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## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

6/18/84

Jule

Dear Donna,

As we discussed, this request from NRSC/NRCC was sent to JAB, MKD, FFF and RGD for approval/disapproval.

Everyone approved although we will ask NRSC/NRCC not to mention the specific date of the 1985 Senate-House Dinner.

Thanks so much for your help.

Coron

CARON JACKSON Office of Margaret D. Tutwiler 456-7620

## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

June 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III MICHAEL K. DEAVER

FRED F. FIELDING RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM:

MARGARET TUTWILER MAY

SUBJECT:

PROPOSED THANK-YOU LETTERS SIGNED BY THE PRESIDENT FOR CONTRIBUTORS TO THE 1984 SENATE-HOUSE DINNER

Attached is the proposed text of a thank-you note which NRSC and NRCC would like to send over the President's signature to approximately 2,500 individuals who contributed to the 1984 Senate-House Dinner.

The Committees are asking for approval on this letter as soon as possible.

Please note that the text mentions a specific date for the 1985 Senate-House Dinner. If you do not want this date made public, we will tell NRSC/NRCC that the letter must be revised so that a specific date is not mentioned.

APPROVAL TO MENTION SPECIFIC DATE FOR 1985 SENATE-HOUSE DINNER:

/					
Approve	Disapprove				

OVERALL APPROVAL TO DO MAILING:

Approve	Disapprove

# THE WHITE HOUSE

June 18, 1984

MEMO TO MARGARET TUTWILER

FROM: BILL SITTMANN

Mike Deaver would like your thoughts on this.

Thanks.

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR CHAIRMAN

MITCHELL E. DANIELS, JR. EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR

National Republican Senatorial Committee

· June 7, .1984

#### MEMORANDUM

TO: JAMES A. BAKER, III

CHIEF OF STAFF AND ASST. TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: RICHARD G. LUGAR

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL REPUBLICAN SENATORIAL COMMITTEE

GUY VANDER JAGT

CHAIRMAN, NATIONAL KEPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE

RE: THE PRESIDENT'S DINNER DIRECT MAIL

In 1982 and 1983, following the Senate-House Dinner, the White House authorized the use of a letter signed by President Reagan thanking all of those who contributed.

We would like to send a similar letter this year to the approximately 2500 people who contributed to the over-whelming success of The President's Dinner, the 1984 Senate-House Dinner. The letter would be sent on or about June 15, 1984.

#### Enclosed are:

- 1. The copy we would like the President to approve to thank donors to The President's Dinner.
  - 2. A sample of the letterhead and envelope to be used.

We have been told that the date of April 30, 1985 has been tentatively held by the White House for the 1985 Senate-House Dinner. As you will note, this date is referred to in the body of the letter.

If you have any questions, please don't hesitate to contact Bob Perkins at 224-2351.

Thank you for your kind attention and assistance. We look forward to hearing from you regarding this matter at your earliest convenience.

cc: Michael K. Deaver Margaret Tutwiler

POST OFFICE BOX 37063

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20013

RONALD REAGAN

## RONALD REAGAN

DRAFT FOR THANK YOU LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN TO ALL 1984 CONTRIBUTORS TO THE PRESIDENT'S DINNER

			**	
Dear		**		 :

I wanted to write you personally to thank you for your outstanding support of The President's Dinner, this year's Senate-House Dinner.

Our goal was to raise \$3.5 million for our candidates for the U.S. Senate and House. Through your help and generosity, we exceeded that goal and are able to give our candidates over \$4.5 million in vitally-needed campaign funds. You helped make The President's Dinner the most successful fundraising event in political history!

From every standpoint, the evening was a spectacular success. Enthusiasm ran high in the overflow crowd, and the guests enjoyed themselves nearly as much as Nancy and I did.

On April 30, 1985, the annual Senate-House Dinner will be held once again. It is my hope that, re-elected as your President, I may join you at the 1985 President's Dinner in continued support of our Party. It's absolutely critical that the 1985 Dinner be as successful as the one we just held.

The other good news is that Ted Welch, this year's outstanding Deputy Dinner Chairman, will serve as Dinner Chairman in 1985, taking the reins from my good friend Drew Lewis. And Jack McDonald, who did an excellent job as Political Action Committee Chairman, will serve again next year. We'll have a great team.

Please mark the date of April 30th on your calendar, as I will mark it on mine.

Again, many thanks for your help.

Sincerely,

Ronald Reagan

## THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON

June 11, 1984 \*84 JUN 11 P1:47

MEMO TO MARGARET TUTWILER

FROM: BILL SITTMANN


Mike Deaver would like to know if we ok'ed this.

