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Strategic Objective 2:

Undertake policy that will send a clear signal that this administration does intend to work toward balancing the budget and thereby take the basic fuel away from the engine of inflation. This message should be sent to the people, to Congress and to those in the money markets who, through their collective buy and sell decisions, set the structure of interest rates.

Budgets, as the President stated in addressing the Union, cannot be accurately projected. Yet, people must make decisions now on what they expect will happen in the future. At this juncture, it is clearly evident that many individuals who can, and do, influence the rates of interest -- the Damocles Sword overhanging this administration's economic recovery efforts -- do believe that the potential is very real that President Ronald Reagan in four years could run up far more red ink than any president in history.

Deficits are not unknown to Americans. In point of fact, in the 22 years between John F. Kennedy's 1962 budget and Ronald Reagan's projected 1984 budget, this country has had only one surplus budget -- under President Johnson.

Our concern about the size of our projected deficit should focus on the fact that even as a stand-alone issue it would cast a very somber tone over the possibilities of Republicans winning seats in the Congress in the fall election this year. Even more importantly, it is also clear that failure to cope effectively with budget deficits, high interest rates and high unemployment this year could be as devastating for Republicans as it was for the Democrats in 1980. It is also evident that when a party appears to have walked away from what its loyalists considered to be its first principles, the foundations are

shaken to the detriment of the whole structure. Hence, politically the present projected 91 billion dollar deficit is not acceptable. Neither is balancing the budget somewhere beyond the sunset.

This administration must reaffirm its commitment to fiscal responsibility. It must make that commitment to get maximum political leverage, both in the policy and the political arenas, by being bold, consistent, and proposing something that has a good chance of working.

The President, we feel, should reaffirm explicitly his personal commitment to a balanced budget amendment by indicating he would certify (if Congress would pass) a Constitutional amendment to balance the budget starting in some specific year in the very near future.

Critics could claim that Reagan's support of the balanced budget amendment reflects cynical manipulation and nothing beyond. To undercut such outcries, other concrete steps must be taken simultaneously to drive home the depth and strength of this administration's commitment to bring run-away deficits under control. It is essential that we propose budget, tax and/or spending changes that would reduce the now-projected deficits.

A wide variety of options exist to satisfy this objective. Three possible options are imposing taxes that hit consumption harder than investment moderating the rate of increase in defense spending to the 3-7% range the President committed to during the campaign and then let Congress itself suggest cuts in areas that we have not touched in, for example, some of the entitlements outside of the Social Security package. To get the projected deficits in the "out years" under control, it may be necessary to adjust the COLA's and tax indexing.

As a linking element, it would be advisable to keep the pressure on Congress to pass budget reductions in the fiscal years between now and the year the budget would be balanced under the balanced budget amendment. This would lay a firm foundation for on-going budget balancing.

Guidelines would also have to be provided to the Congress concerning the amount of funds the administration felt was needed for national defense, welfare, and Social Security, as well as what spending reforms would be acceptable.

Strategic Objective 3:

Signal our support of the balanced budget amendment along with other elements to give immediate force to our commitment to bring down the deficits. Do this in conjunction with the vote to increase the national debt limit in a fashion to unify our Republican support in the Congress.

The balanced budget amendment gives us the opportunity to:

- . put the President back in control of the budgetary process,
- . re-synchronize the President's program with his principle of establishing vision and direction for the current government activities, and
- . put back into force the single driving element of our 1981 legislative successes: namely, a unified Republican effort.

The President should seize the opportunity of the vote to raise the ceiling on the national debt to remind the people that he does not favor such action. Further, he should emphasize that it is now time

to do something to stop this mockery of fiscal responsibility -- an unhealthy legacy brought on over several decades. There may have been some advantage in letting Congress dissect our budget over the past several weeks, allowing them to wrestle with some of the intractable "Hobson's choices" that must be made to bring the budget into proper alignment; however, we should not let that particular stew boil for too many more weeks.

For example, one of the advantages of handling the balanced budget amendment as described is that this procedure pulls the teeth from a series of steps that could not only embarrass the administration severely, but also damage it politically through the year. If the conservative Senate Republicans (who have run against deficits for many elections) agree that they just cannot swallow voting for an increase in the ceiling this time, given projected deficits, they could defeat the debt ceiling vote. Once again, government would close down and clearly the loser this time -- as opposed to last fall's reconciliation vote -- would be the Reagan Administration. To have government grind to a halt because the Reagan Administration could not get the Congress to approve an increase in the debt ceiling sends the wrong message to the wrong people at the wrong time. A burgeoning federal debt is inconsistent with our policies. It pits Republicans against Republicans. The Democrats would have a heyday by once again focusing on the consequences of "no government" for a period of time and blaming it on the inability of this administration to govern in the most basic fashion: simply to keep its doors open.

