

Ronald Reagan Presidential Library  
Digital Library Collections

---

This is a PDF of a folder from our textual collections.

---

**Collection:** Counterterrorism and Narcotics, Office  
of, NSC: Records

**Folder Title:** NSDD 207: Responses to Issues Papers  
[Earl, Robert] (2)

**Box:** RAC Box 10

---

To see more digitized collections visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/archives/digital-library>

To see all Ronald Reagan Presidential Library inventories visit:

<https://reaganlibrary.gov/document-collection>

Contact a reference archivist at: [reagan.library@nara.gov](mailto:reagan.library@nara.gov)

Citation Guidelines: <https://reaganlibrary.gov/citing>

National Archives Catalogue: <https://catalog.archives.gov/>

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection:** COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:  
Records

**Archivist:** dlb

**File Folder:** NSDD 207: Responses to Issue Papers [Earl, Robert]  
(2 of 4) Box 91956 RA # Box 10

**Date:** 11/2/00  
Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
<del>1. Paper</del>	<del>Comments on Issue Paper No. 11, 1 p. R 8/27/01 F97-082/2 #46</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>2. Paper</del>	<del>Issue Paper No. 3 (Revision #2), 2 p. R 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 #47</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>3. Paper</del>	<del>Text same as #2, marked "OMB rewrite", 2 p. R " " #48</del>	<del>11/8/85</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>4. Paper</del>	<del>Issue Paper No. 3 (Alternative Version), 1 p. R " " #49</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>5. Paper</del>	<del>Same as Item #4, 1 p. R " " #50</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>6. Paper</del>	<del>Same as Item #4, marked NSC changes, with edits, 1 p. R " " #51</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>7. Paper</del>	<del>Same as Item #4, marked "Earl", with edits, 1 p. R " " #52</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>8. Paper</del>	<del>Issue Paper No. 3 (Alternative Version, Eyes only JH), 1 p. R " " #53</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>9. Paper</del>	<del>Copy of Item #8, with edits, 1 p. R " " #54</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>10. Paper</del>	<del>Copy of Item #8, 1 p. R " " #55</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>11. Paper</del>	<del>Copy of Item #8, with edits, 1 p. R " " #56</del>	<del>n.d.</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>12. Memo</del>	<del>For the Record, re: Task Force Principals' Meeting of 12 November 1985, 4 p. R " " #57</del>	<del>11/13/85</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>
<del>13. Memo</del>	<del>to Admiral Holloway, re: Domestic vs. International Terrorism Distinctions in NSDDs, 2 p. R " " #58</del>	<del>11/14/85</del>	<del>P1/B1</del>

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
  - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
  - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
  - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
  - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
  - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

**Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

# PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:  
RECORDS

**File Folder** NSDD 207: RESPONSESE TO ISSUE PAPERS [EARL,  
ROBERT] (2)

**Box Number** 91956

**Withdrawer**  
LOJ 4/24/2007

**FOIA**  
F97-082/2

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
<del>2</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>ISSUES PAPER NO. 3 (REVISION #2)</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>2</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>3</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>SAME AS #2 MARKED "OMB REWRITE"</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>2</del>	<del>11/8/1985</del>
<del>4</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (ALTERNATIVE VERSION)</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>5</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>SAME AS #4</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>6</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>SAME AS #4, MARKED NSC CHANGES, WITH EDITS</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>7</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>SAME AS ITEM #4 MARKED "EARL", WITH EDITS</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>8</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (ALTERNATIVE VERSION, EYES ONLY JLH)</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>9</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>COPY OF #8 WITH EDITS</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>10</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>COPY OF #8</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>11</del>	<del>PAPER</del>	<del>COPY OF #8 WITH EDITS</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>1</del>	<del>ND</del>
<del>12</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>FOR THE RECORD, RE TASK FORCE PRINCIPALS' MEETING OF 11/12/85</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>4</del>	<del>11/13/1985</del>
<del>13</del>	<del>MEMO</del>	<del>TO ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY, RE DOMESTIC VS. INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM DISTINCTIONS IN NSDDS</del> <sup>MVH 3/10/08</sup>	<del>2</del>	<del>11/14/1985</del>

**SECRET**

*rec'd 6 July*

DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY  
WASHINGTON



November 6, 1985

MEMORANDUM TO: Admiral J. L. Holloway, III  
Executive Director  
Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

FROM: J. Robert McBrien *JRM*  
Senior Review Group  
Treasury Representative

SUBJECT: Response to Issue Papers

Attached are Treasury's comments on 21 of the 45 Issue Papers presented for our review. We are substantially in accord with most of the proposals although we have made suggestions on several of them.

We do have objections on two Issue Papers: No. 27 and No. 45. Our views on No. 27 are conceptual. Our position on No. 45 reflects Treasury's strong concern that the protective responsibilities of the Secret Service not be diluted or degraded.

Our responses on the issues are attached.

Attachments

Regarded Unclassified When Separated  
from Classified Attachments.

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

*ab 11/11/00*

**SECRET**

COMMENTS ON ISSUES

Issue Papers No. 1, 2, 3, 4, 6, 7, 8, 10, 11, 18,  
24, 27, 29, 30, 32, 35, 36, 39, 43, 44, 45

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 1

Subject: National Program for Combatting Terrorism

The Treasury Department **concur**s in the proposal for assembling a programming document for combatting terrorism. However, we strongly caution all participants in the Task Force and in the USG's efforts against terrorism that a conceptual approach to combatting terrorism that defines the USG's efforts exclusively in terms of dedicated resource requirements and their concomitant dedicated budget requests will fail to identify how the USG truly combats terrorism. That would result in an artificial, incomplete statement of the national program.

