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**REPORT OF THE
INTERDICTION TASK FORCE
TO THE
DRUG SUPPLY REDUCTION WORKING GROUP**

September 21, 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

<u>SECTIONS</u>	<u>PAGES</u>
I. Introduction	1 - 2
II. Assessing Federal Drug Enforcement	3 - 5
III. Issues, Actions, And Tasks	
A. Posse Comitatus	6 - 8
B. Border/Port of Entry Interdiction	9 - 13
C. Technological Support	14 - 20
D. Maritime Interdiction	21 - 24
E. Air Interdiction	25 - 26
IV. Multiagency Task Forces.....	27 - 30
V. Task Force Members	31

I. INTRODUCTION

I. INTRODUCTION:

The Interdiction Task Force of the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction was formed to deal with those aspects of the 1982 Federal Strategy for Presentation of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking addressing drug law enforcement, especially the interdiction of narcotics contraband across the Nation's air, land and sea borders. With the goal of increasing the effectiveness of interdiction operations, the Task Force considered a broad range of issues and potential actions which could be initiated.

Using issues originally identified by both the authors of the Federal Strategy and the Attorney General, the Task Force refined its areas of deliberation to include five core issues:

1. Posse Comitatus: Increased military assistance in drug enforcement.
2. Border/Port-of-Entry Interdiction: Increased interdiction effectiveness at these locations.
3. Technological Support: Increased drug enforcement use of existing state-of-the-art technologies.
4. Maritime Interdiction: Increased interdiction effectiveness in this high-cost arena.
5. Air Interdiction: Increased interdiction effectiveness in this high-cost arena.

The actions recommended to address these five core issues, as well as the tasks identified to implement those actions, place substantial emphasis on increased coordination of Federal drug interdiction efforts, with several multi-agency coordinating bodies proposed according to needs identified by the Task Force. Underlying these recommendations, is a consensus of the Task Force that drug interdiction improvements without the benefit of an enhanced multi-agency drug investigation effort are only short-lived. The current effort in south Florida provides an example where integrated investigative/interdiction multi-agency drug enforcement operations can significantly inhibit, disrupt, and in many cases, destroy the drug smuggling operations across the Nation's borders.

In addition to the five core issues addressed by the Task Force, it was agreed that attention should be drawn to the continuing need at the national level to assess, evaluate, and plan Federal drug enforcement in a comprehensive manner. Despite the fact that this issue of comprehensively assessing Federal drug enforcement extended beyond the purview of the Interdiction Task Force, members agreed to apply the same rigorous review to this issue as the five core issues. Therefore, it is included as a proposed issue in the initial section of the report.

The Task Force recommendations include both ongoing and proposed actions. As much as possible, actions will be implemented from current resources; however, additional resources may be requested. The Task Force did not explicitly take budget constraints into account in developing the report. Nor did the Task Force prioritize or rank individual actions in terms of cost-effectiveness. Such concerns are more properly addressed within the context of the overall Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction.

A final separate section has been added where Task Force member agencies participating in the South Florida Joint Task Force assess the impact of that participation on their ongoing operations, and provide their views on the possible initiation of similar multi-agency operations.

While many areas of a sensitive nature were reviewed by the Task Forces, this report was prepared in such a manner that the inclusion of these sensitive subjects in the text was not necessary. However, more detailed supplementary reports can be provided on these areas as the Working Group requires.

II. ASSESSING FEDERAL DRUG ENFORCEMENT

PROPOSED
ISSUE

ASSESS CONTRIBUTIONS OF FEDERAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES IN THE DRUG INTERDICTION EFFORT IN ORDER TO ESTABLISH OVERALL INTERDICTION PRIORITIES AND AGENCIES' GOALS.

ACTION 1: Identify relationships among interdiction tactics, i.e., the sensitivities to transportation mode, to alternative supply sources, to interdiction, to replacement drugs, etc.

Interdiction can be compared to dealing with a fluid; if you put pressure in one area the flow will react to find the path of least resistance. The reason to determine the relationships or tradeoffs among the modes of transportation (land, sea and air) among the efforts to reduce supply (crop control, crop eradication, interdiction while in transit and enforcement assistance) and among the drugs themselves is to predict how the smugglers will react to law enforcement pressure. This logical approach could greatly assist in conduct of specialized operations as well as planning a long-term assault on the drug problem.

TASKS:

- a. Identify relevant factors which concern interdiction strategies as related to different drugs and operational nature of Federal agencies involved.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice

- b. Establish a drug enforcement study group to evaluate these various relationships. The finished product should be a strategy/counter-strategy paper which would identify an effective long-term enforcement attack on the drug problem.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice

ACTION 2: Inventory law enforcement efforts and interdiction results by type and quantity of illegal drugs, location of seizure, price/value, overall supply, etc.

There is a need to identify where the Federal effort is now targeted, both nationally and by agency. To accomplish this each agency must carefully collect and analyze interdiction data so that input-output or cost-payoff ratios can be generated. This means that all law enforcement efforts must be accounted for, even those that may have been less than successful, because that information can be very useful in planning future operations.

*Let more
could
be
done*

*This should
be done
over night*

TASKS:

a. Each agency should record not only how much effort was spent, but in what geographic region it was expended. For seizures and arrests they should also record transportation mode used and the track followed if possible. The output or results of this effort can be measured in a variety of ways; including but certainly not limited to:

Need uniformity however.

- weight of contraband (amount)
- number of arrests
- number of convictions resulting from arrests
- prison sentence length on conviction
- monetary penalty on conviction
- violator category
- location of arrest

The impact of these efforts and possible trends can be viewed by the study group in relation to the overall problem.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice

b. Upon review of such inventory data, the study group should suggest seizure and interdiction baseline date that would identify the information elements required/desired by the various law enforcement agencies. All agencies would then be striving to obtain these common data elements during any involvement in a seizure/arrest case. EPIC's data base may only require minimal modification/expansion to meet these clearly defined needs.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice

ACTION 3: Identify Federal interdiction priorities in terms of both short- and long-term strategies.

in interdiction priorities

Levels of performance tied to avoid measures of effectiveness need to be developed for the various programs within the five major issues of the Federal Drug Strategy. These measures coupled with other factors should be used to set priorities among the various programs and to establish goals. Once measures of effectiveness are selected and priorities have been established in accordance with the overall strategy, revised levels of performance can be set.

*Delaying
action
Circular*

TASKS:

- a. The Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction should review the Federal Drug Strategy and identify interdiction goals, priority of interdiction efforts and initiatives.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice

- b. Develop appropriate measures of effectiveness for the various programs within the five major issue areas and develop a methodology to set goals for the various programs in light of the overall strategy.

LEAD AGENCY: Drug Enforcement Study Group

- c. The strategy/counter-strategy analysis as well as review of effectiveness measures should be revalidated annually.

LEAD AGENCY: Drug Enforcement Study Group

*form
of circular
which
defies
logic
how resolved*

ACTION 4: Coordination of law enforcement operations.



There needs to be a single point of authority for making interagency decisions concerning law enforcement operations. A central control for interagency law enforcement operations does not exist. Until now broad policy issues have been the primary Federal focus. Each Federal agency is concerned primarily with its own mandates. A central coordinating authority is needed to focus the various agencies to accomplish specific tasks during a limited period of time. This type of control would help to eliminate unnecessary duplication of effort and allow a ~~flexible and coordinated response~~ to shifts in smuggling activity.

TASK:

- a. Establish a position with authority to direct and coordinate interagency operations to ensure the goals of the Federal Strategy are met. The Associate Attorney General acting under 21 USC 873 is appropriate.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice

III. ISSUES, ACTIONS AND TASKS

INTERDICTION TASK FORCE
OF THE
WORKING GROUP ON DRUG SUPPLY REDUCTION

ISSUES, ACTIONS AND TASKS

ISSUE A: DEVELOPMENT OF STRATEGIES AND PLANS FOR IMPEMENTING INCREASED MILITARY ASSISTANCE NOW POSSIBLE UNDER POSSE COMITATUS LEGISLATION.

