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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1984

NOTE FOR: JAMES A. BAKER III
MICHAEL K. DEEVER ✓
ROBERT C. MCFARLANE
CRAIG L. FULLER
MICHAEL A. MCMANUS
ROBERT M. KIMMITT
BENTLEY ELLIOTT
RICHARD B. WIRTHLIN

FROM: RICHARD G. DARMAN *Sick*

SUBJECT: National Security Speech

At our Friday meeting, I agreed to revise the outline to incorporate points made by participants (while keeping the substance of the previous outline). I have tried to do so. The product is attached.

Please provide any further comments by 2 p.m. tomorrow (Tuesday). I will then revise as necessary and submit the revision to the President for discussion with him on Wednesday.

Thank you.

FOREIGN POLICY CHALLENGES FOR THE '80sI. SHARED GOALS -- AMERICAN IDEALISM

- (1) Americans of all kinds share two goals for foreign policy:
 - (a) a safer world;
 - (b) a world in which individual rights can be respected and precious values may flourish.
- (2) These are at the heart of America's idealism.
- (3) But stated abstractly, these goals are not exclusively American. They are shared by people all over the world.
- (4) Tragically, a world in which these fundamental goals are so widely shared is nonetheless a troubled world: Though we and our allies enjoy peace and prosperity,
 - o many of our citizens fear super-power conflict and the horrible threat of nuclear war;
 - o around the world, terrorists threaten innocent people and civilized values; and
 - o in developing countries, orderly progress is threatened by violent revolution and totalitarianism.
- (5) Obviously, the fact that abstract goals may be widely shared is hardly enough to assure their achievement. What matters are the practical means by which they are pursued.

II. PRACTICAL MEANS -- AMERICAN REALISM

- (6) In pursuing our idealistic objectives, we are guided by these practical principles:
 - (a) Realism. Idealistic ends can only be achieved through realistic means.
 - (b) Intelligence. Policies can only be effective if the information on which they are based is sound.
 - (c) Strength. Weakness is inescapably destabilizing. Strength is a prerequisite for security, effective negotiation, democracy, stability, and peace.
 - (d) Economic Growth. Neither strength nor stability can be achieved and sustained without it.
 - (e) Non-aggression. We have no territorial ambitions. Our strength is to assure deterrence and to secure our interests if deterrence fails.
 - (f) Shared Responsibility with Allies. The protection of freedom is a heavy responsibility -- that can be satisfactorily met only if the burden is shared.
 - (g) Dialogue with Adversaries. Though we may oppose the values and policies of our adversaries, we must always be willing to resolve our differences by peaceful means.
 - (h) Bipartisanship at Home. In our two-party democracy, no foreign policy can be effectively managed or sustained without bipartisan support at home.

III. RESTORED STRENGTH -- AMERICAN RENEWAL

(7) For the past three years, we have been steadily rebuilding our capacity to advance our foreign policy goals. We have done so, first, by renewed attention to these practical principles.

-- [Cite a statistic or example for each of (a) - (h) above -- i.e., intelligence build-up, defense build-up, economic renewal, strengthened alliance, etc.]

IV. REMAINING CHALLENGES -- AMERICAN AGENDA

(8) But while much has been accomplished to strengthen the basis for U.S. foreign policy, much remains to be done -- building on our renewed and strengthened base. We might usefully frame our continuing agenda in relation to four great challenges:

(A) CHALLENGE #1:

(9) We must reduce the risk of nuclear war -- and reduce the levels of nuclear armaments (in a way that also reduces the risk they will ever be used).

-- [Cite elements of our policy -- and associated logic.]

-- [Note progress to date -- highlighting bi-partisanship represented by Scowcroft Commission.]

-- [Note proposals by critics -- who appear to share our goals, but whose chosen means don't meet the tests of practicality.]

-- [Cite additional related elements: hotline-type risk reduction; R&D on strategic defense for long-term; MBFR; strengthening the non-proliferation regime -- e.g. China/IAEA.]

(B) CHALLENGE #2:

(10) We must strengthen the basis for stability in troubled and strategically sensitive regions.

-- Nuclear arms control alone cannot guarantee safety or security; nor can it alone provide a basis for constructive regional development.

-- [Cite adverse pattern of rising regional strife and inflammatory terrorism in the '70s.]

-- In general, effective regional stabilization requires a mix of security assistance, economic assistance, and diplomatic mediation -- an integrated approach.

-- [Cite excellent example of policy logic: work of bi-partisan Kissinger Commission re Central America (Elaborate.)]

-- [Integrated approach similarly required for Middle East. (Explain.)]

-- Because effective approaches to regional problem-solving must involve an integrated mix on a sustained basis, it is essential that Congress give full -- not piecemeal -- support to such approaches. Indeed, where we have foundered in regional stabilization it has been exactly because the Congress has failed to provide such support. (Note: "I'll return to this point when I discuss the fourth challenge in a few moments.")

(11) We must expand opportunities for economic development and personal freedom.

-- America's idealistic vision seeks not merely a safer world, but also a better world.

(12) We are strengthening the basis for expansion of economic opportunity.

-- [Rebuilding the U.S. economy -- and, in doing so, helping lead the world toward recovery.]

-- [Resisting protectionist pressures -- building on Williamsburg summit. Cite and defend wine and domestic content examples. Look toward London summit, new round of trade and services negotiations; and international framework that opens markets for our exports of goods and services, allows freer flow of capital, and more growth/efficiency/jobs for all.]

