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WORKMAN

INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFICKING:
A THREAT TO
NATIONAL SECURITY

by

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PREFACE

There is a clear connection between profits from international narcotics trafficking and terrorist groups and guerrillas threatening the vital interests of the United States. The threat is real, and a firm national response is necessary. The national defense, the conduct of foreign relations, and the economy are affected. The threat also provides a wider opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit important strategic areas of the world such as the Middle East, Europe, and areas of major reserves for scarce raw materials.

Because the public does not understand the threat the nation is pursuing only a partial solution. An executive order, as a national policy statement, is needed to identify international narcotics trafficking as a threat to national security and to give tasking to the military. Cooperation will be necessary to assure that the Vice President's coordination of civil law enforcement agencies and the intelligence community's military operations are in harmony.

The once-popular myth that the Marxist terrorist or guerrilla is a robin hood or a poor patriot engaged in a romantic quest for good over evil is fallacious. Although terrorists and guerrillas play on popular causes for credibility, they are highly trained people who trade in narcotics, kidnapping, or bank robbery to gain hard cash. Terrorism in fact, is big business involving big money.

The time has come for the nation to press hard for narcotic producing countries to secure their own borders and to eradicate drug crops. Individual nations should make use of the Security Assistance Program, designed to bolster allied national security, to equip and train militias and naval forces in interdicting drugs and arms trafficking within their own territory and territorial seas. Standards of performance by the source country and joint operations with US ground, air, and the sea forces, especially the US Coast Guard, should be a condition for receiving security assistance.

Serious attack on the problem does not require major new national expenditures or a "Drug Czar," or a new agency. It does, however, require national coordination of intelligence, an effort to provide secure and effective intelligence communications, and an improved coordination between operating agencies and the military beyond voluntary participation. Furthermore, legislation is needed to provide guidelines for the intelligence community so that frequent policy changes on narcotics intelligence gathering are avoided.

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CHAPTER 1

TWENTY-FIVE YEARS OF NARCOTICS TRAFFICKING AND INSURGENCY

"We now know that terrorists are receiving dollars from drug trafficking."

Lowell Kilday
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs
Speaking before the 1984 State
Department ARA Regional Narcotics
Coordinator's Conference in San
Jose, Costa Rica.

Marxist Terrorist and Guerrilla Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking

Prior to the 1970s, Latin American Marxist guerrillas were known to harass narcotics farmers and even to burn their fields in a "stand" against drugs. Between 1970 and 1978, however, the Marxist relationship with the narcotics network changed. The reason is a simple one: The Latin American populace's cultural aversion to personal drug use was overcome by the attraction of enormous profits from narcotics crops and international trafficking. That crime families established safe banking conduits for illicit narcotics business transactions only added to the lure of exploiting drug profits to fund revolution. It was also possible to use the same banking system as the financial instrument for international terrorism.

In the early 1970s, the Soviet Secret Service (KGB) and the Bulgarian Secret Service (DS) implemented a plan to train and arm Marxist terrorists and guerrillas in Turkey and the Middle East, particularly in Lebanon, with profits from the narcotics trade in heroin.¹ Success in funding Middle East subversion through narcotics profits, influenced subsequent similar ventures in Latin America and the Bahamas.

Defecting Soviet Ambassador, Raya Kiselnikova, tells us that in 1971 Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria (MAR) was founded under the auspices of the KGB with ten Mexicans who were attending the Patrice Lumumba University in Moscow. They returned to Mexico City and recruited fifty people for intensive guerrilla training in North Korea.² By 1975, the Marxist Revolutionaria, now a part of the 23 September League was attracting the attention of US law enforcement officials by trading significant amounts of brown heroin for military weapons across the Mexican US border.³


An investigator for Congressman Robert Wilson of California, John Wilburn, reported that the swaps of drugs for guns were large enough to require several trucks escorted by jeeps with mounted 50-caliber machine guns.

El Paso DEA agent Jacques Kiere testified before the 1975 House Armed Services Committee that five out of the ten known Mexican Marxist groups are known to trade Mexican heroin and other drugs for US guns.⁴

The Mexican and the US governments formulated a successful heroin and marijuana crop extradition program in the late 1970s. Mexico had been the major source for US illicit narcotics. Whether officials realized it or not, the eradication program also removed a major source of terrorist financing. Drug eradication, with a strong Mexican government clamp-down on terrorist groups, quieted Marxist insurgency in Mexico. The supply of narcotics soon shifted further south.

Mr. James Dingfielder, US Customs Service Special Agent in Miami, Florida notes:

In the early 1970s and late 60s, drug traffickers were mostly anglos--young male American flamboyant freelancers--Kenney Bernstein who used Lockheed Lodestar aircraft to smuggle dope from Latin America. He was caught and turned out to be one of the most important state witnesses. He was killed in an unexplained aircraft accident shortly thereafter. During those times, it was unusual to see a Hispanic name on the arrest sheets for smuggling. From November 1977 to March 1978 I noticed a very swift change to Latin names on the arrest sheets for drug smuggling. I had been keeping a list of names as an intelligence device to note patterns. I noted that the flamboyant nature of those arrested swiftly disappeared and were replaced by low profile, business-like individuals. Violence was introduced as gangs competed for turf in the business. Murders and kidnappings increased as did the appearance of MAC-10 and MAC-11 machine guns (45-caliber machine pistols). There was talk at the time that the federal government had given Cuban Mariel refugees government loans to buy fishing boats so they could get into the fishing industry. This was to have solved the new immigrant problem of introduction into the US society. I feel this just supplied boats to future smugglers and aided the swift change from young anglo smugglers to Hispanic.⁵



Photograph 1. MAC-10 and MAC-11, 45-caliber machine pistols.

Source: Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF)

The introduction of major drug trafficking networks in Miami brought with it organized gangster activity. The rise in gangster activity in the Miami area is significant to law-enforcement agencies since the greater Miami area was "open territory," or uncontested by organized crime families answerable to the Mafia Commissione, until drug and gun trafficking. Mr. Edward D. (Dan) Conroy of the Federal Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF) is the special agent in charge of the Miami, Florida region. In the course of an interview, he said,

I have been assigned to some of the highest crime cities in the US, but Miami is the worst dope-related, gun-running, kidnapping, murder city I have ever seen. There is sixty to seventy percent more gangster activity south of Ft. Lauderdale than in any other ATF district. The biggest problem in Miami is the flooding of the area with MAC 10 and 11 machine guns made by APB industries, Powder Springs, GA. We put them out of business in 1983. The MAC-10 is a 45-caliber small compact machine gun, selling for \$375.00 retail. You convert it to a full automatic MAC-11 machine gun by clipping the sear. When you add a silencer you can sell the gun for \$2,000.00 on the street. Ninety-nine percent of the machine guns in Miami are this type. In Miami, twenty documented machine gun homicides occurred in the past four years. Greater than sixty percent of the machine gun cases are related to dope cases. From the ATF view, the next biggest problem is multiple gun purchases in Dade and Broward counties. Multiple sales cards purchased in Miami ATF district are greater than any ATF district each year. Addresses on the sales cards are non-existent when checked. The guns are going out of the country. You only need a driver's license to purchase guns. The Florida Department of Motor Vehicles does not check addresses or ID when they issue drivers' licences.

If you were to check every crate, at export companies in Miami going south, for just one week you would come up with a significant number of firearms. A "significant number" is a number in the thousands.⁶

Colombia, The Major New Supplier of Narcotics and Subversion


The Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), a Marxist guerrilla group, is the armed organ of the Partido Comunista de Colombia (PCC). The FARC initiated a "protection service" taxing drug farmers and drug transportation systems as early as 1978. The FARC also used the same international narcotics traffickers moving drugs from Colombia to the US, to smuggle firearms on their return trips to Colombia.⁷ In March 1984, US Ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs, declared:

The relationship between the FARC and narcotics traffickers has probably existed for some time and appears to have been officially sanctioned by the FARC's National Directorate in May 1982 at the FARC's Seventh Conference. Of its twenty-five fronts, half operate in coca and marijuana cultivation areas. FARC fronts in Guaviare region and Vaupes have specific responsibilities to operate with narcotics traffickers for money and arms. The FARC is collecting protection payments from coca in their operating territory, often demanding ten percent of the profit. One front obtains \$3.38 million per month in taxing the coca industry. The FARC front assignment of Rigoberto Lozano Perdomo (alias Joselo) is specifically to deal with coca traffickers and obtain arms and ammunition through them. The FARC obtains adequate funds, through narcotics, to purchase the latest in weapons. The FARC is recruiting coca transient laborers to their ranks. The FARC is also extorting protection money from marijuana traffickers on the north coast, particularly in the Magdalena Department. It is estimated the FARC front in the Guaviari region has obtained \$99 million from their coca crops. Wherever a FARC front operates and narcotics plants are grown, it is fairly certain some arrangement exists between narcotics traffickers and the FARC. Colombia's communist party central committee member Hernando Hurtado states that plans for revolutionary takeover of Colombia include the NARC/FARC connection. The Colombian communist party (PCC) is also benefiting from the NARC/FARC arrangement."⁸

The FARC is extending some of its operations from Cucuta into Venezuela. Mr. Lizardo Marcos, alias Lizard, is a Venezuelan rancher with land near the Colombian border. Mr. Marcos had been kidnapped by the FARC and after his release joined, and continues, in a deal with them. Venezuelan authorities arrested him in Caracas for trafficking in marijuana.⁹

Until recently, FARC and M-19 guerillas controlled the Colombian Caribbean coast which had been the trafficker's primary shipping point; however, Columbia's Pacific coast is now starting to become a major shipping point as well. DEA agents in San Diego report that there was very little international drug trafficking activity on the US west coast until the fall of 1982.¹⁰

FARC and M-19 control of the land used to cultivate and export narcotics has made smuggling from Colombia through the Atlantic to the eastern US is open and without fear of government authority. A US intelligence officer assigned in Latin America stated that a Colombian army officer assigned to the barracks on the Guajira Peninsula has but three choices in his first six months: (1) He accepts bribery; (2) He requests reassignment; (3) he is murdered. Trafficking vessels moor at docks and on the beach on the Guajira Peninsula waiting for their turn to load cargo. Transport and cargo loading is openly visible. (See photograph 2.) The FARC and M-19 guerrillas provide protection here and for the northern Medellin area, in central Colombia, and the Pacific Tumaco southern border area in exchange for hard cash and arms. The



Photograph 2. Trafficking vessels moor at docks on the Guajira Peninsula waiting for their turn to load cargo. Transport and cargo loading is openly visible.

Source: US Coast Guard Headquarters, Enforcement of Laws and Treaties
Division

traffickers operate with impunity. The city of Medellin has become a concentration point of cocaine laboratories. The cocaine is then airlifted to the coasts for shipment north to the US by sea or air. Pacific operations have very different characteristics. Trafficking motherships line up off Tumaco, out of sight of land, awaiting cargo air dropped from DC-3s or DC-4s. Another cargo loading method involves bringing in one mothership at a time for loading. The vessel is covertly sailed up a jungle river and moored in an area covered by the jungle's canopy. Large native canoes then transport the drug cargo to the mothership which then slip out to sea for their trip north to the US.¹¹

The FARC / M-19 Connection

Originally diverse in philosophy, with M-19 following the Chinese Mao orientation and the FARC following the Soviet Marxist-Leninist orientation, M-19 is now under the loose control of the FARC.¹² Jaime Bateman, an early leader of M-19, was a former FARC. M-19 uses narcotics profits to finance their weapons and operations. A former Samoza government Nicaraguan army officer, residing in Panama, is a principal contact for M-19 activities. During the Winter of 1983, he was looking for US customers to buy a large amount of M-19 cocaine.¹³ In 1983, M-19 was short on resources and looking for arms and trained terrorists in exchange for narcodollars. Earlier, M-19 had sent terrorists via Panama to Cuba for training. Arrangements were made between Jaime Marin Jaramillo and the M-19 for shipping the M-19 cargo. (Jaime Marin Jaramillo has been a DEA target for years for his activities in shipping

drugs to the US and arms to M-19; Bolivia subsequently arrested him because of his connections with M-19.) Panamanian contacts had negotiated with Cuba on behalf of M-19, to set up Cuban M-19 training and to set up transport of three loads of marijuana and cocaine to the US for payment and transport of arms and the Cuban trained terrorists to Colombia via drug vessels. One ship, the 'Freddie,' of a two vessel arms shipment was intercepted by Colombia and seized. The coastal freighter Freddie's name had been changed to 'Elindio.' The ships crew, marked charts, and navigators were provided by the Freddie's owners. Two intelligence agents, each from different agencies, pointed out to me that Cuba, Panama, Colombia, and Venezuela had been principals in the overthrow of the Somoza government in Nicaragua. Some of the same "players" were involved in the arrangements for the Freddie trip. Both further stated that although it is no longer official Panamanian policy to permit arms trafficking to Nicaragua, the momentum is still there and officials still permit it. When approaching Colombia, the Freddie was challenged by Colombian naval authorities. The M-19 terrorists on board returned fire. As one intelligence officer put it, "The M-19 bunch got waxed."¹⁴ A final example is a statement from the US Embassy in Bogota describing the FARC relationship with coca growers as financial. The guerrillas obtain financing to buy the latest weapons which are likely to be procured through the drug traffickers and shipped into Colombia on returning drug flights.¹⁵

Until 1984, Colombia's approach to international drug trafficking was that it is a US problem, not a Colombian problem. By 1984, Colombia was

recognizing growing narcotics usage in its own society. In addition, most of the drug crime families in Colombia were entering the political arena as candidates or supporters of the opposition party, Los Pablos. Today Columbia is plagued by five guerrilla groups with more than 10,000 rural and urban terrorists and guerrillas. Colombian narcotics organizations, with their large independent infrastructure and estimated \$500 million in annual revenues, have become a political force and a symbol of national lawlessness. Recent FARC and M-19 incidents demonstrate the threat to Colombia's national security.

