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File Folder SUBCOMMITTEE: SECURITY / TERRORISM (SENATOR DENTON) (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F1995-069/4

Box Number 2

PFEIFFER

14

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
179285	STATEMENT	OF OLIVER B. REVELL, ASST DIRCT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FBI BEFORE A CLOSED SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM...SEPTEMBER 13, 1983, (P.2,4,6 - PARTIAL; P.3,5 ALL)	5	9/13/1983	B1
	P	10/27/1999	F95-069/2	#23	

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File Folder SUBCOMMITTEE: SECURITY /TERRORISM (SENATOR DENTON) (1 OF 2)

FOIA

F95-0069/01

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Doc No	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	MEMO	TO FILE, PARTIAL	1	7/22/1983	B7(C) B7(F) open d/b 5/1/2014

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97TH CONGRESS
HEARINGS OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1981:

February 20, 1981 - FBI Authorization and Budget Oversight
for 1982

April 2, 1981 - Oversight of the Drug Enforcement Administration

April 24, 1981 - Terrorism: Origins, Directions and Support

May 8, 1981 - Intelligence Identities Protection Act of 1981,
S.391

June 11, 1981 - Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism

June 12, 1981 - Historical Antecedents of Soviet Terrorism

June 25, 1981 - Terrorism: The Turkish Experience

June 26, 1981 - Terrorism: The Role of Moscow and its Subcon-
tractors

October 5, 1981 - Government Files: Retention or Destruction?

1982:

February 4, 1982 - FBI Oversight Hearing

February 11, 1982 - Closed FBI Oversight Hearing

February 26, 1982 - The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism
and Subversion: Intelligence Activities of the
DGI

March 4, 1982 - The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and
Subversion: Terrorist and Intelligence Activities
of the Cuban Government in South Florida

March 11, 1982 - The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and
Subversion: Terrorist and Subversive Activities
of the Cuban Government in Latin America

March 12, 1982 - The Role of Cuba in International Terrorism and
Subversion: Terrorist and Subversive Activities
of the Cuban Government in Latin America and
Puerto Rico

Continued...

SENATE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM HEARINGS CONTINUED:

- March 22, 1982 - Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa
- March 24, 1982 - Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa
- March 25, 1982 - Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa
- March 29, 1982 - Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa
- March 31, 1982 - Soviet, East German and Cuban Involvement in Fomenting Terrorism in Southern Africa
- April 23, 1982 - DEA Oversight and Budget Authorization and S.2320
- May 12, 1982 - Communist Bloc Intelligence Gathering Activities on Capitol Hill, S.1959 and S.1963
- June 24, 1982 - Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines
- June 25, 1982 - Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines
- August 11, 1982 - Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines
- August 12, 1982 - Domestic Security (Levi) Guidelines
- September 23, 1982 - S.2255, The Antiterrorism and Foreign Mercenary Act

Ken Hill

98TH CONGRESS
HEARINGS OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C.

1983:

February 2, 1983 - FBI Oversight and Authorization for 1983

February 23, 1983 - DEA Oversight and Authorization for 1983

February 25, 1983 - Closed FBI Oversight and Authorization

March 3, 1983 - Closed DEA Oversight and Authorization

March 25, 1983 - Attorney General's Guidelines for Domestic
Security Investigations (Smith Guidelines)

April 16, 1983 - Role of the Coast Guard in Drug Traffic
Interdiction (field hearing held jointly with
the Foreign Relations Subcommittee on Western
Hemisphere Affairs in Elizabeth City, N.C.)

April 30, 1983 - Cuban Government's Involvement in Facilitating
International Drug Traffic (Field hearing held
jointly with the Foreign Relations Subcommittee
on Western Hemisphere Affairs and the Senate
Drug Enforcement Caucus in Miami, Florida)

STATEMENT BY SENATOR JEREMIAH DENTON BEFORE
THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

FEBRUARY 2, 1983

THE SUBCOMMITTEE, PURSUANT TO ITS MANDATE AND RESPONSIBILITY, TODAY BEGINS ITS HEARING AGENDA FOR THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 98TH CONGRESS WITH AN OPEN OVERSIGHT HEARING ON THE OPERATIONS OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION.

I BELIEVE THAT IT HAS BEEN AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE MUTUALLY BENEFICIAL FOR THE SUBCOMMITTEE AND THE BUREAU TO REVIEW TOGETHER, AT THE BEGINNING OF EACH YEAR, THE SIGNIFICANT ACCOMPLISHMENTS OF THE FBI AND EVENTS AFFECTING THE BUREAU DURING THE PRECEDING YEAR, AS WELL AS TO DISCUSS TOGETHER THE FORECAST AND REQUIREMENTS FOR THE UPCOMING YEAR.

IT CONTINUES TO BE THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S CLEAR INTENTION TO ENSURE THAT THE FBI HAS THE NECESSARY AUTHORITY AND TOOLS TO DISCHARGE ITS INVESTIGATIVE RESPONSIBILITIES IN THE AREAS OF FEDERAL CRIME, TERRORISM, AND FOREIGN COUNTERINTELLIGENCE.

IT IS MY UNDERSTANDING THAT OUR HEARING TODAY COINCIDES WITH THE RELEASE OF THE FBI'S ANALYSIS OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE UNITED STATES FOR THE YEAR 1982 AND THAT THIS REPORT IS AVAILABLE HERE. IT IS AN IMPORTANT DOCUMENT AND I COMMEND THE DIRECTOR AND THE BUREAU FOR THEIR EFFORT TO INFORM OTHER LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES, THE CONGRESS, AND THE PUBLIC OF THE BUREAU'S ASSESSMENT OF THE DOMESTIC TERRORIST THREAT DURING THE PAST YEAR. I STRONGLY RECOMMEND THAT THE BUREAU CONTINUE TO PUBLISH THE REPORT EACH YEAR.

AS WE BEGIN THE 98TH CONGRESS, I BELIEVE IT WOULD BE USEFUL TO REVIEW THE WORK OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE DURING THE LAST CONGRESS AND TO SET OUT WHAT I PROPOSE AS AN AGENDA FOR THE FIRST SESSION OF THE NEW CONGRESS.

DURING THE 97TH CONGRESS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM HELD A TOTAL OF TWENTY-SEVEN HEARINGS -- FIVE FOR AUTHORIZATION AND OVERSIGHT OF THE FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION (FBI) AND THE DRUG ENFORCEMENT ADMINISTRATION (DEA); FOUR LEGISLATIVE HEARINGS (ONE OF WHICH WAS HELD IN CONJUNCTION WITH AN OVERSIGHT HEARING); AND NINETEEN HEARINGS TO EXAMINE ISSUES OF NATIONAL SECURITY.