ACTION 1: Review for clarity and discuss the effectiveness of Department of Defense (DoD) policy on providing military assistance to the drug control effort, including air and sea patrol reports by military forces to Federal law enforcement authorities.
A-12

TASKS:

- a. Using DoD Directive 5525.5, "DoD support to Civilian Law Enforcement Officials," as a starting point, monitor its implementation in the following areas:
- Impact on existing, long-term cooperative relationships;
 - Consistency of the military Departments' implementing documents and the follow-up DoD guidance with the overall policy direction of 5525.5; and,
 - Need for a regular review of the experience gained operating under the terms of 5525.5 to suggest legal and/or policy changes that might be required.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Defense

ACTION 2: Formalize under the Attorney General's office procedures and a control mechanism within the Federal law enforcement community to coordinate requests for military assistance as well as develop strategies and plans for the provision of training, equipment and technical and communications support to Federal law enforcement agencies.
part.

TASKS:

- a. While no agreement was reached on the most suitable mechanism for effecting the coordination required, there was a clear consensus of the need for such strong, central coordination at the National level. This strong central coordination is essential to minimize duplication and overlap of requests from civilian agencies and thereby make maximum use of available DoD assets. The Administration's south Florida experience suggests the type of gains possible under more closely coordinated efforts. It would appear as though the Department of Justice--perhaps under the auspices of the office of the Attorney General--would be the most likely vehicle for this coordination.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Justice and Defense

- ✓ ACTION 3: Educate DoD personnel with regards to: a) the current legal and policy authority available to DoD for providing assistance; and b) the needs of civilian law enforcement agencies.

TASKS:

- a. Due to the history of restrictions associated with the posse comitatus legislation, DoD personnel must be reoriented towards an acceptance of the significant contribution that can be made by military assets to the drug enforcement mission now possible under DoD Directive 5525.5. Concurrent with this, DoD personnel must be acquainted with the needs of civilian law enforcement. The value of information already available, for instance, is not always apparent to military members. DoD must take steps to see to it that subordinate commands are aware of the extent to which they can lend assistance. The military departments' implementing documents required by 5525.5 will be a starting point in this effort but more will be required. DoD is planning a major educational initiative in this regard, involving both the existing, traditional service training systems and a series of special conferences on the topic.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Defense

- b. Civilian agencies must devise methods of advising DoD of their needs in a coordinated manner at various command as well as at local and regional levels. The Coast Guard vessel sighting program and its associated audio/visual support is a good illustration of the type of information DoD elements will require to be of maximum assistance.

LEAD AGENCY: Civilian Federal Enforcement Agencies

ACTION 4: Maximize the DoD contribution to the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).

TASKS:

- a. It is clear that the amount of information available to DoD in the course of normal military operations can be of significant value to civilian law enforcement agencies. EPIC, as the civilian narcotics intelligence coordinating mechanism, is the logical repository for this DoD information. DoD must take steps to improve its information flow to EPIC. As a starting point in this regard, DoD officials have visited EPIC for the purpose of learning more about its capabilities and its operating procedures.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Defense and Justice (DEA)

ACTION 5: Further clarification on the reimbursement requirements for DoD support to civilian law enforcement agencies must be provided to enable the civilian agencies to effectively plan for the utilization of DoD resources.

TASK:

- a. Public Law 97-86 (Posse Comitatus) does not waive the Economy Act requirement for reimbursement to DoD for the costs of support provided. It does, however, direct DoD to take into consideration the budgetary restrictions of civilian law enforcement agencies in formulating reimbursement policy. DoD must promulgate further guidance on the reimbursement issue to facilitate the planning and utilization of defense assets.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Defense

ISSUE B: INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS IN BORDER/PORT OF ENTRY INTERDICTION.

ACTION 1: Airport Initiatives

TASKS:

- a. Establish at selected locations special Customs enforcement Teams "striking" at cargo, baggage, or passengers to examine selected shipments, flights, or passengers. This is a multi-discipline approach, including Customs personnel, canine enforcement teams, and, where possible, DEA agents. Targets for these teams could be identified through prior information or intelligence, random sampling, or observed behavior.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- b. Install new walk-through vapor detector devices at selected sites which can react to the odor of narcotics on arriving passengers based on the test planned at the Houston Airport. Further installation of such equipment could mean costs above current resources.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- c. Add data on lost or stolen passports to Treasury Enforcement Communications System (TECS) since many persons engaged in illegal activity attempt to mask their true identity through the use of lost or stolen passports. This application for TECS is currently in the development stages.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of State and Treasury (Customs)

- d. Install devices to "read" the newly formatted passports to speed query time and improve the accuracy of passenger name queries. Multiple databases or records containing information from other Federal agencies can be accessed through the same time-saving query technique, and inspection personnel can concentrate more on the person being inspected.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of State and Treasury (Customs)

- e. Develop special courses for airport inspection personnel to analyze the behavioral symptoms of persons who may be attempting to avoid detection. These courses will aid both the inspectors on the line and those on special teams or acting as rovers to identify passengers for more rigorous inspection.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- f. Develop and test new civilian and military technology which can aid in the detection of narcotics or assist in subsequent investigations. These technologies could be used to identify narcotics secreted in baggage or cargo or carried on or by passengers.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- g. Establish trade pattern profiles on narcotics source or transit countries to detect and identify cargo shipments or routings which deviate from normal or usual patterns to aid personnel in identifying shipments or particular cargo which should be subjected to a more detailed inspection.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs) and Justice (DEA)

- h. Develop additional tactical intelligence to assist inspectional personnel in identifying suspect passengers, cargo, or baggage. This intelligence can come from multiple sources throughout the Federal Government as well as through DEA and Customs personnel stationed overseas and will be specifically tailored to the needs of airport enforcement personnel.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and Justice (DEA)

- i. Establish teams of "roving" inspectors in arrival and baggage areas who are specially trained in the detection of suspicious or aberrant behavior to identify passengers for more rigorous inspection. These teams would move freely throughout the processing area, mingling with arriving passengers.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- j. Establish a program in which Customs and DEA cooperate more closely at airports through cross-training of personnel in investigation techniques, evidence-handling, document review, and de-briefing of suspects for interdiction intelligence. Such a program would focus on internal smuggling conspiracies involving aircraft crew members and ground support personnel.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Justice (DEA) and
Treasury (Customs)

ACTION 2: Land Initiatives.

TASKS:

- a. Develop automatic license plate scanners for TECS query purposes which will improve the speed and accuracy of queries, and allow inspectors to concentrate on the vehicle and occupants. These devices will alert inspectors to vehicles which may contain suspected persons or which may be the subject of other agency information indicating that a more detailed search may be required. This program would require funding, but actual dollar estimates are not now available.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- b. Analyze truck traffic data from specific land border stations to aid in identifying movement or traffic which may indicate an attempt to conceal illicit cargo.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs) and
Interstate Commerce Commission

- c. Establish teams of "roving" inspectors in pedestrian arrival or processing areas who are specially trained in the detection of suspicious or aberrant behavior to identify persons who may warrant additional inspection.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- d. Develop courses for land border personnel to analyze the behavioral symptoms of persons who may be attempting to avoid detection.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and
Justice (INS)

- e. Develop special programs for detecting smuggling activity using containers on trucks. This is especially important as increasing amounts of international cargo moves in containers which are taken directly from ships to trucks for inland transport. Containerization has significantly increased the difficulties of inspecting arriving cargo.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

ACTION 3: Seaport Initiatives.

TASKS:

- a. Improve profiles on cargo shipments through the use of automation, document analysis, special reciprocal international agreements, and historical trade data to aid enforcement personnel in the identification of ships, shipments, or specific cargo which should be subjected to additional inspection.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and Commerce

- b. Develop source country trade profiles as an aid to personnel in identifying shipments or cargo which deviate from either standard practice or commodity being imported and which may require further inspection.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- c. Expand the use of special vessel search teams trained in the discovery of contraband concealed in vessels. The search teams could utilize various Customs personnel and DEA agents where feasible.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and Justice (DEA)

- d. Implement a special program to concentrate on internal smuggling conspiracies involving vessel crew members and support personnel.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

ACTION 4: General Initiatives

TASKS:

- a. Expanding the collection and use of tactical intelligence to support enforcement personnel in all areas to raise awareness of methods which can be used to enter or conceal contraband, past trafficking methods or indications of variance from norms which may indicate that further inspection is required.

