
Crude Oil Total	34 percent			

Figure 20. US Dependency on Latin American Oil

Source: Computer analysis of US Maritime Administration 1982 Trade datatape for petroleum shipped into the US by tank-ship. "USA: Origins of Direct Crude Oil Imports and Indicated Average Prices," Petroleum Economist, 51, No. 3 (March 1984), 105.

ENDNOTES

APPENDIX B

1. Stockpile Report to the Congress, October 1982-March 1983 (FFMA 36/October 1983).
2. Mineral Commodity Summaries 1984, US Bureau of Mines (with resource information by the Geological Survey), United States Department of the Interior; Mineral Industries of Latin America, Bureau of Mines, United States Department of the Interior, December 1981; Minerals Yearbook, Volume I, Metals and Minerals, United States Department of the Interior, 1982.
3. United States Oceanborne Foreign Trade Routes, United States Department of Commerce, Maritime Administration, 1981.
4. Computer analysis of US Maritime Administration 1982 Trade datatape for petroleum shipped into the US by tank-ship: 333 - crude oil, 334.1 - jet fuel and gasoline, 334.2 - kerosene, 334.3 - fuel oil (light), 334.4 fuel oil (heavy), and 334.5 - lube oil from Mexico and Central America, the Caribbean, South America, and the Bahamas shipped to US ports.

"USA Origins of Direct Crude Oil Imports and Indicated Average
Prices," Petroleum Economist, 51, No. 3 (March 1984) 105.

Appendix C

CHRONOLOGY OF INTERNATIONAL LINKING TERRORIST/GUERILLA EVENTS

- 1959 — Fidel Castro takes charge of Cuba.
- 1961 — The Cuban Direccion General de Inteligencia (DGI), or General Intelligence Directorate, is founded with Soviet KGB assistance. The DGI, essentially under control of the KGB since 1969, operates a special center for illegal immigrants to western countries, especially to the US. The purpose of the center is to train the potential illegal aliens to be DGI agents who then blend with other immigrants in day-to-day living.¹
- 1964 to
- 1975 — The Organization of American States (OAS) condemns Cuban "aggression and intervention" in Venezuela and votes to break all diplomatic and economic ties with Cuba.²
- 1966 — Havana, Cuba, Tricontinental Conference of 513 delegates representing 83 groups from the third world. (The largest such conference since the 1917 Bolshevik Revolution.) The purpose of the conference is to "devise a global

revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism."³ The strategy agreed upon is "to undermine Western interests in the Third World and to destabilize Western societies while keeping Western governments and opinion makers anesthetized with a policy of peaceful coexistence, known in the West as detente."⁴ The Conference General Declaration advocates close cohesion between Soviet style "socialist countries," "national liberation movements," "democratic workers," and "student movements" in capitalist America and Europe. The African, Asian, and Latin American Solidarity Organization is chartered with a permanent secretariat based in Havana and chaired by Cienfuegos Gorriaran, a member of Cuba's Communist Party central committee. Ten months after the conference, a chain of terrorist/guerrilla training camps is established in Cuba under the oversight of Soviet KGB Colonel Vadim Kotcherqine.⁵

Such activity was viewed by the Russians as a military operation.

Claire Sterling is correct in her comments about the PLO. The only amazing thing about public reaction to her work on the PLO is that anybody challenges it, because the PLO itself was the first to announce their link to the Soviets on national television and in interviews all over the place. They have announced not only their training in

the Soviet Union but their close working relationship with the Soviet Union.

Just in February, the Kuwaiti News Agency published a long interview with the PLO's man in Moscow who noted:

We have a signed treaty that requires that before we take any kind of serious action we sit down and discuss it with the Russians and coordinate our activities.⁶

— Ghana accuses Cuba of interference in its international affairs and breaks diplomatic relations.

1966+ — Graduates from Cuban training camps provide the nucleus for three, main, terrorist/querrilla training camp concentrations for the remainder of the 1960s in:

- Cuba,
- Palestinian Facilities in several countries, and
- The Soviet Union.

Cuban instructors staff Fedaveen camps in the Middle East. The Soviet Union concentrates on training Palestinians first, and then branches out to include trainees from Europe, Latin America, North America, Africa, and Asia. Soviet training camps are located in the USSR, Bulgaria, Czechoslovakia, East Germany, North Korea, Hungary, and South Yemen. Palestinian

training camps in Lebanon, Libya, Syria, and Jordan (until the PLO is expelled in 1970) train terrorists/querrillas from Europe, Latin America, Asia, Africa, and North America.⁷ One intelligence report estimates that 10,000 terrorist graduates will have completed training in camps located in the USSR, Cuba, and Arab countries between 1978 and 1984. In 1978, graduates are reported to be located as follows:

- o Mexico — 200
- o England — 400
- o West Germany — 600-700
- o France — 500
- o Holland — 400
- o Sweden — 200
- o Austria — 200
- o Italy — 200⁸

1967 — Cuba's Che Guevara and his small band of rural querrillas operate in Bolivia. He does not have the support of the Bolivian Communist Party, which sought legitimacy and participation through electoral and other conventional tactics. Guevara and his followers are hunted down and killed by a mixed team of US-trained Bolivian rangers and CIA agents. The loss of Guevara and his querrillas causes a basic change to terrorist/querrilla strategy in Latin America: emphasis shifts from rural to urban querrilla activity.

1968 — Dr. Waddih Haddad and Dr. George Habash, Palestinian physicians, establish the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP). The 1967 Six-Day War had demonstrated that Israel could not be defeated in a conventional war and that other means had to be established to find a Palestinian homeland. Habash's PFLP strategy is to internationalize the conflict and to connect with other terrorist groups for coordination and mutual support. Habash is quoted as saying that "We think that killing one Jew far from the field of battle is more effective than killing a hundred Jews on the field of battle, because it attracts more attention."⁹ In 1970, Habash declares himself and the PFLP to be an "armed Leninist Party."¹⁰ Right from the start, Habash establishes Palestinian training camps for terrorists with Cuban training graduates. At one time, Waddih Haddad, is the immediate supervisor of Venezuelan Marxist terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, also called Carlos Martinez, or Carlos, or Carlos the Jackal. Antonio Bouvier, an Ecuadorian Marxist terrorist, is Carlos' teacher in the mid-1960's training Camp Mantazas, operated by KGB General Viktor Simenov. Carlos also attends Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University in 1969. Carlos has extensive contacts with the Arab Fedayeen, the Japanese URA, Turkish guerrillas, Basque separatists, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Under Haddad, Carlos runs the International Terrorist Collective in Paris until 1975, when he escapes arrest with the help of Cuban diplomats.¹¹

1969 — February: Until this date, the Soviet Union has officially rejected terrorism in its public actions while covertly assisting terrorist groups. Like the US, the Soviets are vulnerable to hijackings, bombings, and other related terrorist attacks. But with very few exceptions, Soviet interests have not been attacked by terrorists. This is in marked contrast to the experience of Western nations experiences. A February 27, 1969 Pravda article, commenting on a Palestinian terrorist attack on Israel, marked the first, public, direct support for terrorism. It was: "Action carried out by patriots in defense of a legitimate right to return to their homeland." Yassir Arafat is invited to Moscow in 1970.

— Carlos Marighela publishes the Mini-Manual for Urban Guerrillas, which covers material taught in the Cuban training camps and more. Besides detailed information on demolition, illicit fund raising, infantry drill, liquidation of ranking officials, calligraphy, and other matters, it counsels that the urban guerrilla should first use revolutionary violence with popular causes for a popular power base so that

the government has no alternative except to intensify repression. The police roundups, house searches, and arrests of innocent people make life in the city unbearable. The general sentiment is that the government is unjust, incapable of solving problems, and resorts purely and simply to the physical liquidation of its opponents. The political situation

is transformed into a military situation, in which the militarists appear more and more responsible for errors and violence. When pacifiers and right-wing opportunists see the militarists on the brink of the abyss, they join hands and beg the hangmen for elections and other tripe designed to fool the masses.

Rejecting the "so-called political solution," the urban guerrilla must become more aggressive and violent, resorting without letup to sabotage, terrorism, expropriations, assaults, kidnappings and executions, heightening the disastrous situation in which the government must act.

Early 1970s — Syrian national Henri Nikolake Arsan, long-standing KINTEX customer, is key morphine supplier to former "French Connection" traffickers.¹²

1970s and 80s — KINTEX smuggles arms to Marxist terrorist groups in exchange for morphine base sold in France and West Germany.¹³

1970 — Carlos establishes an international terrorist network under the sponsorship of Haddad and the PFLP. The network is called the "Arm of the Arab Revolution."¹⁴

— Terrorist hijacking of a Soviet aircraft by two Lithuanians convinced Moscow to support a United Nations Resolution condemning airliner hijackings. Arab countries oppose the resolution. Yassir Arafat is invited to Moscow in 1971 and is publicly promised USSR direct support in training, arms, and medical supplies.¹⁵

— International Revolutionary Congress, Pvonqyang, North Korea, is attended by over 400 delegates; the Congress stresses an implied shared set of values and a shared mode of action among terrorists. Dr. George Habbash states to that Congress: "At this time of people's revolution against the worldwide imperialistic system, there can be neither geographic and political borders nor any moral prohibitions against the terrorist enterprises of the people's camp."¹⁶ The media reports of the 1970s and 1980s contain a large number of headlines treating brutal terrorist activities, conducted with "visiting terrorist participation" and international terrorist group logistic and monetary support—the "multinational terrorist" espoused by Habbash.¹⁷

Ten North Korean terrorist training camps operate in Pvonqyang, Yangbysan, Sandwon, Haevu, Nampo, and Wonson. The Chilean newspaper La Prensa reports Latin American terrorist groups from Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela training in North Korean camps.¹⁸

— In an operation exchanging personnel between terrorist groups, a Nicaraguan terrorist is captured, and a Turkish People's Liberation Army terrorist is killed by Israeli security forces during a Palestinian attempt to capture an Israeli passenger jet.¹⁹

1971 — "Kommunist," an article by Boris Ponomarev, Soviet Director for International Communist Affairs, states that although the new terrorist groups are "neither ideologically nor organizationally homogeneous," their "overall anti-imperialistic direction is obvious" and that communist governments should lend logistical support.²⁰

— March: The KGB develops a plan to "create a new Vietnam" in Mexico. The KGB agent in charge of the operation, headquartered in the Mexico City Soviet Embassy, is Oleg Maksimovich Nechiporenko. Gomez Souza had been recruited earlier by Nechiporenko. In 1969 Souza recruits and takes 47 Mexicans to North Korea for guerrilla training. They return to Mexico in September 1970 and form the Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria (MAR).²¹

1972 — The Lod, Tel Aviv, airport massacre is a joint operation between the Japanese URA and PFLP terrorist groups. Yassir Arafat's Black September group plans the attack in revenge for Israel's spoiling an earlier attempt to hijack an airliner at Lod Airport. Until the 1980s, the URA has a headquarters in Beirut, Lebanon, and works in the Palestinian Tel Zatar camp.²²

- Spring: PFLP leader Dr. George Habbash finances the First International Terrorist Meeting, Tripoli, Lebanon. Baader-Meinhof, Japanese UPA, Fritrean Liberation Front, Irish IRA, Basque separatists, French leftwing elements, and Turkish, Iranian, and Sudanese Liberation Fronts attend.²³

- Fall: The Munich Olympics massacre by Palestinian terrorists damages Arab relations with the West. In a September 7, 1972 Pravda article, the massacre is termed "tragic," but Israel's retaliatory attacks are called "aggressive."²⁴

- December: One hundred fifty Cuban military advisors arrive in the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen (South Yemen). Soviet and Cuban aid to South Yemen supports terrorism in adjacent countries that could strategically control the Red Sea at Bab el Bab. The Red Sea controls the approach to the Suez Canal joining the Arabian Sea and the Mediterranean.²⁵

1972-

- 1973 — Cuban diplomats, previously trained in the Soviet Union, coordinate DGI activities and training of terrorist groups for sabotage of refineries, oil and gas pipelines, tankships, and port facilities of the Mediterranean, Persian Gulf, and Red Sea areas. These operations are controlled from the Cuban embassies in Baghdad and Algiers.²⁶

- 1973 — Israel raids the Nahar El-Bard camp in Lebanon and captures Turkish terrorist, Faik Hasan Bulut. Eighteen Turkish terrorists are also killed in southern Lebanon fighting.²⁷
- Three Jordanian and one English terrorist are caught smuggling explosives into France.²⁸
- A Japan Airlines aircraft is hijacked by two South American, two Arab, and two European terrorists.²⁹
- KINTEX was involved in the exportation of arms to Nigeria in the recent civil war with Biafra.³⁰
- 1974 — French newspapers L'aurore and L'arche are attacked by a multinational terrorist group.³¹
- Yasir Arafat is received by the United Nations, a sign of world recognition for the Marxist-Leninist terrorist PLO leader as the legitimate political leader for the Palestinian people. This recognition occurs without the election process, imposed through PLO actions of violence and fear.³²

— April: The Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) is founded in the Tucuman province of Argentina by terrorist revolutionary groups from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay. Organizers of the JCR included the Cuban DGI and the Argentine Trotskyite terrorist group ERP.³³ The Argentine police later capture a document called the Tucuman Plan, drafted in May 1975. According to the Tucuman Plan, the charter of the JCR is to lead a South American continent-wide armed revolution for liberation.³⁴ The JCR headquarters is established in Buenos Aires, and a general command is established between 1975 and 1977. An Argentine police crackdown forces the JCR to move to Paris. The 1,500 strong Latin American Europe Brigade is then formed, and close ties are made with European terrorist groups and their activities, both financial and operational. There are four important organizational components of the JCR from the perspective of terrorist group coordinating activities:

- o The Foreign Bureau, which coordinates the West European Center for the terrorist network.