Thanks/



## Republican National Committee

Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. Chairman



May 30, 1984

The Honorable James A. Baker, III Chief of Staff and Assistant to the President The White House Washington, D.C. 20050

Dear Jim:

Following our discussion on Tuesday, May 29, concerning the use of the President's signature in RNC fund-raising, I discussed the same in some detail with Phil Smith, Executive Director of our Finance Division. I am enclosing, herewith, a copy of Phil's memo to me outlining the three projects we need the President's participation in during calendar year 1983 (two mailings and one personal appearance) in order for us to meet our budgetary requirements.

As you will ascertain from the memo, a denial of the President's signature would have a disastrous financial effect upon the RNC. We estimate that the earlier decision to withdraw the President's signature on our prospect mailing will ultimately result in a net loss of one and a half million dollars in 1984 and as much as \$5 million dollars in 1985.

I understand and fully support your earlier decision as a result of the misuse by others of the President's signature. I would like to point out to you, however, that the RNC has always "played by the rules" with regard to the use of the President's name or signature and I believe Ed Rollins and Margaret Tutwiler will confirm this. While I understand the difficulties presented by other entities in conforming to the rules, I hope you will not punish the RNC by withholding the President's participation in the three matters set forth in Phil Smith's memo.

A failure to implement these projects and mailings would not only affect our overall support of Republican candidates across the board, but would also adversely affect our ability to raise the \$6.9 million dollars the RNC alone can spend on behalf of the reelection campaign following the Convention.

If you need any additional information or data, please give me a call.

Kindest regards,

FRANK J. FAHRENKOPF, JR.

FJF:cm Enclosure

cc: Michael Deaver
Margaret Tutwiler



## Republican National Finance Committee

Philip S. Smith
Executive Director

#### MEMORANDUM

To: Chairman Fahrenkopf

Attn: Bill Phillipsh Date: May 29, 1984

From: Phil Smith

Subj: White House Support/1984 Fund-Raising Programs.

Pursuant to your request I have outlined below the fund-raising mailings and projects involving the President's participation for the balance of the campaign year. As you will note, these projects and mailings represent a substantial percentage of the RNC's budget for fiscal 1984.

#### I. CONTRIBUTOR FILE MAILING - AUGUST 23, 1984

Letter signed by President Reagan (from Dallas) requesting support of RNC programs, including the Presidential Trust, during the general election campaign period. (The President signed a similar letter for us at the close of the 1980 Convention which produced \$3 million for the RNC.) Copy will be submitted to the White House in early June for approval. Estimated quantity to be mailed is 1.8 to 1.9 million.

Revenue Projection - \$3.5 million

# The Anatole Hotel (Chantilly Ballroom) 12:00 pm - 2:00 pm

Traditionally, the RNC sponsors a luncheon or dinner in honor of the Party's nominees during convention week. This year we have planned a luncheon in honor of the President and First Lady and Vice President and Mrs. Bush on Thursday. Tickets will be sold for \$1,000 per person, and we are currently anticipating attendance of 2,200.

Revenue Projection - \$2.2 million

#### III. 1985 FIRST RENEWAL MAILING - December 3, 1984

The President has signed all of our renewal notices for sustaining membership since 1980. Traditionally, these notices are mailed in December of the preceding year, and generate the highest level of response of any mailing to our contributor file. In 1984,

his letter generated over \$6 million, \$3 million of the total being received in December of 1983.

For 1984, we have projected revenues of \$3.5 million from the mailing during December, and an additional \$3 million in January and February of 1985. Hence, total revenues are projected at \$6.5 million.

We would submit copy for White House approval in early November.

In summary, the projects indicated above represent \$12.2 million in RNC revenues over the next eight months. Our budget for this eight month period is \$27 million, or 52% of our 1984 budget of \$52 million. The \$12.2 million therefore represents 45% of our income for the period. Needless to say, withdrawal of support and endorsement of these projects would be devastating.

# THE WHITE HOUSE WASHINGTON May 16, 1984

#### Gail:

This is the response to the Don Adair letter to Mr. Deaver re: his poster for the convention.

This should close the issue and I send this to you FYI.

MOC



## l 1984 Republican National Convention

Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. Chairman Republican National Committee

COMMITTEE ON ARRANGEMENTS

May 15, 1984

Ernest Angelo, Jr. Chairman

Trudy McDonald Vice-Chairman

George Clark, NY Treasurer

Mary Stivers, GA Secretary

Roger Allan Moore General Counsel

**SUBCOMMITTEE CHAIRMEN** 

Don Adams, IL Nancy Apgar, OK Fran Chiles, TX Jack Courtemanche, CA Jennifer Dunn, WA Noël Gross, NJ Bill Harris, AL Ginny Martinez, LA Dennis Olson, ID Sheila Roberge, NH Ken Stout, AL Peter Secchia, MI

STAFF

Ronald H. Walker Convention Manager

**Douglass Blaser** Deputy Convention Manager

Daniel Denning Deputy Convention Manager

Peggy Venable **Executive Director**  Mr. Don Adair 901 South Coit #2027 Richardson, Texas 75080

Dear Mr. Adair:

I am responding to your letter of March 23, 1984, to Mr. Michael Deaver requesting that the President and Vice President personally sign an original painting to be later reproduced as a Convention poster.