In March 1982, M-19 attempted to graduate from guerrilla attacks to larger-scale military operations by launching amphibious attacks on three remote villages in southern Colombia. Colombian government forces killed or captured most of the M-19 fighters and in another incident, the Colombian border guard captured an M-19 truckload of rocket grenades and machine guns.¹⁶

Two years later, in March 1984, Colombian police staged an immense drug raid on the banks of the Yari River, 700 miles south of Bogota in the Llanos Orientales region. After a firefight with guerrillas--which for all practical purposes was a military engagement against the FARC, the military arm of the Colombian communist party--Colombian authorities seized 13.8 tons of processed cocaine and cocaine base (the equivalent of one-quarter of the estimated annual US usage) with a street value of \$2 billion. The Colombians also captured processing laboratories, grenades,

military weapons, airstrips, transport aircraft, helicopters, and FARC guerrillas.¹⁷

Following the drug bust in the Llanos Orientales region of Colombia, and perhaps in reprisal for it, approximately 100 M-19 guerrillas, armed with submachine guns and grenades, raided Florencia, the capital of Caqueta State in southern Colombia. Before the raid was over the guerrillas bombed one government building, held 140 hostages at two banks, killed three soldiers, two policemen, and two children, and wounded fifty others. The attackers over-ran the jail, arming some of the 125 inmates they freed. As they left, they scattered pamphlets which announced the end of a a six-month truce between M-19 and the Betancur government. Following the attack on Florencia, Colombian President Belisario Betancur declared a state of siege in the four southern states of Meta, Caqueta, Cauca, and Huila.¹⁸

A central figure in the 13.8 ton cocaine drug bust, Justice Minister Rodrigo Lara Bonilla, received frequent death threats from drug trafficking families and guerrillas involved in trafficking. On the last day of April 1984, four men in a car blocked Bonilla's limousine while two men on a motorcycle fired a hailstorm of bullets into the car. Bonilla died, but his bodyguards killed one of the assassins and captured another who confessed he had been paid \$20,000 to kill the minister.¹⁹ The slain motorcycle gunman was carrying an imported MAC 10 machine pistol, modified for full-automatic operation.

The US Drug Enforcement Agency publicly states that they "estimate" a loose alliance between the FARC and drug traffickers, but information from a US citizen, kidnapped for ransom and held by the FARC for about three months in late 1983 and early 1984, indicates a closer relationship. The victim was kidnapped in the Llanos Orientales region of Colombia and held hostage at a number of FARC camps, including one which was one-half mile from the large drug bust in March. He explained why he thought the guerrillas would even bother with kidnappings:

The guerrillas have a lot of reasons for kidnapping. They want the government to think they're living off the proceeds of kidnappings, but they really are running the drug business. The guerrillas use this business about social injustice, . . . and if there is not any social injustice, they grab some army or police uniforms and create some.

The victim described the organizational relationships he observed while captive:

The FARC, M-19, and Ejercito Popular de Liberacion (EPL) are all really consolidated, they are really one family controlled by Cuba. The Colombian newspaper El Bogotano is a very leftist paper and often knocked the government. When it found out the guerrillas were being run by the Cubans, they blew the whistle on them. The two reporters who wrote the story were shot and killed. . . . While kidnapped, I observed foreign advisors and trainers in the FARC camp, about ten Cubans, one Vietnamese, two East Germans, and another one that I could not tell if he was East German or Russian.

I was in their camp when a Cuban was at a blackboard instructing some guerrillas. One of the guerrillas asked him "What happens to all of this money? You control the drug traffic, you're taking in millions of dollars, and I don't see any money in our camp. They just give us bare necessities. You get

food, clothes, and shells for your rifle and you do not get anything else." The Cuban advisor's answer was that one half of the money was being sent to El Salvador. "That we are liberating El Salvador. When El Salvador is liberated, then they will turn around and--using the economies of El Salvador, Nicaragua, and Cuba--funnel funds into Colombia and help us, so we can overthrow the government here.'

There is a guy named Pascual Bravo who is funneling cocaine from Peru, Bolivia, and other parts of Columbia into the FARC camp that was raided and then to the US. The FARC are in control of the cocaine labs. A lot of the aircraft fly to the US via Panama (Contadora Island, in fact), and some via Mexico. He has a petition in to buy two brand new C-130 Hercules planes. It would be the same as selling them to the guerrillas. I understand the State Department is not going to let him buy them. One of his main ways of getting the cocaine to the US now is dissolving it in either jet or aviation fuel. A gallon of ether will hold about a kilo of cocaine. So a big plane holds hundreds of gallons. A jetliner that lands could have five or six hundred gallons in a full tank. They pay the pilot not to select that tank on his flight, and they pay the mechanic to bring it out. A lot of the time the people that bring it out do not even know. Then a chemist emulsifies the fuel with an acid-water mixture, and precipitates out the cocaine with ammonium hydroxide.

The US invasion of Grenada happened while I was a hostage. The FARC received two large four engine plane loads of weapons and supplies from Grenada . . . just before it was taken. Unloading each plane load of supplies took sixteen or seventeen trips in Russian-made jeeps, right past where I was being held, to boats on a nearby stream. There is a lot of caves down-stream that they use to hide their supplies and arms.


It is interesting to understand the guerrilla mentality. The Cuban advisors are telling them that they will have control of Colombia in two years. With the big drug busts drying-up their easy money, they are not going to have the same types of supplies or medical care, or anything else they have had up to now, and their morale may start to break down.²⁰

The Panama Connection

The Panamanian connection to international narcotics trafficking and Marxist insurgency is mainly logistic support. Panama provides a conduit for the financial end of the criminal business venture through the Panamanian banking industry, agents in Panama charter vessels and aircraft to carry narcotics, money (narcodollars), guns, terrorists and guerrillas, and Cuban or Nicaraguan undercover secret service agents, and Panama is a contact point for narco-business, and training and supplies for insurgency.


Brokerage functions for vessels and aircraft and contact points for narcotics and arms trafficking are loosely tied together. During the months of June, July, and August tramp coastal freighters line up at anchor in Panama City Harbor, bound for the US, as motherships, with cargoes of freshly harvested marijuana and cocaine. (See photographs 3 through 6.) Air activity involves mainly DC-3, DC-4, and executive jet aircraft flying from the US to Panama, where they refuel, and then fly to Colombia and back to the US. Many Panama connection cases involve Cuba.²¹

One intelligence official in Panama told me the banking problem was the toughest to crack. I had to understand that the banking industry was one of the principal incomes for Panama's economy and there was a great reluctance to "meddle" with it because the income could dry up. In a typical operation, drug traffickers deposit US dollars in no interest




Photograph 3. 325-ft Panamanian freighter M/V DON EMILIO is typical of the tramp coastal freighters in Panama City Harbor, bound to the US, as motherships, with cargoes of freshly harvested marijuana and cocaine.

Source: US Coast Guard Headquarters, Enforcement of Laws and Treaties Division




Photograph 4. A Boarding Party from the Coast Guard Cutter SHERMAN boarding the M/V DON EMILIO just north of the Windward Passage which divides Cuba and Haiti.

Source: US Coast Guard Headquarters, Enforcement of Laws and Treaties
Division



Photograph 5. The M/V DON EMILIO claimed to only be carrying a load of timber.

Source: US Coast Guard Headquarters, Enforcement of Laws and Treaties
Division



Photograph 6. Below the timber, the M/V DON EMILIO's cargo was 30 tons of marijuana. The vessel was seized and turned over to DEA, Customs, and INS Agents in Miami.

Source: US Coast Guard Headquarters, Enforcement of Laws and Treaties
Division

accounts prior to electronically transferring them to other accounts or institutions. Two factors play a role here. First, Panama has no paper money, they use US paper currency as though it were their own. A Panamanian bank, therefore cannot distinguish between domestic and international business transactions when hard US currency is deposited. Second, banks turn cash on hand into credit for profit. The bank is not doing anything illegal and therefore not concerned about the depositers' motives. There are other factors in cracking the Panamanian banking problem. Intelligence officers in Panama pointed out that the "cut on drug dollars is so lucrative that the US government can not compete to buy information or cooperation from individuals in the banking industry. Even if successful in hiring an informant, a cooperative banker would be killed."²²

The Cuban Connection

Cuba's Revolutionary period involvement with narcotics traffickers was a small, highly covert drugs-for-guns-and-supplies connection marked with desperation to obtain arms and sustain Castro's guerrilla activity. Castro did not wish for other countries to identify his movement with criminal activities. He wanted to be viewed as a Robin Hood struggling to overthrow the evil Batista.

The post-Revolutionary period (1960-1978) projects a hard-pressed country, cut from its financial ties with the US. Undoubtedly, those close to Castro in the fledgling government who had been with him as a

guerrilla in the Sierra Mountains remembered how drugs were traded for arms, and other support, and sought to continue the activity to help the new government's economy. Realistically, Cuba's drug activity was probably small since the new government was concerned about its image with the rest of Latin America, but it did show a continuing willingness to participate.²³

The year 1979 marks a Cuban flip-flop and sets the stage for large-scale narcotics trafficking, gun running, and terrorist cooperation. The US Coast Guard had been increasingly concerned about Search and Rescue (SAR) and law enforcement operations near Cuba. Virtually every time US Coast Guard units operated near Cuba there would be a Cuban response with patrol vessels and MIG fighter aircraft. The problem could not be ignored. Operating areas near Cuba contained primary US maritime commerce and air routes as well as fishing grounds and recreational boating areas. The area was also a primary narcotics trafficking law enforcement zone. Circumstances were ripe for confrontation since there was, at that time, no form of communication between Cuba and the United States at that time. The fact that lives and property were being lost because of reduced SAR operations, presented an opportunity to open communications with Cuba on humanitarian grounds.

The first face-to-face talks between the US Coast Guard and the Cuban Border Guard were in Havana in January 1978 and set a teletype link between the Seventh District Operations Center and the Border Guard Headquarters in Havana. Although Cuban units still showed up for US

Coast Guard operations, they now kept their distance and avoided confrontation. Additionally, Cuban units responded to rescue cases or provided information. As confidence increased and US Coast Guard and Cuban Border Guard cooperation grew, the Cubans began to responding to narcotics trafficking cases and even seizing drug vessels that fled into Cuban waters to avoid US Coast Guard Cutters.²⁴

1979 Cuban Flip-Flop

The US government officially states Cuba implemented its international narcotics trafficking policy in the 1979 Cuban communist party Presidium.²⁵ However, Castro's involvement with the drug trade dates at least as early as 1961. In the late 1950s Castro helped finance his own revolution with narcotics from Mexico flown to the US to pay for arms.²⁶ In 1958, Fidel Castro publicly stated he was going to export his revolution beyond Cuba using his methods. His methods included a two-fold purpose for involvement with the narcotics trade: to damage US society by aiding drug traffickers, and to finance Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity in Latin America, including training and arms shipments for insurgency.

Since the end of the Cuban revolution in 1959, Cuba has had two reversals in its stand on the drug trade. These role reversals are probably the consequence of desiring hard currency from dope and of concern over the Cuban image with regard to other Latin American countries. Cuba had gained substantial sympathy from Latin America as a

Robin Hood freeing the region of tyranny and taking on the United States at the same time. Castro doesn't want to lose that sympathy and its value to diplomatic efforts, such as the Contras (Venezuela, Mexico, and Panama) mid-1980s involvement in opposing Washington's growing military involvement in Latin America.

In the early days of US Coast Guard law enforcement efforts, 1977 through 1979, Cuba aggressively tracked down, seized, and prosecuted drug boats and crews transiting Cuban waters. But in 1979, Fidel Castro again sanctioned narcotics trafficking as a means to support Marxist guerrillas and communist parties in Latin America, and to obtain hard cash for the Cuban economy.²⁷ Castro's plan offered Cuba as a haven for narcotics smugglers from the US Coast Guard and a bridge and support base for drug networks to the United States. According to the CIA, when the plan was debated one Cuban official stated that the plan was "barbarous," but he was overruled by "the prevailing view that by assisting the narcotics trade, Cuban would obtain hard currency, \$500,000 to \$700,000 per vessel, while hastening the deterioration of US society."²⁸

The 1979 change in Cuban drug policy was apparently brought about when five major leaders of Columbian narcotics trade met in Spain in 1979 to discuss how to stop Cuban arrests and drug shipment seizures.²⁹ The smugglers asked Mr. Guillot-Lara for assistance. His Cuban connection was through Columbian lawyer and drug dealer Juan (Johnny) Crump, close friend of Fernando Ravelo Renedo, Cuba's Ambassador to Columbia. Ambassador Ravelo Renedo had fought in the Sierra with Castro and was a

dedicated Marxist-Leninist. Mr. Crump negotiated an agreement between Cuba and the smugglers in the Bogota, Columbia Hilton Hotel. Also at the meeting were Mr. Gonsalo Bassols, Cuba's Minister-Counselor to Columbia, Mr. Guillot-Lara; and Mr. Fernando Ravelo Renedo.³⁰ The agreement stated that Cuba would assist drug boats flying the Panamanian flag and bearing the name "Viviana."³¹

Mr. Guillot-Lara had long known the M-19 leader Jaime Bateman. Mr. Guillot-Lara, according to State Department testimony before a US Senate subcommittee, has admitted to shipping arms to M-19 terrorists in 1980 on behalf of Cuba. Funds for these shipments came from Cuban embassies in Mexico and Columbia. Weapons purchased from a Miami arms dealer by Mr. Guillot-Lara include UZI submachine guns, pistols, and AR-15 rifles. The vessel Zar De Honduras, owned by Mr. Guillot-Lara, transported 550 FAL rifles, valued at \$500 each, and 90,000 cartridges from a ship off Panama's coast to Columbia in exchange for 5,000 pounds of marijuana to be shipped to the US. After reaching Columbia, the FAL rifles and cartridges were flown to a M-19 group in Caqueta province in Southern Columbia.³² As a result of Cuban aid to the guerrillas, and after the Colombian army captured dozens of M-19 guerrillas trained in Cuba, Columbia broke diplomatic relations with Cuba in 1981.

