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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 30, 1983

F-11

file

Dear Charlie:

This letter is in response to your letter of September 9th regarding USIA's proposal to establish a Presidential Ronald Reagan Scholars Program as part of the International Youth Exchange Initiative. I've discussed it with the Counsel's office, and we feel that naming the program "President Ronald Reagan Scholars Program" could detract from the worthy purpose it is intended to serve. This, particularly so, as we approach an election year, when naming the program after an incumbent President could be viewed as a partisan act.

I'm enclosing the Counsel's memo to me. Let me know if you want to discuss it.

Sincerely,

Mike

MICHAEL K. DEEVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff

The Honorable Charles Z. Wick
Director
United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Director



November 28, 1983

Dear Mike:

I wrote to you on November 1 (see tab A) concerning establishing a President Ronald Reagan Scholarship Program. My initial letter to you on this subject was transmitted on September 9 (tab B).

Just to keep you informed, these scholarships are now being given out. We are therefore losing an opportunity to give the President proper credit.

I look forward to hearing your thoughts in this regard.

Best wishes.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in black ink, appearing to read "C. Wick", is written over a large, stylized flourish that starts with a large loop and extends to the right.

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House

November 1, 1983

Dear Mike:

While I was overseas on official travel, I had a member of my staff follow up with your office regarding the attached letter from me to you on establishing a President Ronald Reagan Scholars Program.

The word we received was that you wanted to talk to me about this proposal. Please let me know when we can discuss it.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House

D:CZWick:RLEarle:kd

September 9, 1983

Dear Mike:

USIA proposes to establish a President Ronald Reagan Scholars program as part of our International Youth Exchange Initiative.

This opportunity has been made possible through the generous gift of \$1,000,000 contributed by the President's Inaugural Trust. Two possible approaches have been identified, and I would appreciate knowing your preference as to how we should proceed. (See attachment A for a staff memo to me with further details.)

The first option would establish a special fund to support partial scholarships for both U.S. and foreign students. Emphasis would be given to selecting participants in need of financial assistance. This money would be in addition to other Initiative grant money, thus establishing the new category of exchanges -- President Ronald Reagan Scholars.

Coy Eklund, Chairman of the President's Council for International Youth Exchange, believes that this approach would appeal to potential corporate donors and would serve as an incentive to raising private contributions for the Initiative. This option would also increase the overall number of exchanges taking place under the Initiative.

The second approach would establish an enhancement program for foreign students only. Organizations participating in the Initiative would select individuals who had distinguished themselves during their exchange visit to the U.S. These young people would then be designated as President Ronald Reagan Scholars and invited to participate in a high-level seminar on the American political system in Washington.

If you think of a third option, please let me know. I look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President

RECEIVED

83 AUG 28 AIO: 11

August 24, 1983

RE
FB
T/K

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Director

THROUGH: C - John L. Hedges *ML*

THROUGH: E - Dr. Ronald L. Trowbridge *RLT*

FROM: E/YX - Donna Marie Oglesby *DMO*

SUBJECT: Presidential Inaugural Trust Contribution

Outlined below are two options for creating a President Ronald Reagan Scholars program. The proposed projects seek to give recognition both to the President's commitment to international youth exchange and to the generosity of the Inaugural Trust.

Option I - Scholarship Fund

E/YX would set up a special fund, totaling \$1,000,000 over the course of the Initiative, to be made available to youth exchange projects for partial scholarships. Organizations seeking grants from USIA would be invited to include as a portion of the project a request for these funds. Emphasis would be given to selecting participants in need of financial assistance, a principle which Coy Ecklund believes would appeal to potential corporate donors and therefore serve as an incentive to raising private contributions to the Initiative. Participants could be both U.S. and foreign and would be designated Ronald Reagan Scholars.

Option II - Enhancement Program

We would ask youth exchange organizations participating in the Initiative to conduct a search for outstanding candidates from their programs to participate in a special program in Washington. These young people would have distinguished themselves during their stay in the U.S., either at school or in their local communities. The students would gather in Washington during their spring break for a high-level seminar on the American political system. We envision meetings with members of Congress and the Administration and even with the President himself. (John Kennedy used to meet with departing AFS students in the Rose Garden, and we would like to see this tradition renewed.) This project would be limited to foreign students.

Recommendation

E/YX favors Option I, the Scholarship Fund, over the Washington seminar. A project which applies equally well to U.S. and foreign students is preferable to the one-sided alternative. Since scholarships for needy youth are appealing to the President's Council, Option I carries the added benefit for our fund-raising campaign. Option II does not increase the number of youth exchanges, which makes it an expensive investment in quality enhancement.

If you approve this proposal, we will prepare the necessary memorandum outlining the program to the White House for their concurrence.

I recommend that you approve Option I.

APPROVE _____ DISAPPROVE _____ DISCUSS _____

DATE _____

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director



file

October 31, 1983

Dear Mike:

A member of my staff who attended the Spanish International Television Network song competition at Constitution Hall Saturday night reported that the President's recorded message was warmly received by the audience. His comments were timely, and the audience especially appreciated the words in Spanish at the end of his statement. Applause was lengthy and warm.