I understand you and the City of Dallas have rendered an agreement relative to marketing your poster of the President and Vice President during the 1984 Republican National Convention.

You understand that we are not in a position to officially commission your portrayal of President Reagan and Vice President Bush and therefore cannot recommend that they personally sign the original painting as requested in your letter.

I appreciate your interest in the 1984 Convention and wish you every success with your poster.

Yours truly,

Daniel B.Denning

Deputy Convention Manager

DBD/ts

bcc: Hon. micheal memoros



Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr. Chairman

#### **MEMORANDUM**

To:

Michael K. Deaver

From: Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.

The implementation of the attached proposal could enable the Reagan/Bush Committee to spend an additional three to five million dollars on advertising this fall.

Mc Leaners)

How?

By raising additional funds for non-allocable party organizational activity, thus reducing the Reagan/Bush organizational budget by the same amount.

This proposal, prepared by RNC Director of Political Operations, Bill Lacy, outlines how, by utilizing federal election low party spending exemptions, the Reagan/Bush Committee can:

- Effectively increase its advertising budget by transferring a large portion of its organizational budget to media.
- Use Republican fundraising capacity to offset labor and special groups expenditures on behalf of the Democratic nominee, and obtain a spending advantage over the Democratic nominee.
- Build an aggressive voter contact operation with minimal Reagan/Bush Committee expenditures.

This plan is ambitious, and will require substantial additional party fundraising. An additional three to five million dollars would fund a viable program.

This funding can be raised, but the RNC will need your support and assistance.

We stand willing to execute this program in cooperation with Reagan/Bush. I urge you to consider this proposal, and work with us to make it a reality.



William B. Lacy Director of Political Operations

## A PROPOSAL FOR AN EXTENSIVE REPUBLICAN ORGANIZATIONAL EFFORT IN 1984

Prepared for: Chairman Fahrenkopf

April 3, 1984

#### **EXECUTIVE SUMMARY**

#### **PURPOSE**

To argue for an extensive non-allocable organizational program in 1984.

#### RECOMMENDATION

For the RNC and Reagan/Bush to design and execute an organizational program with three primary components:

- Vote delivery/security.
- Mass mailings.
- Volunteer organizational tactics.

#### **BACKGROUND**

#### A historical perspective:

- Since 1960, three of six presidential elections were won by very narrow margins.
- If the historical pattern of landslide/narrow margin victories begun in 1960 continues in 1984, the election will be extremely close.

#### Impact of the law:

- Party committees can conduct many organizational activities traditionally paid for by the federal campaign committees.
- Party expenditures for organizational activities can increase the Reagan/Bush media and direct mail budget, in addition to the budgets of other Republican candidates.

#### The imperatives of 1984:

- Projections of increased minority turnout, labor's organizational efforts for the Democratic nominee, and the AT&T divestiture require an effective, well-planned effort.
- Because we have the time, the financial capacity, and a high level of cooperation with Reagan/Bush, this program is workable.

#### ACTION STEPS

Conceptual approval
Organizational plan
The Financial program
Marketing the program
Execution

#### TABLE OF CONTENTS

- I. A Proposal for an Extensive Republican Organizational Effort in 1984.
  - Purpose
  - Recommendation
  - Background
  - Action steps

#### II. Addendums

- Operational Options
- The Lessons of 1972 and 1980
- The Legal Framework

#### A Proposal for an Extensive Republican Organizational Effort in 1984

#### PURPOSE

My purpose in this memorandum is to argue that the Republican Party must undertake in 1984 a logical extension of the Commitment '80 and Campaign '82 non-allocable funding programs in behalf of the President and all Republican candidates.

#### RECOMMENDATION

I recommend that the Republican National Committee, in close cooperation with the Reagan/Bush Committee, the state parties and the three campaign committees, design, finance and execute an organizational program with three components:

- Vote delivery/security.
- Mass mailings.
- Volunteer organizational tactics.

#### BACKGROUND

Several factors argue for this program:

#### (1) A Historical Perspective

Since 1960, three Presidential elections (1964, 1972 and 1980) were won by landslides and three were won by razor thin margins:

- Richard Nixon would have won in 1960 by increasing his vote total (not his share of the total vote) by 0.3% in Illinois and by 4.1% in Texas.
- Hubert Humphrey would have won in 1968 by increasing his vote total by 2.6% in Missouri, 4.8% in New Jersey, 5.3% in Ohio, 6.2% in Alaska and 6.6% in Illinois.
- Gerald Ford would have won in 1976 by increasing his vote total by 0.6% in Ohio and by 5.3% in Hawaii.