-- [Expanding trade and investment relationships -- cite CBI; make more of "Pacific Basin" opportunities.]

-- [Assuring sufficient international liquidity -- cite, and note importance of, success with and through IMF funding.]

-- [Helping less developed countries grow -- discuss in general; note U.S. trade with LDCs.]

(13) We are also strengthening the basis for an expansion of democratic values.

-- [Elaborate.]

-- [Return to Central American example. Remind that peace and security are preconditions to both economic development and development of democratic institutions -- and that policy requires an integrated mix (as discussed above). Use this as transition to challenge #4.]

(D) CHALLENGE #4:

(14) We must restore bi-partisan consensus in support of U.S. foreign policy.

-- [Repeat points made above re obvious importance of this -- and regrettable cases of Congressional wavering in Central America and Middle East.]

(15) [Argue the problem is deeper than just these two cases might suggest. The more basic problem is: In this "post-Vietnam era, Congress has not yet developed capacities for coherent, responsive, and responsible action to go with the new foreign policy powers it has taken unto itself.]

-- [Cite increased powers Congress has assumed since Vietnam.]

-- [Note that this means that bi-partisan consensus-building is more important than ever.]

-- Indeed, it is now an essential responsibility of leadership -- not only Executive leadership, but also Congressional.

- (16) We have, in some areas, demonstrated the capacity for such joint leadership. But when it comes to integrated programs to stabilize troubled regions, many in the Congress seem to act as if they were still in the troubled Vietnam era -- as if their policy responsibility were simply to be vocal critics, not responsible partners in the development of positive programs to solve real problems.
- (17) Much was learned from Vietnam -- ranging from increased appreciation of the need for careful discrimination in the projection of U.S. force to increased appreciation of the need for domestic political support for any such military element of policy. But clearly force projection and/or military assistance must, in certain cases, be available tools in the foreign policy mix. And equally clearly, the Congress is, at best, uncomfortable with either the military element of foreign policy or with the new responsibility for this element that it has taken unto itself.
- (18) If the Congress intends to keep this new responsibility, there must be additional adaptation in this "post-Vietnam era."
 - o Presidents must now recognize Congress as a more significant partner in foreign policy-making -- and must therefore, as we have, seek new means to reach bi-partisan Executive-Legislative consensus.
 - o But equally important: Congressmen must realize that they, too, are partners -- who must share responsibility for more than just their criticism and their words. They, too, must demonstrate a capacity for consensus-building that can lead to effective, positive action.

V. CONCLUSION

- (19) We have sufficient consensus on the abstract goals of foreign policy; and we've made substantial progress in the development of concrete and realistic means to achieve those goals.
- (20) But while there is consensus on goals and progress on means, there is still a Congressional reluctance to assume the full responsibility for positive (not negative) means that must go with newly claimed Congressional powers. It is this responsibility for the development of effective and affirmative means that must be the focus of bi-partisan consensus-building.
- (21) That is the challenge for responsible leadership in the post-Vietnam era -- for however sound our policy prescriptions, they will come to naught if they cannot be implemented and sustained.
- (22) We've set some excellent examples with the bi-partisan Scowcroft Commission, the bi-partisan support for IMF funding, and the bi-partisan work of the Kissinger Commission. But clearly the pattern of bi-partisan consensus-building must be extended -- to build on the foundations we've laid, and to sustain a set of policies that can, both realistically and idealistically, meet the challenges of the '80s.

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

INFORMATION

March 12, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER
RICHARD G. DARMAN
MICHAEL A. MCMANUS
BEN ELLIOTT

*Hold for
meeting*

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: National Security Policy Speech

Attached is a revised outline for the national security policy speech, currently planned for delivery on April 4, 1984. We are next scheduled to meet on this subject at 10:00 a.m. Friday, March 16, in the Roosevelt Room.

Attachment

REVISED SPEECH OUTLINE

"Bipartisanship and a Safer World"

I. Introduction. Two messages:

- A safer world based on revival of America's strengths
- We need bipartisanship of means, not just ends.

II. A Stronger America in a Safer World

- Outline diversity of US strength.
- Principles we follow: realism; division of labor with allies; growth to promote stability; security as a prerequisite for democracy and peace; dialogue with adversaries.
- Highlight specific successes: China; managing INF crisis; economic recovery, rise of new democracies.

III. The Challenge of Bipartisanship

- Restoration of our strength enables us to enhance our leverage, reduce risks, and build for the future -- in short, an enduring prerequisite for success.
- But bipartisanship also essential or else strength cannot be effectively employed for peace.
- Bipartisanship cannot mean lack of debate. But after Watergate and Vietnam, debate has hardened into polarization. Some in Congress have confused a more active voice with erratic daily intervention in foreign affairs. Criticism has become more satisfying -- or at least easier -- than problem solving.
- We see this as a crucial problem that must be solved. Special leadership required. We are working hard to build coalitions; economic example, Scowcroft Commission, bipartisanship in personnel, e.g., Kampelman, Mansfield, Nitze, etc.
- We have had some success. We believe there is growing support for our nuclear arms control agenda and approach. True also for problems of regional instability although too many critics continue to endorse bipartisan goals while refusing responsibility for the means needed to achieve them.

IV. Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control

- We have worked the nuclear agenda that all agreed was essential after failure of SALT: real reductions, Soviet monopoly in Europe; vulnerability of land forces.
- By contrast, those who continue to criticize us offer only deployment delays, program cancellations, freezes -- these are not means at all; show they are not really facing up to the problems.