The program was seen by 200 million viewers throughout the Spanish-speaking world, including several million Hispanic Americans in this country. Following the Grenadan activities, it was a timely event and a good forum for the President to stress the close ties among our nations.

Thanks for your help in making this possible.

Best regards.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House



October 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House

FROM:

Kenneth Y. Tomlinson *KT*
Director

SUBJECT:

Voice of America Audience Mail

The Voice of America receives 200,000 letters a year, many of them commenting on U.S. foreign policy and the impact and importance of VOA broadcasts. These letters are crucial to VOA operations because they help us learn more about our audience--who they are and what they are interested in. They also tell us whether we are doing our job well.

Below is a compendium of excerpts of some letters received by our 42 language services. I plan to send you this kind of material on a regular basis and hope it will provide you with useful and informative comment from Voice of America listeners.

THE SOVIET DOWNING OF KAL 007...

Pilsen Czechoslovakia. "I am writing not only to ask for a song but to say that the Soviets lost all my respect after the plane incident. First they wanted to hush-up the affair, then they denied it and now they are defending and distancing themselves from it."

(CZECHOSLOVAK SERVICE)

Francistown, Botswana. "I regret the shooting down of the Korean airliner by the Soviet military plane, with the loss of 269 lives. This brutal act of assassination shows that the Soviets do not respect humanity. How can they be the balancing force for peace in Africa?"

(PORTUGUESE TO AFRICA)

Huittinen, Finland. "...1973 a Libyan airline was shot down by an Israel fighter over Sinai; all the 74 passengers died. Why was not that case described as "a murder", "an outrageous, dispicable, cowardly, murderous act" officials? Why did not the USA "react with revulsion, anger, disbelief, outrage and profound sadness" and "demand the fullest possible explanation and apology"? Why did not Israel "disregard aviation safety and sacrifice human minds? Because Israel happens to be an ally of the United States."

...And Our Editorials on the Disaster

Bourgoin, France. "I heard with great interest the two editorials that were broadcast on Friday, September 2nd and the next day concerning:

1. the downing of the South Korean airliner by a Soviet jet fighter and
2. The influence of this downing on the Russian credibility, regarding disarmament talks, and more generally, East/West relations."

"With congratulations for your Editorials that separate government's views from the rest of the program."

(ENGLISH BROADCASTS)

Udaypur, India. "I listen to VOA programs regularly, especially, editorials. They effectively give the American point of view."

(HINDI SERVICE)

PROGRAM IMPACT

Montevideo, Uruguay: "It is a pleasure to write you for the first time. I am sixteen years old. I have been a listener for two years. My family and I are especially interested in your News Summary, particularly regarding Central American and Nicaragua, about which we don't get very complete news (here). I would like to get out of this country, where here is only repression and violence."

(SPANISH SERVICE)

Saudi Arabia. "The fact now that VOA broadcasts in Pashto is very significant. We appreciate this. I have one question. When in a country one person is killed the whole world talks about it:" but its more than four years that thousands of Afghans are killed day and night. Napalm bombs are being dropped on them and no one cares. I think the time has come that the world must do something about it."

(PASHTO SERVICE)

VOA ANNOUNCES A NEW MAGAZINE FOR LISTENERS

Radotin, Czechoslovakia. "When I overheard your call to write you... and to order your newly prepared Voice magazine, dealing with the Voice of America programmes, I realized to myself I also should like to have my own magazine if it is possible. Therefore, I am writing to you. I am a big lover of America, its people, cities, nature, mountains, landscape, the political system there, and because I think I shall never have the possibility to visit your country I listen your programmes. Before I listened only to your Czech language programmes, and now after the beginning of my studies in English language. But by reading of letter you can get to know my knowledge of English is still very poor, and therefore I am still able to understand to your Special English programmes. I study English as a self taught person, and I can say that listening of Special English is excellent..."

(ENGLISH BROADCASTS)



October 26, 1983

mic

Dear Mike:

I just received a copy of the President's letter to the Voice of America for the September 24, 1983, special broadcast and I want to express to you and the President my thanks and those of the entire VOA staff for those very kind remarks.

The appreciative remarks really should be traveling from my office to the White House as the broadcast was not only an exciting challenge for our staff but also gave all of us an opportunity to perform in the highest callings of our service. We are delighted to have been a part of that historic occasion and are even more delighted that the broadcast succeeded in getting through the Soviet jamming.

The entire staff is ready and anxious to support the President's foreign policy in any way it can -- please don't hesitate to call when the need arises.

With warm personal regards.

Sincerely,

Robert E. Wick for

Charles Z. Wick

(Message for Mr. Deaver from Mr. Wick received by telegram from India.)

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House



September 27, 1983

pic

Dear Mike:

I want to take a moment to compliment you for your idea to have the President broadcast from the VOA last Saturday, September 24. There is little doubt that the event had a major impact.

I ran into Senator Percy at the UN and he said that the broadcast should help us get money for VOA. This is but one example. We have had a lot of favorable reaction -- thanks to you.

Warm regards.

