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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
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File Folder: VPTF (Vice President's Task Force) Recommendations/
Status Reports March 1987 Ted McNamara/NSC Staff (3) ~~Box 91956~~

Date: 11/1/00
Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE DAC Box 10	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Chart	re: Implementation of Recommendations on VPTF, 6 p. R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #6	n.d.	P1/F1
2. Chart	re: Agency Responsibility/Action/Status on Recommendations, 5 p. R " " #7	n.d.	P1/F1
3. Report	re: ADP Terrorism Data Base, 1 p. PART 3/27/06 " #8	n.d.	P1/F1
4. Report	re: Develop an Interagency Approach for the Prevention of and Response to ..., 1 p. PART. 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #9	n.d.	P1/F1
5. Report	re: Develop an Interagency Approach for the Prevention of and Response to Biological..., 1 p. PART 3/27/06 " #10	n.d.	p1/F1
6. Report	re: Linkage between National Security/Foreign..., 1 p. R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #11	n.d.	P1/F1
7. Report	re: Public Diplomacy - Unclassified Documents on Terrorism, 1 p. R " " #12	n.d.	P1/F1
8. Report	Suggested Additions to the Review Evaluation of the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting..., 6 p. R " " #13	4/13/87	P1/F1
9. Memo	L. Wayne Army to Admiral Holloway, re: Draft Review of the Vice President's..., 1 p. R " " #14	4/15/87	P1/F1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
RECORDS

Withdrawer

LOJ 4/24/2007

File Folder VPTF (VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE)
RECOMMENDATIONS/STATUS REPORTS MARCH 1987
TED MCNAMARA/NSC STAFF (3)

FOIA

F97-082/2

Box Number 91956

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
3	REPORT	ADP TERROSIM DATABASE	1	ND
4	REPORT	DEVELOP AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH FOR THE PREVENTION OF AND RESPONSE TO...	1	ND
5	REPORT	DEVELOP AN INTERAGENCY APPROACH FOR THE PRESVENTION OF AND RESPOSNE TO BIOLOGICAL ...	1	ND
6	REPORT	LINKAGE BETWEEN NATIONAL SECURITY/FOREIGN...	1	ND
7	REPORT	PUBLIC DIPLOMACY UNCLASSIFIED DOCUMENTS ON TERRORISM	1	ND
8	REPORT	SUGGESTED ADDITIONS TO THE REVIEW EVALUATION OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATting...	6	4/13/1987

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

Teel

6/24

Recommendations to
be discussed with
JG/T are highlighted
and attached. Back
up material also
included.

Rich

Ted

Call Barbara

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
1	National Program for Combatting Terrorism <i>No action</i>	X	X			
2	National Policy for Combatting Terrorism <i>No action</i>	X				Implemented by NSDD-207
3	Strengthening Coordination in Combatting Terrorism <i>No action</i>	X				
4	Coordination of Public Diplomacy/ Statements During Terrorist Incidents <i>No action</i>	X	X			See #28
5	Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats & Incidents <i>Discuss with S/CT</i>	<i>NSC file to file</i>	X	X	IG/T, NSC	IG/T to submit draft to NSC for review <i>Have S/CT</i>
6	Response Options to Terrorism <i>Wait</i>	X	X			
7	Deployment of Counterterrorist Forces <i>No action</i>	X	X			
8	Current Policy Regarding Operational Security of CTJTF Forces <i>Halt for Howe</i>			X	OSG	Place recommendation on OSG Agenda <i>Halt - John Howe</i>
9	U.S. Presence Abroad <i>what has been done. what is the action going - some annual review? Discuss S/CT with S/CT</i>	X		X		Establish procedures to continue monitoring levels of U.S. exposure overseas

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
10	Policy on Passports/ Docs for Govt Employees <i>NSC - Action</i> <i>Task to agencies for review/ Director</i> <i>NSC action (TAB 7 under DOS)</i>	<i>implemented</i>		X		Ensure that inter-agency review is completed, directive approved recommended & disseminated for action
11	U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerability <i>Discuss S/T - Jeanne</i> <i>action</i>	<i>not</i> <i>to be included</i>		X	IG/T	Take lead in defining NBC threats and accelerate work
12	Hostage Family Liaison <i>No action</i>	X	X		DOS	
13	Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the U.S. <i>No action</i>	X				
14	R&D for Combatting Terrorism <i>Discuss with S/T</i> <i>Telephone Campaign - to raise</i> <i>support</i>	X	X	X		TSWG deserves strong Admin support; Funding to be highlighted as sep. item in DOS budget; emph imp to Congress
15	Counterterrorism Exercises & Simulation <i>No action</i> <i>Task missing plan/ schedule</i> <i>10-88</i>	X	X			At same level of partic. & activ.
16	Country Team Briefings <i>No action</i>	X	X			
17	International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism <i>No action</i>		X			Esp. in NATO, where progress to date has been disappointing
18	Extradition Treaties <i>No action</i>		X	X	DOS	Advise Congress of negative results of revised language