LEAD AGENCY: All Federal Enforcement Agencies

- b. Developing country profiles through the use of multi-disciplined teams to identify source or transit countries; study normal trade and shipment practices and patterns; and identify social, economic, political or cultural factors which may contribute to the likelihood of illicit activity. This information would then be disseminated as a means of detecting patterns, shipments, cargo or passengers which may vary from normal practice. These teams would use all information sources available and would actually work in specially selected countries to gather data.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and Justice (DEA)

- c. Development of a program in conjunction with the military to intensively examine naval vessels which may have called at source or transit countries on their cruises.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Defense (Navy) and Treasury (Customs)

- d. Continue development of the program that imposes reporting requirements and sites on private aircraft and merges Customs and INS entry forms for input into DEA's El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Justice (DEA), Treasury (Customs) and Transportation (FAA)

ISSUE C: IMPROVEMENT OF TECHNOLOGICAL SUPPORT TO U.S. DRUG INTERDICTION OPERATIONS.

CAVEAT:

[The use of space age technology to support the law enforcement effort has proven to be one of the most effective weapons in the Federal law enforcement arsenal. Its use in successful drug interdiction is especially critical due to the logistical odds inherent in protecting our borders. In this regard, technology may play a traditional support role, such as facilitating inter-agency communications in cooperative operations, or a more active role, resulting in sophisticated targetting and detection. If efficiently and effectively utilized in combination with drug intelligence, modern technology can ensure optimum cost effectiveness of traditional interdiction manpower and equipment, thereby freeing additional drug law enforcement resources for use in the immobilization of major drug trafficking organizations.]

The tasks which follow place primary emphasis on planning, coordination, and cooperation as means to achieve refined utilization of existing technological support resources. The cost effective benefits of planning, coordination, and cooperation in all areas of the law enforcement effort are significant and would be given high visibility throughout the U.S. Government. For this reason, material in the following task statements are deliberately limited in sensitivity.]

For Action 1 and 2, which follow, the Office of Science and Technology Policy (OSTP) should be requested to coordinate and review the assessments resulting from Action 1, Tasks 1 through 3, and determine the most cost-effective means of enhancing interagency communications. In addition, OSTP would be requested to provide executive direction in the implementation of resulting programs.

ACTION 1: Assess the need for a law enforcement common radio communication frequency and the development of associated secure voice communications.

The ability to communicate freely and securely between various law enforcement agencies during joint or cooperative operations is highly desirable. However, the cost of implementing a Government-wide radio system, the scarcity of available frequencies and security considerations may prohibit a program for enhanced communications through use of common frequencies. Methods for enhancing radio communications with existing systems, e.g., exchange of radios for a specific operation, development of area relay stations, use of High Frequency/Single Side Band radios, etc., have proven increasingly effective and may provide a cost-effective alternative.

Requirements for covered voice communications have been established by many law enforcement agencies, including the Drug Enforcement Administration (DEA), the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Secret Service, and Customs.

Issues concerning a common radio communications frequency for law enforcement and the development of associated covered voice communications have been reviewed by numerous Federal law enforcement agencies, including the Departments of Justice and Treasury. These issues deserve in-depth study, especially vis-a-vis alternative methods for achieving the same benefits with existing systems.

TASKS:

- a. A feasibility study to determine the cost-effectiveness of implementing a national law enforcement communications network should be developed by the Interdepartmental Radio Advisory Committee (IRAC).

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- b. A Federal Law Enforcement Communications Working Group, composed of interagency technical personnel, should be established to assess alternative methods of enhancing interagency communications with existing systems, including cost-effectiveness and security factors.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Transportation (Coast Guard)

N.B. An ad hoc meeting of such a group took place at Coast Guard Headquarters on September 1, 1982. The minutes and recommendations from that meeting will be provided under separate cover.

- c. The desirability of a common communications network between Federal and state agencies must be determined. This issue has been referred to the Federal/State/Local Cooperation Task Force for recommendation.

LEAD AGENCY: (Item Transferred)

ACTION 2: Review the compatibility of communications equipment used by Federal and state law enforcement frequencies.

Most Federal and state agencies utilize the VHF band for voice communications. There is, however, little compatibility in the various law enforcement networks because separate frequencies are assigned to each agency.

DEA, which operates its radio system in the UHF (406-420 MHz) band, is the major exception to the use of VHF. Because of its close working relationship with the FBI, DEA is considering the interface of its radio system with VHF to provide for interagency communications.

To obtain compatibility of VHF radio systems, additional frequencies must be obtained from the FCC and IRAC for use as common radio channels on all systems. If these frequencies are available, considerable expense must be incurred by all involved agencies to modify or convert their radio systems. However, the potential benefits which would accrue in terms of safety, expedited coordination and overall effectiveness warrant further exploration of this area.

All Federal agencies with a High Frequency/Single Side Band (HF/SSB) capability have the potential for long-range interagency communications. This option also should be considered along with other alternatives to a national law enforcement communications network.

TASKS:

- a. The compatibility of communications equipment currently utilized by the various Federal and state law enforcement agencies and the cost of converting or modifying existing equipment must be critical factors in each of the initiatives recommended under ACTION 1.

LEAD AGENCY: Action 1 Agencies.

ACTION 3: Review agency implementation of Executive Order 12356 (National Security Information) to assure uniform security classification among Federal law enforcement agencies of documents and information pertaining to drug interdiction operations.

TASKS:

- a. Due to the actionable nature of the information to be generated, a special classification guide would be the most effective means for assuring uniform security classification for documents and information pertaining to drug interdiction operations originating among Federal law enforcement agencies. The development and oversight of the special classification guide would fall under the responsibility of the Information Security Oversight Office (ISOO).

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- b. Information reported on smuggling operations derived from communications monitoring should be caveated in some way to narrow its dissemination.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- c. A specified unclassified codeword should be applied to purely technical data, i.e., that communications monitoring data which has no actionable nature, but which is used in the intelligence collection and intelligence processing modes. This codeword would be used along with each agency's normal method of controlling sensitive material.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- d. Management responsibility for ensuring uniform security classification will be most effectively housed within the central clearinghouse for interdiction information. This central clearinghouse will be located at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC).

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

ACTION 5: Explore the potential to refine special surveillance operations, engaging state-of-the-art techniques, to monitor and track suspect vessels and aircraft.

With the exception of the development of new technology or the possible installation of additional monitoring posts, Federal law enforcement personnel are now engaging state-of-the-art techniques to track and monitor suspect vessels.

The use of special surveillance operations by the various agencies involved in the interdiction effort has been so successful that existing drug interdiction resources are inadequate to respond to the volume of targets currently being identified. Although inter-agency coordination in the interdiction effort has achieved a high degree of efficiency, capabilities can be further enhanced by interagency sharing of specially developed equipment and by finetuning the intelligence collection and analysis cycle.

TASKS:

- a. The refinement of our policies and procedures for intelligence collection tasking and the processing analysis, and dissemination of information obtained during monitoring operations will provide for a more coordinated and effective Federal law enforcement effort. To this end, a Strategic Planning Working Group, composed of interagency intelligence personnel, should be established to develop methodologies and requirements for the development of strategic intelligence specifically for interdiction operational support and planning.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- b. The necessity of a central point of coordination for tactical and operational material developed will be fulfilled by a central clearinghouse located at the El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC). The expansion of the "comms" monitoring analysis function at EPIC, the training assistance of NSA, and the increased involvement of the Department of Defense at EPIC will secure timely communications, ensure stricter document and teletype handling and refine information dissemination.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA) and Defense (NSA)

- c. Programs to provide military personnel with thorough law enforcement briefings will ensure that the majority of technical support provided by the Department of Defense will be incidental to normal military operations and, therefore, cost-effective to the U.S. Government.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Defense and civilian agencies

- d. An inventory of currently available specialized equipment should be developed and disseminated to facilitate interagency utilization of the most effective equipment available for a specific operations.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Defense

ACTION 6: Accelerate research and development projects on contraband detection techniques based on an inventory of current Federal research in this area.