AT THE BEGINNING OF THE SESSION, THE SUBCOMMITTEE ASKED THE GENERAL ACCOUNTING OFFICE TO UNDERTAKE A STUDY OF THE RESPONSIBILITIES OF THE VARIOUS GOVERNMENT AGENCIES FOR DOMESTIC TERRORISM. THE STUDY, WHICH WILL BE COMPLETED IN THE EARLY SPRING OF 1983, WILL ANALYZE THE RESPONSIBILITIES, INTERRELATIONSHIPS AND RESOURCES OF THOSE AGENCIES.

FOLLOWING THE FBI AND THE DEA AUTHORIZATION/OVERSIGHT HEARINGS IN 1981, THE SUBCOMMITTEE UNDERTOOK AN EXTENSIVE INQUIRY INTO THE ORIGINS, DIRECTIONS AND SUPPORT OF TERRORISM. A SERIES OF FIVE HEARINGS HELD DURING THE FIRST SESSION DEMONSTRATED CONCLUSIVELY MANY LINKAGES AND INTERRELATIONSHIPS AMONG INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS.

THE HEARINGS FURTHER DOCUMENTED EXTENSIVE INVOLVEMENT AND COMPLICITY BY THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS SURROGATES IN A WORLDWIDE NETWORK OF TERRORISM, MUCH OF WHICH TAKES PLACE IN THE NAME OF "NATIONAL LIBERATION" MOVEMENTS.

MOREOVER, THE HEARINGS DEMONSTRATED THAT SOVIET EXPLOITATION OF THOSE MOVEMENTS INCLUDED MILITARY AND POLITICAL TRAINING IN THE SOVIET UNION AND ITS PROXY STATES; FURNISHING EQUIPMENT, INCLUDING SPECIAL WEAPONS, MONEY, DOCUMENTS, AND ESCAPE MECHANISMS; FURNISHING ADVISORS, SOME OF WHOM PARTICIPATED IN THE SELECTION OF CIVILIAN TARGETS; AND FURNISHING PROPAGANDA SUPPORT DIRECTLY IN THE SOVIET AND SATELLITE PRESS AS WELL AS THROUGH STORIES PLANTED IN THE INTERNATIONAL PRESS. THE HEARINGS ALSO DISCLOSED SOVIET USE OF UNITED NATIONS ORGANIZATIONS TO HELP PROMOTE AND LEGITIMIZE "NATIONAL LIBERATION" ORGANIZATIONS THAT EMPLOY TERRORISM TO ACCOMPLISH THEIR GOALS.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE MADE A CASE STUDY OF THE TURKISH EXPERIENCE WITH TERRORISM, BOTH AT HOME AND ABROAD. TWO DAYS OF HEARINGS WERE DEVOTED TO AN EXAMINATION OF RUSSIAN POLITICAL HISTORY; THEY DEMONSTRATED THE ORIGINS OF TERRORISM AS A TOOL TO FURTHER SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. DR. JAMES BILLINGTON, OF THE WOODROW WILSON CENTER FOR SCHOLARS, TESTIFIED THAT THE WORD "TERRORIST" WAS FIRST ADOPTED IN THE 19TH CENTURY AS A BADGE OF PRIDE BY A MAJOR REVOLUTIONARY GROUP IN RUSSIA JUST BEFORE IT LAUNCHED THE MOST SPECTACULAR PROGRAM OF SYSTEMATIC POLITICAL ASSASSINATION.

DURING THE HEARINGS HELD ON JUNE 12, 25, AND 26, 1981, THE SUBCOMMITTEE HEARD TESTIMONY FROM THREE DIFFERENT WITNESSES ABOUT A BULGARIAN AND SOVIET KGB CONNECTION WITH MEHMET ALI AGCA, THE TURKISH NATIONAL WHO ATTEMPTED TO ASSASSINATE THE POPE. THE INFORMATION DISCLOSED BY THE HEARING WAS MADE PUBLIC WITHIN A MONTH OF THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION, AND

APPROXIMATELY 18 MONTHS BEFORE THE TELEVISION DOCUMENTARIES AND MAGAZINE ARTICLES THAT EXPOSE THE PROBABLE COMPLICITY OF THE BULGARIANS AND THE SOVIETS.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO HELD A HEARING ABOUT THE DISPOSITION OF 20,000 CUBIC FEET OF FEDERAL GOVERNMENT PERSONNEL SECURITY INVESTIGATIVE FILES, WHICH HIGHLIGHTED THE PROBLEMS OF THE CURRENT FEDERAL PERSONNEL SECURITY PROGRAM IMPLEMENTED IN ACCORDANCE WITH THE PROVISIONS OF EXECUTIVE ORDER 10450. AS A RESULT OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE'S INTEREST AND EFFORTS, THE DESTRUCTION OF THE BULKY PORTION OF THE FILES, ABOUT 1,000 CUBIC FEET, WAS AVERTED WHEN THE ARCHIVIST OF THE UNITED STATES DETERMINED THE MATERIAL INDEED HAD HISTORICAL VALUE. THE SUBCOMMITTEE IS CONTINUING ITS OVERSIGHT TO ENSURE THE PROPER DISPOSITION OF THE REMAINING 19,000 CUBIC FEET OF RECORDS.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HELD HEARINGS ON S.391, THE INTELLIGENCE IDENTITIES PROTECTION ACT, WHICH WERE INSTRUMENTAL IN ITS ENACTMENT DURING THE SECOND SESSION OF THE 97TH CONGRESS THROUGH H.R.4, THE HOUSE VERSION OF THE SENATE BILL. AMONG OTHER THINGS, THE NEW LAW, TO BE CODIFIED IN 50 U.S. CODE SECTION 421, MAKES IT A CRIME TO DISCLOSE WITHOUT AUTHORIZATION INFORMATION IDENTIFYING CERTAIN U.S. INTELLIGENCE OFFICERS, AGENTS, INFORMANTS AND SOURCES, EVEN THOUGH THE INFORMATION MAY HAVE DERIVED FROM PUBLIC SOURCES.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM BEGAN THE SECOND SESSION OF THE 97TH CONGRESS WITH TWO FBI OVERSIGHT

HEARINGS, ONE OPEN AND ONE CLOSED. THOSE HEARINGS DEALT WITH THE PROBLEMS OF DOMESTIC SECURITY AND HIGHLIGHTED THE INABILITY OF THE FBI TO GATHER AND DISSEMINATE INFORMATION ON DOMESTIC GROUPS OR INDIVIDUALS WHO ADVOCATE VIOLENCE AND SUBVERSION. IT APPEARS THAT THE ATTORNEY GENERAL'S GUIDELINES FOR DOMESTIC SECURITY INVESTIGATIONS ("LEVI GUIDELINES") CONTRIBUTE TO THE DIMINISHED LATITUDE OF THE FBI'S DOMESTIC INTELLIGENCE GATHERING CAPACITY.

