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File Folder [SOVIET UNION ISSUES]

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
105185	MEMO	CHARLES WICK TO MICHAEL DEAVER, RE: MASSIVE SOVIET MONOPOLY	1	6/22/1983	B1
105187	REPORT	RE: SOVIET NEGATIVE	2	7/1/1984	B1
105188	PAPER	STRATEGY TOWARDS THE SOVIET UNION FOR THE NEXT SIX MONTHS	8	ND	B1

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John Williams
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Current
Policy No. 491

Secretary Shultz

On Learning From Experience: The Responsibility of the Democracies

June 12, 1983

United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.

Following is a commencement address by Secretary Shultz at Stanford University, Stanford, California, June 12, 1983.

"Commencement" says that something new is about to begin, just as something else ends. Don't worry about it too much—there are lots of worthwhile things to do in the real world, and you can still have some fun while doing them. But if someone tells you it means a sharp transition from the world of learning to the world of work, don't believe it. The transition is more apparent than real.

The week before last, for example, I happened to meet with an extraordinary American, our Ambassador to the Federal Republic of Germany, Arthur Burns. He's full of information and ideas about Germany, the Atlantic alliance, the American economy, and dozens of other subjects. He's lively and well and full of the future. He's 79 years old. He has been taking German lessons over the past 18 months. He's never stopped learning.

The message is that this habit of learning is a habit that will sustain you throughout your life. An old saw has it that experience itself is the best teacher. I can mention this now that you have already paid your Stanford tuition. But the old saw is only a half truth. Just as scientists say that luck is something that comes to the prepared, experience teaches only those capable of grasping its meaning.

So, make use of the gifts Stanford has given you: the habits of careful observation, of an analytical ordering of what you see, of living with ambiguity and waiting for the evidence before reaching conclusions—the quality of mind that enables you truly to learn from experience.

The Challenge to the Democracies

Societies too must learn and remember, if they are to maintain their vitality and confront the future. In recent weeks, much of my time has been devoted to this country's relations with our closest friends and allies, the great democratic nations of the Atlantic community and Japan. A month ago, I attended a meeting in Paris of the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD), the descendant of the international agency that, 35 years ago, administered the Marshall Plan. Two weeks ago, I joined President Reagan in Williamsburg at the economic summit with leaders of our major industrial partners. And this past Thursday and Friday, in Paris, I took part in the semiannual meeting of foreign ministers of the North Atlantic Alliance.

As Dean Acheson said about the alliance, this unity "is not an improvisation. It is a statement of the facts and lessons of history."

When the Atlantic alliance was founded in 1949, the allies showed they had learned a lesson from the period

before World War II—when the democracies had lacked the will to come together in the face of danger, when they had tried to evade their responsibility of maintaining their strength and permitted a dangerous imbalance of power to develop. Eventually they were forced to respond, but it was at a cost of millions of lives that might have been spared had they taken bold but prudent action beforehand. When the Atlantic alliance was formed, the purpose was to prevent war by ensuring that the cohesion, strength, and collective will of the democracies would never again be doubted by any adversary.

The alliance has succeeded in preventing war. Indeed, since its formation, the only use of military force on the Continent of Europe has been by the Soviet Union against its own "allies." But experience has also taught that the unity of the free nations is central to the achievement of any of our goals: peace, freedom, security, prosperity.

I want to say a few words now about how the democracies learning from the "facts and lessons of history" are responding today to a new set of challenges—in the realms of political affairs, economics, and security.

Political and Moral Unity

The first lesson is that what the democracies have in common is of overriding importance to us and to others throughout the world. Our common heritage gives us a common responsibility.

American students graduating today have many worries, I am sure. You must be anxious about your careers and your future. Yet there is one category of worries that, I daresay, you do not have. You are not concerned that the threat of imprisonment or torture hangs over you if you say or write or do the "wrong" thing. You have no fear of the policeman's midnight knock on the door. Considering how few democracies there are in this world, what we have in common with our allies is therefore something precious: systems of constitutional, representative government; systems of law that guarantee basic political and civil rights and freedoms; open economic systems that give free rein to individual talent and initiative.