} agree  
its only  
a look  
the  
one  
pens!

Much of the United States activities to combat terrorism are inextricably woven into other activities carried out by law enforcement and security agencies as well as by the intelligence community, the foreign service and the military services. We should seek to establish a comprehensive understanding of the integrated USG program that goes beyond wiring diagram boxes and budget lines that are identified as "antiterrorism."

We are also concerned that a programming document not become a foundation for interagency resource and jurisdictional competition under the magic rubric "anti/counterterrorism." The program objective should be to have all relevant Federal entities contribute within the scope of their missions to a comprehensive, cohesive, coherent, cooperative and coordinated antiterrorism effort, the "C<sup>5</sup>A" program.

The programming document, particularly the initial baseline document, should be treated as a **foundation**, not as a comprehensive program description, and should not become the exclusive measurement of shortfalls, redundancies, resource requirements, and legislative needs. Equal concern in the program's management must be given to the quality and consequences of different agencies' contributions.

concur

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 2

Subject: National Policy for Combatting Terrorism

Treasury ~~concur~~ in the need for an expressed national policy on terrorism and agrees that there is utility in having both public declarations and classified policy.

Currently, our policy is a composite of not only formal declarations (NSDDs) but also official speeches, testimony and, in some cases, statements to the press during times of crisis. Policy has been declared and elaborated upon by the President and Vice President, the Secretary of State, the Secretary of Defense, the President's National Security Adviser and others.

Mutuality of support for the policies announced has not always been apparent to either foreign governments, the public, the Congress or the agencies which should execute those policies. Consequently, our national policy may be described from a positive perspective as still evolving in some areas or, in a negative sense, as being contradictory or unsettled on particular issues (e.g., use of military force).

A public reiteration of the essential components of USG antiterrorism policy (while it should not be driven by the specter of press or congressional criticism) could be a useful instrument for informing the public, the press, the Congress, government agencies generally, and our foreign friends and adversaries of the USG's "bottom line" on terrorism. While the statements cited in Issue Paper No. 2 are a good base for a new iteration of policy, ~~there should be a reexamination of what essential elements the USG wants and needs to convey~~ in such a message and of how we think the declared policy will be interpreted by its various audiences. If practicable, public resolution of perceived areas of policy contention should be addressed.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 3

Subject: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

The Treasury Department agrees that the existing interagency mechanisms should be retained with some modification. We particularly support the concept of establishing a senior officer of the NSC, supported by a small, full-time staff, who will be responsible for monitoring, coordinating and helping to carry-out the government-wide antiterrorism program.

The disparate government elements involved in the fight against terrorism cannot be coordinated and integrated to the necessary extent without close attention from a central authority, the NSC, that can work with the universe of institutional concerns involved and that can give direction on behalf of the President. Combatting terrorism is not the special domain of any institution or professional discipline within the government, whether in the realm of criminal justice, intelligence, security, diplomacy, or the military.

Terrorism as a phenomenon and its attendant issues, policies, strategies and programs, as well as specific incidents and activities, cut across these boundaries in an unprecedented fashion -- just as they obscure the traditional "foreign" and "domestic" distinctions. Managing them requires a comprehensive, nonparochial perspective not only of how the discrete elements of the government are involved but also of where and how they should be coordinated and integrated and their competing interests balanced. The NSC, which is uniquely situated to manage these efforts without institutional bias and which already shares part of this role through the TIWG during an incident, is the logical repository of this responsibility.

We have also examined the question of whether assigning these responsibilities to the NSC will involve the President prematurely in terrorism incidents or will create unreasonable expectations of the President in dealing with terrorism. We do not believe so. (∞)

The mechanism that we now have for dealing with terrorism incidents, the TIWG, is subordinate to and chaired by the NSC. The TIWG automatically involves the White House in an incident at the earliest possible moment with the degree of involvement being the principal variable. We would suggest that the NSC, the White House, and the President have long ceased to have any plausible deniability for the ultimate responsibility in managing terrorism incidents and in formulating and executing policies and programs to combat terrorism. This has been the public, congressional and international perception since at least the 1983 suicide bombing of the Marine Headquarters at Beirut International Airport; and it has been reinforced dramatically by the skyjacking of TWA 847 and the Achille Lauro incident. ✓



The accountability for combatting terrorism is already in the White House; it is time that the instruments to manage the coordination of the national antiterrorism program should be located there and should have authority commensurate with that responsibility.

Our only concern with this proposal is in ensuring that the NSC's assuming of the chairmanship of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (1) will not divest the State Department of responsibility for matters in which it should at least initially have the lead, even if primarily for coordination, and (2) as a concomitant will not burden the National Coordinator and his staff with micromanagement responsibilities.

*fair enough; we agree*

Avoiding that kind of outcome will be important; and if an alternative to the Task Force Working Group's proposal must be considered, it may be possible to place the program coordination management role in the NSC as an additional function of the TIWG without shifting the IG/T chair from State. The enhanced TIWG could then concentrate its management coordination role on the totality of the antiterrorism program and on special problems that arise.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 4

Subject: Definition of Terrorism

Treasury believes that the proposed long and short definitions of terrorism are acceptable.

Although we do not object to them, we do not see a pressing need for defining the terms "antiterrorism" and counterterrorism."

However, we do have a problem with introducing the definitions of other forms of low intensity political conflict, i.e., ~~insurgency~~, into the national policy arena. Although, there is utility in distinguishing between terrorism and friendly insurgencies, we may find that the proposed definition of insurgency raises as many questions as it answers.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 6

Subject: Policy for Active Response to Terrorist  
Threats and Incidents

The Treasury Department concurs in the proposal.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 7

Subject: International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

Treasury concurs with the objective of this proposal although we defer to the Department of State on the likelihood of achieving these parallel goals.

