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~~File Folder UNITED KINGDOM (FEBRUARY 1987-MAY 1987)~~

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Now in: Counterterrorism + Narcotics

F02-071/3

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~~SECRET~~

31303

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of UK

NSPWR	*NOMAIL*	MOSCOW NODIS SOVIET BEIRUT ISRAEL LEBANON LIBYA
NSDBR		BEIRUT ISRAEL LEBANON LIBYA NORTH AFRICA SYRIA
NSFEW		UK EUROPE LONDON MOSCOW SUMMIT SUMMIT
NSHRT		BEIRUT ISRAEL LEBANON LIBYA NORTH AFRICA SYRIA
NSRBO		BEIRUT ISRAEL LEBANON LIBYA NORTH AFRICA SYRIA
NSBTM		HIJACK HOSTAGE INTELLIGENCE KIDNAP TERROR
NSJRS	*NOMAIL*	BEIRUT ISRAEL LEBANON LIBYA SYRIA
NSSRT		ISRAEL LEBANON LIBYA NORTH AFRICA SYRIA
NSFLL		ISRAEL SUMMIT
NSHGS		SOVIET SUMMIT
NSHJC		AFRICA NORTH AFRICA
NSHS		AFRICA NORTH AFRICA
NSKAL		ECON TERRORISM
NSRMS		ISRAEL LIBYA
NSSPF		IMF TRADE
NSCLP		NODIS
NSJD		UK
NSMEN		SOVIET
NSREL		SUMMIT
NSWJB		LEBANON

IMMEDIATE

DTG: 191443Z FEB 87

PRT: SIT
SIT: EOB BOHN NATALE NSRHS VAX NSJHO
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 7783

FM AMEMBASSY LONDON

3487

~~SECRET~~

SUBJECT: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM:

*** START OF TEXT ***

BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 04 LONDON 03487

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, UK

SUBJECT: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM:

LONDON VISIT F AMBASSADOR ADAMS

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.
2. SUMMARY: S/CT DEPUTY DIRECTOR ADAMS MET WITH FCO OFFICIALS FEBRUARY 16 FOR A REVIEW OF CURRENT TERRORISM ISSUES, FOCUSING ON THE LEBANON HOSTAGE SITUATION. THE BRITISH CONFIRMED THEIR SUPPORT FOR A

DECLASSIFIED
NLRR FOR 071/3 #31303
BY RW NARA DATE 10/26/11

~~SECRET~~

RESCHEDULED MARCH 5-6 SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS MEETING AND POINTED TO THEIR EFFORTS TO STIFFEN GERMAN RESOLVE ON THE HAMMADI CASE. HMG SHARED U.S. CONCERN ON HOSTAGE SWAPS FOR TERRORISTS, BUT THE BRITISH HAD NO SPECIFIC

PAGE 2

IDEAS ON WHAT TO DO NEXT ON THE HOSTAGES, ASIDE FROM KEEPING UP PRESSURE ON DRUZE LEADER JUMBLATT TO SECURE TERRY WAITE'S RELEASE. THE BRITISH EMPHASIZED CONTINUED MISGIVINGS ON PUNITIVE MILITARY ACTION AGAINST LEBANESE TARGETS OR EXTRATERRITORIAL ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SYRIA. FINALLY, THEY CHARACTERIZED RECENT UK/SOVIET CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM AS UNPRODUCTIVE, BOGGED DOWN ON A SOVIET PROPOSAL FOR A BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY. END SUMMARY.

SUMMIT SEVEN COORDINATION.

3. COMMENTING ON THE CANCELED MEETING OF SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS, TO HAVE TAKEN PLACE THIS WEEK IN ROME, FCO ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY DUNCAN SLATER NOTED THAT THE FRENCH NOW SAY THEY WON'T ATTEND THE RESCHEDULED MARCH 5-6 MEETING IF THERE IS ANY PUBLIC LEAK. SLATER ADDED THAT THE UK WAS CONCERNED AT THIS PROSPECT AND WOULD BE HAVING A WORD WITH THE FRENCH.

4. TAKING UP SLATER'S POINT ON THE VALUE OF MULTILATERAL COOPERATION, ADAMS EMPHASIZED THAT THE U.S. SIDE WOULD HAVE WANTED TO GO AHEAD WITH THE INITIALLY PLANNED FEBRUARY 6 ROME MEETING TO DISCUSS THE BEIRUT HOSTAGE SITUATION, EVEN WITH THE PUBLICITY. IN RESPONSE, SLATER NOTED THAT, IN HMG'S VIEW, THE POTENTIAL ADVANTAGES OF THOSE TALKS HAD BEEN OUTWEIGHED BY THE RISKS OF MISINTERPRETATION BY THE HOSTAGE-TAKERS, WITH IMPLICATIONS FOR THE LIVES OF THE HOSTAGES. THE BRITISH WERE SORRY THAT THE USG MUST HAVE FELT LET DOWN, BUT SLATER WANTED TO ASSURE US THAT THE UK DECISION NOT TO ATTEND HAD BEEN TAKEN AT THE HIGHEST MINISTERIAL LEVEL.

5. ADAMS NOTED, FRANKLY, THAT WE HAD BEEN DISAPPOINTED IN THE UK STANCE, PARTICULARLY IN THE LACK OF BRITISH SUPPORT IN WORKING WITH THE FRENCH. THAT WAS WATER OVER THE DAM, HOWEVER, AND WE WERE NOW MOST INTERESTED IN FINDING A WAY TO GET CONSULTATIONS BACK ON TRACK. DID THE BRITISH SEE ANY WAY OF RETRIEVING TALKS ON THE BEIRUT HOSTAGES, OR SHOULD WE JUST MOVE TO A SUMMIT SEVEN EXPERTS MEETING? SLATER SAID THAT HE FELT THE EXPERTS WERE THE PREFERRED COURSE AND THAT THE BRITISH WOULD BE PRESSING THE OPTION IN BILATERAL CONTACTS.

LEBANON.

6. IN RESPONSE TO SLATER'S QUESTION AS TO HOW WE SAW

THE SITUATION IN LEBANON, ADAMS CHARACTERIZED IT AS VERY CLOU4ED. WE KNOW WHO IS HOLDING THE FIVE ORIGINAL AMERICAN HOSTAGES, AND WE ARE SURE THAT THE LAST FOUR AMERICAN UNIVERSITY HOSTAGES ARE BEING HELD, IF NOT BY HIZBOLLAH, THEN BY AN ASSOCIATED GROUP. THERE IS A QUESTION ON THE EXTENT TO WHICH THE IRANIANS CAN AFFECT THE OUTCOME, BUT WE CERTAINLY BELIEVE THEY CAN INFLUENCE IT.