THANKS

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick

Charles Z. Wick

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

0:40 e. Wick

Director



September 21, 1983

Charlie Wick
9/21/83

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
James A. Baker, III
(alphabetical
order) The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver ✓
The Honorable
David R. Gergen
The Honorable
Edwin Meese, III
FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CW*
SUBJECT: Preempting Negative Public Affairs Issues

As a strategic procedure I suggest we counter, in advance, situations deleterious to our best interests. Such a situation was symbolized by the recent multi-city demonstrations and worldwide "commemoration" of the bombing of Hiroshima. The inferences are that America was inhumane and that, in any event, the nuclear "holocaust" ill-served humanity.

The powerful truth is that Hiroshima was America's response to the rapacious brutality and savagery of the unprovoked Japanese attack and prosecution of the war. Thus, I think we should do something in a positive vein to frustrate these pictures which place America in an unfavorable light. We too can "commemorate" the abrupt ending of the increasing savagery. We saved "the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans" according to Harry Truman.

To quote Truman in full:

"Having found the bomb we have used it. We have used it against those who attacked us without warning at Pearl Harbor, against those who have starved and beaten and executed American prisoners-of-war, against those who have abandoned all pretense of obeying international laws of warfare. We have used it in order to be able to shorten the agony of war in order to save the lives of thousands and thousands of young Americans." (From the August 9, 1945 radio report to the American people.)

There will be other instances which can be put into perspective so that we are not, thereby, clay pigeons for revisions of history and/or revisions of current factual events.

This brings up the need again for a strategic thinker to devote the man hours in this vital area.

Just a reminder of our past discussions.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

September 20, 1983

file
Director



MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
James A. Baker, III

(alphabetical
order) The Honorable
Judge William P. Clark, Jr.

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver

The Honorable
David R. Gergen

The Honorable
Edwin Meese III

The Honorable
George P. Shultz

The Honorable
Caspar W. Weinberger

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CW*
Director

SUBJECT: The Multi-National Concept

Media coverage on the situation in Lebanon is commonly limited to or focuses solely upon the United States and the U.S. Marine contingent in Lebanon. The result is that it is widely perceived that the U.S. forces in Lebanon are there unilaterally rather than as part of a multi-national force.

A similar circumstance exists with regard to the Korean Airline massacre. For example, on September 14 the United States announced at the International Civil Aviation Organization meeting in Montreal that we were going to register U.S. indignation about the Soviet's outrageous act. We should be talking in terms of the world's indignation, not merely the United States' indignation, particularly in these multilateral fora.

The media elements of USIA have been advised to focus on the proper role the U.S. is playing in Lebanon, emphasizing the multi-national nature of its participation there. Regarding the KAL incident we are emphasizing that it is the Soviet Union versus the world.

Perhaps such an emphasis might be desirable for other U.S. Government departments in their dealings with the media.



FTI
REC'D
8/18/83
AUG 10 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: "Soviet Propaganda Alert" No. 15

Attached is the fifteenth issue of the "Soviet Propaganda Alert" produced by our Office of Research.

In May and June the Soviets:

- o Criticized their own propaganda efforts. At a plenum of the Communist Party's Central Committee, Soviet leaders called for a more effective program of "counterpropaganda" to offset Western propaganda's influence.
- o Continued to attack the Reagan administration in harsh and abusive terms.
- o Charged that the U.S. is escalating the conflict in El Salvador, waging an undeclared war against Nicaragua, and turning Honduras into a base for armed aggression against Nicaragua.
- o Played up the official Soviet endorsement of a nuclear freeze, while stressing the sharp contrast between the United States' aggressiveness and the USSR's reasonableness and goodwill.
- o Launched their harshest media attack on Poland since the beginning of martial law, but gave little attention to the Pope's visit to his homeland.

Soviet Propaganda Alert

No. 15

July 25, 1983

SUMMARY

Major Soviet propaganda developments and themes relating to the U.S. in May and June included:

- Counterpropaganda. The Central Committee plenum on ideology, held June 14-15, criticized Soviet propaganda efforts and proposed a uniform system of "counterpropaganda" to oppose Western propaganda. See p. 1
- The Reagan Administration. The Soviet media continued to attack the Reagan administration in harsh and abusive terms, while refraining from extensive commentary on the Democratic Party and its leaders. Recent Soviet coolness toward the idea of a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting may stem from a reluctance to give President Reagan a potential propaganda advantage before the 1984 Presidential elections. See p. 3
- Arms Control. Soviet arms control propaganda played up the official Soviet endorsement of a nuclear freeze and replayed standard themes of U.S. aggressiveness and Soviet reasonableness and goodwill. See p. 5
- Public Opinion and Peace Movements in Western Europe. The British election, the Williamsburg summit, and the Prague Peace Assembly offered little for Soviet propagandists to cheer about. Andropov's statement on a Baltic nuclear freeze seemed designed primarily to assuage Scandinavian public opinion. See p. 7
- Poland. Soviet media launched their harshest attack on Poland since martial law but generally ignored the Pope's visit to Poland. See p. 9
- Central America. According to Soviet propaganda, the U.S. "interventionist policy" is escalating the conflict in El Salvador, waging an "undeclared war" against Nicaragua, and turning Honduras into a base for armed aggression against Nicaragua. See p. 10

COUNTERPROPAGANDA

There's an ideological war going on out there. And the Soviet Union isn't winning it. At least that's what the Soviet leadership seemed to be saying on June 14-15 at the Central Committee plenum on ideology.