Note the historical rhythm of the results:

- 1960 narrow victory.
- 1964 landslide victory.
- 1968 narrow victory.
- 1972 landslide victory.
- 1976 narrow victory.
- 1980 landslide victory.

If this pattern continues, the 1984 result could be extremely tight.

# (2) Extremely Small Congressional Campaign Margins are now common:

- The Republican Party maintained control of the Senate in 1982 by winning five campaigns by 2% or less.
- Also in 1982, we lost 11 House seats by about 30,000 votes, or an average of 2,700 votes each.

#### (3) The Impact of the Law:

- A. By law, the Republican Party can perform for Reagan/Bush and other federal campaign committees many of the activities traditionally paid for by the campaign committees.
- B. Presidential campaign spending ceilings make heavy party activity essential:
  - Use of non-allocable party expenditures is the only way to exercise a financial advantage over the Democratic nominee and still coordinate with Reagan/Bush.
  - The ceiling means that every dollar is irreplaceable.
  - Every dollar spent by Reagan/Bush on exempt organizational activity is a dollar that cannot be spent on media or direct mail.
  - Party expenditures on exempt activities in effect increases the Reagan/Bush budget.
- C. Organizational support will assist other candidates by allowing them to also increase their non-organizational budgets.

#### (4) The Imperatives of 1984.

- A. The political environment demands an effective, well-planned organizational effort:
  - Minority voter registration and the likelihood of increased minority turnout seriously jeopardizes the presidential campaign and other federal races. (The 1980 61% to 51% white over black voter turnout gap is expected to be diminished in 1984. Black turnout in 1982 increased almost 6% over 1978, decreasing the previously 10 point gap between black and white mid-term election turnout to only 7 points.)
  - The Democratic nominee will receive extensive organizational support from special interests such as the AFL-CIO and the NEA.
  - The AT&T divestiture adds substantial complexity to the establishment of national telephone operations; to avoid problems, operational planning must begin immediately.
- B. We have the capacity to undertake an extensive non-allocable party operation in 1984:
  - We have the time to plan such an effort, if we begin now.
  - Because Reagan/Bush will very soon be reaching their ceiling, joint RNC and Reagan/Bush efforts could successfully tap large sources of contributions without endangering RNC funding needs. (Note: three

to five million dollars would represent viable funding for such a program, though we should strive for an even greater budget.)

• The level of cooperation between the RNC and the presidential committee is extremely high. This should give us the ability to work out the details of this program.

#### ACTION STEPS

- A. Conceptual approval
- B. Outline of plan based upon options described in the attached paper:
  - Definition of target states.
  - Selection of tactics for target states.
  - Development of budget and cash flow.
- C. Designing the financial program
  - Structure and responsibilities.
  - Development of finance plan.
- D. Marketing the program
  - Joint RNC and Reagan/Bush operatives meeting.
  - Letter to RNC and Reagan/Bush officials signed by Fahrenkopf and Rollins.
- E. Execution

#### **ADDENDUMS**

- (1) OPERATIONAL OPTIONS
- (2) THE LESSONS OF 1972 & 1980
- (3) THE LEGAL FRAMEWORK

#### ADDENDUM #1 - OPERATIONAL OPTIONS

The purpose of this addendum is to outline operational options for an RNC - Reagan/Bush - state and local parties organizational effort.

Because of the complexity of such an effort, I have chosen to merely outline available options here and to begin preparation of a plan only upon conceptual approval and commitment of active support by both the RNC and the Reagan/Bush Committee.

This program is, in my opinion, realistic and doable from both a political and financial point of view if we act quickly. As you review this paper, please note the large variety of tactical options from which we may choose, but also recognize the necessity of a quick start and a highly specific plan.

#### I. THE RNC PARTY DEVELOPMENT PROGRAM

The goal of the Republican National Committee in this election cycle is to obtain electoral success while building the Republican Party.

The party development program has been successful. To maximize our success, however, it is important to obtain support for county party development from Reagan/Bush. Their support and our program will increase the level of necessary party organizational

activity, thus decreasing the cost of the program I advocate in this memorandum.

Our regional tactical plans, each with computerized management and monitoring systems, will clearly tell us in late summer precisely where our joint Reagan/Bush and RNC organizational program will be needed to guarantee necessary party activities in behalf of all Republicans.