7. ON THE HOSTAGE-TAKERS' DEMANDS FOR HAMMADI'S RELEASE, ADAMS ADDED, OUR SENSE IS THAT THE GERMANS

PAGE 3

ARE MAKING CLEAR THEY ARE NOT OF A MIND TO EXCHANGE HIM FOR THEIR OWN KIDNAPPED NATIONALS. EXTRADITION TO THE U.S. IS STILL AN OPEN QUESTION, AND THERE IS THE POSSIBILITY THE GERMANS MIGHT TRY HAMMADI FOR HIJACKING, EXERCISING JURISDICTION THROUGH THE TAKING OF HOSTAGES CONVENTION. THEY KEEP ASSURING US THEY ARE TELLING US ALL THAT IS GOING ON.

8. SLATER SAID THE UK'S IMPRESSION IS THAT THE
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#3487

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 04 LONDON 03487

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, UK

SUBJECT: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM:
GERMANS HAVEN'T MADE UP THEIR MINDS WHAT TO DO, AS THEY TRY TO BALANCE WESTERN SOLIDARITY WITH HUMANITARIAN PRESSURES TO GET THEIR TWO NATIONALS RELEASED. THE BRITISH HAD RECENTLY HAD A LOT OF CONTACT WITH THE GERMANS TO STIFFEN THEIR RESOLVE, INCLUDING AT THE THATCHER-KOHL LEVEL. THE GERMANS SEEM TO BE PLAYING IT LONG, BUT, SLATER ADDED, THEIR POSITION MAY SWING IF THEY SENSE THAT ANYONE ELSE IS DOING A DEAL FOR THEIR OWN HOSTAGES.

9. ADAMS SAID THAT WAS WHY WE WERE SO CONCERNED ABOUT THE RUMORED ISRAELI/AMAL SWAP INVOLVING THE CAPTURED PILOT. WE HAVE DISCOURAGED THE ISRAELIS PUBLICLY AND PRIVATELY, EMPHASIZING THAT THERE SHOULD BE NO DEAL. IT IS CLEAR TO US THAT, IF ANY AMERICANS WERE PART OF SUCH AN EXCHANGE, THAT WOULD BE THE END OF A HAMMADI EXTRADITION.

10. SECURITY COORDINATION DEPARTMENT HEAD IVOR ROBERTS AGREED THAT AN ISRAELI DEAL WOULD BE VERY UNWELCOME, POINTING OUT THAT IT WOULD LEAVE HMG EXTREMELY EXPOSED ON TERRY WAITE. SLATER ADDED THAT THE BRITISH HAD REITERATED THEIR NO-DEALS POLICY TO THE ISRAELIS, BUT THERE WERE STRAWS IN THE WIND THAT SUGGESTED SOMETHING WAS GOING ON. THE ISRAELIS HAVEN'T SUGGESTED ANY BRITISH NAMES AS PART OF A TRADE, AND THEY ARE TELLING HMG WHAT THE BRITISH WOULD

LIKE TO HEAR, BUT THERE WAS STILL CAUSE TO WORRY.

11. TURNING TO TERRY WAITE'S CIRCUMSTANCES, SLATER EMPHASIZED THAT HMG HAD ENCOURAGED HIM NOT TO GO. THE BRITISH WERE CERTAIN WAITE WAS BEING HELD AGAINST HIS WILL, BUT THEY DIDN'T KNOW WHY. THERE WERE LOTS OF THEORIES -- THAT HE HAD WELSHED ON A PREVIOUS DEAL; THAT HE HAD BEEN AMBUSHED ON HIS WAY OUT, PERHAPS WITH ANDERSON AND SUTHERLAND. MOST OF THE TALES GO BACK IN SOME WAY TO A U.S. CONNECTION, INVOLVING MONEY LINKS TO THE CIA.

12. SLATER NOTED THAT HMG HAD NEVER ASKED WAITE OR THE USG WHETHER ANY SUCH LINKS EXISTED, AND ADAMS COMMENTED THAT, WITH RESPECT TO ACTIVITIES IN THE PAST, HE SIMPLY DIDN'T KNOW. ON THE PRESENT, HOWEVER, WE WERE NOT INVOLVED. WE HAD TRIED TO REACH WAITE BEFORE HE LEFT ON HIS LAST TRIP, JUST TO SEE WHAT HE

PAGE 4

WAS AIMING TO ACHIEVE, BUT HE HAD NOT RETURNED THE EMBASSY'S CALL.

13. SLATER SAID IT APPEARED WAITE HAD WANTED TO DEMONSTRATE HE WAS HIS OWN MAN AFTER THE RECENT POLITICAL STORM IN WASHINGTON. UP UNTIL THE TIME HE WAS TAKEN, HMG HAD NO INTEREST IN WHAT HE WAS DOING; BUT, SINCE HIS CAPTURE, IT HAS BEEN DIFFICULT FOR THE BRITISH TO FRAME A STRATEGY WITHOUT KNOWING WHAT WAITE WAS INVOLVED IN. HMG WAS TRYING TO KEEP LAMBETH PALACE OUT IN FRONT, AND THERE HAVE IN FACT BEEN EXCHANGES BETWEEN THE ARCHBISHOP OF CANTERBURY AND RASFANJANI THROUGH THE IRANIAN EMBASSY IN LONDON. THE OTHER LEG OF BRITISH STRATEGY HAS BEEN TO TRY TO KEEP JUMBLATT'S FEET TO THE FIRE, AS HE STILL SEEMS TO FEEL SOME SENSE OF OBLIGATION FOR WAITE'S SAFETY. JUMBLATT DOES HAVE OTHER THINGS TO WORRY ABOUT, LIKE HIS PERSONAL SURVIVAL, AND, AS THE WEEKS GO BY, HIS INTEREST MAY LESSEN. HMG THEREFORE WANTS TO KEEP UP THE PRESSURE.

14. ADAMS ASKED WHETHER THE BRITISH HAD ANY IDEA WHAT TO DO NEXT ON THE HOSTAGES, AND SLATER REPLIED THAT THEY HADN'T. ONE DIFFERENCE FROM THE SITUATION FACING THE USG WAS THAT NO ONE HAD YET CLAIMED TO HAVE TAKEN THE BRITISH HOSTAGES (WAITE, MCCARTHY, KEENAN, WYNN), AND NO DEMANDS HAD YET BEEN MADE OF HMG. SLATER ASKED WHETHER THERE WERE ANY CIRCUMSTANCES IN WHICH THE USG MIGHT TAKE MILITARY ACTION, AND ADAMS REPLIED THAT THE ANSWER HAD TO BE YES, THOUGH WE HAVEN'T COME TO THAT POINT. WE COULDN'T SAY WHAT WOULD BE THE CIRCUMSTANCES OR THE TRIGGER. SLATER EMPHASIZED THAT THE QUESTION OF ANY PUNITIVE ACTION CAUSED GRAVE DISQUIET IN LONDON. THE BRITISH VIEW MIGHT PERHAPS BE DIFFERENT ON A RESCUE ACTION, BUT IT WAS HARD TO CONCEIVE OF ANY ADVANTAGE TO ACTION JUST TO DEMONSTRATE RAGE OR ANNOYANCE. IT WOULD BE

~~SECRET~~

UNFORTUNATE, SLATER SAID, IF ANY HOSTAGES WERE KILLED, BUT WE COULDN'T BRING THEM BACK TO LIFE. ADAMS ASKED TO WHAT EXTENT WAITE'S FATE FIGURED IN BRITISH CALCULATIONS, AND SLATER STRESSED THAT HMG WAS BEING VERY CAREFUL NOT TO GIVE HIS CASE ANY EXTRA WEIGHT.

