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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. list	re: Terrorism: Exercises (Olympics) (2pp, partial)	n.d.	<del>P-1</del> B1
2. report	re: 1988 Seoul Olympics Counterterrorism Measures ( <del>3</del> <sup>3</sup> pp, partial) <i>(7pp, in whole)</i>	9/-/88	<del>P-1</del> B1
3. cable	from Amembassy Seoul to Secstate Washdc (1p)	9/16/88	<del>P-1</del> B1
4. cable	from USCICNCSOC Macdill AFB FL to JSC Washdc re: exercise Ellipse Foxtrot 88 (1p, partial)	9/8/88	<del>P-1</del> B1
5. cable	from COMJSOC Ft. Bragg NC to Secstate Washdc re: a second in-progress review (1p, partial)	9/8/88	<del>P-1</del> B1
6. report	(4pp)	8/-/88	<del>P-1</del> B1
7. memo	from Barry Kelly to Colin Powel re: Olympic security (3pp)	12/31/87	<del>P-1</del> B1
8. paper	re: <del>Nuclear Terrorism at the XXIV Olympiad, 1988</del> (3pp)	<del>10/27/87</del>	<del>P-5</del> OPEN
9. report	(21pp)	9/-/87	<del>P-1</del> B1
10. paper	re: Terroist Threat Assesment for the Republic of Korea (2pp, partial)	9/18/87	<del>P-1</del> B1
11. e-mail	(2pp)	9/15/87	<del>P-1</del> B1
12. paper	re: The Terrorist Threat in the Republic of Korea (2pp, partial)	8/18/87	<del>P-1</del> B1
13. cable	from Secstate Washdc to Amembassy Seoul re: meeting (2pp)	7/30/87	<del>P-1</del> B1
14. cable	re: first impressions of Jade Nugget 88 (2pp, partial)	n.d.	<del>P-1</del> B1
15. report	( <del>6</del> pp, partial) (13pp, in whole)	7/-/86	<del>P-1</del> B1 <i>1/13 10/24/00</i>
COLLECTION: Counterterrorism and Narcotics Office, NSC: Rcds			smf
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TERRORISM: EXERCISES (OLYMPICS)

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
1	Organizational Chart	Undated
2	Cable: Seoul Olympics/Asian Games	30 Jan 86
3	Official-Informal: Security for Asian Games Olympics	5 Mar 86
4	Security for Asian Games/Olympics	18 Jun 86
5	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
6	S. Korea: Asian Games Security	8 Aug 86
7	Seoul Asian Games: US Support for ROK Security	5 Nov 86
8	Request for Anti-Terrorism Information	9 Jan 87
9	Coordination on Olympics Assistance	16 Apr 87
10	Mission Coordination on Olympics Assistance	29 Apr 87
11	US Contributions to ROK External Security During the 1988 Olympics	May 87
12	USFK Combatting Terrorism Program	6 May 87
13	Mission Olympics Coordination: Current Development	7 May 87
14	DOS Briefing on CT Data Base	23 Jul 87
15	Mtg on USG Assistance for Seoul	30 Jul 87
16	Background Paper re: Terrorist Threat	18 Aug 87
17	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
18	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
19	Background Paper: Terrorist Threat	18 Sep 87
20	Background Paper: Iranian & Libyan Activity in Asia	18 Sep 87
21	October Working Group mtg on Transborder	18 Sep 87
22	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
23	Nuclear Terrorism	27 Oct 87
24	Draft Memo: Olympic Security Preparations	Undated
25	Request for JOSC FCE	30 Oct 87
26	Visit of UndSec Derwinski to Seoul	17 Nov 87
27	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
28	Results of Canadian-US Bilats	20 Nov 87
29	Terrorism: Conf on Security Measures	21 Nov 87
30	Defense Intl Summary	27 Nov 87
31	Follow-up Action to Korean Bilaterals	30 Nov 87
32	Sabatage of Korean AL	2 Dec
33	Comments of Dir of S. Korea's Agency for Natl Security Planning Concerning Flt 858	4 Dec
34	Results of Oct 87 Visit of East Germans	12 Dec 87
35	Threat Assessment, Overseas Locales	15 Dec 87
36	Extradition of Suspected Terrorist Hachiya	16 Dec 87
37	Proposed Concept for JADE NUGGET 88	Undated
38	Exercise Coordination/Approval Process	22 Dec 87
39	Follow-up to ROK-US Bilateral on CT	28 Dec 87
40	IVY Crawler after Action Report	8 Jan 88
41	Calgary Olympics: Interagency Info Sharing	3 Feb 88
42	USG CT Assistance for Seoul	5 Feb 88
43	Key USG Calgary Phone Numbers	9 Feb 88
44	Cable: Manufacturing of various Improvised Explosive Devices	14 Mar 88
45	Cable: Ambassador Bremer's Visit to Seoul	16 Mar 88