- o The front organization, Argentina Center for Solidarity and Information (CAIS), which maintains contacts with terrorist groups, financial transaction and coordination, aid to

refugees, foreign relations and propaganda. CAIS oversight comes from a general secretariat and its six committees. It is not clear whether the general secretariat is Rodolfo Mattarolo or Fernando Luis Alvarez (Pelado). Mattarolo is also a leader in the Argentine Trotskyists Partido Socialista de Trabajadores (ERP) guerrilla group. Alvarez is the husband of Che Guevara's sister Anna Maria Guevara.³⁵

o Solidarity Committee for Argentina, located in Mexico, and the Latin America Press Institute, located in Caracas; they publish the JCP media "Che Guevara."³⁶

o JCP urban guerrilla training camp in Cuba operated by the Cuban Ministry of the Interior.³⁷

1975 — Reports are heard about Mexican terrorist activity trading mainly heroin across the Mexican/US border for US military weapons. According to Jacques Kiere, Head of the El Paso, Texas, DFA National Intelligence Center, the weapons go to Mexico's Twenty-Third of September League, to other terrorists, and to private armies of drug traffickers to protect opium poppy fields, laboratories, and shipments. Other Mexican Marxist groups trading drugs for guns include: pesina de Ajusticiamiento (Guerrero, 1974); Frente Estudiantil

Revolucionaria (Mexico, DF, 1973); Liga Leninista Espartaco (Nuevo Leon, Tamaulipas); Liga Comunista Espartaco (1970s, Monterrey, Saltillo); Fuerza de Liberacion Nacional (Monterrey et al); and Liga Comunista Armada (Monterrey, Saltillo).³⁸

— The Arm of the Arab Revolution kidnapped the OPEC oil ministers in Vienna and hijacked an Air France passenger jet to Entebbe in conjunction with Antonio Bouvier, Carlos' former Ecuadorian Cuban training camp instructor. In retaliation for the Israeli Entebbe rescue, Carlos' group blows up an Istanbul airport lounge, killing four people. (The West German newspaper Die Welt reports in 1976 that Muhamar Kadaffi of Libya rewarded Carlos with 10 million dollars for the Vienna OPEC attack.) Libya is reported to provide over 100 million dollars each year to support terrorist training and operations in Europe and the Middle East.³⁹

— In the Lisbon meeting of the JCR, terrorist revolutionaries from the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Paraguay, and Venezuela join the Junta. The formal alliance and charter of the JCR is approved by the members.⁴⁰ The Junta leader is Fernando Luis Alvarez (Pelado). In the first few JCR years, ransoms from kidnapped businessmen provide several hundred million dollars for coordinated Junta activities. Coordinational relationships are identified between the JCR, IRA, and Carlos of the PFLP.

- The Cuban Constitution is drafted. Within the preamble, Soviet/Cuban ties and support for Marxist-Leninist organizations in Latin America and the world are enshrined:

Basing ourselves on proletarian internationalism, on the fraternal friendship, help and cooperation of the Soviet Union and other Socialist countries, and on the solidarity of the workers and the peoples of Latin America and of the world

- Cuba dispatches 3,000 troops to Angola in support of the Popular Movement for the Liberation of Angola (MPLA) guerrilla war. By 1977, 27,000 Cuban military personnel are in Angola and in ten other African countries.
- 1977 — In Larnaca, Cyprus, a transnational terrorist summit is held, financed by the Palestinians, as a continuation of the 1972 Lebanon summit.⁴¹
- 1978 — Three Bulgarian State Security agencies are identified in delivering arms to Marxist insurgents in payment for narcotics. They are KINTEX, CORECOM, and TEXIM.⁴²
- 1979 — July: The Nicaraguan Government falls to the Sandinista Guerrillas. With the support of Cuba, the Sandinistas followed Castro's Cuban formula for revolution:
 - o Unify the extreme left.

- o Establish a broad coalition, including some non-communists as an ambiguous promise of a broad-based government after victory.
- o Obtain non-communist international support and isolate target governments from Western material and political help.
Systematic propaganda should play on the "broad coalition."
- o Provide Soviet block, Cuban, and anti-Western military support as an incentive for unity of the extreme left groups.

The partnership with Cuba continued after seizing control of the government. Many Nicaraguan guerrilla training camps were established for terrorist guerrilla groups in other Latin American countries. Command and control facilities were established in Nicaragua to unify and facilitate guerrilla operations in El Salvador.⁴³

— Late 1979: The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in El Salvador.⁴⁴

— Soviet arms deliveries to Cuba are greatly increased to 65,000 tons per year.⁴⁵

1980 — The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in Guatemala.⁴⁶

— June: Havana, Cuba, meeting between Soviets, Cuba, and terrorist guerrillas from El Salvador is held to define the strategy for an international propaganda and political campaign in support of El Salvador's insurgents. The agreed-upon strategy includes:

- o Emphasizing in the news media that the El Salvador revolution represented its people fighting for freedom from oppression and that the US goal was military intervention to keep an oppressive government in power.
- o Setting as a goal to gain international recognition and support from organizations and regional groups.
- o Setting as a goal to gain sympathy and support from liberal US politicians and organizations.
- o Calling for a dialogue for resolution of conflict so as to split and isolate the enemy.
- o Establishing front organizations to funnel humanitarian organization's aid funds to the terrorist/guerrilla camps.⁴⁷

1981 — The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in Honduras.⁴⁸

- Total terrorist/querrilla armed strength in El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras, and Costa Rica in 1978 is estimated at 1,450. By 1981 it grew to nearly 8,000. Arms shipments are seized from querrilla forces enroute from Nicaragua to El Salvador. In April and July 1981, a large cache of weapons is captured from querrilla "safe houses" in Guatemala city. Seventeen are US M-16 and AR-15 rifles that had been shipped to US forces fighting in Vietnam, a Soviet surrogate state.⁴⁹

- Narcotics traffickers in Sofia, Bulgaria, and KINIFEX are involved in the attempted assassination of the Pope.⁵⁰

- Bulgaria offered Italian Red Brigade "money and arms" during the kidnapping of General Dozier in order to destabilize Italy.⁵¹

- 1982 — The Cuban strategy described above for Nicaragua is introduced in Costa Rica. Cuba funds a coalition leftist party in Costa Rica to unite insurgent factions. The Cuban government and the Sandinistas arm and train Costa Rican terrorist/querrillas. In March, police seize a large arms cache in San Jose and arrest nine terrorists: several Salvadorans, several Nicaraguans, one Argentine, one Chilean, and one Costa Rican. In July, Costa Rica arrests a Columbian M-19 terrorist who states that the bombing, earlier that month, of the Honduran Airlines office in San Jose was done by Nicaraguan Guerrilla direction.⁵²

- Most Honduran terrorist/querrilla groups are linked with and receive support from El Salvador terrorist/querrilla groups.⁵³
- January-March: Arms from Cuba shipped via Nicaragua to El Salvador greatly increase in size and firepower. New weapons include M-60 machine guns, M-79 grenade launchers, and M-72 antitank weapons.⁵⁴
- February: As a result of Cuban efforts to unify terrorist/querrilla groups within countries, Guatemala querrilla groups announce their unification of efforts.⁵⁵
- Mid 1982: Cuban, Sandinista, and El Salvador querrillas meet on progress of activity against the Honduran government.⁵⁶
- December: Honduran President Suazo's daughter is kidnapped in Guatemala by a Guatemalan terrorist/querrilla group.
- 1984 — KINFEX involved in sale of embargoed high-tech US goods and illegal weapons for South Africa, including AK-47s and grenade and rocket type weapons from Communist Block nations.⁵⁷
- March: In Bogota, Ambassador Tambs, US Ambassador to Columbia, describes the relationship between Columbia's narcotics traffickers and the FARC Marxist terrorist/querrilla group. The ambassador noted:

the FARC is the best equipped, best trained, and potentially most dangerous subversive group in Colombia and has revolutionary plans to take the country. It has approximately two thousand members with a support infrastructure to quickly support over five thousand. Of its twenty-five fronts, half operate in coca and marijuana cultivation areas. The relationship between the FARC and narcotics traffickers has probably existed for some time and appears to have been sanctioned by the FARC's national directorate in May 1982 at the FARC's seventh conference. Each FARC front has specific responsibilities with the fronts in Guaviare and Vaupes to operate with narcotics traffickers for money and arms. The FARC is collecting protection payments from COCA in their operating territory, often demanding ten percent of the profit. One front obtains 3.38 million dollars per month in taxing the coca industry. FARC leader Rigoberto Lozano Perdomo's, alias Joselo, front assignment is specifically to deal with coca traffickers and obtain arms and ammunition through them. The FARC obtains adequate funds, through narcotics, to purchase the latest in weapons. The FARC is recruiting coca transient laborers to their ranks. The FARC is also extorting protection money from marijuana traffickers on the north coast, particularly in the Magdalena department. It is estimated the FARC front in the Guaviare region has obtained 99 million dollars from their coca crops. Wherever a FARC front operates and narcotics plants are

rown, it is fairly certain some arrangement exists between narcotics traffickers and the FARC. Colombia's communist party central committee member Hernando Hurtado states that plans for revolutionary takeover of Colombia include the NARC/FARC connection. The Colombian communist party (PCC) is also benefiting from the NARC/FARCC arrangement.⁵⁸

— April: The Wall Street Journal features a front page staff report on Cuban involvement with smugglers of drugs from Colombia to the US in return for currency to support Latin American revolution.⁵⁹




Figure 15. Soviet Subversion Training Centers

Source: Defense Intelligence Agency (DIA) Report 6 010 5026 83.

Appendix C

1. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
2. Ninty-seventh Congress Hearings on Terrorism: Origins, Directions and Support, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, April 1981.
3. Spy for Fidel, by Castro Hidalgo (a defected DGI agent), Miami, 1971.
4. Ninty-seventh Congress Hearings on Terrorism: Origins, Directions and Support, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, April 1981.
5. Ibid. The ancient Chinese philosopher, Sun Tzu, is often referred to in KGB terrorist training courses for their guiding principles behind active measures: "Fighting is the most primitive way of making war on your enemies because the supreme excellence is to subdue the armies of

your enemies without ever having to fight them." Sun Tzu's strategy embraced four points:

1. Cover with ridicule all the valid traditions in your opponent's country.
2. Implicate their leaders in criminal affairs and then at the right time turn them over to the scorn of their fellow countrymen.
3. Aggravate by every means at your command all of the existing differences in your opponent's country.
4. Agitate the young against the old.⁶

Defector Soviet General Jan Sejna tells Dr. Michael Ledeen of Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies:

"The Soviet Union made a conscious decision at the level of the Politburo in the midsixties, and they so advised their Warsaw Pact partners, that they were going to increase spending in the field of what they called strategic intelligence and what we would call paramilitary or terroristic operations, by 1,000 percent."

This decision was communicated to the pact countries as well as to the Cubans, and every country was then tasked to do its part. In the case of Czechoslovakia, it was running these various Communist

training camps which, as Sejna explained, functioned on various levels. There was, if you will, a kind of "elementary school" camp, which taught: this is a hand grenade; this is how to throw it; or this is what Lenin said; this is how to repeat it.

Then there were the postgraduate schools where people were trained in coded messages and secret writing, political organization and clandestine communication, and so forth. It was this latter kind of camp where, according to Sejna, Feltrinelli was trained.

If what he says is right—and there is a great body of confirming evidence that has cropped up in the last few years—what we are dealing with is a conscious decision at the military level. General Sejna was, after all, a military officer and not an intelligence officer. So his knowledge of this activity, his participation in it, his role was as a military officer running military camps, often not under KGB control but under the GRU, that is to say, under Soviet military intelligence control.

6. Ibid. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.

7. The Terrorist and Sabotage Threat to United States Nuclear Programs, Historical Evaluation and Research Organization, Dunn Loring, VA, 1974.
8. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
9. The Terror Network; The Secret War of International Terrorism by Claire Sterling, Published by Holt, Rinehart and Winston, 1981, page 121.
10. US Defense Intelligence Agency Report 6 010 5026 83, dtd May 6, 1983, The International Terrorist Network.
11. Terrorism: Threat, Reality, Response, by Robert Kupperman and Darrel M. Trent, 1979, Hoover Institution Publication.
12. US Drug Enforcement Administration Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.
13. Ibid.
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
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LATIN AMERICAN COLONIAL LEGACY AND EVOLUTION OF SMUGGLING NETWORKS

The Colonial Legacy

Since the arrival of Columbus, the Bahamas and the Central American, South American, and Greater and Lesser Antilles Islands of the Caribbean Basin have been in varying degree of political, social, and economic instability and armed conflict. Today, such upheaval is fueled by forces within and without. International drug trafficking is a significant destabilizing force in itself, also subsidizing both internal and external intervention interests.

Since the fifteenth century, the pre-Hispanic Amerindian culture has been decimated and replaced by colonialism. The poorly defended Greater and Lesser Antilles Islands were subsequently conquered by the North-West European powers of Britain, France, Denmark, and the Netherlands. Colonization was pressed through settlement and exploitation; the US sought to exert exclusive domain through the Monroe Doctrine. Colonial exploitation replaced existing agriculture and trade, a policy that provided balanced needs for the local region with crops for export and

dependency on the empire. In 1804, with the independence of Haiti, the process of nation building began. Colonialism was the stabilizing force for much of the world until World War II marked the end of European colonial empires. Marxist government was subsequently introduced to the Basin by the conclusion of Castro's revolution in Cuba in 1959.

Instability fueled from within the region is inherited from a colonial legacy that left an imbalance among the political, economic, and social models. The imbalance is recently defined in the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (1984) to the President of the United States: "Chapter 2 of the report places the Central American crisis within its larger hemispheric context, with particular emphasis on the twin challenges of rescuing the hemisphere's troubled economies and establishing principles of political legitimacy."

Instability resulting from outside intervention is fueled by Soviet and Cuban strategy and actions. The Bipartisan Commission report further defines this area: "Chapter 6 explores the security dimensions of the crisis, including Soviet and Cuban involvement, the problems of guerrilla war, the situation as it is today, what can be done to meet it, and what we recommend that the United States do to help. Indigenous reform, even indigenous revolution, is not a security threat to the United States. But intrusion of aggressive outside powers exploiting local grievances to expand their own political influence and military control is a serious threat to the United States, and to the entire region."

Three aspects of the colonial legacy to Latin America are relevant to this study:

- o Substitution of agricultural crops intended to sustain the needs of the local region with crops grown to fuel a European or North American industrial economy in return for hard currency.
- o A history and lifestyle in some areas in piracy, slavery, and smuggling, evolved to the point that international drug trafficking is an accepted norm by a country or populous.
- o Local country banking laws inherited from the former empire and the financial network of empires.