SYRIA.

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#3487

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 04 LONDON 03487

NODIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, UK

SUBJECT: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM:

15. SLATER SAID THE BRITISH DON'T HAVE THE IMPRESSION THE SYRIANS ARE INVOLVED IN THE LEBANON HOSTAGE SITUATION AT THE MOMENT, AND HMG DOESN'T WANT TO GET IN THE POSITION OF ASKING THEM FOR ANYTHING, THOUGH, OBVIOUSLY, ASSAD MUST SENSE THE OPPORTUNITY FOR REHABILITATING SYRIA'S IMAGE. SLATER ASKED WHETHER WE

PAGE 5

HAD ANY INDICATION THAT SYRIA WAS GENUINELY MODIFYING ITS POLICY ON TERRORISM. ADAMS REPLIED THAT WE DID NOT. THEY MAY NOW BE MORE CAUTIOUS, BUT THEIR AIR FORCE INTELLIGENCE STILL PLAYS A KEY ROLE, AND WE SEE NO CHANGE IN THEIR USE OF TERRORIST GROUPS AS AN INSTRUMENT OF STATE POLICY. ROBERTS AGREED THAT, WHENEVER ANYONE CHECKED ON THE ABU NIDAL OFFICE IN DAMASCUS, "THE LIGHTS WERE STILL BLAZING."

16. ADAMS NOTED THAT THERE WAS STILL A QUESTION OF HOW TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE TO DAMASCUS. ON THE U.S. SIDE, WE COULD FURTHER CUT BACK OUR EMBASSY OR CLAMP DOWN ON IMF LOANS. FCO NEAR EAST/NORTH AFRICA DEPARTMENT HEAD PATRICK NIXON INTERJECTED THAT THE UK WOULD NOT JOIN IN IMF SANCTIONS. BRITAIN'S CHOKE-POINT WAS THROUGH THE SUBSTANTIAL EC AID PROGRAM, WHICH WAS SOMETHING THE SYRIANS WILL MISS. THE SYRIANS HAD RECENTLY APPROACHED ITALIAN FOREIGN MINISTER ANDREOTTI, AND THE BRITISH THOUGHT THERE WOULD BE OTHER SUCH MOVES SOON. NIXON NOTED THAT THE CANADIANS WOULD SHORTLY BE SENDING BACK THEIR AMBASSADOR, BUT WHAT WAS IMPORTANT, FROM THE UK STANDPOINT, WAS TO MAINTAIN EC SOLIDARITY, KEEPING THE AGREED MEASURES INTACT.

17. IN RESPONSE TO ADAMS' QUERY AS TO THE VALUE OF A NEW EC MINISTERIAL STATEMENT, SLATER EMPHASIZED BRITISH DESIRE TO LEAVE WELL ENOUGH ALONE. IT WAS NOW A CASE, SLATER ADDED, OF HMG "PLUGGING EACH LEAK" AND OF THE LESS SAID THE BETTER. SOME EC MEMBERS WERE ANXIOUS TO JUMP ON EACH SCRAP AS PROOF THE SYRIANS

~~SECRET~~

WERE CHANGING.

18. ADAMS THEN ASKED WHAT WERE THE POSSIBILITIES OF UNILATERAL OR MULTILATERAL ACTION IN THE WAKE OF UPCOMING TERRORIST TRIALS IN EUROPE, IMPLICATING THE SYRIANS. COULD WE NOT THINK OF SOME WAY TO KEEP PRESSING ON THE SENSITIVE SPOT OF IMAGE AND LEGITIMACY THAT ASSAD DWELLS ON? SLATER SAID HE THOUGHT THE EVIDENCE AGAINST THE SYRIANS WOULD HAVE TO BE OVERWHELMING FOR ANY NEW ACTION TO BE TAKEN; AND NIXON ADDED THAT HE THOUGHT MOST EC MEMBERS WOULD WRIGGLE OUT OF ANY SUCH PROPOSAL, AS THERE WAS A STRONG FEELING AMONG THE CONTINENTALS THAT SYRIA WAS ONE ARAB GOVERNMENT TO WHICH LINES HAD TO BE KEPT OPEN.

19. NIXON EMPHASIZED BRITISH HOPE THAT THE USG WOULD KEEP OFF ECONOMIC SANCTIONS AGAINST SYRIA, PARTICULARLY THOSE INVOLVING EXTRATERRITORIAL APPLICATION. THESE WOULD ONLY SET THE EUROPEANS OFF, PROVOKING ANOTHER TRANS-ATLANTIC ROW. SUCH SANCTIONS, NIXON ADDED, "HIT US ON OUR RAW NERVE, EVER SINCE LAST JANUARY AND LIBYA. WE ARE JUST NOT ON THE SAME WAVELENGTH AS YOU, ANY OF US." ADAMS COMMENTED THAT OUR SENSE IS THE SYRIANS HAVE DONE LITTLE TO IMPROVE. WE NEED TO REINFORCE THE MESSAGE, BUT FROM WHAT HE HAD HEARD, THERE DIDN'T APPEAR TO BE THAT KIND OF CONVICTION IN EUROPE.

UK/SOVIET TALKS.

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20. SLATER CHARACTERIZED HIS EARLY-FEBRUARY MOSCOW CONSULTATIONS WITH SOVIET MFA TREATY AND LEGAL DEPARTMENT CHIEF YURIY RYBAKOV AS VERY UNPRODUCTIVE, AMOUNTING TO LITTLE MORE THAN AN EXCHANGE OF PLATITUDES. INTERESTINGLY, WHEN SLATER RAISED STATE-SUPPORTED TERRORISM, THE SOVIETS HAD BEEN LESS INCLINED TO DEFEND LIBYA THAN SYRIA. ADAMS ASKED WHETHER THE SOVIETS APPEARED TO HAVE RAISED TERRORISM EVEN PRIVATELY WITH ASAD, AND SLATER REPLIED THAT HE THOUGHT NOT. THE SOVIETS HAD NO INTEREST IN PULLING WESTERN CHESTNUTS OUT OF THE FIRE. IN FACT, ANYTHING THAT CAUSED THE SYRIANS TO HAVE DIFFICULTIES WITH THE WEST COULDN'T BE BAD FOR MOSCOW.