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
19	Int'l RD&A Initiatives <i>No action</i>		X			Cont. & expand effort; consider re-newing exchanges w/ Israel
20	Controlling Cross Border Tvl of Known or Suspected Terrorists <i>Major - initiative</i> <i>1) Set down with OMB - game plan who does app.</i> <i>NSC action - Federal Reserve</i>			X	NSC, OMB	Ensure step-up of proper interagency working group to oversee integration of computer systems & data bases; find adequate funding
21	Airport & Port Security <i>No action</i>		X		DOT, DOJ	Cont. high priority for category X pgm. Give higher priority to seeking legisltn & regulatory changes to ensure adequate employee screening
22	Use of Intelligence Exchange to Promote U.S. Policy <i>No action</i>	X	X			
23	Intelligence Fusion Center for International Terrorism <i>No action</i>	X				
24	Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism <i>Discuss with CIA</i>		X	X	IC	Establish base line to measure progress
25	Terrorism Intelligence Analysis <i>Discuss with CIA</i>			X	IICT, OSG	Further examine issue & report to OSG

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
26	Increased Coordination w/Law Enforcement Elements Domestically & Overseas <i>No action</i>	X	X			
27	Chemical & Biological Threat <i>No action</i>		X		IG/T, thru TSWG	Intensify efforts especially to obtain funding
28	Monitoring & Influencing Foreign & Domestic Attitudes & Perceptions Towards Terrorism & U.S. Counterterrorism Policy <i>Discuss with S/CT</i> <i>NSC Tasker directing specific actions -</i>	<i>draft</i>	X	X	IG/T	Resources must be committed to effort; more dedicated positions required, especially from I.C.
29	Government-Media Relations during a Terrorism Incident <i>No action</i>				NSC, Public Dip.WG of IG/T	Develop & implement strategy to offset terrorist exploitn of U.S. media; quietly consult w/ media as to roles & impact; develop mechanism to brief U.S. officials & media together rapidly at onset of terrorist incidt
30	Psychological Operations to Combat Terrorism <i>No action</i>		X		IG/T	
31	Adequacy of the International Legal System to Deal with Terrorism <i>No action</i>	X	X			
32	Review of Provision of Vienna	X	X			

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
33	International Informant Incentives <i>Discuss with S&CT regarding a more formal and expanded program</i>	<i>IGT Review with</i>		X		Give work high priority with the goal of earliest implementation; consider authority for AG & require legislation if necessary
34	Rewards <i>Discuss with S&CT</i>	X	X	X		Increase publicity; Carry out advertising
35	Murder of US Citizens Outside of U.S. <i>No action</i>	X				
36	Death Penalty for Hostage Taking <i>No action</i>		X		DOJ	Continue to pursue this legislation
37	Joint Committee on Intelligence <i>No action</i>			X	Hill	Requires congressional action
38	Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) <i>No action</i>	X	X		IG/T	Review periodically
	Prohibition of Training & Support of Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps <i>Discuss Status DOJ - now to be revised April 87</i>		X		DOJ, Customs, ATF, FBI	

REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
40	Foreign Terrorism Activities Within the U.S. <i>Discuss status with DOJ and SGT</i>		X	X		Speedier progress essential
41	Private Sector Activities that Aid/Abet Terrorism <i>- Discuss status with SGT DOJ and Treasury</i>	<i>NO</i>	X			Needs to be more effectively address (e.g. make ransom payments illegal eliminate tax deductions, etc.)
42	Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities <i>Discuss with SGT and Nuclear Security Community</i>	X	X	X	IG/T	Increased & continuing priority attn; explore interagency forum to institutionalize cooperation; complete in-depth study of threat

F97-082/2 #7

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

10/11/02

10/11/02

PROP REC	SUBJECT	IMPLEMT'D	ACTION		AGENCIES	COMMENTS
			CONT'D	ADD		
1	Deployability of JSOC <i>Discuss with JCS</i>	X		X	JSOC	Brief in detail to IG/T CSG
2	New NSC Policy Planning & Operations Coordinating Board <i>No Action</i>	X				Adequately treated in evaluation of Recommendation 3
3	Federal Jurisdiction in Terrorist Incidents <i>Discuss with S/CT and DOJ</i>		X	X	IG/T	Initiate formal approach to AG to decide whether to pursue further
4	Private Sector Data Base <i>Discuss with S/CT</i>				IG/T	Place on IG/T Agenda w/#28 & 29
5	Anti-Terrorist Assistance Program	X	X			

~~SECRET SENSITIVE~~

REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
5	Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats & Incidents	DOS	IG/T to submit draft to NSC for review	
8	Current Policy Regarding Operational Security of CTJTF Forces	JCS	Place recommendation on OSG Agenda	
9	U.S. Presence Abroad	DOS	Establish procedures to continue monitoring levels of U.S. exposure overseas	
10	Policy on Passports/ Docs for Govt Employees	NSC, DOS	Ensure that inter-agency review is completed, directive approved recommended & disseminated for action	
11	U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerability	DOS	Take lead in defining NBC threats and accelerate work; status report in 30 days	
14	R&D for Combatting Terrorism	DOS	TSWG deserves strong Admin support; Funding to be highlighted as sep. item in DOS budget; emph imp to Congress	

REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
20	Controlling Cross Border Tvl of Known or Suspected Terrorists	NSC, OMB	Ensure set-up of proper interagency working group to oversee integration of computer systems & data bases; find adequate funding	
24	Expanded HUMINT Capability Against Terrorism	CIA	Establish base line to measure progress	
25	Terrorism Intelligence Analysis	CIA	Further examine issue & report to OSG	
28	Monitoring & Influencing Foreign & Domestic Attitudes & Perceptions Towards Terrorism & U.S. Counterterrorism Policy	DOS	Resources must be committed to effort; more dedicated positions required, especially from IC	
33	International Informant Incentives	DOS	Give work high priority with the goal of earliest implementation; consider authority for AG & require legislation if necessary	
34	Rewards	DOS	Increase publicity; Carry out advertisg	