Agribusiness in Latin America is dependent upon economic demand for crops in North America and Europe. Demand for illicit drugs in the industrialized Western world is high, especially in North America. Farmers cultivate crops to produce illicit drugs is started because they earn more profit than they do from planting traditional, legal crops. Ancient piracy, slavery, and smuggling families and networks have evolved into modern-day crime families and international trafficking networks. The Seminar of Narcotics Enforcement Officers, held under the auspices of the United Nations, concluded that international narcotics trafficking,

like piracy, should be an international crime. Finally, modern international banking systems and offshore banking laws, used as the financial conduit for conducting international narcotics trafficking business, grew out of older, empire financial systems—i.e., British banking laws used in the Bahamas and a US and Netherlands 1948 treaty to avoid a thirty percent US withholding tax on profits derived in the US, a treaty negotiated to protect investors nervous about upheavals as a result of the disintegrating colonial order following World War II.

Forces of External Intervention

Four aspects of Soviet and Cuban involvement and problems of terrorist/querrilla war are relevant to this study:

- o Increasing indications that profits from international drug trafficking are funneled back to Latin America to promote political instability.

- o Increasing indications that profits from international drug trafficking are funding weapons, training, and operational logistical support for Marxist terrorist/querrilla activity.

- o Increasing evidence that the logistics capabilities of international and local trafficking networks are used by Marxist

terrorist/querrilla groups for other activities like introduction of trained agents into the US along with smuggled illegal aliens, transport of terrorist and querrillas to and from Cuban training camps, and gun running.

- o Increasing evidence that migrant workers who raise narcotic crops are recruited to the ranks of Marxist terrorist/querrillas.

Evolution of Smuggling Networks

"A smuggler, he abides by the laws of nature—but it is by the laws of man that he is a smuggler."

Author Unknown

The relevance of the basic parts and the evolution of smuggling networks is not to make the claim that international drug trafficking is controlled by Moscow or by Cuba; rather, the relevance lies in understanding a criminal logistic and communications network, the way it has been used by terrorist/querrilla groups, and the way it corrupts individuals and governments. Understanding these concepts is a basic "knowledge-stone" for viewing the relationship of international drug trafficking as a threat to the national security of the US and its neighbors and allies.

A modern day law of nature is that human beings must purchase day-to-day necessities and that luxuries also require money. A second

modern law is that a large profit is derived from the sale of scarce, high-demand products. A third law is that high risk-taking is directly proportional to high rewards.

The rewards, in fact, are very high. As stated earlier, the US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) estimated the 1983 illegal drug sales in the US to be between 50 to 75 billion dollars, or 5 to 7 percent of all US retail sales. This figure also equates to 40 to 110 percent more than the sale of legal drugs in the US and equates to 25 to 90 percent more than the sales of all alcoholic beverages in the US. The 50 to 75 billion dollars does not include lost product from law enforcement seizures, so the value is at least 10 percent higher. Figure 11 shows the percentage make-up of US narcotics illegal sales.

DEA estimates the wholesale import value for 1983 of illicit drugs to the US (value at the national border) to be between 6 to 8 billion dollars, or 2 percent of all imported goods to the US. This figure also equates to a value slightly larger than all imported coffee to the US, or at least twice the value of all imported alcoholic and other beverages. Figure 12 shows the percentage break-down of 1983 imported illegal drugs to the US.

Although daily marijuana use appears to be less than that found in 1978, Figure 13 indicates the use to be still unacceptably high. "Daily

Use" figures are misleading for the 1983 5.5 percent mark. What is not said about the 1983 survey is that two-thirds of all those surveyed said they had bought and used marijuana at some time, and 40 percent said they had used it within the past year.


Figure 14 shows that use of cocaine also appears to be down for adults, but steady for high school seniors. However, Figure 15 reveals a dramatic rise in hospital emergency room activity for cocaine-involved life-threatening situations. The increase in cocaine-related emergency room activity is believed to be caused by more potent drug dosages available because of the 1983-84 market glut and by more dangerous administration methods such as laced marijuana cigarettes. Heroin data trends are similar to those shown for cocaine.

The significant point is that although risks for trafficking and dealing in illicit drugs may be high, the demand for illicit drugs is also high, as are profits.

Narcotics trafficking network parts are no different from those of legitimate agribusiness: crop growing, produce harvesting, produce collection, produce transportation, produce processing, produce wholesale, produce retail facilities and networks, and financial institutions to provide a conduit for business transactions.

Figure 11.

Illegal Drug Sales in the United States
(% of total)




\$50 - 70 BILLION

Figure 12.

Illegal Drug Sales.


Exports to the United States by Type of Drug
(% of total)



\$6 - 8 BILLION

Figure 13


Daily Marijuana Use,
U.S. High School Seniors, 1975-1983



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Data from Student Drug Use in America.

Figure 14


Current Cocaine Use, U.S. Household
Population and High School Seniors,
1974-1983



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Data from the National Survey on Drug Abuse and Student Drug Use in America.

Figure 15

Emergency Room Mentions for Cocaine
In the United States



Source: National Institute on Drug Abuse. Data from the Drug Abuse Warning Network (DAWN).

A farmer in a Third World country may start growing coca bushes or marijuana because they earn more profit than do traditional, legal crops. A fisherman or mariner or private aircraft pilot may start transporting narcotics to a buyer nation because there is more profit for illegal than for legal trade. A freelance wholesaler may add narcotics to his imports, or his employees may use his facilities to receive narcotics because profit is increased or is better than a worker's salary. Such people are loosely bound together in an emerging trafficking network. It is not long, however, before the farmer must "buy" protection because of the value of his crop or because of fear of government law enforcement or big crime families. It is not long before the importer is involved with, or replaced by, organized crime. It is not long before the pilot, fisherman, or mariner joins, or is forced to belong to, a mutual organization controlled by organized crime for "protection" and for avoiding vessel and cargo seizure and arrest. Corruption of morals is complete. At this point terrorist/querrilla groups see an opportunity to gain hard currency for their "revolution of national liberation" and take over the "protection business" and the ground transportation facilities. Furthermore, they force their ideology on the farmer and his family and recruit him and his children to their ranks. They may also become directly involved in the agriprocessing business such as cocaine laboratories. Whole drug farm and processing communities develop as an entity unto themselves, controlled or protected by terrorists/querrillas.

The pilot, fisherman, or mariner turned narcotics trafficker now expands his horizons to include gun running and providing passage for illegal aliens. And just as the terrorist/querrillas see opportunities to obtain hard cash, so do nations like Cuba. These nations then provide safe harbor for vessel repairs and aircraft refueling and make intelligence and escort available to aid the traffickers in avoiding detection and arrest by the international community of nations. Hard currency, which, in turn, supports terrorist/querrilla activity in other countries, is obtained for their nation's economy. The international narcotics trafficking network has matured into a sophisticated logistics and communications network smuggling underworld and subversive cargoes for profit.

Next, the corruptive influence of money compromises law enforcement and high government officials in "growing," "buying," and "transient" countries. Finally, the same corrupting influence compromises the financial institutions upon which a nation's economy is dependent.

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MSP 74

THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES
NATIONAL DEFENSE UNIVERSITY

MOBILIZATION STUDIES PROGRAM REPORT

NATIONAL SECURITY
AND
THE STRATEGY ON INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING

by

HOWARD B. GEHRING, CAPT, USCG

A RESEARCH REPORT SUBMITTED TO THE FACULTY
IN
FULFILLMENT OF THE RESEARCH
REQUIREMENT

RESEARCH SUPERVISOR: CAPT SAMUEL J. CAVALLARO, USCG

THE INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

MAY 1985

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ABSTRACT OF STUDENT RESEARCH REPORT INDUSTRIAL COLLEGE OF THE ARMED FORCES

NAME OF RESEARCHER (S) Howard B. Gehring Captain, U.S. Coast Guard	TITLE OF REPORT National Security and the Strategy on International Drug Trafficking
SECURITY CLASSIFICATION OF REPORT Unclassified	REPORT NUMBER M SP #74

ABSTRACT

Problem Statement: This study analyzes the bridge that is forming between national security and international drug trafficking. Missioning of responsibilities for one primarily falls to the Department of Defense (DOD) while the other goes to the traditional law enforcement community. Both organizational entities receive varying degrees of support from the intelligence community and other departments like the Department of State. The possible mix of policy prescriptions may result in DOD resources having a more direct involvement in the drug supply reduction portion of the National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. Such DOD resource commitment may institutionally threaten traditional law enforcement agencies.

Conclusions: To promote and effectively monitor the actions of policymakers and strategists it is essential to conclude that:

1. Drug trafficking is a growing threat to national security.
2. The relationship between drugs and arms trafficking is no longer a question of "if"; now it is a question of magnitude.
3. It is not necessary to have terrorists involved as the linkages and corruption alone that are tied to traffickers threatens U.S. national security.
4. This is an issue requiring NSC policy prescriptions.
5. All policy guidance on drugs must consider national security.
6. The public "will" to support a long-term campaign against illicit drugs is strong.
7. Significant progress can be made in stemming the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S.
8. The "drug war" may not be winnable in a military sense, however it is one that can be lost.

Recommendations:

1. NSC add international drug trafficking to their agenda for developing policy prescriptions.
2. International dialogue must continue to include international drug trafficking when discussing mutual security arrangements and economic, social and diplomatic ties.
3. Congress must fund a specific drug interdiction capability.
4. All agencies and departments, DOD in particular, should review all restrictions with a goal to maximize support.
5. Continue efforts to make the National Strategy an effective umbrella for departmental and agency strategies directed not only at stemming the flow of drugs into the U.S., but also for meeting the subversive level challenge.

THIS ABSTRACT IS UNCLASSIFIED

to do this? what entity?



EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This study analyzes the bridge that is forming between national security and international drug trafficking. Missioning of responsibilities for one primarily goes to the Department of Defense (DOD) while the other falls to the traditional law enforcement community. Both organizational entities receive varying degrees of support from the intelligence community and other departments like the Department of State. The possible mix of policy prescriptions to counter the influx of illicit drugs into the United States may result in DOD resources having a more direct involvement in the drug supply reduction or interdiction portion of the evolving National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. Such DOD resource commitment may institutionally threaten the traditional law enforcement agencies.

Ever since 1973 when the White House first published a strategy against drugs, that strategy has been directed at an expanding drug abuse and trafficking target. The perceived threats in the 1960's and 1970's focused on health and crime issues. By the 1980's the influx of illicit drugs became implicated with the trade in arms and insurgency, especially the type supporting the low intensity warfare exported by Cuba and found in Central and South America.

While presidential and congressional interest in the effort to stem the flow of drugs is evident, as is a swelling public consensus, the National Security Council has only focused on the issue peripherally. The threat assessments developed since the early 1980's when the intelligence community was tasked to support drug interdiction efforts, find that a national security threat of unknown but growing magnitude exists. As the executive branch persists in the direct high level involvement in drug strategy and policy formulation, the spectre of NSC developed policy options demanding the use of DOD resources grows.

After gaining a common base for terminology, this study questions the relationships between defense oriented issues of national security and policy formulation used in guiding the international strategy in international drug trafficking. The national security concern stemming from the drug related destabilization of our Western Hemisphere neighbors, the same neighbors whose welfare is considered to be in our vital national interest, permits the development of several hypothesis on how the bureaucracy is likely to respond. The subsequent analysis results in several key conclusions and recommendations predicated upon the continued growth of the threat.

The key finding that international drug trafficking is of national security concern warranting eventual NSC developed policy prescriptions, relies upon present trends toward the continued need for more strategy guidance from the highest levels of both the executive branch and the legislative branch.



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CHAPTER I
INTRODUCTION

The final chapter has yet to be written on the not-so-quiet clamor over illicit drug related policy issues of the 1980's. Much of that clamor revolves around making better use of all available resources in a reasoned effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States. This effort has brought a realignment of resources within law enforcement agencies, a resource coordinating body into the White House, a task force on drug enforcement into the Pentagon, exceptions to existing laws on the use of the military in support of law enforcement, new legislative mandates and definitions of institutional responsibilities that include the intelligence community, and an evolutionary strategy. These events leave unanswered such logical questions as to where is U.S. policy on international drug trafficking leading us, and what implications do these trends in reshaping policy thinking have for national security?

Situation

By the 1970's the concern for drug abuse in the United States warranted a visibly higher level of concern by the federal government.¹ Numerous health related issues were addressed as a youthful segment of the population nurtured a growing societal dependence on drugs. One legislated outgrowth of these circumstances was a strategy to combat drug abuse and the flow of

illicit drugs. It fell to what is now known as the White House Drug Policy Office to develop a broad federal drug strategy, and in 1973 the first in a series of federal strategies emerged.²

Every couple of years that 'strategy' is updated with broad policy guidance, as it attempts to keep pace with what was originally viewed primarily as a general public health concern. By the late 1970's this emphasis on the health of the U.S. citizenry was overshadowed within the U.S. and internationally by drug related crime, political corruption and the tremendous volume of non-taxable currency involved. By then many of the provisions of drug abuse studies conducted in the 1960's through mid-1970's were implemented,³ and a legal basis existed to permit the 'strategy' to be recognized by the law enforcement (but not necessarily the intelligence) community as a working extension of the existing Administration policy.* The policy reflects economic, societal and political inclinations that are not always best institutionalized through legislation. The subtle, broad, read-between-the-lines guidance in the most recent 'strategy' allows a boundless amount of effort to be exerted at all levels of local, state and federal government within existing legal or budgetary frameworks.⁴ To support this perception, in 1984 the 'federal strategy' became a 'national strategy'. This recent and

* At the request of the President Ford, in 1975 the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task Force documented their findings on the evolution of drug abuse policy in the U.S., and provided a number of recommendations that are implemented today. This historical reference, White Paper on Drug Abuse, put to rest the prior optimism on "winning the war on drugs".

not-so-subtle change of the 'strategy' was in response to several key events primarily sponsored by the executive and legislative branches of government since 1980.⁵

The first event was triggered by concerned citizens of South Florida asking that something be done to return Florida to them and to staunch the criminal influence. To meet this concern, by early 1982 President Reagan announced the establishment of the Task Force on Crime in South Florida with its efforts overseen directly by Vice President Bush. The resulting increased interdiction and investigative efforts by federal, state and local agencies under this task force concept brought praise from many. It definitely saw the number of cases and arrests in South Florida gaining closer scrutiny from the White House, Congress and the nation as a whole. As law enforcement agencies and the judicial system redistributed resources from around the nation to South Florida, constituencies external to Florida expressed concern. Additionally, by late 1982 the Justice Department announced a coordinated nationwide investigative effort directed at illicit drug related activities involving organized crime. Within months after the Justice Department's announcement establishing what is now thirteen Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Forces (OCDETF's), the White House extended the interdiction portion of the previously mentioned South Florida Task Force on Crime to a nationwide network which was again placed under Vice President Bush. Both new initiatives of the Department of Justice and White House were in response to a growing public awareness of the extent of illicit traffic in drugs coming into most communities of the United States. The

latest White House thrust was aimed at coordinating the use of all reasonably available resources, including the intelligence community, in stemming the flow of drugs across the borders of the United States. This network, known as the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS),⁶ established the White House as even more directly linked to evolving policy issues on drug trafficking. Today the situation driven evolutionary policy that resulted in such efforts as the OCEETF's and NNBIS flows into the latest version of the strategy now entitled the 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking.⁷

With these events came new demands on existing resources and budgetary priorities of the involved agencies. A natural outgrowth was to look at what non-traditional law enforcement agencies and departments, including the Department of Defense (DOD), could contribute to the national effort. The direct involvement of the DOD in law enforcement or jurisdiction over the civilian population is precluded by law or regulation with the exception of some specific instances outlined in Appendix B.* The latest relevant modification or exception to what is referred to as the Posse Comitatus Act was made in 1981, and is conditioned as to the limits to which DOD resources may be utilized to support drug law enforcement. This Posse Comitatus

*
"As a result of legislation in December 1981, the Department of Defense is providing [valuable] support to [civilian] law enforcement operations consistent with national security obligations." (1984 National Strategy...p.9.) "The legislation...allows the use of available military resources in furnishing information and equipment support to civilian law enforcement agencies, providing that such support does not adversely affect military readiness." (1984 National Strategy...p.53.)

