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1987 (2)

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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC
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File Folder: Program Review of the Vice President's Task Force on
 Combatting Terrorism, March -April 1987 ~~#2~~ Box 91956 **RAC Box 10**

Date: 8/11/99

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
14. draft memo	to George Shultz et al re: program review, 2p	nd	P1/F1
15. chart	re: Vice President's Task Force, 1p	nd	P1/F1
16. memo	Grand Green to Melvyn Levitsky et al, re: program review, 3p	3/14/87	P1/F1
17. NSDD	NSDD 207 (page 3 in part, pages 4-9 in whole), 9p	1/20/86	P1/F1
18. list	re: Issues and Recommendations, 2p	nd	P1/F1
19. paper	re: Status of Implementation of NSDD-207, 9p	3/30/87	P1/F1
20. paper	re: recommendations, 6p	11/26/86	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
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- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC
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File Folder: Program Review of the Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism, March -April 1987 (2)

Date: 8/11/99
Box 91956 RAL Box 10

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. paper	re: Sec. of Defense recommendations, 3p	nd	P1/F1
2. paper	re: DCI recommendations 3p PARTIAL 2/05/81 F97-082 #24	nd	P1/F1, B3
3. paper	re: APSNSA recommendations 1p R 1/11/12 F97-082 #25	nd	P1/F1
4. paper	re: OMB recommendations, 1p R 7/8/00 NLSF97-082 #26	nd	P1/F1
5. paper	re: Sec. of Treasury recommendations, 1p R 10/26/00 " " #27	nd	P1/F1
6. paper	re: Sec. of Transportation recommendations, 1p R 6/9/00 NLSF97-082 #28	nd	P1/F1
7. paper	re: Director of FEMA recommendation, 1p R " " #29	nd	P1/F1
8. status reports	from Department of State, 20p SEE SEPARATE WITHDRAWAL SHEET	nd	P1/F1
9. paper	re: recommendation no. 1, 1p D 3/22/06 NLSF97-082/1 #31	nd	P1/F1
10. paper	re: recommendation no. 2, 1p R " " #32	nd	P1/F1
11. paper	re: recommendation no. 3, 1p R " " #33	nd	P1/F1
12. paper	re: recommendation no. 4, 1p R " " #34	nd	P1/F1
13. paper	re: recommendation no. 5, 1p R " " #35	nd	P1/F1
14. report	re: U.S. Overseas Presence, 4p PART 3/29/06 NLSF97-082/1 #36	nd	P1/F1
15. memo	Nicholas Platt to John Poindexter re: Task Force, 3p D 3/6/02 " " #37	11/26/86	P1/F1
16. status of actions	from Attorney General, 20p SEE SEPARATE WITHDRAWAL SHEET	nd	P1/F1
17. memo	D. Lowell Jensen to Poindexter re: NSDD 207, 3p PART 3/11/08 NLSF97-082 #39	6/24/86	P1/F1, B3

RESTRICTION CODES

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA ID: F97-082/1 (Wills)

File Folder: Program Review of the Vice President's Task Force **Date:** 03/28/06

On Combatting Terrorism, March-April 1987 (2) *RAC Box 16*

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
8. paper	Re recommendation #5 1 p. <i>R 3/22/06 NSF 97-082/1 #30</i>	Nd	B1
8a. paper	Re recommendation #9 1 p. <i>R u ~ #30a</i>	Nd	B1
8b. paper	Re recommendation #10 1 p. <i>PART ~ #30b</i>	Nd	B1
8c. paper	Re recommendation #12 1 p. <i>R ~ #30c</i>	Nd	B1
8d. paper	Re recommendation #16 1 p. <i>PART ~ #30d</i>	Nd	B1
8e. paper	Re recommendation #17 and 18 4 p. <i>R ~ #30e</i>	Nd	B1
8f. paper	Re recommendation #19 1 p. <i>PART ~ #30f</i>	Nd	B1
8g. paper	Re recommendation #20 2 p. <i>PART ~ #30g</i>	Nd	B1
8h. paper	Re recommendation #22 1 p. <i>PART ~ #30h</i>	Nd	B1
8i. paper	Re recommendation #28 2 p. <i>R ~ #30i</i>	Nd	B1
8j. paper	Re recommendation #29 2 p. <i>PART ~ #30j</i>	Nd	B1
8k. paper	Re recommendation #32 2 p. <i>R ~ #30k</i>	Nd	B1
8l. paper	Re recommendation #34 2 p. <i>R ~ #30l</i>	Nd	B1