~~SECRET/SENSITIVE~~

REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
39	Prohibition of Training & Support of Counterterrorism/Mercenary Training Camps	DOJ	Discuss status w/DOJ	
40	Foreign Terrorism Activities Within the U.S.	DOJ, DOS	Speedier progress essential	
41	Private Sector Activities that Aid/Abet Terrorism	DOJ, DOS, Treasury	Needs to be more effectively address (e.g. make ransom payments illegal eliminate tax deductions, etc.)	
42	Improved Security for Nuclear Reactor Facilities	DOS, NuclrSec Comty	Increased & continuing priority attn; explore interagency forum to institutionalize cooperation; complete in-depth study of threat	

F97-082/2#7a

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LOJ

10/11/02

PROP REC	SUBJECT	AGENCIES	ACTION	STATUS
1	Deployability of JSOC	JCS	Brief in detail to IG/T	
3	Federal Jurisdiction in Terrorist Incidents	DOJ, DOS	Initiate formal approach to AG to decide whether to pursue further	
4	Private Sector Data Base	DOS	Place on IG/T Agenda w/#28 & 29	

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ISSUE

Develop an interagency approach for the prevention of and response to a nuclear terrorist incident.

CURRENT SITUATION

While much has been done to refine the USG capability to prevent/detect/respond to a nuclear terrorist incident a coherent USG policy in the form of a NSDD has not been established. The interagency agreement concerning this area has expired. Additionally, recommendations from a recent exercise [REDACTED] require an interagency approach to insure implementation. To this end, a nuclear/chemical/biological working group under the IG/T has been established.

PROBLEM

Recent intelligence studies during the last year indicate that while no hard evidence exists, the risk of exotic forms of terrorism, to include nuclear, may be increasing. Each of the governmental agencies have specific mandated responsibilities which bear directly or indirectly on the subject. However, no single document exists which integrates these into a national policy or program. The last effort in this area was a 1985 draft agreement which was never formalized. We need to address not only the USG policy for handling an incident, but the effectiveness of our ability to identify a potential threat, report, assess and respond to such an event.

PREFERRED SOLUTION

A thorough review of the "lessons learned" from [REDACTED] and the draft 1985 agreement can serve as a starter on this subject. The end solution should be an NSDD which clearly defines our national policy, interagency responsibilities, and lays out a solid framework for a USG program to deal with nuclear terrorist incidents.

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS F97-082/2#9
By LOJ, NARA, Date 10/11/02

ISSUE

Develop an interagency approach for the prevention of and response to biological/chemical terrorist incidents.

FOIA(b) (1)

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PREFERRED SOLUTION

A coordinated USG approach should be established. Specifically, an NSDD which spells out agency roles and appoints a lead agency to coordinate overall efforts is required. Chemical/biological threats or attacks which affect USG citizens within or outside the U.S. must be considered.

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 97-082/2 #10
By QJ, NARA, Date 3/27/06

~~SECRET~~ ✓Issue

Linkage between National Security/Foreign Policy agencies and domestic agencies.

Current Situation

While Justice and the FBI are active participants in the inter-agency process, FEMA, the Department of Transportation (and OMB?) are not. Treasury is not as active as it could be.

Problem

Certain tasks recommended by the VPTF and specified NSDD 207 are beyond the reach of the IG/T to monitor or coordinate. Examples: a study of the vulnerabilities of the United States infrastructure to terrorist attack (FEMA); a survey of current port security procedures and an assessment of the terrorist threat to vessels, passengers and crew members.

Preferred Solution

Expand the IG/T to include these agencies, and others as appropriate (Customs) for the purpose of calling them to meetings as deemed necessary/ desirable.

10/11/02
1 207

~~SECRET~~
DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS

F97-082/2 #12

BY

LOS

WASA DATE

10/11/02

~~SECRET/NO FORN~~

ISSUE

Public diplomacy- Unclassified documents on terrorism

CURRENT SITUATION

CIA publishes (under State logo) "Patterns of Global Terrorism," an excellent and authoritative work, which unfortunately comes out much too late. The 1985 publication came out in late January 1987; the preliminary figures for 1986 will not be available until May. "Patterns" is not really a comprehensive document which can serve as a definitive reference. The Threat Analysis Division of State's Diplomatic Security Bureau updates its "Lethal Terrorist Actions Against Americans Overseas," it contains an important chronology, but is not authoritative and its scope is too narrow for what is needed. The Defense Intelligence Agency is preparing a description of major organizations which practice or support terrorism. All these efforts need to be consolidated into a single publication.

PROBLEM

We need annual publication which does for journalists and academics dealing with terrorism what Jane's and Soviet Military Power do for military writers and thinkers.

USG terrorism materials are compiled in different organizations, at different times and in different formats. All this limits the impact of the work currently being done.

State (S/CT) now has a Senior Foreign Service Officer from USIA as deputy for public diplomacy and a mandate to prepare such a document. He does not, however, have the staff to serve as liaison to the intelligence community, compile and sanitize the materials, write the drafts and oversee publication.

PREFERRED SOLUTION

Consolidate current publications at State-S/CT. One officer from CIA and two from DIA should be detailed to State- S/CT to prepare such a document for annual publication. State should provide support in the form of printing and office equipment.