21. WHAT THE SOVIETS HAD REALLY BEEN AFTER, SLATER SAID, WAS A BILATERAL EXTRADITION TREATY WITH THE UK, ALONG THE LINES THEY HAD ALREADY OFFERED TO THE ITALIANS AND THE FRENCH. SLATER HAD TOLD THEM HMG WASN'T INTERESTED, BUT, ONCE ON THAT TOPIC, IT HAD

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#3487

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~~SECRET~~ SECTION 04 OF 04 LONDON 03487
NODIS

~~SECRET~~

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, UK
SUBJECT: US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM:
PROVEN DIFFICULT TO GET OFF IT.
22. THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER AMBASSADOR ADAMS'
DEPARTURE FROM LONDON.
PRICE
BT
#3487

SECTION: 01 OF 04
SECTION: 02 OF 04
SECTION: 03 OF 04
SECTION: 04 OF 04

** END OF TEXT **

~~SECRET~~



SECRET

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL SECRETARIAT

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f. U.K. 31304

PAGE 01 OF 04

AN004239

NSC: CHLD COBB WAC DANZ ERMA KELL OAKL PAAL RODM ROSS SOMM STK
<DIST>SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> SECRET <OSRI> RUFHLD <DTG> 261512Z MAR 87
FM AMEMBASSY LONDON
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 9327

<SUBJ> SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BRITISH
<TEXT>

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 06513
EXDIS - NOFORN
PASS INR/B

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PTER, UK
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BRITISH
COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICIALS

John Barry Kelly
P. Kilgusman

REF: STATE 53310

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. AS A PREFACE TO OUR COMMENTS ON BRITISH OFFICIALS REQUESTED REFTEL, IT IS WORTH NOTING THAT HMG'S ECONOMICALLY-SCALED COUNTERTERRORISM STRUCTURE AFFORDS RELATIVELY INFORMAL ACCESS AND COOPERATION AMONG ITS VARIOUS ELEMENTS. THE FCO, CABINET OFFICE, AND HOME OFFICE, FOR EXAMPLE, HAVE NO MORE THAN A HALF DOZEN OFFICERS APIECE WORKING FULL-TIME ON TERRORISM; AND WORKING RELATIONSHIPS HAVE STRUCK US AS PARTICULARLY COLLEGIAL, WITH RELATIVELY JUNIOR OFFICERS TENDING TO HAVE CONSIDERABLE OPERATIONAL LATITUDE AND INDEPENDENT RESPONSIBILITY (THOUGH, AS INDICATED BELOW, THERE HAS RECENTLY BEEN A LOT OF PERSONNEL TURNOVER, PARTICULARLY AT THE FCO AND HOME OFFICE, THAT COULD AFFECT THESE OPERATIONAL DYNAMICS).

3. AT THE TOP END OF THE SCALE, THE CABINET MEMBERS DIRECTLY CONCERNED WITH TERRORISM -- PRIME MINISTER THATCHER, FOREIGN SECRETARY HOWE, AND HOME SECRETARY HURD -- ALL TAKE A STRONG PERSONAL INTEREST IN THE SUBJECT. THE PRIME MINISTER LOST ONE OF HER CLOSEST ADVISERS, AIREY NEAVE, TO IRISH TERRORISM AND CAME CLOSE TO LOSING HER OWN LIFE IN THE OCTOBER 1984 BRIGHTON GRAND HOTEL BOMBING. HOWE AND HURD, TOO, WERE AT BRIGHTON; AND HURD'S ROBUST OUTLOOK ON TERRORISM WAS FURTHER STRENGTHENED BY HIS STINT AS NORTHERN IRELAND SECRETARY. HOWE WAS HMG'S POINT-MAN ON THE HINDAWI CASE, SHOWING NO-NONSENSE DETERMINATION THROUGHOUT.

4. A FINAL INTRODUCTORY POINT: NONE OF THE BRITISH OFFICIALS WITH WHOM WE DEAL HAS ANY INCLINATION TO MAKE DEALS WITH TERRORISTS OR STATES SPONSORING TERRORISM (ITEM F ON REFTEL CHECKLIST). ALL OF THEM HAVE VERY POSITIVE ATTITUDES TOWARD COOPERATING WITH THE USG AND OTHER LIKE-MINDED GOVERNMENTS ON COUNTERTERRORISM MATTERS (ITEM G), AS WAS BORNE OUT IN HMG'S CONDUCT OF THE BRITISH EC PRESIDENCY LAST FALL. WITH THOSE COMMENTS IN MIND, FOLLOWING ARE OUR ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS ON THE INDIVIDUALS LISTED REFTEL:

(A) CABINET OFFICE:

-- CHRISTOPHER MALLABY, ONE OF THE DEPUTY CABINET SECRETARIES, PLAYS A VERY INFLUENTIAL ROLE IN INTER-

AGENCY COORDINATION OF TERRORISM POLICY. INTELLIGENT, ARTICULATE, AND WITH ACUTE POLITICAL SENSITIVITY, THE CAREER DIPLOMAT MALLABY IS A SOVIET SPECIALIST BY BACKGROUND (AND POSSIBLY THE NEXT BRITISH AMBASSADOR TO MOSCOW). TERRORISM IS ONLY ONE OF THE MANY ISSUES ON HIS CROWDED AGENDA, HOWEVER, AS HE IS ALSO RESPONSIBLE FOR COORDINATION OF EAST-WEST AND DEFENSE POLICIES.

-- NIGEL BRAND'S ROLE APPEARS TO BE MUCH MORE ONE OF STAFF SUPPORT AND COORDINATION THAN OF POLICY DEVELOPMENT. AS SUCH, HE REPORTS DIRECTLY TO MALLABY BUT HAS DIRECT

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NLRR F02-07113 #31304

SECRET

BY RW NARA DATE 12/26/11

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

PAGE 02 OF 04

AN004239

ACCESS TO ALL OTHER SENIOR OFFICIALS (E.G., AT THE ~~ED~~,
HOME OFFICE, NORTHERN IRELAND OFFICE, AND SCOTLAND ~~TRD~~).

(B) FCO:

-- ~~MINISTER OF STATE TIMOTHY RENTON, THOUGH RESPONSIBLE~~
~~ON PAPER FOR SUPERVISION OF THE FCO'S COUNTERTERRORISM~~
STAFF, IN FACT APPEARS TO HAVE ALMOST NO DAY-TO-DAY
INVOLVEMENT IN THE SUBJECT. KEY DECISIONS, SUCH AS ~~HMG'S~~
RESPONSE TO SYRIA'S INVOLVEMENT IN THE HINDAWI CASE, ~~ARE~~
CERTAINLY STAFFED THROUGH RENTON; BUT THE IMPORTANT
DECISIONS HAVE BEEN BUCKED UP TO SIR GEOFFREY HOWE.