The Nicaraguan Connection

If Cuba is Russia's surrogate, then Cuba's Cuba is Nicaragua. Nicaragua has become an arm of Cuba with links to the drug network and

M-19 in Columbia. The Columbian navy intercepted and sank a vessel owned and operated by Mr. Guillot-Lara off the Pacific coast of Columbia, on November 17, 1982. The vessel was carrying several tons of weapons and about twenty-five M-19 guerrillas. During an exchange of gunfire, approximately twenty of the trafficking vessel's crew and passengers were killed. Three M-19 survivors were rescued and arrested. The sinking of the arms vessel and US Coast Guard seizures of several of his other vessels and cargoes had placed Mr. Guillot-Lara in a precarious position, he owed large sums of money to Cuba, M-19, and suppliers, and he could not pay. Mr. Guillot-Lara received a Nicaraguan visa from the Nicaraguan Ambassador to Mexico as the result of a request from M-19 leader Jaime Bateman. Trying to clear his debt problem, Guillot-Lara traveled between Mexico, Panama, and Nicaragua until his arrest in later in Mexico in 1981. While in Nicaragua, Mr. Guillot-Lara met with Jaime Bateman. Nicaragua had fallen in 1979 to the Sandinista guerrillas and had been, and still are, strongly supported by Cuba. One has to ask what Bateman, the Columbian M-19 leader who uses illicit drugs to fund terrorism, was doing in Nicaragua, how much involvement he has had with the Sandinistas, and when it started.

Just as Cuba has been involved in narcotics trafficking to finance Marxist guerrillas, there is growing evidence that Nicaragua is following in Cuba's footsteps. One federal agent described an event where a group of Panamanians dealing in the narcotics trade were looking for a cargo aircraft to fly a load of shoulder-mounted, SAM 7 type, rockets from Europe to Nicaragua--rockets like the one fired into the FBI office in

San Juan, Puerto Rico in 1984. The aircraft which flew the weapons to Nicaragua was owned by a US citizen who has documented ties with Columbian narcotics trade groups and with movement of US narcodollars from the US to banks in Panama. Further, the people he routinely associates with are connections for M-19 and Cuba. His aircraft make periodical trips to Cuba.³³ In addition, the State Department published a statement saying, "We know that in early 1984 the Nicaraguan government was negotiating the sale of a DC-6 aircraft to a known Columbian drug runner."³⁴ On July 17, 1984 the US Drug Enforcement Administration announced that it was seeking indictments for Columbian congressman Pablo Escobar Gaviria and two accomplices, one of them Fabio Restrepo Ochoa, and perhaps indictments for members of the Nicaraguan ruling junta for Sandinista and Columbian international narcotics trafficking to finance the Sandinista revolution and to pay for their growing military operations at a time of economic decline in Nicaragua.

A Warning To Latin America

The stage is being set, by drug profits financing Marxist guerrillas, for a greater violent crises in the Caribbean Basin. The 1983-84 crisis in Lebanon is an example of the violence awaiting Latin America if Narcotics profits are not cut off from Marxist guerrilla groups and the Cuban and Nicaraguan governments very soon.³⁵

ENDNOTES

Chapter 1

1. Statement of John C. Lawn, Acting Deputy of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), on Bulgarian Involvement in Narcotic Trafficking, before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Task Force on International Narcotics Control, US House of Representatives, May 3, 1984.

DEA Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.

"Bulgaria Is a Key Link in Drug Trade," by Jonathan Spivak, Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1983, p. 33.

2. John Barron's The KGB, New York, Readers Digest Press, 1974, pp. 230-257, "The Plot to Destroy Mexico" describes a Soviet KGB plot to create a Mexican Vietnam for the US. The information was provided by defecting Soviet Ambassador Raya Kiselnikova and two guerrilla leaders trained in Pyonoyang, North Korea and in Moscow, Angel Bino Gineros and Fabricio Gomez Souza.

3. Mexican Marxist guerrilla movement and their involvement in trafficking brown heroin to purchase weapons for their revolution is

described in four writings: Jacques Kiere, Director of the US Drug Enforcement Agency national intelligence center (EPIC), El Paso Texas gave unpublished testimony on November 19, 1975 to the House Armed Services Committee describing "60 to 70 guns-for-drugs swaps . . . in which military weapons have gone south; "1976 intelligence files of the Inter-American Commission on Security, Organization of American States (OAS); French News Agency release dated February 14, 1977, source Quezada AFP in Mexico; "Gun Smuggling to Mexico Rises," Washington Post, October 28, 1975, p. A5 describes guns-for-drugs transactions with Mexicans and quotes from Representative Robert Wilson's (D-Calif.) investigation of 40 instances of stolen US military weapons exchanged in Mexico for narcotics; and manuscripts and investigative background notes of an a report aired on National Public Radio on December 5th and 12th, 1975 which describe quotes from an undercover DEA agent, quotes from Bill Kline, DEA Special-Agent-in-Charge, San Antonio, Texas, and quotes from John Stratton, a US congressional subcommittee investigator reporting on Mexican army and police aircraft shot and destroyed by 50-caliber machine gun fire over a main heroin facility n the Mexican state of Guerrero.

4. Jacques Kiere, Director of the US Drug Enforcement Agency national intelligence center (EPIC), El Paso Texas gave unpublished testimony on November 19, 1975 to the House Armed Services Committee describing "60 to 70 guns-for-drugs swaps . . . in which military weapons have gone south."

5. Interview with Mr. James Dingfielder, National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) Center, Miami, Florida on February 17, 1984.

6. Interview with Mr. Edward D. (Dan) Conroy Special-Agent-in-Charge, Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms, Miami, Florida on February 16, 1984.

7. Naval Operational Intelligence Center, Suitland, Maryland, official message to Commandant, US Coast Guard DTG 011543Z MAR 84, Subject, Colombia: Arms Smuggling in Santa Marta for Guerrillas, describes guerrilla arms smuggling from Simon Bolivar airport after unloading from drug vessels along the Santa Marta and Guajira coast.

To determine affiliation of international drug trafficking and gun-running, a listing of individuals involved in Colombian international arms trafficking was obtained from the Headquarters of the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms (ATF). The list was compared with narcotics trafficking case information from the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA). Of the 3,791 individuals involved in gun-running, 85 percent were also involved in international narcotics trafficking. A listing of individuals involved in Venezuelan international arms trafficking was also obtained from the Headquarters of ATF and compared with international narcotics trafficking case information from the DEA. Of the 546 individuals involved in gun-running, the following percentages were also involved in international narcotics trafficking: 25 percent positively, 3 percent probably, and 8 percent possibly. 1983 ATF successful prosecutions in international gun-running compared with DEA files showed the following additional involvement in international narcotics trafficking:

COUNTRY	CASES	%DUAL INVOLVEMENT IN GUN-RUNNING/NARCOTICS TRAF.
Mexico	23	22%
Dominican Republic	3	33%
Brazil	2	100%
Cuba	2	100%
Honduras	2	0%
Equador	1	0%
Jamaica	1	0%
Nicarag	1	0%

Figure 1. Dual Involvement in Narcotics and Arms Trafficking

Source: Computer analysis of Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco, and Firearms and Drug Enforcement Agency files.

A broad range of information on Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity involving narcotics trafficking, gun running, money laundering, and insurgency training was provided by US embassy, Panama ARA, PDG, and DAO staff during interviews on February 29 and March 1, 1984. Additional information was obtained from discussions with participants of the US State Department sponsored Latin American Regional ARA Narcotics Conference held in San Jose, Costa Rica during March 12-14, 1984. Participants included US Drug Enforcement Agency officials and agents assigned to Latin American embassies, the intelligence community, US Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) officials, US State Department INM officials, US Coast Guard officials, US Customs Service officials, National Institute on Drug Abuse officials, US Justice Department officials, representatives from the Joint Chief's of Staff Southern Command (CINCSO), and others.

8. US Embassy, Bogota, Colombia cable to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, dated 19 March 1984, subject: NARC/FARC Connection.

9. A broad range of information on Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity involving narcotics trafficking, gun running, money laundering, and insurgency training was provided by US embassy, Panama ARA, PDG, and DAO staff during interviews on February 29 and March 1, 1984. Additional information was obtained from discussions with participants of the US State Department sponsored Latin American Regional ARA Narcotics Conference held in San Jose, Costa Rica during March 12-14, 1984. Participants included US Drug Enforcement Agency officials and agents

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10. Interview with US Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) agents in San Diego, California on March 6, 1984. Interview with US South West NNBIS Center, Long Beach, California officials and with FBI, Los Angeles, California agent in charge of anti-terrorism on March 5, 1984. Figure 2.

illustrates the increasing narcotics trafficking vessel seizures off the US west coast.

11. Interview with Mr. James Bramble and Mr. Louis Gonzalis, US embassy, Panama ARA described Pacific Coast international narcotics trafficking activity, arms trafficking to guerrilla groups, and Colombian FARC, M-19, and ELN guerrilla activity in narcotics.

12. A private, non-government, debriefing transcript, dated April 14, 1984, of a US national kidnapped for ransom in Colombia by the FARC describes Marxist terrorist/guerrilla activity and methodology in large-scale narcotics production and trafficking and how it is used to finance Castro-like insurgency in other countries. Care is given to protect the kidnapped victim's identity since the FARC warned that they would kill relatives still in Colombia if he "spoke out." The FARC has




Figure 2.

US West Coast Offshore Durg Seizures, 1982-1984

murdered several of the victim's relatives, for effect, prior to his release.

13. Interview with Mr. James Bramble and Mr. Louis Gonzalis, US embassy, Panama ARA described Pacific Coast international narcotics trafficking activity, arms trafficking to guerrilla groups, Colombian FARC, M-19, and ELN guerrilla activity in narcotics, and money laundering.

14. A broad range of information on Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity involving narcotics trafficking, gun running, money laundering, and insurgency training was provided by US embassy, Panama ARA, PDG, DAO.

15. US Embassy, Bogota, Colombia cable to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, dated 19 March 1984, subject: NARC/FARC Connection.

16. April 19 Movement, US Department of State Bulletin, Vol. 82, No. 2065, August 1982, p. 19.

17. US Drug Enforcement Agency Headquarters, Operations Intelligence Branch summary of Colombian operations on March 10, 1984.

"Colombian Police Net 13.8 Tons of Cocaine," Washington Post, March 21, 1984, p. A18.

18. "Columbian Rebels Attack City, Free Inmates; Death Toll 30," Washington Post, March 15, 1984, p. A28.

"Colombia: 32 Die, 50 Hurt in Guerrilla Bomb Attack," USA Today,
March 15, 1984, p. 7A.

"30 Die as Colombian Rebels Raid State Capital, Free Jailed
Comrades," Miami Herald, March 15, 1984, p. 22A.

19. Primary information was obtained from US Embassy, Bogota cable to US Secretary of State, Department of Justice, US Information Agency, dated May 7, 1984, subject, President Betancur's Speech at the Funeral of Rodrigo Lara Bonilla; and testimony before the Foreign Affairs Committee Task Force On International Narcotics Control, May 24, 1984, US House Of Representatives by:

John C. Lawn, Acting Deputy Administrator of the Drug Enforcement Administration on recent developments in Colombian Narcotics Control efforts.

Clyde D. Taylor, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of International Narcotics Matters.

Lowell C. Kilday, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State, Bureau of Inter-American Affairs.

A secondary source of information was found in the press:

"Colombian Troops Siezed 150 Tons of Marijuana," Wall Street Journal,
May 14, 1984, front page.

"Colombian Troops Siezed 150 tons of Marijuana," New York Times, May
14, 1984, pp. A5

"Siege Rules Set For All of Colombia," Chicago Tribune, May 2, 1984,
pp. 1-5.

Colombia sets State of Siege After Murder," Washington Post, May 2,
1984, p. A16.

"Official's Murder Won't Slow Drug War, Colombia Vows," USA Today,
May 2, 1984, p. 7A.

"Colombia Fights Back After Waking to Ravages of Drug Trade,"
Washington Post, May 21, 1984, front page.

"Colombia's Anti-Drug Drive Shuts Major Cocaine Center," Washington
Post, May 12, 1984, front page.

20. A private, non-government, debriefing transcript, dated April 14,
1984, of a US national kidnapped for ransom in Colombia by the FARC
describes Marxist terrorist/guerrilla activity and methodology in
large-scale narcotics production and trafficking and how it is used to
finance Castro-like insurgency in other countries. Care is given to

protect the kidnapped victim's identity since the FARC warned that they would kill relatives still in Colombia if he "spoke out." The FARC has murdered several of the victim's relatives, for effect, prior to his release.

A collaborating source of information confirming the kidnapped victim's statement on merging of Marxist guerrilla groups is found in a cable from American Consul, Barranquilla to SECSTATE, WASHDC 161400Z May 1984 describing actions of the Colombian Army Second Brigade confiscating 200 tons of marijuana, arresting 65 persons--including 23 members of FARC and ELN guerrillas close to the border with Venezuela. Brigadier General Ubaldo Franco Aristizabal, commander of the Second Brigade, stated the guerrillas were members of a joint FARC/ELN unit called the Comando Unificado de Accion Revolucionario (CUAR) based in the Magdalena Medio Region.

21. A broad range of information on Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity involving narcotics trafficking, gun running, money laundering, and insurgency training was provided by US embassy, Panama ARA. I was briefed on two cases in progress involving aircraft. One was an aircraft transporting narcodollars from Colombia to Panama's banks and to Cuba for a money drop. The other was an aircraft flying between Cuba, the US, and Panama in a direct drugs/terrorism deal.

22. A broad range of information on Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity involving narcotics trafficking, gun running, money laundering, and insurgency training was provided by US embassy, Panama ARA.

23. The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, Joint Hearings, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, United States Senate, 98th Congress, Miami, Florida, April 30, 1983.

Hearings by House Foreign Affairs Task Force on International Narcotics Control, February 21, 1984 provided testimony from Mr. Michel from the Department of State, Mr. Mullen of DEA, and Mr. Tomlinson of USIA (Voice of America). The hearing was chaired by Edward Feighan who stated that the purpose of the hearing was to inform US citizens of Cuban government activities in furtherance of narcotics trafficking from Central and South America into the US with the resultant return flow of illegal arms to subversive elements.

"Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking," US Department of State Bulletin on April 30, 1984, Senate Hearings.

Additional information is found in the press:

"The Case Against Cuba," by John Dorschner and Jim McGee, Miami Herald, Tropic, November 20, 1983, p. 10.