General Secretary Iurii Andropov was almost apocalyptic about it. "The future of mankind," he stated, will be decided by the outcome of the "confrontation, unprecedented in the entire postwar period by its intensity and sharpness, of two diametrically opposite world outlooks, two political courses-- socialism and imperialism." We must, he said, tell the people of the world the truth about socialist society, its advantages, and its peaceful policy, and we must do so in an understandable and convincing way. At the same time, we must skillfully expose the "lying, subversive nature of imperialist propaganda." "What we need," concluded Andropov, "is a well conceived uniform system of counterpropaganda" which is dynamic and effective (Pravda, June 16).

Konstantin Chernenko, the party secretary responsible for ideology, also called for large-scale "counterpropaganda," both domestic and international (Pravda, June 15). His specific recommendations to the propaganda sector included:

- o Accentuate the positive. According to Chernenko, "we have no reason to take a defensive position on any question of principle. But we cannot say that our foreign policy propaganda is always sufficiently active and masterful in demonstrating the superiority of socialism."
- o Improve quality. We must "enhance the argumentation..., appeal, and journalistic qualities of the materials addressed to foreign audiences while explaining in an easy-to-understand way the concrete contents of our internationalist policy of peace. Otherwise, we cannot hope for success in foreign policy propaganda in the long term."
- o React more quickly. "Let us not deceive ourselves. If we explain an event superficially, or report it belatedly, later on we shall be obliged not to persuade, but to dissuade, which is more difficult."
- o Employ more modern technology. "It is time to realize," Chernenko said, "that technological backwardness constrains the effective use of our propaganda potential." He complained of paper shortages, lack of printing facilities, and backward television technology, and reproved Gosplan and the ministries responsible for such deficiencies.

Abroad, the Soviet counterpropaganda campaign will still be carried out by TASS, Novosti, Gostelradio, and other propaganda agencies. Chernenko called upon them to work hard and ordered the International Department of the Central Committee (CC) to coordinate the campaign "in the best possible way." (Some recent and perhaps related personnel changes in these agencies are noted in "Soviet Propaganda Alert No. 12.")

Within the Soviet Union, the counterpropaganda campaign will attempt to combat bourgeois ideology, counteract foreign ideas, and neutralize their effect on the thinking and behavior of Soviet citizens. Chernenko praised efforts already under way in Moscow, the Ukraine, Belorussia, Kazakhstan, Estonia, and parts of the Soviet Far East--all areas where Soviet citizens come into contact with foreigners and foreign ideas. He urged the appropriate CC departments to provide local party organizations with materials that "help to expose the intrigues of hostile propaganda." (In Moscow the counterpropaganda effort even includes a crackdown on jokes about Vasilii Chapaev, a Soviet civil war hero.)

THE DANCHEV CASE

If the case of Vladimir Danchev is any indication, perhaps Chernenko is right about the need for improvement. It all started when listeners to Radio Moscow's English Service began hearing some strange things:

- o Andropov, in his Spiegel interview, reaffirmed the "Soviet policy of aggression" and explained Soviet efforts "in achieving military superiority and increasing the threat of nuclear war" (May 1).
- o "The Soviet Union, with the exception of Afghanistan and some other hot spots in the world, rejects war as a means of settling international disputes" (May 18).
- o "The population of Afghanistan plays an increasing role in defending the country's territory against bands infiltrated from the Soviet Union. Reports in Kabul say that tribes living in the eastern provinces Nangarhar and Paktia have joined the struggle against the Soviet invaders" (May 23).

What happened was that Vladimir Danchev, a 35-year-old newscaster for Radio Moscow's English Service, was straying from the prepared script. Sometimes he read the news straight. But on occasion he tampered with the wording, apparently in impromptu fashion while he was actually on the air. According to Western news reports, Danchev, a Tashkent native who had strong feelings

about the war in Afghanistan, did so as a singular kind of protest against Soviet policy.

Embarrassingly, Soviet authorities were among the last to notice. Danchev's ideological deviations went on for perhaps several months, until May 23. That was bad enough. But the authorities caught up with Danchev only two days after the Western press began to report the strange goings on.

Things are almost back to normal again in Moscow. Danchev is no longer on the air. Agence France-Presse (AFP) reports that according to Radio Moscow officials, he was "summoned before a disciplinary committee, fired from his job, and escorted to his home town of Tashkent...where he is now in a psychiatric asylum" (June 21). The Washington Post reports, moreover, that several top Radio Moscow officials, including the editor-in-chief of the radio's World Service, have been reprimanded (May 27). According to AFP, there will be no more live Radio Moscow broadcasts --unless they are strictly monitored by a censor empowered to cut off the transmission (June 21).

THE REAGAN ADMINISTRATION

The Soviets regularly attacked the Reagan administration on a wide variety of foreign and domestic issues. Among these issues, three were prominent: the nature of Reaganism, U.S. political "factions," and the possibility of a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting.

Soviet public statements about the Reagan administration have tended to shift ground in the last year. After the 1980 U.S. Presidential elections, the Soviets repeatedly asked aloud whether it was possible to deal reasonably with the Reaganites. Their public answer was pessimistic: there is some possibility for a serious agreement with the U.S., but no great likelihood. Perhaps the best we can do, they said, is to wait Reagan out.