V. Regional Instability

- A growing problem of the past decade, aggravated by terrorism.
- We have many strengths to bring to bear (military, diplomatic, economic, etc.); often we are only credible mediator. Examples: Central America, Middle East.
- In neither case will a purely military policy work; but our other strengths will count for little if we ignore the military threat imposed by others.
- We must take the military problem into account -- not because we seek to ignore the other means, but primarily because we want them to succeed.

VI. Conclusions

- America now better positioned than in many years to achieve our vision of a secure, prosperous international order.
- Toward Soviet Union, strengthen selves while pursuing agreements; ready to compromise but not to paper over differences.
- Toward regional conflicts, can't expect to do everything; sensible division of labor required.
- Our approach can work, unless internal divisions convince our opponents that they can have their way with little cost. Adequate help for friends can minimize need for our involvement, while protecting our interests. Acting now can keep small problems from growing into unmanageable ones.

REVISED SPEECH OUTLINE

"Bipartisanship and a Safer World"

I. Introduction

An election year means two things for foreign policy:

A. An examination of the record. The world is a "safer place," based on increased U.S. strength, a reviving international economy, a growing number of democracies in the world, and a realistic dialogue with our adversaries. We are proud to run on this record.

B. A challenge to bipartisanship. Campaign rhetoric will take an increasing toll on the principle of bipartisanship in foreign policy. A prediction: what we will be left with is bipartisanship of ends, but less and less agreement about means. Let me also make a partisan judgment: our opponents want to get the credit for favoring the traditional goals of U.S. foreign policy that this Administration has pursued. They don't want to take responsibility for the means that are needed to reach those goals.

II. A Stronger America in a Safer World

The world is clearly a safer place than four years ago -- with, as the media put it, "America held hostage." It is safer because we have strengthened America in many different ways.

A. Improved national defense. More than a decade of large Soviet increases meant we had no higher priority than rebuilding our own capabilities. A strategy was needed that met our security needs and commitments, while making the most of our technological advantages. We are succeeding, and we can now plan for much smaller increases in the budget we will present two years from now.

- Some of our critics say they are for a strong defense, too. Tomorrow.
- Some say we should emphasize simple weapons over those more technically advanced. Classic false dichotomy: we need a balance. In war, as in medicine and industry, there are times simple tools work, and times when we are thankful for the best technology can provide. If we forsake technical advantage altogether, we play to Soviet, not Western strengths.
- Same with readiness versus procurement. We have to be prepared for conflict while building for future needs. We have increased overall readiness by 50 percent. Some appear to say that the way to get more readiness is to spend less money. How can we be anything but skeptical?

Strength takes many forms:

B. Rebuilding America and International Economies. National security does begin at home: a massively reenergized U.S. economy is the basis for rebuilding our strength. We have also managed increasing strains on the international economic system, while upholding a central tenet of bipartisanship: an open trading order.

C. Working with Allies and Friends. Security can be achieved at lower cost through partnerships. Without partnerships, it can't be achieved at all. This is why we have given so much attention to strengthening ties with our traditional allies and with others who share our strategic interests and can contribute to a common effort. Notable examples of success: allied unity in dealing with Soviet bloc; new strides with Japan in sharing burden of defense; a stronger foundation for our relations with China, as symbolized by this spring's trip; strategic cooperation with Israel, broadened cooperation with moderate Arab states; China; rebuilt our relationship with Pakistan and Turkey.

D. Expansion of democracy. America has an overriding interest in the spread of democratic institutions: these are the states we can work with best, who pose least threat to their neighbors and can best meet their own peoples' needs. And with the stability that a safer world provides, we can expect further successes for the process of political reform. Encouraging trends in Latin America (list countries), Turkey, etc.

E. Conserving Our Technological Superiority. Because our defense strategy builds upon our enormous technical strengths, we must energetically safeguard the flow of U.S. and Western technology. We have worked with our European friends to strengthen COCOM, block the Eastern Bloc's clandestine technology collection effort, and curb subsidies to the the Soviet Union.

The principles that guide us are clear: realism, crucial if results rather than rhetoric is the goal; division of labor with allies, to play upon the strength of free world; growth, to promote stability and human well-being; security, to ensure peace and provide the safety democratic development requires; dialogue with adversaries, who see that negotiations (not force) are their most realistic option.

III. The Challenge of Bipartisanship

A. This is a record of achievement we are proud to run on. We have reversed America's decline and made the necessary investments for a peaceful future. But bipartisanship is also essential, or else strength cannot be effectively employed for peace.

B. What does bipartisanship mean? Not unanimity. In a democracy, we believe lack of debate only protects bad policies from criticism. At the same time, the ideal of tempered and responsible discussion of foreign policy issues has often helped us to avoid the political polarization that can weaken us abroad.

C. Greatest test of bipartisanship comes in a time of change. When new problems appear, new solutions are needed, and a new consensus is replacing the old. Effect of Vietnam, Watergate, etc. has been to set our institutions against each other. Some in Congress have confused erratic, daily intrusion in foreign policy for a "more active voice." Criticism has become more satisfying -- or at least easier than problem solving.

D. We take the problem of bipartisanship seriously. Special leadership is required. Scowcroft and Kissinger Commissions, coalition building, brining Democrats into key positions.

E. Achieving broad support especially important on two of the most critical issues before us: strengthening nuclear deterrence and arms control, and managing regional instability. We have achieved growing consensus on our approach to nuclear arms control. True also of regional problems, although still too many critics unwilling to be as serious about means as they are quick to express support for common objectives.