-- ~~DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY (AND POLITICAL DIRECTOR) ~~REK~~~~
~~THOMAS, ONE OF THE FCO'S MOST SENIOR HIGH-FLYERS, IS~~
CENTRALLY INVOLVED IN EC-12 DISCUSSION OF TERRORISM ~~AND~~
PLAYED A KEY ROLE, FOR INSTANCE, IN GAINING EC CONSENSUS
ON HMG'S SYRIAN-SANCTIONS PACKAGE LAST FALL. PARTICULARLY
WELL-DISPOSED TOWARD THE UNITED STATES, THOMAS DID
EVERYTHING POSSIBLE TO ENSURE WE WERE KEPT ABREAST ~~OF~~
EC-12 DISCUSSIONS ON TERRORISM, EVEN IN THE FACE OF
FRENCH OBJECTIONS. THOMAS'S POSITION AS POLITICAL
DIRECTOR LEAVES HIM OUT OF THE DIRECT COUNTER-TERRORISM
~~SECRET~~ SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 06513

EXDIS - NOFORN

PASS INR/B

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PINR, PTER, UK

SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BRITISH

COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICIALS
CHAIN OF COMMAND, HOWEVER, WHICH IS HEADED AT THE OFFICIAL
LEVEL BY HIS COLLEAGUE JOHN BOYD (SEE BELOW). BUT, AS
THE "FRONT-LINE COMMANDER" IN TALKS WITH BRITAIN'S
COMMUNITY AND NATO PARTNERS, HE EXERCISES A FAIR DEGREE
OF TACTICAL LATITUDE ON HMG'S COUNTER-TERRORISM POSITURE.
WITHIN THE FCO, HE ANSWERS TO PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY
SIR PATRICK WRIGHT AND, ULTIMATELY, SIR GEOFFREY HOWE
(THOMAS WILL DEPART THIS SUMMER TO BECOME UK AMBASSADOR
TO ITALY, AND WILL BE SUCCEEDED BY UK AMBASSADOR TO
FRANCE JOHN FRETWELL.)

-- ~~DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY JOHN BOYD TOOK OVER FROM ~~EMID~~~~
~~GOODALL IN EARLY MARCH AS THE SENIOR FCO OFFICIAL WITH~~
DAY-TO-DAY RESPONSIBILITY FOR TERRORISM. ALSO RESPONSIBLE
FOR NORTHERN IRELAND, BOYD CAME TO THE JOB FROM A
TOUR AS POLITICAL ADVISER TO THE GOVERNOR OF HONG KONG.
WE HAVEN'T YET HAD MUCH CHANCE TO OBSERVE BOYD'S WORK
STYLE, BUT OUR INITIAL IMPRESSION IS OF A KEENLY INTELLI-
GENT OFFICIAL WITH WHOM WE CAN WORK CLOSELY AND EASILY.
HE IS SCHEDULED TO HEAD THE BRITISH DELEGATION AT THE
NEXT ROUND OF SEMI-ANNUAL US/UK CONSULTATIONS ON TERRORISM.

-- ~~ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY DUNCAN SLATER, WHO SUPER-~~
~~VISES THE FCO'S SECURITY COORDINATION DEPARTMENT, TOOK~~
OVER THE JOB LAST FALL, FOLLOWING FIVE YEARS AS BRITISH

AMBASSADOR TO OMAN. WE HAVE DEALT WITH SLATER
EXTENSIVELY ON BOTH TERRORISM AND U. N. ISSUES AND HAVE
FOUND HIM HELPFUL AND APPROACHABLE. AT THE OUTSET, HE
TENDED TO OPERATE IN DAVID GOODALL'S SHADOW, AND IT IS
NOT YET CLEAR HOW MUCH MORE INDEPENDENT LATITUDE HE MIGHT
HAVE UNDER JOHN BOYD. CERTAINLY, THE EXPERIENCE HE
GAINED AS CHAIRMAN OF THE EUROPEAN WORKING GROUP ON
TERRORISM DURING THE BRITISH EC PRESIDENCY GIVES HIM A
SOLID LEG UP OPERATIONALLY.

-- ~~SECURITY COORDINATION DEPARTMENT HEAD IVOR ROBERTS~~
~~(WHO REPLACED GRAHAM BURTON IN JANUARY) IS THE THIRD~~
RELATIVE NEWCOMER AT SENIOR LEVELS IN THE FCO
COUNTERTERRORISM STRUCTURE. ROBERTS AND HIS STAFF
FOUR OFFICERS COVER THE SAME AGENDA GENERALLY AS THE
DEPARTMENT'S S/CT, REPORTING TO DUNCAN SLATER.
RELATIVELY YOUNG (AGE FORTY), ROBERTS CAN COUNT ON A GOOD
ONWARD ASSIGNMENT WHEN HE LEAVES THE SCD. (BURTON IS NOW
BRITISH CONSUL GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO.)

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SECRETARIAT

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AN004239

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~~(C) HOME OFFICE~~

-- ~~DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR POLICE MICHAEL PARTRIDGE~~ HAS PLAYED AN INCREASINGLY PROMINENT ROLE IN THE EXPANDING SCOPE OF TREVI GROUP ACTIVITIES, ESPECIALLY FOLLOWING THE BRITISH EC PRESIDENCY. ONE OF DOUGLAS HURD'S MOST SENIOR AND TRUSTED SUBORDINATES, PARTRIDGE WAS ASKED, FOR INSTANCE, TO STAND IN FOR THE HOME SECRETARY IN PERSONALLY BRIEFING ATTORNEY GENERAL MEESE FOLLOWING LAST DECEMBER'S TREVI MINISTERIAL. A CAREER CIVIL SERVANT, HIS PROSPECTS FOR ADVANCEMENT ARE NOW LIMITED BY THE AVAILABILITY OF PERMANENT UNDER SECRETARY POSITIONS FOR WHICH HE MIGHT COMPETE -- THOUGH, AT AGE 52, HE IS STILL EIGHT YEARS FROM RETIREMENT.

-- ~~DEPUTY UNDER SECRETARY FOR CRIMINAL MATTERS DAVID FAULKNER~~, WITH A STRONG BACKGROUND IN POLICE AND PRISONS, IS THE SENIOR HOME OFFICE OFFICIAL ON THAT SIDE OF THE HOUSE. AS SUCH, HE HAS PRIMARY RESPONSIBILITY FOR POLICY LIAISON WITH SCOTLAND YARD AND OTHER UK POLICE FORCES. WE HAVE HAD NO CONTACT WITH HIM.

-- ~~ASSISTANT UNDER SECRETARY FOR TERRORISM GRAHAM ANGEL~~ HAS JUST TAKEN OVER FROM DAVID HILLARY, AND WE HAVE NOT YET HAD A CHANCE TO MEET HIM. BASED ON HILLARY'S EXAMPLE, HOWEVER, ANGEL WILL HAVE RESPONSIBILITIES FOR TREVI AND OTHER MULTILATERAL COORDINATION INVOLVING INTERIOR MINISTRIES, REPORTING TO PARTRIDGE.