TERRORISM: EXERCISES (OLYMPICS) (CONTINUED)

<u>NO.</u>	<u>SUBJECT</u>	<u>DATE</u>
46	[REDACTED]	[REDACTED]
47	Support to ROK	30 Mar
48	IG Mtg on Seoul Olympics	30 Mar
49		
50		RED.
51	REDACTED	
52		
53		REDACTED

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# 1988 Seoul Olympics: Counterterrorism Measures (U)

A Defense Research Report



Defense Intelligence Agency

DDB-2630-71-88  
September 1988

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## 1988 Seoul Olympics: Counterterrorism Measures (U)

A Defense Research Report

*This is a Department of Defense Intelligence Document  
Prepared by the Global Analysis Division,  
Directorate for Research, Defense Intelligence Agency*

*Author: MAJ Richard M. Atwater, USAF  
Terrorism Analysis Branch  
Global Analysis Division*

*Information Cutoff Date: 31 July 1988*

*Classified by multiple sources  
Declassify on OADR*

DDB-2630-71-88

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1988 Seoul Olympics:  
Counterterrorism Measures (U)

SUMMARY

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
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*(U) Seoul's 100,000-seat Olympic Stadium.*

1988 Seoul Olympics:  
Counterterrorism Measures (U)

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*(U) ROK counterterrorism members training at the Olympic Stadium.*

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(U) Significant contributions to this study were provided by Ms. Pamela Jameson and Mrs. Janice Delaney, DB-5C.

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(U) This document has been fully coordinated with the Directorate for Estimates.

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ACTION SS-00

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23

Nuclear Terrorism at the XXIV OLYMPIAD, 1988  
Republic of Korea

PRELIMINARY ASSESSMENT  
27 October 1987

The following conclusions are based upon the results of a Preliminary Assessment of the potential for an act of nuclear terrorism being attempted at, or in conjunction with, the XXIV OLYMPIAD scheduled to be hosted by the Republic of Korea (ROK) during the summer of 1988. This analysis was based solely upon open-source information, and should be therefore treated as PRELIMINARY considerations.

**SUMMARY CONCLUSIONS:**

The probability of non-nuclear violence during the Olympiad is high, and is viewed to be comparable to the probabilities associated with other Olympic games since Munich. This violence could be of two types:

General -- directed against the Olympiad, the Republic of Korea, or the U.S. Armed Forces by an adversary with a message for world consumption;

Specific -- directed against one nation (e.g. it's team) by an adversary for the purpose of manipulation or retribution.

The number of conflicts underway in several areas of the world including, but not limited to: the Mid-East, Africa, Central America, Afghanistan, South and Southeast Asia, virtually insure that some person, group, or nation will seek to use the opportunity presented by the Olympiad to either focus world attention on a cause or to attack an enemy.

At our current stage of knowledge and lacking specific intelligence reports to the contrary, nuclear violence during the Olympiad remains only a possibility, and an attempt to perpetrate a credible nuclear hoax is a somewhat higher possibility. However, in our opinion, these relatively low possibilities should not be discounted until intelligence activities and further analysis enables such threats to be dismissed.

**RATIONALE:**

Potential Adversaries -- The number of world adversaries potentially capable of non-nuclear violence utilizing the stage provided by the Olympiad are many. The subset of adversaries potentially capable of implementing a nuclear threat, or perpetrating a credible nuclear hoax is small, but not insignificant. Potential adversaries span the gamut from lone psychotics, to dedicated terrorist groups and political factions, to nuclear proliferants and state sponsors of terrorism. In the past, few (if any) of these

adversarial types appear to have both the motivational incentive and physical capability for nuclear violence; any intelligence information indicating a change in these prerequisites would be significant.

In the past, the DPRK has been identified as both a direct, as well as an influential, indirect participant in international terrorism. Therefore, a key factor in assessing the likelihood of either nuclear or non-nuclear violence occurring at the Olympiad may very well depend upon the resolution, by the Olympic Committee, of the role assigned to the DPRK in hosting some of the Olympiad events in the DPRK. The more it is perceived by the world community that the DPRK is an active partner or co-sponsor of the Olympiad, the less likely it is that the DPRK would either allow/encourage others, or undertake themselves violent acts during the Olympiad.