IV. Nuclear Deterrence and Arms Control

A. No more important job than preventing nuclear war. Unfortunately, success over forty years doesn't mean the problem is simple: strength and stability of deterrence depend on balanced forces, on clear communication, on prudent leadership. We have sought to strengthen deterrence further by negotiated agreements. And in fact we have put more elements of the East-West military equation on the table than any other Administration.

B. The danger of war and the hope for significant arms reductions arouse understandable controversy. Beneath the surface, however, there is surprising continuity from past policies and a growing consensus about key nuclear questions.

C. Nowhere is this more apparent than in the area of nuclear arms control. By the end of the 1970s both advocates and opponents of SALT II expressed agreement on the need to find answers to these key problems:

1. Soviet SS-20 monopoly in Europe and Asia.
2. Vulnerability of the land-based ICBM force.
3. The failure of arms control to slow overall growth in strategic systems.

D. This set of problems has been our nuclear agenda since 1981. We tackled the crucial problems that others said could not be

ignored. Specifically, we have: implemented NATO's dual decision of 1979; adopted the recommendation of the Scowcroft Commission; reduced theater warhead levels in Europe; worked to develop Congressional support for the "build-down" concept; and proposed deep reductions in strategic forces at the START talks.

E. This represents a careful response to a nuclear agenda upon which even our critics agreed. Those who continue to oppose us pretend that somehow they can achieve greater success. But look beyond their claims to what they offer: a last-minute moratorium on INF deployment, undercutting our allies; unilateral cancellation of the MX, despite its important place in Scowcroft Commission package; unworkable, unverifiable freeze instead of major stabilizing reductions (not means, but attempt to rescue hard problems).

F. All of these measures would in fact have put agreements and increased security further from our reach, not brought them closer. The best way for our critics to show they are really in favor of solving these problems, of strengthening peace and security, is to be willing to take responsibility for the means that are necessary to achieve them. Bipartisanship works if both sides face up to real-world problems.

G. We are on the right course. Beyond today's urgent issues, we are also: exploring the feasibility of nuclear defense; strengthening the nonproliferation regime (e.g., China's decision to join the IAEA); seeking to reduce the danger created by the offensive capability of massive conventional forces in Central Europe.

V. Regional Instability

A. No arms control agreement can completely guarantee safety, for the stability we hope to build into the superpower relationship by agreements can be undone by irresponsible actions elsewhere.

B. Throughout the 1970s conflicts on the rise in key regions. Many causes, including the conclusion of the Soviet Union and its clients that U.S. power and will were in decline. The results not surprising: the collapse of the Shah, Americans held hostage, Afghanistan, Kampuchea, Libyan coercion in Africa, Soviet and Cuban strides in Angola and Ethiopia, subversion in Central America, and the rise of state-supported terrorism -- a mounting crescendo of failure.

C. To better cope with these problems we have sought to carefully blend the various forms of Western strength: our economic resources, our skill and sincerity in mediation, and our ability to offer expeditious security help to threatened friends. We knew that this was the best way of ensuring that our direct military involvement would be both limited and rare.

D. By at least recognizing that the prudent, occasional use of force is sometimes necessary, we have forced our adversaries to think harder about whether their agenda is really worth pursuing. Equally important, we have encouraged our friends to be more confident in taking difficult steps for peace and justice. We have made it easier for them to work with and help each other.

E. Perhaps the best example of the kind of integrated approach we need has been in Central America. A combination of military assistance, economic initiatives, active diplomatic mediation, emphasis on democratization and human rights, and emergency measures when our friends are in need. The scale and depth of problems we face guarantee that military assistance by itself would be hopeless; yet without military aid, other instruments would also fail.

F. Same blend of strengths in Middle East. The U.S. cannot do everything for embattled governments. And we cannot tackle the spread of terrorism on our own. But we reject the suggestion that we should therefore do nothing. Such an approach will only ensure that we face larger problems further down the road. On this basis, our approach is to expand cooperation with states that can be most helpful in advancing our common interests, to do as much as possible for friendly governments in danger, and seize major opportunities for peacekeeping. We will continue to integrate military assistance and cooperation, economic aid, diplomatic mediation and, where necessary, a U.S. presence.

G. There is no guarantee of rapid success in the Middle East, in Central America or in other areas where we and our allies are promoting settlements to regional conflicts (e.g., southern Africa). A mature and resilient America cannot expect that one day foreign policy will simply end. We cannot permit policy to oscillate between overinvolvement and non-involvement. Steady quiet persistence is required. When we suffer setbacks, we should not jump to the conclusion that we can instead defend our interests without ever committing ourselves, or that we should not act until the perfect opportunity arises. We are forced, unfortunately, to respond to less than perfect opportunities to advance our own and friends' goals. Half-way measures--the outcome of refusing to take responsibility for means--produce the worst possible results. The American people do not want to deceive themselves about what it takes to strengthen the peace.

VI. Conclusion

A. In 1984 we seem to have a bipartisanship of goals. The parties seem to have at least some overlapping vision of the future -- one in which force plays a reduced role, small countries are freer, and the international economy is expanding.

B. Yet at the same time we have much less bipartisanship when it comes to means. As a result, a major risk: ending up with the kind of policies that the Kissinger Commission called the worst approach in foreign policy -- doing just enough to fail.