#### II. THE LAW

The best definition of our legal restrictions has been provided by Chief Counsel Mark Braden:

"The Campaign '82 and Commitment '80 programs utilized Federal Election Campaign Act provisions which permit state and local party organizations to make unlimited expenditures for volunteer activities in support of candidates for Federal office, provided certain constraints are observed. These constraints are:

- A. Cost of such activities allocable to Federal candidates are paid for from unearmarked contributions subject to the limitations and restrictions of FECA (no corporate money Federal political committee/account).
- B. Funds received from the RNC, NRCC or NRSC are not used.

Because these activities are non-allocable, their costs do not apply against any federal contribution or expenditure limits. The three types of non-allocable activity are: 1. volunteer materials, 2. mass mailings, and 3. phone banks (presidential)."

One should also note that generic Republican activities such as GOTV, mail, ballot security, etc., may be paid for by the RNC, as long as material does not mention a federal candidate. This exemption also has stunning significance.

It is incumbent upon us to utilize these provisions of the law in 1984.

(Note: attached is the Braden memo describing these legal exemptions in more detail.)

#### III. THE PROGRAM: A CONCEPTUAL FRAMEWORK

Though it is premature to lay out the specifics of the Republican Party's organizational activities, it is possible to develop the conceptual framework of the program, and to review the tactical options that are available to us. The purpose of this section is to outline what a party organizational type program might do.

#### A. Targeting

State targeting could be based upon presidential, senatorial, congressional and gubernatorial targeting, with a sharper targeting focus provided by targeting key counties in target states.

Much like the current voter registration campaign, the program should be national in scope, with a huge percentage of resources directed against our target states.

#### B. Vote Delivery systems

- 1) Voter Identification/Turnout
  - a. Volunteer Phone Operations

    Candidate specific volunteer phone banks may be conducted by the state and local parties for the President without any allocation to his campaign. (As Senatorial and Congressional candidates come into the program, they must "buy" in, as even volunteer phone banks are allocable to them. In many cases, it may be possible for RNC cash contributions to help a congressional candidate "buy" into the program.)

Volunteers may receive token payments for their work.

Operationally, we can probably define a token payment
as two dollars per hour.

Finally, professional firms may be paid by state or local parties to design the system, as well as to train and instruct the volunteers in the calling process Several firms have had tremendous success with such programs. Hiring firms to manage such programs will be expensive; but remember that spending the money for consultants rather than paying phoners maintains non-allocability. Also, the RNC and Reagan/Bush could develop "Swat teams," designed to go into a state to put together phone operations and train personnel.

#### b. Paid Phone Operations

Paid phone operations may be used for generic ID/Turnout activities. This style of operation may simply turn out all registered Republicans, or in states without party registration, those individuals who identify themselves as Republicans.

Paid phone operations may also identify voters who plan to support "the Republican candidate for President" and turn them out.

The RNC may pay for these activities. Further, where corporate funding is legal for state and local campaigns, it may be used in generic phone banks in the proportion that state and local candidates appear on the Republican ticket.

#### c. Follow-up mail

State or local party committees may execute follow-up mail for the phone operation. This mail can be candidate specific as long as volunteers are appropriately involved in the process.

Specific mailings could include:

- Pieces to supporters of specific candidates.
- · Pieces to undecided voters.
- Absentee ballots, or information on absentee balloting.
- Information on polling places.
- Pieces to specific constituencies (Jewish,
  Hispanic, Asian, etc.) identified by the RNC ethnic
  surname file.

#### 2) Absentee Balloting

All expenses incurred to prepare and mail absentee ballots, or information on voting absentee, may be paid for by the RNC without campaign allocation as long as no specific federal candidate is mentioned. Specific candidates may be mentioned if the mailing is funded by state or local parties, and volunteers are appropriately involved.

At a minimum, we should apply the direct mail program responsible for electing California Governor Deukmejian in every state the law allows us to.

Also, all phone operations, whether candidate specific or generic, should have an absentee ballot component.

Finally, absentee programs should be developed for key states where absentee balloting laws are less liberal.

3) Ballot Security
All ballot security programs may be paid for by the
RNC as long as they are generic.

Specifically, I would propose the following options for key states:

- Trained volunteer precinct watchers.
- Paid watchers for more threatening precincts.
- Mailings to areas where registration figures
  and Census Bureau voting age population figures do not
  correspond, for use by poll watchers to challenge
  voters.
- Paid advertising calling attention to voting
   laws and warning potential offenders.
- Earned media orchestrated in the last few days of the campaign.

The value of ballot security and poll watchers is tremendous; limited but significant research indicates that poll watchers in black precincts in the south, for example, can increase the Republican vote by as much as 3 or 4 percentage points; that could be very important.

#### C. POLITICAL MAIL

1) Generic Mail
The RNC may fund generic Republican direct
mailings of any kind.