We also believe that the Department of Justice and Treasury should be involved in this process particularly in terms of extradition treaties, prosecutions by two or more countries, exchanges of law enforcement information, and international cooperation among law enforcement entities.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 8

Subject: Extradition Treaties

Treasury concurs in this proposal but believes that both the Justice Department and State should be involved and that Treasury should contribute any "lessons learned" by its law enforcement agencies to this review, drafting and negotiating process.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 10

Subject: Counterterrorism Exercises and Simulations

Treasury concurs in the proposal but believes that an effort must be made in some exercises to simulate problems that would be likely to involve Federal law enforcement and other agencies in addition to the FBI. This would include for example: ATF, Customs, the Secret Service, the Park Police, the Coast Guard, the Department of Energy, and the Center for Disease Control.

~~SECRET~~

Treasury Response

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 11

Subject: Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism

Treasury supports this proposal. We also believe that the community of intelligence personnel who are assigned to it on a rotational basis should include representatives from the Secret Service, the Customs Service, and ATF, and possibly the Office of the Secretary of the Treasury.

As the concept is developed, we believe that a legal working group should be tasked with identifying legal obstacles to its full effectiveness and with developing proposed solutions to those obstacles.

DECLASSIFIED

F97-082/2-#46

CAJ, J.R. D I E 8/27/01

~~SECRET~~

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 18

Subject: Prohibition of Training and Support/Counterterrorism/  
Mercenary Training Camps

Treasury supports this proposal but believes that Treasury and two of its law enforcement agencies -- the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF) and the U.S. Customs Service -- should be involved in this task with State and Justice.



COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 24

Subject: Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement  
Elements Domestically and Overseas

Treasury would support this proposal if it were expanded in two ways:

1. Overseas: The training and accreditation of U.S. counterterrorism specialists should include some Special Agents of the U.S. Customs Service who are being assigned overseas to Customs Attache Offices. Customs attaches often have unique access to and cooperation from foreign customs service and, in some instances, other foreign law enforcement and security agencies. Their more intensive preparation in the area of terrorism would offer an opportunity to contribute significantly to U.S.-foreign liaison and coordination on counterterrorism.

It would also be beneficial if a cadre of ATF and Secret Service agents who engage in foreign liaison and, in the case of the Secret Service, are being assigned overseas were trained and accredited as U.S. counterterrorism specialists. This would expand the U.S. ability to further our CT relationships and would enhance the credibility of the individual agents as well as reinforce the seriousness of U.S. the initiative.

2. Domestic: In coordination with the FBI and the Intelligence Community, select agents of ATF, Customs, and the Secret Service should be indoctrinated in the national CT program in order that their own liaison and working relationships with state and local law enforcement authorities can better contribute to a comprehensive CT program.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 27

Subject: Terrorism as a Crime

The proposal accompanying this issue is in two parts: (1) that Justice seek legislation to make "terrorism" a criminal offense and (2) that the USG not refer to terrorism as war but rather as crime.

With regard to defining "terrorism" as a federal crime, while we have no intrinsic objection to it, we have substantial doubt that doing so will have much impact on the phenomenon (assuming that the Congress could agree to a "terrorism" definition which would be suitable for describing a criminal offense as contrasted with describing a political phenomenon).

More important is that we not adopt a dogmatic conceptual view of the terrorism phenomenon. In the process of attempting to emphasize terrorism's unconventionality and unacceptability -- its inherent wrongfulness -- as a means of conducting political and military affairs, we must take greater care to ensure that we do not establish a philosophical or legalistic impediment to the employment of those means of armed conflict that we may need to combat terrorism. If we exclude terrorism totally from the concept of war and confine it to crime, we may undermine our legal and political predicates for using our own military and paramilitary assets against terrorists and for taking self-defensive actions usually thought of as relating to conduct between nations.

Thus, what is needed is a conceptual treatment of terrorism that views it both as being criminal in nature and as being illegitimate armed conflict, i.e., "outlaw war" or "lawless statecraft." Terrorism's unconventionality, ubiquity, unpredictability and adaptability require that our own traditional views of crime and war be expanded and developed to define and comprehend terrorism in all its dimensions.

Consequently, we believe that limiting the USG's references to terrorism to crime alone would be both naive and highly counterproductive. It is a complex phenomenon, and simple approaches will not be adequate for combatting it.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 29

Subject: Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)

We support action to amend the FOIA.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 30

Subject: Terrorism Intelligence Analysts

Treasury supports this proposal and would hope to train a few analysts from our enforcement agencies through this process.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 32

Subject: Controlling Cross-Border Travel of Known or Suspected Terrorists

Treasury supports a more intensive effort to control the international travel of known or suspected terrorists. We believe that the effort's first priority should be in denying U.S. visas to suspected or known terrorists and, failing that, to provide more timely and detailed look-out information to the Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) and the U.S. Customs Service. If improving State's AVLOS is the best way to do that, we should concentrate on that activity.

While we support a multilateral program to exchange information on terrorists' movements, we are not particularly confident that a computerized international data base would be either politically achievable or sufficiently complete and reliable to have a good probability of success. In any event, we believe that collateral efforts should be made to improve the exchange of information on terrorist border crossings among customs services and border patrol agencies. Those efforts could complement U.S. foreign intelligence activities on terrorism; and, if successful, might be integrated into the proposed data base.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 35

Subject: Country Team Briefings

Treasury believes that Country Team briefings on U.S. counterterrorism capabilities should also include the FBI LEGATTS, Customs Attaches, and senior DEA and Secret Service representatives in those countries where they are assigned.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 36

Subject: U.S. Infrastructure Vulnerabilities

We do not object to the proposed interagency study. However, we believe that the work in this area should be coordinated with that which has already occurred as part of the United States overall emergency mobilization and preparedness efforts and those activities involving the security and survivability of our national telecommunications system.

