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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name ~~MCNAMARA, THOMAS E.: FILES~~
Counterterrorism and Narcotics

File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (JUNE 1987-JULY 1987)

Box Number *92271 RAC Box 6*

Withdrawer
DLB 12/26/2006

FOIA
F02-071/3
COLLINS
7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31312	EMAIL	BOB PEARSON TO MCNAMARA, RE: FCC REQUEST <i>R 10/26/2011 F2002-071/3</i>	1	6/9/1987	B1
31313	MEMO	ROBERT OAKLEY, BARRY KELLY TO FRANK CARLUCCI, RE: SYRIA AND PM THATCHER	2	6/10/1987	B1
31314	MEMCON	DRAFT MEMCON FOR THATCHER/REAGAN, PAGES 5-6 ONLY <i>D 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	2	ND	B1
31315	LETTER	DUPLICATE OF #20389; LETTER - THATCHER TO REAGAN	2	6/26/1987	B1
31316	CABLE	DUPLICATE OF #20982; #081540Z JUL 87; LETTER - REAGAN TO THATCHER <i>R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	1	7/8/1987	B1
31318	CABLE	#111133Z JUL 87 <i>R 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	5	7/11/1987	B1
31319	MEMCON	DUPLICATE OF #22111; MEETING WITH PRIME MINISTER MARGARET THATCHER OF THE UNITED KINGDOM - JULY 17, 1987 <i>PAR 8/4/2008 F02-071/3</i>	14	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
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- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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Counter Terrorism and Narcotics

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F02-071/3

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7

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
31321	CABLE	DRAFT, NO CABLE NUMBER, MEETING BETWEEN UK PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, JULY 17, 1987 <i>R 4/10/2012 F2002-071/3</i>	7	7/17/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

9-Jun-1987 02:09p EDT

1

(Handwritten initials)
6 UK
31312

MEMORANDUM FOR: MCNAMARA
FROM: jnet%CPUA::NSWRP
(NSWRP@jnet%CPUA@MRGATE)
SUBJECT: FCC request, while at Cini

Received: From CPUA(NSWRP) by VAXC with RSCS id 9610
for MCNAMARA@VAXC; Tue, 9-JUN-1987 10:39 EDT
MSG:FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: KELLYDB --VAXC 06/09/87 10:39:28
To: KELLYDB --VAXC

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: FCC request, while at Cini
Please see FCC note and have appropriate report prepared. Would expect to see
it next week unless otherwise advised. Thanks.
*** Forwarding note from NSMB --CPUA 06/09/87 10:30 ***
To: NSGSG --CPUA

NOTE FROM: Marybel Batjer
SUBJECT: FCC request, while at Cini

FCC raised Syria is his discussion with PM THATCHER. Before she reacted, she
asked FCC if "we" couldn't get together to insure we had the same Intell.

FCC said Bob and Dennis ought to work out a Joint Intell. Assessment of Syria &
terrorism to, in PM Thatcher's words, make absolutely sure that Abu Nidal
has left Syria."

Off to you... I didn't think you'd like me giving out work assignments. M.B.

Consider this note ~~SECRET~~

cc: NSGSG --CPUA Colin L. Powell NSWRP --CPUA Colin L. Powell

cc: NSRBO --CPUA MCNAMARA--VAXC
NSGSG --CPUA NSCLP --CPUA Colin L. Powell
NSDBR --CPUA

DEC ASSI ED
NLRR F02-071/3#31312
BY RW NARA TE 10/26/11

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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MCNAMARA, THOMAS E.: FILES

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31313 MEMO

2 6/10/1987 B1

ROBERT OAKLEY, BARRY KELLY TO FRANK
CARLUCCI, RE: SYRIA AND PM THATCHER

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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als

12/26/06

~~SECRET~~

CLASSIFICATION

f BLK

TJew

(B)

CIRCLE ONE BELOW

IMMEDIATE

PRIORITY

ROUTINE

MODE

SECURE FAX #

ADMIN FAX #

RECORD #

PAGES

DTC

RELEASER

2

110737Z JUN 87

FROM/LOCATION

PETER SOMMER, VENICE

TO/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

TED MCNAR NSC STAFF

TOR: 110737Z

INFORMATION ADDRES/LOCATION/TIME OF RECEIPT

07 JUN 87 11:39
CLASSIFICATION ROOM
USE

SPECIAL INSTRUCTIONS/REMARKS:

Attached is extract from Draft Thatcher memo on portm dealing with Syria.

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MCNAMARA, THOMAS E.: FILES

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
31314	MEMCON DRAFT MEMCON FOR THATCHER/REAGAN, PAGES 5-6 ONLY	2	ND	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

15-Jun-1987 11:07 EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: MCNAMARA
FROM: jnet%CPUA::NSWRP
(NSWRP@jnet%CPUA@MRGATE)
SUBJECT: SYRIAN INTEL ASSESSMENT

13
3/3/5
UK

Received: From CPUA(NSWRP) by VAXC with RSCS id 4787
for MCNAMARA@VAXC; Mon, 15-JUN-1987 10:15 EDT
MSG:FROM: NSWRP --CPUA TO: MCNAMARA--VAXC
To: MCNAMARA--VAXC

06/15/87 10:15:32

NOTE FROM: BOB PEARSON
Subject: SYRIAN INTEL ASSESSMENT
What is the latest timetable on this one? Thanks.
*** Forwarding note from MCNAMARA--VAXC 06/12/87 14:42 ***
To: NSWRP --CPUA
Subject: SYRIAN INTEL ASSESSMENT
NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

12-Jun-1987 02:19p EDT

MEMORANDUM FOR: SEE BELOW
FROM: Thomas E. McNamara
(MCNAMARA)
SUBJECT: SYRIAN INTEL ASSESSMENT
TO: ADDRESSEES
FROM: TED MCNAMARA
SUBJECT: NEED FOR A JOINT US-UK ASSESSMENT ON SYRIA AND ANO

Roger Bone of the UK Embassy called to double check our understanding of the "joint" assessment on Syria and the ANO which was agreed in Venice. I said I could not be sure without checking with Frank Carlucci and those who participated in the conversation in Venice, but that it seemed to me that the following was a reasonable way to proceed:

-- we would do our U.S.-only community assessment and have this ready for policy-level review by Tuesday (this has already been tasked);

-- there was, coincidentally, a JIC paper on the same subject done last week and we would take that into account in doing our paper;

-- once our paper is finished, we could get together with the UK and in consultation with them decide if another JIC paper is necessary (hopefully not);

-- if a JIC paper is needed, we will have to agree on

working that paper also.

Roger replied that this is very much in line with the thinking in London and that in presenting this to Frank Carlucci I could say that this approach was acceptable to the Cabinet Office and No. 10 Downing Street.

I said I would get back to him if this were not the way we wished to proceed. We agreed to keep in touch.

Distribution:

FOR: Frank C. Carlucci	(CARLUCCI)
FOR: Colin L. Powell	(POWELL)
FOR: Robert B. Oakley	(OAKLEY)
FOR: D. Barry Kelly	(KELLYDB)
CC: Grant S. Green	(GREEN)
CC: W. Robert Pearson	(PEARSON)

cc: NSGSG --CPUA

NSWHC --CPUA

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31315	LETTER DUPLICATE OF #20389; LETTER - THATCHER TO REAGAN	2	6/26/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31316

J. UK

<DIST>SIT: FOB WHER_OUT VAX

<PRFC> IMMEDIATE<CLAS> ~~SECRET~~<OSRI> RUEHC #<DTG> 081540Z JUL 87
<ORIG>FM SECSTATE WASHDC
<SUBJ>SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

15

<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ STATE 208517

NODIS

FOLLOWING STATE 208517 DTG 08 JUL 87 SENT ACTION
LONDON BEING REPEATED TO YOU FOR INFO:

QUOTE ~~SECRET~~ STATE 208517

NODIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PHEL PTER UK SY

SUBJECT: PRESIDENTIAL LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE EMBASSY SHOULD DELIVER THE LETTER BELOW FROM
THE PRESIDENT TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER AS SOON AS
POSSIBLE. A SIGNED ORIGINAL WILL FOLLOW BY POUCH.