Act became law following the Civil War with the primary intent of
*
restricting military participation in civilian law enforcement
activities, and provides:

"Whoever, except in cases and under circumstances expressly authorized by the Constitution or Act of Congress, willfully uses any part of the Army or the Air Force as a posse comitatus or otherwise to execute the laws shall be fined not more than \$10,000 or imprisoned not more than two years or both." (Title 18, U.S.C. Section 1385)

Following the 1981 codification of these provisions to Posse Comitatus, the Defense Department and its field components received increased numbers of requests from local, state and federal law enforcement agencies for training, equipment and services. To insure timely and proper requests from law enforcement agencies and to facilitate a somewhat predictable DOD response, some agency to agency "memorandums of agreement" were drawn up and approved. In combining the more traditional DOD mission tasking with a growing role in law enforcement, elements of perceived legal risk and degradation of military capability were voiced by the Defense Department. To minimize such risk the Service Secretaries assigned personnel to the six NNBIS regional offices and to the White House NNBIS staff. The Secretary of Defense also chartered a DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement with tasking (see Appendix C) that facilitated the Department's growing involvement.⁸ Throughout this period the international

*
Military as used here and in the Act (specifically, the Army and the Air Force) is further refined in the DOD Directive 5525.5 of 22 March 1982 where it states on page 6 that, "DOD guidance on the Posse Comitatus Act...is applicable to the Navy and the Marine Corps as a matter of DOD policy, with exceptions as may be provided by the Secretary of the Navy on a case-by-case basis."

policy concerns overseen by the Department of State continued to be intertwined with both ongoing law enforcement operations and the growing use of DOD resources. This was particularly evident in the effort to help reduce the foreign supply of illicit drugs through eradication programs and other diplomatic efforts to stem the flow of illicit drugs coming to the U.S. from Latin and Central America through the Caribbean.

While efforts continued to reduce the supply as well as the demand for illicit drugs, reports of drug trafficking profits being funneled off to buy arms or otherwise support terrorist activities or insurgencies became more prevalent by the mid-1980's. Statements by the Secretary of State, and by the Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration, as well as other Administration spokesmen outside of and during numerous congressional committee hearings in 1984, highlighted grave or significant national security related concerns over terrorist activities and the destabilizing influence of illicit international drug dealings. When the Secretary of State addressed the Miami Chamber of Commerce in September of 1984, he stated:

"The complicity of Communist governments in the drug trade is cause for grave concern among nations of the free world.....We can only speculate as to the motives for Communist involvement in the drug trade. We know that with their failing economies, Cuba and Nicaragua need hard cash to buy essential goods. We have seen how Cuba uses drug smugglers to funnel arms to Communist insurgencies and terrorists. And it is not hard to imagine that smuggling massive amounts of drugs into Western nations may serve their broader goal of attempting to weaken the fabric of Western democratic society.....Add to this the fact that narcotics trafficking is undermining the integrity of international financial centers....(and)may involve up to \$80 billion each year."

*

Presidents, and even some members of the military have similarly expressed their growing awareness and concern for national security aspects of illicit international drug trafficking. General Paul Gorman, Commander-in-Chief, U.S. Southern Command, was aware that national security goes beyond the more traditional military view when he wrote:

11

"....any nation which tolerates drug traffickers in its midst commits societal suicide and invites the suborning of democratic political institutions, the corruption of public officials,....moreover, traffickers in drugs are conduits for subversion. It is very much in the interests of the U.S. to curb these vicious criminals....I am keenly aware of critics who perceive that U.S. policy....overly emphasizes military undertakings....I see no way of separating political and economic measures from security measures on behalf of our interests."

The growing awareness and concern extends to the states and a formidable public resolve. When five U.S. Gulf Coast governors assembled for a 'southern summit' on drug trafficking in early 1985, they adopted a resolution symptomatic of that concern. The resolution asks Congress to enact laws assigning the Defense Department "the specific mission of actively searching for and interdicting agents" trying to smuggle drugs into the United States.

12

The response from the Department of Defense contained a predictable sameness to similar inquiries posed since outlining

*
Just prior to the completion of the 1975 White Paper on Drug Abuse, President Ford said, "All nations of the world -- friend and adversary alike -- must understand that America considers the illicit export of opium [drugs] to this country a threat to national security...Secretary Kissinger and I intend to make sure that they do [understand]." (White Paper on Drug Abuse,...p.50.) Similarly President Reagan has stated that drug abuse is "one of the gravest problems facing us." (Address to the Miami Chamber of Commerce, September 1984, by the Secretary of State).

the 1981 exception to Posse Comitatus. Dr. Lawrence J. Korb,
Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations and
Logistics, stated:

13
"The Defense Department already is doing everything possible within the limits of the law and our primary mission of protecting the national security."

Dr. Korb also testified before Congress on 14 November 1984 and
subsequently wrote:

14
"The Defense Department is contributing to the anti-drug effort to the maximum extent possible under current law and under the resource and military preparedness constraints with which we must abide."

15
He goes on to state:

"Before addressing the specific issues affecting our support to the civilian drug law enforcement community, let me put the DOD role in perspective by making a few preliminary remarks....National security cannot be undermined as the Defense Department meets its other responsibilities under the law."

Purpose of the Study

One central purpose dominates this study; that is to be provocative, to question the relationships between defense related issues of national security and policy formulation used in guiding the national strategy on international drug trafficking; finally, to stimulate discussion about where we should be going for the remainder of this century.

There are two thoughts here although it is long paragraphs which begin into a clear indication that only one thought will follow. Should be two sentences.

Methodology

The technique to analyze possible evolving relationships between illicit international drug trafficking and national security initially involved a thorough review of the historical files on U.S. drug policy evolution over the last two decades. This was coupled with extensive interviews. Agency files and key personnel at the policy formulation level were queried to better understand how the published national strategy on international drug trafficking evolved. Throughout this process the question of if and where national security issues had been considered was asked often. In addition, the below questions dominated the efforts to obtain relevant information:

- o What is national security in its broadest sense?
- o Does international drug trafficking pose a threat to the national security of the U.S.; if so, could it warrant a future dedicated military response?
- o Is the national strategy on international drug trafficking responsive to growing perceptions of national security related issues?
- o Who are the policy strategists when considering drug trafficking issues?
- o What accommodations have the strategists made in developing a national strategy on international drug trafficking?

The attempt to analyze how the national strategy on drug trafficking evolved in light of possible national security implications also required further analysis on how key strategists and institutions responded in the past. The trends derived from this effort are qualitatively analyzed in Chapter IV, and they are necessarily of a generic nature. Overall this methodology proved very time consuming and underlined the need for further analysis as mentioned in the conclusions (Chapter V).

Scope

The focus is necessarily narrow and concentrates on the evolving policy issues that possibly link national security and international drug trafficking. The policy bridge between the two is being strengthened by events of the 1980's, and the underpinnings of that policy are broadly reflected in the White House's 1984 National Strategy. The study actually focuses on the relationships between one prong of that multi-pronged strategy and any trends toward the use of resources traditionally dedicated to defense.

To further narrow the focus of this report, no effort is made to outline individual agency responsibilities, * however, an understanding of the essence of each discussed agency, department and branch of U.S. government is essential. No effort is made to outline institutionally imposed jurisdictional or legal constraints of the traditional law enforcement agencies. Rather the study emphasis remains on the national policy trends [related to international drug trafficking] of the past decade with a view towards projecting policy tendencies that may reflect what is in store for DOD resource utilization. To keep the length of this report manageable and to retain the focus requires that readers have an understanding of the political, economic and social environment in which the policy issues on international drug

*

Both the 1984 National Strategy (pp. 48-51 and 113-118) and the unclassified Appendix B to the NNBS Joint Surveillance Committee draft report entitled "Analysis and Policy Recommendations for the Surveillance and Detection of Narcotics Smugglers en route to the United States, August 1984", outline agency responsibilities.

trafficking operate. However, to weigh each of those issues or influences accurately and to predict any future changes are beyond the scope of this study.

In the remaining four chapters we will first look at the various views on what constitutes a national security concern possibly warranting the use of DOD resources. Then the evolution of threat assessments and how some strategies have evolved to meet those threats are discussed. In Chapter III the realm of the high level executive and legislative strategists and policy-makers is explored so that the process of negotiation and compromise can be better understood when considering the national security aspects of international drug trafficking. The final chapter on conclusions and recommendations is followed by appendices to insure a common basis of terminology.

FOOTNOTES

CHAPTER I (Pages 1-11)

1
The Drug Abuse Office and Treatment Act of 1972
(Washington: n.d.)

2
Drug Abuse Policy Office, Office of Policy Development,
1973 Federal Strategy on Drug Abuse (Washington: The White House,
1973), p.3.

3
A Report to the President from the Domestic Council Drug
Abuse Task Force, White Paper on Drug Abuse (Washington: The White
House, 1975), pp. ix, 91, 97 and 104.

4
Drug Abuse Policy Office, Office of Policy Development,
1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug
Trafficking (Washington: The White House, 1984), pp. 5 and 14.

5
Interview with Richard L. Williams, Senior Staff Member of
Drug Abuse Policy Office, White House, 11 December 1984 and 14
January 1985.

6
L.N. Schowengerdt, Jr., and T.P. Hart, "The National
Narcotics Border Interdiction System," The Bulletin, U.S. Coast
Guard Academy Alumni Association, November/December 1984, pp. 24
and 25.

7
1984 National Strategy...., pp. 45, 47 and 53.

8
Interview with Lieutenant General R. Dean Tice (USA), Head
of DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement, OSD(MI & L), Pentagon, 29
January 1985.

9
George P. Shultz, Secretary of State, "The Campaign Against
Drugs: The International Dimension." Address to the Miami
Chamber of Commerce, Miami, FL: 14 September 1984.

10
"Rampant Drug Abuse Brings Call for Move Against Source
Nations - Supply Soars as Traffic Corrupts Governments; Illicit
Gains Are Said to Finance Terrorism," The New York Times, 9
September 1984, p. 1.

11

General Paul F. Gorman (USA), Commander in Chief, U.S. Southern Command, "U.S. Southern Command: Sentinel of U.S. Interests in Latin America," Defense 84, November/December 1984, pp. 22 and 23.

12

"Governors Ask Pentagon to Help Curb Drug-Traffic," The Washington Post, 19 January 1985, p. A6.

13

Ibid.

14

Lawrence J. Korb, Assistant Secretary of Defense for Manpower, Installations, and Logistics, "DOD on the Drug War Front," Defense 85, February 1985, p. 17 (with footnote insert).

15

Ibid.

1
often appear quite naive. The appreciation for the complexities involves knowing the participants and their institutional bias and cognitive processes. * One of the first steps in looking at national security is to insure a common basis of definition based on creditable sources. Next it is necessary to be conversant with the possible shortfalls of these definitions as applied to specific circumstances. That is no less the case where international drug trafficking may be a relatively new player under the broad umbrella of national security.

Unlike the Joint Chiefs of Staff, the National Security Council (NSC) has no published dictionary of commonly used terminology describing such terms as 'national security', ** and when the National Security Council reviews its list of over a hundred issues that are regularly monitored, international drug trafficking does not appear. "It does not routinely appear on the agenda as it is being conducted effectively under existing policy by the responsible agencies."²

When the Secretary of Defense considers national security, he also considers the constancy of American defense policy and the preservation of peace with freedom. He has further stated,³

*
A rather thorough discussion on the clues to national security interests, on shared images, determining stands, and the processes present in making national security policy is found in chapter 2 of Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy, by Halperin.

**
This does not show a lack of detail, rather it shows an acknowledged circumstance driven complexion to what constitutes national security. Based on the conversation with the National Security Council (NSC) representative, the definition used by the Department of Defense could be a starting point for developing policy considerations when deliberating in the NSC.

*acknowledged
circumstance
driven
complexion*

"...the three underlying principles of our national security policy remain unchanged - our commitment to deterrence, our defensive orientation, and our determination, should deterrence fail, to fight to restore peace on favorable terms."

To insure a DOD wide understanding of these principles, the Joint Chiefs of Staff utilize the following DOD definition of
4
'national security' as their starting point:

"A collective term encompassing both national defense and foreign relations of the United States. Specifically, the condition provided by :

- a. a military or defense advantage over any foreign nation or group of nations, or
- b. a favorable foreign relations position, or
- c. a defense posture capable of successfully resisting hostile or destructive action from within or without, overt or covert."

This leaves no question as to what is meant by national security when considering a direct military attack upon the U.S. Normally very small nations and sometimes their alliances can only be concerned about this kind of national security. Superpowers and great nations must also be concerned with threats to the national security which are much more subtle and distant in space and time than the direct military attack. When conceptualizing as a superpower about situations viewed as menacing, "considerations of appropriate response tend towards emphasizing
5
the national responsibility rather than the national peril."