IN A SUBSEQUENT SERIES OF FOUR HEARINGS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE INQUIRED EXTENSIVELY INTO THE RIPPLE EFFECT OF THE "LEVI GUIDELINES" ON AGENCIES SUCH AS THE U.S. SECRET SERVICE AND THE U.S. PARK POLICE, AS WELL AS ON STATE AND MUNICIPAL LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES. FROM THE EVIDENCE, IT IS CLEAR THAT A SERIOUS CONDITION NOW EXISTS THAT MUST BE REMEDIED, AND THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL WORK TO BRING ABOUT THE NECESSARY CHANGES. THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE FBI HAVE AGREED THAT THE GUIDELINES NEED MODIFICATION AND HAVE UNDERTAKEN TO REVIEW AND MODIFY THEM. THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE AFFORDED THE OPPORTUNITY TO COMMENT ON THE SUGGESTED CHANGES, WHICH WE EXPECT TO SEE WITHIN THE NEXT FEW DAYS.

DURING THE "LEVI GUIDELINES" HEARINGS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE DEVELOPED A RECORD THAT UNDERScoreD THE URGENCY ATTACHED TO AMENDING THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, THE PRIVACY ACT, AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT IN ORDER TO MAKE POSSIBLE ESSENTIAL INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES. I EXPECT THAT SUCH LEGISLATION WILL BE REINTRODUCED IN THE 98TH CONGRESS.

AS A RESULT OF THE DEA OVERSIGHT HEARING AND A SUBSEQUENT SERIES OF FOUR HEARINGS EXAMINING THE ROLE OF CUBA IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM AND SUBVERSION, THE SUBCOMMITTEE CALLED THE ATTENTION OF THE DEA AND OTHER GOVERNMENT AGENCIES TO THE CUBAN GOVERNMENT'S ROLE IN FACILITATING INTERNATIONAL DRUG TRAFFIC, ESPECIALLY BY ALLOWING CUBAN WATERS TO BE USED FOR THE OFF-LOADING OF DRUGS INTENDED FOR U.S. MARKETS. THE HEARINGS FURTHER DOCUMENTED CUBAN EFFORTS, THROUGH ITS INTELLIGENCE SERVICE, THE DGI, TO INFILTRATE AND PLACE AGENTS IN SOUTH FLORIDA AND OTHER PARTS OF THE U.S.; CUBA'S PROVISION OF TRAINING, SUPPORT, AND PROPAGANDA TO TERRORIST MOVEMENTS IN LATIN AMERICA, IN PUERTO RICO AND IN THE MIAMI AREA; AND THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THOSE EFFORTS, AS SHOWN BY THE KGB'S COMPLETE CONTROL OF THE DGI.

IN A SERIES OF FIVE HEARINGS IN MARCH 1982, THE SUBCOMMITTEE REVEALED AND DOCUMENTED, THROUGH THE TESTIMONY OF FORMER MEMBERS OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS (ANC) AND THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO), THE EXTENT TO WHICH SUCH "NATIONAL LIBERATION MOVEMENTS" IN AFRICA HAVE BEEN SUBVERTED BY THE SOVIET UNION, CUBA, AND THE GERMAN DEMOCRATIC REPUBLIC AND USED TO ADVANCE SOVIET FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. THE SUBCOMMITTEE WAS ALSO ABLE TO DOCUMENT THE TERRORIST NATURE OF BOTH THE ANC AND SWAPO; THE INDISCRIMINATE USE OF TERROR BY THOSE ORGANIZATIONS AGAINST CIVILIAN POPULATIONS AND THEIR OWN MEMBERS WHO QUESTIONED THESE AND OTHER PRACTICES; AND THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION, EAST GERMANY, AND ANGOLA IN TRAINING AND EQUIPPING THE TERRORISTS.

DURING THE HEARINGS, THE SUBCOMMITTEE UNCOVERED A SUCCESSFUL PLOT HATCHED AT THE UNITED NATIONS BY THE SWAPO PRESIDENT, SAM NUJOMA, TO ASSASSINATE TWO POLITICAL RIVALS IN NAMIBIA. THE SUBCOMMITTEE REFERRED THE DETAILS OF THE PLOT, AND THE SUPPORTING DOCUMENTS, TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT AND THE ATTORNEY GENERAL OF NEW YORK FOR INVESTIGATION.

ON DECEMBER 16, 1982, BARTHOLOMEW H LAPANE, A FORMER MEMBER OF THE AFRICAN NATIONAL CONGRESS AND OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY, WAS MURDERED ALONG WITH HIS WIFE, IN HIS HOME IN SOWETO, SOUTH AFRICA, BY ASSASSINS USING AN AK-47 ASSAULT RIFLE. IT NOW APPEARS THAT HIS FIFTEEN YEAR OLD DAUGHTER, BRENDA, WHO WAS WOUNDED IN THE ATTACK, WILL BE PERMANENTLY PARALYZED. BASED ON THE MODUS OPERANDI, THE CHOICE OF WEAPON, AND A PUBLIC STATEMENT, IT APPEARS THAT THE KILLERS WERE ANC TERRORISTS.

ON MARCH 25, 1982, MR. H LAPANE COURAGEOUSLY TESTIFIED BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE ABOUT THE CLANDESTINE ROLE OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN COMMUNIST PARTY IN THE ANC AND IN THE FORMATION OF THE ANC'S TERRORIST WING, UMKONTO WE SIZWE, "THE SPEAR OF THE NATION." BEFORE GIVING THAT TESTIMONY, MR. H LAPANE MET WITH OTHER WITNESSES, ALL FORMER MEMBERS OF THE ANC AND THE SOUTH WEST AFRICA PEOPLE'S ORGANIZATION (SWAPO), TO DISCUSS THE POSSIBLE CONSEQUENCES OF THEIR TESTIMONY. MR. H LAPANE AND THE OTHER WITNESSES, KNOWING THEY WERE MARKED FOR ASSASSINATION, DECIDED TO TELL THEIR OWN STORIES AND TO EXPOSE THE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION AND OTHER COMMUNIST COUNTRIES IN SUBVERTING AND EXPLOITING THE ANC AND SWAPO TO ACCOMPLISH COMMUNIST

FOREIGN POLICY OBJECTIVES. ALL THOSE BRAVE WITNESSES BELIEVED THAT SOMEONE HAD TO TELL THE WORLD THE TRUTH ABOUT WHAT IS REALLY HAPPENING IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. THEY SAID THAT, IF THEY DID NOT DO IT, THE REAL STORY WOULD PROBABLY NEVER BE TOLD.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ALSO HELD HEARINGS ON SEVERAL PIECES OF LEGISLATION: S.2255, THE ANTI-TERRORISM AND FOREIGN MERCENARY ACT; S.1963, A BILL TO TRANSFER RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECEIVING NOTIFICATION OF NON-DIPLOMATIC AGENTS OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS FROM THE STATE DEPARTMENT TO THE JUSTICE DEPARTMENT; S.2320, A BILL TO ENHANCE CRIMINAL FORFEITURE OF PROCEEDS IN DRUG AND RACKETEERING RELATED CASES; AND S.1959, A BILL TO REQUIRE NATIONALS OF COMMUNIST COUNTRIES TO REGISTER WITH THE ATTORNEY GENERAL PRIOR TO ENGAGING IN CERTAIN ACTIVITIES INVOLVING MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND CONGRESSIONAL EMPLOYEES.