Most alliances in history have not lasted. The fact that the democracies have been held together by ties of political, economic, and security cooperation for more than three decades, through many profound changes in international conditions, is proof, I believe, that our unity of shared values and common purpose is something special.

At the same time, the grim lesson of history should warn us that even this great coalition will not survive without conscious effort and political commitment. Those statesmen who were "present at the creation" in the immediate postwar period showed enormous vision and courage. In a new era of history, it is up to all of us to summon the same vision and courage to assure that it survives and flourishes.

Therefore, it is of enormous importance that our moral unity is today being so effectively translated into political unity. It is important that old divisions within the alliance are narrowing, as shown by the fact that the ministerial meeting I just attended was held in Paris for the first time in 17 years. It is important that the alliance is attractive enough for new countries to want to join—the original 12 now number 16. It is important that the 24 industrial democracies grouped in the OECD have worked out a framework for a consensus on the difficult issue of East-West trade, based on a thoughtful analysis of the balance of interests in economic relations with communist systems.

Outside the formal alliance framework, British, French, and Italian soldiers now stand alongside our Marines protecting Beirut. Our Atlantic allies, Japan, and other countries around the world are supporting our efforts to promote the withdrawal of all external forces from Lebanon. Britain, France, West Germany, Canada, and the United States are working together as a "contact group" to help reach a negotiated arrangement for the independence of Namibia. And all the diverse Williamsburg summit partners—including Japan—joined in an impressive joint statement on security and arms control.

Thus, for all our occasional squabbles, the democratic nations have not forgotten the paramount importance of the values and interests we have in common.

Our Common Prosperity

In the economic dimension as well, experience teaches that cooperation is essential. We now live in an interdependent world in which each country's well-being, primarily its own responsibility, is nevertheless affected powerfully by the health of the global economy, for which the industrial democracies bear a special responsibility.

In the 1970s, the plagues of recession, oil shocks, and inflation spread across national boundaries. The impact was not only economic but political. There was great concern that these ills would weaken not only Western economies but the cohesion of Western societies. If democratic governments proved unable to deal effectively with their economic problems, societies would be under continuing strain, social divisions would be aggravated, and we might have faced a demoralizing crisis of democracy. Increasing resort to protectionism, choking off world trade and compounding the recession, could have undermined relations between allies. These political divisions, as well as budgetary pressures, threatened to weaken the common defense.

The free nations had learned, however, from the experience of the 1930s, when the failure of cooperation gave birth to widespread protectionism, which deepened the Great Depression. This time the free nations began the practice of holding yearly economic summits and intensified their cooperation in many other forums, multilateral and bilateral. So we can hope that the common sense of the body politic will prevail over the drive of special interests for protective treatment.

As the Williamsburg declaration testifies: "The recession has put our societies through a severe test, but they have proved resilient." Rather than economic stagnation, we are seeing the impressive capacity of open economies to regain their vitality. Growth with low inflation has resumed in the United States, Japan, West Germany, Britain, and other countries which together account for about three-quarters of the production of the industrialized world. If we have truly wrung inflation out of our system, and if we all maintain discipline in our national policies, the world could be headed for a long period of sustained noninflationary growth. Those are big "ifs," I know, but our experience should tell us that the job can be done and that we will be much better off as we do it.

It is essential that we resist protectionism, which could hinder this recovery. The Williamsburg summit partners candidly acknowledged to each other that every country's record is spotty on this score. But they committed themselves "to halt protectionism, and as recovery proceeds to reverse it by dismantling trade barriers." New efforts of trade liberalization would be especially beneficial to the developing countries: in 1980, their export earnings of $580 billion amounted to 17 times their net receipts from foreign aid.

For all our temporary setbacks, the free economies have brought about since 1945 an era of growth and prosperity unprecedented in history. On the Eastern side of the divided Continent of Europe, economic problems are

systemic. Inefficiences are built in; innovation is inhibited; effective economic reforms are excluded because they would weaken the grip of centralized Soviet political control. In contrast, our economic difficulties are largely problems of self-discipline, of better management of fiscal and monetary policy to permit the inherent vitality of the free economic system to show its power. The weakness of Soviet-style economies is structural. We have reason for confidence, for our economic future is in our own hands.

