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8

DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	MEMO	FRED FIELDING TO EDWIN MEESE, JAMES BAKER, AND M. DEAVER RE THE ATTACHED	1	10/28/1983	B6
2	MEMO	FIELDING TO REAGAN RE EXECUTIVE CLEMENCY RECOMMENDATIONS	2	10/27/1983	B6
3	REPORT	RE APPLICATION FOR PARDON	7	4/29/1983	B6
4	REPORT	RE APPLICATION FOR PARDON	6	4/29/1983	B6

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MKD:

I've spoken to FF

He rates it a 0.

He does recommend.

At all.

file
file

WILLIAM F. SITTMANN

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

file

October 29, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL

FROM: FRED F. FIELDING Orig. signed by FFF
COUNSEL TO THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Letters from Kathryn Bonotto
on the Civil Rights Commission

Attached are letters and enclosures recently sent to Michael Deaver and to me from a Mrs. Kathryn A. Bonotto, who believes that certain activities of the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights merit investigation by the Department of Justice.

Given this belief and the general tenor of the correspondence, I think it would be preferable for the substantive response to these letters come from the Department, and would appreciate your arranging for an appropriate individual to review and respond to Mrs. Bonotto's letters. I have simply acknowledged her letters and advised that she will be hearing from the Department.

Thanks for your help.

Attachments

cc: Michael K. Deaver ←

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1983

Dear Mrs. Bonotto:

Thank you for your letter to me of October 6, 1983, and your subsequent letter to Michael Deaver of October 15, expressing your views about the U.S. Commission on Civil Rights.

Because you believe the matters about which you wrote merit investigation by the Department of Justice, I am forwarding your letters and enclosures to that Department for its review and direct response to you. You should be hearing from the Department shortly.

Sincerely,

Orig. signed by FFF

Fred F. Fielding
Counsel to the President

Mrs. Kathryn A. Bonotto
18020 Governors Highway
Homewood, Illinois 60430

cc: Michael K. Deaver

12711 Valenta Drive
Moscow, ID 83843
29 October 1983

Mr Michael Dence
The White House

Dear Mike,

On the chance that you have not yet read the fall issue of Common Cause, I have photocopied this attachment.

As for the international scene, we did admire President Reagan's cool handling of the Korean plane shoot down, and earlier we were encouraged by his inclination to hold back aid for Israel unless they behaved. But we gather that gifts to Israel without any strings now is ingrained in American politics — even when this also costs us lives. And we continue to provide the financial support needed for Israel's settlements on the West Bank, which surely will make things worse.

As for Central America, we favor the good neighbor policy. We hope that Ms. Kirkpatrick will soon join Watt and Dittus among the missing.
Good wishes
Calvin Fenner

NEXT BEST THING TO LOCKJAW

Well publicized feuds among President Reagan's top aides might not have improved Reagan's public image, but they apparently have given one of his top men, Michael Deaver, deputy chief of staff, a sleeker profile. Deaver gave his own secret for his 40-pound weight loss during the last year: "Only eat on days when senior staff members are speaking to each other."

PENNY FOR HIS THOUGHTS?



Sen. Daniel Moynihan (D-N.Y.) used to work as a Harvard professor, so it's no surprise that his 1982 financial disclosure statement reported income from royalties on his past publications. But snuggled next to such respectable sums as \$308.82 (*Counting Our Blessings*) and \$260.85 (*Beyond the Melting Pot*) is

the paltry sum of \$2.50 (*Harper's* magazine).

Moynihan's office explains. No, the tidy sum isn't *Harpers'* equivalent of a royalty. A subscriber, paying close attention to recent changes in federal copyright law, sent \$2.50 to the senator after photocopying an article with Moynihan's byline. —P.T.

IF YOU CAN'T SAY ANYTHING NICE....

During heated debate on the floor, Members of Congress may want to go at each other like cats and dogs, but rules require them to conduct their scrapping politely.

Members aren't allowed to name call or toss off a personal remark or insult to an individual Member or Congress as a whole. In the House, a representative can request that an offensive remark be struck out of the record.