This concept is codified and found in DOD directives in the form of statements such as:

...provide armed forces "capable... of supporting the national politics; implementing the national objectives..." and "preserving peace and security."
-U.S. Code, Title 10, Section 8062;

Functions of DOD include "uphold and advance national policies and interests" and functions of military departments include "prosecution of war" and "needs of war," but also "provide... forces...for service in foreign countries as may be required to support the national interests of the United States." - DOD Directive 5100.1 (1980).

Entire books are authored on national security without defining the limits of its use as a term of reference. An exception to this is provided by former Secretary of Defense, Harold Brown when he wrote:

"National security, then, is the ability to preserve the nation's physical integrity and territory; to maintain its economic relations with the rest of the world on reasonable terms; to protect its nature, institutions, and governance from disruption from outside; and to control its borders."

Others, like the speech writer for the Commandant of the Coast Guard, have been directed to flavor presentations in terms that do not give too narrow and a dangerous construction to national security. In this context, national security is to transcend the usual resources of ships, tanks, planes and even men. It requires a strong, sustained and fair economy along with a society that displays a degree of harmony and opportunity, and these in turn require a foreign policy representative of our finer values. The guidance further requires that only then can national security rest on effective and responsible military power. It condemns those who equate national security only to national defense for they do not understand their own society or the tasking of the military that has been created to serve society. The Commandant believes that those who equate national security to national defense in a free society actually threaten

CHAPTER II

CURRENT PERCEPTIONS

The image or perception of what constitutes a threat to national security stems from both the vantage point and institutional interests of the beholder. Developing a strategy to effectively deal with international drug trafficking shares the same variance in perceptions, but often by a different group of responsible individuals or institutions than those dedicated to national security policy. To bridge this gap in evolving policy development, requires an understanding of national security, the threats to national security, and the present national strategy on drug trafficking. This chapter will review current perceptions on these issues.

Views of National Security

A valid assumption is that the United States and other governments tailor national security decisions to what is happening abroad or what is hoped to be achieved abroad. That assumption is too simplistic. Decisions and actions of governments stem from the interplay among executive and legislative organizations, public and private interests, and, certainly, personalities. This process must be taken into account in developing policy prescriptions from which policy is to emerge.

Images as to what constitutes national security interests

to cross the line separating civil authority and the military.⁷ Armed with these 'umbrellas', it is clear that national security policy has diplomatic, military, intelligence, economic, and domestic political components. These often become viewed in terms of national interests. By definition, which is to say by customary usage, U.S. 'vital interests' are those interests against the infringement of which we are prepared to take some kind of serious military action.⁸ By this definition many issues of genuine and important national interest are excluded. Distinguishing between whether issues are of 'vital' interest or of 'major' interest is a task of political leadership. The crucial question for the decisionmakers becomes:⁹

"Is the issue at hand so important to the well-being of the United States that the President must be prepared to use force if all other efforts fail to resolve the problem?"

In this context Canada, Mexico, Central America, and the Caribbean Islands constitute the zone of primary concern. When it comes to revolutionary change spawned by insurgency and terrorism and the spread of Marxist political influence throughout Central America, some view this as inimical to U.S. vital interests while others say it is major. The bottom line is rarely clear and in this case, if the U.S. cannot tolerate additional Marxist regimes in Central America, the U.S. world order interest is then vital; if we can live with them (indefinitely), the world order interest becomes major.¹⁰ It necessarily follows that formulation of policy having such national security implications is therefore entrusted to several executive agencies and interagency coordinating procedures. On

important matters or where agency heads have differing views, the President makes the decision. This is where the NSC provides an overarching viewpoint for the President's consideration that is absent many of the bureaucratic and institutional pressures influencing the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and other agency heads. These 'strategists', as discussed in the next chapter, all bring their views of national security to the policy development tables. This indicates that the definition of national security may become self-serving and slippery. It also means what each institutional concern wants it to mean.

11

Trends indicate a need to reflect upon two key questions:

"How much additional attention and resources should the U.S. government give to the political, economic, and security problems of countries close to U.S. borders? To what extent will greater attention to these issues divert public attention and resources from crucial problems elsewhere in the world? Looking back it is now clear that the United States neglected its own neighborhood during the past 20 years as it pursued a global role that sapped its human and material resources....The potential revolution in Mexico, Cuba's continuing drive to subvert Central America and Caribbean states, and the inability of the United States to protect its own borders against narcotics smuggling and illegal aliens point to the need for much greater attention by policymakers to the serious problems of North America."

So long as a policy issue is orchestrated effectively by agency heads and the President is not inclined to take the lead, issues of national security may never reach the NSC. Is this the case when looking at policies associated with international drug trafficking and the degree of linkage between terrorism and instability in Central America? To answer this will first

Excellent transition!

require an assessment of the threat and the role of governmental strategists which are provided in this and the following chapter.

The Threat

Who defines a national security threat? There is no consensus definition of a national security threat to be found in the literature. The more distant or indirect the threat that is alleged to affect our national security, the more controversial is the question whether it actually warrants a response, and if so, what kind.¹²

Threat assessments are routine for the intelligence community, ~~However~~, it has only been in recent years that a national priority was established that allowed national intelligence estimates (NIE) and other intelligence support (not knowingly directed at U.S. citizens^{*}) to help stem the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S. Prior to this, and even today, individual law enforcement agencies provided the highly sophisticated threat analysis on issues related to international drug trafficking.¹³

On an almost daily basis the media reports on the implications of having our Caribbean and Latin American neighbors actively producing and trafficking in drugs. Many of these nations are source or transit countries for most of the cocaine and marijuana available in the U.S. A cause and effect

*
The restriction against knowingly collecting, retaining and disseminating intelligence on U.S. citizens stems from restrictions found in Executive Orders (E.O. 12333) and DOD, as well as other, agency regulations. Any tendency to utilize these as a reason or means of graceful degradation or convenient inaction by some in the intelligence community or other agencies is understandable, but must continue to be discouraged until actual U.S. citizen direct involvement has been established.

relationship also makes these same countries exhibit a depressed economic situation and relative political instability. The net result, for many of these nations, provides a fertile political, social and economic environment for the development of subversive groups. These factors, coupled with openly confirmed reports of drugs being used to barter for guns, make our southern neighbors prime candidates for drug related insurgency and the kind of destabilizing terrorism reported by the Secretary of State. The Secretary expressed what he called "grave concern among the nations of the free world" for the complicity of Communist governments in the drug trade. He further stated that,

"We can only speculate as to the motives for Communist involvement in the drug trade. We know that with their failing economies, Cuba and Nicaragua need hard cash to buy essential goods. We have seen how Cuba uses drug smugglers to funnel arms to Communist insurgencies and terrorists. And it is not hard to imagine that smuggling massive amounts of drugs into Western nations may serve their broader goal of attempting to weaken the fabric of Western democratic society."

*Not a lot is the same
just used more than
once to make a point.
(See p. 6)*

Earlier in the 1980's the question was, "is there a link between arms and drugs?"; today it is a question of magnitude. Once the question of magnitude is known, especially when coupled with an understanding of source country capabilities to help themselves eradicate drugs, a better assessment of what should be done is possible.

When a group of 17 experts in terrorism led by former national security affairs advisor Zbigniew Brzezinski looked into -----
spelled right?

* Throughout the interview and literature review process it became evident that at this time it is DOD policy to neither officially confirm nor deny any linkage between drugs, arms, insurgency and national security.

terrorist activities, they reported early this year that

"Terrorism sponsored by governments rivals arms control as the biggest international problem and the U.S. must begin directly confronting the Soviet Union on it...The continuing reliance by states on terrorism and other forms of subversion to accomplish political ends may lead to a diminution of international stability and an unprecedented degradation of law and order throughout the world ...It is imperative that the public and its governments understand the implications of this and begin to formulate the means to prevent its occurrence."

The relationship between terrorism, drugs and arms is known to exist. The congressional records since the spring of 1983 is ^{are?} brimming with testimony supporting the cautious assessment of this relationship. ¹⁸ Case studies with follow-up analyses have been pursued to amply support the growing concern for the national security implications. ¹⁹ Ten years ago there was no plan to activate new guard stations and gates at the Pentagon to control the flow of traffic as a measure to thwart terrorism. In February 1985 those gates and guard stations became reality. Similar actions have been taken by the Department of State and the Drug Enforcement Administration in recent months. This brings us back to the central question of this study. Is the relationship between terrorism, drugs and arms of such a magnitude that our national security is threatened; if so, is it to the point that the portion of the 1984 National Strategy on international drug trafficking requires a more effective response, a response including the direct support of the DOD and the NSC? When it comes to combating terrorism, Secretary Shultz ^{20, 21} pointed out that,

"we must be willing to use military force"...
"all our efforts will not eliminate the threat,
that will require time and broad, consistent
strategy combining elements of defense,
response and international cooperation. But
we must stand firm."

The relationship between drug traffickers and terrorism is
not limited to Central and Latin America , however the threat is
nearest our shores from that direction. General Gorman tends

*Believe you could
have chosen
a better
word.*

22

that way when he writes:

".....traffickers in drugs are conduits for
subversion...It is very much in the interests
of the U.S. to curb these vicious criminals and
to cooperate with Latin nations willing to attack
illegal narcotic distribution systems at their
sources."

Assuming terrorist tactics will continue to be used to reach
specific political objectives, and in view of the numerous soft
targets for terrorists in the U.S., our policymakers should
develop answers to a host of complex questions, one of which is
the subject of this study.

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23

The Vice President assessed the situation when he stated,
"success against drug smuggling is intimately tied to the
continuation of freedom and democracy in the hemisphere."

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*
The connection between drugs, arms, and insurgency is not a
new phenomenon. Bulgaria, Turkey, Burma and many other world
community countries have been fighting or promoting such factors
for over two decades.

**

State Department buildings at home and abroad have recently
all been made less vulnerable to terrorist threats. Our Ambassa-
dors have had to leave some Latin American countries because of
life-threatening situations promoted by traffickers. Similarly
the Drug Enforcement Administration has had to take like
measures; as the traffickers come under pressure from efforts to
cut off their supplies, DEA agents have been kidnapped and
threatened and 'hit squads' have been reported in the U.S.

As reflected previously, this concern for hemispheric security and stability is tied most directly to the United States' immediate southerly neighbors. In the Caribbean, Central American and Latin American regions, the tendency to establish some form of democratic government prevails, and on the surface seems to argue against the threat to hemispheric security until the remaining options to democracy are considered. In the past five years, amidst tremendous instability brought on by a number of factors, nine countries of the Western Hemisphere have moved to democracy from dictatorship, and zero countries have gone from

25

democracy to dictatorship. While the existing and emerging democracies do not always meet the exact United States measure of a mature democracy, the tendency is clear and supported. As neighbors we rely to varying degrees on one another for mutual support. The most notable failing in this arena is considered Cuba with the resulting concern for that ^{COUNTRY'S} ~~countries~~ export of the type of government that threatens to destabilize emerging democratic forms of government in Africa, Central America, Latin America and the Caribbean Basin. Former U.S. Ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs, and former U.N. Ambassador Jeane Kirkpatrick have suggested that the cooperation between drug traffickers and revolutionary movements may be extensive, involving the governments of Cuba and Nicaragua. Colombian officials do not recognize such a formal connection within their

26

country. Yet these distinctions become blurred when viewed in other contexts. The Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-American Affairs ((INM)), Langhorne Motley stated,

27

See p. 30. I believe this is where you have the real meaning of INM. And that the INM on this page should be something else.

24

Might have better better as two sentences.

"There is a new awareness among the countries of Latin America and the Caribbean that illegal drug production and trafficking are dangerous to their own societies."

And despite the prior official pronouncement above from Colombia, DEA reports that the Colombians "see that the money engendered by the drug trade can be a destabilizing influence"...."They know that the money will be used to support terrorism in Colombia."²⁸

In the Caribbean, political instability is rife among the strongest democratic governments, even with the swing away from leftist governments, such as in Jamaica.²⁹ The rampant poverty on many of the islands seems to assure economic instability with all its associated political and social ills. This is no less the case in much of Latin America, and can be found globally.

A common denominator develops in this environment. In the scramble for a livelihood, many individuals tend to turn to the most ready source of income. To many this means growing, processing, transporting or otherwise working in the illicit international drug trade. In several countries with strong ties to the U.S., including Bolivia and even more distant countries like Burma, wealthy, heavily armed drug traffickers control large drug producing areas. These areas become autonomous with no government control. In many of our closest neighbors there are so many farmers relying on cannabis, coca and poppy cultivation that the governments are loath to cut the plants down. In some instances, these 'narcodollars' keep the national economies afloat.³⁰

In the short run that may appear to be a positive aspect of drug trafficking, but in the longer run the western hemisphere is

finding that the drug traffic becomes a threat to the democratic host country by further destabilizing the state. This is the case in Bolivia.³¹ Additionally, there is a similar fear that the fragile political systems of Peru, Mexico, the Bahamas and Jamaica are being undermined. Bolivia's undersecretary of interior, Gustavo Sanchez, says, "There is no greater destabilizing force for democratic government than the power of the narcotrafico (drug trafficker)."³²

When looking at the record in Central America from the vantage point of a leftist rebel,³³ the conditions that have fed revolution over the decades still exist - the huge disparities between rich and poor, wrenching poverty, unequal land distribution and shaky military based political systems. These in turn are further exacerbated by high birthrates and unemployment.

All these observations were further highlighted in 1984 with the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. The report provides both long and short range U.S. policy recommendations responsive to social, economic, and democratic development in the region, and to internal and external threats to its security and stability. The Commission,³⁴ chaired by Henry Kissinger, reported that,

"Central America's crisis is our crisis"...
"Our task now, as a nation, is to transform the crisis...to help our neighbors not only to secure their freedom from aggression and violence, but also to make them both prosperous and free. If, together, we succeed in this, then the sponsors of violence will have done the opposite of what they intended: they will have roused us not only to turn back the tide of totalitarianism but to bring a new birth of hope and of opportunity to the people of Central America."

Almost a half year before the Commission reported its results, Mexico, Colombia, Panama and Venezuela developed a 21 point peace plan for Central America. These four nations became known as the Contadora group, and its plan is the Contadora pact. Vice President Bush and Secretary Shultz both note that, "we support the Contadora; we think things may have been worse without Contadora and we will support them in the future."³⁵

In line with both the findings of the National Bipartisan Commission and the intent of the Contadora group, a number of Central and Latin American countries attempted to improve their situation through regional initiatives despite being constrained by political, fiscal and resource considerations. The most notable is the Quito declaration on drugs. Eight countries signed the initial resolution in August 1984 in Quito, Ecuador. The declaration identified narcotics trafficking as a major health problem, a hindrance to economic and social development, and a corrupter and destabilizer of governments.