C. Bipartisanship should be a source of strength in U.S. foreign policy. In this decade, it is our challenge to see that it becomes a source of strength -- and of success -- once more. To do so we have to rebuild a consensus on the means for dealing with the most important foreign policy problems we face.

- Toward the Soviet Union, we will strengthen ourselves while pursuing agreements; we are ready to compromise, but not to paper over differences.

- In dealing with regional conflicts, we cannot expect to do everything ourselves. But we cannot decide to do nothing for those in trouble.

D. To succeed, we will need to bring our many strengths to bear. Nothing less is an adequate response to the problems that we face, or worthy of our vision of the future. We believe that those who truly share this vision will work with us to achieve it. It will be a victory in which both parties, and all peoples, can share.

Keep

WHITE HOUSE STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: 3/12/84 ACTION/CONCURRENCE/COMMENT DUE BY: _____

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH PLANNING SCHEDULE (3/12/84)

	ACTION FYI			ACTION FYI	
VICE PRESIDENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McFARLANE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
MEESE	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	McMANUS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
BAKER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	MURPHY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DEAVER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	OGLESBY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
STOCKMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	ROGERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
DARMAN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SPEAKES	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FELDSTEIN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	SVAHN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FIELDING	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	VERSTANDIG	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
FULLER	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	WHITTLESEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HERRINGTON	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>TUTWILER</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
HICKEY	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<u>WIRTHLIN</u>	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>
JENKINS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>

REMARKS:

Please provide any comments or suggestions to Ben Elliott, with a copy to my office. Thank you.

RESPONSE:

Richard G. Darman
 Assistant to the President
 Ext. 2702

March 12, 1984

PRESIDENTIAL SPEECH PLANNING SCHEDULE

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WRITER RESEARCHER</u>	<u>TOPIC/THEME/PURPOSE</u>
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A. SPEECHES

YOUNG LEADERSHIP CONFERENCE OF UNITED JEWISH APPEAL	03/13 Tuesday	Peter Elizabeth	Tolerance, commitment to Israel's need for strong defense.
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ADDRESS INDEPENDENT INSURANCE AGENTS OF AMERICA	03/27 Tuesday	Dana Kim	Economic recovery.
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ADDRESS WOMEN IN BUSINESS CONFERENCE (New York, NY)	04/05 Thursday	Peter Misty	Economic recovery, women's entre- preneurship, education.
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ADDRESS N.Y. STATE FEDERATION OF CATHOLIC SCHOOL PARENTS (New York, NY)	04/05 Thursday	Tony Elizabeth	Values, school prayer, tuition tax credits, excellence in education, abortion.
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DROPHY FUNDAMENTALIST 1984 CONVENTION	04/13 Friday	Peter Elizabeth	Up with America.
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B. RADIO TALKS

RADIO TALK:	03/17 Saturday	Ben	
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RADIO TALK:	03/24 Saturday	Ben	
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<u>EVENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WRITER RESEARCHER</u>	<u>TOPIC/THEME/PURPOSE</u>
NRSC's INNER CIRCLE RECEPTION	03/26 Monday	Peter Misty	
MEDAL OF FREEDOM LUNCHEON	03/26 Monday	Dana Elizabeth	
RECEPTION FOR TRILATERAL COMMISSION	04/01 Sunday	Ben Julie	
DROBBY MEETING WITH MEMBERS OF THE NATIONAL SECURITY TELECOMMUNICATIONS ADVISORY COMM.	04/03 Tuesday	Dana Julie	
RECEPTION AT WHITE HOUSE FOR FORD THEATER BENEFIT	04/08 Sunday	Peter Kim	
SIGNING CEREMONY FOR THE 27th LAW DAY, USA PROCLAMATION	04/11 Wednesday	Tony Kim	
RECEPTION FOR NRCC'S REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL LEADERSHIP COUNCIL	04/12 Thursday	Al Misty	
<u>D. FOREIGN VISITS</u>			
P.M. SOARES OF PORTUGAL: DEPARTURE STATEMENT	03/14 Wednesday	Dana Julie	

<u>EVENT</u>	<u>DATE</u>	<u>WRITER RESEARCHER</u>	<u>TOPIC/THEME/PURPOSE</u>
LUNCHEON WITH P. M. FITZGERALD & PROMINENT IRISH AMERICANS	03/16 Friday	Tony Julie	
PRES. MITTERRAND OF FRANCE: ARRIVAL, STATE DINNER TOAST, AND ENTERTAINMENT THANK YOU	03/22 Thursday	Dana Julie	
STATE VISIT: PRES. BLANCO OF THE DOMINICAN REPUBLIC: ARRIVAL STATE DINNER TOAST & ENTERTAINMENT	04/10 Tuesday	Dana Julie	
P. M. PREM OF THAILAND: DEPARTURE STATEMENT	04/13 Friday	Dana Julie	
<u>E. TAPINGS</u>			
TAPING: AMERICAN PREPAREDNESS ASSOCIATION DINNER	03/23 Friday		
TAPING: MARINE CORPS SCHOLARSHIP FUND	03/23 Friday		
TAPING: AMERICAN ADVERTISING FEDERATION	03/23 Friday		

SENIOR STAFF MEETING ACTION ITEMS

(03/05/84)