Members of Congress who think they've been insulted take the rule very seriously. Rep. Ron Dellums (D-Calif.) didn't like Rep. Tom Hartnett's (R-S.C.) choice of words when he criticized Dellums during House debate on defense spending this year. Hartnett referred to Dellums as "an element" who favors unilateral disarmament.

As it turned out, Speaker of the House Tip O'Neill (D-Mass.) intervened and ruled that the comment could stay in the record. Despite the speaker's call, however, Hartnett offered Dellums an apology. —P.T.

QUESTION & ANSWER

Q I recently saw on a package of M&M's peanut chocolate candies an Olympic Games emblem and the words, "official snack food 1984 Olympic Games." What does this mean?

A According to a spokesperson for the Los Angeles Olympic Organizing Committee, the designation means that the candy's corporate maker, M&M/Mars Inc., has been "selected by the

have also had their products designated as "official" Olympic items—including Perrier (official mineral water), McDonald's (official fast food) and Atari (official home video games).

The committee spokesperson said she could not disclose how much corporations



committee as an official sponsor for the 1984 Summer Olympic Games." Two other Mars Products—regular M&M's and Snickers candy bars—are also designated "official snack food."

Coke, Tab, Sprite, Fresca and other Coca-Cola Bottling Co. products have been designated the "official soft drink" for the Olympics, while Budweiser and other Anheuser-Busch products have been picked as the "official" beers. Some 27 other sponsors

pay to have their products designated as "official" Olympic item but said the amounts start "in the mid-seven-figure category and go up from there." Only one corporation selling a certain product can have its items designated as "official"; thus, a Coke competitor like Pepsi could not also receive the designation.

In addition to the money a corporation is willing to pay, the committee also considers the firm's "commitment to youth and to the community" when selecting Olympic sponsors, she said. Money paid by the sponsors is used to cover some of the costs of holding the Olympic Games in Los Angeles in the summer of

10-30-83

MR. MICHAEL DEEVER
DEPUTY ASSISTANT
THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE
1600 PENNSYLVANIA AVE
WASHINGTON, D.C.

DEAR MR. DEEVER:

THE ONLY REASON THAT I HAVE NOT VOICED
MY APPROVAL OF THE PRESIDENT'S ACTIONS
DURING THE PAST WEEK IS THAT I HAVE BEEN
TOO BUSY WRITING SCATHING LETTERS TO THE
NETWORKS AND DEMOCRATS.

WATCHING THE NEWS, I COMMENTED, "THEY ARE
NOT JUST ANTI-REAGAN; THEY ARE ANTI-U.S.,

MY NEXT DOOR NEIGHBOR SAID, "THEY ARE COMMUNISTS"

I SUSPECT THAT A GREAT MANY AMERICANS HAVE
A SENSE OF RELIEF TO HAVE A PRESIDENT WILLING
TO ACT TO STOP THE EROSION OF U.S. PRESTIGE
AND ITS SECURITY.

THE ENCLOSED ARTICLE ON LEBANON SEEMS TO
ME TO BE WELL RESEARCHED, BALANCE AND
CONSTRUCTIVE; OF USE IN FORMULATING POLICY.

SINCERELY,

Reagan Rice
REGAMAND RICE

Why there's still hope Lebanon can survive

SEATTLE P.I. 10-30-83

By Helena Cobban

The best way to begin to understand Lebanon's tortuous politics is to travel through its mountains. Although the Lebanon mountains can be toured in a single day, the crazy-quilt pattern of pine-clad ridges, steep gorges and red-roofed villages perched above winding roads illustrates the web of rivalries and interdependencies that underlies the relations among Lebanon's religious communities.

Yet relations among these groups are only part of the story behind efforts to create a viable Lebanon. The country's religious communities are anything but monolithic. Within each are clashing personal, economic and social interests. And within each there is a contest between those determined to hold a pan-Lebanese society together and those who seek either autonomy or a wider, non-Lebanese identification for their community.

Forty years after Lebanon received its first promise of independence, its future still depends far more heavily on its individual communities than on any national forces. The persistent civil strife that the country has suffered since 1975 has underscored the failure of modern ideologies and institutions to change Lebanese loyalties.