It may be a cheaper proposition for the NSC to contract with an outside authority which has already done some work on this question, such as Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies.

In terms of resource allocation and budgeting priorities, this issue will nearly always play a minor role unless the private sector, which we believe controls most of the assets threatened, can be persuaded that more needs to be done and that it is in their best economic interests to do it.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPERS NO. 39 and 44

Subject: Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism;  
International RD & A Initiatives

We concur that a special effort should be made on R&D through the proposed National Coordinator.

We believe that the initiative proposed in No. 44 should be closely coordinated with the rest of the USG's R&D activity for combatting terrorism.



Treasury Response

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 43

Subject: U.S. Presence Abroad

While we do not object to this proposal, we are concerned that a U.S. law enforcement presence in some high threat countries might be eliminated without an adequate balancing of its importance. Since law enforcement work carries with it recognition and acceptance of being at greater risk of serious physical harm or death, the balancing must be to avoid unacceptable risk.

COMMENTS ON ISSUE PAPER NO. 45

Subject: Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

The Department of the Treasury's current policy concerning the protection of visiting dignitaries -- limiting the Secret Service's responsibility to the Head of State or Head of Government -- is based on the terms of Title 18, United States Code, Section 3056. The Department believes that it was **not the intent of Congress** that the Secret Service **protect** any of the "accompanying party" unless directed to do so by the President of the United States, after a finding of a specific need for protection. The State Department's authority pursuant to Title 22, United States Code, Section 2666, clearly applies to any other foreign dignitary in need of protection.

The Department of the Treasury is in agreement with the assessment that the protection of foreign Heads of State and Government is beneficial to the Secret Service's overall mission. The relationships established during these visits greatly enhance the cooperation the Service receives when the President and Vice President visit the reciprocal country. ✓

However, we strongly disagree that there exists fragmentation or egregious duplication in the protection of a visiting Head of State's "accompanying party." Our experience indicates it is far from clear that there is a substantial duplication in the current situation, since one of these agencies would be supplying people and resources to protect the "accompanying party" of the Head of State.

The overlapping responsibilities that may exist have been managed effectively by the two affected agencies in the past and will not present an insurmountable problem for the future.

Finally, the Department of the Treasury will never allow the Secret Service's major focus of protecting the President and Vice President to be diminished.

*I'm not convinced...*

*gratuitous*



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING  
OF  
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM  
NOVEMBER 7, 1985  
3:00 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.  
Room 208, OEOB

AGENDA

Opening Remarks -- Admiral Holloway  
Presentation of Draft Recommendations  
Discussion of Draft Recommendations  
Discussion of Nov 12 Agenda for Task Force Principals Meeting

LIST OF ISSUES FOR INITIAL DISCUSSION

Issue Paper No. 1	National Program for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 2	National Policy for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 3	National Organization for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 4	Definition of Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 6	Policy for Active Response to Terrorist Threats and Incidents
Issue Paper No. 7	International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 11	Intelligence Fusion Center for Terrorism
Issue Paper No. 17	Current Policy regarding the Operational Security of JSOC/DELTA
Issue Paper No. 22	Multilateral Counterterrorist (CT) Strike Force
Issue Paper No. 24	Increased Coordination with Law Enforcement Elements Domestically and Overseas
Issue Paper No. 25	Rewards
Issue Paper No. 27	Terrorism as a Crime
Issue Paper No. 29	Freedom of Information Act (FOIA)
Issue Paper No. 30	Terrorism Intelligence Analysts
Issue Paper No. 42	Deployment Policy of JSOC



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT  
WASHINGTON  
SENIOR REVIEW GROUP MEETING  
OF  
VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM  
7 NOVEMBER 1985  
3 p.m. - 4:30 p.m.  
ROOM 208, OEOB

PARTICIPANTS

CHAIRMAN: Vice President George Bush

EXECUTIVE DIRECTOR: Admiral J. L. Holloway, USN (Ret.)

SENIOR REVIEW GROUP:

STATE: Ambassador Robert Oakley  
Ambassador Parker W. Borg  
J. Robert McBrien

TREASURY: Noel Koch

DEFENSE: Lowell Jensen

JUSTICE: Matthew Z. Scocozza

TRANSPORTATION: Charles Alien

CIA: LTGEN John H. Moeliring

JCS: Oliver Revell

FBI: VADM John Poindexter

NSC: Oliver North

WHITE HOUSE: Richard Hauser for Fred Fielding

OMB: Robert Howard for Dr. Alton Keel

WORKING GROUP

Ambassador Edward L. Peck (Deputy Director)  
Lou H. Boink  
David L. Cole  
Craig P. Coy  
Patrick F. Daly  
Robert L. Earl  
Burton Hutchings  
David J. McMunn

LIAISON GROUP

FBI: Charles Stapleton

FAA: Billie Vincent

OMB: Arnold Donahue

JUSTICE: David Bouvinger

OK = OK  
 → = must changes  
 X = Non-concur

	1	2	4	6	12	39	42	43	45
State	→	OK	X	X	X	→	X	→	→
DoD	OK	X	→	X	OK	OK	X →	OK	OK
Treasury	OK	OK	→	OK		OK		→	X
Justice	OK	→	→ <sup>OK?</sup>	OK <sup>→?</sup>	OK	OK		OK	OK
Transportation				OK		OK			
CIA	OK	OK	→	OK	OK <small>No. Coarct</small>	OK	X →	→	→
OMB	X								
FBI	OK	→	→	OK	OK				
JCS	OK	OK	→	OK	OK	→	X	OK	OK
NSC	→	OK	X	→	X				