ITEM	ACTION
<p>1. <u>Today's Schedule</u>: The meeting with Chancellor Kohl and the speech to the National League of Cities will be covered by the press. Deaver and McFarlane will discuss the presentation to Chancellor Kohl of a flag carried by the space shuttle.</p>	<p>Speakes Deaver McFarlane</p>
<p>2. <u>Cabinet Activity</u>: On Tuesday, CCEA will meet on financial market developments, and CCFA will discuss rural development policy. On Wednesday, CCCT will discuss the Commission on Industrial Competitiveness (the machine tool issue will probably be removed from the agenda of this meeting). CCEA will meet with the President on Thursday regarding TIMS.</p>	<p>Fuller</p>
<p>3. <u>Legislative Calendar</u>: Senate action this week will focus on Ed Meese's confirmation and on school prayer.</p>	<p>Oglesby</p>
<p>In the House, the Central America aid package will be taken up in committee, where we are hoping to overturn the subcommittee's action. In order to stress the importance of the Central America package, a reference may be inserted in tomorrow's speech to the evangelicals.</p>	<p>McFarlane Darman</p>
<p>4. <u>School Prayer</u>: We are anticipating a filibuster on this issue, with a key vote on cloture later this week. Other procedural difficulties should be expected. White House meetings with outside groups will be held, and phone calls will be made by the President and various Cabinet officials.</p>	<p>Oglesby</p>

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

FBI
file

January 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR DICK DARMAN

FROM: MIKE McMANUS *McMANUS*

SUBJECT: The President's Speech Planning Schedule

I would have the following suggestions with regard to the Speech Planning Schedule:

1. The address in Atlanta on January 26th should stress only the economy, small business and free enterprise, and not necessarily all of the themes from the State of the Union.
2. The speech in Chicago on January 31st should, I believe, stress only the economic recovery and not military deterrence.
3. The speech in Las Vegas on February 7th should stress not only school discipline but also the rebuilding of basic academic programs of study to avoid criticism from the groups like the ACLU and to include our strong position on merit pay et al.

cc: Mike Deaver

FBI



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1 September 1983

file

Michael K. Deaver
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Michael Deaver:

Enclosed is the transcript of the interview we recorded in May on your work with Mr. Reagan during his years as governor. It is a good beginning to what we hope will be discussion in some detail of the major aspects of your role as his deputy executive secretary in Sacramento.

When you have time, will you read over the transcript for any clarifications that may be needed. If you will then return it to us we will keep it on file for completion with future interviews for the gubernatorial era project.

Your recruitment of Dean Watkins has been a real boost to our work. He is a very pleasant, direct, and effective person to work with. So far he has brought in three major gifts to the project, from Mr. and Mrs. Joseph Moore, Robert Reynolds, and himself. If it would not be too much trouble, could you send me a copy of the list you sent him? We'd like to provide him with whatever information we have on those listed who may have UC connections.

I was pleased to read that you are heading a group on women's political concerns. It's curious that so large a population group should perceive itself and be perceived as out of the mainstream of events. We happen to have interviewed a number of women who were active in California politics in the 50s and 60s; perhaps they might have something to say that would be helpful. I enclose a list.

Sincerely,

Gabrielle
Gabrielle Morris, Project Director

GM:lgd
Enclosure

Interview with Michael Deaver

Date of Interview: 4 May 1983 ##

Interviewer: Gabrielle Morris

Transcriber: Sam Middlebrooks

I EARLY POLITICAL AND
ADMINISTRATIVE EXPERIENCES

Begin Tape 1, Side A subhead > Fieldwork and Sacramento Transition

Deaver: I was working for the Republican State Central Committee in 1965 and '66. I was an area field director, and I was running assembly races.

Morris: The machinery of that is kind of interesting. We talked to Win Adams. He said you were one of seven youngsters. [laughter] He was pleased [with] the fact that you were all young and energetic. Could you recall who the others were?

Deaver: One of them is a fellow that's back here now by the name of Ron Frankum. He works in Meese's shop. Oh, gosh---

Morris: Would that list be buried somewhere in--? the Hoover Institution?

Deaver: I'm sure Win has it.

Morris: He didn't--

Deaver: Ron could probably remember much better than I could. It just escapes me. Pete Wilson, who is now United States Senator, was

This symbol indicates the start of a new tape or tape segment. For a guide to tapes, see p. 1

one, in San Diego. In fact, I reminisced with him the day he got elected: "My gosh, look what's [happened], I'm in the White House, and you're in the United States Senate. It wasn't too long ago we were out there driving up and down the coast."

Morris: So it was a good training ground.

Deaver: It was a very good training ground, because it made you independent. It made you instantly a manager. We were young kids. I was twenty-eight, twenty-nine. I was the most successful that year. I had four assembly races, and I won three out of the four.

Morris: That's great.

Deaver: They all turned over Democrats. I was going to stay in Santa Barbara, because I loved it. I was going to go to work for an ad agency there. Somebody--I think it may have been Dennis Carpenter, who was the deputy chairman of the party--insisted that I come up to Sacramento and get involved in the transition government. He said, "You don't have to go up there and make a commitment to go into government. But go work in the transition. They need some good people."

So I went up to Sacramento, and I was assigned to Bill Clark. I went to work for him. Our assignment was--I was one of four assistants he had. During the transition, he had the entire cabinet responsibilities, to go into all the the departments and

agencies and interview the directors and find out what their budgets were going to be and find out what personnel changes we ought to be making. Come back and make those recommendations.

Morris: Talking to Pat Brown's appointees?