3. TEXT OF LETTER TO PRIME MINISTER THATCHER

BEGIN TEXT

JULY 7, 1987

DEAR MARGARET:

THANK YOU FOR YOUR JUNE 26 LETTER. FIRST, LET ME SAY
THAT I WAS DISMAYED THAT MY LETTER TO ASSAD AND THE
PLAN TO SEND A SPECIAL ENVOY TO DAMASCUS WERE LEAKED TO
THE NEWS MEDIA HERE. I REGRET THAT NEWS OF THE LETTER
AND ENVOY CAUSED PROBLEMS FOR YOU BEFORE THE EC MEETING.
I AM PLEASED TO SEE THAT WE HAVE REACHED AN AGREED
ASSESSMENT OF THE IMPORTANCE OF THE RECENT MOVES BY
PRESIDENT ASSAD AGAINST THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION.
ALSO, WE ARE, I BELIEVE, IN COMPLETE AGREEMENT THAT ANY
APPROACH TOWARDS SYRIA SHOULD BE CAUTIOUS, DELIBERATE
AND STEP-BY-STEP.

WE SEE VALUE IN PRESSURING ASSAD TO TAKE ADDITIONAL
ACTION AGAINST ABU NIDAL AND TO ABANDON HIS SUPPORT OF
TERRORISTS. BESIDES ABU NIDAL THERE ARE ADDITIONAL
AREAS WHERE WE THINK ASSAD SHOULD BE WILLING TO TAKE
MEASURES, E.G. AGAINST HIZBOLLAH AND IN CONTROLLING
BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. ASSAD HAS THE MEANS TO
TAKE ADDITIONAL STEPS AND WE WILL PRESS HIM TO DO SO,
MAKING IT CLEAR THAT A FUNDAMENTAL IMPROVEMENT IN OUR
BILATERAL RELATIONS WILL DEPEND ON HIS TAKING CONCRETE
ACTION.

THE ACTION HE TOOK AGAINST ABU NIDAL WAS THE FIRST
STEP. SYRIA CAN ALSO CONTRIBUTE MUCH TO RESTORING
ORDER IN LEBANON, TO MAKING A VIABLE PEACE PROCESS
POSSIBLE, AND TO AFFECTING THE SHAPE OF THE IRAN-IRAQ
WAR BY DISTANCING ITSELF FROM IRAN. WITHOUT ILLUSIONS
OR A FALSE SET OF EXPECTATIONS, WE'RE PREPARED TO TEST
ASSAD.

WE WILL CONTINUE TO CONSULT CLOSELY WITH YOU ON ASSAD'S
RESPONSES AND ON USEFUL NEXT STEPS FOLLOWING GENERAL
WALTERS' VISIT. PLEASE BE ASSURED THAT GENERAL WALTERS
WILL FOLLOW THE DELIBERATE, STEP-BY-STEP APPROACH THAT
YOU AND I ADVOCATE.

I LOOK FORWARD TO SEEING YOU AND DISCUSSING THE RESULTS
OF OUR APPROACH TO SYRIA IN MORE DEPTH LATER THIS MONTH.

Sincerely,
Ron

DECLASSIFIED

MLRR F08-071/3731316

BY LOI NARA DATE 8/4/08

<DIST> SIT: COM NSHDD VAX

19

J. UK

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUFHLD <DTG> 111133Z JUL 87
<ORIG> F/ AMEMBASSY LONDON
<TO> TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3672
INFO RUHAA/AEMBASSY AMMAN 3796
RUHAD/AEMBASSY BAGHDAD 1731
RUHEG/AEMBASSY CAIRO 5300
RUEHM/AEMBASSY DAMASCUS 2366
RUFHM/AEMBASSY MOSCOW 0592
RUFHR/AEMBASSY PARIS 0231
RUFHTV/AEMBASSY TEL AVIV 5430
RUFHJU/A CONSUL JERUSALFM 1031

31318

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S DISCUSSIONS AT THE FCO, JULY 10

<TEXT>
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 1472
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, XF, UK, IR, CY, IN
SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S DISCUSSIONS AT THE FCO, JULY 10

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
"BEGIN SUMMARY"

2. SUMMARY:
-- ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY MET WITH FCO DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY ALAN MUNRO AND OTHER OFFICIALS JULY 10 TO REVIEW HIS RECENT BILATERALS WITH THE SOVIETS IN GENEVA AND THE STATE OF PLAY ON THE MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS, SYRIA AND THE IRAN-IRAQ WAR. THE BRITISH SAW THE SOVIET POSTURE AS ENCOURAGING. THEY URGED THAT WASHINGTON MORE ACTIVELY SUPPORT AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE IN THE COMING WEEKS LEST U.S. SILENCE GIVE SHAMIR A VETO. MUNRO INDICATED THAT THATCHER WOULD BE MAKING THESE POINTS IN WASHINGTON.

-- MUNRO SAID THAT HMG BELIEVED THERE WAS MORE ROOM TO PRESSURE ASAD ON ABU NIDAL ACTIVITY IN THE BIQA' AND CONTINUED PRESENCE OF KHOULI AND OTHERS INVOLVED IN TERRORISM IN HIGH GOVERNMENT POSITIONS. HE IMPLIED THAT THE BRITISH BELIEVE IT IS TOO EARLY FOR THE U.S. AMBASSADOR TO RETURN TO DAMASCUS.

-- BOTH SIDES AGREED OUR MISSIONS IN NEW YORK WERE WORKING WELL TOGETHER ON THE GULF WAR RESOLUTION. THE BRITISH EXPRESSED CONCERN THAT IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST RESOLUTION

-- E.G. ROLE OF THE UNSYG, OBSERVERS FOR THE CEASEFIRE, A TIMEFRAME -- HAD NOT BEEN FULLY THOUGHT THROUGH. MUNRO OFFERED INFORMAL BILATERAL DISCUSSIONS IN NEW YORK ON THE SECOND RESOLUTION IN THE NEXT WEEK OR SO. END SUMMARY.

"END SUMMARY"

OPENING SOVIET POSITION ON THE PEACE PROCESS:

3. MURPHY EXPLAINED THAT POLYAKOV OPENED HIS FORMAL PRESENTATION WITH FAMILIAR THEMES -- A CONFERENCE MUST BE "FULL-FLEDGED," WELL PREPARED IN ADVANCE, AND INVOLVE THE PLO -- BUT WORKED HARD TO CREATE THE SENSE OF SOVIET FLEXIBILITY AND GENUINE INTEREST IN PEACE IN THE CORRIDORS.