Work OK Drop OK OK Drop OK Drop...? or Work

1	Program → PEDS graphics brief	1	Earl, Hutch
2			
3	Coordinator	11	Holloway, Hutch
4	Definition	2	Earl
6 & <del>7</del>	Response Policy & Options	8	Earl, Hutch
7			
11	Fusion Center	10	Hutch
<del>16</del> , 17, 42	JSOC Deployment & Cover	9	Boink, Daly, Earl
<del>21</del> 22	Paramilitary Response	7	Hutch
<del>23</del>	ISA	12	Holloway, Hutch
24 ?	Coord w/ Law Enforcement	6	Hutch
25	Rewards	3	McMunn
27			
29	FOIA	4	Cole
<del>30</del>			
42	Infrastructure Vulnerabilities	5	Boink

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Revision #2)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: Strengthening Counterterrorism Policy Coordination

ISSUE: The organization for combatting terrorism must be compatible with the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Government, be capable of administering the programmatic aspects of the national program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a counterterrorist strategy, and provide the operational capability for dealing with terrorist threats and incidents. The existing organization utilizes the interagency approach in the form of the Lead Agency concept. The principal components of this interagency approach are:

(1) the assignment of Lead Agency responsibilities to the Department of State for terrorism overseas, the Department of Justice/FBI for terrorism within the United States, and the FAA for aircraft hijackings.

(2) the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), which generally operates in a tactical fashion to resolve threats and incidents in an operational context.

(3) the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), which identifies issues, make recommendations on policies and programs and coordinates interagency counterterrorism activities.

(4) The NSC, which exercises policy oversight and coordination responsibilities, including chairing the TIWG.

While this organizational arrangement has been generally worked well, there are some problems, including delay in correcting the operational difficulties identified by the TIWG, delay in implementation of the IG/T recommendations, and lack of sufficient long-term planning efforts. In addition, there has not been sufficient collaboration between the operationally-oriented TIWG and the policy and program activities of the IG/T.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group should be retained with the following modification:

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED  
WLS F97-082/2#47  
BY ADJ NARA DATE 10/11/02



~~SECRET~~

The National Security Council should strengthen its overall policy coordinating role in combatting terrorism. The NSC should assign additional staff to this function and should:

- (1) Continue to chair the TIWG and co-chair the IG/T.
- (2) Work with the IG/T to identify programs to:
  - o correct current operational deficiencies.
  - o formulate coherent plans for long-term efforts.
- (3) Staff recommendations to the President, for his decision.
- (4) Work with the agencies and OMB to make sure that the President's decision are implemented.

~~SECRET~~

8 November 1985

LIST OF ISSUES RESOLVED AT 7 November SRG Meeting (Revised List)

1. Issues in Contention: #3 (one issue)
2. Issues Agreed in Principle but Requiring Some Refinement:  
1, 2, 7, 11, 14, 16, 17, 21, 22, 24, 25, 30, 45 (13 issues)
3. Issues Agreed Upon:  
5, 6, 8, 9, 10, 12, 13, 15, 18, 20, 26, 28, 29, 31, 32,  
33, 35, 36, 38, 39, 41, 43, 44.....(23 issues)
4. Issues Being Dropped:  
4, 19, 27, 34, 37, 42, (6 issues)

# SECRET

For use of this form, see AR 380-5; the proponent agency is ACSI.

THIS IS A COVER SHEET  
FOR  
INFORMATION SUBJECT TO  
BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN  
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION  
DOD 5200.1-R AS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMPONENT  
REGULATIONS

THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFOR-  
MATION CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)  
COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE SERIOUS  
DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION  
OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REGULATIONS  
CITED ABOVE

UNCLASSIFIED FROM REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED INFORMATION B(S)

*dlb 11/1/00*

*(This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents)*

# SECRET

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Revision #2)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: ~~Strengthening Counterterrorism Policy Coordination~~

ISSUE: The organization for combatting terrorism must be compatible with the overall organizational structure of the U.S. Government, be capable of administering the programmatic aspects of the national program for combatting terrorism, be able to generate a counterterrorist strategy, and provide the operational capability for dealing with terrorist threats and incidents. The existing organization utilizes the interagency approach in the form of the Lead Agency concept. The principal components of this interagency approach are:

- (1) the assignment of Lead Agency responsibilities to the Department of State for terrorism overseas, the Department of Justice/FBI for terrorism within the United States, and the FAA for aircraft hijackings.
- (2) the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), which generally operates in a tactical fashion to resolve threats and incidents in an operational context.
- (3) the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), which identifies issues, make recommendations on policies and programs and ~~coordinates~~ interagency counterterrorism activities.
- (4) The NSC, which exercises ~~policy oversight and coordination responsibilities~~, including chairing the TIWG.

While this organizational arrangement has been generally worked well, there are some problems, including ~~delay~~ in correcting the operational difficulties identified by the TIWG, ~~delay~~ in implementation of the IG/T recommendations, and lack of sufficient long-term planning efforts. In addition, there has not been sufficient collaboration between the operationally-oriented TIWG and the ~~policy and program activities~~ of the IG/T.

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group should be retained with the following modification:

~~SECRET~~

The National Security Council should strengthen its overall policy coordinating role in combatting terrorism. The NSC should assign additional staff to this function and should:

- (1) Continue to chair the TIWG and co-chair the IG/T.
- (2) Work with the IG/T to identify programs to:
  - o correct current operational deficiencies.
  - o formulate coherent plans for long-term efforts.
- (3) Staff recommendations to the President, for his decision.
- (4) Work with the agencies [and OMB] to make sure that the President's decisions are implemented.