With the approach of the 1984 Presidential elections, Soviet attention has increasingly turned to Reaganism and the U.S. political process. The following exchange on a Radio Moscow program (June 10) was typical:

Does Reaganism have "some objective causes in the purely economic sphere"? Perhaps the influence of the "military-industrial complex"? (Anatolii Doronin)

Not really. The whole point is that this influence existed earlier. The American bourgeoisie, you see, is not homogeneous. There is a constant struggle between factions within the American ruling class. Some factions support detente, as in the 1970s. Others, on the extreme right wing,

do not, and it is this faction that seized the White House in 1980. (Aleksandr Bovin)

"Evidently a contributory factor is the transfer of capital to military branches of industry in connection with the economic crisis." (Doronin)

No, that is a constant factor. Eisenhower--strange as it may seem--was the first to warn Americans about it. The U.S. military-industrial complex has become stronger, and it naturally exerts an enormous influence on U.S. policies. But another group of the ruling bourgeoisie will come to power, and although the military-industrial complex will remain the same, U.S. foreign policy can change. There is no strict link here. (Bovin)

According to Bovin and other Soviet commentators, the Reagan administration essentially represents an attempt to take social and political revenge for the defeats the United States suffered in the 1970s. The Reagan stand on restoring America's greatness is a response to the loss of client regimes such as Vietnam, Iran, and Nicaragua. The tough Reagan stand on the Soviet Union is a result of an "extremely primitive" philosophy of history--the Reaganites see the hand of Moscow in everything they do not like.

Such lines of analysis perhaps explain the sharp differentiation, in Soviet propaganda, among "factions" on the U.S. political spectrum.

On the Republican side, Soviet spokesmen were sharply and increasingly critical of the Reaganites. They continued to attack the morality of the Reagan administration, but in harsher terms than previously. Vadim Zagladin, first deputy chief of the CC International Department, in speaking of U.S. policy, asserted that the "supreme, ultimate evil" is a policy that is fraught with the threat of war, no matter what conceptions motivate that policy (Sovetskaia Rossiia, June 5).

Moreover, in contrast to their long silence during the initial phases of the Watergate scandal, the Soviet media were quick to report the "snowballing scandal" over the Carter briefing books. Soviet propagandists accused President Reagan of trying to evade the responsibility for "these dirty intrigues" and stated that the assertions made at the Reagan press conference in June "in no way correspond to the facts" (Moscow Television, June 29).

On the Democratic side, Soviet propagandists were much more restrained. There was no comprehensive Soviet discussion of the Democratic Party, although there was brief mention of some of

the Presidential candidates (Moscow Television, June 28). There was scant criticism of Democratic party leaders or policies. By and large, the Soviet media did little more than repeat the Democrats' criticism of the Reagan administration and cite Democratic statements on specific issues such as arms control.

A good example was the serious and circumspect Soviet treatment of the recent visit to the USSR by Averell Harriman, a figure long associated with Democratic administrations. Andropov praised Averell Harriman's "fruitful activity" as U.S. ambassador to Moscow 40 years ago and stated that the Soviet people give Averell and Pamela Harriman "their due for their adherence to the cause of strengthening mutual understanding between the Soviet and American peoples, their efforts at improving relations between the USSR and the United States" (Moscow TASS in English, June 2).

Finally, the Soviets backed away publicly from a U.S.-Soviet summit meeting. In recent public statements, Andropov expressed skepticism about the possibility of a summit meeting, and in a June 21 TASS interview, Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko for the first time spoke of "preconditions" for any such meeting, including "a certain degree of mutual understanding on major issues" and a "desire on both sides to actually strive for positive developments, even better, for a breakthrough" in relations.

If Soviet media commentary on the question of a summit meeting is any indication, Gromyko's "preconditions" may reflect a Soviet reluctance to provide President Reagan with the gloss of a foreign policy success during or just before an election year. According to Valentin Zorin, if a summit meeting is not "for propaganda or election purposes but is geared to a businesslike and constructive dialogue, there can be no opposition to a summit meeting." But, he warned, "the Soviet Union will not take part in anybody's political game," referring to what he charged were efforts to clean up President Reagan's "bad image" (Moscow Radio in English, June 18). In short, Soviet propagandists may have begun to contend with the possibility of four more Reagan years.

ARMS CONTROL

Arms control issues continued to dominate Soviet propaganda in May and June. As the START, INF, and MBFR negotiations resumed in Geneva and Vienna, Soviet commentators clung tenaciously to standard Soviet themes:

- o The Soviet Union seeks only equality and identical security and proposes reductions in strategic and intermediate-range nuclear arms accordingly.

- o The U.S. wants military superiority and unilateral Soviet disarmament.
- o The U.S. is obstructing all arms control negotiations.

In a major propaganda demarche, however, the Soviet government for the first time officially endorsed the concept of a nuclear freeze. At the June 16 session of the USSR Supreme Soviet, "a simultaneous qualitative and quantitative freeze by all nuclear powers of all nuclear armaments possessed by them" was proposed (Izvestiia, June 17). Soviet commentators hailed the idea as "simple and clear...., requiring neither puzzling calculations nor lengthy talks and arguments." An agreement could be reached, they claimed, if only there were goodwill on the other side (Moscow Television, June 18).