RESTRICTIONS

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IV. ISSUES AND RECOMMENDATIONS

- RECOMMENDATION NO. 1: National Program for Combatting Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 2: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 4: Coordination of Public Diplomacy/Statements During Terrorist Incidents (U)
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 5: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 6: Response Options to Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 7: Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 8: Current Policy Regarding Operational Security of CTJTF (C)
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 9: U.S. Presence Abroad
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 10: Policy on Passports/Documentation for Government Employees
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 11: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 12: Hostage Family Liaison
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 13: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 14: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 15: Counterterrorism Exercises and Simulations
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 16: Country Team Briefings
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 17: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 18: Extradition Treaties
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 19: International Research, Development and Acquisition (RD&A) Initiatives
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 20: Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 21: Airport and Port Security

- RECOMMENDATION NO. 22: Use of Intelligence Exchange to Promote U.S. Policy
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 23: Intelligence Fusion Center for International Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 24: Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 25: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 26: Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement Elements Domestically and Overseas
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 27: Chemical and Biological Threat
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 28: Monitoring and Influencing Foreign and Domestic Attitudes and Perceptions Toward Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 29: Government-Media Relations during a Terrorist Incident
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 30: Psychological Operations to Combat Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 31: Adequacy of the International Legal System to Deal with Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 32: Review of Provisions of Vienna Convention
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 33: International Informant Incentives
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 34: Rewards
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 35: Murder of U.S. Citizens Outside of United States
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 36: Death Penalty for Hostage Taking
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 37: Joint Committee on Intelligence
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 38: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 39: Prohibition of Training and Support of Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 40: Foreign Terrorist Activities within the United States
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 41: Private Sector Activities That Aid/Abet Terrorism
- RECOMMENDATION NO. 42: Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL DISTRIBUTION RECORD

Log Number 90216
Date March 20, 1986

Subject: Progress Reports on Implementation of NSDD-207

DOCUMENT CLASSIFICATION: TOP SECRET SECRET CONFIDENTIAL UNCLASSIFIED

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THE SECRETARY OF HUD 251 7th Street SW				
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION (HEW) 100 Maryland Avenue, SW				
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR 100 Constitution Avenue, NW				
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4


DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION AS OF JANUARY 20,
1986

22. Intelligence Exchange to Promote U.S. Policy


June 5, 1986: NSC notes increased briefings.

July 9, 1986: DOS reports that INR has been working with the Office of the Ambassador for Combating Terrorism to obtain reports from CIA and NSA that are sanitized so as to be able to pass them on to foreign governments, and to encourage reciprocal exchanges. NSC notes that CIA reports 19 briefings in conjunction with foreign governments as of June 23, 1986.



23. Intelligence Fusion Center for International Terrorism

June 5, 1986: NSC notes that a Center was opened, though as yet without other agency participation.



DECLASSIFIED IN PART / RELEASSED
NLS F97-082 #24
By CAS, NARA, Date 2/05/01

43. Paramilitary Terrorist Response Capability

June 5, 1986: NSC notes action in progress following new CT Finding.

[REDACTED]

March 24, 1987: CIA does not appear to have responded to this recommendation this time around.

RECOMMENDATIONS FOR IMPLEMENTATION AS OF MAY 1, 1986:

24. Expansion of Human Intelligence Collection Efforts

June 5, 1986: NSC notes that the operational directive was in the process of being revised.

July 9, 1986: NSC review does not comment on number 24.

[REDACTED]

25. Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

June 5, 1986: NSC notes a IICT Project, due June 1, 1986.

July 9, 1986: CIA reported that the National Intelligence Officer for Counterterrorism directed a subcommittee of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) to consider how to establish programs to encourage such a cadre of analysts. It was judged best to adapt existing programs than create new ones. NSC comments that the first such course will be conducted in August 1986 as an interagency effort under IICT auspices.

March 24, 1987: CIA concluded that while there was considerable opportunity for interagency training and personnel rotation that was not being utilized, that there were also limits to an interdepartmental career development program given the conflicting regulations governing personnel development. Therefore, encouragement of cadres of counterterrorism expertise within the Agency will be encouraged through various course offerings.

