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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. report	re: Puerto Rican Terrorists Groups, 20p	Nov/88	P1/F1 , F6, F2
2. memo	meeting, 9p <i>P 7/19/00 NSF 97-082/1 #1</i> <i>D F97-082/1 #2 9/28/00</i>	10/31/88	P1/F1, F3

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
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- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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ATC-CI-2630-176-88

1) Kelly 16
2) File

D. L. Lull

United States Army Intelligence Agency
Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center

ITAC INTELLIGENCE BRIEF

**I
I
B**

Puerto Rican Terrorist Groups (U)

NOVEMBER 1988

NATIONAL SECURITY INFORMATION
Unauthorized Disclosure Subject to Criminal Sanctions

Classified by Multiple Sources
Declassify on OADR

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DEPARTMENT OF THE ARMY
UNITED STATES ARMY INTELLIGENCE AND THREAT ANALYSIS CENTER
BUILDING 203 - STOP 314
WASHINGTON NAVY YARD
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20374

AIAIT-ZA

3 NOV 1988

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE DISTRIBUTION

SUBJECT: ITAC Intelligence Brief (IIB), Puerto Rican Terrorist Groups (U), ATC-CI-2630-176-88

1. (U) This IIB presents a review of Puerto Rican terrorism as it has specifically affected US military interests on the island. It further provides guidelines to help assess the potential terrorist threat.

2. (U) This publication was prepared by Ms. Marilyn R. Beardsley, US Army Intelligence and Threat Analysis Center (ITAC). The interpretation of intelligence information in this publication represents the views of ITAC and may be subject to modification as the result of subsequent information.

3. (U) Comments should be addressed to: Commander, USAITAC, ATTN: AIAIT-CP, Building 203-STOP 314, Washington Navy Yard, Washington, DC 20374-2136.

James J. O'Brien
JAMES J. O'BRIEN
Colonel, MI
Commanding

Information Cutoff Date: 30 July 1988

Classified by MULTIPLE SOURCES
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PUERTO RICAN TERRORIST GROUPS (U)

(U) Summary

(U) The US military first came to Puerto Rico following the Spanish-American War in 1898. As an integral part of the island's early development, the US military has remained a symbolic target for radical Puerto Ricans who see the US Government as an "occupying force" and who promote the dissolution of the island's Commonwealth status for total Puerto Rican independence.

(U) As a symbolic target, US military personnel and facilities have been sporadically attacked by Puerto Rican terrorist groups since the early 1970s. This study provides the background of Puerto Rican terrorism, a profile of indigenous groups, and the present social and political circumstances affecting the terrorist threat to the US military in Puerto Rico.

(U) The Fight for Independence Begins

(U) The history of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement dates back to the island's original Tainos Indians and the Spanish conquest in the late 15th century. Since then the island has experienced little freedom from the violence that has been associated with the quest for independence. The history of the Independence Movement continues to inspire present-day terrorists.

(U) Puerto Rico faced severe economic and political problems during the early 1900s. Resentment toward the US Government increased as support for Puerto Rican nationalism grew. Two political parties were organized, the Independence Party of Puerto Rico (1912) and the Nationalist Party (1922). These parties built up momentum and began organizing strikes of the gasoline and sugarcane industries. Political tension escalated; police and Nationalist Party members clashed on several occasions. Some Nationalists felt that they had no choice but to meet violence with violence and formed a separate Nationalist Party coalition.

(U) The militant nationalists initiated the armed struggle for independence with the assassination of San Juan Chief of Police, Colonel Riggs, in February 1936. Violence continued on the island throughout the next decade. Government attempts to end the violence were unsuccessful and seemed to further inspire the Nationalists, resulting in many injuries and deaths.

(U) By 1947 the Nationalist Party's goals were being undermined by a new political party, the Popular Democratic Party (PDP).