Coordinated research and development projects on contraband detection techniques are a necessity for optimum effectiveness of drug interdiction resources.

The U.S. Customs Service has extensive ongoing and proposed program for the development of contraband detection devices, including the Inland Waterway Boat Detection System, which detects the presence of boats in remote waterways, and the Portable Hydrogen Detector, a handheld tool capable of detecting bulk quantities of narcotics hidden beneath metal surfaces of vehicles, vessels and aircraft.

DEA has directed its efforts primarily towards the identification of narcotics at source locations, such as its cooperative program with the Government of Mexico to locate by air and eradicate opium poppy and marijuana fields.

In addition, the research and development projects of other Federal agencies, including those outside the Federal law enforcement community, may have application to the development of contraband detection techniques. For example, the Safety and Security Research and Development Program of the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) contains technical projects to enhance screening of people, baggage and cargo.

TASKS:

- a. A comprehensive inventory of current Federal research in both contraband detection techniques and all other potentially related fields should be developed to eliminate duplication of effort.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (National Institute of Justice)

- b. Projects to undergo accelerated research and development should be identified through prioritization of contraband detection requirements for which there is no existing Federal capability.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Justice, Treasury and
Transportation

ISSUE D: INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF MARITIME SMUGGLING INTERDICTION OPERATIONS.

ACTION 1: Identify and establish a coordinating mechanism to facilitate enhanced air surveillance (reconnaissance) at sea.

Maritime reconnaissance is generally performed by four distinct forces: the Coast Guard, Customs, DEA and Department of Defense elements (primarily Navy). While DoD reconnaissance flights do not primarily target potential drug smugglers, their capabilities extend to this activity, and a mechanism is in place to ensure all Navy sightings are reported to the Coast Guard. All intelligence information is eventually passed to EPIC. The coordination of information flow, therefore, varies with the agency and type of resource which obtains the data. An improved mechanism is required for a coordinated immediate response to sightings of highly suspicious activity. Currently, the agency acquiring the intelligence will normally respond, and call upon other agencies only if they are needed. The final repository for non-immediate intelligence information is generally EPIC for long-term analysis.

Since theoretically, a vast quantity of information is collectable which requires collation, analysis and dissemination, the obvious follow-on is increased coordination of collection efforts and information processing to avoid unnecessary duplication of effort.

Benefits anticipated from such coordination include:

- Maximum effective use of law enforcement reconnaissance assets.
- Increased seizures.
- Increased flight safety.
- Increased operational security.

TASKS:

- a. Appoint aviation reconnaissance coordinators in such geographic areas as the Miami Region who will gather and evaluate flight schedules to avoid duplication of effort, while providing optimum coverage of areas of high interest.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs) and Justice (DEA)

- b. Undertake an evaluation of law enforcement activity with a view toward increasing the use of classification of law enforcement movements, systems and information, and obtaining appropriate security clearances for involved personnel. It is noted that much of the information will be classified due to DoD asset involvement.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- c. Since reconnaissance in the marine environment is a specialized task, expand the Coast Guard briefing tape, which is presently being produced for the Navy, and ensure distribution to all potential reconnaissance activities (DoD, Customs, DEA, etc.).

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Transportation (Coast Guard)

ACTION 2: Expand intelligence capabilities at source locations, along established smuggling routes, and at interdiction points.

The key to cost-effective use of the limited maritime interdiction assets available is total voyage intelligence on smugglers. Due to international restrictions, reporting at the source locations may be sketchy, while enroute intelligence is almost non-existent. Interdiction and enroute intelligence can be improved greatly. Total voyage intelligence also includes the delivery to unloaders (contact boats) and consignees, and must be tied to coordinated and joint investigations aimed at complete smuggling organizations.

Benefits anticipated include:

- Maximum effective use of agency interdiction assets.
- Increased seizures and increased deterrence.
- Increased convictions of all levels of individuals within smuggling organizations.

TASKS:

- a. Encourage and expand current Coast Guard and Customs intelligence initiatives directed against maritime trafficking as necessary to maximize data flow.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and
Transportation (Coast Guard)

- b. Increase in-country intelligence through more intensive collection efforts in producing and transit countries. Those agencies with collection capabilities should be tasked to commence or increase their efforts aimed at the marine environment.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Defense and Justice (DEA)

- c. Increase emphasis on and use of the Inter-American Maritime Intelligence Network (IAMIN) to assist in developing a better total product for enroute intelligence.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of State

- d. Consider routine track line searches by DoD elements along known or hypothesized smuggling routes in the overall tasking of DoD resources.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Defense

- e. Increase joint and cooperative efforts to tie shoreside smuggling organizations to the suspicious vessels sighted to improve results of conspiracy cases.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

ACTION 3: Enhance the capabilities of the marine intelligence unit (MIU) at EPIC to coordinate the collection and dissemination of intelligence products for this environment.

This action item should be coordinated with the inter-agency investigations task force in view of their interest in the utilization of EPIC.

The MIU at EPIC is currently comprised primarily of DEA personnel and is shorthanded for both the long-term and immediate analyses required. The MIU has been augmented to some extent for SEUS initiatives. Sophisticated smuggling methods, coupled with increased marine intelligence collection efforts, have overburdened this component of EPIC. Benefits to accrue from this enhancement include:

- Increased seizures.
- Increased identification of major smuggling organizations and individuals.
- Enhanced ability to tie in individual events to organizational activity and break the organization.

TASKS:

- a. Provide analysts from Coast Guard, Customs and DEA to operate the MIU on a 24-hour basis.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Transportation, Treasury and Justice

- b. Upgrade the communications capability to handle the increased flow of intelligence information going to and from EPIC. Included in this upgrade should be a secure telephone (Wideband) capability and a Sensitive Compartmented Information (SCI) communications and storage facility.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- c. Upgrade the data processing/computer system at EPIC to permit the storage and processing of classified material.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

- d. Provide for training of a cadre of MIU analysts in the use and tasking of DoD and National Intelligence Collection Systems.

~~LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)~~

ISSUE E: INCREASED EFFECTIVENESS OF AIR SMUGGLING INTERDICTION OPERATIONS.

ACTION 1: Review and expand detection capabilities, particularly along the Gulf and Southwest borders of the United States.

TASKS:

- a. Identify "weak links" and possible gap fillers, using existing FAA or military radar.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Treasury (Customs) and Justice (DEA)

- b. Develop better means to sort and analyze detection data, using existing resources of member agencies and continued development of Posse Comitatus assistance from DoD.

LEAD AGENCY: Departments of Defense and Treasury (Customs)

- c. Establish a formalized policy for analysis, distribution and sharing of intelligence data among the participating agencies. Designate Intelligence Liaison Officers in each agency who would be the primary contact for intelligence--both incoming and outgoing. Individual agencies would not have to establish new intelligence operations, but would share the data they are already collecting.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Justice (DEA)

ACTION 2: Continued enforcement of current regulations, and consideration of drafting of new regulations relating to private aircraft operations.

TASKS:

- a. Explore additional steps to restrict the licenses of pilots convicted of transporting/smuggling drugs/narcotics.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Transportation (FAA)

- b. Explore additional steps to prohibit operation of a civil aircraft within the U.S. with knowledge that narcotics/drugs are carried in the aircraft.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Transportation (FAA)

- c. Prohibit the use of "pink slip" evidence of registration for operations outside the U.S.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Transportation (FAA)

- d. Explore the feasibility of identifying frequent flights of a suspicious nature outside the U.S. and relay information to appropriate drug enforcement agency.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Transportation (FAA)

ACTION 3: Improve cooperation and coordination with foreign countries which are either considered source countries for drugs, or which are countries "flown over" on way to the U.S. Such cooperation could result in vastly improved exchange of information and approval to overfly foreign airspace by U.S. drug enforcement aircraft in pursuit of violators.

TASKS:

- a. Establish procedure for most expeditious procedure for obtaining foreign operational authority.
(Caribbean - Colombia, etc.)

LEAD AGENCY: Department of State

ACTION 4: Develop specific, realistic, and integrated goals and objectives for the Federal Air Interdiction effort, achievable in a 6-month time-frame.