ON DECEMBER 19, 1982, S.1963 WAS PASSED BY THE SENATE BY UNANIMOUS CONSENT, BOTH AS A FREESTANDING BILL AND AS AN AMENDMENT TO H.R.7154, A BILL TO RELIEVE THE U.S. MARSHAL SERVICE FROM SERVING CIVIL PROCESS. THE CONFERENCE COMMITTEE APPROVED THE INCREASE IN PENALTIES BUT DELETED THE SHIFT IN RESPONSIBILITY FOR RECEIVING NOTIFICATION AS PROVIDED IN THE ORIGINAL BILL.

THE HEARING ON S.1959 DEMONSTRATED THE ALARMING EXTENT OF UNRESTRICTED, AND LARGELY UNMONITORED, COMMUNIST BLOC ACTIVITIES ON THE HILL. MOREOVER, THE ONGOING EFFORT OF COMMUNIST BLOC INFILTRATORS TO CULTIVATE AGENTS OF INFLUENCE

IS AN ALARMING SITUATION THAT S.1959 SEEKS TO ADDRESS. IT IS A SPECIAL CONCERN GIVEN THE DIFFICULTIES THE FBI, WITH ITS LIMITED RESOURCES, HAS IN PROPERLY MONITORING SUCH ACTIVITY. THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL CONTINUE TO LOOK FOR LEGISLATIVE, AS WELL AS ADMINISTRATIVE, REMEDIES FOR THIS GRAVE PROBLEM.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM BEGINS THE FIRST SESSION OF THE 98TH CONGRESS WITH THE FIRST OF TWO FBI OVERSIGHT HEARINGS. THE "LEVI GUIDELINES," EFFORTS TO MODIFY THEM, AND THE FBI'S ABILITY TO GATHER INTELLIGENCE ON DOMESTIC GROUPS THAT ADVOCATE VIOLENCE, TERRORISM OR SUBVERSION WILL BE OF PARAMOUNT INTEREST. THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL ALSO CONSIDER THE ABILITY OF THE FBI TO EXTEND ITS INTELLIGENCE GATHERING ACTIVITIES TO GROUPS THAT FURNISH SO-CALLED "LEGAL SUPPORT" FOR TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE SECOND MAJOR ITEM ON THE AGENDA OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE THE DEA OVERSIGHT HEARINGS.

BEGINNING TODAY, THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL ALSO TAKE A CLOSE LOOK AT THE STATISTICAL PROCEDURES USED IN COMPILING DATA ON TERRORIST INCIDENTS IN THE U.S., SINCE IT APPEARS THAT THE CRITERIA FOR INCLUSION IN THE FBI'S REPORT MAYBE UNDULY LIMITING. THE CURRENT CRITERIA MAY CONTRIBUTE TO AN UNDERESTIMATION OF THE THREAT THAT DOMESTIC TERRORISM PRESENTS.

ANOTHER TOPIC OF CONCERN TO THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL BE THE 1984 OLYMPIC GAMES, TO BE HELD IN LOS ANGELES, CALIFORNIA. INFORMATION CONTINUES TO REACH THE SUBCOMMITTEE, FROM VARIOUS SOURCES, THAT TERRORIST GROUPS MAY BE PREPARING TO EXPLOIT THE EVENTS. MUCH STILL NEEDS TO BE DONE BY BOTH FEDERAL AND

STATE AGENCIES TO PREPARE FOR THAT CONTINGENCY. WE WILL UNDERTAKE AN INQUIRY, FOLLOWED BY CLOSED HEARINGS, TO ASSESS THE PROBLEM AND TO ENSURE THAT RESOURCES ARE AVAILABLE TO PERMIT AN EFFECTIVE RESPONSE TO ANY THREAT THAT MAY DEVELOP.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE PLANS TO HOLD HEARINGS TO EVALUATE THE IMPACT OF THE SOUTH FLORIDA TASK FORCE ON DRUG TRAFFICKING IN FLORIDA AND ADJACENT EASTERN AND GULF COAST STATES. OF CONTINUING INTEREST IS THE EXTENT TO WHICH INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST GROUPS AND COUNTRIES SUCH AS CUBA CONTINUE TO FACILITATE OR UTILIZE DRUG SMUGGLING TO FINANCE THEIR OWN ACTIVITIES.

IN THE AREA OF DOMESTIC TERRORISM, THE SUBCOMMITTEE PLANS TO EXAMINE TERRORISM IN THE U.S. AND PUERTO RICO UNDERTAKEN ON BEHALF OR IN THE NAME OF THE PUERTO RICAN INDEPENDENCE MOVEMENT. WE WILL ALSO EXAMINE THE LEGAL, FINANCIAL AND PROPAGANDA SUPPORT THAT TERRORIST GROUPS SUCH AS THE PLO, ANC, SWAPO, AND THE PROVISIONAL IRISH REPUBLICAN ARMY RECEIVE FROM WITHIN THE U.S. WE WILL SEEK TO DEVELOP APPROPRIATE MEASURES TO CURTAIL THAT SUPPORT.

THE SUBCOMMITTEE HAS SCHEDULED TWO HEARINGS TO EXAMINE AVAILABLE EVIDENCE PURPORTING TO LINK THE USSR AND BULGARIA TO THE ATTEMPTED ASSASSINATION OF POPE JOHN PAUL II.

IN CONJUNCTION WITH THE FOREIGN RELATIONS COMMITTEE, THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL ATTEMPT TO DEVELOP LEGISLATION DEALING WITH ACTIVITIES OF FOREIGN AGENTS IN THE UNITED STATES AND WILL SEEK AMENDMENTS TO REFINE THE FOREIGN AGENTS REGISTRATION ACT OF 1938, AS AMENDED. WE WILL CONTINUE TO PLACE A HIGH

PRIORITY ON DEVELOPING AND ENACTING LEGISLATION TO DEAL WITH TERRORISM SINCE, UNDER CURRENT LAW, THERE ARE NO PROVISIONS ADDRESSING TERRORISM PER SE AS A FEDERAL CRIMINAL OFFENSE.