26. Increased Coordination of Intelligence Warning and Law Enforcement

June 5, 1986: NSC notes that action in progress.

[REDACTED]

The DCI and FBI will convene a conference with major police departments on July 21, 1986. Conferences on coordination with the FBI and INS were also to be scheduled.

March 24, 1987: CIA notes that the IICT has worked with the FBI and AT&F to apply forensic evidence gathered during the investigation of a terrorist crime for intelligence purposes. This can aid in the warning of other possible targets.

[REDACTED]

27. Chemical and Biological Threats

June 5, 1986: NSC notes R & D underway.

July 9, 1986: CIA reports that the IICT and the IG/T jointly examined the problem. The threat, and U.S. capabilities and vulnerabilities were examined. A proposal has grown out of this in an effort to parallel DOE's counter nuclear terrorism procedures. The cost of this effort over three years is \$10 million. NSC comments that it will review and coordinate this proposal with OMB.

March 24, 1987: CIA says that coordination between the IICT subcommittee and the IG/T has been good. Progress has been made to counter a Chemical or Biological warfare (CBW) threats: a US-Canada exercise testing their ability to respond to CBW has been scheduled for June 1987; IICT personnel have worked with the Army to build up its ability to respond to CBW incidents; and a draft NSDD is being prepared by the IG/T outlining a government-wide plan of countermeasures to CBW.

ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION AS OF JANUARY 20, 1986:

3. Strengthening Coordination in Combating Terrorism

July 9, 1986: Notes location of new facility in OEOB.

4. Coordination of Public Statements During Terrorist Incidents

June 5, 1986: NSC notes that this concern addressed in NSC/CTG checklist.

July 9, 1986: NSC suggests OSG/TIWG guidance has been distributed as necessary. Cites Libyan raid example of press guidance prepared by OSG.

6. Mandated Response Options to Terrorism

July 9, 1986: NSC notes that a range of options was prepared in the event that a follow-on strike on Libya became necessary, and that similarly, a potential range of options was ready to respond to Syrian-sponsored terrorism that had been prepared in the OSG/TIWG.

14. Oversight of Research and Development for Combating Terrorism

July 9, 1986: NSC notes that NSC is represented in all interagency groups concerning terrorism and that therefore is well positioned to coordinate interagency efforts in this area.

15. Counterterrorism Exercises and Simulations

July 9, 1986: NSC notes exercise "Pocket Mouse" tested the the EST on May 15, 1986. Also notes that "Hushed Brass" and "Mighty Derringer" were planned for participation with senior officials.

DECLASSIFIED

REF ID: A6697-082 # 25

BY KML NARA DATE 1/11/12

6

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMMEDIATE IMPLEMENTATION AS OF JANUARY 20,
1986:

1. National Program for Combating Terrorism

June 5, 1986: NSC comments that OMB has the Task Force data base.

July 9, 1986: NSC notes that OMB is currently upgrading the data with their budget examiners and the agencies.

F97-082 #26

LDS

10/6/00

SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION AS OF MAY 1, 1986:

13. Protection of Foreign Dignitaries

June 5, 1986: NSC comments that action is completed, though funding may be an issue.

July 9, 1986: Treasury reported on April 24 that DOS transferred responsibility to it on this issue on May 1, 1986. A DOS memo of June 19 also suggests that the issue of funding seems to be resolved for the near term.

March 20, 1987: Treasury reports that this recommendation has been fully implemented. Treasury now protects spouses of visiting heads of state, via the U.S. Secret Service.

DECLASSIFIED (RE/OASD)

NLRR F97-082 #27

BY CH NARA DATE 10/26/06

SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION AS OF MAY 1, 1986:

21. Airport and Port Security

May 20, 1986: Transportation completes tasked report and forwards to the NSC.

July 9, 1986: NSC notes that Transportation reported that surveys of foreign and domestic ports were completed. It concluded that while the general lack of security appears alarming, this has to be viewed in the context of relatively low threat levels. IGMS will continue to monitor threat levels; port security measures; and will coordinate any U.S. initiatives. NSC comments that legislation should be pursued under this recommendation to grant airport and port licensees access to FBI and other law enforcement files.

[March, 1987] Undated memo attached to May 20, 1986 report responds to above NSC interest in sharing of criminal history data by noting that the proposal was not well received in either House of Congress, and that therefore the DOT had not pushed the proposal since.