By starting now to put our ducks in line, and to fashion actively this program, we can turn that dark scenario clearly to our advantage.

Strategic Objective 4:

Win, lose, or draw on the economic recovery, we must do all we can to position the Reagan Administration more firmly on the side of equity than we did in 1981.

In point of fact, if our economic program generates a strong and sustained recovery through the fall and benefits everyone, then the only major issue with any substance left for the Democrats would be the issue of fairness. They could agree that everyone did benefit from the Reagan recovery but yet make the statement "not everyone benefited equally," and use that to badly bruise some of our candidates in the fall.

We can be very sure, regardless of what the economic circumstances will be, that fairness will rank high on the Democratic strategy options. They will use with a vengeance the Congressional Budget Office report of February 28 which showed that 86% of all the federal income tax benefits enacted by Congress in 1981, at President Reagan's request, will go to families with incomes over \$20,000 a year, while two-thirds of all the cuts in benefits will be taken from families with incomes below \$20,000.

These are some of the things that we might do to take the edge off that charge:

- . We should push and support legislation which will close tax loopholes now being used by large and profitable corporations.

- 
- . We must not get locked into battles over nickel and dimes on social programs that will provide grist for the mill of the Democrats and the media to tag us with the label of "scrooge." As many of these battles as can be deferred to another day should be.
  - . We should encourage policies that hit the power and undue privilege of affluent individuals and businesses.
  - . If Deputy Secretary Carlucchi really has a program underway aimed at assuring wiser expenditure of defense dollars, let's get it out front with hard examples of the savings that have been made through his programs and the specifics on boondoggles that have been eliminated.
  - . We should subject the Pentagon to even more skeptical scrutiny on their budgets than the rest of government.
  - . When the E.R.A. ratification process expires in June there will be another amendment putting it back on the docket. We should quickly assess how much leverage our Task Force on Legal Equity for Women really has and encourage that Task Force to be ready with recommendations to be presented just prior to or after the E.R.A. surfaces again. While it is evident that this area has been mined before, hopefully we can find enough ore to position this administration clearly on the side of opposing unequal treatment because of sex.
  - . While we have lost considerable credibility with the Black and minority communities because we have been perceived as vacillating on the Voting Rights Act, we should now put no road blocks in the congressional extension of the Act (which contains language that may cause some slight discomfort) and support even the House bill. There is virtually no downside

with our southern base, and further wrangling and hauling will likely neither change the course of Congress nor help us in any way politically.

- Review our programs such as employment training, the enterprise zones, and crime control to see if we can find pieces of those programs that help the poor and the needy in the urban cities and highlight those elements publicly. While there is little we can do to strip away the support the Democrats now get in the Black community, there is some evidence that our "perceived" insensitivity to Blacks is spilling over and hurting us among moderate suburban ticket-splitters. This we can staunch.

#### Strategic Objective 5:

Jimmy Carter demonstrated that you cannot build positive support for an administration through the use of "symbols" alone. On the other hand, we should recognize explicitly that symbols can, do, and have done damage to this administration, especially on the dimensions of fairness and sensitivity.

Any presidential actions that evoke the images of luxury, privilege or power should be most carefully scrutinized and eliminated. Although the President must and should get away from Washington to relax, when he visits the island of Barbados over the Easter weekend the emphasis must be on the working tasks accomplished prior to Saturday and Sunday.



Strategic Objective 6:

Just because we are now "the Administration," we should not feel obligated to defend every single on-going program, especially those that have their roots in the Carter Administration.

Remember that many of the programs that we administer were Carter's programs. We must not tie ourselves to his legacy. Contrarily, when a Carter program is wrong (especially any defense programs), we should tag them as his and as wrong.

Further, we should carefully sort out the spending and tax elements that were passed last year and identify which were really "ours" and which were "theirs" -- and then defend ours and cut ourselves loose from some of theirs in the budgetary battles this year.

Strategic Objective 7:

Reinforce the notion that this administration is both future-oriented and forward-looking.