~~SECRET/NO FORN~~
DECL: OADR



United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

April 13, 1987

da 11/1100

UNCLASSIFIED (WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT)

MEMORANDUM

TO : Admiral J. L. Holloway
Executive Director
Vice President's Task Force on
Combatting Terrorism

FROM : L. Paul Bremer III *W 4/17*
Member, Senior Review Group

SUBJECT : Draft Review VP Task Force, April 20, 1987

As requested in your April 10, 1987 memorandum, attached are the Department of State draft comments on the review evaluation. Upon your examination, we anticipate that many of these fixes can be incorporated into the subject document prior to the Vice President's review.

Attachment:

~~SECRET~~ Document
As stated above.

S/CT PDaly
0377H

UNCLASSIFIED
(WITH SECRET ATTACHMENT)

~~SECRET~~

SUGGESTED ADDITIONS TO THE REVIEW EVALUATION OF THE VICE
PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM

Review Evaluation 1

The programming document should be distributed to appropriate agencies.

Review Evaluation 2

NSDD 207 does not supersede NSDD 30, 138, 179 and 180 but more clearly "provisions of NSDD's 30 and 138 are hereby modified in accordance with this directive." NSDD 179 established the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism and NSDD 180 deals with the civil aviation anti-terrorism program. Evaluation should be modified for accuracy.

Review Evaluation 3

According to the provisions of NSDD 207, the Operations Sub-Group (OSG) of the TIWG will meet to "review ongoing non-crisis operations/activities." The mission of the OSG is clearly defined as operational. On the other hand, 207 defines the role of the IG/T as "responsible for development of overall US policy on terrorism." The following should be added to the last paragraph: "The purpose of such meetings with regional officials would be to expose OSG members to current issues, trends or evolving non-CT policies. Care should be taken that such meetings not be misinterpreted as being for the purpose of policy decisions which in the case of counter-terrorism belongs in the IG/T."

Review Evaluation 4

Recommend complete rewrite of this review evaluation as set forth below.

Quote: The USIA proposal to establish a central repository of articles, research reports, pamphlets, video tapes, statistics, speeches and press reports on terrorism is a good one and would provide valuable support to an effective interagency public diplomacy effort. There is, however, no IG/T proposal for staffing and funding this initiative. The Task Force believes that the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism is the logical place to establish such a repository. As with other public diplomacy efforts, staff for this project should come from the various foreign affairs agencies. We should not expect the private sector to be able to provide comprehensive, reliable, unclassified information on terrorism until the U.S. Government can do so.

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DECL: ~~OADR~~

DECLASSIFIED
NLS F97-082/2 #13
BY NOS NARA, DATE 10/11/02

The Task Force concludes that this recommendation should be placed on the agenda of the IG/T for consideration in conjunction with recommendations 28 and 29. While progress on this proposal is important, it should follow the more urgent tasks of developing a national public diplomacy strategy for terrorism. Unquote.

Review Evaluation 5

The paper "Policy Framework on the Use of Force" will be formally submitted to the NSC by Apr 30, 1987.

Review Evaluation 7

An extensive review of the EST/SSA mission is currently being conducted by an interagency sub-group of the OSG. The purpose is to identify requirements and build appropriate budget documents to ensure that those requirements are funded. If the EST/SSA concept is to continue as the USG initial response to terrorist incidents, dedicated monies must be programmed to support its mission.

Review Evaluation 9

The establishment of a procedure to monitor levels of US exposure overseas may require an NSC directive or Presidential endorsement.

Review Evaluation 11

The Department of Justice as Domestic Lead Agency with the assistance of NSC, FEMR, and OMB, should contract for and fund the study recommended in this review. Special National Intelligence Estimates completed in 1986 which address the generic NBC threats from terrorists should be utilized in preparing the assessments required.

Review Evaluation 21

We do not understand the reference to the loss of U.S. voting rights in the IMO and the imminent loss of that right in the ICAO. We have not lost our vote in the IMO and do not expect to lose the right to vote in either organization.

Review Evaluation 22

DOS/IN should be changed to DOS/INR for accuracy.

Review Evaluation 25

Change Paragraph 5 to read: "The IICT should further and report back to the OSG. After evaluation by the OSG, the report should be forwarded to the IG/T for policy review."

Review Evaluation 27

COMMENT: The review evaluation for Item 27 as written in the draft is based on incomplete data. As a result, the Task Force conclusions as written have largely been overcome by events or are not factual. Moreover, the references in the conclusions to the TIWG are inappropriate. The IG/T (not the TIWG) is responsible for policy development and review of the matters mentioned. Finally, we note that the original input reflected in the draft submitted for our review was not coordinated with the Department of State. We therefore recommend that this entire evaluation and Task Force conclusion be rewritten. To that end, a corrected input for this issue is set forth in the paragraphs below. This input accurately reflects actions undertaken in this critical area which are in accordance with the directions given in the original Vice Presidential Task Force Report.