The continued presence of Israeli, Palestinian and Syrian forces in Lebanon further complicates efforts to arrange a national compromise.

Since the late 18th century the key forces ultimately responsible for the emergence of a distinctive Lebanese national entity were the two peoples of the Lebanon mountains, the Maronite Christians and the Druse.

In 1920 the French redrew the map of Lebanon, including the cities of the coast and the agricultural areas to the north, east and south of the mountains. The new eastern and southern areas had large Shiite Moslem populations.

But the newly Lebanonized cities — Beirut, Sidon, Tripoli and Tyre — boasted large and economically powerful Sunni Moslem populations. The French promoted a quasi-alliance between the dominant community of the mountains — the Maronites — and the overwhelmingly urban Sunnis to assure the stability of the new entity.

The National Pact

Lebanon became independent on the basis of an unwritten political formula known as the National Pact. Under the terms of this compromise

Cobban is a former Beirut correspondent for the *Christian Science Monitor* and the *Sunday Times* of London who is now a visiting scholar at Georgetown University's Center for Contemporary Arab Studies. This article is excerpted from the winter issue of *Foreign Policy* magazine.

ministry on a seemingly endless carousel.

The civil war of 1975-1976 provided an opening for the younger Sunni leaders just as it had done for their Maronite counterparts:

The Shiites

Since the 12th century, Sunnism has been the dominant sect throughout the East Mediterranean, but small communities of Shiite Moslems survived in the Jebel Amil area south of Mount Lebanon and in the Bekaa Valley to the east. These two areas of Shiite settlement were also brought into Greater Lebanon in 1920.

More than any other sect, Shiism was trapped in the past by feudal ways. For many decades Shiite villages were largely cut off from the modern world. These villages offered few avenues of opportunity for ambitious Shiites, and they streamed to Beirut, where they worked in the growing construction and manufacturing sectors. Their own mushrooming suburbs and shantytowns formed a misery belt around the whole city.

By the early 1980s Lebanon's Shiite population was divided into three pockets of settlements all roughly equal in size: in the south, in the Bekaa Valley, and around Beirut. Many Shiites also immigrated to the French-speaking areas of West Africa, where they prospered as merchants and traders.

A handful of traditional feudal families dominated Shiite politics until the late 1960s, when an ambitious young preacher named Musa Sadr started calling for social reform. Cannily enlisting some of the Bekaa feudal chiefs to back him against common southern rivals, he started building strong networks of peasant support in the south for his Movement of the Deprived.

In August 1978 Sadr disappeared in Libya, presumably murdered by Muammar el-Qaddafi's regime. But the movement he had created and its military wing Amal — which means hope — had already transformed Shiite community politics. Amal retains strong bases in Shiite rural settlements, but many of its activists are the young, educated Shiites of



Christian children looked out through the bars of a church window. They were living in the church until it was safe to return to their homes in a besieged Chouf mountain town that was surrounded by Druse militiamen.

basic structure of the Lebanese body politic.

After the savage attack on the U.S. Marines in Lebanon on Sunday, Oct. 23, 1983, and President Reagan's decision to declare the U.S. presence there as vital to U.S. interests in the region, the United States finds itself in a position of unprecedented power in and unprecedented commitment to Lebanon.

This power is limited, however, by U.S. interests with respect to Israel and Syria and by the extremely complex nature of Lebanese

any intervention in any intra-Lebanese negotiations as may ensue, and by clearly telling the Lebanese parties that they should not seek support for hegemonic ambitions from either potential patron.

Lebanese policymakers should evaluate long-term sociopolitical roots of their country's crisis as well. The city and its environs now contain more than one-third of the population. Any political settlement should seek to harness the energy of the Maronite and Shiite suburban political activists to national ends.

AP PHOTO

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The National Pact

Lebanon became independent on the basis of an unwritten political formula known as the National Pact. Under the terms of this compromise the Maronites retained the presidency of the republic and overall command of the army; the post of prime minister was reserved for a Sunni in recognition of their primacy among Lebanon's Moslems.