Potential Threats -- The spectrum of nuclear threats is extensive; ~~it ranges from a hoax type nuclear extortion threat with no ability and/or intention to carry out the threatened nuclear violence, to threats where the adversary has the capability and intention to detonate a nuclear yield producing device.~~ The probability of any nuclear threat occurring, in our judgment, is low; for assessment purposes, the range of threats was grouped into generic types and then listed in the following sequence of decreasing probability:

~~Hoax~~ -- An adversary conveys their threat, demands, deadlines, etc. by some form of communication and tries to convince the authorities that the threat is genuine. The scenario may be based upon any one of the generic types of nuclear threats; the essential point is that the adversary is bluffing and lacks the ability to carry out the threatened action if their demands are not met. Three nuclear hoaxes were attempted during the 1985 Los Angeles Olympic Games; we are unaware of any similar attempts associated with other Olympic games.

~~Radioactive Dispersal Device (RDD)~~ -- An adversary threatens to contaminate the selected target with a radioactive material by any one of a variety of dispersal techniques. From an adversarial point-of-view this type of nuclear threat may be very attractive; radioactive materials commonly used for medical, industrial, and research applications can be easily obtained, the contamination zone can be limited to the selected target, and great fear can be invoked in the public mind. In short, this type of threat can be implemented in a "low technology" manner, and the level of lethality can be limited by the adversary to be commensurate with his immediate demands and objectives.

~~Non-Nuclear~~ -- An adversary threatens to disrupt, damage, or destroy one of the ROK's nine nuclear power or three research reactors with conventional weapons or techniques; likewise, an unannounced attack could be implemented. The level of lethality can be either limited to shutting down the selected facility without radioactive contamination (or localized within the facility) to wide spread contamination of very radioactive fission products from the reactor fuel. This type of threat would be most likely focused upon either embarrassing or further destabilizing the ROK Government.

~~Improved Nuclear Device~~ (IND) -- An adversary might attempt to acquire Special Nuclear Material (SNM), design, and build their own nuclear yield producing device and threaten to use it in the ROK during the Olympiad; such an undertaking would probably require some support, approval, and/or encouragement by one of the more radical governments (i.e. "state sponsors of terrorism"). In our judgment, such an undertaking would be most extreme for an event like the Olympiad; particularly in view of the fact that the Democratic Peoples Republic of Korea (DPRK) would ultimately have far more to lose than it would have to gain toward their ultimate goal (unifying Korea under DPRK control) by allowing a terrorist group to destroy a city or kill everyone at the Olympiad.

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19

DIA/DB-5  
18 Sep 87

Background Paper for the National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: Terrorist Threat Assessment for the Republic of Korea (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide background information for the National Security Council Staff on the terrorist threat to the Republic of Korea.

2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

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c. (U) Foreign Terrorists.

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
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DIA/DB-5  
18 Sep 87

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~~REDACTED~~

COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY: Mr. Norman Woods  
Global Analysis Division, DIA  
373-1806

APPROVED BY:

1 Enclosure  
Threat Assessment Factors  
(FOUO) 1 Cy

WARNING NOTICE - INTELLIGENCE  
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
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16

DIA/DB-5  
18 Aug 87

Background Paper for the National Security Council Staff

SUBJECT: The Terrorist Threat in the Republic of Korea (U)

1. (U) PURPOSE: To provide background information for the National Security Council Staff on the terrorist threat to Seoul, Osan, and Taegu, Republic of Korea (ROK).

2. (U) POINTS OF MAJOR INTEREST:

~~REDACTED~~-----

-----~~REDACTED~~-----

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
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COORDINATION: None.

PREPARED BY: Mr. Norman C. Woods  
Global Analysis Division, DIA  
373-8106

APPROVED BY:

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*Φ*  
*Olympics*

RUYLSFG/CDR1STBN1SFGA OKINAWA JA  
RUHVAAA/HQ PACAF HICKAM AFB HI  
RUDWAAH/7AF OSAN AB KOR  
RUEHUL/AMEMBASSY SEOUL KOR  
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SUBJECT: FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF JADE NUGGET 88 (U)

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SUBJECT: FIRST IMPRESSIONS OF JADE NUGGET 88 (U)  
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2. (U) OBSERVATIONS.

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3. (U) KEY LESSONS LEARNED.