"US Officials Link Castro and Drugs," by Leslie Maitland Werner, New York Times, November 10, 1983, p. A19.

"Washington Report: Letter Warns Drug Probe of Cuba Could Backfire," by Irwin Speizer, Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, February 18, 1984, p. 8A.

"Cuban Godfather Arrested in Miami," Ft. Lauderdale News/Sun-Sentinel, February 18, 1984, p. 14B.

"US: Cuba Still Fosters Drug Trade," by Paul Anderson, Miami Herald, February 23, 1984, front page.

"Castro Reported Harboring Drug, Arms Smugglers," San Juan, Puerto Rico, Star, February 22, 1984, p. 5.

"Call for Cuban Drug Smuggling Action," Pembroke Mirror, March 18, 1984.

"Havana Haven," by Stanley Penn and Edward T. Pound, Wall Street Journal, April 30, 1984, front page.

24. Review of US Coast Guard Headquarters, Search and Rescue Division (G-OSR-4) files.

"The Coast Guard and the Southeastern Frontier," by Captain A. R. Larzelere, USCG, US Naval Institute Proceedings/Naval Review 1980, p. 152.

25. "Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking," US Department of State Bulletin on April 30, 1984, Senate Hearings.

26. Prior to being thrown out of the US Coast Guard, an ex-Air Force pilot described his civilian activities in the late 1950s to a small number of officers at Coast Guard Air Station, San Diego in 1961. He had flown arms into Cuba for Castro's revolution. Castro's return payment for the weapons was drugs to be flown to the US. In addition, a March 31, 1982 Federal Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) intelligence report that describes a 1961 meeting of high-ranking Cuban officials; including revolutionary leader and president of the National Bank of Cuba, Che Guevara, Captain Moises Crespo of the Cuban secret police, and Dr. Salvador Allende, a senator and future Marxist president from Chile, to discuss establishing a cocaine trafficking network to raise hard cash for the Cuban government in its struggle to get a post-war economy on its feet. The DEA report is described in "The Case Against Cuba," by John Dorschner and Jim McGee, Miami Herald, Tropic, p. 20. Intelligence agents have stated that the article is accurate. The report continues to summarize twenty-seven DEA reports covering the following twenty-three years to 1984 and states

It is safe to assume that Cuba has been, and continues to be both indirectly and directly involved in drug trafficking through the Caribbean to the United States. . . . Considering the increasing volume of drug trafficking activity in the Caribbean, the

proximity of Cuba to the United States, the benefits to be derived from minimal participation, and the motivating ideas of the government of Cuba, it seems likely that Cuba's involvement with drug trafficking will continue and possibly increase.

27. The second change in Cuba's stance on drug trafficking took place in the 1979 Communist Party Presidium.

28. The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, Joint Hearings, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, United States Senate, 98th Congress, Miami, Florida, April 30, 1983.

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Hearings in the House of Representatives on "Cuba's Criminal Conspiracy," Honorable Tom Lewis of Florida, Congressional Record dated May 9, 1984, p. E 2054, stated: "Cuba is facilitating the flow of illicit drugs into the United States in order to obtain hard currency,

support guerrilla and terrorist activities in Central America and to undermine our society."

"The Case Against Cuba," by John Dorschner and Jim McGee, Miami Herald, Tropic, November 20, 1983, p. 10. Several intelligence officers stated, during interviews, that the information in this article is accurate.

29. Evidence from a criminal trial and seven corroborating witnesses gives the behind-the-scene view of Castro's 1979 policy change.

30. Both Ambassador Ravelo Renedo and Gonzalo Bassols are listed as agents of the Department of the Americas, the Cuban bureau responsible for establishing and supporting Marxist revolution in Latin America.

31. Another testimony described the voyage of the fishing boat Lazy Lady from Miami to Cuba's north coast. There the Lazy Lady rendezvoused with a drug mothership named Viviana, flying the flag of Panama. The Viviana carried 10 million quaaludes from Columbia for the US. Cuban Vice Admiral Aldo Santamaria stated, "We are going to fill Miami completely with the drugs," when he met and cleared the Lazy Lady into Cuban waters. In another incident, the US Coast Guard seized a trawler loaded with 40,000 pounds of marijuana off the coast of North Carolina. The trawler's name was Viviana and the vessel flew the flag of Panama.

32. The Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating International Drug Traffic, Joint Hearings, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary and the Subcommittee on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Senate Drug Enforcement Caucus, United States Senate, 98th Congress, Miami, Florida, April 30, 1983.

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assigned to Latin American embassies, the intelligence community, US Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) officials, US State Department INM officials, US Coast Guard officials, US Customs Service officials, National Institute on Drug Abuse officials, US Justice Department officials, representatives from the Joint Chief's of Staff Southern Command (CINCSO), and others.

Information on Seventh Coast Guard District operations in the Caribbean Basin and Bahamas was obtained during interviews with Law Enforcement Branch and Operations Intelligence Branch officials in Miami, Florida during February 16-17, 1984.

Background Briefings were received from the South East National Narcotics Interdiction System officials in Miami, Florida on February 16-17, 1984.

33. A broad range of information on Marxist terrorist and guerrilla activity involving narcotics trafficking, gun running, money laundering, and insurgency training was provided by US embassy, Panama ARA, PDG, and DAO staff during interviews on February 29 and March 1, 1984. Additional information was obtained from discussions with participants of the US State Department sponsored Latin American Regional ARA Narcotics Conference held in San Jose, Costa Rica during March 12-14, 1984. Participants included US Drug Enforcement Agency officials and agents assigned to Latin American embassies, the intelligence community, US Vice President's National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS)

officials, US State Department INM officials, US Coast Guard officials, US Customs Service officials, National Institute on Drug Abuse officials, US Justice Department officials, representatives from the Joint Chief's of Staff Southern Command (CINCSO), and others.

34. "Cuban Involvement in Narcotics Trafficking," US Department of State Bulletin on April 30, 1984, Senate Hearings.

The DEA announcement concerning the indictment of Colombian congressman Pablo Escobar Gaviria and two accomplices, and the possible indictments of a number of highly placed Nicaraguan government officials, including Defense Minister Humberto Ortega, and Interior Minister Tomas Borge Martinez can be found in many press reports dated July 17, 1984. Most representative are "Sandinistas, Cocaine Traffic in US Linked", Washington Times, p. 12A, and "Cocaine", Washington Times, p. 1.

35. Nation, Failure of a Flawed Policy, Time News Magazine, February 27, 1984, p. 16.

Soviet encouragement for the destabilization of Lebanon, leading to a discredited US in the Arab world, is viewed from a series of news articles offering differing approaches leading to the same conclusion:

"Moscow Sending Key Official to Syria In Move Seen as Quest for Bigger Role," Washington Post, February 9, 1984, p A29.

"Common Interest In Lebanon Bolster Syrian-Soviet Ties," Washington Post, February 14, 1984, p A14.

"Soviets Put Conditions On Role For UN," Washington Post, February 14, 1984, pp. A-1.

"Bouhabib: Dreams of Hope Amid the Nightmare," Washington Post, March 17, 1984, p. C1.

"US Military Program in Beirut Grinding to Halt," by David B. Ottaway, Washington Post, May 8, 1984, p. A15.

"US, France Compete in Persian Gulf," by David B. Ottaway, Washington Post, April 25, 1984, front page.

"US Policy Failure in Beirut Poses Containment Problem," by John M. Goshko, Washington Post, May 1, 1984, p. A16.

"Has Reagan Raised the Stakes: Lebanon: Defining the US 'Vital Interest,'" by Richard Whittle, Congressional Quarterly Weekly Report, Vol. 41, No. 43, October 29, 1983, p. 2219.

DEA Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984, p. 2-6, App. p. 1-13.

"Bulgarian Agents Described as Ready to do Moscow's Bidding," by Nicholas Gage, New York Times, March 23, 1983, p. A12.

Statement of John C. Lawn, Acting Deputy of the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), on Bulgarian Involvement in Narcotic Trafficking, before the Foreign Affairs Committee, Task Force on International Narcotics Control, US House of Representatives, May 3, 1984.

DEA Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984.

"Drugs for Guns, the Bulgarian Connection," By Nathan M. Adams, Reader's Digest, January 1984, p. 87. The Adams article appears to reflect information contained in the above DEA Special Report, but provides more of the details from interviews with defected Bulgarian DS Col. Sverdlev and from documents.

DEA Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984, p. 6.

"Bulgaria is a Key Link in Drug Trade," by Jonathan Spivak, Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1983, p. 33.

DEA Headquarters Strategic Intelligence Section Special Report, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in International Narcotics Trafficking, May 1984, p. 5."

"The Attack on the Pope New Link to Bulgarians," by Nicholas Gage, New York Times, March 23, 1983, front page.

"Bulgaria is a Key Link in Drug Trade," by Jonathan Spivak, Wall Street Journal, May 13, 1983, p. 33.

"Shooting of the Pope: Italian Quietly Pursues Bulgarian Connection," by Jonathan C. Randal, Washington Post, May 13, 1983, p. A1.

"Bulgaria, Stung by Papal Case Charges, Cracks Down on Smuggling," by Jonathan C. Randal, Washington Post, May 15, 1983, p. A15.

"Syrians Aiding Heroin Traffic in Bekaa Valley," by Jack Anderson, Washington Post, February 1, 1984.

Cable 280454Z JUN 84 from US Embassy, Rome, to SECSTATE WASHDC, Subject Arms/Nuclear Smuggling, p. 15; describes Italian Judge Carlo Palermo's judicial investigation in international arms trafficking. The sale of the Leopard tanks had been arranged by Glauco Partel. The seller was a man called Reuting, headquartered in West Germany as an importer/exporter. Partel testified: "Reuting must have been connected with the German Services He got in touch with us through Eugene

Bartholomeus when the latter had asked us to sell the 66 helicopters . . . the Leopard tanks were offered by Renato Gamba, the owner of a factory of light weapons at Gardone Valtrompia, in the province of Brescia." Judge Palermo had earlier linked Gamba as a part of the Syrian international trafficker, Henri Nikolaki Arsan's organization. Arsan arranged deals for KINTEX, trading narcotics for weapons, as also described in the article "Drugs for Guns, the Bulgarian Connection," By Nathan M. Adams, Reader's Digest, January 1984, P 96. In addition, the Adams article appears to reflect information contained in the DEA Special Report listed in endnote 45, but provides more of the details from interviews with defected Bulgarian DS Col. Sverdlev and from documents.

Bottin International Business Register, 1983, Vol. 2, Europe, p. 927, "Bulgaria, Import and Export Organizations, KINTEX."

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CHAPTER 2

BEGINNING OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM

and

EXPLOITATION OF NARCOTICS PROFITS

What follows is an overview of international terrorist group linkages and the Soviet and Cuban strategy to employ terrorism, financed by drug trafficking. (See Appendix C.)

Terrorist/Guerrilla Organization and Purpose

Terrorists are initially organized into independent cells bound together by a central command structure or controlling group. Violent activity is meant to cause and maintain fear within both the government and the general population, but terrorist targets are carefully selected to give the appearance that the violence is a natural response to a repressive government or government official. At first, direct engagement in major battles is avoided, but as the terrorist group matures toward a revolutionary force, political objectives become more polished and terrorist activity gives way to practical military operations. According to Mao, terrorism is consistent with the essence of classical military strategy: the efficacious use of force to achieve desired political ends.

Funding Terrorist/Guerrilla Activity

Growth from small terrorist bands to revolutionary forces requires financial support. Modern terrorism is big business, and the cost of conducting international terrorism is high. Walter Laqueur of Georgetown's Center for Strategic and International Studies has observed: "Money is the fuel of terrorism. The belief that the use of terrorism is the poor man's method of waging war is no longer valid."¹ M. K. Pilgrim points out that the 1974 Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) operating budget was \$150 million, by 1983 it would grow to \$200 to \$250 million. The Al Fatah faction of the PLO had a 1975 income of \$200 million. A year later Arab states donated \$90 million to the PLO.² This is but one example; however, there is substantial evidence that financial wealth is shared amongst the international community of terrorists.³ So where does all this money come from?

The US Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA) estimates 1983 illegal drug sales in the United States netted between \$50-75 billion, or 5 to 7 percent of all US retail sales. The wholesale import value of illicit drugs in the US was between \$6-8 billion, or 2 percent of all imported goods to the US, or slightly larger than wholesale value of all imported consumer electronics equipment such as televisions and stereo record and tape players. Terrorist organizations have tapped into the lucrative international drug trafficking systems to provide an important financial source for their activities.

Terrorism and Soviet Strategy

The Soviet Union appears to have adopted more than just a support role for terrorist organizations. The first section of the Communist Manifesto, "Bourgeois and Proletarians," recognizes that the emancipation of the workers will never come in exactly the same way in every country, yet it suggests a program of measures that is "generally applicable." In the second section, "Proletarians and Communists," the Manifesto insists that communists establish relations with other groups to give them direction, and "to openly declare that their goal can be attained by the forcible overthrow of all existing social conditions." The fourth section, "Position of the Communist in Relation to the Various Existing Opposition Parties," encourages property owners to break the national constitution by use of repressive force. To Engle, that was when revolutionary struggle begins.

Karl Marx, in Neve Rheinische Zeitung, 1848, stated "there is only one way to shorten the murderous death agonies of the old society, only one way to shorten the bloody birth pangs of the new society--only one means--Revolutionary Terrorism. Nikita Khrushchev, after America tested the hydrogen bomb, came to view a nuclear war as a no-win situation and, in the 20th Communist Party Congress in 1958, suggested that a new strategy for dealing with capitalist states was needed. Lenin's 1919 strategy of an inevitable frightful collision with the capitalist states and ultimate victory for the Soviet Union and communist system could not be permitted to lead to nuclear war.⁴

In January 1961, Khrushchev defined new strategy for dealing with the West: "There would be ample opportunity to undermine the stability of pro-Western regimes in Third World nations—by training and arming underground communist cadres for sabotage, guerrilla warfare and terrorism." Yuri Andropov, chief of the Soviet secret police (KGB) in 1967 was in charge of training terrorists and guerrillas.⁵ An important aspect of the Khrushchev strategy is that it is a continuous low-level form of conflict, just below the "threshold of pain" where it does not cause enough alarm from the citizens of a nation to require the government to deal effectively with it. It is a state, or condition, where confusion exists as to whether it is a social, law enforcement, or a military problem.