TASKS:

- a. Review and refine, as necessary, current policies to meet overall Federal air interdiction goals/objectives.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

- b. Evaluate periodically operational effectiveness of Federal air interdiction effort.

LEAD AGENCY: Department of Treasury (Customs)

IV. MULTIAGENCY TASK FORCES

MULTIAGENCY TASK FORCES

As requested, those members of the Interdiction Task Force participating in South Florida Joint Task Force considered the issue of the use of similar task forces in other areas of the country. The consensus of those members is as follows:

1. The multiagency approach utilized by the South Florida Joint Task Force permits maximum use of both enforcement personnel and the laws, regulations, and enforcement expertise of wide-range of Federal enforcement agencies previously not used in combatting narcotics trafficking.
2. This use of the full weight of the complete Federal enforcement establishment against narcotics trafficking in the south Florida area has disrupted and dispersed the normal pattern of drug smuggling to areas outside of Florida.
3. The level of interagency cooperation achieved in south Florida meets the standards established in the FY 1982 Federal Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, currently pending publication.
4. While the publicity heralding the initiation of the South Florida effort clearly restored the public confidence, it was inconsistent with traditional investigative and intelligence-collection methodologies, and limited the ultimate enforcement potential of the operation.
5. The commitment of enforcement resources to other task forces of the same magnitude as those made to the South Florida effort, whether on a temporary or a permanent basis, could not be sustained by member agencies.
6. Using the South Florida operation as a model, smaller multiagency cooperative operations are desirable. They offer drug enforcement potential approaching the current South Florida effort if initiated covertly. In addition, such scaled-down multiagency task groups offer favorable prospects for making inroads into the trafficking of substances, such as heroin, not heavily impacted by the South Florida Joint Task Force.

7. The scaled-down multiagency task group envisioned by members of the Interdiction Task Force primarily would consist of current Federal enforcement personnel in those locations where intelligence, investigative leads, and interdiction efforts indicate such efforts are warranted. Operating under the direction of the local U.S. Attorney, Strike Force Attorney, or DEA Office, these resources could be supplemented by participating agencies on a short-term basis as the operation dictated. Effective coordination is a prerequisite for joint or combined interdiction operations.

In summary, the South Florida Joint Task Force has precipitated opportunities elsewhere in the country ripe for drug enforcement exploitation. A scaled-down multiagency task group approach offers an immediate, resource-realistic Federal enforcement response to those opportunities and should be pursued.

Specific Interdiction Task Force member agency comments, proposals, and recommendations from Customs and the Coast Guard relating to this issue follow. While these recommendations are within the Task Force consensus on this issue, the detailed components await further analysis by other agencies impacted. DEA will submit its proposal under separate cover.

INTENSIVE INTERAGENCY INVESTIGATIVE-INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

In order to exploit the dispersive and disruptive impact on narcotics smuggling of the South Florida Joint Task Force, to address the trafficking of substances not impacted by the Joint Task Force such as heroin, and to utilize fully the successful enforcement methods embodied in its cooperative multiagency approach, the U.S. Customs Service recommends the following with the concurrence of the Coast Guard.

1. Initiation of additional multiagency investigative/interdiction operations on a national scale using the South Florida operation as a model;
2. Modification of the South Florida model so that these operations would rely principally on the use of locally available resources (with possible resource increases generally not to exceed 12 TDY personnel from each participating agency, as warranted), and would be conducted covertly in the intelligence collection and investigative phases preliminary to interdiction;
3. Joint planning of investigative operations by DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, and other participating agencies with authority to conduct drug smuggling investigations delegated to Customs by the Attorney General.
4. Oversight of these operations by the Department of Justice, through the local U.S. Attorney or Strike Force Attorney, or by DEA, as in south Florida, permitting the full use of not only the interdiction but also the investigative potential of Customs. In either event, DEA continues as the lead Federal agency in narcotics enforcement with Customs sharing in the management and supervision of these operations.
5. Expansion of multiagency participation to include FBI and IRS, using a wider range of Federal laws, regulations and expertise against drug trafficking, just as Customs enforcement of currency laws can target the transportation and disposition of drug profits;
6. Phased implementation of operations tracking the classical smuggling enforcement cycle (intelligence/informant development; pre-interdiction investigation; coordinated air/land/marine interdiction; post-interdiction investigative follow-up) in such areas as the west coast, New York and the southwest Mexican border;

7. Joint planning of interdiction operations paralleling the investigative effort by Customs, DEA and other participating agencies with final determination of the location, duration and number of Customs personnel assigned to be made by the Commissioner of Customs. Similar decisions regarding Coast Guard and other participating agencies' resources are reserved to their management; and,
8. Coordinated implementation of air, land and marine interdiction operations at both the national and local command levels.

The results to be achieved in the utilization of such intensive operations on a national scale include:

1. Increased overall Federal drug enforcement through the merger of member agencies' specific drug enforcement priorities. Customs general mandate to interdict smuggling and investigate currency violations is targetted on drug trafficking in the location of the intensive operations;
2. Minimal increases in resources are required through the reliance on unpublicized pre-interdiction intelligence and investigative operations, using local resources; and,
3. Increased investigative leads with long-term potential for penetrating the upper levels of major narcotic trafficking organizations. The multiagency approach permits full investigative follow-up of interdiction operations' substantive narcotics smuggling and financial leads.

It is Customs contention that such intensive operations offer the means for the maximum exploitation of south Florida smuggling displacement at minimum cost.

V. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

INTERDICTION TASK FORCE

V. TASK FORCE MEMBERSHIP

CHAIR:

Treasury - George C. Corcoran, Jr. (Customs)

MEMBERS:

Justice - Edward Heath (DEA)
- Abraham L. Azzam (DEA)
- Patrick Tarr (DEA)

Defense - John Heaphy

Treasury - William Green (Customs)
- J. Robert Grimes (Customs)

Transportation - Raymond A. Karam
- L. N. Schowengerdt (Coast Guard)

Interior - Harry DeLashmutt

Agriculture - Wayne W. Wilson

State - Terrence G. Grant *14-9-74*

Commerce - H. Stephen Halloway -

Central Intel. Agency - Laurie Forbes

Federal Comm. Commission - Larry Clance
- John Hudak

Office of Mgmt. & Budget - Adrian Curtis
- Kathy Collins
- Nick Stoer


STAFF CONTACT:

Treasury - Willard A. Workman (Customs)

SUBGROUP CHAIRS:

A. Posse Comitatus - John Heaphy (Defense)
B. Border/Port of Entry - Eugene Mach/Mick Lane (USCS)
C. Technological Support - Abrahma Azzam (Justice DEA)
D. Maritime Interdiction - L.N. Schowengerdt (USCG)
E. Assess Federal Enforcement - L.N. Schowengerdt (USCG)
F. Air Interdiction - Peter Kendig (Customs)

FEDERAL DRUG STRATEGY POLICY STRUCTURE



memorandum

DATE: September 24, 1982

REPLY TO
ATTN OF: Frank V. Monastero, Chairman
Interagency Investigations Task Force

SUBJECT: Interagency Investigations Task Force Report

TO: The Honorable
Rudolph W. Giuliani, Chairman
Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction

Pursuant to your request of August 27, 1982, attached is the report of the Interagency Investigations Task Force of the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction.

The two issues initially assigned to this Task Force - use of specialized expertise and asset forfeiture - were originally identified by the Attorney General in his presentation to the President and the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy on March 24. The actions and tasks recommended in the report are responsive to those issues and represent a consensus of the Task Force members.

An additional issue involving expansion of the South Florida Task Force concept was identified but the Interagency Investigations Task Force was unable to reach a consensus on appropriate action. Opinions of Customs and of DEA are appended to the report.

I commend the efforts of those who participated in the work of the Task Force, and look forward to reviewing the draft report of the full Working Group.