DECLASSIFIED

FILE # F97-082 #28

BY MGH NAME, DATE 6/9/00

DIRECTOR OF FEMA

RECOMMENDATION FOR IMPLEMENTATION AS OF MAY 1, 1986:

11. U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

June 5, 1986: NSC notes that action awaits funding by FEMA

July 9; 1986: On April 18, 1986, DOS requested FEMA conduct a study of the vulnerability of critical elements of the U.S. infrastructure to terrorist attacks. FEMA has a National Assets Protection Program which is relevant to the protection of key public and private facilities. Additional FEMA funding has been requested from OMB. NSC comments that further work likely to be tasked of FEMA.

F97-082 #29

mjp

6/9/86



March 21, 1987

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. FRANK C. CARLUCCI
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Admiral Holloway's Terrorism Program Review

Attached are the Department of State's status reports on recommendations from the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism.

Melvyn Levitsky
Melvyn Levitsky
Executive Secretary

DECLASSIFIED

Department of State, 21, 1997

By M20 9/11/99

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION 5

DESCRIPTION: Submit to the NSC a policy framework prepared by the IG/T for making decisions on the use of force in response to international terrorist threats or attacks.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: IG/T.

STATUS OF ACTION: A document was prepared which, through a questioning process, examined sets of criteria within which the key decisions on the use of force in preemption, reaction, and retaliation could be formulated. A draft working copy of this document was presented to the NSC at the staff officer level in November 1986. Due to changes in the NSC staff, no further action was taken on this recommendation. Copies of this document are available in S/CT.

~~SECRET~~
OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F97-082-30

8: 015, NARA, DATE 3/22/06

~~SECRET~~

RECOMMENDATION 9

DESCRIPTION: Lead a review of all USG official personnel requirements overseas in high threat areas and submit recommendations to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: Following the guidelines of this recommendation and the President's request that agencies review and cut where possible staffing levels overseas, the Bureau of Management in the Department of State directed all Chief of Missions abroad to examine staffing and offer suggestions for reductions. Responses were compiled into a report which was submitted to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs on April 17, 1986.

The Department considers that this recommendation of the Task Force has been satisfied.

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RECOMMENDATION 10

DESCRIPTION: Review government-wide policies on travel documentation for U.S. employees and promulgate consistent guidelines throughout the government.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Department established a Working Group composed of Consular Affairs, Counter-Terrorism, Security, and Near East/South Asia bureau officers to review present policies, guidance, and training [REDACTED] [REDACTED] for official Americans traveling abroad. The Working Group completed several recommendations to be incorporated into a government-wide policy on this issue. The Department forwarded those completed recommendations to the NSC in a memo dated November 26, 1986 and suggested that the NSC circulate them to other agencies for comment/concurrence.

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RECOMMENDATION 12

DESCRIPTION: Expand State Department's outreach program to hostage families.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department has enhanced its procedures for maintaining liaison with the families of the hostages held in Lebanon. These procedures should work equally well in any other long-term hostage situation.

A senior officer in the Bureau of Consular Affairs is the Department's primary point of contact with the families. This officer works closely with the Office for Counter-Terrorism, the appropriate geographic bureau, and the Medical Division to ensure that each family is kept fully informed and is contacted at least weekly even when there are no new developments to report. While a hot-line has not been established, families are aware of the officer's home and office telephone numbers, and they have been told to call at any time. Calls are immediately returned so that long distance charges are minimal for the families. In addition to regular telephone contact the officer is available to meet and assist the families whenever they come to Washington.

While the issue of private counseling services has not come up, the Department is prepared to direct families to appropriate organizations or services if they should request such assistance.

Although the established procedures have diminished family pressure for meetings with senior officials, continued demand for occasional meetings can be expected, particularly if the hostage situation continues for an extended period of time.

While efforts to assist hostage families will continue, the Department considers that the recommendation of the task force has been satisfied.

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RECOMMENDATION 16

DESCRIPTION: Provide coordinated interagency briefings on U.S. policies, resources, and capabilities committed to combatting terrorism for all senior U.S. officials stationed overseas.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Ambassador-at-Large now meets with all new American Ambassadors before they proceed to post to discuss our counterterrorism policy in general and to review our country-specific objectives. The Foreign Service Institute has augmented its Ambassadorial Seminars with special sections on USG policy and resources committed to combatting terrorism. Similar courses for Deputy Chiefs of Mission are scheduled for the summer, including a full day course on the management of security functions.