The PDP was led by Luis Munoz Marin, who had worked through the US Congress to allow Puerto Ricans to elect their own governor in the 1947 elections. Marin won the gubernatorial election, dealing a strong blow to the Nationalist Party. Marin and the PDP promoted independence for Puerto Rico by way of a Commonwealth to establish economic stability. The Nationalists viewed Marin as a "puppet" for the US Government, and his Commonwealth was viewed as only a facade for the continued "US domination" of Puerto Rico.

(U) Overthrow of the government, to include the new governor and his supporters, by armed rebellion, became the Nationalists' goal. On 30 October 1950 the Nationalists attacked police and government offices, including the governor's residence, with small-arms fire and firebombs. The government quelled the uprising within 3 days. Over one hundred rebels were taken into police custody. During the same time, in Washington, DC, two Nationalists unsuccessfully attempted to assassinate President Harry S. Truman. The Nationalist Rebellion had failed.

(U) After the Nationalist Rebellion, fervent support for independence subsided. Most of the rebel leaders were either dead or imprisoned. The island began a new era of industrialization with the inauguration of the Commonwealth on 25 July 1952, and support for the Nationalist Party faded. However, on 1 March 1954, the Nationalists carried violence to the mainland once again when a woman and three men entered the US House of Representatives in Washington and sprayed the Congressional assembly with gunfire. Five Congressmen were wounded. The Nationalists were arrested at the scene, convicted on several federal charges, and imprisoned.

(U) The Nationalist Party no longer exists as an organized political force, but its goals form the psychological roots of the island's pro-violence independence movement.

(U) The Emergence of Puerto Rican Terrorist Groups: The FALN

(U) Relative prosperity on the island during the 1960s resulted in a decrease of popular support for the Independence Movement. However, the recession of the 1970s, with the closures of businesses, unemployment, and wage reductions for many Puerto Ricans, was accompanied by a rise in political tension as the economy worsened. Industrial strikes over wage disputes and layoffs in US-owned businesses were supported by the pro-independence Puerto Rican Socialist Party (PSD). Groups such as the Armed Revolutionary Independence Movement (MIRA) and the Armed Commandos of Liberation (CAL), were believed responsible for several bombing attacks against US-owned businesses and US Army Reserve stations during this time.

(C) The violence was not confined to the island. Businesses in Manhattan were firebombed in the early 1970s by a group called the United Revolutionary Force for Armed Independence (FURIA). This group was the forerunner of the Armed Forces of National Liberation (FALN). The FALN was a highly organized and motivated terrorist group dedicated to "liberating Puerto Rico from US control." Unlike other Puerto Rican terrorist groups, the FALN pursued the "armed struggle" against the US Government within the continental US.

(C) The FALN initiated its terrorist campaign with five bombings in New York City on 26 October 1974. The attacks were symbolic in nature, targeted US government offices and banks, and were seemingly designed not to cause injuries. However, as a result of limited public response, the group changed tactics. On 11 December 1974 the terrorists attacked police with a "booby trap" explosive device, which permanently disabled one New York City police officer. On 29 January 1975, the FALN carried out its most deadly and destructive attack, the bombing of the Fraunces Tavern in historic Manhattan's financial district. The lunch hour bombing killed 4 and injured 55 patrons. Subsequent indiscriminate, incendiary, and explosive FALN bombings throughout the 1970s and early 1980s resulted in injuries to more than 80 people in Chicago, Washington, DC, and New York.

(C) The 3 November 1976 discovery of a FALN "bomb factory" in Chicago led police to several FALN members who had lived as members of the local community for several years, including one who worked for the federal government. On 12 July 1978, another "bomb factory" was discovered when a pipe bomb accidentally detonated, severely maiming the group's explosives expert, William Morales, later to be known as No Hands Morales.

(U) The safehouse discoveries forced the group to become more clandestine and to develop an intricate underground network of members and supporters. By October 1979, the group had become fully operational again and marked its return to activity with a series of bombings in New York and Chicago.