Complete revision follows:

QUOTE: The Technical Support Working Group of the IG/T and the appropriate subcommittees of the IICT have undertaken a number of initiatives individually and in coordination to define the NBC terrorist threat and to identify and implement appropriate countermeasures programs. The principal impediment to ultimate completion of the countermeasures program is lack of funding for the necessary R&D effort which has already been identified. Major actions completed so far on this critical item include:

- The publication in 1986 (at the direction of the NIO for Counterterrorism) of two distinct special National Intelligence Estimates addressing the likelihood of threats from terrorists employing nuclear or chemical, biological, and radiological elements;

- The establishment in 1987 by the IG/T of a Nuclear/Biological/Chemical (NBC) Working Group (supported by the IICT) to codify in two distinct documents (NSDDs) the coordinated nature of the planned national responses to nuclear or CBR terrorist incidents abroad;

- The management and bi-national coordination in 1986 and 1987 by the Exercise Committee of the IG/T of a joint US/Canadian exercise to respond to a mock terrorist incident employing chemical agents;

- The creation by the TSWG of a Chemical/Biological Incident Response and Research and Development (CBIRRDs) subgroup to identify countermeasures and R&D necessary to combat this threat and to recommend to the TSWG priorities for funding such initiatives. Through CBIRRDs and the TSWG, the IG/T has:

-- Identified twenty three candidate projects for R&D which would improve US national countermeasures against the CBR threat;

-- Established a minimum funding estimate required to support the proposed enhancement of the CBR countermeasures program;

-- Obtained funding (in the FY 86 supplemental) to begin work on five of these R&D initiatives. (Funding to complete work on the five and to begin work on one or two others is contained in the FY 88 State Department budget; however, sufficient funding for even these projects may not be forthcoming owing to the effects of the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings amendments.)

Based on the foregoing, it can be concluded that:

- The IG/T, acting through the TSWG and its sub-committee, has effectively assumed the lead agency role in addressing this issue;

- The nature of the potential NBC threats and the identification of appropriate defensive countermeasures have been identified;

- Improved methods for responding to NBC incidents are being identified and exercised;

- An active R&D program has been identified and prioritized;

- Funding for R&D countermeasures for responding to the NBC threat has been emasculated owing to the state of the national economy and Congressional pressures to meet mandated budget deficit reduction measures.

- Action by the NSC, OMB, and Congress is necessary to provide sufficient levels of funding support for this initiative. UNQUOTE

(NOTE: Recommend Task Force conclusions in the initial draft about the need for new or additional studies to be accomplished and report of same to the TIWG be struck from the evaluation. As pointed out in the revised input above, such studies would only duplicate what has already occurred in both the threat assessment and identification of countermeasures arenas. Moreover, the reference to the TIWG is inappropriate in this context. The body which should review such studies (if such were required) is the IG/T.)

Recommendation 28

Recommend the review evaluation in the draft be replaced with the evaluation below.

Quote: To be effective, the national policy for terrorism needs to be skillfully articulated to American and foreign publics in a logical, systematic and coherent manner. Accordingly the original report charged the NSC and the IG/T with overseeing the development of a "long-range comprehensive strategy" for public diplomacy and its implementation by an active Public Diplomacy Working Group.

USIA has detailed a Senior Foreign Service Officer as Public Diplomacy Deputy to the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism. He has reconstituted the Public Diplomacy Working Group, which has agreed on general goals and made preparation of a detailed strategy plan its number one priority. The plan will be submitted for interagency review no later than May 15.

While efforts have been made to increase the information available to the public, to monitor public opinion in the U.S. and abroad concerning terrorism and to exploit public speaking opportunities, these activities have been proceeding without benefit of an overall public diplomacy plan.

Specifically, USIA has agreed to conduct terrorism-specific polling in key European countries and results are expected in July. Additionally, the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counterterrorism intends to work with specific U.S. missions abroad in order to generate more analysis of foreign public attitudes about terrorism and to identify audiences for international information efforts.

The Task Force concludes that much more needs to be done in this area and that more interagency resources must be devoted to this effort. At present, USIA has contributed a senior officer to the effort and has agreed to provide a secretary. This is the only resource increase over the past year. Previous public diplomacy efforts, such as those in support of U.S. policy on Central America and South Africa have received much higher priority, with as many as 20 positions from several agencies involved. While the specifics of the forthcoming work plan will determine exact personnel needs, the Task Force believes that more dedicated positions will be needed. Of special importance is the detailing of personnel from the intelligence community who can readily access the sensitive materials available and work to "sanitize" them for public exploitation. Unquote.

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Recommendation 33

Review Evaluation - second paragraph, add new third sentence to read:

"The International Informant Incentives Working Group of the IG/T has been tasked to examine the issue and will report to the IG/T by the end of April 87 the results of their findings."

Proposed Recommendation 4

Review Evaluation - First paragraph, change third sentence to read:

" ... establish a repository provided adequate interagency support to include personnel, monies and facilities are provided to support the project."

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SENSITIVE



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

April 15, 1987

MEMORANDUM TO ADMIRAL J. L. HOLLOWAY

FROM:

Wayne
L. WAYNE ARNY, III

SUBJECT:

Draft Review of the Vice President's
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism Report (S)

I believe the draft review of the Vice President's Task Force recommendations and their implementation is generally excellent and should be approved. As the draft notes, a vast majority of the Task Force's recommendations have been or are in the process of being effectively implemented. Obviously, work remains in order to accomplish our goals and many of the draft reviews identify the next steps in our counter terrorism effort. (S)

I would like to express my concerns on two issues addressed in the draft review:

- Recommendation 20: I do not believe that OMB and the NSC are the appropriate agencies to lead an interagency group which "would oversee the development and implementation" of a cross-border tracking system of known or suspected terrorists. State should remain the lead agency as originally recommended. Furthermore, the draft review should not mandate "special funding"; appropriate funds can be worked out through the normal budget process. (S)
- Recommendation 11: I believe that the IG/T should take the lead in defining terrorist threats--including nuclear, chemical, and biological threats--to the U.S. infrastructure, rather than FEMA, due to the highly technical nature of the issues involved. (S)

My staff will be available to work with your staff to make revisions.