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The State Department offers its Coping with Violence Seminar to all USG employees going overseas. Many senior personnel from other agencies attend these courses.

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has been in touch with FSI on how threat analysis information will be factored into FSI's courses for specific target groups, and this role will be reflected in upcoming briefings.

Interagency teams have briefed 26 posts in high threat areas regarding U.S. counter-terrorist response capabilities.

Ambassadors from high threat posts transiting Washington receive personalized briefings from the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism.

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RECOMMENDATION 17 and 18

DESCRIPTION: Continue efforts to enlist international cooperation in combatting terrorism through both bilateral and multilateral agreements. Particular emphasis should be given to concluding agreements for more effective measures for apprehending, extraditing, and prosecuting known terrorists.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: DOT/FAA DOJ/FBI?

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Department of State has continued to seek international agreements for combatting terrorism at several levels.

- A. General Resolutions on Agreements. In 1985, the UN General Assembly passed its strongest resolution to date condemning terrorism. In the same month, the UN Security Council adopted a resolution, proposed by the U.S. and supported by the Soviet Union, against hostage taking. In the fall of 1986, the Western members of the Security Council attempted to draft a resolution condemning international terrorism. The Western effort was not successful due to non-aligned insistence on the inclusion in the draft resolution of unacceptable language regarding national liberation struggles and state terrorism. Efforts to draft an acceptable resolution are expected to resume this year. The U.S. proposed measures on maritime security to the International Maritime Organization (IMO) in December 1985, which were adopted by the IMO in September 1986. We also introduced a strong resolution against terrorism at the December 1986 meeting of the World Tourism Organization's Executive Council, which was adopted.
- B. International Conventions, Agreements, and Treaties. The IMO is drafting a new convention for the suppression of unlawful acts against the safety of maritime navigation. The International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) is developing a new protocol for the suppression of violence at airports serving international civil aviation, which will implement the

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Montreal Convention. We have successfully urged, with broad support, a new model security article by ICAO for states to use in their bilateral air transport agreements. Such an article has been approved, and the U.S. has initiated a major renegotiation effort to make a binding security article part of its bilateral air transport agreements. Nearly 30 countries have agreed formally or in principle to incorporate acceptable new security measures. Major states include the Soviet Union, U.K., FRG, France, and Canada. The U.S. has also initiated a major effort to renegotiate extradition treaties to limit the political exception clause. The first such treaty, with the U.K., has been completed and ratified, and others are expected.

- C. Informal Cooperation. European fora, such as the EC and the Council of Europe, greatly increased their level of cooperation on counter-terrorism during the course of 1986. U.S. cooperation with those groups, moreover, grew apace, as did U.S.-European cooperation in the Summit Seven context and bilaterally. U.S. efforts to intensify NATO's cooperation and consultation on counter-terrorism at a policy level have been largely frustrated by Allied reluctance to see NATO as an appropriate forum for such cooperation.

EC actions against Libya (April) and Syria (November), although marred by Greece's refusal to take part at various stages, have shown an unprecedented degree of European resolve to work together against state sponsors of terrorism. Helpful statements calling for greater cooperation among states to stop terrorism were issued, as well, at the European Parliament. U.S. cooperation with the EC political directors has been more active than in the past, but better methods for consultation need to be worked out, especially at technical levels. U.S. cooperation with the EC's Trevi Group (Justice/Interior Ministers) and subgroups has been particularly effective and concrete. The Council of Europe (COE) has undertaken useful coordination work, and the U.S. publicly supported the November 1986 COE Declaration on counter-terrorism. We will continue to work closely with the COE when possible.

The Tokyo Summit's strong statement denouncing terrorism and its mandate to make the Bonn Declaration more effective against all forms of terrorism affecting civil

aviation were followed up during 1986 and early 1987 by a series of experts meetings. Progress was made on expanding the Bonn guidelines and developing new language for the 1987 Summit meeting at Venice in June.

At NATO, U.S. efforts to intensify cooperation and consultation on counter-terrorism met with less success. Most of our Allies believe that existing European fora are more appropriate for such cooperation and feel that existing U.S. consultative mechanisms with those fora are sufficient. Further, we have run up against the argument that existing NATO technical-level fora already address the issue of terrorism. We have argued that a policy level track should also be part of legislatively-mandated proposal to NATO permanent representatives -- with little success.