One option: a piece from Senator Laxalt or

Chairman Fahrenkopf to all registered Republicans

urging them to go to the polls on election day

to support the Republican ticket.

2) Candidate Specific Mail
State or local party committees may fund
candidate specific mailings, as long as no commercial
mailing lists are used and volunteers are
appropriately involved in preparation of the mailings.
The potential scope of this exemption is astounding:
by utilizing it, we could mail letters, tabloids,
brochures, or any kind of mail. Further, by using the
RNC ethnic surname file, we can target messages to
specific voter constituencies. And we could do it
through state party non-profit postage permits, saving
additional money for further application.

#### D. VOLUNTEER ORGANIZATIONAL TACTICS

State and local party committees may fund and execute extensive candidate specific volunteer organizational tactics. A program could include:

- 1) Volunteer Training Not only instruction, but specific instruction manuals and kits.
- 2) Materials
  This could include buttons, brochures, posters,
  tabloids, yard signs, bumperstrips, etc. All
  Reagan/Bush materials of this nature can be paid for by
  state and local parties after the convention.
- 3) Tactics
  Tactics could include a wide variety of
  traditional activities, including literature drops,
  yard sign days, etc.

#### IV. FINANCING

Clearly, this would be an expensive program. Equally clearly, there is not room in the current RNC budget to fund it; further, none of the candidate specific items may be paid for by the RNC, or by funds transferred by the RNC.

A major fundraising apparatus must be established to fund this program on two levels:

- o Additional funding for the RNC for generic activities.
- o Funding for the state and local party programs.

The program could be built to provide unique or non-competitive methods for raising money, so RNC fundraising efforts would not suffer.

I propose that we build such a program; it will require the full and active support of the White House and Reagan/Bush to be successful, as only they can provide some of the resources that will be necessary to make the program work.

## V. ADMINISTRATION

Because of the unprecedented cooperation between the RNC and Reagan/Bush, I believe the administration of such a program would be possible, if difficult.

It must be a joint effort, conducted much the same way as the current registration program, though post-convention legal restrictions will be far less burdensome.

I have sufficient funding in my budget to administer the political portion of the program. Reagan/Bush would incur light administrative costs, primarily for

staff and travel. Additional funding would be necessary for the administration of the financial side of the program; Phil Smith believes this to be possible, and feels his staff could, with help, administer the fundraising portion of the effort.

# VI. SUMMARY

With approval, I will immediately submit this proposal to the Reagan/Bush Committee for their conceptual approval.

Upon their approval, we may begin the arduous process of planning such a massive program in detail, from raising the required funds to the state-by-state political plans.

I urge your approval, and seek your active advocacy of this program.

## ADDENDUM #2 - THE LESSONS OF 1972 & 1980

Two previous presidential campaigns deserve special attention here: the 1972 Nixon campaign, which possessed the most sophisticated, effective and expensive voter contact program in the history of electoral politics, and the 1980 Reagan effort, which recognized the massive positive implications in the federal election law's state and local party exemptions and set out to utilize those exemptions through Commitment '80.

In my opinion, our goal in 1984 must be to combine the lessons of 1972 and 1980: to utilize a Commitment '80/Campaign '82 approach, but to approach it with the determination and aggressiveness of the 1972 Nixon reelection effort.

### I. 1972: THE LINCOLN HANDBOOK OF POLITICS

The sheer technical magnificence of the voter contact program of the Committee to Reelect the President has been virtually buried by the impact of Watergate.

Many writers have commented on the irony of the Watergate burglary in a year when the President was to record one of the greatest landslides in history with 60.7% of the popular votes and 520 electoral votes, but few writers have given CREEP its due respect for efficient resource acquisition and utilization, largely because the Committee's totally legitimate activities have been overshadowed by its illegal ones.

While Gary Hart presided over George McGovern's rag-tag guerilla campaign - which displayed tactical brilliance in winning the Democratic nomination - Clark MacGregor built at CREEP an awesome voter contact machine that would roll over McGovern's forces in November.

According to Theodore White, MacGregor was "impressed, then astounded, by the spring march of the McGovern army climaxing in California." We would do well to recall that MacGregor kept this Hart quotation on his wall: "I hope the Nixon people do to George McGovern what the Democrats did - underestimate him. If they do we'll kill them."

MacGregor set about avoiding that mistake by building CREEP's voter contact operation. "The job of this Committee is to get bodies to the polls. That's page one of the Abraham Lincoln Handbook of Politics", MacGregor maintained.

The voter contact operation consumed \$12,000,000 of the Committee's \$42,000,000 budget. Some of its achievements:

- 2,000 store front headquarters.
- 30,000 senior citizen volunteers.
- 250 telephone banks.
- 17,000,000 piece GOTV mailing.
- 15,932,000 personal or phone contacts of households.