Collective Security

Unfortunately, the Soviet system is very proficient in another sphere: the accumulation of military power. Therefore, security must remain a priority area of cooperation. If the values and interests we have in common are truly precious to us, then we have a duly to defend them. The summit partners at Williamsburg made very clear that they have learned this lesson. Let me read to you from their joint statement:

> As leaders of our seven countries, it is our first duty to defend the freedom and justice on which our democracies are based. To this end, we shall maintain sufficient military strength to deter any attack, to counter any threat, and to ensure the peace. . . . The security of our countries is indivisible and must be approached on a global basis. . . . We have a vision of a world in which the shadow of war has been lifted from all mankind, and we are determined to pursue that vision.

In an age of nuclear weapons, maintaining collective security is no easy task. "A nuclear war cannot be won and must never be fought." That's a quote from Ronald Reagan. Our challenge is really twofold: we must both defend freedom and preserve the peace. We must seek to advance those moral values to which this nation and its allies are deeply committed. And we must do so in a nuclear age in which a global war would thoroughly destroy those values. As the President pointed out in Los Angeles on March 31, our task is "one of the most complex moral challenges ever faced by any generation."

We and our allies have agreed for decades on a twofold strategy for meeting this challenge. First, we are committed to ensuring the military balance, modernizing our forces, and maintaining vigilance. Second, we are prepared for and committed to constructive dialogue with our adversaries, to address the sources of tension, resolve political conflicts, and reduce the burden and danger of armaments.

We cannot find security in arms alone. We are willing to negotiate differences, but we cannot do so effectively if we are weak or if the Soviet Union believes it can achieve its objectives without any compromise. Therefore, both these tracks—strength and diplomacy—are essential.

Unfortunately, the democratic nations have tended to neglect their defense responsibilities. Some serious problems have resulted and are now coming home to roost. They underlie many of the current controversies. In the 1970s, the trauma of Vietnam caused the United States to reduce its armed forces and reduce real defense spending, at the same time that the Soviet Union, in the wake of the Cuban missile crisis, was embarked on a relentless buildup in all categories of military power—strategic, conventional, and naval. Once the United States lost its unquestioned strategic superiority over the Soviet Union, NATO's defense—which relies on the commitment of American strategic power—became much more complicated. Yet NATO conventional forces continue to be inadequate. Ironically, NATO's success in keeping the peace in Europe for more than three decades leads some to take peace for granted and to forget the crucial role NATO has played in guaranteeing it.

The unprecedented expansion of Soviet power over the past two decades cannot be ignored or rationalized away. Any president, any administration, would be forced to respond. We have seen too often that an imbalance of power is an invitation to conflict. Therefore, this Administration, and our allies, are committed to maintenance of the military balance in Europe and globally.

Surely the burden of proof is on those who would undo the present military balance, or alter it, or conduct risky experiments with unilateral concessions without genuinely reducing the levels of armaments on both sides.

At the same time, experience teaches that a balance of power, though necessary, is not sufficient. Our strength is a means to an end; it is the secure foundation for our effort to build a safer, more peaceful, and more hopeful world. On the basis of strength, the cohesion of our alliance, and a clear view of our own objectives, we must never be afraid to negotiate.

This is our attitude to arms control. As NATO decided in December 1979, for example, we intend to modernize our intermediate-range nuclear forces in Europe to counter the Soviet deployment of over 1,000 nuclear warheads on their new intermediate-range missiles (SS-20s). But we are also willing to eliminate this entire category of nuclear weapons from the face of the earth; and we are prepared, as an interim step, to reduce these forces to any equal, verifiable level.

If negotiations do not succeed, however, we must be prepared to deploy at the end of this year as decided in 1979. The Soviet Union has no higher priority goal at the moment than to intimidate NATO into canceling its deployments unilaterally, thereby leaving the Soviet Union with its massive monopoly of new missiles and warheads already in place. As the summit partners made unanimously clear at Williamsburg, the alliance cannot, and will not, permit this to happen.