The perceived strategic parity between the Soviet Union and the United States has caused the Soviets to look for more subtle and indirect threats in areas remote from Western Europe. Reviewing terrorist activity over the last ten years, it appears that the Khrushchev strategy is not just words on paper. Soviet conflict exploitation has developed in the Middle East, Africa, and Latin America. Terrorism, as surrogate warfare, in Latin America and the Bahamas is more likely to increase than not, placing US vital interests at risk. Carlos Marighela, member of Brazil's Communist Party and author of Mini-Manual For Urban Guerrillas wrote: "Terrorism is an arm the revolutionary can never relinquish—it is an action the urban guerrilla must execute with the greatest cold bloodedness, calmness and decision." Moreover, how the United States deals with terrorism in the Bahamas and Latin America and in the Middle

East cannot help but influence the world's view of US strength and resolve.

The record of transnational terrorism in the 1970s and 80s points to an international terror organization with Soviet ties. Evidence also shows Soviet logistical support for terrorism from huge profits in international drug trafficking. Figures 1 through 4 in Appendix C present general Soviet support relationships based upon known activities by 1978. The relationships depicted show Soviet training centers, Soviet-controlled support centers for subversion, and known terrorist logistical and operational support for conducting terrorist acts.

Soviet collaborative seeds were sown in 1959 when Fidel Castro took charge of Cuba. Two years later, Castro formed the Cuban Direccione General de Inteligencia (DGI), or General Intelligence Directorate with Soviet KGB assistance.⁶ In 1966, the Tricontinental conference of 513 delegates representing 83 groups from the third world was held in Havana, Cuba, with the purpose of "devising a global revolutionary strategy to counter the global strategy of American imperialism."⁷ The delegates agreed on a strategy "to undermine Western interests in the Third World and to destabilize Western societies while keeping Western governments and opinion makers anesthetized with a policy of peaceful coexistence, known in the West as detente."⁸ The African, Asian, and Latin American Solidarity Organization was an outgrowth of the conference and was chartered with a permanent secretariat based in Havana. Cienfuegos Goriaran, a member of Cuba's Communist Party central committee, chaired

the solidarity organization and ten months after the conference, a chain of terrorist training camps was established in Cuba under Soviet KGB Colonel Vadim Kotchergine.⁹ Graduates from the first Cuban training camps provided the nucleus for staffing other camps in Cuba as well as new camps in Palestinian facilities in several countries and the Soviet Union. The Soviets concentrated on training Palestinians first, then branched out to include trainees from Europe, Latin America, Africa, and Asia. Two years later Dr. Waddih Haddad and Dr. George Habash, Palestinian physicians, established the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), an "armed Leninist Party."¹⁰ Habash's PFLP strategy is to internationalize the conflict and to link up with other terrorist groups for coordination and mutual support, a classic view of "international terrorism."¹¹ Consistent with the actions of "international terrorism," Waddih Haddad, at one time, was the immediate supervisor of Venezuelan Marxist terrorist Illich Ramirez Sanchez, also called Carlos Martinez, or Carlos, or Carlos the Jackal.

Antonio Bouvier, an Ecuadorian Marxist terrorist, was Carlos' teacher in the mid-1960s Cuban training Camp Mantazas operated by KGB General Viktor Simenov. Carlos attended Moscow's Patrice Lumumba University in 1969 and established an international terrorist network under the sponsorship of Haddad and the PFLP. The network was called the "Arm of the Arab Revolution." Under that network, Carlos had extensive contacts with the Arab Fedayeen, the Japanese URA, Turkish guerrillas, Basque separatists, and the Baader-Meinhof Gang. Under Haddad, Carlos ran the

International Terrorist Collective in Paris until 1975 when he escaped arrest with the help of Cuban diplomats.¹²

The 1970 International Revolutionary Congress in Pyongyang, North Korea was attended by over 400 delegates and stressed an implied set of shared values and a shared mode of action among terrorists.¹³ Following the revolutionary congress many terrorist acts of violence were conducted with "visiting terrorist participation" and "international terrorist" group logistic and monetary support. The seeds planted in the Cuban training camps grew. Ten North Korean terrorist training camps were established and the Chilean newspaper La Prensa reported Latin American terrorist groups from Mexico, Guatemala, Peru, Uruguay, Chile, Brazil, Columbia, and Venezuela trained in the North Korean camps. International terrorist linkage went beyond training, though; it included sharing personnel for operational missions. In an operation involving exchange personnel, a Nicaraguan terrorist was captured and a Turkish People's Liberation Army terrorist was killed by Israeli security forces during a Palestinian attempt to capture an Israeli passenger jet. The following Spring, PFLP leader Dr. George Habbash financed the First International Terrorist Meeting, in Tripoli, Lebanon. Baader-Meinhof, Japanese URA, Eritrean Liberation Front, Irish IRA, Basque separatists, French leftwing elements, and Turkish, Iranian, and Sudanese Liberation Fronts attended. In Larnaca, Cyprus, a transnational terrorist summit is held, financed by the Palestinians, as a continuation of the 1972 Lebanon summit.¹⁴

Meanwhile in 1974, the Revolutionary Coordinating Junta (JCR) was founded in the Tucuman province of Argentina by terrorist revolutionary groups from Argentina, Bolivia, Chile, and Uruguay. Organizers of the JCR included the Cuban DGI and the Argentine Trotskyite terrorist group ERP. The charter of the JCR is to lead a South American continent-wide armed revolution for liberation.¹⁵ The JCR headquarters was established in Buenos Aires and a general command was established between 1975 and 1977. An Argentine police crack-down forced the JCR to move to Paris, but the 1,500 strong Latin American Europe Brigade was then formed and made close ties with European terrorist groups and their activities, both financial and operational. The following year, a meeting of the JCR was held in Lisbon where terrorist revolutionaries from the Dominican Republic, Columbia, Paraguay, and Venezuela joined the Junta and the formal alliance.¹⁶

Closer to the Home Front, in March 1971, the KGB developed a plan to "create a new Vietnam" in Mexico. The KGB agent in charge of the operation, headquartered in the Mexico City Soviet Embassy, was Oleg Maksimovich Nechiporenko.¹⁷

Finally, in Bogota, in March 1984, Ambassador Tambs, US ambassador to Colombia, described the relationship between Columbia's narcotics traffickers and the FARC Marxist guerrilla group. The Ambassador said,

. . . the FARC is the best equipped, best trained, and potentially most dangerous subversive group in Columbia and has revolutionary plans to take the country. It has approximately two thousand active members with a support infrastructure to quickly

support over five thousand. Of its twenty-five fronts, half operate in coca and marijuana cultivation areas. The relationship between the FARC and narcotics traffickers has probably existed for some time and appears to have been sanctioned by the FARC's national directorate in May 1982 at the FARC's Seventh Conference. Each FARC front has specific responsibilities with the fronts in Guaviare and Vaupes to operate with narcotics traffickers for money and arms.¹⁸

5,000 guerrillas in a country the size of Colombia seems unthreatening until you consider the pattern of successful revolutions in Latin America. Growth to revolutionary army strength can be quick. Castro initiated a revolution with a very small band of guerrillas. In 1978, the total terrorist and guerrillas armed strength in El Salvador, Guatamala, Honduras, and Costa Rica was estimated to be 1,450. Three years later, the number had grown to 8,000, and by 1984 to 12,000.¹⁹

ENDNOTES

Chapter Two

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8. Ninty-seventh Congress Hearings on Terrorism: Origins, Directions and Support, Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism of the Committee on the Judiciary, US Senate, April 24, 1981.
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16. M. K. Pilgrim, paper on financing international terrorism, p. 47.
17. John Barron's The KGB, New York, Readers Digest Press, 1974, p. 230-257, "The Plot to Destroy Mexico" describes a Soviet KGB plot to create a Mexican Vietnam for the US. The information was provided by defecting Soviet Ambassador Raya Kiselnikova and two guerrilla leaders trained in Pyonoyang, North Korea and in Moscow, Angel Bino Gineros and Fabricio Gomez Souza. Gomez Souza had been recruited earlier by Nechiporenko. In 1969 Souza recruited and took 47 Mexicans to North Korea for guerrilla training. They returned to Mexico in September 1970 and formed the Movimiento de Accion Revolucionaria (MAR), which would merge later with the Twenty-third of September League.

18. US Embassy, Bogota Colombia cable to Secretary of State, Washington, DC, dated 19 March 1984, subject NARC/FARC Connection.

19. US State Department Background Paper: Central America, May 1984, a White Paper on terrorism in Central America.

CHAPTER 3

THE NATIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL RESPONSE

Speaking before the 1984 State Department, ARA Regional Narcotics Coordinators Conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, US Ambassador to Costa Rica, Curtin Winsor, Jr., voiced his concerns about the severity of the international narcotics trafficking problem and the lack of a national response.

As a sitting ambassador in a Central American country, I am very concerned. Drug trafficking is a grave national security threat. We have been treating the problem as a static situation. We need to carry the attack on the problem to the source countries themselves as a dynamic solution.

Curtin Winsor, Jr.,
US Ambassador to Costa Rica

International Narcotics Trafficking Sources

Colombia is the primary source of all marijuana trafficked to the US with Jamaica and Mexico following as the second and third source of supply. Belize is an emerging marijuana cultivation source to watch. A combined total of 12,600 to 15,000 metric tons of marijuana were trafficked to the US in 1983.¹

Seventy-five percent of the cocaine trafficked to the United States comes directly or indirectly from Colombia. Colombian traffickers not

only transport cocaine but also dominate the financing and smuggling of cocaine hydrochloride processed in Peru, Ecuador, Bolivia, and Brazil. Bolivia and Peru are the next largest sources of cocaine trafficked to America, each providing ten percent of the supply. Fifty to seventy-one metric tons of cocaine hydrochloride were trafficked to the US in 1983.²

Southwest Asia remains the primary source of opium products, with Mexico and Southeast Asia following in second and third place. Mexico supplied thirty-three percent, or seventeen metric tons, of heroin trafficked to the US.³

Methaqualone and amphetamines are two other dangerous drugs trafficked into the United States. In 1981, eighty-five percent of the methaqualone and twenty percent of amphetamines found in America were imported from Colombia and Mexico. South American laboratories supply smugglers with the major source elements for methaqualone. The drugs are smuggled into Colombia for clandestine tableting laboratories in Barranquilla, Santa Marta, Cartagena, and Medellin prior to shipment. The primary market for Mexican licensed pharmaceutical firms making amphetamine (mini-bennies) and phentermine (black mollies) is drug traffickers. Mexican restrictions, like most other countries, on import and export of both dangerous drugs are simply ineffective.⁴

Once processed, the drugs are shipped by land, sea, and air. Ships and boats transport sixty percent of the marijuana, thirty-five percent of the cocaine, fifteen percent of other dangerous drugs, and

approximately twenty-five percent of the heroin. Aircraft transport fifty percent of the cocaine, thirty-five percent of the marijuana, approximately half of the heroin, and eighty percent of the other dangerous drugs.⁵

Figures 3 through 6 are the vessel and aircraft trafficking routes from Colombia, Mexico, Jamaica, Peru, Bolivia, and Belize.

Interdiction of Latin American narcotics trafficking vessels could potentially snare 55 percent of the marijuana, twenty-seven percent of the cocaine, six percent of the heroin, and thirteen percent of other dangerous drugs imported to the United States. Interdiction of Latin American narcotics trafficking aircraft would potentially snare twenty-eight percent of the marijuana, thirty-nine percent of the cocaine, thirteen percent of the heroin, and sixty-eight percent of other dangerous drugs imported to the United States.⁶

Federal Strategy For An Internal Problem

Drug abuse is one of the gravest problems facing us internally in the United States.

President Ronald Reagan

In June of 1982, President Reagan called for a major campaign against drug abuse in the United States. The Drug Abuse Policy Office under the Office of Policy Development of the White House staff prepared the 1982




Figure 3.

Marijuana Trafficking Routes

Source: DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends, Fall 1982




Figure 4.
 Generalized Heroin Trafficking Flow
 Within the United States, 1981

Source: DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends, Fall 1982





Figure 5.

Cocaine Trafficking Routes

Source: DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends, Fall 1982



- Amphetamine/Phentermine
- Methaqualone
- - - - - Diazepam
- Ergotamine Tartrate (LSD Precursor)

Figure 6.

Dangerous Drugs Trafficking Routes

Source: DEA Quarterly Intelligence Trends, Fall 1982

Federal Strategy For Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking. The five major elements of the strategy are: (1) International Cooperation, (2) Drug Law Enforcement, (3) Education and Prevention, (4) Detoxification and Treatment, and, (5) Research. All five major elements of the strategy are considered long-range goals in reducing the problem of drug abuse and drug trafficking to a reasonable level.⁷ Long term is defined as fifteen to twenty years. But with the exception of international cooperation, the strategy elements are basically domestic in nature. Interdiction and seizure aim to stop trafficking into the US, whereas investigation and prosecution deal with US, state, and local law violations. Education, prevention, detoxification, treatment, and research are generally geared for US citizens in an attempt to reduce demand for the drugs.

The federal strategy provides for voluntary military participation providing information and equipment to assist civilian law enforcement activities. The expanded use of US military resources, under revised provisions of posse comitatus, is targeted to assist civil law enforcement activities, and military involvement is voluntary on a not-to-interfere basis with preparedness to meet national security requirements. International cooperation's stated goal is to reduce the availability of illicit drugs to the United States through crop and transportation control as close to the source as possible.⁸ The federal strategy does not mention drug trafficking as a threat to national security—indeed, the federal strategy views drug trafficking as a social and civil law enforcement problem.

The 1982 federal strategy for preventing drug abuse and drug trafficking looks inward to a grave internal national problem. If this were the only consideration, perhaps the five major strategy elements would be enough. But there is an external deadly connection between profits from international narcotics trafficking and insurgent terrorist groups and guerrillas threatening US vital interests. Narcotics profits are helping finance a violent revolution intended to spread across Latin America and the Bahamas, leaving in its wake neighbor nations hostile to the United States and its economy.