The single most dramatic perceptual change the Reagan victory induced was to position the Republican party as the party of innovation and change. That perception is an asset and we should build upon it, especially if by the end of the year the economy gives us some breathing room so that we can refocus some resources on space technology. Further we should seek out, define, and force some votes on the Hill that can be construed as votes for the future, hope, and opportunity and against continuation of government as Americans have experienced it (under the Democrats) over the last 40 years.

Strategic Objective 8:

Remember that both political and governing coalitions are based upon the strength of their individual pieces -- the voting constituents.

We must pay much closer attention to both our base coalition and to our swing coalitions and examine every policy and every action against this criterion: "Does our action build or destroy support among that unique group of Americans who were responsible for our election?" This should be done not simply because we owe them, but rather because this group is the easiest one to keep in our corner to maintain our grass roots strength, especially among small businessmen, farmers, southern conservatives, Hispanics, blue-collar ethnics, and Reagan Democrats.

Strategic Objective 9:

Take more visible positions on some of the social issues. Select at least one such issue that the Congress is wrestling with this year and give it strong presidential support.

Democrats who voted for Reagan are primarily drawn to us not only because of the economic issues, but also because of the Reagan position on social issues. Given the profile that we have recently developed on who these individuals are and what issues they are concerned about, we would strongly recommend that the administration go out front this year on the issue of voluntary prayer in the schools. Busing must be handled very carefully because of its civil rights overtones.

Strategic Objective 10:

Set in place a series of communication options that will increase Ronald Reagan's opportunities to speak directly to the people on the subject of his choosing, timed at his discretion, and through the media best designed to give us maximum impact with the groups with whom we want to communicate.

Remember that the most unreliable and ineffective communication vehicle for us or any president to use is the press conference. We should consider setting into motion as quickly as we possibly can a communications plan that would rely upon:

- . distributing directly to local TV stations a two-minute message from the President with mini video tape cassettes. They could slot these into their own news programs. Topic matter should relate to specific regional interests and be distributed in those particular areas to 400 or so major television stations;
- . blocking out five- to ten-minute radio speeches for the President to give twice or three times a month. These should not be scheduled every week. We need the flexibility;
- . following through on the idea that was proposed at Camp David that the networks themselves will give us two- to three-minute segments on national television news if we permit them to ask one or two questions on the topic that we choose to discuss;
- . crafting "op-ed" pieces, specifically designed to drive home our positions among the opinion leaders;

- . looking at the press not as a monolithic mass but as composed of a variety of individuals and segments that we can deal with more effectively in smaller, more homogeneous blocs by the way we disseminate information through the President and others;
- . preparing to address the nation with at least two "political" talks between now and the fall election and having the RNC fund that time through television;
- . launching a group of "presidential forums." These would consist of a series of meetings with key constituent groups at geographically dispersed locations. The forums will have specific labels reflecting their purpose to avoid association with President Carter's Town Meetings. For example:
  - . President's Auto Worker Forum
  - . President's Teacher Forum
  - . President's Agri Forum
  - . President's Small Businessman Forum
  - . President's Steel Worker Forum
  - . President's Retiree Forum
  - . President's Urban Forum

The time, place and type of forum would be directly contingent on the message we want to communicate.

The purpose of these forums would be:

- . To break the stereotypical setting of the President's "speeches" by bringing him closer to the people to address a subject (group) of our choosing.
- . To reinforce confidence that only President Reagan's programs and values constitute the leadership that will meet the country's needs.
- . To deal to the personality strengths of the President -- he's sincere, he cares, he's candid, he's committed. The bottom line: he is a leader in whose hands you can place your trust and your hopes for the future.

The format of the forum should be informal. The site selection might be a high school gym rather than a hotel ballroom. The President is with his people on their territory. He's there to listen. He didn't come to lecture. He came because he cares. Consider family attendance. The President opens the forum with informal remarks and brief statements on key national issues and particularly those most relevant to the specific audience with a warm-up with a message.

- . Progress on inflation
- . Importance of tax cuts
- . May vote on budget ceiling -- diffuse the issue
- . Housing
- . Unemployment
- . El Salvador -- why it is critical and why it isn't Vietnam. Allay fears but help them understand it is a real threat.

Audience questions should be directed to the President. The bulk of questions would likely be concentrated within the framework provided by his opening comments. Firm, direct, but informal answers would be ideal. The audience is "real folks," not the press corps. Informality might be assisted if the President were to ask each questioner to preface question with some personal background (e.g., name, where grew up, family size, employment status, etc.).