-- ~~HEAD OF TERRORISM (F-4) DIVISION COLIN WALTERS~~ HAS ALSO JUST REPLACED ROY HARRINGTON, WHO LEFT IN FEBRUARY. AGAIN, WE HAVE NOT HAD EXTENSIVE DEALINGS WITH WALTERS, BUT, ON FIRST IMPRESSION, BELIEVE HE WILL EASILY MATCH HARRINGTON'S HARD-CHARGING STYLE. WE ANTICIPATE EXCELLENT ACCESS TO HIM AND HIS F-4 DIVISION COLLEAGUES.

~~(D) METROPOLITAN POLICE/SCOTLAND YARD~~

-- ~~COMMISSIONER SIR KENNETH NEWMAN~~, AFTER FOUR AND A HALF YEARS IN THE POSITION, IS RETIRING AT THE END OF JULY. FORMERLY CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE ROYAL ULSTER CONSTABULARY, HE HAS A THOROUGH GROUNDING IN COUNTERTERRORIST POLICY AND OPERATIONS THAT HAS BEEN TESTED IN HIS TENURE AT SCOTLAND YARD (VIZ. IRANIAN EMBASSY AND LIBYAN EMBASSY SIEGES; HINDAWI CASE).

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 06513

EXDIS - NOFORN
PASS INR/B

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PINR, PTER, UK
SUBJECT: REQUEST FOR INFORMATION ON BRITISH
COUNTERTERRORISM OFFICIALS

CHAIN OF COMMAND, HOWEVER, WHICH IS HEADED AT THE OFFICIAL
-- ~~NEWMAN'S DESIGNATED SUCCESSOR, CURRENT DEPUTY COMMISSIONER OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE PETER IMBERT~~, IS TO TAKE OVER AUGUST 1. IMBERT IS SEEN AS MUCH MORE OPERATIONALLY ORIENTED THAN THE INTELLECTUALLY-INCLINED NEWMAN. HE WAS DEPUTY OPERATIONAL HEAD OF THE METROPOLITAN POLICE ANTI-TERRORIST SQUAD FROM 1973-76 AND SERVED AS ONE OF THE TWO POLICE NEGOTIATORS WITH IRA TERRORISTS DURING A LONDON SIEGE IN DECEMBER 1975. HIS COUNTERTERRORISM EXPERIENCE ALSO INCLUDED RESPONSIBILITY FOR INVESTIGATING FOREIGN SUBVERSIVE GROUPS IN THE UK IN THE LATE 70'S.

-- ~~DEPUTY ASSISTANT COMMISSIONER FOR THE SPECIAL BRANCH SIMON CRAWSHAW~~ HAS BEEN IN THAT POSITION FOR TWO YEARS. HIGHLY EXPERIENCED, HE SERVED PREVIOUSLY AS HEAD OF SCOTLAND YARD'S ANTITERRORISM BRANCH. WE WORK WITH HIM VERY CLOSELY, AND HE HAS VISITED THE UNITED STATES ON SEVERAL OCCASIONS.

-- ~~GEORGE CHURCHILL-COLEMAN, WHO REPLACED CRAWSHAW AS HEAD OF THE ANTITERRORISM BRANCH (C-13)~~, IS ONE OF THE EMBASSY LEGATT'S CLOSEST CONTACTS AT THE METROPOLITAN POLICE COMMANDERS LEVEL. WE HAVE RECEIVED TOTAL

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
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AN004239

COOPERATION IN OUR DEALINGS WITH HIM.
5. PHOTOS: REGRET WE HAVEN'T BEEN ABLE TO COME UP WITH
MUCH IN THIS DEPARTMENT. HOWEVER, REPRODUCED PHOTOS OF
IMBERT AND NEWMAN HAVE BEEN POUCHED TO INR/B.
SEITZ

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03 · SSN> 6513 <TOR> 870327065327 MSG000165135205
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03 · SSN> 6513 <TOR> 870327065542 MSG000165135341
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INFO RUEHKK/EC COLLECTIVE PRIORITY
RUEHDM/AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY 2331

4
31305

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BREMER'S LONDON CONSULTATIONS,
- APRIL 3

<TEXT>
SECRET SECTION 01 OF 03 LONDON 07283

EXDIS
E.O.12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, UK, SY, PREL
SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BREMER'S LONDON CONSULTATIONS,
- APRIL 3

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.
~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY. AMBASSADOR BREMER MET APRIL 3 WITH FCO AND HOME OFFICE OFFICIALS TO REVIEW THE U.S. APPROACH TO A VENICE SUMMIT STATEMENT ON TERRORISM, MIDDLE EAST ISSUES WITH A FOCUS ON SYRIA, AND PROGRESS IN EC COORDINATION ON TERRORISM PREVENTION. THE FCO SAID THAT THATCHER WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT AT VENICE, BUT CAUTIONED THAT IT WOULD HAVE TO BE DRAFTED CAREFULLY TO TAKE INTO ACCOUNT THE SENSITIVITIES OF OTHER SUMMIT GOVERNMENTS (I.E., GERMANY). END SUMMARY.

~END SUMMARY~
FCO POLITICAL DIRECTOR DEREK THOMAS

3. BREMER MET WITH THOMAS PRIMARILY TO REVIEW THE STATUS OF A VENICE SUMMIT STATEMENT ON TERRORISM. THOMAS WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY DUNCAN SLATER AND HIS OWN PRIVATE SECRETARY.
4. BREMER EXPLAINED THE U.S. WOULD LIKE THE VENICE SUMMIT DECLARATION TO REITERATE THEMES FROM EC STATEMENTS (SO NON-EC GOVERNMENTS COULD ENDORSE THEM), CONDEMN HOSTAGE-TAKING AND CALL FOR THE UNCONDITIONAL RELEASE OF HOSTAGES, AND STRESS THE NEED TO BRING THE RULE OF LAW TO BEAR AGAINST TERRORISTS. HE ADDED THAT CHIRAC HAD AGREED IN PRINCIPLE TO A VENICE STATEMENT WHILE IN WASHINGTON.
5. THOMAS ASSURED BREMER THAT THATCHER WOULD WELCOME A STATEMENT. ON THE CONTENT, THOMAS CAUTIONED THAT THE SENSITIVITIES OF OTHER GOVERNMENTS, PARTICULARLY THE GERMANS, WOULD HAVE TO BE TAKEN INTO ACCOUNT. WHILE THE FRG DID NOT WANT TO WATER DOWN ITS COMMITMENT TO FIGHT TERRORISM, IT WAS RELUCTANT TO GO PUBLIC AT THIS POINT.