4. MURPHY COUNTERED WITH THE FIVE POINTS WE CONSIDER KEY: DIRECT NEGOTIATIONS ARE THE WAY TO PEACE; A CONFERENCE MUST LEAD IMMEDIATELY TO FACE-TO-FACE NEGOTIATIONS; THE CONFERENCE

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 102-0713 #31318
BY LOI MARK DATE 8/4/08

CANNOT IMPOSE OR VETO A SETTLEMENT; 242/338 RENUNCIATION OF VIOLENCE MUST BE ACCEPTED BY ALL PARTICIPANTS; LEGITIMATE RIGHTS OF THE PALESTINIANS MUST BE ADDRESSED AND PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATIVES MUST BE INCLUDED IN THE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION. THIS PROVOKED LIVELY QUESTIONING BY AND DEBATE AMONG THE SOVIETS ON THE MEANING OF THESE POINTS. THE SOVIETS WANT TO SHOW SOME FLEXIBILITY:

5. MURPHY SAID THAT IN THE END THE SOVIETS AGREED TO MANY OF THE ESSENTIAL CONFERENCE MODALITIES, THE NEED FOR BILATERAL COMMITTEES, AND THE CONCEPT OF NO IMPOSITION/NO VETO. HOWEVER, REAL GAPS REMAINED ON THE ISSUES OF PALESTINIAN REPRESENTATION, HANDLING OF MULTILATERAL ISSUES, AND THE NEED TO AGREE IN ADVANCE ON THE TERMS AND EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL UNDER 242.

6. MURPHY SAID HE FLOATED AGAIN THE IDEA OF A PARALLEL CONFERENCE FOR MULTILATERAL ISSUES (E.G., ECONOMIC AND HUMANITARIAN ISSUES) BUT EMPHASIZED THAT THE CRITICAL POLITICAL DIMENSION OF THE PALESTINIAN PROBLEM WAS BILATERAL. MURPHY CONFIRMED TO THE BRITISH THAT THIS FORMULATION WAS DESIGNED TO EXCLUDE THE SYRIANS BUT NOT THE EGYPTIANS, WHO WOULD BE ATTACHED TO THE JORDANIAN/PALESTINIAN DELEGATION AT THE REQUEST OF THE PARTIES AFTER NEGOTIATIONS BEGAN. HE ALSO REPORTED THAT HE REMINDED THE SOVIETS THAT THE TERMS AND EXTENT OF WITHDRAWAL HAD TO BE NEGOTIATED.

7. POLYAKOV CONCLUDED, MURPHY SAID, THAT THE U.S. SHOULD WORK ON ISRAEL, JORDAN, AND EGYPT, AND THE SOVIETS WOULD WORK ON SYRIA AND THE PLO. AS IN EARLIER ENCOUNTERS, HE AGREED TO BE BACK IN TOUCH AFTER HIS GOVERNMENT HAD A CHANCE TO REFLECT ON THESE DISCUSSIONS.

~~S E C R E T~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 14725
EXDIS

F.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: P, RL, XF, UK, IR, SY, IN

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S DISCUSSIONS AT SOVIET PERCEPTIONS OF THE U.S.

POSITION ON INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE:

8. MUNRO WONDERED WHETHER THE SOVIETS QUESTIONED U.S. SUPPORT FOR A CONFERENCE. HE WAS CONCERNED THAT THE SOVIETS WOULD BE LESS FLEXIBLE IF THEY SENSED THE U.S. WAS NOT YET SERIOUS. CLUVERIUS REPLIED THAT THEY SEEMED TO ASSUME OUR POSITION HAD EVOLVED TOWARD SUPPORT FOR A CONFERENCE.

SOVIET OBJECTIVES:

9. MURPHY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS DEFINITELY WANTED TO APPEAR RESPONSIBLE AND TO GET ENGAGED IN THE PEACE PROCESS. SPECIFICALLY, THEY SEEMED MOST CONCERNED WITH BRINGING BACK FROM GENEVA SOMETHING TANGIBLE FOR THE PLO. THEY HELD NO PARTICULAR BRIEF FOR SYRIA. WHEN FACED WITH THE PRAGMATIC U.S. VIEW THAT THE KEY PLAYER ISRAEL WOULD NOT COME TO A CONFERENCE WITH THE PLO AT THE TABLE, THE SOVIETS FINALLY ADMITTED THEY COULD LIVE WITH WHATEVER THE PALESTINIANS COULD. ONE FORMULATION THEY SUGGESTED WAS THAT THE PLO SET UP AN AGENT TO DESIGNATE PALESTINIANS FOR THE JOINT DELEGATION (SIMILAR TO THE U.S. "HANG-BACK" OPTION).

10. MURPHY NOTED HE WAS STRUCK BY THE EVOLUTION OF THE STYLE OF POLYAKOV AND HIS TEAM OVER THE LAST TWO YEARS, WITH THIS GENEVA SESSION BEING THE MOST ENGAGING. THERE APPEARED TO BE UNREHEARSED GIVE AND TAKE AMONG THE SOVIETS, MUCH OF WHICH WAS

GENERATED BY ZOTOV, WHO NOW WORKED FOR DOBRYNIN IN MOSCOW. THE BRITISH NOTED THAT ZOTOV PLAYED A SIMILAR ROLE DURING THEIR RECENT MIDDLE EAST BILATERALS IN MOSCOW.

SOVIET VIEWS ON ISRAEL:

11. AMBASSADOR CLUVERIUS REPORTED THAT THE SOVIETS LISTENED WITH INTEREST TO HIS BRIEFING ON INTERNAL ISRAELI POLITICS, BUT RESISTED THE CONCLUSION THAT THE SOVIETS MUST TAKE RESPONSIBILITY FOR IMPROVING THEIR IMAGE IN ISRAEL. NONETHELESS, POLYAKOV ADMITTED THE SOVIETS HAD DECIDED TO OPEN A REGULAR POLITICAL DIALOGUE WITH ISRAEL. MURPHY AND MUNRO AGREED THAT JEWISH IMMIGRATION WAS STILL KEY TO ISRAELI ATTITUDES TOWARD THE SOVIETS. MURPHY NOTED THAT THIS TIME POLYAKOV REFRAINED FROM DENYING THAT THE IMMIGRATION ISSUE WAS OUR CONCERN.

OUTSIDE PERCEPTIONS OF THE US-SOVIET TALKS:

12. MUNRO NOTED HUSSEIN FEARED THAT THE U.S. WAS GIVING THE SOVIETS TOO MUCH DETAIL AND WOULD LIKELY CHIDE US ABOUT IT. MURPHY SAID HE WOULD REASSURE HUSSEIN, AND INDICATED THAT HE HAD ALREADY TOLD HUNAPAK THAT THERE WAS NO MEETING OF THE MINDS WITH THE SOVIETS YET.

STATE OF PLAY IN THE REGION:

13. MUNRO, WHO HAD JUST RETURNED FROM A TRIP TO ISRAEL, EGYPT AND JORDAN, SAID THAT HE THOUGHT PERES'S PROBLEMS WERE LIKELY TO INCREASE FAILING MORE PUBLIC U.S. SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. SHAMIR, HE CONTINUED, MIGHT GO ALONG WITH A CONFERENCE IF HE PERCEIVED AN ELECTORAL DRIFT TOWARD PERES. HE INDICATED THAT THATCHER WAS LIKELY TO PRESS FOR SUCH SUPPORT NEXT WEEK IN WASHINGTON.

14. MURPHY REPLIED THAT SHAMIR DID NOT FEEL A THREAT FROM PERES AT THIS POINT AND WAS STILL CONVINCED THAT A CONFERENCE WAS LETHAL FOR ISRAEL. WHILE THE ISRAELI POLITICAL SYSTEM COULD STILL SAVE PERES, THIS WOULD REQUIRE, AS ABBA EBAN HAD SAID RECENTLY, LAROR SPENDING MORE TIME IN THE KNESSET CAFETERIA AND LESS TIME TOURING EUROPE.