Impromptu closing by President reflective of question/answer session and his values/patriotism.

Some suggestions as to the organization of the forums could include having them set up by local groups (e.g. UAW Local for Auto Worker Forum). People who would like to attend forum sign up and then are selected by lottery. Advantages of lottery are threefold: 1) The President cannot be accused of loading the audience; 2) it reduces likelihood of extreme dissident groups organizing demonstrations in the forum; and 3) it would allow Secret Service opportunity to screen attendees.

Press corps coverage can be allowed but they would not be permitted to ask questions. The session could be taped for distribution to local TV news outlets.

As for timing --as soon as possible.

The President would be comfortable and effective in this type of environment, but we must recognize that questions will come from various directions and some might be hostile. On the other hand, the ability to anticipate questions is enhanced by the facts that: 1) the bulk of the audience for each forum will be of a common background and therefore have common interests and questions, 2) questions will tend to fall into

the framework of the President's opening remarks, and 3) if deemed necessary, research could be done in each city prior to a forum to identify key interests and issues among the subject audience.

We need not be concerned about "over-exposure." Our concern should focus on what we must do to get the right kind of exposure.

We should also accept the fact that the Washington media are what they are. Their interpretational program is never going to be supportive no matter how hard we try to woo them. Therefore, we must concentrate on the strengths of Ronald Reagan himself and on the non-Washington-based media.

Additionally, we should look at non-conventional media-communications channels. For example, targeted direct mail is something that a president has never used. Given, however, the kind of response that the various Republican committees are generating from virtually any mail list -- good or bad -- in raising funds using the president's name, we should carefully examine the possibility of using direct Presidential mail from lists of responders to the RNC, NRCC, or NRSC to recommit our friends and marshal specific opinion leader support to impact the Congress or generate support from some of our institutional allies.

Voices other than Ronald Reagan's should be consciously used to test major initiatives we may be considering and to prepare the political-media environments prior to our major announcements. Once the President goes out in front with a position, then surrogate support should be significantly heightened. Some of the resources that can provide this kind of support for the President are: friendly governors, members of the cabinet, the Vice President, and other private but well-known individuals who through experience or position are in a unique position to comment favorably on our policies. But

this takes planning and coordination to insure a broad range of voices on a wide spectrum of the media giving precisely the message that we want communicated.

Lastly, serious consideration should be given to the suggestions of Mike Deaver to provide a more reasoned set of rules to govern the White House Press core.

Strategic Objective 11:

Do not use Ronald Reagan as a tourist this fall.

Presidents who go out on the stump are often of limited help to most candidates; additionally, they almost invariably fritter away some of their own perceptual strength as national leaders when they don the hat of what the press portrays as a political huckster. The President should, however, make some very carefully planned symbolic personal stops that will give us broad-based media coverage. Also, he should be available to all Republican candidates in D.C. to help them personalize their campaign with mini TV cuts with the President when, and if, they so choose.

The political stops that the President does make this fall should be carefully targeted. Given the nature of this year's elections, where the President travels should not be decided until the last two or three weeks of the campaign. President Reagan's schedule should be kept as flexible as possible in October.



Strategic Objective 12:

If the mixed economic results hold, we can make a good case for our successes and systematically prepare the way those successes are explained by the Republican committees and candidates.

As Republicans, we have been out of power so long that we have been conditioned to always craft our messages against a program or a policy. We must now create two or at most three positive defenses of our programs and policies to take to the electorate in the fall. All Republicans must answer the question: "Why do Republicans deserve to be reelected this fall?" If we answer that question in a unified fashion, we triple our impact.

Strategic Objective 13:

Unless we encounter severe setbacks in our economic programs by mid-summer, we should look seriously at undertaking some bold, imaginative step in the foreign policy area late September/early October.

Strategic Objective 14:

Continue to use the Reagan Federalism program as a platform to drive home our objective of making government more responsive to the people.

The Federalism theme can be used by the President in the 1982 elections to fulfill his 1980 promise to get government off the people's backs. His visits to states, meetings with governors and local government officials, and frequent public communication via

radio and television should stress these points. These interactions must be coordinated, followed up by members of the administration with a single voice, and reported to Congress.