(U) The FALN had developed ties with the island-based terrorist groups and issued a joint communique after a bombing in Puerto Rico. However, the extent of cooperation among FALN and island-based terrorist groups was superficial and did not include actual operational participation with each other.

(C) On 4 April 1980 the FALN suffered its most serious setback when police arrested 11 members in Evanston, Illinois, just prior to a planned armored car robbery. The investigations following the arrests provided authorities with insight into the complex workings of the group. Authorities found evidence of

the group's expertise in planning of operations, use of sophisticated covert techniques, acquisition of resources, manufacture of explosive devices, and use of weapons. Ten of the FALN members arrested in 1980 were sentenced to prison terms of 55 to 90 years. Subsequent confessions by one convicted member provided a wealth of information resulting in more arrests and convictions of hardcore FALN members.

(C) Although the group was hard hit by the arrests of 11 members in 1980, it was able to recover and to perform what were to be the last FALN bombing attacks in New York on New Year's Eve 1982. Four more FALN members were arrested in 1983, including [REDACTED] who was jailed by the Mexican authorities for several bank robberies and other criminal charges in Mexico. On 3 July 1986, three more FALN members were arrested after FBI officials successfully thwarted a plot to free a group member imprisoned at the federal penitentiary in Leavenworth, Kansas. These arrests, which resulted in lengthy prison terms, essentially ended FALN operations, although imprisoned members continue to claim their dedication to the cause. The FBI's successful investigation of the FALN led to the identification of known associates and crippled any potential recruitment efforts. The group is no longer believed to pose a threat.

(C) FALN violence reestablished public awareness and media coverage of the Puerto Rican Independence Movement in the US. In its communiques the group addressed a number of issues to attract international support for its cause:

- ° US Navy use of the island of Vieques, Puerto Rico, as a target practice area
- ° US Government approval for granting of Puerto Rican statehood
- ° Creation of "colonial puppets"
- ° Exploitation of Puerto Rican and other Third World country workers by multinational corporations
- ° Theft of national resources
- ° Higher unemployment rate in Puerto Rico than in the mainland US
- ° Allegations of US government sterilization of 35 percent of all female Puerto Ricans
- ° Alleged "assassination" of members of the Puerto Rican independence movement

(C) By referring to the current controversial issues in its communiques, the FALN linked its goals with the welfare of the island's citizens. This practice is still used by active terrorist groups on the island. Many of the same topics have appeared in the communiques of indigenous Puerto Rican terrorist groups.

(U) Indigenous Terrorist Groups in Puerto Rico

(S) Three groups are believed responsible for the terrorist attacks in Puerto Rico that began in 1979. They are the Ejercito Popular Boricua (EPB-Macheteros), the Organization of Volunteers for the Puerto Rican Revolution (OVRP), and the Armed Forces of Popular Resistance (FARP). Although other names have been used to take credit for some attacks, members of these three groups are believed responsible. In fact, there is little information to distinguish among members of the three groups. The groups have been known to work very closely together, publish joint communiques, and share information to the degree that some members are believed to belong to more than one group. The Macheteros have been associated with the most lethal and destructive attacks and robberies. The OVRP and the FARP have claimed responsibility for the low-level bombings. However, conflicting reports and claims made by the groups after attacks have made it difficult to assign responsibility. New and different names have been used at times to project the impression of increased membership in, and support for, the independence movement. The practice also confuses investigating authorities and complicates the criminal prosecution of arrested members. Ultimately, however, all group members strive for the one goal of Puerto Rican independence. They want to "rid the island of the imperialist Yankee government and businesses through the use of violence." They are anti-US and anti-imperialist. Marxist-Leninist ideology is the foundation for their envisioned socialist society, although such ideological references have not been commonly reflected in their communiques.