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5. (U) WE HAVE COORDINATED THIS MESSAGE WITH US EMBASSY, SEOUL.  
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North Korean President  
Kim Il-song (U)

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• *Regional Games, held every four years, but not in the same year as the Olympics. The regional games are as political as the Olympics because they are important to smaller powers who can compete more successfully against regional competitors than against the major sports powers.*

• *World, regional, and national championships in individual sports, held at various intervals under the control of individual sport federations or of their national components. (U)*

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**General Organization**

*The Olympic movement comprises the International Olympic Committee (IOC), national Olympic committees (NOCs), international sport federations, and regional games federations. These organs control the following events:*

• *The Olympic Games, held every four years since 1896 (except during the World Wars). Each four-year cycle is called an Olympiad, with the Games celebrated at the end. The Seoul Olympics will be those of the XXIVth Olympiad (the Olympiads ending in 1916, 1940, and 1944 are counted even though those Games were canceled). Winter Olympic Games do not hold such a designation because the ancient Greeks held no such events.*

*Lausanne was chosen as IOC headquarters in 1913. The nine-member executive board, elected by the IOC General Assembly, sits for four years. The president (currently Spain's Juan Antonio Samaranch) is elected to an initial eight-year term and can be reelected at four-year intervals. (U)*

**National Olympic Committees**  
*NOCs comprise local Olympic officials, a country's IOC members, representatives of various units of the*

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*international federations, and persons from other interested government or business groups. The NOCs must be sanctioned by the IOC but in fact enjoy considerable autonomy. Bids for the Olympic Games can be submitted only through a sanctioned NOC. (U)*

*When a city is selected as Olympic host, its country's NOC, along with local sport federations, business, and government, forms a Games Organizing Committee. This committee is responsible for the preparation of the Olympic site, subject to IOC monitoring. (U)*

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**International Sport Federations**

*Each sport is controlled by an international federation. Some of these are older than the IOC but most have prospered as the Olympic system has grown. Federations must approve the Olympic program in their sport before it is contested and retain complete control of their events throughout the Games. Federations can define the term "amateur" as they wish, and their progressively looser rules have undermined both Olympic rules and IOC insistence that only "amateurs" take part in the Olympic Games. (U)*

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*A General Assembly of Sport Federations coordinates the interests of these groups. In 1983 separate associations were formed of federations whose sports are celebrated in the winter and summer Games. (U)*

**Awards and Boycotts**

*The Olympic Games have been moved from chosen sites three times: from Rome to London in 1908, from Tokyo to Helsinki in 1940, and from Denver to Innsbruck for the winter Olympics in 1976. These shifts came as a result of requests from the Olympic hosts; the IOC has never withdrawn an award on its own initiative. It would do so only if it deemed Olympic preparations unsatisfactory. (U)*

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But—also on 10 January—The Voice of National Salvation, a North Korean-run "clandestine" station transmitted to South Korea, said Kapitsa attacked the "cynical machinations" by which the IOC chose Seoul as Olympic host. According to VNS, he attacked the desire of some countries—notably Japan—to hold the Games only in Seoul. VNS paraphrased Kapitsa as saying his country would attend the Games if they were held in both Korean capitals. (u)

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On 19 February VNS claimed that:

"Kapitsa . . . said that many countries, including Japan, are insisting on holding the Olympics in Seoul only. He debunked such an attitude as a (nonsensical?) decision advanced out of political machination aimed at using the Olympic movement. He said that Moscow is still against holding the Olympics in Seoul, and that it will participate in them only if the Games are held both in P'yongyang and Seoul." (u)

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*Kim Il-song greets Cuban President Castro  
in P'yongyang. (U)*

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**Unified Team: The German Precedent**

From 1952 to 1964, "Germany" was represented in the Olympics by a unified team. German athletes marched in Olympic opening ceremonies behind a compromise flag (the five Olympic rings superimposed on the basic German black-red-gold tricolor). German gold medal winners were serenaded by the strains of a Beethoven hymn rather than either "German" national anthem. (U)

Selecting a unified team proved difficult; hundreds of meetings were required to solve complicated political, jurisdictional, and logistic problems. West Germany dominated team selection, in large part because its national Olympic committee was granted IOC recognition first—in 1951. East Germany's NOC achieved only provisional recognition in 1955. The East Germans entered international sports federation by federation, at last achieving separate Olympic status after the Tokyo Games of 1964. (U)

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IOC President Juan Antonio Samaranch (U)

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