During the educational and legislative phases, the President's proposal will come under considerable attack. It is essential to advance Reagan Federalism as:

- . a philosophy of governance and a perennial issue of Constitutional government;
- . a set of themes and not a cluster of programs;
- . an approach to governance compatible with the President's Economic Recovery Program, and consistent with the President's commitment to reduce the level of government;
- . a strategy aimed at a significant contributor to the nation's economic problems -- big, unresponsive government distant from the people; and,
- . a strategy for reducing the governmental bureaucratic complex that has circumvented state legislatures.

The President can use Federalism to further propel his agenda at all levels of government and among all people. There is a strong public desire to move power out of Washington and back to the states.

- . The public debate on Federalism will, however, be lost if the arguments are made at the programmatic level, but won if it is presented thematically.

Strategic Objective 15:

There will be great pressure brought to bear on the administration late spring and early summer by those who want to generate political gain out of the peace and anti-nuclear movement. We should co-opt the peace marchers' positions whenever possible.

The zero base option for Europe proposed by the President last fall provides the ideal model for us to follow this spring. While the Kennedy-Hatfield nuclear freeze may have some serious pitfalls, we should develop soon proposals for strategic arms talks that call for a reduction in nuclear weapons with verification on our terms. The key response that the President made to Brezhnev's call for a freeze was just right: "It doesn't go far enough."

Strategic Objective 16:

Recognize that the most powerful and unpredictable political shocks to our administration this year will come from our foreign relations.

In 1981 we were fortunate. We did not face a major foreign crisis. We may not be so lucky in 1982. El Salvador, China, the Mideast, the NATO Alliance each and all could trigger some major hot spots for us this year. Prioritizing the likelihood of a breakout in these areas against their political impacts should be an ongoing and closely-monitored activity for us.


Strategic Objective 17:

We must keep our Republican leadership base squarely behind us by rewarding openly those Republican leaders who support us and punishing those who don't.

Given the difficulty of the tasks that we face this next year, it is imperative that we solidify the resolve of our political allies to stand behind and openly support our positions and policies. Further we must dampen and contain the criticism in our own ranks. We should not hesitate to move strongly and quickly against high profile Republicans who damage the credibility of President Reagan by attacking him publicly.

In sum, we are now at the most critical political juncture this Administration will ever face. None of the key decisions to be made are easy. But clearly what we do or fail to do in the next four months will tag this presidency as a failure or a success.

We cannot tolerate with impunity the kind of attacks on the President mounted by our "own" Senators Packwood and Mathias and Congressman Marks. If Packwood persists in his destructive sniping we should remove him from his Republican leadership position. His dissonant voice encourages others, like Representative Marc Lincoln Marks. Not only do their comments provide ammunition for the media and the Democrats, but they directly erode our base Republican support.



*Dannon  
Guller*

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**M E M O R A N D U M**

TO: Edwin Meese, James Baker and Michael Deaver

FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin

DATE: June 22, 1982

SUBJECT: The Public's Attitudes toward Eleven Potential Tax Increases

Our half sample (N=739) reflects broad differences of support for eleven proposed changes to increase federal tax revenues. (See following table.) The most strongly supported tax change: "Requiring all corporations that make a profit to pay a minimum corporate tax." The most strongly opposed tax change: "Imposing a tax on oil that would raise the price of gasoline by about eight cents."

Be careful about the "Safe Harbor" revision. I am uncertain whether the description that was applied ---"Repealing the present law that lets one company sell tax benefits it cannot use to another company which can take these benefits to reduce its taxes."---cast the issue properly. I believe the abuses of the Safe Harbor tax provisions can very clearly be applied against us politically.

We need to discuss the implications of our tax policies in depth and soon.

No one likes to have their taxes increased; however, with the prospect of a \$100 billion dollar deficit next year, and perhaps larger deficits in the future, taxes may have to be increased in order to raise more revenue. I'm going to read you a list of tax options that have been proposed, and I'd like you to rate each one on a scale where a minus 5 means you strongly oppose that plan, while a plus 5 means you strongly favor the plan. A zero therefore means that you neither favor nor oppose the plan, but are neutral about it. Of course, you may use any number between minus 5 and plus 5 to indicate how much you personally favor or oppose each proposed tax increase.