~~SECRET~~

12 November 1985

AGENDA ITEM #4: PLANS FOR THE FINAL REPORT

I. Schedule: Report to be submitted to the President on 20 December

-- SRG to consider the first draft on 27 November

-- Task Force principals to meet to review the draft report on  
16 December

II. Format

Background

Conclusions

Recommendations

Annexes

III. Points

Throughout the background section of the report important "points" (as opposed to more debatable or contentious "issues"), gleaned from our consultations with terrorism experts both inside and outside the government, will be made. This will be a significant part of our effort to "educate the public" in our later public report (Feb 1986).

12 November 1985

MEMO FOR ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY

Subject: The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T)

1. The only national document establishing the IG/T is NSDD 30 of 10 April 1982:

*intl (only)?*  
"The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), chaired by the Department of State, will be responsible for the development of overall US policy on terrorism, including, inter alia, policy directives, organizational issues, legislative initiatives, and interagency training programs."

2. The membership of the IG/T is not stipulated in NSDD 30, nor in any other national document.

3. Membership of the IG/T has apparently "evolved" over the years. The IG/T itself considers its own membership, and recently acted to add DEA and the NIO/T (in addition to a CIA member) to the IG/T. (Source: telecon with Parker Borg, 12 November 1985.)

4. A 26 April 1985 internal State Department briefing memo for Mr. Whitehead lists the current membership of the IG/T:


"The permanent members include the Vice President's Office, the NSC, the Department of Justice (which has interagency responsibility for domestic terrorism) and the FBI, DEA, the Department of the Treasury, the Department of Defense and the JCS, the Department of Energy, the CIA, and the FAA. Other agencies are invited when there is an agenda item of direct interest to them."

Note: This totals 12 "permanent" members, although adding the NIO/T would make it 13.

5. A passing reference to the IG/T is made in NSDD 138 of 3 April 1984:

"A consolidated plan to implement these Phase I security, protection, and enforcement initiatives shall be prepared by the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) for review by the NSPG no later than May 31, 1984."

Very respectfully,



Robert L. Earl

12 November 1985

NOTE FOR ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY

Subject: Comments on NSC Changes on "Consensus" Draft of Issue #3

1. In general, all four changes dilute the impact of our intended action to put someone in charge. Specifically,

deleting the reference to "paygrade" of the coordinator (Special Assistant to the President) allows the NSC to keep the status quo -- i.e. at the lowest possible staffing level. (Allows Ollie to be retained "as is" -- not even a "promotion" to upgrade NSC influence.)

adding State/CT in subpara c (with OMB) further dilutes the impact of the NSC coordinator ("shares" power with more people -- responsibility and authority are diluted).

substituting the word "recommendations" for "direction" in subpara d dilutes the impact of the NSC staff on State and even raises the question of who's subordinate to whom?

constraining the applicability of the "focal point" in subpara e to merely "resolving disputed matters that cannot be reconciled through normal interagency channels" dilutes the role of the NSC coordinator much further than our proposed draft.

2. The NSC apparently agrees with the State Department interpretation of the role of the IG/T as applying only to international terrorism. Although this is certainly not made clear in NSDD 30, I would expect it to be the DOJ interpretation as well -- i.e. DOJ feels that they have Lead Agency responsibility for domestic terrorism lock, stock, and barrel, and that their membership on the IG/T is merely because of their small but increasing role in international terrorism. Thus, by this interpretation, there is no counterpart interdepartmental group for domestic terrorism. (Perhaps there should be, with the NSC coordinator being "in charge" of both interdepartmental groups.)





OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

12 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

FROM: J. L. Holloway, III *4*  
Admiral, USN (Ret.)  
Executive Director of the Task  
Force on Combatting Terrorism

SUBJECT: Draft Recommendation No. 3. "National Organization  
for Combatting Terrorism"

1. Enclosed is a revision to Draft Recommendation No. 3. "National Organization for Combatting Terrorism".

2. This version was prepared on the basis of interagency discussions conducted subsequent to the meeting of the Senior Review Group on 7 November 1985, and is intended to represent a consensus of the views offered by the Task Force representatives.

Enclosure:  
Draft Recommendation

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, at the level of Special Assistant to the President, which will:

a. Be supported by a small staff.

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and policy direction of the national program for combatting terrorism through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).

e. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

f. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State shall include serving as:

a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.

c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting terrorism.

3. There shall be established a TIWG support group, made up of interagency representatives, to be convened and to remain in session for the duration of terrorist incidents.

~~SECRET~~

E97-082/2#49

LOJ

10/11/02

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, at the level of Special Assistant to the President, which will:

a. Be supported by a small staff.

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and policy direction of the national program for combatting terrorism through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).

e. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

f. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State shall include serving as:

a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.

c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting terrorism.

3. There shall be established a TIWG support group, made up of interagency representatives, to be convened and to remain in session for the duration of terrorist incidents.

~~SECRET~~

L05

F97-082/2#50

10/11/02



OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT

WASHINGTON

12 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism

FROM: J. L. Holloway, III *4*  
Admiral, USN (Ret.)  
Executive Director of the Task  
Force on Combatting Terrorism

SUBJECT: Draft Recommendation No. 3. "National Organization  
for Combatting Terrorism"

1. Enclosed is a revision to Draft Recommendation No. 3. "National Organization for Combatting Terrorism".
2. This version was prepared on the basis of interagency discussions conducted subsequent to the meeting of the Senior Review Group on 7 November 1985, and is intended to represent a consensus of the views offered by the Task Force representatives.

Enclosure:  
Draft Recommendation

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modifications:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, [at the level of Special Assistant to the President,] which will:

*dilutes impact*

a. Be supported by a small staff.