SOVIET ROLE IN THE REGION :

15. MUNRO AND FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY DAVID MIERS
SECRET SECTION 03 OF 04 LONDON 14728
EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PRL, XF, UK, IR, SY, IN

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S DISCUSSIONS AT OUTLINED BRITISH FEARS THAT WESTERN (SPECIFICALLY U.S.) INACTION IN THE COMING MONTHS COULD GIVE THE SOVIETS MORE ROOM FOR MANUEVER AND ALLOW THEM TO SHIFT THE BLAME FOR A STALEMATE TO THE WEST. MURPHY AGREED THAT THE SOVIET ROLE, PARTICULARLY AS THE SUPPORTER OF A RENEWED EFFORT FOR ARAB UNITY, WAS TROUBLING. HOWEVER, COUNTERING THE SOVIETS, AND CO-OPTING SHAMIR ON THE CONFERENCE ISSUE, REQUIRED A PACKAGE WHICH INCLUDED SOVIET/JORDANIAN/EGYPTIAN/U.S./EUROPEAN ELEMENTS. U.S. ACTION ALONE WOULD NOT BE SUFFICIENT.

16. THE BRITISH AGREED BUT STRESSED AGAIN WASHINGTON'S KEY ROLE IN PROMOTING SUCH A PACKAGE AND DEPRIVING SHAMIR OF A VETO OVER A CONFERENCE.

17. MURPHY ADDED THAT DESPITE ALL THE TALK OF FLEXIBILITY, IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT FOR THE SOVIETS TO CHANGE LONG-HELD POSITIONS, ESPECIALLY UNDER U.S. PRESSURE. IF THE UK, FRANCE

AND OTHER EUROPEANS JOINED THE FRAY, THE SOVIETS MIGHT FIND IT EASIER TO MOVE. MUNRO AGREED AND NOTED THAT THE UK HAD, IN ADDITION TO ITS OWN EFFORTS, URGED HUSSEIN TO ENGAGE THE SOVIETS DIRECTLY.

18. IN CONCLUSION, MUNRO SAID THE CURRENT SOVIET POSTURE AS DEMONSTRATED IN THE GENEVA ROUND SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE U.S. TO LEAN FORWARD ON THE INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE BEFORE THE U.S. ELECTION OR OTHER UNPREDICTABLE EVENTS CAUSED THE CURRENT WINDOW OF OPPORTUNITY TO CLOSE. HE SAID THATCHER PLANNED TO CARRY THAT MESSAGE TO WASHINGTON NEXT WEEK.

US-SYRIA RELATIONS:

19. MUNRO EXPRESSED APPRECIATION FOR THE THOROUGH READ-OUT ON THE WALTERS/ASAD MEETING WHICH THE BRITISH HAD RECEIVED IN WASHINGTON. HE WONDERED WHAT WE INTENDED TO DO NEXT. MURPHY REPLIED THAT NO DECISION HAD BEEN MADE. THERE WAS UNLIKELY TO BE ANOTHER CLEAR TRIGGER FOR RETURNING OUR AMBASSADOR LIKE THE CLOSURE OF ARU NIDAL OFFICES. IN ADDITION, WHILE TERRORISM REMAINS A POLICY OPTION FOR SYRIA, THERE HAD BEEN NO INCIDENTS FOR A YEAR. THIRD, OUR CHARGE IN DAMASCUS HAS NO ACCESS TO ASAD OR KHADDAM. ALL THIS ARGUED, MURPHY CONCLUDED, FOR THE RETURN OF OUR AMBASSADOR. MUNRO DISAGREED, INSISTING THERE WAS STILL ROOM FOR PRESSURE ON SYRIA TO CLOSE ARU NIDAL CAMPS IN THE 'IRA' AND TO DISMISS KHOULI. HE PREDICTED, NONETHELESS, THAT THE EC WOULD LIFT RESTRICTIONS ON HIGH-LEVEL VISITS TO SYRIA AT THE JULY 13 FOREIGN MINISTERS MEETING.

SYRIAN-IRAQI RELATIONS:

20. MUNRO REPORTED THAT ACCORDING TO ZAID RIFAI, HUSSEIN'S MAJOR GOAL WHILE THE PEACE PROCESS IS ON HOLD IS TO DETACH SYRIA FROM IRAN AND PROMOTE A SYRIA-IRAQ RAPPROCHEMENT. WHILE SADAM HAS REFUSED ASAD'S REQUEST FOR UNION AND A DEFENSE TREATY, THE DIALOGUE CONTINUES.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR:

21. MURPHY AND MUNRO REVIEWED THE STATE OF PLAY AT THE UN. THE BRITISH SUGGESTED THAT MORE THOUGHT NEEDED TO BE GIVEN TO THE ROLE OF THE UNSYG AFTER THE FIRST RESOLUTION, THE TIME-FRAME FOR IMPLEMENTATION OF THE FIRST RESOLUTION, HOW IMPLEMENTATION WOULD BE MONITORED, AND THE ACTUAL TEXT OF THE SECOND RESOLUTION. MUNRO SAID THE BRITISH WOULD BE READY TO DISCUSS LANGUAGE ON A SECOND RESOLUTION WITH THE U.S. AS SOON AS HMG COMPLETED ITS INTERNAL REVIEW ON ENABLING MEASURES FOR AN ARMS EMBARGO. HE THOUGHT A BILATERAL DISCUSSION SHOULD PRECEDE BROADER CONSULTATIONS. MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT HEAD YOUNG COMMENTED THAT WHILE THERE WAS NO CHANCE THAT IRAN WOULD ACCEPT THE RESOLUTION, THEY MIGHT GIVE A QUALIFIED REJECTION.

SOVIET VIEWS ON THE UN RESOLUTION:

22. MURPHY SAID THAT THE SOVIETS WERE COMMITTED TO THE FIRST RESOLUTION BUT SKEPTICAL OF SUPPORT FOR THE SECOND. THEY DID NOT COMMIT SHEVARDNADZE TO APPEARING IN NEW YORK FOR EITHER

S E C R E T SECTION 04 OF 04 LONDON 1472

EXDIS

E.O. 12354: DECLASS: OADR

TAES: P, R, L, X, F, U, K, I, R, S, Y, I, N

SUBJECT: ASSISTANT SECRETARY MURPHY'S DISCUSSIONS AT RESOLUTION, BUT SUGGESTED THAT IT WOULD MAKE MORE SENSE FOR FOREIGN MINISTERS TO GATHER FOR THE SECOND RESOLUTION.

LOWERING THE IRAQI AND KUWAITI PROFILE IN THE GULF:

23. MUNRO SAID THAT THATCHER HAD PREVIEWED IN HER LATEST LETTER TO THE PRESIDENT HER INTEREST IN FINDING WAYS TO CONVINCING IRAQ AND KUWAIT TO BE LESS PROVOCATIVE TOWARD IRAN. HE SUGGESTED THAT ADOPTION OF THE FIRST RESOLUTION MIGHT BE FOLLOWED BY A LOW-KEY APPROACH TO IRAQ TO STAND DOWN ON ATTACKS AGAINST SHIPPING AND TO KUWAIT TO DECREASE ITS LOGISTICAL SUPPORT FOR IRAQ, CUTTING BACK ON IRAQI OVERFLIGHTS AND PUTTING MORE SUPPLIES THROUGH AQABA. THIS WOULD HAVE TO BE DONE DELICATELY, PERHAPS THROUGH THE GCC. KUWAIT MIGHT CONSIDER OPENING A BACK CHANNEL TO IRAN ON SHIPPING AS THE SAUDIS HAD DONE. IN ANY CASE, MUNRO ADDED, THE IRAQI AIR FORCE WAS GOING TO HAVE A TOUGHER TIME IN THE GULF AGAINST ANTI-AIRCRAFT WEAPONS THE IRANIS CAPTURED FROM THEM IN FAO.