6. BREMER ARGUED THAT WE WOULD BE PLAYING INTO THE TERRORISTS' HANDS IF WE WERE TO BE PARALYZED INTO SILENCE BECAUSE WE HAD HOSTAGES. THOMAS AGREED, BUT ADMITTED THAT SOME UK MINISTERS ARE STRUGGLING WITH THE JUXTAPOSITION OF THE UPCOMING UK ELECTION, TERRY WAITE, AND PUBLIC POSTURE ON TERRORISM.

7. BREMER ASKED WHAT THE UK WAS DOING ABOUT THE SYRIAN PROPOSAL FOR AN INTERNATIONAL CONFERENCE ON TERRORISM,

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NOV 02-071/3#31305
BY [signature] NARA DATE 8/4/08

WHICH HE EXPECTED WOULD BECOME A PROBLEM AT THE NEXT UNGA. HE SUGGESTED THAT WE BOTH MIGHT WORK WITH YUGOSLAVIA ON THIS, AS SYRIA WOULD BE TRYING TO GET NAM SUPPORT. THOMAS SAID THAT, WHILE THE PROPOSAL WAS BEING DISCUSSED IN THE EC, UK OPPOSITION WOULD PREVENT A CONSENSUS ON EVEN CONDITIONAL EC SUPPORT. HE ADDED THAT THE UK WOULD BE WILLING TO DISCUSS TERRORISM WITH THE ARAB LEAGUE IN A TROIKA WHICH WOULD EXCLUDE SYRIA OR LIBYA.

8. THOMAS CONFIRMED THAT THE TERRORISM CONFERENCE IDEA DID NOT COME UP DURING THATCHER'S DISCUSSIONS IN MOSCOW, AND WAS RAISED BUT NOT PRESSED VERY HARD IN HOWE'S MEETINGS.

FCO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY JOHN BOYD

9. THIS WAS BREMER'S FIRST MEETING WITH THE NEW FCO DEPUTY UNDERSECRETARY RESPONSIBLE FOR TERRORISM. BOYD WAS ACCOMPANIED BY ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY DUNCAN SLATER, HEAD OF THE SECURITY COORDINATION DEPARTMENT IVOR ROBERTS, AND HEAD OF THE MIDDLE EAST DEPARTMENT ALAN GOULTY.

10. FINISHING UP THE DISCUSSION ON A VENICE STATEMENT, BOYD SAID THAT THE PRELIMINARY UK THINKING INCLUDED THREE THEMES: CONDEMNING STATE TERRORISM, EXHORTING ALL GOVERNMENTS TO REFUSE TO GIVE IN TO TERRORISTS, AND URGING MORE JUDICIAL COOPERATION. IT WAS AGREED THAT FURTHER WORK WOULD HAVE TO AWAIT THE ITALIAN DRAFT.

11. IN REVIEWING THE RECENT TERRORISM MEETING IN ROME, BREMER NOTED THAT IT WAS AGREED THAT GOVERNMENTS SHOULD FOLLOW UP ON THE MANY UNRESOLVED HIJACKINGS SINCE THE
S E C R E T SECTION 02 OF 03 LONDON 07283

EXDIS

E.O.12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, UK, SY, PREL

SUBJECT: AMBASSADOR BREMER'S LONDON CONSULTATIONS, BONN DECLARATION. IVOR ROBERTS SAID THAT THE UK MINISTRY OF TRANSPORT IS LOATHE TO GET INVOLVED IN ANYTHING THAT WOULD AFFECT AIR SERVICES AGREEMENTS. BREMER REPLIED THAT THE U.S. FAA HAS NO PROBLEMS PROVIDED THAT THE MATTER IS PURSUED IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS.

12. ON SYRIA, ALAN GOULTY SAID THAT THE SYRIANS HAD CONSIDERED A MILITARY RESCUE OF THE HOSTAGES BUT HAD REJECTED THE IDEA. HE ADDED THAT IRAN HAD THUS FAR SUCCEEDED IN CONVINCING THE SYRIANS THAT AN ASSAULT ON THE SOUTHERN SUBURBS OF BEIRUT WOULD BE TOO COSTLY. BREMER SAID THAT WE SHOULD ENCOURAGE THE SPLIT BETWEEN SYRIA AND IRAN. HE ADDED THE U.S. NET ASSESSMENT WAS THAT THE SYRIAN MOVE INTO WEST BEIRUT MADE THE HOSTAGE SITUATION MORE PRECARIOUS.

13. BREMER SAID THAT PRESIDENT CARTER HAD BEEN TOUGH WITH ASSAD ON TERRORISM. ASSAD'S RESPONSE HAD BEEN THAT HE WOULD CERTAINLY FREE THE HOSTAGES IF SYRIAN TROOPS FOUND THEM, BUT THAT HE WOULD NOT KICK ABU NIDAL OUT OF SYRIA UNDER PRESSURE. BREMER AGREED THAT THE SYRIANS HAVE TRIED TO EXPLOIT THE CARTER TRIP AND THE RETURN OF GERMAN AND CANADIAN AMBASSADORS, CLAIMING THAT THE WORST IS OVER. BREMER CONFIRMED THAT THE U.S. POLICY ON SYRIA SET LAST NOVEMBER WOULD NOT BE CHANGED ABSENT SYRIAN

CHANGES IN ITS SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM. ON A RELATED ISSUE, BREMER SAID THAT THE U.S. HAD BECOME QUITE CONCERNED WITH IRAQ'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORIST GROUPS AND WOULD BE MAKING A STRONG DEMARCHE TO THE IRAQI GOVERNMENT SOON.

14. GOULTY CAUTIONED THAT PUBLIC PRESSURE TO NORMALIZE RELATIONS WITH SYRIA COULD BUILD IF THERE IS NO FURTHER EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM. HE NOTED THAT, WHILE WE KNOW SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM CONTINUES, THE BRITISH PUBLIC ARE MOST CONCERNED WITH ACTUAL INCIDENTS ON BRITISH OR EUROPEAN SOIL, NOT, FOR EXAMPLE, ARAB TERRORISM AIMED AT OTHER ARABS. BREMER CONCLUDED THAT A GOOD OPPORTUNITY TO REMIND THE PUBLIC OF CONTINUED SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM WOULD BE THE UPCOMING TERRORIST TRIALS IN EUROPE
ASSISTANT SECRETARY GRAHAM ANGEL, HOME OFFICE

15. THIS WAS ALSO BREMER'S FIRST MEETING WITH NEW HOME OFFICE ASSISTANT UNDERSECRETARY GRAHAM ANGEL, WHO IS RESPONSIBLE FOR UK COORDINATION WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS' LAW ENFORCEMENT AGENCIES ON TERRORISM PREVENTION, INCLUDING SPECIFICALLY IN THE TREVI GROUP. ANGEL WAS ACCOMPANIED BY JEFF DILLING OF THE HOME OFFICE COUNTER TERRORISM DIVISION.