Deaver: Talking to Pat Brown's people, right. Exactly. So I had the whole human services area, employment, health... That was my responsibility for Bill Clark. When the transition ended and inaugural day came, Clark had asked me if I would be his deputy, deputy cabinet secretary. I said, "I don't know whether I really want to stay and do this."

He said, "Just do it for a year." I did stay. I developed a good relationship with Clark.

When he moved on to become the executive secretary, he asked me to be his deputy there. That gave me the entire governor's office. Where I had this narrow little cabinet responsibility, I then had twenty-nine or thirty--had tremendous responsibility. And most of those responsibilities were associated with the Reagans personally. I didn't know them. I hadn't even really campaigned for the Governor.

> Getting to know Mr. and Mrs. Reagan

Morris: ~~Right~~. Had you met Mr. Reagan and Mrs. Reagan during the campaign?

Deaver: I had met him, but I didn't know them. I didn't know them really

until I became the assistant executive secretary. ~~And I~~ got into supervising the schedule and appointments and travel ⁿ ad household and all of his personal staff, his secretaries and staff assistants, the Governor's.

I immediately liked both of them. They were just like old shoes to me. A lot of people, staff, were--there were stories about Nancy Regan that weren't even true. And the staff were so intimidated by her. I found her to be delightfully frank and open. And very, very inquisitive. She wanted all the information she could get.

Morris: She was really interested on how the governor's office functioned?

Deaver: Not so much that. She never got interested in that particularly. She would be very interested in his schedule. If he started to be overworked or got tired, or we overscheduled him or did stupid things in the schedule, she'd let me know. And I responded. It never happend again. And I think she liked that. And I liked dealing with her. I loved dealing with him. I think he and I became, I think, good friends, still are good friends.

I never dreamed I would spend eight years in state government, which is what I ended up doing. And then doing this experience back here. It just would have been the last thing from my mind that I w^ould have ever done.

Morris: That's interesting. Why were you interested in taking on the campaign job—?

Deaver: I was always interested in politics; I wasn't interested in governing. I had an instinct for politics, and my real instincts are public relations and marketing. So I was much more interested in—I did that stint with the state committee. I never thought about staying in politics forever.

Morris: But this was a staff job. You weren't—

Deaver: This was a staff job, and here I was in government for eight years. And here I am back here for two and a half years in government. But there is a lot in public relations and marketing right where I'm sitting right now. I did five years when I got out of the governor's office in 1974. I opened up my own public relations firm in New York, Washington, LA, and Sacramento, with a partner. It was very successful, and it was a lot of fun. And we made—

Morris: You were still working in the same public affairs area, weren't you?

Deaver: Oh, yes. We did a lot of public affairs.

Morris: You were doing a lot of work with Mr. Reagan.

Deaver: Right. He was a client. I managed his speaking schedule and his

* Peter Hannaford

radio show and his newspaper column, actually managed everything except his private life. So I've really been associated with him since 1966.

> Republican Party Cal Plan

Morris: That's a long time. Did Win Adams directly supervise you fellows in the '65-'66 period?

Deaver: Yes.

Morris: What kind of briefings and orientation did he do?

Deaver: Win Adams was kind of the administrative supervisor. I never thought of Win Adams as a political person. I thought of him more as an administrator. Actually, the political supervision came from^m Stu Spencer and Bill Roberts.

Morris: As early as '65?

Deaver: Oh, yes. We had that Cal Plan--what did we call that committee? We had a committee of professionals, about twenty-five of us, that met four or five times a year. That's where we really got our guidance. We had to go out and analyze these districts and come in and sell our districts to get Cal Plan support.

Morris: Sell them--?

Deaver: Sell them to this committee of experts that the Republican party

set up. These were all people like Spencer, Roberts, and—

Morris: Cap Weinberger?

Deaver: No, he wouldn't have sat on it. Dennis Carpenter, some of the other state—

Morris: Dr. Parkinson?

Deaver: Dr. Parkinson. The other county chairmen. Jim Halley, ^[San Francisco County] people like that.

Morris: You had to sell that committee in order to get funding to work in the county?

Deaver: For instance, I had from the LA County line to the Santa Clara County line, over to the Merced County line, down to the Kern County line, I mean, down to the LA County line. So I had this whole mid section of California. Had five districts in there. I had three of them that I knew we could win. I was convinced. And I had to come back to that committee and say, "Okay, here's the money that I think can be raised. Here's what I think I can do. I've got some good, energetic volunteer people there. I think I can raise the Republican registration by a point and a half. I think I can get it up to thirty-seven or thirty-eight. And I've got three outstanding candidates. I think I can get it narrowed down to this guy Frank Murphy, who's a young lawyer in Santa Cruz."

And I sold those districts to the committee so that I could get funding.

Morris: Really?

Deaver: Yes. And then I went out and ran the campaigns. It was a lot of fun. It really was.

Morris: Why did you take up with the Republican committee rather than the Democratic Central Committee?

Deaver: I came from a very, very conservatively oriented family. My father was very active in the campaign against Roosevelt.

→
[telephone interruption]

Morris: So your family was conservative--

Deaver: My family was very conservative. Then I went to college. I got a liberal arts education.

Morris: At San Jose State?

Deaver: At San Jose State. I think I got a little more liberal in my own thinking then. But I snapped out of it in 1964 and worked my tail off for Barry Goldwater. I really always believed-- I'm not a-- I don't consider myself to be a right-winger. I consider myself to

be a moderate. I think Ronald Reagan's a moderate. But I've always believed that the best thing would be the most individual freedom you can get. So I think that sums up in very simple terms what I believe.