(U) Attacks against the US Military Begin

(C) The Macheteros, OVRP, and FARP initiated attacks against the US military with the ambush of a Navy shuttle bus on 3 December 1979. The bus was making its daily early morning run carrying Navy personnel to their remote work station in Sabana Seca. In an isolated area of the road, several masked gunmen emerged from a blocking vehicle and fired automatic weapons and handguns at the bus. The occupants immediately dropped to the floor of the bus and were unable to see their assailants. The attack ended suddenly and the gunmen fled the scene. The driver and two sailors were killed and eight sailors wounded. One of the passengers drove the bus back to the base. The attack was later claimed in a joint communique by the Macheteros, the OVRP, and the FARP, as "retaliation for the death of a fellow patriot" found hung in his prison cell in Florida. They had executed a well-planned attack, and obviously had known the bus schedule, the absence of security or witnesses at that location and time, and that their victims were unarmed and could not defend themselves.

(C) The terrorists have used a variety of weapons and explosives in their diverse attacks, including automatic weapons, 9mm pistols, shotguns, firebombs, pipe bombs, and light antitank weapons (LAWs). The terrorists have displayed consistency in the careful planning and execution of their operations. This was well demonstrated in the Macheteros' most destructive attack, the 12 January 1981 bombings of 11 aircraft at the Muniz National Guard Airfield in San Juan. Poor security at the airfield allowed the terrorists easy access and escape. Extensive planning and pre-operational surveillance provided the terrorists the knowledge that the 45-acre airfield was guarded by only two guards, one stationary and the other roving. An anonymous caller phoned a local television station after the attack and claimed that 11 men and women had carried out the operation in less than 8 minutes. After cutting their way through an 8 foot chain-link fence during the midnight guard shift change, seven members stood guard while the other four placed approximately 26 pipe bombs in strategic locations on 13 aircraft (see figure 1). The terrorists then exited through the hole in the fence into the surrounding heavy vegetation without being detected by the guards and remotely detonated the bombs. Although two of the bombs failed to explode, the others caused \$45 million in damages to aircraft and equipment on the airfield, ranking this among the most costly terrorist attacks worldwide. The Macheteros hoped that this attack would win worldwide recognition of their professional capabilities. To this end they prepared a videotape showing disguised group members making the bombs.

(C) Although the Muniz bombing gained certain recognition for the terrorists, it did not provide lasting momentum for their cause. Their next attack against the US military was on 16 May 1982. At approximately 0110 hours, four Navy enlisted men assigned to the USS Pensacola were attacked while walking back to their ship in Old San Juan harbor. The sailors, who were wearing civilian clothes, had just left a well-known waterfront brothel when gunmen in a passing Cadillac fired at them with automatic weapons, killing one and wounding the others. As with the 1979 bus ambush, the terrorists employed preoperational surveillance and selected an accessible and defenseless target during early morning hours. This incident was also claimed by the Macheteros in a communique that stated that the attack was in retaliation for the US Naval exercise "Ocean Venture 82," that local fishermen blamed for the earlier decrease in catches that year. Since the May 1982 attack, with a few exceptions, Puerto Rican terrorists have primarily conducted low-level bombing attacks against lightly guarded targets (usually military recruiting stations, post offices, and National Guard installations). They have mainly used pipe bombs set to detonate in the early morning hours to avoid injury to personnel.

These bombs, usually placed outside buildings, have caused only minor structural damages.

(S) The exceptions to this type of attack have been few, but require mentioning. The terrorists have used LAWS on two occasions. The first LAW attack was on 30 October 1983 and was directed against FBI offices in Hato Rey. The second attack occurred 25 January 1985 and targeted the US courthouse in Old San Juan. The LAW attacks demonstrated the terrorists' expanded weapons capabilities, but were not particularly well executed. The LAW rounds caused little damage and no casualties. The LAWS used in the attacks were traced to Cuban sources, which suggests a link between the groups and Cuba.