DURING THE 97TH CONGRESS, WITNESSES BEFORE THE SUBCOMMITTEE REPEATEDLY URGED AMENDMENTS TO THE FREEDOM OF INFORMATION ACT, THE PRIVACY ACT, AND THE FEDERAL TORT CLAIMS ACT, AS WELL AS MODIFICATION OF THE "LEVI GUIDELINES," IN ORDER TO ENHANCE THE ABILITY OF THE U.S. GOVERNMENT TO GATHER AND PROPERLY USE INTELLIGENCE INFORMATION NECESSARY FOR THE PROTECTION AND PRESERVATION OF OUR NATIONAL SECURITY. THE SUBCOMMITTEE WILL ATTEMPT TO IDENTIFY AND SUPPORT ALL REALISTIC WAYS OF EXPEDITIOUSLY EFFECTING CHANGES TO IMPROVE THE ABILITY OF THE AUTHORIZED AGENCIES OF THE GOVERNMENT TO DO THEIR JOB EFFECTIVELY.

Panel Has Line on Olympic Terror,

Senator Says

Information Received That Groups May Be Preparing to Exploit Games

In 1984

By RONALD J. OSTROW, Times Staff Writer

WASHINGTON — Sen. Jeremiah Denton (R-Ala.), chairman of the Senate Judiciary subcommittee on Terrorism, said Wednesday that the panel has received information from various sources that "terrorist groups may be preparing to exploit" the 1984 Olympic Games in Los Angeles.

Denton did not elaborate, but a subcommittee source said the panel received the information about two months ago from "the Los Angeles police community and federal law enforcement."

"There is information about people going to Lebanon for (terrorist) training and then coming back to the United States," the subcommittee source said. He said the subcommittee had no information to show that these people are now in Los Angeles. "You're not going to get a road map" from terrorists, the source said.

Denton cited the possibility of terrorist outbreaks at the Olympics in his opening statement at an FBI oversight hearing. "Much still needs to be done by both federal and state agencies to prepare for that contingency," he said.

The subcommittee will conduct an investigation, "followed by closed hearings, to assess the problem and to ensure that resources are available to permit an effective response to any threat that may develop," Denton said.

The Pentagon has budgeted \$50 million to provide security at the games, if local or state authorities are unable to handle the job, The Times reported Tuesday.

The subcommittee source said he understood that there have been "coordination problems between agencies involved in that they don't always share information that might be useful to those charged with" providing protection at the games.

"We want to be sure that bureaucratic interests are being suppressed and that everything is being done that can be," he said.

Informed of Denton's remarks and those of the subcommittee source, a spokeswoman for Edgar Best, director of security for the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, said that "cooperation among law enforcement officials and agencies in Southern California is working very smoothly. . . ."

"We can't comment on the senator's reference to suggested activities in Lebanon," the spokeswoman said. "We hope that the information will be channeled to the appropriate U.S. government agencies responsible for anti-terrorist activities." Subcommittee investigators have been told that the 1984 games present special logistical problems for security because events are scheduled at different locations, requiring that protective steps be taken over the relatively long distances that participants will travel.

FBI Director William H. Webster told the subcommittee Wednesday that he had elevated terrorism investigations to one of the bureau's top four priorities, against a backdrop of increasing terrorist incidents in the United States. Webster said 51 terrorist incidents took place in the United States last year, compared with 42 in 1981 and 29 in 1980. "Seven people were killed and 26 injured in 1982, six more deaths and 22 more injuries than in 1981," he said.

In its new status within the bureau, terrorism joins white-collar crime, organized crime and foreign counterintelligence as priority investigative programs. Terrorism for the last five years has been in a lower category "simply because of the small amount of resources required to manage it, as was the case with civil rights investigations," Webster said.

But whenever there was a terrorist incident or a major civil rights investigation, "it became the most important thing we were doing," Webster said. For this reason, he said, "we elevated it to make clear on the record that we viewed it as a matter of very significant importance, even though it was not requiring a substantial amount of our resources to manage."

L.A. TIMES

FEB 3 - 1983

Information Bureau

July 18, 1983

Mr. Michael Deaver
Assistant to the President
White House
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Deaver:

On September 13 and 14, 1983, in room SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building, Washington, D.C., the Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism will hold hearings on the 1984 Olympics. The purpose of the hearings is to develop available information on the anticipated threat levels as well as to examine the response capability of federal, state and local agencies involved. In order to ensure an open and candid discussion of this topic, these hearings will be closed to the public and press.

In light of your role in the planning for Olympic security, it is requested that you appear and give testimony before the Subcommittee on September 18, 1983.

Please contact Bert Milling, Jr., at (202) 224-6136 if you have questions. My staff is available to assist in coordinating your appearance.

Sincerely,

Jeremiah Denton
U.S.S.

JD:mmm

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

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SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

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Mr. Michael Deaver
Assistant to the President
White House
Washington, D. C. 20500


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U.S.S.

JD:mm

July 18, 1983
*Requid
and
Nancy Reagan*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO FILE

On September 13-14, 1983, Senator Denton and his Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism will hold closed hearings in Room SD-226 of the Dirksen Senate Office Building. The subject will be the security arrangements for the 1984 Olympics in Los Angeles.

This committee, through counsels, Bert Milling and Joel Lisker at 224-6136, has indicated that their main areas of concern are that (1) adequate resources are being committed to the Olympic Security effort, and (2) the proper intelligence gathering and disseminating procedures are in place and operating. They have also asked for a copy of Col. Beckwith's final report that will be submitted on August 4th.

The following agencies have been requested to attend and testify on the following dates:

September 13th - 1000 - 1600 hrs.

White House (Deaver)
Federal Bureau of Investigation
Los Angeles Police Department
Central Intelligence Agency
State of California (Governor's Office)
LAOOC (Ed Best)

September 14th - 1000 - 1230 hrs.

US Secret Service
State Department
Department of Defense
Immigration and Naturalization
Customs
National Security Agency
Long Beach Police Department
Los Angeles Sheriff's Office

Fred Upton -
OMB.

395-4790

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

July 22, 1983

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September 14th - 1000 - 1230 hrs.

US Secret Service
State Department
Department of Defense
Immigration and Naturalization
Customs
National Security Agency
Long Beach Police Department
Los Angeles Sheriff's Office

DOD
INS
Customs } Panel
USSS
State
FBI - Rowell
CIA - Nelson
USSS - Uta
Pollard
William
Harris
Customs
Wm. Childers

Dec 2.

INS - Ralph Thomas 633-2906
NSA - White House full name
John Johnson DPOB Clearances where
688-7246 SSN
Potkin
John O'Malley
Gene Mack
Don Blunt

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. WRIGHT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
BEFORE A
CLOSED SESSION OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
SEPTEMBER 13, 1983

Mr. Chairman and Members of the Subcommittee:

I am pleased to be here today to discuss the role of the White House in the planning of security arrangements for the 1984 Summer Olympics.

As a matter of national pride, it is essential that we have a successful Olympics and, especially, a safe Olympics. I do not have to remind you of the terrible killings at the 1972 Summer Olympic Games at Munich -- nor of more recent terrorist activities elsewhere. The President is committed to working with the State and local law enforcement authorities and in bringing to bear, as necessary, the resources of the Federal Government, to assure adequate security arrangements for the

extension of their normal responsibilities. For example, the FBI, in collaboration with our intelligence agencies, will target efforts to collect and analyze the information necessary to anticipate and combat terrorism and disruption that might occur at the Olympics. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will augment its inspection workforce to accommodate the increase of entrants to the Los Angeles area. The Customs Department will increase its surveillance and passenger inspection activities at key ports of entry.