Latin America provides thirty-four percent of US imported oil, various strategic mineral resources, and consumes one third of America's exports. Not only is Latin America important economically, but it also holds within its borders the majority of defense and merchantile sealines-of-communications (SLOCs). These SLOCs have strategic choke points where hostile southern neighbors could deny their use. For instance, sixty-six percent of oil imported to the US by tankship is already within Mig fighter range from Cuba. More Cuba-like states in the Caribbean would increase the percentage of threatened imported oil. (See Appendix B for detailed account of US dependency on Latin American oil and minerals and Appendix C for SLOC and commerce illustrations.)

The Effectiveness of the Federal Strategy in Drug Interdiction

For all federal agencies involved in drug interdiction, only 16 percent of the marijuana and

less than 10 percent of the heroin, cocaine and other dangerous drugs are intercepted.

US Government Accounting
Office (GAO) Report, 1984


Though the volume and street value of seized drugs are most impressive, these seizures are dwarfed by the total drugs available. More drugs are entering the United States in 1984 than entered five years ago.

DEA statistics show the 1984 street price is \$75 to \$100 for a gram of cocaine, or a third less than the previous year.⁹ There is more cocaine available. Further, the cocaine seized in 1984 is two to three times purer than cocaine seized the previous year. According to the economic law of supply and demand, the increased purity of cocaine on the street and decreasing cost was viewed as bad news for the national strategy.¹⁰

Rear Admiral Frederic P. Schubert, Pacific Regional Coordinator for the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) testified before Congress: "Those who decide to break the border on a northwest track from Mexico to California can do so with very little concern about detection or apprehension." Rear Admiral D. C. Thompson, NNBIS Southeast Coordinator stated, "We are not winning some of the most important battles, like cocaine. We're losing ground on that. We're discouraged, we're disappointed with the results."¹¹

The US Customs Service reports that 1,376 aircraft flew 18,000 trafficking runs in 1983. Customs seized 203 aircraft, or one percent of the drug flights. The Customs Service seized 19,601 pounds of cocaine from all modes of transportation in 1983 compared to 3,741 in 1981 yet Admiral Murphy, Chief-of-Staff to the Vice-President, stated, "I don't see where we are winning the war on cocaine."¹² The US Coast Guard has seized between 2.3 to 3.7 million pounds of marijuana each year since 1981; however, Coast Guard resources are spread pretty thin.¹³ In 1983, the Coast Guard seized one thousand pounds of cocaine, thirty thousand pounds of hashish, and one hundred pounds of other dangerous drugs. Figure 7 pinpoints Coast Guard Caribbean Basin drug vessel seizures and arrests during 1982. This map vividly represents maritime interdiction which implements the national strategy. The location of seizure concentrations and the low activity below fifteen degrees latitude illustrates the inward nature of the federal strategy. Interdiction strategy tries to stop trafficking prior to penetration of US borders. This strategy employs land barriers forming ocean route choke points in the Yucatan passage between Yucatan and Cuba, the Windward Passage between Cuba and Haiti, the Mona passage between the Dominican Republic and Puerto Rico, and various passages between the islands of the Lesser Antillies.¹⁴ Only four seizures were made between 1981 and April 1984 near the primary source country, Colombia.¹⁵

The Federal Organized Crime Drug Enforcement Task Force opened 535 cases against drug organizations and indicted 1,841 people in its first fourteen months of operation. Twelve national regional task forces



<u>Vessels Seized</u>		<u>Arrests</u>	<u>Total Marijuana Seized</u>
Foreign:	28	252	973,585
Stateless:	14	146	511,591
U.S. :	132	453	1,523,032
Totals:	174	851	3,008,208

Figure 7.

1982 US Coast Guard Drug Seizures From
 Trafficking Vessels originating in the Caribbean Basin

Source: US Coast Guard Headquarters, Operations Law Enforcement Division

seized fifty million dollars in drug-related property in 1983. The task force's goal, according to Attorney General French Smith, "is nothing less than the destruction of the major drug-trafficking rings that plague the US."¹⁶

All federal agencies involved in the federal strategy report their resources are stretched too thin, and national resources committed to the war on drugs don't match the size of the problem. The various agencies are working diligently—heroically even—and meeting with greater success than the past; however, eighty-four to ninety percent of narcotics internationally trafficked penetrate US borders and find their way to US buyers on the street.¹⁷ Even though the federal strategy has an "inward-looking" implementation, those involved in the struggle acknowledge the national security nature of the problem. Yet, the military departments participate in the national strategy only on a voluntary, not-to-interfere basis.

Speaking before the 1984 State Department ARA Regional Narcotics Coordinators Conference in San Jose, Costa Rica, Lowell Kilday, Deputy Assistant Secretary of State for Inter-american Affairs, identified the narcotics issue as "a central issue in the bilateral discussions with other countries. Soviet and Cuban penetration, economic assistance, bilateral trade, democratization, debt management. . . . Each and every one of these bear directly on the security of the US and include the narcotics issue."

The Effectiveness of the International Strategy in Drug Interdiction

The bottom-line is that we have to receive better cooperation from host countries Our message to source countries is you better get on top of the drug problem before it gets on top of you.

Lowell Kilday
Deputy Assistant Secretary of
State for Inter-American Affairs
Speaking before the 1984 State
Department ARA Regional Narcotics
Coordinator's Conference in San
Jose, Costa Rica.

The first seminar on Illicit Drug Traffic for Law Enforcement Officers of the Anglophone Caribbean was held in Nassau, Bahamas in March 1983, under United Nations coordination, to assess and improve the international drug control strategy applied in the Caribbean Basin. Seminar participants noted that drug traffic is clearly now an international phenomenon, sharing many characteristics with the internationally recognized crimes of slavery and piracy. They found grounds for formal recognition of drug trafficking as an "international crime." They also noted trafficking trends, within the Caribbean sub-region, were acquiring a new dimension with traffickers now attempting to reach Europe in addition to the main south-to-north flow to the US.¹⁸

The participants noted that it had not so far been possible to generate sufficient financing to make a quick and major impact in

reducing illicit supplies of narcotic drugs through income substitution or other means, whether in the region of the Americas or elsewhere. Thus reducing supply would be a long-term measure. The best immediate strategy available was to tighten enforcement around identified areas of illicit supply and gradually squeeze them. This technique had been applied successfully in parts of Southwest Asia.¹⁹

In developing coordinated countermeasures, the seminar considered Drug Control strategy established by the United Nations and found many inadequacies. Existing facilities for rapid and secure information exchange are inadequate and there are too many restrictions on immediate seizure and arrest after initial detection. There are always problems extraditing fugitives and no means for exchanging accurate intelligence information on drug trafficking. Any new counter-measures must stem from updated national drug control laws and consider the difficulty in balancing free tourist movement and banking development with the urgent need to take firm measures against drug trafficking. In effect, the United Nations International Drug Control Strategy was no better off than the effectiveness of US strategy.²⁰

Narcotics Trafficking Profits Financing Marxist Insurgency

Think of what destabilization of the whole Central American isthmus including Mexico, could mean to our ability to meet our commitments
Confronting hostile neighbors . . . any US government would be faced with demands to bring our troops home from Europe and reduce our commitments in the Pacific The manner in which we meet the challenges in

Central America affects profoundly our abilities to safeguard world peace and the future of individual liberty.

Senator Henry Jackson 21

As noted in Chapter One, the US Ambassador to Colombia, Lewis Tambs reported that half of the Colombian FARC fronts operate in coca and marijuana cultivation areas, and one front receives 3.38 million dollars per month taxing the coca industry; another front had obtained a 99 million dollar profit from their coca crops. The Ambassador further stated wherever a FARC front operates, some arrangement exists between narcotics traffickers and the FARC. In addition, the US citizen kidnapped by the FARC observed that the FARC, M-19, and EPL are all consolidated under Cuban control and that Cuban advisors stated one half of FARC narcotics profits were sent to countries "being liberated" such as El Salvador. Consolidation of guerrilla groups was confirmed by the Colombian army during a drug raid.

According to the Tambs report alone, the FARC has realized at least 40.6 million dollars and probably 1.4 billion dollars per year. Furthermore, at least 20.3 million dollars and probably 70 million dollars, went to El Salvador Marxist guerrillas via Cuba in one year.²² (These figures do not include profits from the remaining twenty-five FARC fronts nor from M-19 and EPL insurgents.)

According to the US Defense Security Assistance Agency, US assistance to El Salvador for federal fiscal year 1983 totaled \$326.8 Million.²³ FARC narcotics profits sent to Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador was at

least 20.3 to 70 million dollars in 1983. Both the US government aid and FARC aid came from the US economy—US aid from taxes, FARC aid from US citizen purchase of narcotics.

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March 1983, Dated April 14, 1983.

19. Ibid.

20. Ibid.

21. The 1984 Report of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America to the President of the United States was dedicated to the late Senator Henry "Scoop" Jackson because of his interest and understanding of the region—but more importantly, because of his understanding of the strategic value of Latin America to the United States.

22. 1983 FARC aid to Marxist guerrillas in El Salvador computations result from \$3.38 Million/month and multiplied by 12 months.

23. A telephone interview was held on June 4, 1984 with Mr. Henry H. Gaffney, Director of Planning, US defense Security Assistance Agency. According to the US defense Security Assistance Agency, US assistance to El Salvador for federal fiscal year 1983 was extensive:

Military Assistance Program	\$ 33.5 million
Guaranteed Credits (for military equipment)	\$ 46.5 million
International Military Education Training	\$ 1.3 million
Other Economic Support (balance of payments)	\$140.0 million
Other Economic Support (development)	\$ 58.8 million
PL 480 (food)	\$ 46.7 million

The first three forms of assistance total 81.3 million dollars and financed the military security umbrella intended for development and reform in El Salvador.

CHAPTER 4

CONCLUSIONS - RECOMMENDATIONS

and

CONCEPT OF OPERATIONS

These conclusions and recommendations move beyond the 1982 National Strategy to Prevent Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking by adding the question of national security and by suggesting ways to improve drug interdiction.

Conclusions

1. International narcotics trafficking is a threat to national security, and more. The perceived parity in Europe between the Soviet Union and the United States has prompted the Soviets to seek for more subtle and indirect means to undermine US strength away from Western Europe. The characterization of current Soviet aims is to place the West's access to petroleum and other strategic raw materials at risk and to weaken the social order of the US through the introduction of drugs into its society. According to Mao, invasion of a nation's social order is a more fundamental approach to threatening an adversary than the conduct of conventional war.

2. Marxist insurgent group profits from international narcotics trafficking are funding guerrilla insurgency in the Caribbean basin, especially in Colombia and El Salvador, and formerly, Nicaragua. The US economy is supporting its own adversary through purchase of illicit narcotics by its citizens.

The change of Latin America to a hostile neighbor status would:

- o Place at risk Latin American oil which provides thirty-four percent of US imports. See Appendix B.

- o Place at risk most of the US sea lines of communication. Except for a few great-circle routes between the US east coast and Europe and the US west coast and Asia, virtually all merchantile and defense sealines of communications and commerce between the US and the world have choke points in Latin America, especially in the Panama Canal and the Caribbean Basin. The question is not whether hostile nations would allow commerce to pass choke points; rather, it is whether the US could afford the increased military and naval forces necessary to assure the uninterrupted flow of commerce and the sealift necessary to support US forward deployed forces. Sixty-six percent of all imported oil is within MiG fighter aircraft range from Cuba now. See Appendix B.

- o Require a Defense Department review of resources needed to provide security from hostile southern neighbors.

- o Place at risk one-third of the US export market.

- o Place at risk US sources for eighty-eight percent of bauxite needed to produce aluminum, seventy-five percent of the mineral columbium for jet engine and laser production, seventy-three percent of graphite for Stealth technology and high-strength low-weight materials, and other raw resources critical to the US economy and national defense. See Appendix B.

3. The Soviet Union's strategy in Latin America is to exploit terrorist/guerrilla activity to gain Cuban-like client states in the Carribean Basin. Two principle points apply:

- o Use of surrogates to distance terrorist activity from obvious Soviet support.

- o The Soviet economy cannot support revolution in Latin America; it must be financially self-supporting. Of the three primary self-supporting methods used to raise hard cash for revolution (narcotics trade, kidnapping, and bank robbery), narcotics trafficking provides the highest cash value.

4. The Soviet alternative to loss of self-supporting insurgent financing is to fund it from the Soviet Bloc economy. Such direct financial commitment for mischief in the Third World would strain the Soviet economy, and, no doubt prompt a reconsideration.

5. To continue and increase profits to fund insurgency, Cuba is taking steps to bypass the US maritime choke-point interdiction strategy and to assure enhanced security of high value narcotics, such as coca plants and cocaine laboratories. These steps include the growing and processing of narcotics on Cuban soil.

6. International narcotics trafficking seriously threatens the US economy. The 1983 retail sales of internationally trafficked narcotics (\$50 - \$75 billion, US) equalled the 1983 US trade deficit (\$63 billion, US). Currency obtained illegally from narcotics trafficking and invested, or deposited in bank accounts, outside the US is denied to the US economy.

7. The nation is not winning the drug war. The nation has neither dedicated required resources, nor deployed them effectively to attack drug trafficking effectively. Eighty-four to ninety percent of narcotics trafficked internationally penetrate US borders and find their way to US buyers on the street. Furthermore, the nation can not afford to wait for the long-term results associated with the 1982 Federal Strategy on Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking (15-20 years) to attack the threat to national security from drug profits financing Latin American insurgency. Every shipment of narcotics providing profits to Marxist insurgents fields more trained and equipped Marxist guerrillas threatening our vital national interests.

8. The national cost from the loss of Latin American strategic contributions and from a degraded US social order is greater than the

cost of an effective national attack to stop Marxist terrorist and guerrilla groups from financing revolution through illegal drug profits.

9. The absence of a clear and comprehensive national policy statement directly defining international narcotics trafficking as a threat to national security prevents effective use of national resources to attack the problem by restricting participation of the military.