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB<sub>and S/CT</sub>, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

*dilutes*

d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and policy ~~direction of~~ the national program for combatting terrorism through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).

*Who's subordinate to whom?*

e. Provide a focal point for <sup>resolving disputed</sup> ~~all~~ matters concerning terrorism other than those [clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.] *that cannot be reconciled thru normal interagency channels. process*

*dilutes*

f. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

*not by exception*

2. The duties of the Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism in the Department of State shall include serving as:

a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.

c. Principal Administration spokesman for national policy dealing with combatting terrorism.

3. There shall be established a TIWG support group, made up of interagency representatives, to be convened and to remain in session for the duration of terrorist incidents.

F97-082/2#51

~~SECRET~~

*LOI*

*10/11/02*

*recons. regarding*

Earl

~~SECRET~~

F97-082/2#52

LOI

10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modification:

1. There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, at the level of Special Assistant to the President, which will:

a. Be supported by a small staff.

b. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).

c. Be responsible, in conjunction with OMB, for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.

d. Provide, on behalf of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs, both management coordination and ~~policy direction~~ of the [entire] national program for combatting terrorism and through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).

e. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

f. Serve as Vice Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

2. There <sup>duties</sup> shall be created in the Department of State the position of Ambassador-at-Large for Combatting Terrorism. His duties shall be as determined by the Secretary of State, but shall include:

a. Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.

b. Vice Chairman of the Terrorist Incident Working Group.

c. Principal Administration spokesman for the national policy for combatting terrorism.

3. There shall be established an interdepartmental group for the TIWG [which] shall <sup>to</sup> be convened and remain in session for the ~~duration~~ <sup>agency support</sup> of all incidents.

~~terrorist~~

*for the TIWG*  
*a support group made of appropriate interagency representatives for the TIWG*

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

LOT

F97-082/2 #53

10/11/02

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version, Eyes Only JLH)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modification:

There will be established on the National Security Council staff a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, at the level of Special Assistant to the President, which will:

1. Be supported by a small staff.
2. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).
3. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
4. Provide both management coordination and policy direction of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and through the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).
5. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version, Eyes Only JLH)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modification:

There will be established on the NSC<sup>staff</sup> a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, at the level of Special Assistant to the President, which will:

1. Be supported by a small staff.
2. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).
3. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
4. Provide <sup>both</sup> management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).
5. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

*policy direction through*

F97-082/2 #54

LOJ

10/11/02

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3 (Alternative Version, Eyes Only JLH)

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations set forth in NSDD 30 should be retained with the following modification:

There will be established on the NSC a position dedicated full-time to the national program for combatting terrorism, at the level of Special Assistant to the President, which will:

1. Be supported by a small staff.
2. Serve as Executive Director of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG).
3. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
4. Provide management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T).
5. Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

F97-082/2#55

LOJ

10/11/02

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

ISSUE PAPER NO. 3

COGNIZANT ACTIVITY: All Departments and Agencies

SUBJECT: National Organization for Combatting Terrorism

DRAFT RECOMMENDATION: The existing interagency approach and Lead Agency concept utilizing the basic organizations <sup>set forth in NSDD 30</sup> ~~Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Terrorist Incident Working Group~~ should be retained with the following modifications: <sup>on the NSC a dedicated, full-time ~~to the national program~~</sup>  
There will be established ~~the position of National Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism, in the National Security Council organization~~ at the level of ~~Senior Director for National Security~~ <sup>Special Assistant to the President</sup>. ~~The Coordinator will be:~~

for

1. ~~Be~~ Supported by a small, full-time, dedicated staff.
2. ~~Serve as Chairman of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.~~
2. Serve as Executive Director of the TIWG.
3. Be responsible for maintaining the programming documents of the national program for combatting terrorism.
4. Provide management coordination of the entire national program for combatting terrorism through the programming documents and the ~~Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism.~~
5. <sup>Chairman,</sup> Provide a focal point for all matters concerning terrorism other than those clearly the sole responsibility of a single agency or department.

197-082/2456

LOT

10/11/62

~~SECRET~~

TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

<b>Date of Receipt</b>	13 NOV 1985	<b>Router's Initials</b>	RE
------------------------	-------------	--------------------------	----

**Remarks:** MFR: Task Force Principals' Meeting of 12 November

Holloway	Λ.	(I)	M
Peck	Λ	(I)	
Coy	Λ	(I)	CM
Boink	Λ	(I)	Bob
Cole	Λ	(I)	Bob
Daly	Λ	(I)	DO
Earl	Λ	(I)	RE Good Report!
Hutchings	Λ	(I)	PAWA
McMunn	Λ	(I)	M
Doris	Λ	I	
	Λ	I	
	Λ	I	
	Λ	I	

**Deadline Date** Return to Bob Earl after routing.

**Incoming Chrono File**

**Data Base Keyword(s)**

<b>Filer</b>	<b>Out</b>
--------------	------------

**Subject Working File**

# SECRET

For use of this form, see AR 380-5; the proponent agency is ACSI.