(C) Information linking indigenous terrorists to off-island terrorist groups and sympathizers has not been substantiated, although there are indications that some group members may have received training in Cuba. The Macheteros, the OVRP, and the FARP have generally operated independently and almost exclusively in Puerto Rico. The only known exception was the 12 September 1983 Wells Fargo robbery in Hartford, Connecticut. This professionally planned and executed robbery gained the terrorists \$7.2 million. A Macheteros group member, who worked as a guard for Wells Fargo, conducted the robbery and left the US with the money without his links to the group ever being discovered. Feeling confident that they had erased all traces of evidence, the Macheteros boldly claimed the robbery in a communique a year later. However, it was the Wells Fargo connection, along with earlier safe house discoveries, that led federal authorities to the arrests of 14 alleged members and associates of the Macheteros on 30 August 1985.

(U) The 1985 Arrests

(U) A total of 19 alleged members and associates of the Macheteros were arrested on or after 30 August 1985 and charged with 17 counts in the indictment relating to the Wells Fargo robbery in 1983. The charges all centered around the actual robbery and subsequent movement of the stolen money out of the US. It is noteworthy that the charges did not include any mention of terrorist group involvement.

(C) The arrests were helpful in providing a profile of the Macheteros, especially the group's leadership. Identification of group members revealed the group's diverse educational and economic backgrounds, social status, and occupations. The members had in common only their dedication to the fight for independence. Their legitimate occupations and positions in society were carefully managed to cover their participation in covert terrorist activities. They lived dual existences as pro-

fessionals, businessmen, and laborers, at the same time maintaining their roles as terrorists.

(C) Although the arrests and safe house raids revealed much information about the Macheteros, the total group membership island-wide is still unknown. The group has maintained strict security practices, such as the use of code names, which has protected the identity of many members. Recent estimates by Puerto Rican authorities indicated that there are less than 50 hard-core members in all the groups combined. No more than 10 percent of the population has supported Puerto Rican independence in public elections; an even smaller percentage of this group supports the use of violence to achieve that end. However, many Puerto Ricans are sympathetic to the terrorists, seeing them in a romantic sense as "patriots," and would not assist federal authorities in the investigations of terrorist incidents.

(U) Terrorist Attacks since the 1985 Arrests

(U) The 1985 arrests were believed to have severely disrupted Macheteros operations. However, the group has since conducted operations, and on 6 November 1985 they attempted to assassinate the executive officer of the San Juan US Army Recruiting battalion. On that morning, as ██████████ made his routine moped ride from his home on Fort Buchanan to his office downtown, two men on a motorcycle shot at him four times with a 9mm pistol. Two bullets wounded ██████████ one in the chest and the other in his hip. As he fell to the side of the road, his assailants stopped, apparently to administer the "coup de grace" but retreated because of the presence of the witnesses in the area. They dumped the stolen motorcycle and escaped in a waiting automobile.

(U) The Macheteros claimed the assassination attempt in a written communique, as did the OVRP in an anonymous phone call to the office of United Press International in San Juan. The attack was apparently intended to intimidate federal authorities associated with the August arrests and was claimed as an act of retaliation for those arrests. However, subsequent information indicated that ██████████ was not simply chosen as a symbolic target. Prior to the attack he had heated encounters with officials at a local high school concerning US Army recruitment of Puerto Rican youth in the school. As a result, he became the subject of unfavorable comments and threats in the underground political press. Army recruitment of Puerto Rican youth is often protested by terrorists and their sympathizers. ██████████ was perceived as having no understanding or respect for the Latin culture and heritage, so he engendered hostile feelings on the part of local terrorists and sympathizers.