10. The US and source-country publics are largely unaware of the role international narcotics trafficking plays in threatening national security; indeed, the public generally views it as only an arguable social issue and as a domestic law-enforcement problem. An informed public is more likely to engender a national domestic environment supportive of needed Federal action. The public is far more likely to support an aggressive effort to stop drug profits from falling into Marxist hands than to support a military build-up in Central America.

11. During interviews with intelligence officers from each of the law enforcement agencies, with members of the Central Intelligence Agency, and with military intelligence officers, three central complaints emerged:

- o Effective interdiction, seizure, criminal investigation, and prosecution depend upon accurate and timely intelligence gathering and reporting. Unfortunately, most intelligence is highly compartmentalized into a set of disjointed views involving narcotics trafficking, terrorist activity, guerrilla

insurgency, gun running, and national defense. Confusion is compounded by individual agency "clamps" on information and on "turf-guarding." National coordination is needed for an integrated larger view, and must not be based upon voluntary participation.

- o The intelligence community has received different tasking policy guidelines for gathering narcotics trafficking intelligence during each of the past four administrations, each of which has reacted to the pendulum of public opinion--on the one hand, public sensitivity to the dangers of drug usage; on the other, public reaction to the gathering of intelligence on US citizens.

- o Many forms of intelligence data communications systems are in place with little or no security provisions. The possibility of intruders obtaining information from those systems or contaminating intelligence data bases exists. More important, because of inadequate data communications and installation security measures, classified intelligence is often not shared with those who have a need to know.

12. Interdiction of international narcotics trafficking and seizure of illicit cargoes concentrates upon "keeping-it-out" once near US borders, rather than "keeping-it-in" the source countries' borders and territorial seas. "Keeping-it-out" is more resource-intensive than confining it to the source.

Recommendations

1. An Executive Order should be signed by the President to provide a clear and comprehensive national policy statement directly defining international narcotics trafficking as a threat to national security. Should the requirements for the Executive Order be extended for a long-term need, legislation should be enacted in its place. (See Appendix A for draft Executive Order.)

2. Because international narcotics trafficking is a threat to national security, Department of Defense participation should no longer be voluntary. Specific military missions should be tasked which enhance detection and interdiction of international narcotics trafficking to deny drug profits now funding Marxist insurgency in Latin America. In particular, Commander-in-Chief, US Southern Command, Quarry Heights, Panama should receive mission tasking. See Appendix A for recommended military mission tasking.

3. Legislation should be enacted to provide the intelligence community with policy guidelines for gathering narcotics trafficking intelligence. The legislation should focus on stabilizing a balance between national need to meet a threat and the collection of intelligence on US citizens, focus on removing compartmentalized processing of intelligence in sets of disjointed views of narcotics trafficking, terrorist activity, guerrilla insurgency, gun running, and national defense insurgency in Latin America, and focus on removing individual agency "clamps" on information

and on "turf-guarding." "Turf-guarding" responds to the truth that intelligence, or knowledge, in the law enforcement community is power. Control of intelligence is likewise power. A possible solution would be the integration of DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) and the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) under the aegis of the Vice President's Office and the introduction of Central Intelligence Agency, Defense Intelligence Agency, and Federal Bureau of Investigation liaison positions.

Coordination of intelligence by the Vice President's Office would obviate agency attempts to control a body of intelligence to exert influence over other agencies or to protect "turf." EPIC and NNBIS should be restructured to have mirror data dictionaries, or definition of data, for computer-supported systems where NNBIS regional centers provide tactical intelligence gathering and processing and EPIC sifts through data fed from the NNBIS centers to gather and process strategic views of intelligence. The NNBIS centers should integrate local law enforcement agencies and departments into the operation as much as possible.

4. EPIC, NNBIS, and interface law enforcement agency intelligence computer and data-communication systems in place or planned should be given a security audit and recommendation by the National Security Administration (NSA) to eliminate the possibility of intruders or contamination of intelligence data bases and to assure that classified intelligence is shared with those who have a need to know.

5. The Vice President's Office should undertake a determined campaign, with the various federal law enforcement agencies, to educate the public about the international narcotics trafficking threat to national security. A review should be made of the information that is classified but no longer active in tactical law enforcement, or the possibility of presenting information while protecting sources and methods. One reason the public is not informed, is the unnecessary classification of information, or the withholding of it, during "turf guarding." An informed public would provide a more favorable national domestic environment for necessary Federal action.

6. The concept of operations described in the next section is recommended for maritime and airborne narcotics trafficking interdiction. This concept of operations concentrates on keeping drugs within a source country's borders and territorial seas. The concept also prepares the source countries to secure their own borders and territorial seas. Most important, the concept is directed toward the primary means for Marxist insurgency to finance revolution, a point equally important to military preparedness in Latin America. These steps are also vital to allow US Coast Guard resources to redirect interdiction from Colombian narcotics traffickers to the growing Cuban involvement.

Concept of Operations

The current concept of operations deploys single ship barrier zones within a choke point to detect, interdict, and to escort seized trafficking vessels to an impoundment area. The weakness of this concept lies in:

- o The inadequate number of resources deployed within each barrier zone to detect transiting smugglers. Surveillance equipment on board barrier vessels is limited to surface search radar and other sensors limited to the electronic "height of eye" of the vessel which, in turn, limits range of detection and requires several barrier vessels in each zone. Should and intercept and boarding be made, the barrier vessel is drawn off station, each such occurrence providing opportunity for other smuggling vessels to pass the barrier undetected.

- o Choke-point strategy in the place of an interdiction barrier within the territorial sea of source countries.

- o The lack of source country operational unit participation.

All barrier patrols can be described analytically in order to do some comparison shopping. The two patrols most often described are the linear barrier patrol and the "bow-tie" barrier patrol. Regardless of the type of barrier, the problem can be simply stated: the trafficker will create an expanding area that must be searched to detect the smuggling vessel. For example, if a trafficker sets to sea at thirteen knots somewhere from Colombia's 936 mile coastline, one hour later the trafficker will have created a theoretical 11,700 square mile-search area (13 knots X 900 miles X 1 hour). The task is to search this area in the most effective manner that resources will allow.

The description of a barrier patrol can be divided into several phases. The Coast Guard Headquarters' Office of Research and Development has a computer-supported analytic model that exercises alternatives of barrier phases:

- o transit
- o detection
- o intercept
- o board
- o escort


There is a time interval to be considered for each of these phases, the driver of which is "time to detection" followed by "time to interdict." The most efficient method of reducing these times is to increase sweep width through advanced surveillance methods and reduce the patrolling vessel's role of intercept and board. The mathematics simply do not support an argument for one platform's performing all phases of this mission.

Any coastal barrier patrol will be faced with the problem of the time it takes to achieve the maximum Coverage Factor (CF) for a maximum Probability of Detection (POD) with the resources available followed by the time it takes to intercept the detected vessel. Analytically, the problem can be viewed as a routine search, but with a moving datum. The currently used choke-point strategy is best illustrated by describing the Yucatan Passage barrier patrol. This passage is approximately 150 miles wide. Based on EPIC data, the average smuggler speed is thirteen knots. As a trafficker transits the passage at a speed of thirteen knots, the

smuggling vessel will have created a search area of (13k X 156m) 2,028 square miles in one hour. The assigned WHEC or WMEC Coast Guard cutter patrols the passage at a speed of fourteen knots. Using the ship's surface radar, a twelve-mile sweep width limits the patrol vessel to a maximum 168 square mile (14k X 12m) search area. The maximum Coverage Factor obtainable in this scenario is 8.3 percent (16/2,028). Obviously, any diversion to intercept or board detected vessels greatly reduces the Coverage Factor and opportunity to detect a smuggler. It is easy to understand why the nation is, at best, interdicting only ten percent of the marijuana and sixteen percent of other narcotics smuggled to the US.

The recommended new concept of operations establishes an interdiction barrier within the territorial sea of Colombia, using Colombian and US Coast Guard resources. The 936-mile-long Colombian coast is divided into six 156-mile barrier zones with Colombian frigates/destroyers, and WHEC/WMEC US Coast Guard cutters assigned to each zone as the On Scene Commander (OSC) (four in the Caribbean Basin and two on the Pacific coast). Towed radar platform Aerostats are tethered to each of the six OSC barrier patrol vessels. The zone OSC vessels are positioned thirty miles offshore running a ten-knot, speed-of-advance line parallel to the shoreline back and forth from each side of the assigned zone using either the linear or the "bow-tie" pattern. Six Colombian high-speed fifty-foot to ninety-foot offshore patrol boats are assigned to each zone OSC and assigned to search twenty-five-mile-wide barrier sub-zones twelve miles from the shoreline. Figure 22 graphically plots the recommended barrier zone concept. Where US Coast Guard vessels are the OSC, Colombian naval

COLOMBIAN NARCOTICS BARRIER



KEY TO BARRIER ZONES




Figure 8. Recommended Barrier Zone for Colombian International Narcotics Trafficker Interdiction


officers are assigned on board during joint operations to exercise authority over the high-speed offshore patrol boats and to enforce Colombian law.

Assuming that a trafficker transits the zone at a speed of thirteen knots, using current methods without an aerostat, the six vessels would achieve a coverage factor of only eight percent. This would mean that the vessel would have to search for two days and fifteen hours before experiencing a single detection. The recommended concept of operations achieves a detection within ten hours and twenty minutes. The barrier zone OSC would vector high-speed offshore patrol craft to make the actual intercept, classification, and boarding. As high-speed offshore vessels are ordered off a search pattern to intercept, classify, and board, the remaining boats would readjust themselves to search equal larger sub-zones. Figure 9 illustrates six states of operations representing a pure search state of the OSC aerostat and six high-speed offshore patrol boats (designated WPB) all searching, down to a degraded state of just the OSC aerostat searching and all high-speed offshore patrol boats intercepting, classifying, and boarding. The bottom line is that the maximum CF is ninety-nine percent and the minimum is seventy-nine percent. The current concept of operations in the choke points achieves only a CF of eight. In other words, the chance of detecting a smuggling vessel or aircraft offshore the old way is eight out of one hundred--the new way is ninety-nine out of one hundred at best to seventy-nine percent at worst. The argument to depart from a single unit operation to a



STATE 1

CF = .999



STATE 2

CF = .999



STATE 3

CF = .999



STATE 4

CF = .998



STATE 5

CF = .924



STATE 6

CF = .791

Figure 9. Interdiction Concept (One OSC vessel with tethered aerostat and six high-speed offshore patrol boats sharing the same 150 mile long barrier).

division of mission responsibilities among a coordinated fleet of various capabilities is compelling.

The choice between the linear or the "bow-tie" pattern is a matter of which offers the best coverage factor and probability of detection according to the parameters of the operation. The parameters that affect coverage are length of barrier (d-s), cutter speed (v), smuggler speed (u), and sweep width (S). The choice of which pattern to use is therefore determined by the barrier patrol vessel's speed and sweep width, the smuggling vessel's speed, and the length of the barrier. Generally, the linear patrol is the patrol of choice when patrol speed and the smuggler's speed are in a ratio of under 2, and the barrier length and sweep width are in a ration of 7 or more. This is the normal US Coast Guard operating procedure. The equation which yields the coverage factor for a linear patrol is:

$$CF_1 = 1 - \left(\frac{\left(\lambda - \frac{\sqrt{\lambda^2 + 1} - 1}{2} \right)}{\lambda(\lambda + 1)} \right) \quad \begin{array}{l} \lambda = (D-S)/S \\ r = \frac{v}{u} \end{array}$$

Even though the Coast Guard seldom operates with enough of an advantage over its quarry to dictate the use of a "bow-tie" pattern, the equation which yields the coverage factor is:

$$CF_{bt} = \left(1 + \frac{r\sqrt{r^2 - 1}}{r + 1} \right) \frac{1}{\lambda + 1}$$

The higher value for CF resulting from these two equations will dictate which pattern to use and will always yield a coverage factor that is within 8 percent of the absolute maximum achievable.

Besides interdicting narcotics trafficking from Colombia to the US, a goal is to have the Colombian Navy stand on its own feet as much as possible and to have only one zone OSC assigned to a US Coast Guard cutter to monitor US interests. The Coast Guard will probably be needed closer to the Atlantic side of Cuba and the Gulf of Mexico since Cuba has started coca cultivation, since Belize and Jamician narcotics crops are in a growth stage, and since Colombia trafficking patterns might squirt out to Venezuela, Brazil, or another country. The aerostats would be on loan to the Colombian Navy for as long as reasonable interdiction continued. A secondary benefit to the US would be realized from this approach because the Colombian Navy would have an experienced capability to sweep the approaches to the Panama Canal clear of hostile surface craft and to provide air warning to Canal air defenses should mobilization occur.

There is a cost for the new recommended concept of operations; however, the cost should be paid for by the Security Assistance Program. Eventually, the reduced insurgency will require less conventional military assistance expenditures. The aerostats and fuel costs to gain Colombian Navy cooperation will not be as high as the cost of a military solution in countries like El Salvador. Moreover, the US public is likely respond to a barrier off the coast of source countries in a

positive supportive way, whereas the public has proven to be divided in its support for increased US military build-up in Central America and the remainder of Latin America.

The Bottom Line

The term "threat to national security" is a legal and policy term which implies a threat exists to the national capability to conduct foreign relations protecting vital interests of the US, and/or a threat exists to the national defense of the country.

The 1983-84 Lebanon crisis is an example of a fulfilled threat to US national security partially funded by narcotics trafficking profits. The violent activities of heavily armed and trained militias in Lebanon undermined US Middle East foreign policy protecting a security agreement with Israel and an interest in the security of its European NATO partners' oil supply. International heroin trafficking profits through Bulgaria provided a large percentage of financing for training and arming of those militias.