At Williamsburg and at NATO, we saw an impressive consensus on security and arms control. This is a firm ground for confidence that war will be deterred, that stability will be maintained, and that we will have a chance at least to reach reliable agreements making the world that you inherit a safer place.

Facing the Future

The final lesson I want to leave you with is this: experience teaches us that nothing is foreordained. Nations, like individuals, have choices to make. History is filled with many examples of nations and individuals that made the wrong choices; there are also many examples of foresight, wisdom, and courage.

Democracies are sometimes slow to awaken to their challenges. But once they are aroused, no force on earth is more powerful than free peoples working together with clear purpose and determination.

Therefore, I have confidence in the future. You new graduates, with your energy, talent, creativity, represent the promise of that future. Few others are so fortunate. Few others have such a responsibility.

And now, my congratulations to you, to your parents, and to Stanford, and my very best wishes to all of you. ■

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...r's deed of gift.

United States Department of State
Assistant Secretary of State
for European and Canadian Affairs

July 26, 1984

NOTE FOR: MICHAEL DEAVER

Mike: --

Attached is an updated version of the foreign policy piece that I showed you on Air Force One en route to Ireland. Last week, while I was out of the country, I asked Gahl to pass a copy to Ed Rollins.

Rick

Richard Burt

The Honorable
Michael K. Deaver,
The White House.

With the improvement in the economy and the prospects for continued gains promoting consumer optimism, Democratic Presidential nominee Mondale is likely to see foreign policy as a target of political opportunity in the 1984 campaign. Any doubt that this would be the case was erased by the salience of foreign policy issues during the run-up to the Democratic Convention. Yet, if the issues are managed correctly, the President not only can reduce his vulnerability in the foreign policy sphere but turn it into an electoral asset to complement his other strengths.

BACKGROUND

From a partisan Democratic point of view, the first three years of the Reagan Administration produced a number of events, personality clashes and rhetorical excesses which suggest a strategy of seeking a debate on foreign policy. This strategy would attempt to force the Administration to explain (1) the harsh and combative anti-Soviet rhetoric, and the resultant cool US-Soviet relationship; (2) the lack of apparent progress in arms control; (3) the loose talk about nuclear war (4) the emphasis on military spending; (5) the resort to force, particularly in the Middle East and Central America; (6) the lack of concern for the "Third World;" and (7) the absence of any major diplomatic accomplishment.

More than anything else, Mondale is likely to base his foreign policy offensive on the question, "do you feel safer today than you did four years ago?" He will play on the lack of arms control results, the heightening of East-West tensions, and the emergence of regional crises. In addition, he will try to paint a picture of an Administration without foreign policy accomplishments which contrasts poorly with its predecessors. (It is noteworthy that Mrs. Ferraro emphasized this alleged lack of success in her July 11th address to the World Affairs Council of Northern California). Overall, the President will be portrayed as too confrontational and unworthy of the voters' trust; indeed, the Democrats may even roll out a variant of the "red phone" ad Mondale used with such effectiveness against Hart. The fact that Moscow appears to have decided on so confrontational a course with us may make this tack a more likely one for the Democrats.

For all of the above reasons, the Reagan Administration ought to move early and quickly to get its message out and shape perceptions. We should stress that we have built the framework for a successful foreign policy, and that the benefits have both begun to come in and will come in increasingly over the next four years. It should be made clear that the restoration of American military and economic

strength, the rebuilding of alliances, the revival of confidence -- all have begun and will continue to produce fruits. Grenada and the rescue of American students stand in sharp contrast to Iran and the hostage humiliation. Similarly, Americans will understand the Soviets would have preferred to negotiate with a weaker America. It can be explained that an improvement in US-Soviet relations, results in arms control, and greater regional stability will come about when the Soviets and their friends accept that they must exercise restraint and be willing to accept relations that are not one-sided. Indeed, it can be argued that the Soviet belief that a one-sided relationship in their favor is possible is a residue of the Carter years and their now dated view of the political will present -- or absent -- in the American establishment.