██████████ highly unfavorable visibility, combined with his weak security practices (using the same route to work at the same time each day), made him a vulnerable target.
(U) Recent Terrorist Activity and the Near-Term Outlook

(U) Since the ██████████ shooting, the level of terrorist activity in Puerto Rico has decreased. Terrorist attacks have primarily been low-level bombings since 1984. Unlike the ambushes and spectacular bombing attacks during the late 1970s and early 1980s, the groups have chosen to attack lightly guarded or unguarded targets with low-level bombs. US military recruiting offices and US post offices have been the primary targets; however, several bombings have also occurred in the Government Services Agency (GSA) motorpool outside Fort Buchanan and along the exterior walls of National Guard installations. In 1986 the terrorists expanded their targeting to include local government, economic offices, and some private businesses. The new targets were apparently added to show support for issues of public interest, such as ongoing labor disputes. All of the bombings since 1984 have had similar scenarios: several bombs were placed in various locations throughout the island usually on the exterior of buildings and were set to detonate during early morning hours. The bombs were designed to cause minimal damages and to avoid injuries. The terrorists were seemingly not discouraged by the bomb detonation rate of less than 50 percent. Whether or not the bombs exploded, the terrorists achieved their goal of demonstrating their continuing operational capability.

(U) The trials of the Macheteros members began on 6 September 1988 (legal experts believe they will last over a year). Until the conclusion it is unlikely that the terrorists will increase the level of attacks; to do so would risk adverse publicity for their group members that could affect the outcome of the trials. It is, therefore, likely that any terrorist activities will be limited to infrequent, low-level bombings against lightly guarded targets to express continued dedication to the "fight for Puerto Rican independence."

(U) Following are several factors that could serve as justification for future bombing attacks in the near term.

° The November 1988 political elections. The period before the elections has always raised the level of tension on the island, as issues are addressed (unemployment, low wages, and poverty) and blamed on the corruption of the Puerto Rican Government. In addition, if the issue of statehood appears to be gaining increased support during the pre-election rallies, the terrorists may be motivated to strike in an attempt to counteract such support.

° Economic Conditions. Worsening economic conditions on the island, especially an increase in the unemployment rate, or a major layoff of employees, could provoke a terrorist attack. The terrorists may try to strengthen support for their cause by attacking the US Government as the source behind the economic difficulties.

° Central America. Perceived US Government involvement in the affairs of other Latin American countries, especially military action, may provoke an attack; the US military would be a primary target.

° Trial Results. The terrorists will probably react to the results of the Macheteros trials, whether or not the results are favorable to the defendants. If the accused are found guilty, an attack to protest perceived US Government injustice would be possible. If the terrorists are not convicted, an attack may follow to protest the ordeal imposed by the US Government upon innocent Puerto Rican citizens.


(U) Conclusion

(U) The long-term outlook for terrorist activity in Puerto Rico is that it will continue for the foreseeable future. As long as Puerto Rico remains a US Commonwealth there will be individuals who will use violence in an attempt to attain their goal of Puerto Rican independence. The degree of support for the Independence Movement has varied throughout the island's history and will continue to be influenced by many political and social variables. However, the use of terrorism by independence seekers will continue as long as there is hope that independence for Puerto Rico can be achieved at the expense of commonwealth or statehood.

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Figure 1. (U) Machetero Terrorist Attack

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APPENDIX A (U)

Chronology of Terrorist Attacks in Puerto Rico
Claimed by the Macheteros, OVRP, and FARP (U)

October 1978 through July 1988

<u>DATE</u>	<u>INCIDENT</u>	<u>GROUP NAME</u>
24 Aug 78	Shooting of a police officer in Naguabo.	Macheteros
02 Oct 78	Theft of explosives in Manati.	Macheteros
15 Feb 79	Bombing of Coast Guard radio tower in Old San Juan.	OVRP
03 Dec 79	Ambush of US Navy Bus in San Juan. 2 sailors killed and 8 wounded.	Macheteros, OVRP & FARP
14 Jul 80	Bombing of radio towers in Dorado, Ponce, Old San Juan, and Mayaguez.	OVRP
12 Mar 80	ROTC officers fired at in their auto on their way to Ft. Buchanan. 1 passer-by was injured.	Macheteros
12 Jan 81	Bombing of Muniz Air National Guard base. \$45 million damage.	Macheteros
21 Apr 81	Robbery of Well Fargo Truck in Santurce. \$348,000 stolen.	Macheteros
11 Nov 81	Bombing of electrical power station in Condado.	Macheteros
27 Nov 81	Bombing of electrical power stations in Santurce and Condado.	Macheteros
16 May 82	Ambush of US Navy personnel in Old San Juan. 1 sailor killed and 3 wounded.	Macheteros
19 May 82	Sniper fire during sit-in at the Villa Sin Miedo. 1 officer killed and 2 injured.	Macheteros
20 May 82	Attempted fire bombing of the Caribe Hilton Hotel in San Juan.	Macheteros