No campaign before or since had that level of voter contact. The significant flaw in the CREEP effort was the maximizing of the President's victory margin at the expense of congressional gain.

Given the President's agenda of change, this flaw must be avoided in 1984.

## II. 1980: EXPLOITING EXEMPTIONS

The Commitment '80 program, run by an RNC team led by Drew Lewis and installed by the Reagan for President Committee, was designed to exploit the spending exemptions allowed for state and local parties by the federal election law.

The program was a success. Although there are a variety of accounts of Commitment '80's impact, by even the most pessimistic account the effort added a few million dollars worth of organizational activity to the Reagan campaign.

The goal in 1984 must be to expand upon the Commitment '80 program. And, in my opinion, four key factors give us the ability to expand the scope of an organizational effort:

- More time to plan.
- Sufficient time for coordinated execution.
- High level of RNC/Presidential campaign committee cooperation.

• Capacity to make this program part of the RNC's current operation, rather than having it "layered" onto our operations as Commitment '80 was. In short, I feel there is dramatic evidence that by combining the intensity and efficiency of the 1972 voter contact operation with the concept of Commitment '80, the Republican Party can maximize its assistance to Republican candidates in 1984, while making a substantial contribution to the development of the party.

History proves it can be done.



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TO:

Republican State Chairmen and Executive Directors

FROM:

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SUBJ:

1984 FRAMEWORK

# I. CAMPAIGN '82/COMMITMENT '80

The Campaign '82 and Commitment '80 programs utilized Federal Election Campaign Act provisions which permit state and local party organizations to make unlimited expenditures for volunteer activities in support of candidates for Federal office, provided certain constraints are observed. These constraints are:

- A. Cost of such activities allocable to Federal candidates are paid for from unearmarked contributions subject to the limitations and restrictions of the FECA (no corporate money Federal political committee/account).
- B. Funds received from the RNC, NRCC or NRSC are not used.

  Because these activities are "non-allocable," their costs do not apply against any

  Federal contribution or expenditure limits. The three types of non-allocable activity

  are: 1. volunteer materials, 2. mass mailings, and 3. phone banks (presidential).
- 1. Volunteer Materials. A state or local party committee may make unlimited expenditures for campaign materials such as buttons, bumper stickers, bandbills, brochures, posters, tabloids, yard signs, etc., used in connection with

volunteer activity. These campaign materials may be prepared on behalf of any or all party candidates -- including Federal candidates -- in the general election. The material may be prepared in total coordination with the candidate. These exempt campaign materials do not include print or broadcast media, direct mail, billboards, or other types of general public advertising.

Mass Mailings. State and local party committees may make mass mailings, but not direct mail of volunteer campaign materials prepared in coordination with candidates without the cost of the materials or mailing being considered a contribution to, or an expenditure for, any Federal candidate. Campaign materials, such as bumper stickers, brochures, posters, tabloids, newsletters, voter registration, and absentee ballot information, can all be mailed in the mass mailings without the cost being considered a contribution to any Federal campaign. Mass mailings are excluded from the definition of "contribution;" direct mail is not excluded from the definition of "contribution." Direct mail means mailing by commercial vendors or from commercial Commercial lists are lists that are purchased or leased from commercial vendors Lists obtained from public offices, such as voter registration lists, are not commer cial lists. Mass mailings by party committees from lists developed by the state and local party are not direct mail. Examples of lists developed by political parties are: lists of-contributors to the Committee, lists of volunteers who have worked for the Committee, and/or any list developed as a result of substantial volunteer activity on behalf of the party committee. Mailings by commercial houses for a party committee with a commercial or party mailing list are direct mail.

The permitted mass mailings can be made without any impact upon a state committee's or RNC's expenditure or contribution limits for a particular Federal campaign.

Other types of mailings (direct mail) made by the state committee which advocate the election of a specific Federal candidate count toward the state committee's contribution limit or coordinated expenditure limit. The state committee's non-profit, bulk postal rate may be used.

3. Phone Banks. State and local party committees may have a olunteer voter registration or get-out-the-vote (GOTV) phone bank specifically on behalf of the Republican presidential or vice presidential nominees without the expenditures being counted as contributions to the presidential campaign.

The costs incurred by state and local parties in using phone banks for voter registration and GOTV efforts specifically on behalf of the presidential and vice presidential nominees are not contributions to, or expenditures for, their campaign when the phone banks are operated by volunteer workers. Furthermore, providing travel, subsistence, or token payments to volunteers does not alter their volunteer status. Payments incurred by state or local parties in the use of paid professionals to design the phone bank system, develop calling instructions, or train supervisors are also not contributions and do not alter the volunteer nature of a phone bank.