16. BREMER STRESSED THE U.S. AIM OF BETTER COOPERATION AMONG WESTERN GOVERNMENTS ON PRACTICAL MATTERS SUCH AS VISA POLICY, MACHINE-READABLE PASSPORTS AND THE PROPOSED DATA BANK FOR WEAPONS AND EXPLOSIVES. HE SAID THAT WE ARE OPEN TO SUGGESTIONS ON OTHER SUCH PRACTICAL AREAS OF COOPERATION. HE ADDED THAT IT IS CENTRAL TO U.S. POLICY THAT TERRORISTS BE TREATED LIKE CRIMINALS WHO SHOULD BE BROUGHT TO TRIAL AND SENTENCED LIKE OTHER OFFENDERS.

17. IN REVIEWING THE WORK OF THE EC AD HOC WORKING GROUP ON IMMIGRATION, ANGEL SAID THAT THERE WAS A MAJOR CHANGE UNDERWAY IN ATTITUDES TOWARD IMMIGRATION CONTROL IN EUROPE. FREE IMMIGRATION HAD BEEN THE GOAL, BUT TERRORISM AND DRUGS HAD CHANGED THAT. NOW GOVERNMENTS WANTED TO IMPROVE CONTROLS, BUT WITHOUT HEAVY EXPENDITURE. HE ADDED THAT BRITAIN HAD MORE EXPERIENCE WITH IMMIGRATION CONTROL THAN MANY OF ITS EUROPEAN PARTNERS BECAUSE OF ITS COLONIAL HISTORY.

18. BREMER PRAISED THE WORK OF THE TREVI GROUP AND NOTED IT HAD SHOWN THAT MULTILATERAL COOPERATION COULD ADD UP TO MORE THAN THE SUM OF THE PARTS OF BILATERAL RELATIONSHIPS. ANGEL SAID THAT THE TREVI GROUP HAS WORKED WELL TO STRENGTHEN LINKS BETWEEN TERRORISM-PREVENTION PRACTITIONERS IN VARIOUS EC COUNTRIES. HE NOTED, HOWEVER, THAT THE EC TRADITION OF CHANGING PRESIDENTS EVERY SIX MONTHS COULD SOMETIMES GET IN THE WAY OF REAL PROGRESS BECAUSE EACH PRESIDENCY WANTED TO MAKE ITS OWN MARK, USUALLY INVOLVING A PUBLIC DECLARATION. BREMER EXPLAINED THAT THE PUBLIC SIDE WAS VERY HELPFUL TO THE USG IN EDUCATING ITS PUBLIC ABOUT EUROPEAN EFFORTS TO COUNTER TERRORISM DIRECTED AGAINST U.S. INTERESTS IN EUROPE AND ELSEWHERE.

S E C R E T SECTION 03 OF 03 LONDON 07283

EXDIS

19. ANGEL SAID THAT HE LOOKED FORWARD TO THE MAY TERRORISM BILATERALS IN WASHINGTON. HE ADDED THAT THE HMG TEAM WOULD WANT TO TALK ABOUT THE IRA, AS WELL AS

OTHER ISSUES.

20. AMBASSADOR BREMER WAS ACCOMPANIED AT HIS MEETINGS
BY POLITICAL OFFICER ROBIN RAPHEL.

21. THIS CABLE WAS DRAFTED AFTER BREMER'S DEPARTURE.
PRICE

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 03<SSN> 7283<TOR> 870406191835 MSG000166043914
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 03<SSN> 7283<TOR> 870406192037 MSG000166044037
<SECT>SECTION: 03 OF 03<SSN> 7283<TOR> 870406192218 MSG000166044138

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

April 27, 1987

Shin 2981
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/ 11K

31306

Dear Margaret:

In recent weeks I have taken a careful look at U.S. relations with Syria. I wanted to give you my thoughts on this subject, and let you know of my plans in the period ahead.

Like you, I have always believed we cannot and should not be naive about Syria. Its leaders are ruthless and Machiavellian in the pursuit of their interests. We must assess their behavior realistically, understanding that Syria will support terrorism when its leaders believe the benefits outweigh the political risks.

Nevertheless, we need to develop a viable working relationship with Damascus. Syria is an important Middle East country and a key player in regional politics and events. Consequently, we cannot ignore Syria. We will need to be prepared to engage the Syrians on the regional political issues in which they are players when opportunities arise to advance our interests.

As you know, former President Carter has reported President Asad's firm assurance that, as he put it, "Acts of violence against innocent people are prohibited, kidnappings are prohibited, hijackings are prohibited, attacks on people because of their religious beliefs -- like Jews -- are prohibited, attacks outside the site of the problem, such as attacks in Europe, are unacceptable, and there will be absolutely no attacks of a terrorist nature mounted from Syrian territory."

In the period since you and I adopted sanctions against Syria, President Asad appears to have taken some steps to lower Syria's profile -- at least temporarily -- with respect to terrorism.

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NLRR F02-071/3 #31306

BY HOJ NARA 8/4/08

From my perspective, U.S. strategy in the period ahead should be to encourage a step-by-step process to induce Syria to take concrete measures in this direction. Beyond this, there is always the prospect of movement in the peace process, about which Asad has recently expressed more positive views. If nothing else, these views may warrant testing. To the extent possible, it seems to me that we want to do what we can to diminish Asad's incentive to play his usually destructive role whenever a breakthrough toward peace seems within reach.

With these two goals in mind, I plan to send a message soon to President Asad. My message to him will restate our interest in a more normal relationship with Syria, but note that Syria has not taken any of the specific steps we have indicated it should take to end Syrian support for terrorism, such as a break in relations with Abu Nidal. I will suggest that, if President Asad is able to demonstrate, with practical measures, that there will be no further acts of terrorism by groups based in Syria, I will be willing to return our Ambassador to Damascus.

If Asad's response to my message is positive, I would plan to send an emissary on a discreet visit to Damascus to discuss what steps President Asad may be willing to take.

I would welcome your views on this initiative.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in dark ink, appearing to be "Ron", written in a cursive style.

The Right Honorable
Margaret Thatcher, M.P.
Prime Minister
London

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MCNAMARA, THOMAS E.: FILES

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UNITED KINGDOM (FEBRARUY 1987-MAY 1987)

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6

<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
31307	LETTER DUPLICATE OF #20826; THATCHER TO REAGAN	2	5/2/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

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31308	CABLE DUPLICATE OF CONTENTS OF #20826; CABLE #062104Z MAY 87; LETTER - THATCHER TO REAGAN	2	5/6/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

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31309	AGENDA MAY 11 US/UK BILATERAL	1	ND	B1

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31310	CABLE #200426Z MAY 87	8	5/20/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

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<i>ID</i>	<i>Document Type</i> <i>Document Description</i>	<i>No of</i> <i>pages</i>	<i>Doc Date</i>	<i>Restric-</i> <i>tions</i>
31311	CABLE #221730Z MAY 87	2	5/22/1987	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
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