The Druse filled some positions of relative power within the army, in a nod toward their historic role in helping to define a Lebanese state.

Of the four major communities the Shiites got the worst of the deal. The National Pact gave them only one post of any real influence, that of speaker of the parliament.

Although the Maronites were clearly first among equals, the veto power of the Sunni prime minister helped the National Pact preserve a precarious stability for about 30 years. But since 1943 Lebanon's demographic balance has shifted. The Shiites have experienced the highest rate of net growth, a development that has made them the largest religious community.

The Maronites

The Maronites, members of an obscure Christian sect, were originally Syrians who some time before the 10th century sought refuge in modern-day Lebanon from the Orthodox Christian and Moslem peoples of the Levant.

Although Lebanon was not the cradle of Maronite doctrine, it has been a hospitable incubator for their community and remains the center of the Maronite world. The Maronites can argue with some validity that the well-being and survival of Lebanon is a *sine qua non* for their survival as a sect.

The Sunnis

Until the Anglo-French armies came to the Levant during World War I, Beirut, Tripoli, and other Sunni-dominated coastal cities had been part of the Ottoman Empire — ruled by Sunni Turks. Then in 1920, as part of the postwar division of the Ottoman Empire, the Sunnis of the Lebanese coast were reduced to a sectarian minority in the new French-dominated entity of Greater Lebanon.

Still impelled by the conciliatory instincts of big merchants, most important Sunni community leaders easily adapted to, and even profited from, the new situation. But poorer Sunnis resented their new lower status and the resultant tensions within the Sunni community continue to the present day.

In the 1950s the Sunni community in Lebanese cities became inflamed by Nasserism, and for two full decades various Nasserist and other Arab nationalist groups posed a constant challenge to the traditional Sunni leaders. But until 1975 the Sunni old guard managed to retain control, with various members of just six powerful families following

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Under Amal's auspices Shiite doctors and teachers travel to rural villages to engage in remarkably vigorous community-organizing efforts.

Amal coffers are filled by contributions from many of the immigrants to Africa, whose considerable new wealth has also fueled an unprecedented Shiite construction boom in West Beirut and created several Shiite-owned banks.

This prosperity has given the Shiite community a new confidence and assertiveness; Shiites can argue quite credibly that more than just their numbers entitles them to a meaningful role in governing Lebanon and more government funds for developing rural Shiite communities.

Phalangist hard-liners have periodically accused the Lebanese Shiites of harboring subversive loyalty to Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini and of secretly hoping to turn Lebanon into a satellite of revolutionary Iran. The Iranian revolution did give new self-confidence to the Shiites everywhere.

But the current assertiveness of the Lebanese Shiites has other, domestic sources, and the excesses of the Iranian regime have shocked a majority of Lebanese Shiites.

Meanwhile, Lebanon's Shiites have demonstrated a strong commitment to Lebanon. Their youth provide the backbone of the conscript Lebanese army; and those who remain abroad repatriate more of their earnings. In addition, the Shiites have probably been less prone than most other Lebanese communities to seek external assistance to bolster their position.

The Druse

The Lebanese Druse community has changed less over the years than any of the religious communities discussed thus far. The Druse are members of an esoteric sect that seceded from Shiism in the 11th century. Early in their history, the Druse barred outsiders from joining the sect; the community has been generally self-absorbed ever since.

The Druse have always supported a unified Lebanon. Their one condition for this support is that their traditional position in the mountains not be jeopardized. The late Kamal Jumblatt, the Druse leader, made several political and military attempts to break out of the second-class role in which modern history has cast the Lebanese Druse. But he never succeeded, and as neither his son Walid nor any other possible successor has anything like the Kamal's charisma, it is unlikely that the Druse community will be able to shed its disadvantaged status.



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basic structure of the Lebanese body politic.

After the savage attack on the U.S. Marines in Lebanon on Sunday, Oct. 23, 1983, and President Reagan's decision to declare the U.S. presence there as vital to U.S. interests in the region, the United States finds itself in a position of unprecedented power in and unprecedented commitment to Lebanon.