Morris: You'd worked in the Goldwater campaign as a local--?

Deaver: As a young staffer actually, for Santa Clara County.

> The 1966 Campaign

Morris: One of the givens in the whole Reagan story is that there were a whole bunch of volunteers from the Goldwater campaign who were--

Deaver: Ready.

Morris: --looking for a way to stay active.

Deaver: Right.

Morris: Is this what you found in your *area*?

Deaver: Yes, Reagan was clearly the candidate of the Goldwaterites. I was not a Reagan man. Isn't that interesting! When I think about that (and I hadn't thought about it for a long time)--I went from Goldwater to George Christopher. And it had nothing to do with philosophy. I thought George Christopher could win. I didn't know this guy Ronald Reagan. He was an actor. I met him in Santa Barbara, and he impressed me. But I still was a Christopher man.

④ I can't tell you who I voted for in the very end, but I remember a guy accosting me one night about ten years ago in Santa Barbara, almost punching me in the nose, because he said, "You were for Christopher, and now you've got this big job with Reagan." I said, "Look, that hasn't got anything to do with it."

Morris: What was there about Christopher's campaign that made it lag?

Deaver: Oh, he just wasn't a very good candidate. He wasn't articulating the issues. And Reagan, who has a great sense of what is on the people's minds, was articulating Berkeley. That wasn't even an issue until Ronald Reagan started saying, "You either obey the rules or get out of our campuses." And he got a million blue-collar votes, and Democrat votes, on that issue alone. Plus, they were very unhappy with Pat Brown, and having eight years of yet another Brown. How many of these years can we take?

Morris: Right. Of Brown the first time around. But at that point, we didn't know we were going to have eight more years of another Brown.

Deaver: Oh, we should have had better sense the last time. We'd had four years of the kid.

Morris: That is one of the things in politics, too, that the longer you stay in office, the less you get done and the more negative feelings you build up.

Deaver: Well, that is normally true, although this guy is kind of an anomaly to that. I remember the most that we ever got done were the welfare reforms, which were in the second term. Which catapulted him to the national scene. Fourteen different states then came to him and instituted welfare reforms, which gave him a national issue. And I remember polls that were taken at the end of the eight years of governor, where people gave him about a fifty-two, fifty-three per cent job rating overall for his eight years, which is pretty good, the majority of the people. But over eighty per cent of the people said, whether I liked him or not, agreed with him or not, at least he did what he said he was going to do. That's a very strong key to the success of Ronald Reagan.

Two things about Ronald Reagan. He's always been underestimated. His opponents always underestimated him. And he's consistent. Whether you agree with him or not. Whether you liked him firing the traffic controllers, he did it, by God, and it's a little bit of the Harry Truman.

Eugene McCarthy said to me in 1979 that he wanted to endorse Ronald Reagan. I said, "You want to endorse Ronald Reagan?"

Morris: Did he?

Deaver: He did endorse him. I said, "Why?" He went through a few things, and then he said, "But the most important thing, Mike, is that I

believe that this is the first guy since Harry Truman that won't confuse the job with the man." And he's right.

> Polling and a 1972? Assembly Campaign

Morris: That's an interesting distinction. Have you found polling to be a useful tool and a helpful guide?

Deaver: Sure. Absolutely. From the standpoint of seeing what's on the people's mind, not letting it lead you, but seeing what's on the people's mind. Reagan has always used polls.

Morris: Were you using them when you were doing the fieldwork?

Deaver: Absolutely. Oh, yes. I used a lot of polls, and boy, I tell you, it made a lot of difference. I remember a race in Santa Barbara that I assisted on in '68 or '70. I went down and helped them on it. We polled, and the incumbent Republican assemblyman had eighty per cent of the people with him on the issues, gun control, marijuana, death penalty, all these things. But he was losing the race by twelve points. Nobody knew where his opponent stood. And we did a great brochure, which turned out to be a classic brochure, and hundreds of people have used it. It really wasn't my idea. It was an ad consultant that I hired. But it said, "~~Do you know where your assemblyman stands on the issues?~~" and then it had ballots: ~~control of marijuana, yes or no. No, it didn't either. I'm sorry.~~

Ⓟ The outside of the brochure said, "How do you feel about the issues? Use of marijuana, yes or no. Death penalty, yes or no." About six gut issues. Then you opened it up, and it said, "Here's

* would that be Don McGillvray?
12 Sounds like the 1972 Campaign,
in which MacGillvray beat
Gary Hart 66,671 to 66,055. Close!

where your assemblyman stands on the issues, and here's where his opponent stands on the issues."

Morris: You could develop information about the two

Deaver: We turned the election around.

Morris: ~~the two~~ candidates?

Deaver: Oh, sure. They'd all taken positions. The other guy was a liberal, who's up there ^[in Sacramento] now, who was against the death penalty and for the use of marijuana, and all of these were things that conservative Santa Barbara was opposed to, but they didn't know where he stood. We let them know.

Morris: ~~Even though he was an incumbent.~~

~~Deaver: That's right.~~

Morris: ~~He had not been~~ ??

Deaver: ^Q He was a lousy candidate. I ^{have} got to go.

Morris: Thank you. This is a good beginning.

~~[End Tape 1, Side A and End of Interview.] ##~~

CALIFORNIA WOMEN POLITICAL LEADERS ORAL HISTORY PROJECT

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*William Malone preferred not to release his transcript at this time.

July 1983

California Women Political Leaders Total: \$847
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