Private, bilateral consultations and cooperation have continued with a host of governments including our closest allies.

Progress in all of the above fields continues, and work will go forward in the months ahead particularly in the areas of cooperation with EC bodies, effective bilateral cooperation, ad hoc multilateral cooperation, keeping the issue of terrorism before the Alliance, and working for strong and useful language on terrorism for the Venice Summit Declaration.

- D. Extradition Treaties. The Department of State, in coordination with the Department of Justice, has developed a two-pronged strategy for negotiating extradition treaties with stable democracies to eliminate, or at least severely restrict, the application of the political offense exception in cases involving violent crimes, typically committed by terrorists. The first approach is followed by those countries that are parties to the European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism without reservation to that Convention's exclusion of the political offenses exception for specified crimes. The United States has successfully concluded supplementary treaties along these lines with the U.K. and FRG. The U.K. Supplementary Treaty went into force on December 23, 1986. The FRG treaty will be submitted to the Senate for advice and consent before ratification by the President. Negotiations continue with Luxembourg, Spain, and Austria following this approach. While not parties to the European Convention, this approach has also been taken with Canada and Australia, with whom negotiations continue.

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A second approach has been developed for those countries that are party to the European Convention subject to a reservation that preserves their options to apply the political offense exception under limited circumstances. The United States successfully concluded and signed on March 17, 1987 a Supplementary Treaty with Belgium following this second approach. The Belgian treaty authorizes waiver of the political offense exception for specified offenses and eliminates the exception altogether for hostage-takings and other crimes committed under particularly serious circumstances. The United States recently pursued this approach with France, which has indicated that it will soon become party to the European Convention subject to a political offense reservation. While an approach along these lines might be acceptable to countries that have similar reservation to the European Convention (Cyprus, Denmark, Iceland, Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and Switzerland), our strategy is to pursue the first, and preferred, approach with as many countries as possible before pursuing further the second and less desirable alternative.

While we have made speedy progress with countries with whom we are prepared to conclude Supplementary Treaties to cover this issue, negotiations will take longer with others with whom we are negotiating entirely new extradition treaties to replace outdated ones. In these negotiations the political offense exception is only one of a number of issues to be resolved before a treaty is concluded and submitted to the Senate for advice and consent.

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RECOMMENDATION 19

DESCRIPTION: Pursue bilateral arrangements for terrorism related R&D exchanges.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism continues, in conjunction with the IG/T, to pursue bilateral RD&A exchanges with [REDACTED] [REDACTED] We are considering the possibilities for expansion to other states.

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The IG/T has also initiated technical level investigations with our NATO allies on the acquisition and use by terrorists of explosives and detonation devices. Discussions will take place through the NATO Explosive Ordinance Disposal (EOD) Working Party and the NATO EOD Technical Information Center. These preliminary working level contacts are necessary precursors for formalized statements of goals and objectives and funding agreements.

The newly established Practical Measures Working Group of the IG/T will continue efforts in this area.

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RECOMMENDATION 20

DESCRIPTION: In conjunction with the Departments of Justice and Treasury improve computerized systems for monitoring cross-border travel and visa control of known or suspected terrorists.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: JUSTICE AND TREASURY.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department is moving ahead to control the cross-border travel of known or suspected terrorists through computerized systems. The present outdated Automated Visa Outlook System (AVLOS) will be replaced by a new, more effective system. [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED] The contract was awarded in September 1986, and implementation is scheduled to begin January 1988.

State and INS have initiated an information sharing project to exchange computer terminals which permit the electronic transfer of alien lookout data between the two agencies in Washington. We also have a pilot project in Montreal which allows for the transfer of immigrant visa information to INS. Our eventual goal is to share our visa information electronically with all INS ports-of-entry by means of our systems interface in Washington.

The State Department is also working closely with Customs to begin building an interface with their lookout system, TECS II, eventually to share electronically real time lookout information between the two agencies.

In addition, we are cooperating with Customs in their efforts to develop an improved machine to read passports. State has the capability of producing machine-readable passports at nine of our agencies and expects to have all agencies automated in early 1988. Customs has been testing some AIT machine-readable equipment which has produced excellent results and is considering buying these readers to install at their inspection sites.