Strategic Arms Reduction Talks (START)

The latest U.S. proposal on reductions of Soviet and U.S. strategic missiles drew a quick Soviet rejection. According to Soviet commentators, it essentially seeks to limit land-based missiles, "which make up the backbone of the Soviet Union's defense potential," and it ignores "constructive Soviet proposals" for "deep reductions in all types of strategic weapons" (Krasnaia zvezda, June 10). The U.S. position on START is geared to obtaining "a one-sided military advantage," not an "honest accord" (Pravda, May 27).

Congressional votes to fund the development and testing of the MX missile were also denounced. Soviet propagandists condemned President Reagan's "arm twisting, disinformation, and deliberate lies" in forcing passage of the MX authorization (Moscow Domestic Service, May 26). They also contended that the MX missile is a first-strike weapon and, as such, an integral part of the Reagan administration's plan to achieve military superiority (Moscow Radio in English, May 26).

This, Soviet propagandists asserted, the Soviet Union will never allow to happen. "Faced by necessity," it will take "retaliatory steps to consolidate its defense capability, including the deployment of corresponding new strategic systems" (Pravda, May 27).

Intermediate-range Nuclear Forces (INF)

Soviet propagandists repeatedly lauded the Soviet offer to reduce its medium-range nuclear arms in Europe to the level of British and French missiles and warheads. At the same time, they derided U.S. proposals that would require the Soviet Union to dismantle its medium-range weapons in both the European and Asian parts of the USSR. The "deliberate unacceptability of

such proposals is so obvious," declared the Soviet government, that they mean only one thing: U.S. "reluctance to seek mutually acceptable solutions based on the principle of equality and identical security" (Pravda, May 27).

Soviet bluster was increasingly evident on INF issues, too. The Soviet Union threatened to lift its declared unilateral moratorium on SS-20 missile deployments in Europe. Second, the Soviet Union threatened to install missiles in Eastern Europe to counterbalance U.S. forward-based nuclear weapons in Europe and other NATO nuclear arms. Third, it will "take necessary countermeasures having the territory of the United States itself in view" (Pravda, May 27). Soviet spokesmen have studiously avoided saying what this means, although they publicly have denied that the Soviet Union will attempt to put missiles into Cuba.

Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR)

"Complete, realistic, and clear-cut." "Of a compromise character." "Preserves everything positive that has been accomplished during the Vienna talks." That's how the Soviet press described the "draft comprehensive agreement" submitted by the Warsaw Treaty Organization (WTO) states at the newly resumed MBFR talks on June 24 (Pravda, June 24).

The gist of the WTO proposal, according to the Soviet press, is that irrespective of disputes over the current number of NATO and WTO troops, the reduction of troops and arms in Central Europe should begin now. Specific provisions include measures for: (a) troop reductions to a ceiling of 900,000 on each side; (b) procedures for reductions, with each signatory state with sizable forces in Central Europe bearing "a considerable part" of the overall troop cuts; and (c) verification, with observers invited "on a voluntary basis" to monitor major troop cuts, and with three or four permanent observation posts on each side.

The Soviet Union, it should be noted, has seldom taken the propaganda lead on MBFR issues, preferring to leave that to the East Europeans. East European MBFR delegates have played a visible role in the negotiations--in this case, it was the Czechoslovakian delegate who submitted the WTO draft agreement. The East European press has actively covered the MBFR talks, and is frequently cited in the Soviet press.

PUBLIC OPINION AND PEACE MOVEMENTS IN WESTERN EUROPE

Soviet propaganda was uncharacteristically on the defensive in many matters of concern to Western Europe, particularly in the following cases.

Thatcher's Reelection. Soviet spokesmen had relatively little to say about the British elections on June 9, either before or after. This relative silence was in marked contrast to Soviet efforts to influence the West German elections in March.

The sweeping Thatcher victory was difficult for Soviet propaganda to explain away. By orthodox Marxist tenets, Britain's "enormous unemployment" and "economic blind alley" should have prevailed in the elections. Nevertheless, Soviet observers tried to rationalize, conservative control of the mass media, the Falklands crisis, a divided opposition, and a "certain temporary, seasonal improvement" in the economy had carried the day (Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, June 10).

Williamsburg. Soviet propagandists stressed that the Williamsburg summit demonstrated U.S. double-dealing. President Reagan's real purpose at Williamsburg, they said, was to discuss the Soviet military threat and the need for Western solidarity. Nevertheless, with "imperial arrogance," he and his advisers waved aside the West Europeans' demands that the U.S. reduce its high interest rates and renounce the artificially high currency exchange rate. Washington vaguely promised to study such questions, but in essence it continues to transfer its own economic difficulties onto the shoulders of its allies (Pravda, June 3).

Prague Peace Assembly. The East European sponsors of the "World Assembly 'For Peace and Life, Against Nuclear War'" boasted that approximately 3,000 participants from 132 countries gathered in Prague (TASS, June 26). But they could claim little more. Many prominent figures in Western peace movements refused to attend. The three delegates of the West German "Greens" were so angered by attempts to prevent them from meeting with "Charter 77" dissidents that they sent a letter of protest to Czechoslovakia's President Gustav Husak. Antigovernment protesters held a small demonstration in Prague's Wenceslaus Square. Western press commentary was so negative that the Soviets and East Europeans felt compelled to protest (Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, June 24).