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10 Jun 82	Bombings at the Marbella Condos in Carolina.	FARP
01 Sep 82	Attempted robbery of Wells Fargo armored vehicle in Naranjito.	Macheteros
16 Nov 82	Robbery of armored car in Carolina. \$300,000 stolen.	Macheteros
29 Apr 83	Attempted Wells Fargo armored truck robbery in Rio Piedras.	Macheteros
15 Jul 83	Robbery of Wells Fargo truck. Driver killed and \$587,000 stolen.	Macheteros
12 Sep 83	Wells Fargo robbery in Hartford, CT. (Only known off-island operation) and \$ 7.2 million stolen.	Macheteros
30 Oct 83	LAW attack on FBI office in Federal building in Hato Rey.	Macheteros
10 Dec 84	Five bombings or attempted bombings at US Army Recruiting station, in Mayaguez; National Guard Academy, Levittown; office at the University of Puerto Rico, Rio Piedras; US Marine/Navy recruiting offices, Ponce; and US Army recruiting center in Cayey.	OVRP
25 Jan 85	LAW attack on US Courthouse in Old San Juan.	Macheteros/ OVRP
06 Nov 85	Attempted assassination of US Army recruiting officer outside the gates of Ft. Buchanan.	Macheteros/ OVRP
06 Jan 86	Bombings of post offices in Santurce, Cidra and Guanica; Bombing of US Army recruiting station in Toa Baja.	Macheteros/ OVRP.*(PRRF)
07 Jan 86	Attempted post office bombing at Coamo.	Macheteros/ OVRP.*(PRRF)
11 Jan 86	Electrical company truck was firebombed in a parking lot.	Macheteros/ OVRP.*(PRRF)

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14 Apr 86	Bombing of restroom at the University of Puerto Rico in Rio Piedras.	OVRP
29 Apr 86	Assassination of a former PR police officer who was linked to the death of two "patriots." (Cerra Maravilla case).	OVRP
28 Oct 86	Bombings or attempted bombings at: US Navy recruiting station in Fajardo; GSA motor pool at the US recruiting station adjacent to Ft. Buchanan; and various military facilities in Puerto Rico. Ten bombs were located.	Macheteros/ OVRP & FARP
04 Nov 86	Attempted bombing of a wall outside a National Guard facility in Ponce. Believed to be one of those planted on 28 Oct 86.	Macheteros/ OVRP & FARP
28 Dec 86	Bombing of a US military vehicle in the Yauco National Guard motorpool and attempted bombing of Guaryma post office.	No Claims (Poss. OVRP)
25 May 87	Eight pipe bombs found at following locations in Puerto Rico: US Customs office in Bararrio La Plata; Western Federal Savings Bank in Mayaguez; Department store in Caguas; Banco De Caguasin Cidra; Department store in Caguas; City Bank Branch in Mayaguez; Bank of Boston in Carolina.	"Liberation Guerrilla Forces" **(OVRP)
19 Mar 88	Attempted pipe bombing of US Army/Navy recruiting station in Caguas.	No Claim
22 Jul 88	Pipe bombing of US Army/Navy recruiting station in Caguas.	No Claim

* These incidents were claimed in the name of a previously unheard of group called the "Frente Revolucionario Nacional De Puerto Rico," the Puerto Rican National Revolutionary Front (PRRF). However, it is believed that the Macheteros and the OVRP were using cover names.

** Probable cover name used by the OVRP.

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.