This power is limited, however, by U.S. interests with respect to Israel and Syria and by the extremely complex nature of Lebanese politics.

Yet even in the wake of the recent tragedy, U.S. policymakers need not succumb to the view that nothing can be done to save Lebanon.

The country's intricate demographic makeup assures that neither the hegemony of a single sect nor any basically centrifugal solution to the country's internal problems can bring long-term stability to Lebanon or to its Israeli or Syrian neighbors.

To the extent that the post-1975 turmoil has brought this lesson home to the Lebanese, the Israelis and the Syrians, there may be a greater opportunity now than there was in the blinding afterglow of the 1982 Israeli military action to negotiate a viable political settlement.

Inside Lebanon, certainly, centripetal forces have always existed within each of the country's major communities. The end of 1983 may find them as strong as at any time in the past, if not stronger.

The Lebanese presidency is still an enduring symbol of Lebanese unity, sovereignty and legitimacy for a majority of Lebanese people. President Amin Gemayel's association with this symbolism suffered greatly during his first year in office, with most Moslems frightened by the hard-line Maronitism that he seemed to be imposing on them. In mid-September 1983 his apparent lack of a coherent policy toward the Moslem sects brought his army to the ignominious position in the lower Chouf of being shot at simultaneously by the Druse from the east and by the Shiites from the west.

The U.S. role

Neither the United States nor any other outside actor can solve the Lebanese people's problems for them. What the United States can do is provide an umbrella for constructive negotiations. The Reagan administration can use the leverage and wide contacts it has inside the Lebanese body politic to nudge the contending parties toward a viable political solution.

Thus the United States should make it clear to its Lebanese interlocutors that it will not back attempts by any side to dominate the country. One course it must not follow would be to conclude after the attack on the Marines that vital U.S. interests require the United States to side with the "moderates," who are defined as Christians, against the "radicals," who are defined as only Moslems. Few communities in recent years in Lebanon have a monopoly on moderation or radicalism.

The United States can also hold the ring clear for the Lebanese to come to terms with one another, both by strongly simulating to Israel

any intervention in any intra-Lebanese negotiations as may ensue, and by clearly telling the Lebanese parties that they should not seek support for hegemonic ambitions from either potential patron.

Lebanese policymakers should evaluate long-term sociopolitical roots of their country's crisis as well. The city and its environs now contain more than one-third of the population. Any political settlement should seek to harness the energy of the Maronite and Shiite suburban political activists to national ends.

Decades, indeed centuries, of feuding between and within Lebanese religious communities cannot simply be set aside. But the situation is not completely hopeless; The dangers of further instability in Lebanon have now been amply demonstrated, not only to the Lebanese themselves, who have lived through nearly nine years of civil chaos and uncertainty, but also to their two immediate neighbors and to the U.S. Marines. It is not unrealistic to believe that the parties who have now seen these risks can contribute to finding a solution.

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NON MIHI SED PATRIAE
"Not for myself, but for my country."

2117 North Towner Street
Santa Ana, California 92706

October 31, 1983

The Honorable Michael K. Deaver
Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Deaver:

We strongly support the President's decisive action to liberate Grenada and rescue the Americans on that island.

However, due to lack of adequate intelligence related to those islands, I would hope that the President might seriously consider my offer to assist with such matters as we may be faced with similar situations which could prove very costly on similar operations in the future.

I am not aspiring for a position of status or for acquiring prestige, but rather, I am willing to assist the President and his advisors with necessary tasks at any level or in any capacity.

As a professional geographer, I have more than just an understanding of foreign affairs. Prior to the Cuban Missile Crisis, I was able to convey very significant information to the Kennedy Administration and appropriate agencies which made an impact on both American and world history.


From 1965, until Ronald Reagan was elected Governor of California, I devoted most of my time, without pay, to precinct strategy and the campaign with the Orange County Republican Central Committee. Afterwards, I was not interested in an appointment for a state position. Instead, I decided to continue my education at the graduate level.

Of course, you must have known Gus Owen and Gordon Bishop. They could verify the map which I designed and drew to show and identify every precinct in Orange County. They could also verify how often I would stop my work and assist other volunteers and staff with their tasks. I am also, hoping to assist the Administration in a similar manner, again, even without pay, until the President is re-elected.