The use of the phone bank must be predominantly for the presidential campaign.

y reference to a candidate for the House or Senate must be incidental to the overall phone bank activity; otherwise, the cost value that is attributable to a Congressional candidate is considered a contribution to that candidate. Clearly, a reference to a Congressional or Senatorial candidate is incidental only if it is not a predominant purpose or substance of the phone call.

Payments of the costs for an ID, registration, or GOTV phone banks in support of the presidential nominee from RNC funds or funds donated by the RNC to state or local parties do not qualify for the exemption from contribution or expenditure limits. As an example, if the RNC pays one-third of the cost of a volunteer phone bank for the Republican nominee and the other two-thirds are paid for by state or local political parties, the one-third paid for by the RNC would be allocable as an expenditure for the Republican nominee.

Cost of such activities, which would be allocable to the nominee's campaign, must be paid for from unearmarked contributions, subject to limitations of the FECA (no corporate money -- Federal political committee/account).

II. GENERIC REPUBLICAN ACTIVITIES. Many additional Republican party activities can be performed without impacting on contribution or expenditure limits. The RNC or state and local party committees may make expenditures in connection with get-out-the-vote (GOTV) drives, absentee balloting, and voter registration without allocation to Federal candidates, providing the direct mention of a Federal candidate is avoided. These generic activities can include general media advertising. Expenditures for educational campaign seminars or for the training of campaign workers and for registration and GOTV campaigns need not be attributed to individual Federal candidates unless these expenditures are made on behalf of a clearly identified (named) candidate. Mailings, direct or mass, which do not make reference to a specific Federal candidate urging voter registration or a general GOTV appeal do not count as an expenditure for, or contribution to, a specific Federal candidate.

Phone banks used for voter registration or GOTV efforts which are not in connection with a <u>specific</u> Federal candidate are not allocable expenditures on behalf of a Federal candidate. If a nominee's name or other unambiguous reference is used, then the phone bank or other activity, is in connection with, or is in support of, a specific Federal candidate and an allocable expenditure or contribution results.

A political party's voter registration, absentee balloting, or GOTV activities in a Federal election year, even if they are not expressly for a specific Federal candidate, are activities which are intended to influence an individual's decision to vote for all Federal and State candidates of the party. For this reason, even if no reference is made to any Federal candidacies, phone banks, or direct mail efforts annot be funded exclusively from an account which contains funds raised outside the

restrictions of the FECA. FEC regulations require that a party committee be able to prove, by reasonable accounting procedure, that a percentage of the voter program's costs has been paid for from funds raised under the limitations and restrictions of the FECA. This requisite will generally require a Federal political committee/account.

To state this in a different manner, a political party's expenditures for GOTV or registration campaigns which are simply based upon party IDs, must be allocated on a reasonable basis between the two <u>classes</u> of candidates (state and Federal) which would appear on that state or county elective ballot. The percentage of the phone bank or registration effort costs reasonably allocable to Federal candidates should be paid from funds raised under the FECA restrictions, generally from a Federal committee/account. The cost is not allocable to any limit for a specific Federal candidate.

## III. REGISTRATION AND ABSENTEE VOTING

In the last ten years, registration and absentee balloting laws have been significantly liberalized in many states. Mail registration states include:

Ohio Kentucky Alaska Maryland - Oregon California Pennsylvania Minnesota Delaware Tennessee ! District of Columbia Montana New Jersey Texas Utah New York Kansas Wisconsin

#### IV. LIBERAL ABSENTEE BALLOTING STATES

Rhode Island, Tennessee,

Texas and Arizona - Anyone over 65 is eligible to vote absentee

Ohio - Anyone over 62

Michigan - Anyone over 60

California, Oregon,

and Washington - Anyone may vote absentee

These absentee and registration provisions provide great opportunities when viewed in the context of the availability of non-profit postal rates to the party

committees and our <u>direct mail</u> capacity. The impact of an effective absentee mailing program was demonstrated in the '78 Ohio and '82 California gubernatorial campaigns.

## V. CONCLUSION

The Commitment '80 and Campaign '82 programs were based on the factors outlined in this memorandum. There were a series of problems with these programs which can be attributed to two factors: 1. A lack of lead time for planning and development, and 2. Weak state party finances.

A Commitment '80/Campaign '82 type program can reach its full potential only with advanced planning and development. Mail registration and absentee balloting programs require very substantial advanced planning for the acquisition of lists and development of materials which meet requirements of the various jurisdictions. A financial base must be laid for state parties to fully utilize the Federal exemptions available. A state committee must have a registered, financially stable Federal political committee to exploit these opportunities. A clear understanding of the opportunities presented by the Federal Election Campaign Act and of state absentee and registration provisions is vital for rational planning for the 1984 campaign cycle.