The assembly's final document repeated standard Soviet themes on questions of war and peace, though without direct mention of the United States. Soviet commentaries on the assembly were more explicit in denouncing the U.S. (TASS, June 26).

Baltic Nuclear-Free Zone. At a June 6 dinner in honor of visiting Finnish President Mauno Koivisto, Andropov stated that the Soviet Union "is prepared to facilitate the creation" of a nuclear-free zone in northern Europe and "to study the question of substantial measures concerning Soviet territory adjoining the zone." It is also ready to discuss the question of "giving

nuclear-free status to the Baltic." According to most observers, this was meant primarily to mollify Scandinavian public opinion, which has been greatly ruffled by the reported presence of Soviet submarines in the territorial waters of Sweden and Norway.

POLAND

For months, Soviet propaganda has pushed a consistent line on Poland: Solidarity has lost. Normalization is under way. But because of Western subversion and a few remaining counterrevolutionaries, vigilance is still the order of the day.

In recent weeks, however, Soviet observers have been more vigilant than usual. In the sharpest media attack on Poland since the imposition of martial law, the Soviet journal New Times criticized "liberal ideas" expressed in the prominent Polish weekly Polityka. How, for example, can Polityka allow it to be said that political crises are inevitable in a socialist society? If this were true, even a Marxist-Leninist "formation" would sooner or later exhaust its constructive possibilities. New Times charged that "Polityka, whose first page contains the words 'workers of the world, unite,' seems to consider it normal to propagandize views that are alien to proletarian, communist ideology" (May 6).

The significance of the New Times article is not entirely clear. It can be read as an attack on Deputy Prime Minister Mieczyslaw Rakowski (the former editor of Polityka) and a warning to the current Jaruzelski leadership. Yet, other Soviet articles have routinely cited Jaruzelski and other Polish leaders as if there were no problem. Pravda approvingly cited parts of Jaruzelski's closing speech to the recent plenum of the Polish United Workers' Party (June 4). In Poland, as elsewhere in Eastern Europe, the ominous fact is that Soviet propaganda translates readily into practice.

Pope John Paul II's visit to Poland passed almost unnoticed in the Soviet media. Pravda, for example, reported the Pope's arrival and departure, and very little else. It briefly acknowledged that the visit had helped "achieve further progress in the matter of internal stabilization and national conciliation" (June 25). Judging by the extent of its coverage, however, it was much more enthusiastic about Warsaw's new trolley-buses, Poland's railroad development plans to 1990, and Poznan's international fair than it was about the Pope. Between June 17 and 30, Pravda gave the Papal visit no more than a dozen lines in three or four short notices. Other Soviet media provided comparable coverage.

CENTRAL AMERICA

Soviet propaganda focused on U.S. "interventionist" policy in Central America and generally avoided mention of Soviet and Cuban involvement. The U.S., it was charged, supports "terrorist regimes" in Latin America, even the most odious ones, and labels as communist any country where "the popular masses" are striving for self-rule. This is "classic colonialism," which is condemned by the entire world public, even West European government leaders (Moscow Television, June 23).

Soviet propagandists severely criticized what they charged were preparations for increased U.S. involvement in the region. They depicted the U.S. diplomatic reshuffling in Central America and the State Department as a commitment to an exclusively military solution (TASS International Service, June 28). Noting the formation of a White House "Central American policy propaganda group," they predicted a growing campaign to "brainwash" the American public through "disinformation and lies" (TASS International Service in English, June 18).

U.S. "interference" in El Salvador is escalating, according to Soviet propaganda. Although President Reagan stated on June 28 that the U.S. has no plans or intentions to send U.S. troops to Central America, Soviet commentators charged that the number of U.S. personnel in El Salvador is growing and that during the visit of President Alvaro Magana to Washington in June, "the possibility of dispatching regular U.S. army units" to El Salvador was raised (TASS International Service, June 19). The growing strength of the insurgents threatens to turn El Salvador into a second Vietnam (Moscow Television, June 29).

Honduras, according to Soviet propaganda, is being turned into a base for aggression against Nicaragua. The U.S. has prepared the Honduran army to strike against Nicaragua and has given increasingly open support to Somocista gangs hiding in Honduras (Moscow Domestic Service in Russian, June 18). TASS charged that the murder of two U.S. newspapermen in Honduras "was planned in advance and perpetrated by Somocista men and Honduran military, who, like their mentors from the CIA, clearly abhorred the position held by the two journalists" (Moscow TASS in English, June 23).

Nicaragua, it was charged, was the object of an "undeclared war" by the U.S., which is plotting the overthrow of the legitimate Sandinista government (TASS, May 5). Previous Soviet statements expressed only general political and moral support for Nicaragua (TASS, May 3). In June, Soviet commentators stepped up their rhetorical support for the Sandinistas but stopped short of stating what the Soviet response to U.S. moves might be (Pravda, June 11). As before, Soviet propaganda made no explicit reference to the Contadora initiative.