24. MURPHY REPLIED THAT AN INDIRECT APPROACH FROM THE SAUDIS OR GCC MIGHT BE DIFFICULT TO MANAGE AND THAT THESE SUGGESTIONS SHOULD BE MADE DIRECTLY IN BAGHDAD AND KUWAIT. WHILE IT WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO CONVINCING THE IRAQIS TO GIVE UP THEIR AIR ATTACKS, THEY MIGHT BE PERSUADED TO STAND DOWN FOR A TIME IN RESPONSE TO THE FIRST UN RESOLUTION WHILE THE UNSYG WAS IN ACTION.

25. MUNRO WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY SIR DAVID MEERS, NEAR EAST NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT HEAD ALAN GOULTY AND HIS DEPUTY STUART LANGE, MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT HEAD ROB YOUNG, AND IRAN DESK OFFICER PETER COLLECOTT. WITH MURPHY WERE AMBASSADOR WAT CLUVERIUS, DAN FRIED OF EUR/SOV, AND EMBASSY OFFICER ROBIN RAPHEL.

26. AMBASSADOR MURPHY DEPARTED LONDON BEFORE CLEARING THIS MESSAGE.

27. MOSCOW MINIMIZE CONSIDERED.
PRICE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 04<SSN> 472<TOR> 870711120649 MSG000174312409
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 04<SSN> 472<TOR> 870711120839 MSG000174312518
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<SECT>SECTION: 04 OF 04<SSN> 472<TOR> 870711121144 MSG000174312703

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

July 20, 1987

12

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH *FWE*
NELSON C. LEDSKY *NCL*

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation
President's Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher
July 17, 1987

Attached for your review and approval is a Memorandum of Conversation from the President's meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on July 17, 1987, at the White House.

RECOMMENDATION

Following your review of the Memorandum of Conversation, that you authorize Grant Green to forward it to State and Defense.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

Tab I Memo to State & Defense
Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

cc: Peter Rodman
Bob Linhard
Bob Oakley
Steve Danzansky
Don Mahley
Ted McNamara

ah

12/24/87

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II
90746

~~UNCLASSIFIED WITH
SECRET ATTACHMENT~~

alb 12/26/06

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. MELVYN LEVITSKY
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COL. WILLIAM M. MATZ
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

SUBJECT: Memorandum of Conversation
President's Meeting with Prime Minister Thatcher
July 17, 1987 (U)

Attached is the Memorandum of Conversation from the President's
meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher on July 17, 1987,
at the White House. (U)

GRANT S. GREEN, JR.
Executive Secretary

Attachment

Tab A Memorandum of Conversation

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SYSTEM II
90746

31319

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT: Meeting with Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom

PARTICIPANTS: The President
The Vice President
Secretary of State George P. Shultz
Secretary of Defense Caspar W. Weinberger
Howard Baker, Chief of Staff
Frank C. Carlucci, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs
Ambassador Charles H. Price
Rozanne Ridgway, Assistant Secretary of State
Nelson C. Ledsky, NSC

Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher
Ambassador Antony Acland
Private Secretary C. D. Powell

DATE, TIME July 17, 1987, 11:30 a.m. - 1:20 p.m.
AND PLACE: Oval Office and Old Family Dining Room

(The President and Prime Minister Thatcher first met for 45 minutes with notetakers. The discussion then continued at lunch.) (U)

The President greeted Mrs. Thatcher in the Oval Office and the two walked outside for a photo opportunity. During the picture-taking, the President thanked Mrs. Thatcher for her statements on television that morning. He also explained why he had decided not to answer press questions shouted at him during photo opportunities, but to wait to make a detailed statement when the Irangate hearings were completed. (U)

The two returned to the Oval Office and began to talk about the Arab - Israeli peace process. The President noted that the Secretary of State had had a prior meeting with Mrs. Thatcher, and had wanted to suggest a change in the Prime Minister's departure statement. (S)

Mrs. Thatcher acknowledged her discussion with Secretary Shultz earlier in the morning. She said she had shown the Secretary her draft departure statement which contained a lengthy reference to the idea of an international conference on the Middle East. (S)

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Declassify: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS FDZ-071 #31319

LOJ NARA, Date 8/4/88

The President at this point handed Mrs. Thatcher the text of Secretary Shultz' suggested revision for this section of the departure statement. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher read the paragraph, and proclaimed it a reasonable compromise. She called it a skillful piece of drafting and said she would incorporate it in its entirety in her departure statement. (U)

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the President said he agreed in general and that he would be as helpful as possible in the months ahead. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher thanked the President.

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Mr. Powell then handed to Mrs. Thatcher a further suggested revision in the paragraph on the Arab-Israeli international conference, for insertion in her departure statement. Mrs. Thatcher gave this new version to the President who suggested the matter be reviewed again at the luncheon. The two then proceeded together upstairs for lunch, joining the other 10 guests who were already in the dining room. (S)

At the start of the lunch, a slight revision of the paragraph on the Middle East, prepared by Secretary Shultz, was shown to Mrs. Thatcher. She read it quickly, and agreed to its content. The text of the paragraph, which was later used by Mrs. Thatcher in her departure statement, read as follows:

"Second, we discussed the prospect for peace in the Middle East. We agreed -- and here, Mr. President, I use words which we both formally endorsed -- we agreed that direct negotiations between the parties are the only practical way to proceed. We also explored how an international conference might contribute to bringing about such negotiations. Clearly, it would not have the right to impose solutions or to veto agreements reached by the parties. We must continue to make progress in the peace process and commit ourselves to work for that." (U)

As Mrs. Thatcher looked over the statement, the President welcomed her formally to Washington and told a joke about how the British might end their driving on the right (wrong) side of the road. Mrs. Thatcher chuckled, and said real problems of this sort would arise when construction of a tunnel under the English Channel began. The only solution may be to build two tunnels. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher went on to say she had been shocked by the questions about arms control shouted by the press during the photo opportunity. Why was the press more concerned by the timing of an INF agreement and a Summit than by the contents of the document? Much more must be done, she insisted, to educate our publics on the importance of getting the details right. We must be careful and that means proceeding slowly and cautiously. The press and public would rightfully blame us if we entered into an agreement that had serious faults. (U)

Mr. Carlucci noted in this connection that the Soviet position on verification was very weak. (S)

The President then recalled the phrase he had learned in Russian: Trust but verify. (U)

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The President said he had fantasized many times about what he might show the Soviet leader when he visits Washington, and what Gorbachev's reactions might be. He assumed Gorbachev would be

surprised beyond belief. He recalled in this connection that a Soviet fighter pilot defected to the West several years ago and that a fascinating biography had been written about the pilot, containing a long flashback of the young Russian's boyhood. The point the President said he wanted to make was that the defector, even when taken to a US supermarket, could not believe that such an institution existed. Nor could he accept that officers and enlisted men in the US Army treated each other as friends and colleagues, with a measure of respect for one another. This was contrary to the pilot's experience in the Soviet military. The young Soviet pilot also, for example, had never driven a car.