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We have urged other countries (the U.K., Germany, the Netherlands, India and Japan) to follow our lead in MRPs with some success. (Australia and Canada already produce MRPs.)

The Department of State and DEA have put into effect a drug trafficking information sharing system.

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and we will receive update records on a monthly basis.

Finally, the State Department is working with CIA, FBI, and Customs to develop a list of known or suspected terrorists to enter in our present visa outlook system. We intend to share the list with other governments and urge them to contribute names of terrorists known to them.

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RECOMMENDATION 22


DESCRIPTION: Through the IG/T and with the concurrence of the DCI provide policy guidance for terrorism intelligence exchanges with local governments.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: IG/T and DCI.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department's Bureau of Intelligence and Research (INR) continues to work closely with the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism to obtain sanitized reports from CIA and NSA to pass to foreign governments and to encourage exchanges of intelligence with foreign governments. Several papers on Libyan terrorism and Abu Nidal are good examples of this collaboration.

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 Such discussions with senior officials have occurred during visits by the Ambassador-at-Large and other high delegations, but are not yet a part of the ongoing dialogue at the working level.

The Department has attempted to classify threat advisories at the lowest level so that they might receive the widest dissemination. When the advisories must be classified, an unclassified summary is included if at all possible.

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RECOMMENDATION 28

DESCRIPTION: Develop a long-range strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism now has a USIA Senior Foreign Service officer aboard as Deputy Director for Public Diplomacy. The new deputy is writing a comprehensive work plan which will be completed by the end of March 1987. While the plan is still in draft form, the following are likely to emerge as priority areas:

- o An incident management handbook devoted solely to the press/public diplomacy. The hand book will include pre-drafted cables of instruction to affected embassies, suggested standard guidances for State, White House, and DOD spokesmen, action requests for USIA, and duty rosters (designated by position) to be activated as soon as a task force is formed.
- o There is no timely, comprehensive and official source for unclassified information about terrorism. State, CIA, and DOD all prepare or are preparing unclassified documents about terrorism and counterterrorism policy, but conceptual differences and varying priorities lessen the value of work already being done. The strategy paper will request that the resources used to prepare these documents be consolidated at State so an annual white paper on terrorism can be issued.
- o State PA is monitoring U.S. public opinion polls on terrorism and works closely with the Office for Counter-Terrorism (S/CT) to make speakers available to the U.S. public. From March 15 through August 31, S/CT is booked for 27 speaking engagements and has another six tentative dates.
- o USIA Office of Policy Guidance is monitoring FY 88 Country Plan submissions to make sure that USIS posts in key countries world wide, but especially in Europe, will present programs on terrorism during FY 88. USIA's Program Development Office is working with S/CT to fill requests for speakers on terrorism during the current fiscal year.
- o USIA's Office of Research has been requested to conduct opinion polls in the U.K., France, Italy and the FRG to assist in opinion analysis in those countries.

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Finally, the Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T is presently developing a comprehensive public diplomacy strategy and action plan. In the course of formulating this plan, we are considering various means for bringing media representatives and appropriate USG officials together quickly at the outset of any terrorist event for the discussion of the national interest in the case, so that USG considerations could be a factor in the media's own determination of how it should proceed in fulfilling its own responsibilities to the public. Final approval of the strategy and action plan is essential to the definitive preparation of actions by responsible offices and agencies.

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RECOMMENDATION 29

DESCRIPTION: Continue a dialogue with media representatives to obtain support for denying terrorists the visibility they seek.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE

STATUS OF ACTIONS: Extensive discussions with journalists at the working level (State and Pentagon correspondents of the major networks, weekly news magazines and wire services) and at the management level (the principal stockholder of one of the country's largest news outlets, the vice president of a major network) make it clear that important news organizations will not agree to even voluntary guidelines.

This does not mean that important news organizations are not concerned about the impact of the their coverage on terrorist incidents. Several major news organizations have issued formal guidelines, and, perhaps more importantly, many organizations are devoting a lot of time to introspection and public examination of the roles they have played in past terrorist incidents. It is clear that criticism of the excesses in the coverage of TWA 847 have been taken seriously by major media in the U.S. State (S/CT) accepts all invitations to discuss this topic with journalists in public in hopes that continued attention to this topic will have a salutary effect.