Profits from international drug trafficking are now financing training and arming of Marxist terrorist groups and guerrillas in Latin America. Capabilities of the trafficking network itself are used by Cuba and Marxist terrorists and guerrillas for other logistics support requirements such as smuggling guns and transporting personnel to and from Cuban and Nicaraguan training camps for insurrection. Armed Marxist

guerrillas sabotage Latin American elections and are undermining other US foreign policy initiatives. Drug financed terrorists and guerrillas state that they will create and harness a violent revolution throughout Latin America. The results of a Marxist regional revolution would cripple the US economy and require increased military resources to defend US southern borders and maintain open SLOCs while maintaining NATO and other treaty obligations. Except for Canada, the US would be isolated in the hemisphere. The Soviet Union is using financial self-supporting international terrorism and guerrilla warfare in the US backyard to threaten US national security from an arms-length distance using surrogates.

International narcotics trafficking is a serious threat to national security now. The US does not have the option of waiting fifteen to twenty years before denying narcodollars from insurgents in the Caribbean Basin. The Western world could learn a lesson from the 1983-1984 Lebanon crisis. Western intelligence sources place the serious start of using Bekaa Valley heroin profits to arm Palestinian militias around 1971 to 1973. It took ten to twelve years from the start of narcodollar militia financing to the violent 1983-1984 firestorm in Lebanon and a failed US policy. What if the time-line were the same for Latin America? If we use the 1977 date the FARC and M-19 started large-scale involvement in the drugs-for-arms-and-hard-cash trade, the potential for a violent firestorm in the Caribbean Basin will have been funded by the turn of the decade, 1990. What would be the impact on US foreign policy? What would be the impact on US and neighbor nation's ability to defend themselves?

Some argue that if narcodollars are eliminated, the Soviets will find another way to fund insurgency. This may be so, but the Soviets would have to increase visible financial support and the Soviet economy would be more stressed as more of the insurrection financing came from the Soviet treasury. The more probable scenario is that the level of insurgency could decrease as financing decreases. Bank robberies and kidnappings alone would not provide adequate funds.

2.2 Civil Law Enforcement.....	(7)
2.3 Military Tasking.....	(7)
2.4 State Department Tasking.....	(9)

Part 3. General Provisions

3.1 Implementation.....	(9)
3.2 Purpose and Effect.....	(9)

There is a clear connection between profits from international narcotics trafficking and insurgent terrorist groups and guerrillas threatening the vital interests of the United States. The national defense and the ability to conduct effective foreign relations are threatened. The threat provides increased opportunity for the Soviet Union to exploit important strategic areas of the world such as Middle Eastern and Latin American oil fields, Europe, areas of world-class reserves for scarce raw materials, and sealines-of-communication.

NOW, by the authority vested in me as President by the Constitution and laws of the United States of America, it is hereby ordered as follows:

Part 1.

International Narcotics Trafficking's Threat to National Security

Section 1.1 Relationship with International Terrorism and Insurgent Guerrilla Groups.

(a) International narcotics trafficking is a threat to national security. Marxist-insurgent group profits from international narcotics trafficking are funding guerrilla insurgency in the Caribbean basin. Further, purchase of illicit narcotics by US citizens supports our own adversary with the US economy. Soviet Union strategy in the Caribbean Basin exploits terrorist/querrilla activity to gain Cuban-like client states using two principal methods:

- o Arms-length distancing from Soviet visibility by use of surrogates.
- o Financially self-supporting revolutionary activity. Of the three primary self-supporting methods used to raise hard cash, (narcotics trade, kidnapping, and bank robbery), narcotics trafficking provides the highest cash value.

Stopping Marxist terrorist and guerrilla profits from international drug trafficking can significantly slow Marxist insurgency in Latin America, thereby permitting a more peaceful environment for reform and development to take place. The Soviet alternative to loss of insurgent, self-supporting financing is to fund it from the Soviet Block economy. Such an action would not only remove a burden from the US economy, but would also add to Soviet financial commitments, thereby placing a strain on a stressed economy.

Section 1.2 Deterrent Factor for US Foreign Policy Implementation

Marxist exploitation of revolutionary conditions in foreign countries places extreme risk to implementation of US foreign policy. Marxist terrorist and guerrilla participation in international narcotics trafficking to finance arms procurements, training, and insurrection has created a threat to US capability to implement foreign policy. Change of Latin America to a hostile neighbor status would also:

- o Place at risk the oil the US receives from Latin America—thirty-four percent of US imports

- o Place at risk one third of the US export market.

Section 1.3 The Threat to National Defense

Change of Latin America to a hostile neighbor status would:

- o Place at risk most of the US sealines of communication.
Except for a few great circle routes between the US east coast and Europe and the US west coast and Asia, virtually all merchantile and defense sealines of communications and commerce between the US and the world have choke points in Latin America, especially in the Panama Canal and in the Caribbean Basin. The question is not whether hostile nations would allow commerce to pass through choke points; rather, the question is whether the US could afford the increased military and naval forces necessary to assure the uninterrupted flow of commerce and the sealift necessary to support US forward-deployed forces. Sixty-six percent of all imported oil is within MIG fighter aircraft range from Cuba now.
- o Require a Defense Department review of resources needed to provide security from hostile southern neighbors.
- o Place at risk US sources for raw resources critical to the US economy and national defense.

Part 2.

Direction, Duties, and Responsibilities

Section 2.1 The National Security Council

(a) Oversight. The National Security Council (NSC) was established by the National Security Act of 1947 to advise the President and to coordinate matters of integrating domestic, foreign, and military policies relating to national security. The National Security Act of 1947 also provides strategic direction for the armed forces and their operation under unified control. The NSC shall act as the highest Executive Branch entity for review, guidance, and direction of military tasking under section 2.3 of this Order.

The National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS) was established to enhance coordination between federal agencies chartered with interdicting narcotics on the high seas, along US borders, and at ports of entry. The Office of the Vice President is responsible for NNBIS leadership.

Coordination is required between military and NNBIS operations and civil law enforcement to assure harmony and integration in the national effort to attack international narcotics trafficking. NNBIS is assigned the lead role for coordination.

(b) Committees. The NSC shall establish such committees as may be necessary to carry out its functions and responsibilities under this Order. The NSC, or a committee established by it, shall consider and submit to the President information on special activities or operations, on policy review, including all dissents, and on a continuing review of the threat to national security posed by international narcotics trafficking.

Section 2.2 Civil Law Enforcement

International Narcotics Trafficking's deleterious impact upon the nation has surpassed the internal, social-and-civil, law-enforcement problem. The national requirements for social-and-civil, law-enforcement efforts are not diminished or changed; however, additional policy direction and military tasking are required to meet an external threat to national security imposed by the financing of Marxist insurgency from international narcotics trafficking profits.

Section 2.3 Military Tasking

Military tasking is assigned in three areas: Security Assistance Program, intelligence gathering, and surveillance and detection:

(a) Security Assistance Program — Tasking in this area involves equipment acquisition, logistics support, and training to operate a barrier to narcotics trafficking twelve miles off narcotics source

country's coast. Tasking also includes military training for source country military and police forces that must air- or sea-lift into remote areas and secure territory before enforcement action can be exercised.

(b) The initial barrier shall be a joint operation to interdict narcotics traffickers within twelve miles of Colombia's coast, using Colombian Navy vessels and US Coast Guard Cutters, enforcing Colombian law. Equipment will include, but will not be limited to, six aerostat radar platforms and fuel for the Colombian Navy barrier operation. Once the Colombian Navy is trained, the primary barrier operations will be Colombian. Monitoring of barrier effectiveness will be maintained by CINC US Southern Command and by occasional joint operations with US Coast Guard cutter participation.

(c) Intelligence Gathering — In addition to parent organization procedures, guidance will be provided by the National Narcotics Border Interdiction System (NNBIS). Emphasis on intelligence gathering is to detect narcotics trafficking for subsequent interdiction, especially trafficking intended to finance Marxist insurgency.

(d) Surveillance and Detection — Emphasis on surveillance and detection is to provide for interdiction, especially of trafficking intended to provide financing for Marxist insurgency. Focus will be on narcotics trafficking departing source countries and on trafficking approaching the US border.

Section 2.4 State Department tasking

State Department negotiation with source countries will be necessary to obtain a request, or permission, to conduct barrier operations described in section 2.3 above.

Part 3.


General Provisions

Section 3.1 Implementation

The NSC, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the Secretary of Transportation, the Attorney General, and the Director of Central Intelligence shall issue such appropriate directives and procedures as are necessary to implement this Order. Heads of Civil Law Enforcement Agencies shall issue appropriate supplementary directives and procedures consistent with this Order. The NSC may establish procedures in instances where the military or civil agency head and the Attorney General are unable to reach agreement on other than constitutional or other legal grounds.

Section 3.2 Purpose and Effect

Nothing contained herein or in any procedures promulgated hereunder is intended to confer a substantive or procedural right or privilege on any person or organization.



APPENDIX B

US STRATEGIC DEPENDENCIES ON LATIN AMERICA

In broad terms, a nation's "vital interests" usually denote what a nation will wage war to protect. This is not to say that the United States will go to war over individual mineral deposits; however, the aggregate of mineral deposits becomes "vital."

Some of the more vital US interests in Latin America are protecting strategic resources necessary to project military power or to defend the nation, to maintain open sealines-of-communications (SLOC's) for both mercantile and military supply vessels in times of crisis, to maintain a healthy economy during a national crisis, and to preserve friendly governments on our borders. It is also in the US interest to prevent large scale diversions of military resources from other intended areas of response such as NATO.

MINERAL DEPENDENCIES

The Strategic And Critical Materials Stock Piling Act, 50 USC 98 et. seq. requires a list of those strategic and critical materials that the US is deficient in and needs to provide for the supply of essential military and civilian needs for national defense. ¹ This appendix contains a 1983 summary view of US import dependency on Latin American

minerals, defined in percent of product imported and restricted to a strategic materials list critical for national defense:²

STRONTIUM	99%	MOLYBDENUM	40%
INDUSTRIAL QUARTZ	90%	ZINC	46%
BAUXITE	88%	SILVER	46%
COLUMBIUM	75%	COPPER	44%
LEAD	73%	BERILLIUM	38%
GRAPHITE	70%	SILICON	30%
BISMUTH	67%	TIN	16%
ANTIMONY	60%	MANGANESE	12%
FLOURSPAR	58%	CADMIUM	9%
ANTIMONY METAL	54%	ALUMINUM METAL	6%

The potential world reserves for strategic resources in the region is shown in Figure 16.

— Jamaica provides 39 percent of US bauxite requirements and has 9 percent of the total bauxite world reserves. Bauxite is needed for production of aluminum, industrial abrasives, and filters for petroleum production. One of the nine US alumina plants is in St. Croix, US Virgin Islands, and seven others are located on the US Gulf coast and in the Caribbean.

— Mexico provides 6 percent of US antimony metal, 20 percent of antimony ore, 33 percent of bismuth, 9 percent of cadmium, 58 percent of fluorspar, 63 percent of graphite, 23 percent of silver, 99 percent of strontium, 10 percent of zinc, and 22 percent of molybdenum. Mexico has 30 percent of the cadmium and measurable portions of the total world reserves of antimony, bismuth, copper, fluorspar, graphite, lead, mercury, and silver. Antimony is used in the production of electrical batteries, chemical pumps, pipes and tank linings, and cable sheaths. In metal alloys, antimony inhibits chemical corrosion. Nonmetallic antimony is used in plastics as a stabilizer and as a flame retardant. Antimony is also used in refining special glass such as optical glass. Bismuth is used in metallurgical additives where malleable iron castings are produced. Cadmium is used for coating and plating, batteries, pigments, plastics, and synthetic products and alloys. Fluorspar is used in the production of hydrofluoric acid, a key ingredient in aluminum, fluorochemical, and uranium industries. Fluorspar is also used to produce glass and enamel and is used in the steel industry as a flux. Graphite is primarily used in refractories, foundries, and steelmaking; however, it is replacing asbestos in producing packing and gaskets. Graphite fiber composites are increasingly becoming important for high-strength, low-weight, radar-masking aerospace stealth technology. Graphite fibers absorb rather than reflect radar waves. Silver is used in electrical contacts and conductors.

- Strontium is used as a radiological material, and chemical derivatives are used as pigments. Zinc is primarily used as a galvanizing material and corrosion-control material and as an element to produce zinc alloys, brass, and bronze metals. Molybdenum is used in steel and superalloy production; it is also used as a refractory metal, catalyst, lubricant, and pigment.

- Honduras provides 33 percent of US lead. Lead is used in the production of batteries, pigments, gasoline additives, glass, and plastics. Lead is also important to the munitions industry.

- Venezuela provides 6 percent of US aluminum, 13 percent of alumina, 39 percent of bauxite, 15 percent of iron ore, and 10 percent of silicon. Silicon is used in the production of steel and aluminum, silicones, silanes, and nonferrous alloys.

- Brazil provides 38 percent of US berillium, 75 percent of columbium, 7 percent of graphite, 12 percent of manganese, 90 percent of industrial quartz crystal, 20 percent of silicon, and 8 percent of strontium. Brazil has 11 percent of the bauxite, 80 percent of the columbium, 13 percent of the iron ore, and measurable portions of the total world reserves of gold, manganese ore, and nickel. Columbium is an essential requirement for steel production where heat expansion must be controlled such as in jet engines and lasers. Copper-based berillium alloys provide a physical property that allows use in

- a wide range of applications in cast and wrought forms such as connectors, springs, sockets, switches, bushings, bearings, noncorrosive and nonmagnetic housings, and temperature and pressure-sensing devices for aircraft and vehicles and for electronic and well-drilling industries. Manganese is used in the production of manganese-aluminum additives for steel and superalloy production and in production of dry-cell batteries. Industrial quartz crystal is used for industrial abrasives and glass making.

- Surinam provides 10 percent of US bauxite and has a measurable portion of the bauxite total world reserves.

- Peru provides 34 percent of US bismuth, 10 percent of copper, 40 percent of lead, 21 percent of silver, and 18 percent of zinc. Peru has 10 percent of the silver and measurable portions of the total world reserves of bismuth, copper, iron ore, lead, molybdenum, tungsten, and zinc. Copper is used for production of wire rod and of other electrical materials. Copper alloys such as brass and bronze are used in electrical components, building construction, industrial machinery and equipment, and transportation products. The main use for tungsten is production of cutting and wear-resistant materials such as tungsten carbide. Other uses include mill products, specialty steels, chemicals, superalloys, and hard-facing rods and materials.