I/R-87/S-173

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NARA DATE 10/11/02

Recommendation 8

Review Evaluation

Final resolution of this recommendation is still pending although it has been the subject of active consideration in the past seventeen months.

The intention of the recommendation was to make it easier to refer to the U.S. capabilities for military response to terrorist threats and actions. This in turn should improve the confidence of the American people and our friends and allies that we do indeed possess the capability to effectively use force in reaction to terrorism, and through this more positive reference to our military counterterrorist force, more effectively deter terrorist groups and the states which may sponsor terrorism.

In fact, we have conducted extensive consultations with over 26 nations, during which we have outlined in detail the American counterterrorist force which is prepared to assist them during an incident should they request it. (See Recommendation 16.)

The existence of JSOC as the U.S. counterterrorist force is an "open secret" — having been the subject of a rather technically accurate movie — and is referred to regularly in the press.

This is not considered to be a critical issue, but it should receive periodic review to avoid unnecessary efforts in an attempt to preserve secrecy when it is no longer in the best interest of the overall terrorist program.

This recommendation therefore will be placed on the agenda of the Inter Agency Group on Terrorism for further consideration.

<DIST>SIT: EOB WHSR_IN VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> UNCLASSIFIED<OSRI> RUEHC #<DTG> 060313Z JUN 87
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<TO>TO ALL DIPLOMATIC AND CONSULAR POSTS IMMEDIATE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: REVIEW OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
COMBATting TERRORISM

<TEXT>

UNCLAS STATE 173374

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: PTER

SUBJECT: ~~REVIEW OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
COMBATting TERRORISM~~

1. IN MARCH 1987 PRESIDENT REAGAN ASKED THE VICE PRESIDENT TO RECONVENE THE TASK FORCE ON COMBATting TERRORISM TO REVIEW OUR POLICY FOR COMBATting TERRORISM AND TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR CURRENT PROGRAM. THAT REVIEW HAS BEEN COMPLETED AND WAS DELIVERED TO THE PRESIDENT ON JUNE 2, 1987.

2. THE TEXT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT INTRODUCING THE REVIEW REPORT AND SUMMARIZING THE FINDINGS OF THE REVIEW FOLLOWS. THE ACTUAL REPORT IS CLASSIFIED. IT EXAMINES IN DETAIL THE U.S. COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITIES AND EVALUATES THE PROGRESS MADE SINCE THE ORIGINAL REPORT OF THE TASK FORCE WAS COMPLETED ON DECEMBER 20, 1985.

3. POSTS SHOULD TAKE EARLY OPPORTUNITY TO DRAW THE REPORT TO THE ATTENTION OF HOST GOVERNMENT AT THE APPROPRIATE LEVEL. DRAWING ON THE FOLLOWING KEY CONCLUSIONS:

- CURRENT POLICY FOR COMBATting TERRORISM IS SOUND AND EFFECTIVE; THE REPORT IS A REAFFIRMATION OF OUR COUNTER-TERRORISM POLICY;
- THE POLICY SHOULD BE CAREFULLY EXPLAINED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE;
- THE MISTAKES INVOLVED IN OUR CONTACTS WITH IRAN CAUSED A TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN CREDIBILITY WHICH HAS BEEN REGAINED AS OUR RESOLVE HAS BECOME APPARENT;
- OUR VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM HAS BEEN REDUCED BUT NOT ELIMINATED, THIS MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE;
- THE U.S. WILL CONTINUE TO BE A PRINCIPAL TARGET OF TERRORISTS: WHEN WE SUFFER LOSSES, WE MUST MINIMIZE THE IMPACT;
- ASIDE FROM A BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL AND NUCLEAR TERRORIST INCIDENT, THE GRAVEST THREAT IS A LACK OF CONFIDENCE BY THE AMERICAN PEOPLE, REDUCED CREDIBILITY AND INCREASED ACTIVITY BY TERRORISTS WHO BELIEVE THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED: TO OVERCOME THIS WE MUST DEMONSTRATE RESOLVE AND CONSISTENCY;
- NOTICEABLE DROP IN MIDEAST-RELATED, STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM IN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF LAST YEAR FOLLOWING THE LIBYA STRIKE;
- INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION CONTINUES TO BE A KEY ELEMENT;
- PREVENTION HAS BEEN SUCCESSFUL THANKS TO EFFECTIVE POLICE WORK, INTELLIGENCE AND THE JUDICIAL PROCESS;

- WE ARE DOING A BETTER JOB IN COMBATTING TERRORISM THAN WE WERE 17 MONTHS AGO WHEN THE TASK FORCE REPORT WAS SUBMITTED -- HOWEVER, WE MUST DO BETTER.

4. THE TEXT OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S LETTER FOLLOWS: BEGIN QUOTE. DEAR MR. PRESIDENT: ON MARCH 4, 1987 YOU DIRECTED ME TO RECONVENE THE VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM TO REVIEW OUR POLICY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM AND TO EVALUATE THE EFFECTIVENESS OF OUR CURRENT PROGRAM. THAT REVIEW HAS NOW BEEN COMPLETED.