Attachment

R E P O R T

OF THE

INTERAGENCY INVESTIGATIONS TASK FORCE

TO THE

WORKING GROUP ON DRUG SUPPLY REDUCTION

September 24, 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

	<u>SECTIONS</u>	<u>PAGE</u>
I.	Introduction	1
II.	Issues, Actions, and Tasks	1
III.	Additional Issues	6
IV.	Task Force Members	6
	Attachment A	
	Attachment B	

C-1 Task 1. To enhance interagency cooperation and use of specialized expertise in the area of asset removal and financial investigations, the Task Force proposes that a strategy be developed for utilization of the Treasury Department's Financial Law Enforcement Center (FLEC).

Discussion: In support of an expanded national financial investigative effort, U.S. Customs established the Financial Law Enforcement Center to facilitate the development of both drug and non-drug financially oriented intelligence and to identify those violations having the greatest potential for prosecution. FLEC is envisioned as the centralized national clearinghouse and repository for criminal cash flow intelligence and expertise. It has the departmentally mandated responsibility to receive all information collected pursuant to the (Foreign) Bank Secrecy Act; analyze it; and make appropriate dissemination of its findings to the law enforcement community.

C-1 Task 2. U.S. Customs and IRS will create enhanced procedures and guidelines to facilitate and coordinate access to and dissemination of financial intelligence.

C-1 Task 3. DEA, Customs, IRS and other involved agencies will provide FLEC with a continuous flow of operational intelligence to enable effective analysis of financial information and thereby identify suspect transactions, financial institutions of questionable practice, and previously unknown assets of criminal organizations.

Discussion: The Financial Law Enforcement Center will examine the financial characteristics of the criminal markets and assist in the

development of a law enforcement strategy that will exploit the vulnerability of criminal organizations' business practices through application of criminal and civil sanctions. The operational intelligence provided by client organizations to FLEC will then be returned to those agencies for further review or investigation.

AG Action 2: Increase multi-agency coordination so as to identify those investigations which have drug trafficking implications and to bring special expertise to bear on operational efforts concerning organized crime, financial investigations, drug movement, drug-related violence, and official corruption.

See
C-1?

Task 4. Recognizing that DEA is the principal agency in narcotics enforcement, multi-agency drug violator targets will be selected in coordination with DEA; local coordinating group members will achieve a consensus of drug-related violators who may be susceptible to anti-smuggling or financial investigative efforts.

AG Action 3: Through enhanced interagency cooperation ^{LECC's} and increased prosecutorial resources, identify mechanisms (e.g., Law Enforcement Coordinating Committees) to facilitate both drug and non-drug case development for violations having the greatest potential for prosecution.

Discussion: A number of mechanisms now exist to accomplish this, such as FLEC, EPIC, LECC, and the committee which makes requests of DOD for equipment and technical assistance. The need for better use of attorney resources was noted as being a perennial problem to be addressed by DOJ, but no tasks have been developed at this time.

AG Action 4: Increase cross-training of Federal law enforcement agents.

Task 5. An inventory of the training that is available, and an assessment of the training desired, will be made in the next three months. DEA will compile information for the Department of Justice, Customs will do the same for the Department of the Treasury, and the Coast Guard will compile for the Department of Transportation. Other interested agencies as well as DEA, Customs, and Coast Guard will provide their findings to the Task Force for consolidation.

Discussion: A working group is currently canvassing agencies of the Federal Government to identify all training available to sworn full-time peace officers of state and local jurisdictions. Additionally, the group will develop and coordinate curricula and design programs of specialized training for state, local and Federal law enforcement officers to be conducted at FLETC.

Task 6. The Department of Defense will assess the needs to conduct cross-training to sensitize DOD personnel to the needs of civilian law enforcement.

AG Action 5: Increase the effectiveness of vessel smuggling interdiction operations through major cooperative offensives (e.g., Operation TIBURON).

Discussion: The Task Force recommends that this action item be transferred to the Interdiction Task Force.

AG Issue B: ENHANCEMENT OF THE GOVERNMENT'S ABILITY TO ATTACK CRIMINAL PROFITS AND ASSETS THROUGH INTERAGENCY COOPERATION AND LEGISLATIVE INITIATIVES.

AG Action 1: Create, through the Intergovernmental Advisory Council on Asset Removal, a coordinative mechanism to formulate new legislation and to amend existing legislation to enhance the government's ability to attack criminal profit.

AG Action 2: Increase law enforcement's ability to gain access to currency transaction reports and to prevent the illegal transportation of monetary instruments into and out of the United States through support of legislation to amend the Bank Secrecy Act.

AG Action 3: Broaden law enforcement's ability to pursue financial investigations by facilitating Federal law enforcement access to Federal income tax information in non-tax criminal cases through a united advocacy of legislative remedy to the Tax Reform Act.

AG Action 4: Develop and support amendments to the criminal forfeiture provisions of the Racketeer Influenced and Corrupt Organizations (RICO) statute and the Continuing Criminal Enterprise (CCE) section of the Controlled Substances Act.

Discussion: This issue and companion actions were discussed from a procedural perspective. The consensus was that this Task Force has the responsibility to identify impediments to the exercise of investigative duties. This responsibility is shared with other Task Forces and pertains to all facets of investigative activity, not just asset removal. Suggestions for legislative change will be referred to the Task Force on Legislative Initiatives for coordination.

Task 7. Customs and IRS will provide a position paper to the Task Force on Legislative Initiatives on impediments to law enforcement activities created by the Bank Secrecy Act and the Tax Reform Act.

Task 8. DEA will provide to the Task Force on Legislative Initiatives position papers on Federal Tort Claims, Freedom of Information, Bail Reform, and Deputation.

III. ADDITIONAL ISSUES

The Associate Attorney General requested that the Inter-agency Investigations Task Force discuss the issue of South Florida-type task forces in other regions of the country and provide him our recommendations. Since the major participants in this committee also participate in the Interdiction Task Force, the committee agreed to append the recommendations discussed and agreed to by the Interdiction Committee. However, the participating agencies have been unable to reach agreement. The views of Customs (Attachment A) and DEA (Attachment B) are appended.

IV. TASK FORCE MEMBERS

The following list includes those members (all caps) originally appointed by the Working Group and representatives who attended either or both of the meetings on June 4, 1982, or September 15, 1982.

FRANK V. MONASTERO, Chairman, DEA	633-1329
GEORGE CORCORAN, Customs	566-2416
Rollin Klink, Customs	566-2416
RAYMOND KARAM, DOT	426-9192
William Moga, DOT	426-4512
Jim Haas, USCG	426-1981
JOHN HEAPHY, DOD	697-0617
BERNARD MAKOWKA, CIA	351-6585
Laurie Forbes, CIA	351-6585
Richard Wassenaar, IRS	566-6723
Floyd Clarke, FBI	324-5709
Merrill Parks, FBI	324-5709
Ed Heath, DEA	633-1051
Patrick Tarr, DEA	633-1331

IV. MULTIAGENCY TASK FORCES

MULTIAGENCY TASK FORCES

As requested, those members of the Interdiction Task Force participating in South Florida Joint Task Force considered the issue of the use of similar task forces in other areas of the country. The consensus of those members is as follows:

1. The multiagency approach utilized by the South Florida Joint Task Force permits maximum use of both enforcement personnel and the laws, regulations, and enforcement expertise of wide-range of Federal enforcement agencies previously not used in combatting narcotics trafficking.
2. This use of the full weight of the complete Federal enforcement establishment against narcotics trafficking in the south Florida area has disrupted and dispersed the normal pattern of drug smuggling to areas outside of Florida.
3. The level of interagency cooperation achieved in south Florida meets the standards established in the FY 1982 Federal Strategy for Prevention of Drug Abuse and Drug Trafficking, currently pending publication.
4. While the publicity heralding the initiation of the South Florida effort clearly restored the public confidence, it was inconsistent with traditional investigative and intelligence-collection methodologies, and limited the ultimate enforcement potential of the operation.
5. The commitment of enforcement resources to other task forces of the same magnitude as those made to the South Florida effort, whether on a temporary or a permanent basis, could not be sustained by member agencies.
6. Using the South Florida operation as a model, smaller multiagency cooperative operations are desirable. They offer drug enforcement potential approaching the current South Florida effort if initiated covertly. In addition, such scaled-down multiagency task groups offer favorable prospects for making inroads into the trafficking of substances, such as heroin, not heavily impacted by the South Florida Joint Task Force.