Related to this approach is the idea that accomplishments, i.e., treaties and agreements, are the criterion for a successful foreign policy. Such a view betrays a basic misunderstanding of the purpose of foreign policy. It must be explained that diplomacy is not just reaching agreements, and that the true purpose of foreign policy is to protect and promote the interests of the United States and its friends and allies. It can be pointed out that previous administrations had agreements but that America's position in the world declined all the same. No agreement is preferable to a bad one, and a foreign policy which succeeds in revitalizing American values, military strength, the economy, and our alliances can only be judged as a success.

The US-Soviet relationship ought to be portrayed in this context. The measure of progress ought not to be the number of summits or treaties. Detente, an era of unprecedented meetings and pacts, was also an era of unprecedented increases in Soviet military power and political adventurism. The President should articulate a vision of a US-Soviet relationship which recognizes rather than ignores the differences between the two countries, but then goes on to do something about these differences in a realistic fashion. It should be noted that this could well take time, that it is up to Moscow to decide if it is willing to meet us halfway, that we are not interested in cosmetic improvements, and that the United States ignores at its own peril the lessons of Poland, Afghanistan, KAL, and the Geneva walkout.

In the long run, the US-Soviet relationship has the potential to improve owing to steps we have taken to repair our defenses and alliances. We are open to better relations with the new Soviet leadership and hope they accept this possibility. In the meantime we must be patient. Any relationship if it is to endure must be based upon realism,

strength, and reciprocal arrangements. Once the Soviets accept this reality improvement is possible. For now, it is important to retain perspective. No crisis exists. But the Soviets for their own reasons -- most probably to frighten and divide the West -- have sought to create a crisis atmosphere. Possibly, their behavior reflects as well the fact they have had three leaders in as many years.

Whatever the explanation, the record shows repeated Soviet rebuffs of our overtures, i.e., the Scowcroft visit, arms control, the January 16th speech, and the unjustified Olympics decision. The Administration has proposed an unprecedented arms control agenda, calling for deep reductions and in some cases elimination of nuclear forces, as well as limitations on levels and use of conventional forces. It also has proposed eliminating chemical weapons. The absence of agreements is due to Soviet resistance to real arms control. The Administration wants arms control, but only on a basis of reductions, equality, and adequate verification. We are against signing an agreement at any cost. We must be prepared to continue to negotiate in good faith and to be patient.

A Democratic attempt to exploit current East-West tensions could well backfire. As noted above, American reasonableness stands in sharp relief to Soviet negativism. It is difficult for the Democrats to argue otherwise without appearing to echo Moscow's line. Moreover, a critical approach on Mondale's part could appear increasingly out of date. The Hotline pact, the prospect for new arms control talks in Vienna in September, the large number of bilateral agreements -- all suggest that East-West tensions are beginning to ease and that the President's firm but reasonable approach has begun to pay off.

An additional element of any strategy for dealing with foreign policy ought to be one which portrays this Administration as realistic and the Democratic nominees as inexperienced and, where possible, ill-informed. In a world of terrorism, an unrelenting Soviet arms buildup, Afghanistan, and KAL, the United States must be strong if it is to be safe. Military force should be explained as a necessary element of foreign policy. Thus, if Mondale and Ferraro try to paint Reagan as too dangerous and simplistic for today's complex world, we ought to paint them as being too naive and uncertain for today's dangerous world. The marked contrast in experience between Vice President Bush and Congresswoman Ferraro--if it is not conveyed in a patronizing manner--offers a clear opportunity to exploit this difference.

A final element of the Reagan approach ought to emphasize U.S. leadership--not only of alliances, but also as the key participant in regional diplomacy, arms control, international

economic cooperation, human rights, etc. Here the record can be set straight to counter those who argue the U.S. is too confrontational and uses only the military instrument of policy. The China trip and London Summit should help here. More generally, the President's strong leadership abilities and willingness to stand up for American interests contrasts effectively with Walter Mondale's tendency to react and vacillate. Like Vice President Bush's advantage in knowledge over his Democratic challenger, this "leadership gap" between the two Presidential candidates should be exploited as much as possible.