In retrospect, there may have been a "leak" in the planned invasion of Grenada as a Cuban ship may have unloaded as many as 1000 regular troops just before the U.S. arrival. Also, it is possible that the Beirut incident may have been the result of the Soviets also receiving the same information several days prior to the action in Grenada.

There may be an agent in the Administration who relayed the information directly to the Soviets.

Sincerely,


John W. Spring

"Behind the Red Flag lurks danger."

Pat
Jacobson

5113 Jennings Drive
Fort Worth, Texas 76118
(817) 281-0866

~~file~~

Monday 3/14

Mike Darling ~

Enclosed is a request
that was sent to Mary's
office that I wish
you would give your
message to ~

Young Man, Halder
Cramer, is the son of
William Cramer (owner
of Belton Lab) a close
friend of mine! He

has wanted more money
for the Eagles than any
one I know ~ so if you
would ~~of~~ push this ~

I would appreciate very
much! OK?

Mike I hope you
won't be too hard on the
Gagan people here in Japan -
They are not all right wing
books - they just want to
be apart of something they
have all worked so hard
to accomplish - I understand
that + I think you can too
we both got showed around
a good deal in the last
campaign + had a lot of
heart-ache - The President
needs these people to win
the election - please try
to see that they are included!

I love you -
Pat



THE SCHOLA CANTORUM OF TEXAS, INC.

Orchestra Hall 4401 Trail Lake Drive Fort Worth, Texas 76109 (817) 924-1481

October 21, 1983

Mrs. Pat Jacobson
5113 Jennings Drive
Fort Worth, Texas 76118

Dear Mrs. Jacobson:

I enjoyed our telephone conversation and appreciate your willingness to assist me at the White House.

Enclosed is a copy of the letter to Mr. Rosebush, which I think is self-explanatory, some promotional material on Schola for your perusal, and four season tickets.

I would appreciate your guidance if you can improve on my handling of the situation.

I hope you can be with us a week from Sunday for our concert, and look forward to meeting you at that time.

Again, my thanks for your assistance. Let me know if you need further information.

Sincerely,

Halden Conner
Chairman of the Board

HC:ew

Enclosures



THE SCHOLA CANTORUM OF TEXAS, INC.

Orchestra Hall 4401 Trail Lake Drive Fort Worth, Texas 76109 (817) 924-1481

October 18, 1983

Mr. James S. Rosebush
Deputy Assistant to the President
Office of the First Lady
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue N. W.
Washington, D. C. 20500

Dear Mr. Rosebush:

Enclosed find the tape you requested in our telephone conversation on October 13, 1983, and some descriptive material about Schola Cantorum of Texas, along with two of our sample programs from last year and various press reviews of our work.

We are tentatively scheduled to sing in the National Cathedral Sunday morning, June 10, 1984. It would be wonderful to have an opportunity to perform for a function at the White House any time from June 8th through June 14th. This would fit perfectly with our ten-day schedule for Washington, D. C. and New York. The opportunity to sing at the White House is, of course, preeminent, and we would alter these dates of the tour to accommodate our best opportunity to sing at the White House.

There are six pieces on the tape, which give you a cross section of the types of music we are comfortable with and the quality of the sound. Two were recorded at our live concert at the Kimbell Art Museum in Fort Worth on May 10, 1983, and four at cathedrals in Speyer, Germany and Salzburg, Austria on our singing tour this summer. We have a vast library of recordings in various places over the past few years, if you would like additional tapes. We have attempted to give you a sample only.

As you would expect, we are most anxious to perform at the White House on this summer's East Coast tour and would be happy to learn special works as necessary to fit the occasion. I assure you we can provide evidence of the quality of our presentations, and would provide a program in keeping with the expectations of a White House presentation.

Thank you very much for your consideration and help in this matter. I look forward to visiting with you in the near future.