I AM PLEASED TO REPORT THAT THE TASK FORCE HAS REAFFIRMED THAT OUR CURRENT POLICY AS ARTICULATED IN THE TASK FORCE REPORT IS SOUND, EFFECTIVE, AND FULLY IN ACCORD WITH OUR DEMOCRATIC PRINCIPLES AND NATIONAL IDEALS OF FREEDOM, JUSTICE, THE RULE OF LAW, AND RESPECT FOR HUMAN RIGHTS. THAT POLICY, HOWEVER, NEEDS RE-EMPHASIS AND ITS PROVISIONS AND PURPOSES NEED CAREFUL EXPLANATION TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE.

AMERICANS MUST UNDERSTAND THAT OUR ACTIONS IN PREVENTING AND RESPONDING TO TERRORISM ARE PART OF A CONSCIOUS POLICY AND AN INTEGRATED NATIONAL PROGRAM THAT WAS SPELLED OUT IN DETAIL IN THE REPORT TO YOU A YEAR AND A HALF AGO. IN FOLLOWING THE POLICY AND THE PROGRAM WE HAVE BEEN EFFECTIVE IN COUNTERING TERRORISM. HENCE, OUR COMMITMENT TO THAT POLICY HAS BEEN, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE, BENEFICIAL. THE MISTAKES INVOLVED IN OUR CONTACTS WITH IRAN CAUSED A TEMPORARY REDUCTION IN CREDIBILITY WHICH HAS BEEN REGAINED AS OUR RESOLVE HAS BECOME APPARENT. INDEED, OUR PROGRAMS OF PRACTICAL COOPERATION WITH FRIENDLY STATES -- INTELLIGENCE SHARING, TRAINING AND ASSISTANCE -- HAVE EXPANDED AND GROWN STRONGER IN RECENT MONTHS.

IN THIS PROGRAM REVIEW THE TASK FORCE HAS FOCUSED PRIMARILY ON AN ITEM-BY-ITEM REVIEW OF THE EFFECTIVENESS WITH WHICH EACH OF THE TASK FORCE RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED. WHERE ANY NEW CONCERNS OR ISSUES EMERGED, THEY WERE EXAMINED IN THE REVIEW PROCESS. OVERALL WE HAVE FOUND PROGRESS HAS BEEN EXCELLENT AND THE IMPROVEMENT IN OUR COUNTER-TERRORISM CAPABILITY HAS BEEN EVIDENT IN THE RESULTS. MOST OF THE TASKINGS HAVE BEEN COMPLETED. OTHERS OF A CONTINUING NATURE ARE BEING EFFECTIVELY MANAGED. IN A FEW CASES -- USUSALLY REQUIRING THE COOPERATION OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENTS -- OUR FINAL OBJECTIVES HAVE NOT YET BEEN ATTAINED, BUT THE EFFORTS OF THE ADMINISTRATION HAVE BEEN VIGOROUS AND SUSTAINED. THESE SITUATIONS WERE NOT UNANTICIPATED. A DETAILED EVALUATION OF THE EFFECTIVENESS WITH WHICH THE ORIGINAL RECOMMENDATIONS HAVE BEEN IMPLEMENTED IS FORWARDED AS A CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE TO THIS LETTER-REPORT. WHEN THE REMAINING WORK NOTED IN THESE EVALUATIONS IS COMPLETED, OUR PROGRAM WILL, IN A TECHNICAL SENSE, FULFILL THE RESOURCE REQUIREMENTS OF OUR NATIONAL POLICY.

ALTHOUGH THIS REMARKABLE PROGRESS IS PRAISEWORTHY, I MUST EMPHASIZE THAT OUR VULNERABILITY TO TERRORISM, THOUGH REDUCED, HAS NOT BEEN ELIMINATED. THIS IS A CRITICAL POINT WHICH MUST BE CONVEYED TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE. DEMOCRATIC SOCIETIES ARE BY THEIR NATURE MORE VULNERABLE TO TERRORISM THAN OTHERS. AS A PRACTICAL MATTER, IN THE FACE OF EXTENSIVE WORLDWIDE INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST

ACTIVITY, THE UNITED STATES WILL CERTAINLY CONTINUE TO BE A PRINCIPAL TARGET OF TERRORISTS. BECAUSE OF THE GROWING EXPERIENCE OF THE TERRORISTS AND THE SOPHISTICATION OF THEIR METHODS, HUMAN CASUALTIES AND PROPERTY LOSSES TO AMERICAN CITIZENS AND US INTERESTS REGRETTABLY WILL CONTINUE TO OCCUR. WHEN WE SUFFER THESE LOSSES AT THE HANDS OF TERRORISTS, WE MUST BE PREPARED TO MINIMIZE THE IMPACT.

EXCEPT IN THE CASE OF A CATASTROPHE RESULTING FROM BIOLOGICAL, CHEMICAL OR NUCLEAR TERRORISM, THE GRAVEST THREAT IS THE POTENTIAL POLITICAL IMPACT: A SHORT TERM CRISIS, REDUCED AMERICAN CREDIBILITY IN THE EYES OF OTHERS, AND AN UPSURGE IN ACTIVITY BY TERRORISTS WHO BELIEVE THEY HAVE SUCCEEDED.

WE CAN MINIMIZE THE POLITICAL EFFECTS OF A SUCCESSFUL ACT OF TERRORISM AGAINST THE UNITED STATES SO THAT IT WILL NOT UPSET OR CAST DOUBT ON OUR PROCESS OF GOVERNMENT OR OUR LEADERSHIP. TO DO THIS WE MUST EMPHASIZE AT ALL LEVELS OF GOVERNMENTS THAT ADHERENCE TO OUR POLICY, OUR PROGRAM, AND OUR PROCEDURES IS MOST IMPORTANT. ONLY IN THIS WAY, BY DEMONSTRATING RESOLVE AND CONSISTENCY IN DEALING WITH THE THREAT, CAN THE POLITICAL IMPACT BE BLUNTED.