Taken collectively, these themes -- that the United States has revived, that the trends are in our favor, that once again we are standing up for our interests around the world, and that once more we have an Administration not afraid to lead -- should meet with considerable success. Indeed, recent opinion surveys (attached) indicate that the nation is feeling good about itself. American confidence in our world role is at a post-Vietnam era high. The American people are expressing greater pride in the United States, a greater willingness to defend it, and a greater appreciation of its uniqueness. And few Americans if given a choice would prefer to live elsewhere.

What is most remarkable about these figures is not only the upswing in recent years but also the large gap between how the American people feel about their country and how the far less optimistic citizens of our principal allies feel about theirs. Patriotism has replaced resignation. The President is responsible for this change and he should be given credit for it, appeal to it, and promise more of it over the next four years.

<u>A Region-by-Region Survey</u>

-- <u>Europe</u>: Here the emphasis ought to be on the health and vitality of the Atlantic Alliance. Above all there is the example of the successful implementation of the December 1979 INF decision despite unprecedented Soviet pressures. But other examples abound: the concerted attempts to promote arms control at Geneva and Stockholm; the booming economic recovery; the Brussels Declaration; the new consensus over East-West political and economic relations; the Washington Declaration on East-West relations; and the growing use of the Summit 7 mechanism to promote growth without inflation and combat challenges ranging from protectionism to terrorism.

-- <u>Asia</u>: Asia is replete with signs of progress and success. Most notable is Japan, which is increasingly taking its

rightful place alongside Europe and the U.S. as a pillar of the democratic, free enterprise, anti-Communist world. Gains made in breaking down trade barriers deserve special notice. A second success is China; as the President's recent trip demonstrated, the consolidation of this key relationship is a major accomplishment of the Administration. Last but far from least is the often overlooked success story of the ASEAN countries; here we have 1980's most impressive record of economic growth.

-- Central America: The Reagan Administration is the first to end the neglect of this hemisphere in deeds and not simply words or slogans. US-Mexican relations are on a new footing. The Caribbean Basin Initiative is an imaginative and bold attempt to promote economic growth through trade and investment. The Kissinger Commission produced a valuable bipartisan approach to tackling Central America's profound but not insoluble problems. The U.S. has stood by El Salvador; we should be proud of its record of holding democratic elections amidst violence fed from outside by the Soviets, Cuba, and Nicaragua. The U.S. continues to work closely with regional states (the Contadora group) on behalf of diplomatic solutions. And the Administration has increased our security assistance efforts, not as an end in itself, but to provide an environment in which needed political, economic and social development can take place. We do not aim for a "new Vietnam;" to the contrary, our policy is designed to avoid a choice between massive intervention or communist victory. This integrated approach promises to succeed if Congress does not interfere. But there are no easy answers, no quick fixes except bugging out.

-- The Middle East: This Administration has nurtured a close and cooperative relationship with Israel. Consistent with this theme it has taken the lead to promote diplomatic initiatives designed to bridge the gap between Israel and its moderate Arab neighbors. The President's September 1982 initiative builds upon Camp David and remains the best and only realistic path to peace in this volatile part of the world. In Lebanon, the U.S. sacrificed to bring about democracy, reconciliation, and peace; we did our best, we provided the freely elected government precious time to work for national unity, and we remain ready to contribute to Lebanon's future. We stood up to Qadhafi and Libya's assaults on its neighbors; similarly, we stood up to Iran and made clear our determination to maintain access to the international waters alongside the key oil producing areas of the Persian Gulf.

-- Africa: Here there is not only effort but progress. American diplomacy has increased the possibility that South

Africa and her neighbors may find a way to live alongside one another peacefully; just as important we have done so in a way that has not compromised our opposition to apartheid. We believe the best way to promote peaceful change in South Africa's internal structure is by working with it and not by isolating or ostracizing the country and its people. As recent agreements between South Africa and her neighbors demonstrate, results are beginning to come. We are confident that over time this will increasingly be the case. Elsewhere in the continent U.S. foreign policy has been a mixture of fostering economic development and assisting friendly states challenged by subversion. Progress has been made in both struggles.