7. The scaled-down multiagency task group envisioned by members of the Interdiction Task Force primarily would consist of current Federal enforcement personnel in those locations where intelligence, investigative leads, and interdiction efforts indicate such efforts are warranted. Operating under the direction of the local U.S. Attorney, Strike Force Attorney, or DEA Office, these resources could be supplemented by participating agencies on a short-term basis as the operation dictated. Effective coordination is a prerequisite for joint or combined interdiction operations.

In summary, the South Florida Joint Task Force has precipitated opportunities elsewhere in the country ripe for drug enforcement exploitation. A scaled-down multiagency task group approach offers an immediate, resource-realistic Federal enforcement response to those opportunities and should be pursued.

Specific Interdiction Task Force member agency comments, proposals, and recommendations from Customs and the Coast Guard relating to this issue follow. While these recommendations are within the Task Force consensus on this issue, the detailed components await further analysis by other agencies impacted. DEA will submit its proposal under separate cover.

INTENSIVE INTERAGENCY INVESTIGATIVE-INTERDICTION OPERATIONS

In order to exploit the dispersive and disruptive impact on narcotics smuggling of the South Florida Joint Task Force, to address the trafficking of substances not impacted by the Joint Task Force such as heroin, and to utilize fully the successful enforcement methods embodied in its cooperative multiagency approach, the U.S. Customs Service recommends the following with the concurrence of the Coast Guard.

1. Initiation of additional multiagency investigative/interdiction operations on a national scale using the South Florida operation as a model;
2. Modification of the South Florida model so that these operations would rely principally on the use of locally available resources (with possible resource increases generally not to exceed 12 TDY personnel from each participating agency, as warranted), and would be conducted covertly in the intelligence collection and investigative phases preliminary to interdiction;
3. Joint planning of investigative operations by DEA, Customs, Coast Guard, and other participating agencies with authority to conduct drug smuggling investigations delegated to Customs by the Attorney General.
4. Oversight of these operations by the Department of Justice, through the local U.S. Attorney or Strike Force Attorney, or by DEA, as in south Florida, permitting the full use of not only the interdiction but also the investigative potential of Customs. In either event, DEA continues as the lead Federal agency in narcotics enforcement with Customs sharing in the management and supervision of these operations.
5. Expansion of multiagency participation to include FBI and IRS, using a wider range of Federal laws, regulations and expertise against drug trafficking, just as Customs enforcement of currency laws can target the transportation and disposition of drug profits;
6. Phased implementation of operations tracking the classical smuggling enforcement cycle (intelligence/informant development; pre-interdiction investigation; coordinated air/land/marine interdiction; post-interdiction investigative follow-up) in such areas as the west coast, New York and the southwest Mexican border;

7. Joint planning of interdiction operations paralleling the investigative effort by Customs, DEA and other participating agencies with final determination of the location, duration and number of Customs personnel assigned to be made by the Commissioner of Customs. Similar decisions regarding Coast Guard and other participating agencies' resources are reserved to their management; and,
8. Coordinated implementation of air, land and marine interdiction operations at both the national and local command levels.

The results to be achieved in the utilization of such intensive operations on a national scale include:

1. Increased overall Federal drug enforcement through the merger of member agencies' specific drug enforcement priorities. Customs general mandate to interdict smuggling and investigate currency violations is targetted on drug trafficking in the location of the intensive operations;
2. Minimal increases in resources are required through the reliance on unpublicized pre-interdiction intelligence and investigative operations, using local resources; and,
3. Increased investigative leads with long-term potential for penetrating the upper levels of major narcotic trafficking organizations. The multiagency approach permits full investigative follow-up of interdiction operations' substantive narcotics smuggling and financial leads.

It is Customs contention that such intensive operations offer the means for the maximum exploitation of south Florida smuggling displacement at minimum cost.

MULTIAGENCY OPERATIONS

The parties recognize that by virtue of an order of the Attorney General dated January 28, 1982, all Federal drug law enforcement investigation activities are subject to the general supervision of the Director of the Federal Bureau of Investigations. (See 28 C.F.R. Sections 0.85 and 0.102)

With the concurrence of the Director, FBI, the following recommendations concerning multiagency operations are submitted:


Specific Features

- 1) Multiagency coordinating groups are needed in various geographic areas to address the drug trafficking situation through intensified investigative/interdiction efforts. A meaningful disruption of drug traffic can result from interdiction and immediate investigative followup achievable through a temporary, multiagency task force approach.
- 2) Joint multiagency interdiction/investigation approaches would rely principally on the use of locally available resources, limiting TDY personnel to minimize resource commitments that have not been expressly appropriated.
- 3) Joint planning of investigative followup operations and preinterdiction intelligence collection will reflect multiagency cooperation (especially Customs, Coast Guard, and DEA) that is so evident in South Florida. Final determination of the location, duration, and numbers of personnel will be made by the Administrator of DEA, in consultation with the Commandante and the Commissioner, and the number of Customs personnel delegated temporary drug investigative authority will be approved by the Attorney General upon the written recommendation of the Administrator of DEA.
- 4) Overall supervision of these operations will be carried out by DEA, the principal drug enforcement agency. As in South Florida, Customs will share in the management and supervision of these multiagency operations, to the degree necessary.
- 5) Multiagency participation beyond that of DEA, Customs, and the Coast Guard will be encouraged depending on the appropriateness of the situation. FBI involvement will be decided on a case-by-case basis where consistent with the mission of that agency.
- 6) Joint planning of interdiction operations is desirable so as not to disrupt ongoing task force operations and agency resource commitments. It is recognized that the Commissioner of Customs and the Commandante of the Coast Guard have final determination


for their respective agencies of the location, duration, and number of personnel assigned outside of the task force.

The results expected from such operations include:

- 1) Although temporary, a meaningful disruption of drug trafficking in task force locations and along pertinent drug trafficking routes;
- 2) An increase in Federal drug enforcement through the enhanced coordination of the resources of participating agencies; and
- 3) An increase in investigative leads which can only be fully exploited in long-term drug investigations conducted by the permanently assigned resources of the DEA and the FBI.



A. Rosse Comitatus



ATTORNEY GENERAL

Military A.I. Assistance Coordination Unit (ICJ)

Permanent Multi-agency PLANNING, EVALUATION & BUDGET COMMITTEE (OMB)

President's Commission located in DOT

DIRECTOR OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS ASSOCIATE AG

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE CLASSIFIED

DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS SECRETARY OF STATE

EQUIPMENT AND RESEARCH COORDINATION WG

AIR SURVEILLANCE COORDINATION COMMITTEE (DoJ)

Customs, BOJ, USCG etc. DEPT. submit proposal to AG

TRAINING COORDINATION WG

NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATIONS NETWORK

FOREIGN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (collection) DCI

State Justice Treasury

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS COMMITTEE INM

LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEES

NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE (dissemination)

AMBASSADORS


FINANCIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER (financial information)

COUNTRY NARCOTIC TEAMS

TASK FORCES

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR DOMESTIC MARIJUANA CULTIVATION DOJ(AG) Agriculture Interior Justice

ELPASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER



Integrated A/P Program Customs/DEA

REQUESTS for PC by FSL AG

ATTORNEY GENERAL

PLANNING, EVALUATION & BUDGET COMMITTEE (OMB)

DIRECTOR OF DOMESTIC OPERATIONS
ASSOCIATE AG

DIRECTOR OF INTELLIGENCE
CLASSIFIED

DIRECTOR OF INTERNATIONAL OPERATIONS
SECRETARY OF STATE

EQUIPMENT AND RESEARCH COORDINATION

AIR SURVEILLANCE COORDINATION

TRAINING COORDINATION

NATIONAL LAW ENFORCEMENT COMMUNICATION NETWORK

LAW ENFORCEMENT COORDINATING COMMITTEES

FOREIGN STRATEGIC INTELLIGENCE COMMITTEE (collection)

NATIONAL NARCOTICS INTELLIGENCE CONSUMERS COMMITTEE (dissemination)

FINANCIAL LAW ENFORCEMENT CENTER (financial information)

COORDINATING COMMITTEE FOR DOMESTIC MARIJUANA CULTIVATION

ELPASO INTELLIGENCE CENTER

INTERNATIONAL PROGRAMS COMMITTEE INM

AMBASSADORS

COUNTRY NARCOTIC TEAMS

TASK FORCES

FEDERAL
STATE
LOCAL

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

11.24.82

Carlton

Have you walked
your way through this?
Any problems?