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PEACE MOVEMENTS AND PUBLIC OPINION
IN WESTERN EUROPE

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**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Recd. 8/16/83

Office of the Director

F-11



AUG 9 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff and
Assistant to the President
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick
Director *CZ*

SUBJECT: European Public Perceptions of INF

You will be interested in the attached USIA briefing paper based on our latest round of INF surveys.

We have found that, except in Britain, public opposition to stationing prevails in four of the five basing countries.

We are faced with problems, in part, because the general public is either unaware of or unwilling to accept a number of the basic assumptions inherent in our INF policy.

At the same time, European publics tend to perceive our arms reduction negotiating efforts as sincere and clearly favor the President's interim proposal over the second Andropov proposal.



August 8, 1983

PUBLIC OPINION UPDATE ON INF

USIA-commissioned national public opinion surveys taken during June in the five basing countries suggest some problems and opportunities for U.S. policy.

The Setting: Opposition Predominates to INF Deployment

Outside Britain, where a large majority supports INF stationing, public opposition clearly prevails to stationing in their own country. Moreover, the extent of the opposition would be as widespread to deployment of a reduced number of new missiles agreed on by the U.S. and the Soviet Union, as it is to stationing in the absence of an arms control agreement.

Negative attitudes toward deploying an agreed-upon reduced number of Euromissiles may be influenced somewhat by a widely prevailing disbelief that the superpowers will reach an agreement by the end of the year.

PROBLEMS FOR THE U.S.: U.S. Assumptions Not Accepted

INF support and opposition are expressed in a public opinion climate of widespread unawareness or unwillingness to accept some basic assumptions inherent in U.S. policy:

- o Soviet INF Monopoly: Generally Not Perceived. Only about one in 10 know about the Soviet INF monopoly. The public debate about the French and British missiles, sparked by the second Andropov proposal, may have clouded the issue for the majorities or near-majorities everywhere who believe that "both" sides have Euromissiles in place.
- o Soviet INF Supremacy: Largely Not Recognized. Monopoly aside, even the Soviet superiority in missile strength in Europe tends to go unrecognized, except among the British public. Elsewhere, about as many (more in Belgium) perceive an existing superpower parity in Euromissiles, as see the Soviet Union ahead.
- o INF Deterrence Value: Widely Appreciated Only in Britain: In the continental basing countries, opinion is largely divided on whether the new Euromissiles would help prevent or increase the likelihood of a Soviet attack on Western Europe. (Opponents to deployment justify their position mainly by citing heightened danger, increased vulnerability, and fear of war.) The British public, polled immediately after the recent election, widely endorses INF as a deterrent force.

- o British and French Missiles: Confusion. Britain excepted, the view prevails that the British and French missiles are intended for national rather than for NATO's defense. British opinion splits on this score. At the same time, by wide margins, the publics in all basing countries think these missiles should be part of the U.S.-Soviet arms reduction talks. This seeming paradox, to some extent, probably reflects general anti-nuclear missile sentiment as well as the widespread unfamiliarity among the general public with the details of arms talks negotiations.

OPPORTUNITY FOR THE U.S.: Receptivity to U.S. Negotiating Efforts

Further U.S. INF initiatives at Geneva are likely to receive a sympathetic hearing from publics preoccupied with pressing economic and social problems.

- o U.S. Motives Credible. While, on the whole, they tend to lack confidence in U.S. ability to deal with world problems, Europeans generally credit the U.S. with making a genuine effort to reach an arms reduction agreement with the Soviet Union. Only Italian public sentiments tend in the opposite direction. By contrast, perceptions of Soviet sincerity are one-sidedly negative. A notable exception is the German public which is divided on the issue.
- o Reagan Proposal Preferred. Choosing between the Reagan interim proposal and the second Andropov proposal, European public opinion clearly favors the U.S. position. Given the ambivalent -- or uninformed -- reactions to the British and French missiles' intended purpose and their role in arms talk negotiations, the rejection of the Soviet proposal may have less to do with its specific provisions than with public perceptions of U.S. and Soviet credibility. And the U.S. has consistently scored better on such indicators.
- o INF Not A Central Public Concern. Compared with overriding economic and social problems, Europeans accord INF stationing a low ranking among worrisome national issues. (Characteristically, most are unaware when deployment is scheduled to begin). In keeping with this perspective, public activism in opposition to deployment is reported only by very small proportions of the general public. Belgians are the least involved in INF; the Dutch the most active.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Mr. Deaver:

We're scheduled to do the taping
on September 21st.

Donna

F. J. J.

**United States
Information
Agency**

Washington, D.C. 20547

Office of the Director

Rec'd 8/12



AUG 9 1983

Dear Mike:

As we discussed last week, I understand why it would be difficult for the President to come to USIA for our 30th Anniversary ceremonies.

I would like to follow up on your suggestion that the President video tape comments to Agency employees on this special occasion. (My staff and I will be most happy to provide all necessary support.)

The President's participation via video taping will do a great deal to demonstrate the Administration's support for the nation's public diplomacy efforts.

We are inviting Vice President Bush to attend the ceremony and represent the Administration in the President's absence.

I look forward to hearing from you about when we can set up a taping session for the President.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

Sheet 21

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House

~~Approve~~ _____
~~Disapprove~~ _____