The Secret Service will assign increased support to assure the security of dignitaries. The State Department will also provide for routine protection of and special consular services for the foreign dignitaries attending the Games.

Through the oversight of the Office of Management and Budget, we have made sure that sufficient funds are provided in the 1984 budgets of these agencies to carry out their additional tasks.

The Department of Defense will also contribute to the security of 1984 Olympics, assisting State and local law enforcement agencies through the provision, upon request, of special equipment and technical manpower. To provide this support, the Department of Defense requires special legislation. Such

legislation has been submitted as part of 1984 Defense Authorization request. This legislation authorizes fiscal year 1984 appropriations to the Department of Defense of such sums as may be necessary, but not to exceed \$50 million for the purposes of

- logistical support and personnel services,
- lending and providing equipment, and
- providing other such services in support of the 1984 Olympic Games that the Secretary of Defense may consider appropriate.

It is anticipated that a major portion of these funds will be used to strengthen and support security arrangements.

The legislation also provides that before any funds can be obligated by the Department of Defense, the President must approve a justification submitted by the Olympic Law Enforcement Coordinating Council. This process will assure that Defense assistance is allocated to the highest priority security functions and is limited to only those activities that are within special Defense competence.

We have been working and will continue to work closely both with officials of the Federal agencies and with State and local officials to make sure that our activities are well coordinated and well justified. We will continue oversight role to seek better justifications as plans are better formulated by Federal, State and local jurisdictions. We hope for an outstandingly successful Olympics next summer.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 13, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: MICHAEL K. DEEVER
FROM: KENNETH J. HILL ~~KJH~~
SUBJECT: Olympic Status Report: Senator Denton's Hearings

The first day of hearings by the Senate Judiciary Subcommittee on Security and Terrorism, (Senator Denton) were held today at the Dirksen Building. The hearings were classified Top Secret and a closed session. This initial phase was composed of testimony from:

1. White House
2. Federal Bureau of Investigation
3. Central Intelligence Agency
4. National Security Agency
5. State Department
6. Secret Service
7. Customs
8. Immigration
9. Defense Department
10. Coast Guard

The testimony of each agency had been coordinated through my office as to ensure each agency was fully aware of the Administration's philosophy and approach to security for the Olympic Games, and to ascertain that their planning process was sufficiently advanced to satisfy the inquiries from this Senate Committee.

Joe Wright (OMB) presented the White House testimony, (See attached), and I was available to assist him in response to several questions that arose. The panel specifically asked for a copy of Beckwith's report. As gracefully as possible, and under direct pressure, we declined, but vowed to review certain portions of this report with Senator Denton and his staff. We indicated that the report was specifically prepared for the White House in an attempt to have a private assesment of the security situation in L.A. in view of the many reports in the media that had indicated a lack of cooperation and direction among the Olympic security planners. Sensitive matters were frankly and candidly discussed within the report. It was never intended for dissemination. Senator Denton seemed satisfied by an agreement that I would meet with them at a future date and discuss some of the recommendations.

Next, we explained what my role would be throughout the Olympic planning process. We were specifically asked whether there were

any problems at all concerning Federal vs. local authorities, etc. We didn't feel it was appropriate to initiate these issues at the beginning of this forum and declined, indicating that each agency or local jurisdiction could feel free to bring up any issue as appropriate.

The overall tone of the hearings was cumbersome. This was not a hearing that lended itself to "give and take." The subcommittee was only partially informed of what was going on in Los Angeles, and therefore, asked some awkward questions that made little sense. Overall, the general feeling is that nothing startling will come out of these hearings.

Tomorrow the following groups will testify:

1. Los Angeles PD
2. Los Angeles County Sheriff
3. Long Beach PD
4. State of California
5. Los Angeles Olympic Committee

It is anticipated that these local authorities will be more vocal concerning their views of the potential problems facing the planning process. The federal agencies went out of their way to point to the fact that there is excellent cooperation in Los Angeles and that none of the issues are insurmountable.

Senator Denton indicated several times that he will give his full support to any appropriation bills before Congress, that are for security assistance during the Olympic Games. He is vitally interested and while the hearings may not fulfill any real meaningful role, his support is welcome.

cc: Michael McManus



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

STATEMENT OF JOSEPH R. WRIGHT
DEPUTY DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
BEFORE A
CLOSED SESSION OF THE
SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM
COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY
UNITED STATES SENATE
SEPTEMBER 13, 1983

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As a matter of national pride, it is essential that we have a successful Olympics and, especially, a safe Olympics. I do not have to remind you of the terrible killings at the 1972 Summer Olympic Games at Munich -- nor of more recent terrorist activities elsewhere. The President is committed to working with the State and local law enforcement authorities and in bringing to bear, as necessary, the resources of the Federal Government, to assure adequate security arrangements for the

athletes and safe conduct of the Games. Following guidance from the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee (LAOOC) that the Olympics will be privately funded, the Administration has proposed providing services at no cost only for those activities that are within the Federal Government's direct responsibilities. Other services of a more discretionary nature that may be requested by the LAOOC will normally require full reimbursement.

Providing adequate security in this Olympics is a complex task -- far more complex than in providing security arrangements for the 1980 Winter Olympics at rural Lake Placid. In Los Angeles, we expect to host 7 million spectators at 23 game sites. Over 48 Federal, State and local agencies will be involved. These agencies will have the chief responsibility for maintaining law and order and safe conduct of the Games.

Representatives from the several departments and agencies that will contribute to security arrangements are here today and will describe their role in some detail. All of the agencies, except for the Department of Defense, are providing services which they are authorized to perform under existing law, as an

extension of their normal responsibilities. For example, the FBI, in collaboration with our intelligence agencies, will target efforts to collect and analyze the information necessary to anticipate and combat terrorism and disruption that might occur at the Olympics. The Immigration and Naturalization Service will augment its inspection workforce to accommodate the increase of entrants to the Los Angeles area. The Customs Bureau will increase its surveillance and passenger inspection activities at key ports of entry. The Secret Service will assign increased support to assure the security of dignitaries. The State Department will also provide for routine protection of and special consular services for the foreign dignitaries attending the Games.

The Department of Defense will also contribute to the security of 1984 Olympics, assisting State and local law enforcement agencies through the provision, upon request, of special equipment and technical manpower. To provide this support, the Department of Defense requires special legislation. Such legislation has been submitted as part of 1984 Defense Authorization request. This legislation authorizes Fiscal Year 1984 appropriations to the Department of Defense of such sums as may be necessary, but not to exceed \$50 million for the purposes of

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We have been working and will continue to work closely both with officials of the Federal agencies and with State and local officials to make sure that our activities are well coordinated and well justified. Through the oversight of the Office of Management and Budget, we have made sure that appropriate funds are provided in the 1984 budgets of these agencies to carry out their additional tasks. OMB will also continue our oversight role to seek proper justifications as plans are better formulated by Federal, State and local jurisdictions. We hope for an outstandingly successful Olympics next summer.