(S)

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Mrs. Thatcher said that not enough has been done to explain these difficulties to our own people. (U)

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tariffs. The President recalled that he had been a Democrat in the 1930's, and it was the Republicans who were then for tariffs and restrictive trade legislation. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher said she had looked at the House and Senate bills. Both seemed bad. (U)

Howard Baker remarked that both bills had been butchered with amendments dealing with non-trade subjects. This was a sign that Congress recognized that the President would veto the bills, and that they could get a free ride by attaching personal pet projects to the pending legislation. (U)

Secretary Weinberger noted two especially troublesome amendments which prevented SDI contracts from being given to our Allies abroad. (U)

Mr. Carlucci observed that restrictive trade legislation was being considered at the very moment our trade deficit was being turned around. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher asked whether this was clearly evident, and the President affirmed that the trend was in a positive direction. Secretary Weinberger added that the total budget deficit was going down as well, but that nobody in Congress would acknowledge this fact. (U)

The conversation then turned to the press. Mrs. Thatcher said that she found the questioners she faced on several talk shows this morning very nervy. Some insisted the President knew everything and had made bad decisions, and others that he was so detached that he made too few decisions. (U)

The President said that he recalled a speech he gave at Albert Hall in London some years ago when he was Governor of California. As was the custom, each participant was given a box lunch. Inside his box was a lamb chop and some fruit -- but no utensils. The President said he picked up his lamb chop with his fingers and began to eat. The press immediately began snapping pictures and the next morning under his photograph in the newspapers was the suggestion that he used his fingers because he didn't know which fork to employ. One couldn't win with the press. Lyndon Johnson often suggested to friends that if he were seen walking across the Potomac River, the Washington press would criticize him the next morning for not knowing how to swim. (U)

Mrs. Thatcher said that she has to stand up every Tuesday and Thursday in Parliament to answer questions from the opposition. This made one tough enough to stand up to almost anything. She had already done three television shows that morning, and was doing a fourth this afternoon. It was for Face the Nation, which would be shown on Sunday. (U)

The President ended the lunch with two jokes from what he said were from his collection of current, authentic Soviet humor. The first concerned a Soviet citizen, who after waiting years to buy a car, presented his money to a Soviet official. The official told him to come back in 10 years exactly -- July 17, 1997 -- to pick up his car. The Soviet citizen asked if he should return in the morning or afternoon. The official seemed annoyed and asked what difference did it make. The citizen replied simply: the plumber is coming that morning. (U)

The second story concerned Gorbachev's efforts to catch and punish all those caught speeding on the highway. Soon after a measure to this effect went into law, Gorbachev found himself outside Moscow and running late for a meeting. He thereupon told his driver to get in the back of the car so that he could drive. He sped down the road where two policemen with motorcycles were waiting. One gave chase, stopped the car, and in a minute or two turned around and returned to where the second policeman was waiting. The second policeman asked the first if he had written a ticket or arrested the driver. The first policeman replied negatively. The second policeman asked why not. The first policeman's explanation for inaction was that the person in the car was very important. The second policeman inquired who this important person was. The first policeman said: I don't know, but his driver was Gorbachev. (U)

The meeting ended on this note and the President and Prime Minister Thatcher walked out to the diplomatic entrance to deliver their departure statements.

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

db

12/26/06

July 21, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR FRANK C. CARLUCCI
COLIN L. POWELL

FROM: FRITZ W. ERMARTH
NELSON C. LEDSKY

SUBJECT: Shultz-Thatcher Meeting

Attached is an advance copy of a draft cable describing the meeting on July 17 between Prime Minister Thatcher and Secretary Shultz. The draft is winding its way to the seventh floor at State and should be over her officially sometime late this afternoon or tomorrow.

Attachment

Tab A Cable

cc: Fritz Ermarth
Tom McNamara
Bob Oakley
Peter Rodman
Alison Rosenberg

31321

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opt.
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1 (R)

~~SECRET~~

SPE

DR: EUR/NE:FCOOPER:LP {1159T}

DA 07/17/87 EXT. 75687

API S: SECRETARY

CLE EUR:RLRIDGWAY
S/S:

EUR:MJWILKINSON
S/S-0:

DES

AC IMMEDIATE LONDON

INF PRIORITY BONN, MOSCOW PRIORITY, TEL AVIV PRIORITY, AMMAN
PRIORITY, USNATO PRIORITY, USUN PRIORITY, NST GENEVA PRIORITY,

SPE

CA EXDIS

E.E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

T TAGS: PARM, UK, US, JO, IS, GE, UR, PREL, XF, XJ, SF

S SUBJECT: MEETING BETWEEN UK PRIME MINISTER THATCHER
AND SECRETARY SHULTZ, JULY 17, 1987

1. ~~{~~ ENTIRE TEXT}.

2. SUMMARY: SECRETARY SHULTZ AND PRIME MINISTER THATCHER MET FOR 45-MINUTES JULY 17 AT THE BRITISH EMBASSY. AFTER A SHORT INTRODUCTORY DISCUSSION IN WHICH PRIME MINISTER THATCHER EXPRESSED SOME WONDERMENT AND DISMAY OVER MEDIA AND CONGRESSIONAL HANDLING OF THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR, THE MEETING CONCENTRATED LARGELY ON TWO AREAS: ARMS CONTROL WITH PARTICULAR REFERENCE TO INF/SRINF, AND THE MIDDLE EAST WITH A FOCUS PRIMARILY ON THE PEACE PROCESS AND POSSIBILITIES FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. MRS. THATCHER PROPOSED THAT SHE AND PRESIDENT REAGAN AGREE TO A COMMON POSITION ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR ANNOUNCEMENT DURING HER WASHINGTON VISIT, HANDING THE SECRETARY SOME SUGGESTED LANGUAGE. THE SECRETARY SAID HE WOULD LOOK AT THE DRAFT TO SEE WHETHER A MUTUALLY AGREED FORMULATION MIGHT BE POSSIBLE. THERE WAS A BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA WITH MRS. THATCHER EXPRESSING HOPE THAT

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DECLASSIFIED

NLRRF02-071/3#31321

BY KML NARA DATE 4/10/12

~~SECRET~~

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THE US WOULD TAKE NO STEPS THAT MIGHT COMPLICATE THE NEXT MEETING OF THE COMMONWEALTH IN VANCOUVER IN SEPTEMBER. THE SECRETARY IN TURN EXPRESSED HIS HOPE THAT MRS. THATCHER DURING HER WASHINGTON VISIT WOULD MAKE A PUBLIC ENDORSEMENT OF SUPPORT FOR THE FRONTLINE STATES, PARTICULARLY FOR MOZAMBIQUE AND CHISSANO. THE SECRETARY WAS ACCOMPANIED IN THE MEETING BY ASSISTANT SECRETARY RIDGWAY, AMBASSADOR PRICE, AND EUR/NE OFFICE DIRECTOR COOPER {NOTETAKER}. THE PRIME MINISTER WAS JOINED BY AMBASSADOR ACLAND AND CHARLES POWELL FROM HER OFFICE. END SUMMARY.

3. THE PRIME MINISTER BEGAN BY EXPRESSING CONSTERNATION AND DISMAY OVER THE WAY THAT CONGRESS IS HANDLING THE IRAN/CONTRA AFFAIR AND ITS TREATMENT BY THE US MEDIA. SHE OBSERVED THAT THE PRESIDENT'S CRITICS APPEAR TO BE RUNNING TWO OR THREE HORSES IN DIFFERENT DIRECTIONS. THEY ACCUSE THE PRESIDENT OF NOT BEING IN CONTROL BECAUSE HE USES NOTES. "I USE NOTES MYSELF" SHE OBSERVED. AT THE SAME TIME, THEY IGNORE THE PRESIDENT'S STRONG LEADERSHIP AND CLEAR DECISIONS ON THE PERSIAN GULF AND SOUTH KOREA, TO NAME TWO RECENT EXAMPLES. OBSERVING THAT GORBACHEV MUST BE LAUGHING AT THE US ANTICS, SHE SAID SHE HAD LECTURED THE PRESS THAT IT CANNOT USE ITS FREEDOM ONLY TO TEAR DOWN AND TO DESTROY. SHE SAID SHE HAD USED HER INTERVIEWS IN WASHINGTON TO SUPPORT THE PRESIDENT AND TO EMPHASIZE THE IMPORTANCE TO THE WESTERN WORLD OF CONTINUED STRONG US LEADERSHIP.