EVIDENCE HAS DEMONSTRATED THAT OUR POLICY FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM HAS BEEN EFFECTIVE WHEN CARRIED OUT WITH CONSISTENCY AND SUPPORTED BY THE EXPANDED RESOURCES WE ARE DEVOTING TO IT. ACCORDING TO THE LATEST STATISTICS FOR 1986, THE YEAR FOLLOWING THE ISSUANCE OF THE TASK FORCE REPORT, THE NUMBER OF AMERICANS WHO DIED WORLDWIDE AS THE RESULT OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS DECLINED TO 12 FROM 38 IN 1985. ALSO, WORKING UNILATERALLY OR WITH FRIENDLY NATIONS WE TOOK PREEMPTIVE ACTION IN SEVERAL HUNDRED INSTANCES TO STOP POSSIBLE TERRORIST ACTS AGAINST AMERICANS AND AMERICAN INTERESTS. FINALLY, OF SPECIAL NOTE IS THAT ONLY ONE AMERICAN WAS KILLED IN THE UNITED STATES BY TERRORISTS IN 1986 AND THAT A DOZEN INTENDED TERRORIST ACTS IN THE U.S. WERE AVOIDED DUE TO THE EFFORTS OF OUR COUNTER-TERRORIST AGENCIES.

WE SHOULD ALSO HIGHLIGHT OUR EFFECTIVE EFFORTS TO DEAL WITH STATE-SPONSORED TERRORISM. ALTHOUGH TERRORIST INCIDENTS HAD BEEN INCREASING FOR SEVERAL YEARS, THERE WAS A NOTICEABLE DROP IN MIDEAST-RELATED, STATE-SPONSORED, TERRORISM IN EUROPE IN THE SECOND HALF OF LAST YEAR. THIS RESULTED FROM OUR STRIKE ON LIBYA LAST APRIL, THE EXPULSION FROM WESTERN EUROPE OF LIBYAN "DIPLOMATS" AND "BUSINESSMEN," AND INCREASED SURVEILLANCE AND INTELLIGENCE. THESE ACTIONS PRODUCED GOOD EFFECTS, THUS SHOWING THAT CAREFULLY CHOSEN MILITARY ACTION COMBINED WITH COOPERATION WITH OUR ALLIES CAN BE BENEFICIAL. IN CONCERT WITH OTHER NATIONS WE HAVE ALSO SELECTIVELY APPLIED DIPLOMATIC PRESSURE TO GOOD EFFECT. TIGHTENED AIRPORT AND TRAVEL SECURITY HAS ALSO CONTRIBUTED TO FEWER HIJACKINGS AND INCIDENTS.

THE BEST APPROACH TO A TERRORIST INCIDENT IS TO PREVENT ITS OCCURRENCE. HENCE, WE AND OUR FRIENDS AND ALLIES HAVE DEVOTED INCREASED ATTENTION AND RESOURCES TO IDENTIFYING, TRACKING, AND APPREHENDING TERRORISTS, AND THROUGH COURAGEOUS JUDICIAL ACTIONS TO EFFECTIVELY PROSECUTING, CONVICTING AND PUNISHING THE TERRORISTS AS THE CRIMINALS THEY ARE. THIS QUIET, UNSPECTACULAR, BUT

VERY EFFECTIVE, POLICE AND INTELLIGENCE WORK COMBINED WITH A DETERMINED JUDICIAL PROCESS HAS RESULTED IN A SIGNIFICANT DECLINE IN INTERNATIONAL TERRORIST INCIDENTS AND AN INCREASE IN THE NUMBERS OF TERRORISTS IN CUSTODY AROUND THE WORLD. THESE SUCCESSES HAVE BEEN THE DIRECT RESULT OF A STEP-BY-STEP APPLICATION OF OUR POLICY. I AM CONVINCED THAT WE ARE DOING A BETTER JOB IN COMBATTING THE TERRORISM NOW THAN WE WERE SEVENTEEN MONTHS AGO WHEN THE TASK FORCE SUBMITTED ITS REPORT. I AM EQUALLY CONVINCED THAT WE MUST DO BETTER. AS WE INCREASE OUR EFFORTS WE AS A NATION SHOULD NOT EXAGGERATE EITHER THE THREAT, OR THE LIMITED DAMAGE THAT TERRORISTS CAN DO TO US AND TO OUR SOCIETY. TO DO SO ONLY PLAYS INTO THE TERRORISTS' HANDS BY INCREASING THEIR POLITICAL IMPACT. WE MUST, THEREFORE, EMPHASIZE GOOD INTELLIGENCE, CAREFUL POLICE WORK, INTERNATIONAL COOPERATION, JUDICIAL PROCESS, AND A CONTROLLED APPROACH TO PUBLIC HANDLING OF TERRORIST INCIDENTS. ONLY IN THIS WAY CAN WE STOP AND THEN EXTINGUISH THIS CRIMINAL MENACE TO ALL CIVILIZED SOCIETIES. SINCERELY, GEORGE BUSH. END QUOTE.
SHULTZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 01<SSN> 3374<TOR> 870605232625 MSG000171242783