HC

United States Department of State

Washington, D. C. 20520

July 5, 1984

INFORMATION MEMORANDUM
S/S

TO: The Deputy Secretary

FROM: PA - John Hughes

SUBJECT: Americans Have Strongest Patriotic Sentiments Among 12 Countries Surveyed

SUMMARY: Independence Day marks an appropriate time to review findings from several national polls regarding the patriotic sentiments of Americans, including comparisons with patriotic sentiments expressed by respondents in 11 foreign countries.

These reveal: (1) American "confidence" in the U.S. world role is at a post-Vietnam high-point; (2) Americans express greater "pride" in their country, including (3) greater willingness to defend it, than do nationals in all other surveyed countries; (4) pride in America is based largely on the belief that Americans enjoy more freedom than the citizens of any other country.
END SUMMARY.

1. Confidence in U.S. as World Leader at 10-year High - A September 1983 Roper poll showed 49 percent of the public was "very confident" the U.S. "will continue to be a leader in world affairs" -- up from 42 percent in September 1982 and 40 percent in October 1973. An additional 35 percent on the 1983 poll said they were "fairly confident" the U.S. would continue its world leadership role. Only 13 percent said they were "not at all confident."

2. Americans Express Much more Pride in Country Than Japanese or West Europeans - Eighty percent of the American public said they were "very proud" to be "an American," compared to 30 percent of the Japanese who expressed similar pride in their own country and 39 percent (average) among ten West European countries surveyed. (See attached table for results in each country.) An additional 16 percent of Americans said they were "rather proud"; only 3 percent said they were "not proud" of their nationality.

"Pride in country" has proven to be a relatively stable attitude, and not likely to fluctuate widely due to events. The huge difference between Americans and other nationalities is not likely to have changed appreciably since Gallup conducted these polls in late 1981.

3. <u>Americans More Willing to "Fight for Country"</u> - Gallup found a 71-20 percent majority of Americans expressed willingness to "fight for your country" in case of "another war." This compares to a slight plurality of West Europeans willing to fight for their respective countries (an average of 45% willing vs an average of 38% not willing among six countries surveyed) and a plurality of Japanese opposed (22% vs 40%). A New York <u>Times</u> survey conducted last November found that a 72-21 percent majority believed Americans should "support this country in wartime even if they believe its actions are wrong."

4. <u>Americans Proudest of Freedoms Enjoyed in U.S.</u> - Asked what "things" about the U.S. they were "most proud of as an American," a clear majority (62%) cited specific freedoms (e.g. freedom of speech, press) or freedom in general, according to a CBS/New York <u>Times</u> poll taken in June 1983.

Americans considered themselves freer than citizens of thirteen other countries listed by Gallup on a December 1983 poll. Eighty percent said Americans have a "great deal" of freedom, 11 percent said "only some" freedom, and one percent said "very little." Americans rated Canada (78% "great deal" of freedom) nearly as high as the U.S., but rated other countries considerably lower, including Great Britain (60%), France (44%), Japan (37%), West Germany (32%), Mexico (26%), and the Soviet Union (1%).

All in all, an overwhelming majority of Americans (86%) regard the U.S. as the "best country to live in," compared to only 11 percent who believe "there are other countries which would be just as good," according to an ABC/Washington <u>Post</u> poll taken in June 1983.

Attachment: As stated.

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Pride in Own Country
(Gallup International Poll, Oct.-Nov., 1981)

Surveyed Country	Proud	Rather Proud	Not Proud	No Opinion
U.S.	80%	16%	3%	1%
Japan	30	32	31	7
Western Europe				
Rep. of Ireland	66	25	6	3
England	55	31	11	3
Spain	49	34	12	5
Northern Ireland	46	33	13	8
Italy	41	39	17	3
France	33	43	17	7
Denmark	30	41	22	7
Belgium	27	44	19	10
West Germany	21	38	29	12
Netherlands	19	41	31	9
(West Europe Avg)	(39)	(37)	(18)	(6)

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The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

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