4. MRS. THATCHER SAID THAT THE MEDIA HAD ALSO FREQUENTLY ASKED HER WHY THE RUSSIANS ARE DRAGGING THEIR FEET ON AN INF/SRINF AGREEMENT. SHE SAID THAT IN HER VIEW THE ANSWER IS OBVIOUS: GORBACHEV VERY MUCH WANTS AN AGREEMENT, BUT HE HAS TO BE VERY CAREFUL. HE MUST DO TWO THINGS; HE HAS TO CHANNEL MORE MONEY INTO THE DOMESTIC ECONOMY, MEANING LESS MONEY FOR THE MILITARY; AT THE SAME TIME, HOWEVER, HE HAS TO SOMEHOW KEEP THE MILITARY WITH HIM.

5. SECRETARY SHULTZ OBSERVED THAT THE SOVIET PAUSE IS NOT UNEXPECTED. THEY HAVE DONE IT BEFORE ON OCCASIONS WHEN THEY THINK THEY HAVE SOMETHING THAT WE WANT. GORBACHEV WANTS TO LET US WRIGGLE FOR A WHILE. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE BELIEVES THE SOVIETS WILL EVENTUALLY COME AROUND. HE SAID THAT THE SOVIETS UNDERSTAND THEY MUST REACH AN AGREEMENT WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN, A CONSERVATIVE, IF THEY ARE TO HAVE ANY

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POSSIBILITY OF SUCCESSFUL ARMS CONTROL NEGOTIATIONS WITH A SUCCESSOR TO REAGAN WHO WILL NOT ENJOY REAGAN'S SUPPORT AMONG CONSERVATIVES.

6. MRS. THATCHER ASKED HOW STRONGLY THE US INTENDS TO PRESS FOR GLOBAL ELIMINATION OF LRINF, OBSERVING HOW GLOBAL ZERO WOULD GREATLY FACILITATE VERIFICATION. SECRETARY SHULTZ RESPONDED THAT IN REYKJAVIK WE MUTUALLY ACCEPTED LEVELS OF 100 LRINF WARHEADS OUTSIDE OF EUROPE, BUT WE ARE STILL PUSHING HARD FOR ZERO. HE SAID THAT HE IS HOPEFUL THE SOVIETS WILL ACCEPT GLOBAL ZERO. ON SRINF GORBACHEV IN APRIL OFFERED GLOBAL ZERO AND HE EXPECTS THAT THE FORMAL SOVIET POSITION WILL EVENTUALLY REFLECT THAT.

7. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT GORBACHEV IS PRESSING US ON THE GERMAN MISSILES; GORBACHEV MAY GO ALONG WITH UNMODERNIZED PERSHING 1-AS, BUT THAT WOULD MEAN THE GERMAN MISSILES WOULD HAVE A VERY LOW LEVEL OF EFFECTIVENESS BY THE EARLY 1990S.

8. THE PRIME MINISTER OBSERVED THAT WHILE THE PERSHING 1-A IS NOT STRICTLY SPEAKING A THIRD COUNTRY MISSILE SYSTEM LIKE THE BRITISH SYSTEMS, IT IS A DUAL-KEY SYSTEM AND DOES NOT BELONG IN THE NEGOTIATIONS. SHE EXPRESSED HORROR THAT THE GERMANS ARE NOT INSISTING ON THE RIGHT TO MODERNIZE THE PERSHING 1-AS. SHE SAID THAT SHE AND CHANCELLOR KOHL WOULD HAVE PREFERRED NOT GOING TO ZERO ON INF, BUT THEY BOTH UNDERSTAND THAT WE SOLD THE ZERO CONCEPT TO OUR PUBLICS AND WE CANNOT NOW BACK AWAY. THE SECRETARY POINTED OUT THAT HE HAD TOLD THE ALLIANCE IN BRUSSELS THAT ANOTHER OPTION WOULD BE TO MATCH SOVIET SRINF DEPLOYMENTS AT SOME LEVEL BUT THAT THE RIGHT TO MATCH MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A WILLINGNESS TO DEPLOY. HE AND THE PRIME MINISTER AGREED THAT DEPLOYMENT OF SRINF WOULD NOT BE ACCEPTABLE TO THE EUROPEAN PUBLIC.

9. PRIME MINISTER THATCHER SAID THAT SHE REMAINS FEARFUL OF SOVIET SALAMI TACTICS ON NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND IS CONCERNED OVER THE CREDIBILITY OF THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY. SHE EXPRESSED STRONGLY THE VIEW THAT AN INF AGREEMENT MUST BE FOLLOWED BY AN INCREASE OF OTHER AMERICAN NUCLEAR WEAPONS IN EUROPE. SHE REFERRED TO A GREATER NUMBER OF SLBMS DEDICATED TO SACEUR AND THE STATIONING OF MORE F-111S IN CONTINENTAL EUROPE.

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10. MRS. THATCHER ASSERTED THAT SOVIET TACTICS REMAIN TO SEPARATE THE US FROM EUROPE AND TO GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS REMOVED FROM EUROPE. SOVIET CONVENTIONAL WEAPONRY IS BECOMING EXTREMELY GOOD. SHE SAID SHE HAS RECENTLY COMPLETED A REVIEW OF BRITISH CONVENTIONAL WEAPONS, AND THEY ALL NEED TO BE UPDATED BECAUSE OF EXTREMELY RAPID SOVIET MODERNIZATION. SHE ALSO EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT SOVIET CHEMICAL WEAPON SUPERIORITY AND THE DIFFICULTY OF VERIFYING WHETHER THE SOVIETS WOULD BE IN COMPLIANCE WITH A BAN ON CHEMICAL WEAPONS PRODUCTION.

11. SHE CONCLUDED HER DISCUSSION OF ARMS CONTROL AND EAST/WEST RELATIONS BY REITERATING CONCERN THAT THE SOVIET STRATEGY IS TO GET NUCLEAR WEAPONS OUT OF EUROPE AND TO UNDERMINE THE FLEXIBLE RESPONSE STRATEGY, ALL THE WHILE MODERNIZING ITS CONVENTIONAL CAPABILITIES. SHE SAID THAT A WESTERN NUCLEAR CAPABILITY IS ESSENTIAL TO DEFENSE AND WE HAVE TO BE CAREFUL NOT TO HAVE OUR NUCLEAR PRESENCE ERODED. THEREFORE, WE NEED A CLEAR FIREBREAK BETWEEN SRINF AND ANY FURTHER NEGOTIATIONS ON SHORTER RANGE SYSTEMS. SECRETARY SHULTZ AGREED BUT UNDERScoreD THE NEED TO STAY WITH THE WORDING ON SNF WORKED OUT IN THE REYKJAVIK NAC. HE SAID THAT WE ALL UNDERSTAND THERE WILL BE NO NEGOTIATIONS ON SNF BUT WE NEEDED TO KEEP THE FORMULA WHICH THE GERMANS COULD ACCEPT. MRS. THATCHER SAID THAT THE REYKJAVIK FORMULA DID NOT CONSTITUTE AN EFFECTIVE FIREBREAK, BUT AGREED TO STICK WITH THE WORDING WORKED OUT AT THE REYKJAVIK NAC.