Sincerely,

Halden Conner
Chairman of the Board

Enclosures

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

October 28, 1983

TO: LOESJE EDWARDS

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEEVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff

Information

Action

Would you please have
inscribed and autopen
a picture of First Lady
and President for Club-
house.

To Members of the English-
Speaking Union
wbw...
Thank you..Send back to
us.



The English-Speaking Union

OF THE UNITED STATES

To draw together in the bond of friendship the English-speaking peoples of the world



WASHINGTON, D.C. BRANCH

2131 S Street, N.W. 20008 • 234-4602 or 234-4639

Office Hours: 9:30 am - 5:00 pm Monday - Friday

26 October, 1983

Mr. Michael K. Deaver
Assistant to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Deaver:

To follow up on our previous letter, we are forwarding you, as promised, the Mountbatten Rose scarf, to be presented to Mrs. Reagan.

We know that in view of recent events this is an especially hectic time for the First Family, but we continue to hope that in due course we might have a reply to our request for a signed photograph for our Clubhouse.

With all best wishes, I am

Yours sincerely,

Dirk A. Zylstra
Executive Director
The English-Speaking Union
Washington, D.C. Branch

DAZ/vh

*Elaine
Crispen
has
scarf
& will
Thank*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 31, 1983


Dear Mr. Balick:

This is in response to your letter addressed to Michael Deaver in connection with the President's upcoming trip to Japan. Your correspondence was referred to me as I am the administrator of this trip.

I am passing your letter on to our people in Japan. Any need we may have for your services will be confeyed to you in Japan.

Thank you for letting us know of your availability and willingness to help.

Sincerely,


Michael A. McManus, Jr.
Assistant to the President

Mr. Kenneth D. Balick
Research Assistant to
Yoshihiko Seki, M.P.
No. 509 Coucilorors' Office
Building
Nagata-Cho, Chiyoda-Ku
Tokyo, Japan

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

TO: *H. Ke McHaras*

FROM: MICHAEL K. DEAVER
Assistant to the President
Deputy Chief of Staff

Information

Action

pls acknowledge

*pass to people in dept
any need for similar
contact info
thank you for any
input or availability*

KENNETH D. BALICK
RESEARCH ASSISTANT TO YOSHIHIKO SEKI, M. P.

OFFICE:
NO. 509 COUCILORS' OFFICE BLDG.
NAGATA-CHO, CHIYODA-KU, TOKYO
TEL: 508-8509

HOME:
4-4-16 AKASAKA
MINATO-KU, TOKYO
TEL: 588-1747

Kenneth D. Balick

October 12, 1983

Mr. Michael Deaver
White House Deputy Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Mr. Deaver,

I am writing to you concerning the President's upcoming trip to Japan on Nov. 9th-12th. As a 1983-1984 Luce Scholar, I am working in the office of a member of the Japanese Diet. The Luce Scholars Program, started in 1973, is an expression of Henry Luce's continued interest in improving American understanding of Asia. Each year the Luce Foundation selects 15 Americans to work with leading professionals in the Far East.

After graduating from Cornell University's School of Industrial and Labor Relations, I worked at The Carnegie Endowment for International Peace and Fred Bergsten's Institute for International Economics before the Luce Scholarship placed me as an assistant to Mr. Yoshihiko Seki. Mr. Seki is a leader of Japan's Social Democrats, a moderate, middle-of-the-road, opposition party. As a member of the Upper House, he sits on the Foreign Affairs Committee; consequently, much of my work involves U.S.-Japan relations, particularly trade and defense issues.

Before returning to the Kennedy School of Government in the fall of 1984, my immersion into the Japanese political system is giving me a unique perspective which I hope to utilize in fostering stronger U.S.-Japan ties in the future.

Kenneth D. Balick

It is in this latter capacity that I write. As the only young American working within the Japanese Diet, I may be able to help the President, in some small way, either during his trip here or anytime thereafter, to achieve his objective of displaying closer U.S.-Japan ties.

It would be a great honor to attend any appropriate functions during the President's visit here or to serve you in any possible way during the coming year.

I look forward to hearing the President address the Diet and helping you in whatever way I can.

Most sincerely,

Kenneth D. Balick

Kenneth D. Balick