	Average Response	Support Ratio
Requiring all corporations that make a profit to pay a minimum corporate tax.	+2.41	5:1*
Raising the tax on a pack of cigarettes by 8 cents.	+2.36	4:1
Doubling the present tax on alcoholic beverages.	+2.08	3:1
Limiting the tax deductions companies get when they pay for employee health insurance	+0.22	1:1
Increasing the enforcement of the present tax laws by hiring more IRS agents to see that taxes owed to the government are actually paid.	-0.33	1:1
Imposing a national sales tax of 1% on all items purchased in the United States.	-0.35	1:2
Eliminating the 10% federal income tax cut that is scheduled to take effect on July 1, 1983.	-0.44	1:2
Repealing the deductions given on federal income taxes for payment of state sales taxes.	-0.98	1:3
Repealing the present law that lets one company sell tax benefits it cannot use to another company who can take these benefits to reduce its taxes.	-1.34	1:3
Imposing a tax on oil that would raise the price of gasoline by 5 cents a gallon at the pump.	-1.80	1:6
Imposing a windfall profits tax on deregulated natural gas that would raise the cost of natural gas to the consumer by 10%.	-2.79	1:10
Imposing a tax on oil that would raise the price of gasoline by about 8 cents a gallon.	-2.82	1:10**

\*This ratio should be interpreted as: For every 5 persons who strongly favor (+5) this policy, there is 1 person who strongly opposes (-5) this same policy.

\*\*This ratio should be interpreted as: For every 1 person who strongly favors this policy, there are 10 people who strongly oppose this same policy.

*Revision of Page 2*

MICE DEAUER

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
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FLASH RESULTS

RNC 10

JUNE 15 - 22, 1982

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


POLITICAL CLIMATE



# RIGHT DIRECTION/WRONG TRACK

GENERALLY SPEAKING, WOULD YOU SAY THAT THINGS IN THIS COUNTRY ARE GOING IN THE RIGHT DIRECTION, OR HAVE THEY GOTTEN OFF ON THE WRONG TRACK?



Number One National Problem

(Rank order by frequency of mention on latest survey)


	Sep 18-28 TRI	Oct 5-14 TRII	Oct 17-26 TRIII	Nov 9-18 TRIV	Nov 30- Dec 9 TRV	Dec 13-16 TRVI	Dec 18-22 TRVII	Jan 11-19 RNC1	Feb 25 Mar 6 RNC4	Mar 20-29 RNC5	April 12-18 RNC7	May 21-26 RNC9	June 16-22 RNC10
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
employment	7	6	8	12	17	13	17	17	23	29	28	28	27
inflation	30	25	25	26	21	21	22	24	17	17	13	15	15
economy/General	17	12	16	16	15	19	14	16	10	6	19	6	6
high interest rates	7	9	7	6	5	3	3	5	6	5	5	7	7
world peace	4	7	6	6	6	10	10	5	5	5	9	7	7
government spending	3	5	3	4	3	5	4	3	5	3	3	3	2
decline in morals	3	4	5	5	4	3	4	5	5	4	4	6	6
social Security	6	3	2	3	4	5	3	3	3	3	5	4	3
crime	3	5	4	3	3	2	2	4	3	2	3	3	3
foreign policy	1	2	2	1	1	3	3	2	2	3	2	1	2
taxes	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
national defense	2	3	2	1	2	2	1	1	1	1	2	1	1
labor unions	-	-	1	-	1	1	-	-	-	1	-	-	-

Government Hopeless to Solve Problems

	Eagle II	Eagle III	Eagle IV	Eagle V	Eagle VI	Eagle VII	Eagle VIII	Eagle IX	Eagle XI	Track I	Track II	RNC 1	RNC 4	RNC 5	RNC 10
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Agree	50	52	52	55	48	44	57	56	46	41	40	48	47	54	53
Disagree	47	45	45	41	50	53	42	42	52	57	58	51	51	43	43
No opinion	3	2	4	3	3	3	2	2	3	1	1	1	2	3	4


Average Man Getting Worse

	Eagle II	Eagle III	Eagle IV	Eagle V	Eagle VI	Eagle IX	Track I	Track II	RNC 1	RNC 2	RNC 3	RNC 4	RNC 10
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Agree	66	74	72	67	70	62	65	64	67	64	66	67	67
Disagree	32	24	25	29	30	36	33	34	32	34	31	31	31
No opinion	2	2	3	3	1	2	2	2	1	2	3	2	2