Nite

~~Handwritten scribbles and illegible text, possibly including the word "Nite" and other markings.~~



U.S. Department of Justice

Office of the Associate Attorney General

Washington, D.C. 20530

November 15, 1982

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Working Group on
Drug Supply Reduction

FROM: Rudolph W. Giuliani *RLG by PKK*
Associate Attorney General

SUBJECT: Draft Report to the Attorney General
and the Cabinet Council

Enclosed for your review is a draft report to the Attorney General and the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy. The draft has been prepared at my request by personnel of the Drug Enforcement Administration. It draws upon the reports of the various subcommittees.

Please review the draft. We welcome your comments and criticisms. Our goal is to submit a report which will consist only of Sections I and II of this draft. Those sections are, in effect, a synopsis of the key recommendations contained in the subcommittee reports (Part III), but do not contain all the subcommittees' recommendations. Therefore, in commenting on this draft you should also analyze the question whether additional matters contained in Part III should be contained in Part II.

I would like to meet to discuss the draft and your comments on Tuesday, November 30, 1982. You should also reduce your comments to writing and submit them at the meeting on November 30. The meeting will be at 10:00 a.m. on that date in Room 4118 of the Department of Justice.

Thank you.

Enclosure

DRAFT REPORT

OF THE

WORKING GROUP ON DRUG SUPPLY REDUCTION

TO THE

ATTORNEY GENERAL

AND

THE CABINET COUNCIL ON LEGAL POLICY

NOVEMBER 15, 1982

TABLE OF CONTENTS

I. OVERVIEW

II. PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- A. Posse Comitatus
- B. Foreign Strategic Intelligence
- C. Interagency Financial Law Enforcement
- D. Domestic Marihuana Eradication Program
- E. Interagency Assessments and Studies
- F. Interdiction Improvements
- G. Interagency Strategy on International Initiatives

III. SUBCOMMITTEE REPORTS

- A. Task Force on International Initiatives
- B. Task Force on Legislative Initiatives
- C. Task Force on Federal/State/Local Cooperation
- D. Task Force on Interdiction
- E. Task Force on Interagency Investigations

I. OVERVIEW

In late January 1982, the President established the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy chaired by the Attorney General with membership from several departments and agencies. The purpose of the council was to address major crime, immigration, and civil rights issues requiring a high level of inter-department involvement. One of the first issues presented to the President and the Cabinet Council was the critical problem of drug trafficking. A meeting was held March 24, 1982, at which the Attorney General presented a status report on the criminal drug trafficking situation together with an action agenda focussed on eleven specific issues. This action agenda was to be examined by a Working Group of the Cabinet Council chaired by the Associate Attorney General. The Associate Attorney General assigned the eleven issues to five sub-working groups -- International Initiatives, Interdiction, Legislative Initiatives, Federal/State/Local Cooperation, and Interagency Investigations. These committees met throughout the summer to formulate more specific tasks to be undertaken by the numerous agencies and departments that have responsibilities in fighting illegal drug trafficking.

The Working Group and its subcommittees have addressed and transformed the original eleven issues into a slightly smaller list of programs to be given immediate attention. The basic criteria which evolved within the subcommittee of the

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Working Group are to explore programs and policies which would benefit from greater governmental coordination and cooperation. The tasks developed by this group also tend to focus on multi-agency initiatives which require no new resources. Purposely excluded in the subcommittee meetings was a recapitulation of the various agencies' ongoing programs for FY-1983. Thus, this report must be viewed as describing only the initiatives and not the routine programs of the involved agencies.

A recent development affecting this report is the Attorney General's and the President's October 14, 1982, announcement of a new crime program. Some of the initiatives in that program overlap with the mission of the Working Group on Drug Supply Reduction. The issue of multi-agency task forces, for example, no longer need be addressed in terms of feasibility, but in terms of operational deployment.

This report to the Attorney General and the Cabinet Council includes modest but significant recommendations to enhance the inter-departmental coordination so crucial to a comprehensive effort to curtail drug trafficking and narcotics related criminal activity. Approval of the recommendations by the Attorney General, and endorsement by the Cabinet Council, will solidify the government's resolve in addressing the complex issue of drug supply reduction.

A. Posse Comitatus

Federal law enforcement agencies have just begun to request and receive military assistance under the relaxed provisions of the posse comitatus legislation. Primarily, assistance from the Department of Defense has been made available in South Florida where adequate operational coordinating mechanisms exist. The Working Group believes that full exploitation of various forms of military assistance -- assistance for State and local law enforcement as well as Federal law enforcement -- requires strong, central coordination in developing strategies, making requests, and implementing operational plans.

Recommendation A-1: A permanent organizational unit should be established in the Department of Justice (perhaps within the Office of the Attorney General) to develop policy and facilitate operational requests by Federal and State law enforcement agencies for military assistance. The Department of Defense should establish or assign an appropriate counterpart organizational unit to develop DOD policy, especially concerning reimbursement, and to respond to civilian requests for assistance.

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Integral to full exploitation of military resources by law enforcement agencies is a reorientation of DOD personnel towards an acceptance of the significant contribution to the drug enforcement mission that can be made by the deployment of military assets. To accomplish this reorientation, DOD personnel must become acquainted with and sensitized to law enforcement needs.

Recommendation A-2: The Department of Defense, with the support of Federal and State law enforcement agencies, will develop comprehensive training programs to educate military personnel about the needs of drug law enforcement.

One of the more obvious capabilities of the military is their acquisition of information about vessels and aircraft. Much of this gained during the course of normal military operations can be of significant value if properly disseminated. The El Paso Intelligence Center (EPIC) is the logical repository for this information.

Recommendation A-3: The Department of Defense will work with ^{appropriate} ~~EPIC~~ ^{agents of} ~~EPIC~~ to improve the flow of information to ~~this~~ ^{EPIC} national narcotics intelligence center.

II. PROGRAMS AND RECOMMENDATIONS

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Although military assistance has been conceived primarily in terms of the South Florida Task Force operation, nothing in these recommendations is meant to indicate that interdiction operations define the scope of military assistance; on the contrary, the use of military assistance -- training, equipment, technology -- for domestic ^{Cocaine & BIS} ~~marihuana~~ eradication, specific law enforcement operations, gathering strategic intelligence, and other functions should be pursued to the fullest extent providing only that the national security mission of the Department of Defense is not compromised.

B. Foreign Strategic Intelligence

Strategic Intelligence on international narcotics problems is critical to the development of narcotics control initiatives and to the monitoring of international programs. Strategic intelligence objectives guiding both collection and analytic activities center on four areas: narcotics production, trafficking patterns, international financial flows and banking practices, and the implications of narcotics problems to political and economic stability.

Strategic narcotics intelligence is derived largely from human intelligence collection efforts complemented by technical collection programs. The Working Group believes that the effectiveness of these activities can be enhanced

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by a comprehensive program capable of integrating the collection activities of agencies under the Director of Central Intelligence with the collection capabilities of law enforcement agencies not directly responsible to the DCI. The absence of such integration has resulted in the duplication of collection activities in some areas, while in others it has resulted in significant gaps in intelligence coverage.

Recommendation B-1: The Director of Central Intelligence, in concert with the Departments of State, Justice, and Treasury, ~~will~~ create an inter-agency Foreign Strategic Intelligence Committee to coordinate intelligence collection activities in the strategic narcotics field.

C. Interagency Financial Law Enforcement

At the cornerstone of the Federal effort against drug trafficking organizations are financial law enforcement activities aimed at attacking criminal profit through the civil and criminal forfeiture of traffickers' assets. Although the special expertise of the Departments of Treasury and Justice has contributed immensely to the success of this effort, the need for concrete means to enhance the government's ability to attack criminal profit through inter-agency cooperation at all levels of government has become increasingly essential.

C.T.

} No mention of
operational or
tactical intelligence