9/13

Deaver

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LAOC

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NY STATE POL
Sgt. chief
Inspector

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USSS

10-12:30

1. Gathering intel
+ dissemination
2. Resources available
3. Copy of Beckwith report.

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SUBCOMMITTEE: SECURITY / TERRORISM (SENATOR DENTON) (1 OF 2)

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179285	STATEMENT OF OLIVER B. REVELL, ASST DIRCT, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FBI BEFORE A CLOSED SESSION OF THE SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM....SEPTEMBER 13, 1983, (P.2,4,6 - PARTIAL; P.3,5 ALL)	5	9/13/1983	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

179285



U.S. Department of Justice

Federal Bureau of Investigation

Washington, D.C. 20535

STATEMENT

OF

OLIVER B. REVELL

ASSISTANT DIRECTOR

CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION

FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

BEFORE A

CLOSED SESSION OF THE

SUBCOMMITTEE ON SECURITY AND TERRORISM

COMMITTEE ON THE JUDICIARY

UNITED STATES SENATE

SEPTEMBER 13, 1983

"SECRET MATERIAL ATTACHED"



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All paragraphs are classified "SECRET," unless otherwise indicated.

Mr. Chairman and members of the Subcommittee, I am pleased to appear before you today to discuss the Federal Bureau of Investigation's (FBI) role in the planning of security for the forthcoming Olympic Games. Scheduled to begin in Los Angeles on July 28, 1984, and close August 12, the Games are expected to attract approximately 12,000 athletes and a host of visitors and officials. The Games will consist of 23 sporting events to be held in 8 cities and areas located in 5 Southern California counties, with preliminary events in Boston, Massachusetts; Annapolis, Maryland; and Palo Alto, California. (U)

Since the tragic killing of Israeli athletes by Arab terrorists at the 1972 Summer Olympic Games in Munich, West Germany, elaborate security measures for these events have become obligatory, and the Games in the United States will be no exception. Director Webster has made Olympic security a top priority in the FBI, and he has taken a personal interest in our overall planning and preparations. (U)

The FBI is working closely with numerous local, state, and Federal agencies to ensure that all that can be done regarding the security of the athletes and officials is being done. We are coordinating the flow of intelligence regarding possible terrorist movements or attacks, both prior to and during the Games, and

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preparing an emergency response to an incident, should one occur. These are the areas in which the FBI is concentrating its energies and resources, and I would like to discuss them with you. (U)

The Attorney General of the United States has designated the FBI as the lead Federal agency for Federal law enforcement activities, including planning and coordination for the 1984 Summer Olympics. This is not a new role for the Bureau. We had the lead role for responding to major incidents of terrorism, and for coordinating the Federal law enforcement effort for the 1979 Pan American Games in San Juan, Puerto Rico; the 1980 Winter Olympics at Lake Placid, New York; and the 1982 World's Fair in Knoxville, Tennessee. (U)

Our authority for Federal law enforcement during special events such as the Olympics emanates from certain investigative responsibilities assigned to the FBI. These are primarily the Act for the Protection of Foreign Officials and Official Guests of the United States, Title 18, United States Code (U.S.C.), Sections 112, 878, 970, 1116, 1117, and 1201; Assaulting or Killing a Federal Officer, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 111, 1114, and 2231; and our mandated responsibilities for foreign counterintelligence matters, including Espionage, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 793-798 and Title 50, U.S.C., Section 783; Sabotage, Title 18, U.S.C., Sections 2151-2157; and various Registration Acts, such as Title 8, U.S.C., Section 1325; Title 22, U.S.C., Section 618; and Title 50, U.S.C., Sections 851-857. (U)

We have also been assigned the overall responsibility for combating terrorism within the United States, as noted in the

June, 1979, National Security Council document prepared by the Executive Committee on Terrorism. More recently, a Secret National Security Decision Directive dated April 10, 1982, dealing with managing terrorist incidents, stated that the coordination of the Federal response to a terrorist incident would be the responsibility of the lead agency. For terrorist incidents within the territory of the United States, the Directive provided that agency will be the Department of Justice, and unless otherwise specified by the Attorney General, the FBI will be the lead Federal agency within the Department. (S)

This National Security Council Decision Directive also established a Terrorist Incident Working Group, consisting of representatives from the Department of State, [REDACTED] Department of Defense, FBI, Federal Emergency Management Agency, and the National Security Council Staff. This Group has two functions: to support the Special Situation Group, chaired by the Vice President, and to ensure interagency coordination. As the lead Federal agency for a terrorist incident response, the FBI will manage the response to the incident under the direction of the Attorney General and in coordination with the Terrorist Incident Working Group. (S)


The FBI is a permanent member of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, chaired by the Department of State, which develops overall United States policy on terrorism. The same Directive gave the White House Operations Group, headed by the Director of the White House Military Office, responsibility for

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issues relating to threats or acts of terrorism against the President, the Vice President, senior United States officials, and protectees as directed by the President. Liaison among this latter group and the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group, is the responsibility of the National Security Council Staff. (S)

In our role as lead Federal agency for responding to a terrorist incident, we are working side by side with other Federal, state, and local agencies having security and law enforcement responsibilities at the Games. We have not sought, nor do we seek, to encroach upon the jurisdictional responsibilities of these agencies. In fact, our successes in counterterrorism investigations, now a primary mission of the FBI, have been supported to a great extent by the efforts of law enforcement officers at all levels. While preparing for the Olympic Games presents a challenge to all of us in law enforcement, established relationships and investigative experiences provide the foundation for meeting our responsibilities. (U)

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[REDACTED]

To support this massive effort, the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism adopted our recommendation that a subcommittee be established to facilitate exchanges of information, and to ensure all available intelligence regarding the Olympics is sent to FBI Headquarters and to Los Angeles. This subcommittee is under the chairmanship of the FBI, and is composed of representatives from the [REDACTED] Defense Intelligence Agency, U.S. Secret Service, Air Force Office of Special Investigations, Army Intelligence, Naval Investigative Service, and the Department of State. It meets under the authority of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism which, as directed by National Security Decision Directive 30, [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] Directed to provide intelligence support to the Special Situation Group and the Terrorist Incident Working Group, this committee focuses on threat alerts, trend assessments, and procedural improvements. (S)

Collecting massive amounts of intelligence at FBI Headquarters is the first step. That data must be evaluated and provided to those on the scene in California. (U)

The Los Angeles Division of the FBI is part of the local interagency intelligence collection effort to combat terrorism and disruption relative to the 1984 Olympics. The Olympic Interagency Intelligence Subcommittee, cochaired by the FBI, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, and the Los Angeles Police Department, has