Discussions with journalists also made it clear that government officials have been responsible for giving some of the material which had the most potential to damage counterterrorist operations. Reporters with no desire to mislead made it clear that multiple sources within the government had discussed

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If responsibility for leaks can be established disciplinary action should be taken.

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S/CT's incident management press book will contain specific suggestions for statements to be made at the beginning of any terrorist incident. These statements will specifically mention areas which spokesmen will not address and cite the reasons why we believe that discussion of such items poses a potential hazard for specific individuals.

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RECOMMENDATION 32

DESCRIPTION: Monitor abuses of diplomatic immunities in support of terrorists for possible sanctions against violators of the Vienna Convention.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCIES: NONE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: The State Department has continued efforts previously underway to discuss this matter with other governments in both bilateral and multilateral (e.g., Summit Seven) frameworks. Very recently there has been a major intensification of these efforts with selected countries in response to specific threats and incidents of Libyan-supported terrorism. Last year the EC adopted strong language condemning terrorism and announced a series of steps to tighten visa restrictions and invoke other measures against Libyan diplomats. EC states have since expelled more than 100 Libyan diplomats and businessmen.

Every year since 1980, the Sixth Committee (Legal) of the UN General Assembly has taken up, at the initiative of the five Nordic countries, an agenda item on "Consideration of effective measures to enhance the protection, security, and safety of diplomatic and consular missions and representatives." This item focuses on the need to safeguard the maintenance and normal development of diplomatic and consular relations as the cornerstone of cooperation between states and peoples irrespective of their political and social systems. The emphasis in the past has been that diplomatic and consular missions and representatives were increasingly the subject of attacks and acts of violence, which seriously compromised cooperation between states. However, this same item could be used by us for further exploration of ways of dealing with abuse of privileges and immunities by diplomatic and consular missions and representatives.

Since the Nordic countries took the lead on the item, we consulted closely with them during our 1986 pre-UNGA consultations about the feasibility of using the debate on last year's resolution to stress the importance of full compliance with treaty obligations. During the debate under Item 128--Protection of Diplomats--at the 41st session of the United Nations General Assembly, the U.S. Delegation stressed that abuse of diplomatic privileges and immunities and misuse of the diplomatic bag for terrorist purposes were absolutely unacceptable. Several other delegations also condemned the abuse of diplomatic privileges.

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The General Assembly adopted by consensus a resolution marking the 25th anniversary of the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations which addressed the matter of abuse of diplomatic privileges. The pertinent paragraphs of that resolution are the following:

Preambular: "Recalling that, in accordance with the Convention, without prejudice to their privileges and immunities, it is the duty of all persons enjoying such privileges and immunities to respect the laws and regulations of the receiving State" and

Operative: "Urges all states to take effective action at national and international levels with a view to suppressing terrorist and other acts of violence against diplomatic missions and representatives, and to timely prosecuting the perpetrators of such acts and with a view, in accordance with the Convention, to avoiding abuses of diplomatic privileges and immunities."

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RECOMMENDATION 34

DESCRIPTION: Provide, in conjunction with the Department of Justice, more extensive publicity regarding the terrorist reward program in order to more effectively integrate it into the overall counter-terrorist effort.

TASKED AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF STATE.

SUPPORTING AGENCY: DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE.

STATUS OF ACTIONS: Section 502 of the Omnibus Diplomatic Security and Anti-Terrorism Act of 1986, passed by the House of Representatives on March 18, 1986, amends Section 36(b) of the State Department Basic Authorities Act of 1956 by increasing the amount of the reward for information about most-wanted international terrorists from \$500,000 to \$1,000,000. This legislation was the result of intense consultations between the State Department and congressional members and their staff assistants.

Rewards for information have been established for five terrorist incidents: Kuwaiti Airlines 221 (12/4/84), TWA 847 (6/14/85), Zona Rosa massacre, El Salvador (6/19/85), Achille Lauro (10/85), and TWA 840 (4/2/86).

Last year, the State Department tasked our facilities here and abroad to publicize our rewards program. Virtually all of our posts overseas responded that the publicity envisioned would not be accepted by the host government or media, or would have a negative effect. We continue to work on efforts to publicize the program through other channels, such as posters to be used at embassies. In addition, plans are underway for the program to be advertised through Voice of America and Interpol.

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