12. MRS. THATCHER THEN TURNED THE CONVERSATION TO THE MIDDLE EAST, EXPRESSING CONCERN ABOUT DEVELOPMENTS THERE. SHE REGRETTED THAT THERE HAD BEEN NO MAJOR WESTERN INITIATIVE SINCE THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS; NOTED THAT PRESIDENT REAGAN'S 1982 SPEECH HAD BEEN SUPERB BUT HAD BEEN REJECTED BY BEGIN; CHARACTERIZED PERES AND HUSSEIN AS TWO POSITIVE FIGURES WHO ARE DOING EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO TRY TO ADVANCE THE PEACE PROCESS AND WHO DESERVE OUR SUPPORT; AND EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT GROWING SOVIET EFFORTS TO INCREASE THEIR INFLUENCE AMONG THE ARAB STATES. SHE ASKED RHETORICALLY WHETHER IT WAS NOT TIMELY TO MOVE FORWARD BY PROMOTING AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WHICH COULD PROVIDE A "FRAMEWORK" WITHIN WHICH THE TWO PARTIES COULD WORK AND TALK. SHE CITED THE REASONABLE AND COOPERATIVE ROLE OF THE SOVIET UNION IN THE UN ON THE IRAN/IRAQ ISSUE AS ONE HOPEFUL SIGN THAT THE SOVIETS

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MIGHT BEHAVE RESPONSIBLY IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST.

13. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID HE COULD AGREE WITH EVERYTHING THAT THE PRIME MINISTER HAD SAID BUT THAT NEVERTHELESS IT STILL LEADS TO THE QUESTION OF HOW TO PROCEED. HE THEN PROCEEDED TO LAY OUT HIS ANALYSIS OF KEY FACTORS AFFECTING PROSPECTS FOR A MIDDLE EASTERN PEACE PROCESS, WITH PARTICULAR EMPHASIS ON THE ISRAELI SIDE OF THE EQUATION. HE SAID THE KEY IS THAT THERE MUST BE BROAD SUPPORT WITHIN ISRAEL FOR THE PROCESS AND FOR THE SPECIFIC IDEA OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. THAT BROAD SUPPORT MUST INCLUDE LIKUD SUPPORT, AT LEAST IN PART, AS WAS THE CASE IN THE CAMP DAVID ACCORDS AND THE SINAI SETTLEMENT. THEREFORE, THE US APPROACH IS TO SEEK TO FIND A WAY OF GETTING SHAMIR AND LIKUD ON BOARD IN FAVOR OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE LEADING TO DIRECT TALKS BETWEEN ISRAEL AND THE ARABS.

14. THE SECRETARY SAID WE WOULD BE CONCERNED ABOUT AN APPROACH THAT WOULD SEEM TO SUPPORT PERES AGAINST SHAMIR IN A DOMESTIC ISRAELI PARTISAN OR ELECTORAL SHOWDOWN WHICH THE SECRETARY SUSPECTED THAT PERES WOULD LOSE. THE SECRETARY CONTINUED THAT NOTWITHSTANDING PERES' CHARM, THE ARABS HAVE TO REALIZE THAT SHAMIR IS PRIME MINISTER AND MUST BE BROUGHT INTO THE PEACE PROCESS IF IT IS TO SUCCEED. THEREFORE THE US IS LOOKING AT A PACKAGE THAT WOULD HAVE SOMETHING IN IT FOR SHAMIR. SHAMIR NEEDS GUARANTEES THAT THE STRUCTURE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WILL NOT RESULT IN ISRAEL'S BEING GANGED-UP ON BY THE RUSSIANS, CHINESE AND ARABS TO RETURN TO THE 1967 BORDERS. THE SECRETARY ADDED THAT THE SOVIETS TALK ABOUT THE CONFERENCE NOT INTERFERING WITH BILATEAL NEGOTIATIONS BUT TURN RIGHT AROUND TO INDICATE THAT THE PALESTINIAN ISSUE IS NOT BILATERAL AND THEREFORE MUST BE DEALT WITH BY THE CONFERENCE. THE SECRETARY NOTED NEVERTHELESS THAT THE SOVIETS DESPERATELY WANT TO PARTICIPATE IN AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST, AND WE THUS HAVE SOME LEVERAGE.

15. SECRETARY SHULTZ SAID THAT ANOTHER ANGLE THE US IS USING ON SHAMIR IS TO UNDERSCORE THE IMPORTANCE OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE FOR SOVIET JEWRY. IF THE SOVIETS MEET THE ISRAELI PRICE FOR A CONFERENCE {DIPLOMATIC RECOGNITION, BETTER EMIGRATION RECORD, BETTER TREATMENT OF SOVIET JEWS} WE ARE ASKING SHAMIR IF THIS ITSELF WOULD NOT JUSTIFY HIS GOING TO GENEVA

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FOR A COUPLE OF DAYS. THE SECRETARY SUMMARIZED HIS REMARKS BY UNDERSCORING OUR VIEW ON THE NEED TO REDUCE THE RISKS FOR SHAMIR, TO OFFER HIM A LEADING ROLE IN DEVELOPING AN APPROACH, AND TO DEVELOP BROAD SUPPORT FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE WITHIN ISRAEL INCLUDING WITHIN LIKUD.

16. MRS. THATCHER ASKED THE SECRETARY WHETHER HE THOUGH THAT SHAMIR EVER INTENDS TO NEGOTIATE OVER THE WEST BANK OR JERUSALEM OR WHETHER IN FACT IT IS SHAMIR'S VIEW THAT ALL OF BIBLICAL ISRAEL BELONGS TO MODERN ISRAEL. IF THE LATTER, SHAMIR IS SIMPLY HOLDING THE ENTIRE WORLD RANSOM AND THERE WILL NEVER BE NEGOTIATIONS. THE SECRETARY AGREED THAT SHAMIR IS NOT PREPARED TO NEGOTIATE TERRITORY BUT IS READY TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT INTERIM ARRANGEMENTS. MRS. THATCHER CHARACTERIZED THIS POSITION BY SHAMIR AS HYPOCRITICAL BECAUSE IT DENIES BASIC RIGHTS TO THE ARABS, AND REMOVES ISRAEL'S CREDIBILITY AS THE ONLY MIDDLE EAST DEMOCRACY. THE SECRETARY SAID HE HAS EMPHASIZED IN RECENT SPEECHES THE DEMOGRAPHIC CLOCK TICKING AGAINST ISRAEL IN ITS ARAB POPULATION.

17. THE PRIME MINISTER EXPRESSED SKEPTICISM THAT SHAMIR WOULD EVER NEGOTIATE UNLESS HE FELT HE WOULD BE LEFT BEHIND IF HE WERE UNWILLING TO MOVE. SHE EMPHASIZED THE NEED FOR THE US TO TAKE THE LEAD AND ASKED WHETHER WE COULD NOT JOINTLY PUSH FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE. SPECIFICALLY, SHE ASKED WHETHER IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE DURING HER VISIT HERE TO MAKE CLEAR THAT IF THE PARTIES WOULD NEGOTIATE DIRECTLY WITHIN THE FRAMEWORK OF AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE, WE WOULD SUPPORT THAT APPROACH. SHE HANDED THE SECRETARY A DRAFT FORMULATION OF A PUBLIC STATEMENT ON AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON THE MIDDLE EAST. THE SECRETARY INDICATED THAT HE WOULD STUDY IT TO SEE IF AGREED LANGUAGE COULD BE WORKED OUT.

18. THERE WAS A FINAL BRIEF DISCUSSION OF SOUTHERN AFRICA. THE SECRETARY COMPLIMENTED THE PRIME MINISTER ON BRITAIN'S STRATEGY OF WORKING CONSTRUCTIVELY WITH THE FRONTLINE STATES IN SOUTHERN AFRICA. MRS. THATCHER REMINDED THE SECRETARY OF THE FORTHCOMING COMMONWEALTH MEETING IN VANCOUVER IN SEPTEMBER AND EXPRESSED THE HOPE THAT THE US WOULD NOT TAKE ANY STEPS WHICH COULD MAKE DEALING WITH THE ISSUE OF SOUTH AFRICA AT THAT MEETING MORE DIFFICULT. THE SECRETARY FOR HIS PART ASKED THE PRIME MINISTER TO SPEAK OUT ON BRITISH

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