Having these positive indicators from the nations of the region coupled with the policy recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission may provide the extra ingredients needed to further improve our evolving strategy on international drug trafficking. The hemispheric national security threat seems to have visibly become part of future policy refinements for the next edition of the National Strategy.

A National Strategy on Drug Trafficking

When things change,[?] things change. One way to facilitate the intended response to change is to have a strategy. ^{AND} in the effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the United States, that strategy becomes a mechanism to express changes in our policy. All strategies, be it peacetime, wartime or time of national crisis, flow from a need to develop a plan of action in response to a ~~perceived threat~~ ^(REAL, PERCEIVED OR POTENTIAL) ~~or the possible formation of a threat, or risk, in the absence of a strategy.~~ In the more traditional military sense, these strategies evolve for purposes such as acting as a declarative deterrent, or to develop forces as in a procurement strategy, or, as is more often the case, to apply force. Precise definitions of terms like 'strategy', 'military strategy', and 'national strategy' are commonly used by DOD and are found in Appendix D.

From our prior discussion in this chapter, it is apparent that any effective strategy to deal with stemming the flow of illicit drugs must first be based on a valid threat assessment. This would then be the strategy that would promote a wall[?] of resolve[?], and in this case that wall should deter the illicit drug traffic, but is unlikely to eliminate it. ³⁶ The kind of strategy we are looking for then is one that provides a flexible countervailing deterrence. It is not a procurement or a force application strategy although each relies on the other for ultimate policy implementation in this case.

Before digging into the present strategy, an observation is appropriate based on the prior findings of this chapter. In an effort to develop a national resolve, the biggest obstacle may

not be our perceived drug trafficking adversary; rather it may be ourselves. Dreary repetitions of historical institutional interests coupled with other stumbling blocks to a national consensus and effective policy do not build that sought after wall of resolve. The reasons become many, complex, and interrelated. Constraints are implicit in our representative form of governance where the nature of the response is often incremental, that is, doing only what is believed minimally necessary at each stage.

The 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, hereafter referred to as the National Strategy, was first published in 1973 as the Federal Strategy. During the past 12 years it has gained its value by providing a historical record of policy guidance driven by circumstance and budgetary considerations. As mandated by Congress, it had improved coordination between agencies and facilitated improvements within a broad envelope of guidance. As an agenda, over the years that *NATIONAL* strategy never mentions that international drug trafficking is a growing threat to our national security, and it perpetuates the view of the 1960's and 1970's that drug trafficking is strictly a social and civil law enforcement problem. A decade ago drug demand reduction was just being addressed and the objective of drugs supply reduction was:

37
"....to make obtaining drugs inconvenient, expensive, and risky, so that fewer people will experiment with drugs, fewer who do experiment will advance to chronic, intensive use, and more of those who currently use drugs will abandon their use and seek treatment."

Today the National Strategy encompasses problems of demand,

supply, transportation and distribution. There are five major areas of concentration; three are aimed at reducing demand here in the U.S. by (1) Education and Prevention, (2) Detoxification and Treatment, and (3) Research. The remaining two prongs of this 5-pronged strategy deal with supply reduction.

The fourth prong is international cooperation to control narcotics. International initiatives under this portion of the strategy are coordinated by the Bureau of International Narcotics Matters (INM) at the State Department. Support is gained from the Drug Enforcement Administration and the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. This international effort concentrates on such programs as illicit crop eradication augmented by crop substitution efforts, and support to source and transit countries in their efforts to improve local law enforcement.

The remaining prong of the strategy is drug law enforcement. It is here where the drug supply reduction effort recognizes the need to stem the flow of drugs into the U.S. *

By combining the potential of the National Strategy with the formation of such drug law enforcement efforts as NNBS and the thirteen OCDEFT's in the early 1980's, it is apparent that vast improvements in coordination of the activities of more than two dozen agencies in nine federal departments have occurred recently. This trend towards extensive Executive Office involvement is counter to the intent of current strategy and

* A detailed description of the National Strategy view of the law enforcement program is contained in Chapter IV, Drug Law Enforcement, of the 1984 National Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking.

earlier findings in which the Domestic Council Drug Abuse Task
40
Force stated:

"The task force recommends that as many of the responsibilities of this office as possible gradually be shifted to the departments, agencies, and Cabinet committees, in order to avoid institutionalizing direct Executive Office involvement in this area."

The National Strategy historically reports the many circumstance driven milestones reached by the early 1980's. Similarly, it appears inevitable that circumstances should require acknowledging the emerging implications that international drug trafficking may have on national security.

Current broad objectives for international drug trafficking
41
are:

- o Strong, coordinated anti-smuggling activities;
- o Improving collection, analysis and dissemination of accurate and timely intelligence concerning illicit drug production and drug trafficking;
- o Improving cooperation and coordination among federal, state and local law enforcement agencies.

As developed previously, any strategy of the type we are considering is predicated on a particular threat. The National Strategy recognizes this and publishes its threat assessment
42
as:

"Drug trafficking is sophisticated and complex. A wide variety of drugs are involved, most with several international sources. The traffic in illicit drugs not only violates drug laws, but also involves numerous other criminal activities, including racketeering, conspiracy, bribery and corruption of public officials, tax evasion, banking law violations, illegal money transfers, import/export violations, crimes involving firearms, and crimes of violence. The wide range of illegal activities presents an equally wide range of vulnerability to law enforcement action."

Such a threat determination leaves little doubt as to the place national security plays in the present strategy. It does not appear to have a place in the published National Strategy. Other indicators as to how national security is viewed can be found elsewhere in the National Strategy by reviewing Appendix A at the end of this report. In each instance that the term 'national security' or a related term involving military capability is used, it may be interpreted to be a reason for minimal or even non-performance by the DOD. This brings us back to the question of if there is a bridge evolving between national security and international drug trafficking, why doesn't the National Strategy acknowledge it?

The current National Strategy does not appear to be driven in any direct sense by issues of national security, and a good indication of its present thrust is represented by the following statement of President Reagan on 17 November 1982 in a speech to
43
the Miami Citizens Against Crime:

"Through a wide range of self-help measures, you mobilized all the resources of home, neighborhood and community for the battle against drug smugglers and their criminal associates. And in doing all this, you tapped the real strength of our political system - the spirit, energy and will of everyday people who, acting through their private social institutions as well as their political system, achieve far more than any government planner or bureaucratic dreamer could ever hope to achieve."

This bottoms up recognition of the threat by local communities has been recognized by the President, and the public's awareness of this threat is purposefully indicated by the extensive use of referenced newspaper articles in this chapter. It may just be a matter of time before the top down

guidance acknowledges the threat as one requiring national security policy level guidance and redirection for the National Strategy.

When these inferences of policy are considered in light of the fact that DEA reports that the worldwide supply of every popular drug far outstrips the demand,⁴⁴ it is conceivable that even the best of national policymakers could ~~despair~~^{SP} *despair*.

Within the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office, it is readily acknowledged that there is no intent for DOD to have a funded narcotics mission of the type addressed here. Yet, as long as the smuggling trend continues upward, there is growing pressure to use more of the resources of all agencies even though they are missioned elsewhere. It is further speculated that before DOD would ever receive dedicated mission tasking in support of the effort to stem the international flow of illicit drugs, the influx of drugs will level out; thus preclude the need for such tasking.⁴⁵

Meanwhile, there will always be a need for some level of law enforcement effort at some level below the peak required to eliminate the influx of illicit drugs. Rather than matching capability to the threat, the struggle within the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office and throughout most of the government is to find an acceptable floor for budgetary support.⁴⁶

Those tasked with dealing with such issues are going to be given the label of 'strategist', and their efforts to promote a form of negotiated progress will be the subject of the next chapter.

FOOTNOTES

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CHAPTER III

STRATEGISTS

"The President's drug strategy is working," testified the ¹ Commissioner of Customs during Congressional hearings this year. At the pinnacle of United States strategists sits our President, and it is he who openly promotes having his Cabinet officers be policy spokesmen and fellow strategists. It is upon President Reagan's desk that a stone sits with the motto, "there is no limit to what a man can do or where he can go if he doesn't mind who gets the credit." In our representative form of government, doing things may often rely on obtaining this 'credit', or having the opportunity for a form of self or institutional interest credit accumulation. Everyone from the President on down to the person implementing parts of a much bigger plan can be labelled a strategist, but only a few are chosen to combine policymaking with strategy making. It is these few that are to be scrutinized in this chapter.

How does the President make the strategy for which he is credited and seems responsible? Who are this country's strategists when it comes to policymaking on national security issues? Are they the same strategists for illicit drug trafficking policy? In the previous chapter it became obvious that a particular national security policy has the likelihood of being more effective if it ^{is} ~~were~~ framed within an accurate threat assessment. It is that strategy and the policy that flows from

it that in turn is to frame the actions of the implementers. So from the very beginning of this process, decision making risk becomes inversely related to the acceptance and accuracy of the intelligence community's threat or national intelligence estimate (NIE). The NIE is the most refined analysis available and relies for much of its value upon being open to politically unpopular views for it to be effective. This would lead one to a further conclusion that prescriptions allowing good national strategy and policy relies upon optimal intelligence support. Whether optimal intelligence support as it relates to international drug trafficking is being obtained, or how to structure the intelligence community to gain optimal support for the singular issue of drug trafficking, is beyond the scope of this report.

*very common
worded.*

Before identifying who the strategists are, or maybe who they should be, it may be helpful to review some concepts on strategy development. There is a relatively common belief that the determination of U.S. strategy has become a more or less incidental by-product of the administrative process of budget determination. This concept goes back at least two decades.

When it comes to defining strategy and its application to the national effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs into our country, DOD certainly does not make the strategy. Neither is national strategy made by the individual law enforcement agencies. Meanwhile the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office publishes policy guidance in the National Strategy, NNBS

*
See Appendix D for accepted DOD definitions of the terms military strategy, national strategy, and strategy.

facilitates coordination efforts to stem the flow, and individual departments and agencies make their institutionally perceived best use of existing resources. In this regard the task of each law enforcement agency, as well as DOD, is to organizationally, or within mission mandate, establish acceptable policy. To carry out that policy, each designs and procures material, platforms, sensors, and other equipment while organizing, training, and equipping agency personnel. All this should be done in pursuit of some strategic realities. ? Is it?

In the previous two chapters, an attempt was made to highlight some emerging drug trafficking realities in our environment that may force strategy development based on a concern for an expanded view of national security. The term 'strategist', much like the term 'strategy', is all too often narrowly interpreted as applying only to military objectives *such as* ~~like~~ defeating an enemy army, ^{* therefore,} ~~so~~ a natural tendency is to confine our concept of strategic capability to forces-in-being. Those forces-in-being have great value, however, just as strategy and ~~the~~ strategic policies are always ^{*} directed towards achieving political ends, with respect to which military objectives are only way-stations, so must strategic capabilities of the United States for stemming the flow of drugs be reckoned in terms of the capacities of the United States. These U.S. capacities are in terms that rely first on the selection of reasonable ends to be pursued, and ~~rely~~ secondly, on efficiently organizing all our

* This is an error which Clausewitz, the great strategic theorist, repeatedly warned against in his famous book On War.

* 3

resources to accomplish those ends. The more clearly the strategists understand the nature of the implications of these realities, the more likely a public consensus and national "will" can solidify and our responsible policymakers will be able to develop more rational stratagems for dealing with international drug trafficking. It is at this juncture and in the highest levels of government that the distinction between strategist and policymaker may become blurred. To understand who makes policy in the national arena becomes difficult because the question is not "who" makes policy, but "what" makes policy. As we are soon to (re)discover when discussing international drug trafficking, the virtues of will, predilection, even good intentions cannot be
4
relied upon to determine the response of our system because

"....we are thrown back on the analysis of (1) the strategic orientation that is conditioned by our preparations and built into our institutions, and (2) our capabilities and constraints. Those factors constitute, respectively, the logic and the logistics of national action. They are both what makes certain responses seem 'necessary', and what causes other responses to turn out to be impossible."

The challenge of formulating a viable strategy [the job of the strategist] in the face of an often complex and quite changeable domestic and international setting is to identify the obstacles to an effective strategy, and then the strategist must continue on to seek ways to work around these obstacles in an effort to achieve defined goals. Without defined goals, which is possibly the function of the National Strategy, this becomes even

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Resources as used here means intellectual and emotional as well as material.

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The longer the sentence, the more difficult it is to grasp the

more difficult. Add the concept expressed earlier that our primary obstacles may be ourselves; it may not be viable to execute a strategy to achieve a goal even when based on public consensus. Another possible way of viewing the formulation of a viable U.S. strategy on international drug trafficking is to divide it ~~up~~⁵ into four basic elements:

- o A clear conception of goals and priorities among these goals;
- o A design for achieving these goals or countering the threats to their attainment with available resources;
- o A societal consensus which will support the strategy;
- o A worldwide reputation for adhering consistently to the strategy.

In discussing the more specific roles of the strategist in international drug trafficking policy formulation, it is helpful to confine this view of strategists to the senior agencies' heads on up to the President. In this respect, the U.S. government acts⁶ within three major sets of organizational relationships:

- o The executive branch with the legislative branch;
- o The President and White House staff with the executive departments and agencies;
- o The offices within each of the various executive departments.

These organizational relationships, coupled with the free world expectations of a superpower, have provided a strategy and policy arena that is not always evident in the [?]moment. Putting together a policy that is responsive to the wide range of concerns associated with a free world superpower view of national security involves balancing "what should be done?" with "what can be done?" and thus the effective strategist promotes policies that are often negotiated based on political, economic, and social considerations. The following sections will briefly

long center

explore some perceived roles of key strategists in developing policies related to international drug trafficking and the implicit considerations for national security.

Executive Branch

When the strategists assemble to consider issues of what should and what can be done, one of the options usually involves maintaining the budgetary status quo, ^{This is} a view often applauded by the Office of Management and Budget (OMB), ^{WHICH ALSO} ~~and this in turn~~ usually translates ^{INTO} ~~to~~ making the best use of existing resources. The responsibility as to how those resources are employed ultimately rests with the President. The NSC is the principal forum for presidential consideration of foreign policy issues and national security matters. The NSC gathers facts, ^{SOLICITS?} elicits the views of appropriate government agencies, conducts analyses, determines alternatives, and presents to the President all the pertinent information available. This system for developing clear policy options relies upon a number of factors to shape ⁷ policy in an evolutionary manner as depicted by Figure III-1. If this system for the formulation of national strategy is utilized, then the decision (e.g., the approval of the ⁸ recommended course of action) is clearly that of the President.