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designed an Anti-Terrorist Operations Center (ATOC) to be the intelligence broker for all Olympic participants, and to be the mechanism which receives and evaluates all threats. (U)

To facilitate this assessment function, each of the chairing agencies has contributed personnel to form what is presently known as the Integrated Threat Analysis Group. Eventually, this group will become the nucleus of the ATOC. All personnel involved in the Integrated Threat Analysis Group or the ATOC will be cleared for access to Top Secret material before they receive any classified documents or information. A more detailed description of the functions and makeup of the Integrated Threat Analysis Group will be given to you by Sheriff Sherman Block of the Los Angeles Sheriff's Department. (U)

There will be two entities in the Los Angeles area equipped to use the intelligence provided to them. The ATOC, previously mentioned, will be located in the Los Angeles Office of the FBI. This center will prepare information for dissemination to the Information Coordination Desk of the Olympic Security Coordination Center, made up of all law enforcement agencies concerned with security at the Games. The Information Coordination Desk is designed to combine information received from the ATOC with data gathered from other management centers coordinating such activities as air support, bomb response, diplomatic protection, and emergency response. The Information Coordination Desk will be located in the Olympic Security Coordination Center and, as such, will be in a position to be aware of all Olympic related information. The Olympic Security Coordination Center is to be staffed by representatives

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of all Federal, state, local, and civilian agencies involved in the Olympic operations. (U)

Because the ATOC is to be the focal point for the collection and dissemination of Olympic intelligence, I would like to spend a few moments describing it in detail. (U)

Each agency in the ATOC will contribute resources to support the operation. The center's staff will be comprised of command-level intelligence representatives from the FBI, Los Angeles Sheriff's Department, Los Angeles Police Department, and the U.S. Secret Service. On a daily basis, the center will assess risks to the Games and identify those events having the greatest potential for disruption. (U)

Raw intelligence information which comes into the center will be received, processed, analyzed, and disseminated. The center's staff may also call for additional investigation or analysis, and will be available to brief the respective agency staff and command officers about specific incidents or circumstances. (U)

It is anticipated that the FBI will acquire classified information of significant value to those having law enforcement responsibilities at the Olympics. To eliminate stumbling blocks, law enforcement officers assigned to the ATOC will be cleared for Top Secret material, and FBI Legal Attaches providing information from foreign services will determine at the outset whether or not the particular service would object to its information (as supplied or appropriately concealed) being furnished to law enforcement agencies other than the FBI. We are asking the intelligence community

to provide us, at the headquarters level, wherever possible, with information which can be passed as either unclassified or carrying a low-classification level, so that it can be disseminated immediately to Los Angeles and to the appropriate users. Any highly classified information which cannot be disseminated will be used by the FBI as necessary and appropriate. (U)

Preparing for an event of this magnitude would not be complete without plans to respond to an incident. The Los Angeles FBI Office has developed Emergency Response Teams to establish an initial Federal presence and handle routine incidents under FBI jurisdiction. (U)

The Emergency Response Teams will be on standby 24 hours a day, from the opening of the Olympic village sites through the end of the Games. They are self-contained units which can respond quickly to control serious or escalating problems until additional resources can report to the scene and be integrated into the operations. Each of the four teams will consist of 20 Agents: 1 commander, 1 communicator, 2 investigators, 2 hostage negotiators, 2 bomb technicians, and 2 six-man Special Weapons and Tactics (SWAT) teams. (U)

In addition to the Emergency Response Teams, the FBI will have available its highly trained Hostage Rescue Team, and it will operate under the direction of the Special Agent in Charge of the Los Angeles Division. Established by the Director in January, 1982, this team of 50 Special Agents was developed to resolve the kinds of terrorist situations experienced by other nations. Its

primary mission is to save lives, and it provides the President and the Attorney General an alternative to the use of military force in a domestic terrorist incident. (U)

The Agents on the team were selected from field offices throughout the country, and each member underwent vigorous physical and psychological screening at the FBI Academy in Quantico, Virginia. They have observed and trained with similar antiterrorist groups throughout the world during a rigorous 8-month training schedule. Each member of the team is trained in emergency medical treatment, the use of breaching and diversionary devices, specialized entry techniques, and a variety of other skills. For example, team members have been trained to engage in nighttime siege or hostage situations which present unique difficulties. (U)

In the event an incident does occur, those in Los Angeles must evaluate the situation so that an appropriate response can be made. An assessment will be based on 4 factors: subjects, hostages, objectives, and weapons. After considering these variables, which are taught in FBI crisis management classes using the acronym "SHOW," the on-scene commander will assign a threat or risk level. For this purpose, there are 4 criteria levels:

<u>LEVELS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTIONS</u>	<u>EXAMPLE</u>
I	High risk	Armed subject without hostages.
II	Unusually high risk	Two armed subjects with hostages.
III	Extraordinary	Four terrorists, armed with automatic weapons, holding 80 hostages aboard aircraft.

<u>LEVELS</u>	<u>DESCRIPTIONS</u>	<u>EXAMPLE</u>
IV	Exotic	Extortionist threatening city with mass destruction weapon - nuclear, biological, and chemical. (U)

We anticipate responding to these varying situations as follows:

Level I - Individual Agents or Emergency Response Team

Level II - Emergency Response Team

Level III - Hostage Rescue Team

Level IV - Hostage Rescue Team, in conjunction with Department of Energy and Nuclear Emergency Search Team (NEST), Centers for Disease Control, and Department of Defense components, as required. (U)

Regardless of the severity of the incident, Emergency Response Teams normally will be the first to respond along with the appropriate local police agency. They are prepared to act immediately to stabilize the crisis, in coordination with the police agency having jurisdiction, and in accordance with existing contingency plans. They also are capable of planning and executing an emergency rescue if necessary. Time and other constraints permitting, however, the preferable response to a Level III or Level IV situation is deployment of the Hostage Rescue Team. In the event of a Level IV incident, the Department of Energy's Nuclear Emergency Search Team also may be called out. The use of specialized and highly trained units will minimize the risks associated with hostage recovery. (U)

I am pleased to note that the FBI enjoys an excellent relationship with the Department of Energy and the Centers for

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Disease Control in Atlanta, Georgia, and conducts joint training with these agencies. Should a Level IV incident occur, we would immediately activate our established coordinated plans to contain and counter the threat effectively. In addition, the President may waive the "Posse Comitatus" limitation for military intervention and allow the assistance of the military. This step is reserved for a "worst case" situation, such as multiple terrorist attacks at different sites. (U)

Mr. Chairman, we have not received any credible indication or evidence that any groups or individuals are planning a disruption of the Games. That is not to say that nothing will happen; however, all of us involved with security of the Olympic Games whether at the Federal, state, or local level are determined that the Los Angeles Olympics will not fall prey to a successful terrorist attack. (U)

At this time, I would be pleased to answer any questions. (U)

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