PRESIDENTIAL PERFORMANCE


# REAGAN JOB RATING GENERAL



# REAGAN JOB RATING (ECONOMY)




# REAGAN JOB RATING (FOREIGN AFFAIRS)






# REAGAN JOB RATING (UNEMPLOYMENT)



# REAGAN JOB RATING (INFLATION)



APPROVE

DISAPPROVE


NO OPINION

1981

1982


# JOB RATINGS: JUNE 15-23, 1982

## RONALD REAGAN AND THE CONGRESS




# HAS REAGAN CUT SPENDING ENOUGH?

FROM WHAT YOU'VE HEARD AND READ, HAS RONALD REAGAN CUT GOVERNMENT SPENDING ENOUGH, MORE THAN ENOUGH, OR NOT ENOUGH DURING HIS FIRST YEAR AS PRESIDENT?



# REAGAN DONE TO SOCIAL SECURITY?

IN REGARD TO SOCIAL SECURITY PAYMENTS, IS IT YOUR IMPRESSION THAT RONALD REAGAN HAS INCREASED OR REDUCED SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS?



Like Most About Reagan  
(Rank order by frequency of mention)

	Jul 1981	Aug 1981	Sep 1981	Sep 18-28	Oct 4-14	Oct 17-27	Nov 9-18	Nov 30- Dec 12	Jan 11-19	Feb 25- Mar 6	Mar 20-29	April 12-18	May 21-26	Jun 16-
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
Strong leadership capability	15	24	23	20	20	19	19	20	18	16	14	13	14	14
Do a good job	10	8	10	10	9	10	10	10	9	8	10	9	10	11
Appearance/Personality	10	5	6	4	4	5	6	6	6	8	6	7	5	7
Honest/Sincere	9	7	6	6	5	5	7	9	9	7	5	7	3	5
Outspoken/Straightforward	5	7	5	4	5	4	5	4	4	5	3	4	6	4
Stand on government spending	2	1	6	7	5	6	5	6	6	4	5	4	3	4
Stand on economy	4	3	3	3	5	3	3	3	4	3	3	2	2	2
Help the people	4	4	2	2	3	3	2	2	1	2	1	2	1	1
Qualified/Capable	2	2	2	3	2	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	1	1
Campaign promises	2	3	3	2	1	2	1	1	2	1	1	1	1	1
Stand on labor unions	-	-	4	2	1	2	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-
General positive	5	3	1	-	3	3	4	4	3	4	3	6	6	7
Too soon to judge/Neutral	1	1	1	5	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-	-
No opinion	5	5	3	4	3	4	5	6	7	9	9	11	8	7
Specific positive responses	83	83	86	77	84	82	80	79	77	72	68	69	66	66
Negative	11	11	10	14	12	13	14	15	16	19	23	20	19	20

Like Least About Reagan

(Rank order by frequency of mention)

	Jul 1981	Aug 1981	Sep 9 1981	Sep 18-28	Oct 4-14	Oct 17-27	Nov 9-18	Nov 30-Dec 12	Jan 11-19	Feb 25-Mar 6	Mar 20-29	Apr 12-18	May 21-26	June 16-2
stand on cutback in social programs	6	4	8	9	9	8	8	7	9	8	7	7	6	6
will not represent the people	4	3	3	4	4	5	5	5	4	6	6	5	4	5
stand on aid to the elderly	6	5	7	8	6	6	5	6	5	3	4	5	7	5
appearance	2	3	2	2	2	2	2	2	1	2	2	2	1	3
avors rich	2	4	3	4	4	4	5	4	5	5	4	4	5	3
stand on foreign policy	3	2	3	3	4	5	5	3	5	3	4	3	2	3
his age/Health	4	4	4	4	3	3	3	3	1	2	1	3	1	2
ctor	3	3	1	2	2	2	2	1	1	2	2	-	2	2
abinet/Aides	3	1	2	2	2	2	3	3	2	2	1	2	1	2
stand on labor unions	-	3	2	1	-	1	1	1	-	-	-	-	-	-
eneral negative	3	1	2	2	1	1	2	3	3	3	2	3	2	3
oo soon to judge/Neutral	2	2	3	13	2	1	2	1	1	1	1	-	-	-
o opinion	14	13	9	10	10	0	11	14	11	14	13	13	14	14
ositive	26	28	23	18	24	24	21	21	20	18	18	18	19	20
esistance Ratio	24:10	25:10	23:10	13:10	20:10	19:10	15:10	14:10	13:10	9:10	8:10	9:10	10:10	10:1