Before the NSC can proceed as previously outlined, the issue is established as an agenda item warranting such attention. In the case of international drug trafficking, it is not an agenda item! As long as the NSC is able to point to the successes of responsible departments and agencies, it indicates an effective Administration policy not in need of NSC policy prescriptions.

THE FORMULATION OF NATIONAL STRATEGY




Figure III - 1. The Formulation of National Strategy.
Source: Armed Forces Staff College Pub 1.

When international drug trafficking is considered at the NSC, it is addressed more than likely because it indirectly relates to some other higher priority issue on the NSC agenda, such as international terrorism.

So let's apply previously identified relationships between national security, the threat, and strategy with the concept of how the intelligence community and NSC operate with respect to international drug trafficking.

The ~~purpose~~ for the NSC was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President with respect to the integration of domestic, foreign and military policies relating to the national security. The NSC is the highest Executive Branch entity that provides review of, guidance for and direction to the conduct of all national foreign intelligence and attendant policies and programs. *I ASSUME INTERNATIONAL INTELLIGENCE IS OFF LIMITS TO THE NSC?* To support the NSC the U.S. intelligence activities have very specific goals as outlined by Executive Order (E.O.) 12333 where it states:

"The United States intelligence effort shall provide the President and the NSC with the necessary information on which to base decisions concerning the conduct and development of foreign, defense and economic policy, and the protection of U.S. national interests from foreign security threats." The intelligence community shall (section 1.4 of E.O. 12333) "...conduct intelligence activities necessary for the conduct of foreign relations and the protection of the national security of the U.S., including... collection of information concerning, and the conduct of activities to protect against... international narcotics activities."

Even with such clear guidance, interpretation as to what actions were intended by the ~~E.O.~~ ¹²³³³ has permitted the intelligence community to further specify that international drug trafficking intelligence is law enforcement information, not national security information. ¹⁰ The justification for this largely comes from the intelligence community's view, based on the law enforcement community's prior methodology, that, "this distinction between law enforcement and national security information is routinely recognized by other agencies." ¹¹ This view may be inappropriate considering the growing threat

discussed in Chapter II, and supports the thesis that a presidential decision simply opens a new round of maneuvers rather than settling the question of what is to be done. 12

The intelligence support of the President, OMB and of Congress is guided by intelligence community constituted boards, councils and groups with no singular intelligence community voice. ^{FOR EXAMPLE,} Intelligence on an issue of national security, ~~let's say~~ ~~for example,~~ ^{MIGHT} come from the Defense Intelligence Agency. To get to the President, it would pass through the General Defense Intelligence Program where the National Security Agency and the Central Intelligence Agency, as well as others, may contribute before reaching the President or Congress. Each agency contributes views that gain their value from the diversity of assessments ^{WHICH RESULT} ~~derived~~ ^{THIS} from multi-agency analytical competition. ~~and, while not~~ ^{and although this will not ease} easing the decision making process, it should reduce decision making risk of unexpected consequences for the strategist. In the consensus seeking process, especially if done too early, key data and correct conclusions may be washed away before reaching the strategist. The freedom to speak up, to

* This bureaucratic phenomenon is discussed extensively in Chapter 15 of Halperin's book Bureaucratic Politics and Foreign Policy. He points out on page 293 that most government actions, which look to the casual outside observer as if they resulted from specific presidential decisions, are more often an amalgam of a number of coincidental occurrences: actions brought about by presidential decisions (not always those intended), actions that are really maneuvers to influence presidential decisions, actions resulting from decisions in unrelated areas, and actions taken at lower levels by junior participants without informing their superiors or the President. Thus to explain a series of actions, it is necessary to consider not only the relevant presidential decisions (policies, strategies), but also these other sources.

disagree and to challenge, opens channels of dissent from competing and different agencies as well as academic experts. By perpetuating this process, the DOD agencies, such as the Defense Intelligence Agency, individual Service intelligence resources, and the National Security Agency, as well as the non-DOD agencies (Central Intelligence Agency and the multitude of intelligence organizations of the Cabinet Departments) have a mechanism to access the President through the Director of Central Intelligence and the NSC on issues of national security.

about 50 words in context

Within the executive branch, the Cabinet members and individual agency heads not only have intelligence to pass up through the system, but must also oversee the implementation of many of the decisions based on policy guidance from above. The system encourages further specificity in the policy and strategy formulations as the broader executive level guidance is implemented at each lower step by departments, agencies and personnel in the field.

The President has structured the border drug interdiction strategy development effort through the Vice President, Cabinet officers and the White House Drug Abuse Policy Office. The responsibilities he placed on one particular Cabinet Council, the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, under the leadership of the Attorney General has focused, among other issues, on the development and implementation of international and domestic efforts to reduce the supply of illicit drugs. This Council has been aided at the agency level by a Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction.

By mid-1982 Executive Order 12368 was signed and formally designated the Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office in the

his penultimate sentence on the next page is confusing and needs to be rewritten

White House Office of Policy Development as his advisor on drug abuse policy matters. This adviser is supposed to be responsible for coordinating and overseeing both international and domestic drug abuse functions by all executive branch agencies. It is from this office that the National Strategy evolves. That 5-pronged strategy had vastly improved coordination among agencies, with one exception -- interdiction. This aspect of the strategy relied heavily on either extensive interagency coordination or strong top-down guidance. From a management perspective this was the most complex portion of the National Strategy to coordinate and oversee because more than two dozen agencies in many of the federal departments have some role in the area of interdiction. * International drug trafficking strategists within the Executive Branch are found in:

- o Executive Office of the President (Office of Policy Development, Drug Abuse Policy Office);
- o Office of the Vice President (NNBIS);
- o Department of Justice (Drug Enforcement Administration, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Immigration and Naturalization Service, El Paso Intelligence Center, Cabinet Council on Legal Policy, National Drug Enforcement Policy Board);
- o Department of Treasury (Customs Service, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms);
- o Department of Transportation (Coast Guard, Federal Aviation Administration);

 * A detailed look at which federal departments and agencies retain drug abuse responsibilities is found in Appendix A of the National Strategy. These can be summarized as follows:

<u>Designation</u>	<u>Total</u>	<u>Trafficking</u>	<u>Budgeted</u>
Cabinet Departments	11	6	4 (none DOD)
Departmental Agencies	32	14	8
Independent Agencies	5	2	0
TOTAL	48	22	12

Thus of the 48 departments and agencies, 22 are involved in international drug trafficking and of those 12 are budgeted.

- o Department of State (Bureau of International Narcotics Matters, Agency for International Development);
- o Department of Defense (DOD Task Force on Drug Enforcement, Military Departments, National Security Agency);
- o Department of Commerce (National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration);
- o Independent Federal Agencies (Central Intelligence Agency, U.S. Information Agency).

It was this perceived void in the overall coordination of the interdiction portion of the strategy by both Congress and the President that helped to create NNBS and a new recognized layer of executive level strategists.

Oversight of NNBS relies upon a number of national and regional boards. The Executive Board is chaired by the Vice President and composed of select Cabinet level officers.

Detailed issues find resolution in a Coordinating Board chaired by the Chief of Staff to the Vice President and with membership from departmental agencies. Day-to-day efforts are monitored

 * Congress is a key player in strategy development for it is here that procedures become institutionalized, and these then become the domain of the executive departments and agencies to implement. The role of Congress as strategist is considered in the next section of this chapter.

** In addition to the Vice President the Executive Board consists of the Secretaries of State, Defense, Treasury, and Transportation, Attorney General, Counsellor to the President, Director of the Drug Abuse Policy Office, and Director of CIA.

*** In addition to the Chief of Staff to the Vice President, the Coordinating Board consists of the Associate Attorney General, Secretaries of Air Force, Navy, and Army, Director of FBI, Commissioner of Customs, Administrator of DEA, Commandant of Coast Guard, Commissioner of Immigration and Naturalization Service, Director of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms, Administrator of Federal Aviation Administration, Deputy Director of CIA, Assistant Secretary of State (INM), Assistant Secretary of Defense (RA&L), Special Assistant to Secretary of Transportation, and Deputy Director of Drug Abuse Policy Office.

?
 I thought it was either MI+L = Korb or RA = Webb.

by a White House staff having membership from representative agencies, including DOD and the intelligence community.

At all of these levels in the executive branch, it is recognized and was recently attested to by NNBIS that:

"Increasing evidence regarding the dangers of drug usage, the terrorism and crime which is fueled by drug sales, and the subversion perpetrated by hostile governments in our hemisphere through their aiding the flow of drugs into this country supports our concern and efforts."

When President Reagan created NNBIS, the Vice President was placed in charge of the border interdiction of drugs with the full agreement of the Vice President, the Attorney General, and the then Counselor to the President, Mr. Edwin Meese. These individuals are the recognized executive policy spokesmen for the effort to stem the flow of illicit drugs into the U.S., and are the key strategists today. Among many related initiatives they have insured that there is:

- o Improved interagency coordination among law enforcement agencies;
- o Increased participation of the military services in drug interdiction;
- o Involvement of the intelligence community in the interdiction efforts.

By his position within our government, and his stature in the international community, the Vice President is the focal point for international drug matters. Especially within the Bahamas, Jamaica, Belize, and Colombia, this recognized position is used to gain improved foreign efforts against traffickers. This is all done in coordination with and realizing that the Department of State retains the lead responsibility for foreign policy. In this effort the Vice President can gain a more

unified and responsive amount of coordination required with the Drug Enforcement Administration, the intelligence community, Customs, Coast Guard, Defense and the Drug Abuse Policy Office of the White House.

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How effective this coordinative effort actually is often relies upon that complex political and social system that somehow spawns a national "will" for action. This is one of the strategists' biggest challenges when in the position of formulating national policy. It is the view of the President and the strategists that surround him that forced the observations that national "will" includes the ability of President Reagan to generate and sustain the support of the rest of the political system for some purpose. If that purpose is to stem the flow of illicit drugs, even the President cannot exercise his will for the Nation, but he can try to mobilize its resources at the opportune time and with the necessary political support.

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For that national "will" to be an effective deterrent to illicit international drug trafficking, there has to ~~not only be~~ ^{be more than} a capability in terms of resources, ~~but there has to~~ ^{there must} also be a recognized risk to the trafficker, the source country or the countries facilitating the transshipment. A measure of that risk is the credibility placed on the strategists' ability to make their policies work. This is fraught with obvious bureaucratic peril, ~~however~~ ^{because} as this strategy is being formulated, it may be too easy to tend towards seeing the situation in source countries in our own image. Unfortunately this construct relies on credibility based on what the strategist measures as success

rather than what the adversary may use as a measure of success or failure. ^{Consequently,} ~~and thus~~ the strategist may unsuccessfully try to use improper accomplishments to establish credibility. An example of this could be the State Department's years without significant deviation from its concept of normal diplomatic dealings with a sovereign like Colombia, even when it was known to supply the majority of illicit drugs into the U.S. As a result, and as supported by the Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America (sometimes referred to as the Kissinger Report), institution building through encouragement of American democratic forms, a kind of mirror imaging process, is being relaxed in many of our dealings in Central and South America, and with it a new credibility is evident.

In a Cabinet form of government not only is it necessary to rely on the departments to carry out the policies of the strategists, it is also important that the departments and agencies perceive that they participated in nurturing the policy into its final form. On a day-to-day basis the individual departments and agencies ^{where do they imprint these courses? on what?} imprint the courses of action and the credibility of our government. The departments and agencies in turn view their institutional contributions as significant. It is the effective strategist from the President and his staff on down that recognizes this without fanfare. This in turn promotes the type of loyalty and quiet, yet pervasive, leadership style so prominent in the 1980's. So while the Cabinet form of government is often perceived as being less efficient and less responsive than many would prefer, it has proven to be more enduring. When considering issues of international drug trafficking, history

will have to be relied upon to confirm this as policy formulation evolves and is recorded in the National Strategy.

The question of when should White House involvement be restricted in matters related to international drug trafficking is not a new one. The answer of the 1970's spoke in terms of strengthening Cabinet management. The task force tasked with developing recommendations based on the drug issues prevalent up until 1975, namely health and crime, recommended ²⁰

"...as many of the responsibilities as possible be gradually shifted to the departments, agencies, and Cabinet committees, in order to avoid institutionalizing direct Executive Office involvement in this area."

Whether that recommendation remains valid today is a related issue of this study that will not be pursued, except to note that there are those in strategy and policymaking positions who support such a thesis. ²¹ Under such a Cabinet management scheme, the White House involvement would only involve participation in major policy decisions, maintaining oversight to ensure that the President's policies and guidance are being effectively implemented, and assisting as required, in the coordination of the involved agencies. Do such restrictions lose validity if international drug trafficking is of growing magnitude in the national security arena? Whereas a responsible Cabinet member may not find it advantageous to have an issue for which he or she is responsible aired in a Cabinet meeting, especially if it relates to national security, they could find themselves amongst the fortunate to have similar policy issues affecting their department(s) discussed in the NSC. Here policy prescriptions can evolve in a more calculated manner not pre-empted by

unintended presidential guidance. Whereas international drug trafficking policy issues during the preceding decade were conceptually and effectively handled at the individual department and agency level, if this becomes an issue of sufficient national security concern, then the tendency may be to solicit NSC developed prescriptions.

Such NSC developed prescriptions, as previously discovered, would certainly involve both the State Department and the DOD. As recognized strategists, the DOD can meld efforts of the State Department, NNBIS, DEA and host nations into operational reality, but would that encompass all the ancillary concerns and result in the most effective long term use of available resources? Answering that appears to be a risk many of our strategists are not ready to take. Even if it was answered, since DOD is not missioned to help foreign governments find and wipe out cocaine and marijuana processing and distribution facilities, it cannot do so even though DOD has the detection equipment, training and intelligence capability. During congressional hearings in Miami in March 1985, now retired General Gorman blamed some ineffectiveness on friction among government agencies and the State Department's reluctance to put diplomatic pressure on the Central and South American governments who seem to be preoccupied with internal security problems. During those same hearings the General also indicated that costs for more DOD involvement would be much lower than most people imagine. Such allegations are wrapped up in legal issues associated with the Economy Act, other laws, foreign policy and perceptions of what is institutionally

in the best interests of the individual strategist's concerns. Opposite views on agency friction are common and seem to serve bureaucratic purpose. As an example, the Commissioner of Customs testified that:

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"...I would like to respond to some comments that have been made about lack of cooperation in the executive branch, and to say at least from my perspective, my dealings with...DEA, ...Coast Guard, ...and Defense have been absolutely terrific, so I would like to at least mention at least at my level and from at least what I have seen over the past 2 years we have had very little problem in cooperating among the managers of the various enforcement organizations."

Even within DOD the acknowledgement of commitment is regularly attested to; for example the Secretary of Defense wrote

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"Since....the 1981 (exception to Posse Comitatus), I have committed myself fully to the anti-drug trafficking effort; indeed, I have never refused a major request for assistance. On many occasions, I have reaffirmed publicly and directly to the President my support of the administration's drug policy."

Confusing not authoritatively implied.

The strategist must be prepared to counter misconceptions to effectively dialogue at all levels of the bureaucracy to promote ideas, establish goals, facilitate implementation, and take it to the public and Congress for a consensus. In this role these multi-faceted individuals become the executive level synergizers. An example of this is the previously outlined evolution of NNBIS and its use of Cabinet, agency and regional strategist capabilities. NNBIS may continue much as it is for as long as the present Administration is in office, or it may evolve into a form dictated by the legislative strategists and their concepts as to how policy should emerge to counter the international drug trafficking threat.

Legislative Branch

The preceding section reaffirmed some known concepts on how the political leaders of the U.S. may try to orchestrate events and determine our vital interests in efforts to prioritize national policies. While that responsibility lies first and foremost with the President, next in importance is the Congress and its various committees. When it comes to international drug trafficking, one select committee and several subcommittees dominate while numerous caucus groups and other committees occasionally display an interest in the effort to stem the flow of drugs. The interplay between what the executive and legislative branches are attempting to accomplish, each in their own way, is often fascinating and much too intriguing to be fully analyzed here.

The senior strategists and policymakers in the executive branch, such as departmental secretaries and agency heads, spend more time than ever testifying before congressional committees and trying to answer detailed questions prepared by growing congressional staffs. Members of Congress have even less time to attend to the details of such matters as international drug trafficking. The variety of political interests that see to it that the legislator is elected, may not be looking for an executive with a penchant for organizational detail; so there should be little surprise that they and their staffs do not always produce a smooth evolution of consistent policy positions. While individual legislators remain responsible to their constituents, that individual legislator is almost never the one

~~that~~ ^{with} casts the final deciding vote. With but one vote among 535, it is easy to see how difficult it is to hold that individual responsible for the consequences of existing policy directed towards international drug trafficking or any other issue. Since the congressional staffer is much less accountable than the strategist and policymaker in the executive branch, the staffer does not need to know much in great detail about international drug trafficking to be the recognized expert amid the many staffs.

It is in this environment that the individual members of Congress must themselves compete for issues and in turn gain publicity. All too often an artform develops that makes it seem as if they are dealing with the issues. Personal and hidden agendas soon become indistinguishable from other bureaucratic efforts and displays of true professionalism.

When we were looking at the President's role as a strategist, it was possible to see how he could help mold a form of public 'will' and awareness, an awareness that is well documented by the news media on an almost daily basis. That 'will' when combined with the proper resource capabilities provides a creditable deterrent to international drug trafficking. This is where Congress comes in. That capability is a product of quality resources administered by each responsible agency and a quantity of those resources sufficient to the task. Congress by its actions not only legislatively tasks, but also determines the quantity and often quality of resources. In other words,

Quality X Quantity = Capability

Capability X Will = Deterrence

Does not deterrence require the "enemy" to believe?

Where quality is controlled by individual agencies and quantity is established by Congress in the budgetary process, it soon becomes evident that a national coordinative body becomes invaluable in providing the multiplier effect in the preceding relationships. When the executive branch saw this, NNBIS was established. When the legislative branch recognized the need, new legislation was passed after over a year of hearings, a veto, and redrafting to form the legislatively mandated, and thus recently institutionalized, National Drug Enforcement Policy Board (NDEPB).²⁵ Whether the executive branch's NNBIS or the legislative branch's NDEPB^{*} will co-exist or one will become a singular solution to a national policy issue awaits review of strategic perspectives from the White House and jousting to meet negotiated political ends. Recognition, or the lack of recognition, of the growing magnitude of the threat to national security could determine which of the possible options are

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This board was established through the National Narcotics Act of 1984 (Public Law 98-473). Whereas NNBIS exists because of presidential interest and is funded by individual agencies, NDEPB^(D) is an almost parallel congressionally supported effort. The Act reads "The magnitude and the scope of the problem [flow of illegal narcotics into the U.S.] requires the establishment of a National Drug Enforcement Policy Board, chaired by the Attorney General, to facilitate coordination of all Federal efforts by relevant agencies. It is the purpose of this Act to insure

(1) the maintenance of a national and international effort against illegal drugs;

(2) that the activities of the Federal agencies involved are fully coordinated; and

(3) that a single, competent, and responsible high-level Board of the United States Government, chaired by the Attorney General, will be charged with this responsibility of coordinating United States policy with respect to national and international drug law enforcement.

selected and for what advertised reasons.

In making such determinations, it is worth noting that individuals outside the executive branch are frequently consulted by the President on national security issues although they are not ~~formally~~ members of the ^{FORMAL} national security bureaucracy. Some congressmen and senators thus can have significant influence on decisions related to national security and international drug trafficking. Such legislators are usually chairmen or high-ranking members of such committees as Armed Services or Foreign Relations with responsibility for national security affairs; plus they have discretionary budget power. Because the legislative branch by constitutional design enjoys certain rights to control the operations of the executive branch, their exercise of these rights has a very direct effect on the executive level decision making process. So eventually the President needs Congress in the effort to stem the flow of drugs for it is congressional action that is needed to authorize the expenditure of funds by the individual agencies. In this way Congress too can exercise a veto. In the effort to stem the flow of drugs in a more timely manner, the President has found it expedient to act without legislative authorization in forming NNBIS. In doing so he recognized that such moves become unpopular with Congress and tend to generate opposition, if not to NNBIS, to other policies. The formation of NDEPB represents a form of congressional endorsement of the NNBIS concept by Congress's effort to permanently institutionalize a coordinating body, and yet, as signed into law, it is an attempt to ^{wrest} direct executive control of the drug interdiction effort from the White House and

*Sanford Long and
cooperated.*

place it within the departments and agencies by law and through the budgetary control of the legislature.

This form of policy evolution, commencing with an executive branch initiative and subsequently being institutionalized by congressional action, is one way the system tends to work. When it comes to the interdiction of drugs, the congressional records document these numerous efforts along with new strategies promoted by legislators and their staffs. It is a rare congressman ~~that~~^{who} would not be aware of the peripheral influence, and sometimes direct influence, drug trafficking has on the stability of our southern neighbors for it is here that members of Congress have involved themselves in the management of U.S. policy more than any other region of the world. It is this awareness coupled to the obvious concern of their constituents that has prompted the legislative strategists to conduct numerous hearings in an effort to legislate agency responses to the perceived threat. For example, this year when DEA was acknowledging a subcommittee's documentation of weaknesses in the drug interdiction capability, the acting DEA Administrator stated

"The Congressional Drug Interdiction Initiative now before the Congress suggests a method to improve the effectiveness of the Federal Government's interdiction effort. Without question, the proposal to create an Air Force Reserve air wing could measurably improve the U.S. Customs Service's ability to detect and intercept drug smugglers."

During those same hearings the DOD had an opportunity to comment on the same congressional effort at guiding a portion of the interdiction strategy. Dr. Korb first commented on the congressionally mandated upgrade of outdated P-3 aircraft which

DOD was required to configure with Air Force F-15 radar and deliver to the Customs Service. He stated, "you and the members of your staff are to be commended for your foresight in seeing the possible advantages such a surveillance platform would provide to drug interdiction efforts." Then in response to the congressional initiative to form a Reserve Special Operations Wing he stated,

"We are also considering positively the possibility of supporting new initiatives such as the one you... proposed in a recent letter to the Secretary of Defense. The proposal certainly has merit and we are examining it with a view toward determining the most cost effective means of providing support without degrading readiness. We have asked the Joint Chiefs of Staff to validate the wartime threat in order to identify the most appropriate detection/surveillance system to ensure the most effective use of the taxpayer dollar. The bottom line is this: if the proposal for DOD support is viable, we will assist.

What we ask in return is recognition of the need for Defense to balance requests for assistance with readiness implications and national security mission imperatives."

From these statements it becomes quite apparent how Congress effectively becomes a strategist. If the words "national security" used in the context of Dr. Korb's last statement gain an international drug trafficking imperative, these strategists may find a new way to further respond to constituency demands. This is part of that same concern prompting this study.

To understand some of the sensitivities that may preclude DOD taking a harder line on use of their resources, it is useful to look at earlier hearings where the following statements were made by the Chairman of the House Subcommittee on Government Information, Justice and Agriculture:

"Evidently the Congress and perhaps who knows, even the President or the Vice President, for all I know, and certainly the American people, have been living under an illusion that they thought the Department of Defense was interested in trying to assist in this matter (drug interdiction), but....I think it has become very obvious that we have got a lot of footdragging taking place over at DOD, and not any real big hurry to do anything about it. I am going to hold your feet and the feet of the Department of Defense and the Navy and the Air Force to the fire on this."

Earlier this year when the leaders of the Army, Air Force and Navy appeared before the same committee, U.S. Representative
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Claude Pepper continued the assault by telling them,

"We commend you on what you're doing. But I don't want the public to get the idea that this mighty United States is doing all it can to suppress the invasion of drugs in this country. We're losing the war."

These congressional perceptions need to also find validity in some sort of threat assessment. It is here that the intelligence community and staff level NSC involvement with Congress could play a major role in rectifying some of the possible misperceptions on international drug trafficking. I am addressing only one aspect of the separate issue of congressional oversight of intelligence, and that is to get the information required from the executive branch and the intelligence community. As strategists and makers of policy, it is imperative that intelligence assessments reach them to permit de-politicized policy formulation on all matters related to national security, including drug trafficking. How Congress oversees such intelligence efforts has manifold implications for U.S. policy not only on drugs, but also on combating international terrorism and the insurgencies identified in Central and Latin America.

As previously mentioned, the effectiveness of that policy development usually relies on budgetary support, and here is where the strategists in Congress further influence the implementation of program efforts directed at international drug trafficking. When the Air Force wanted to reprogram three million dollars to procure equipment to upgrade some tracking radars to be used in the air interdiction of drugs, they went to Congress and said, "Mr. Chairman, we ask the assistance of you and your colleagues in obtaining congressional support for this reprogramming effort." ³³ In the scramble for funding of DOD to directly support the effort to stem the flow on drugs, consideration has been given to modifying the Economy Act and thus allow a more liberal expenditure of DOD funds. One proposal, unpopular to DOD, considered having DOD set aside up to 0.1% of its approximately \$300 billion annual budget for reprogramming into the effort against drugs. Such a \$300 million (~~0.1% of \$300 billion~~) effort would almost equal the fiscal year 1985 outlay of \$328 million by the DEA and exceed the \$245 million outlay of the Coast Guard during the same period. ³⁴ This level of DOD funding effort, if expended on resources and capabilities resident in the traditional law enforcement agencies, could easily be perceived as an institutional threat

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Federal drug law enforcement outlays for fiscal year 1981 totaled \$705 million and have grown steadily until that total is \$1228 million in fiscal year 1985. The 1985 outlays included \$328 million for DEA, \$267 million for Customs, \$245 million for the Coast Guard, and nothing for DOD. A more detailed table of these and related expenditures supporting all 5 prongs of the national strategy are located in Appendix B of the 1984 National Strategy.

to those agencies. The most acceptable form of money to DOD is 'new' or 'colored' money that is tagged specifically for direct law enforcement support at levels and for purposes that support DOD primary missions without being a threat to other institutional entities.

The expenditure of funds to reduce the supply of drugs also includes the efforts to help supplying and transshipping nations become more effective in their attempts to support mutually beneficial law enforcement efforts directed at stemming the flow of drugs. Limited funding for this comes through the Department of State's Bureau on International Narcotics Matters. Outlays for these efforts have been between \$28 million and \$43 million annually during the past 5 years with the majority of the money directed towards crop eradication.

Absent the acknowledgement that international drug trafficking has growing national security implications for the U.S., none of the monies available through even a bigger source, that is the Security Assistance Program, is earmarked to stem the flow of drugs. In fact our total security assistance to all of Latin America has historically been under \$1 billion or less than 3% of the total Security Assistance Program annual expenditures. It is traditionally recognized that security assistance is a necessary element in supporting national security objectives. While providing one of the hardest currencies in circulation, it deters, extends influence, and allows our neighbors to defend themselves from destabilizing influences. If the restrictions on security assistance funding recognized

international drug trafficking for what it is becoming, then
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Congress could redirect these resources that are now controlled
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by the State Department and administered through DOD. In
reading the legislation governing security assistance, critics
can say it is flawed because it remains inflexible and provides
far too much congressional micro-management. However, that same
congressional involvement could make security assistance a
congressional weapon in the effort to stem the flow of illicit
drugs.

Congressional influence as a strategist was again felt when
it recently passed a law requiring the President to cut foreign
aid to countries that do not cooperate in efforts to block the
international flow of narcotics. While appearing quite simple in
concept, neither the President nor the Department of State have
been inclined to add this to the complexities of foreign policy
execution. When it was discovered by Congress that the U.S. has
provided aid to the seven drug producing countries where drug
crops increased in 1984, the chairman of the House Select
Committee on Narcotics Abuse and Control ** exhibited his
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frustration by stating,

"Each President...is influenced by a State Department
that's more concerned with friendly relations with
these drug producing countries than...with responding
to the laws of Congress."

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Security assistance comes under the Foreign Relations
Committee. Unsuccessful efforts have been made to try to place
this influential program under the Armed Services Committee.

**
The Senate does not have a comparable select committee on
narcotics.

*misspelled
sh. gleaned*

Where then are the strategists headed? An answer to this is gleaned from looking at the progress of the last few years, the negotiated compromises on policy, and the published priorities of the National Strategy. Such an analysis is pursued in the next chapter.

Excellent transition

FOOTNOTES

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