THIS IS A COVER SHEET  
FOR  
INFORMATION SUBJECT TO  
BASIC SECURITY REQUIREMENTS CONTAINED IN  
INFORMATION SECURITY PROGRAM REGULATION  
DOD 5200.1-R AS SUPPLEMENTED BY COMPONENT  
REGULATIONS

THE UNAUTHORIZED DISCLOSURE OF THE INFOR-  
MATION CONTAINED IN THE ATTACHED DOCUMENT(S)  
COULD REASONABLY BE EXPECTED TO CAUSE SERIOUS  
DAMAGE TO THE NATIONAL SECURITY

HANDLING, STORAGE, REPRODUCTION AND DISPOSITION  
OF ATTACHED DOCUMENT WILL BE IN ACCORDANCE WITH  
POLICIES AND PROCEDURES SET FORTH IN REGULATIONS  
CITED ABOVE

DECLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF  
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES *db 11/1/00*

*(This cover sheet is unclassified when separated from classified documents)*

# SECRET

DA LABEL 23  
1 MAY 73

PREVIOUS EDITIONS OF THIS LABEL ARE OBSOLETE \* U.S. G.P.O. 1974-552-726

~~SECRET~~

13 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR THE RECORD

Subject: Task Force Principals' Meeting of 12 November 1985

1. The third meeting of the principals of the Task Force on Combatting terrorism convened at 4.04 pm, Tuesday, 12 November 1985 in the Roosevelt Room of the White House. Vice President George Bush convened the meeting as Chairman of the Task Force, while press photographers took a few pictures. In attendance were: Secretary of State Shultz, Secretary of Defense Weinberger, Attorney General Meese, Secretary of the Treasury Dole, FBI Director Webster, OMB Associate Director Keel, CIA Deputy Director McMahon, JCS Chairman Crowe, White House Counsel Fielding, Deputy National Security Adviser Poindexter, the Vice President's Chief of Staff Fuller, the Vice President's National Security Adviser Gregg, and Executive Director Holloway.
2. The VP began by commending everyone's efforts to date, particularly Adm Holloway and staff. "Superb job" so far. There is broad agreement on most issues. He promised to get everyone out of the meeting by 5 pm.
3. Adm Holloway also expressed appreciation for everyone's candor and interest within the Task Force. We're on schedule. We've resolved most Congressional concerns, although we've only permitted them to consult with us. On 23 November the VP meets with media CEOs. The earlier concern of the Working Group and others in the Task Force that the press would see an attempt to impose restraining guidelines on them seems largely dispelled. The media appear genuinely enthusiastic about the meeting.
4. Admiral Holcomb presented the programming documents -- 155 program elements; 21,000 people; etc.
5. Secretary Shultz questioned whether people with more than one job were shown in the statistics. (Answer: yes.) Is a guard at the Israeli Embassy here in town counted? (Answer: probably.) People's reaction will be: "My God! Is there this much money and people devoted to terrorism?" (Adm Holcomb stressed that the data came from the agencies themselves.)
6. Admiral Holloway made the point that when one person devotes less than full time to terrorism, man-year equivalents were counted.
7. Attorney General Meese asked if the "Administration" category included us sitting at this table? (Answer: yes.)

~~SECRET~~

197-082/2-57

LOT

10/11/82

~~SECRET~~

8. Admiral Holloway turned to the Issue status chart in the handouts. 23 of the original 45 issues were in basic agreement. 13 of them were agreed upon in principle, but needed rework. Only one issue was in strong contention (national organization). Six issues had been dropped. The revision to Issue 3 had resulted from some working-level rework this weekend, but apparently there was still substantial division of opinion. Indeed, there were diverse, almost diametrically opposed opinions on it, and it had become a very sticky issue.

9. The VP paraphrased the NSC & State objections that he had heard last week at the SRG meeting -- a concern that a coordinator would be too close to the White House, and that the organization should not be as operational in the White House as was being proposed. He suggested the issue be opened for discussion and asked the Secretary of State for his views.

10. Secretary Shultz stated this will only cause trouble. We have an operations center (at State). There is a coordinating effort already being made. Adm Poindexter or Bud McFarlane get involved and resolve issues when necessary. That is not a problem. It is not necessary to formally move the documents to the NSC and to manage it from there. It's a misfire. Bud & John get involved anyway.

11. The VP suggested that that wasn't what was being proposed and asked Admiral Holloway to clarify the proposal.

12. Admiral Holloway briefly explained the three major points of the latest version of Recommendation No. 3. He cited a need for cross-fertilization of the TIWG and the IG/T. He also expressed a need for a support group for the TIWG for 24-hour-a-day coverage during an incident.

13. The Attorney General stated that there was a danger of adding a whole new layer (in the bureaucracy). He said the principle of the Reagan Administration -- as we did in California -- is to use the Cabinet. Use the departments; use the Cabinet process (the SSG) to coordinate. To set up a whole new organization is at odds with the Lead Agency concept. We don't need a TIWG support group. The WHSR serves in an international incident, and the FBI Ops Center serves in a domestic one.

14. Adm Poindexter stated that we (the NSC) had objected to this issue first, but for slightly different reasons. Terrorists seek public attention. The President needs to convey that he's in control. But within the Executive Office of the President it would not provide enough insulation and flexibility. Clearly, in major

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

incidents the focus is in the White House. But, in minor ones the White House isn't involved -- e.g. FAA manages an aircraft hijacking. The TIWG is convened in major cases to provide coordination. The NSC serves as an arbiter, an honest broker, to resolve disputes at the working level. The weekend rewrite is an improvement, but we still have some fixes. However, let's not get involved in that level of detail in this meeting. More manpower (on the NSC) is something we ought to do. We've had less than one man-year devoted to it. We're willing to add more to help shepherd projects along. We have specifically recommended deletion of the Special Assistant title; we don't want a focus on this issue publicly recognized. We are concerned with perceptions. We could see adding additional people to the Crisis Management Center. We want to make it appear that a terrorist crisis is no different from other crises along the way. We would want to downplay this change in the public report.

15. Secretary Weinberger stated that the "problem" with terrorism is represented by the discussion so far. The original recommendation is what we (Defense) support. (He then cited the Achille Lauro incident, though the example seemed to support the NSC-State case more than his....) The President can't escape the public focus. Somebody's got to do the allocation of assignments. We're worried more about the perceptions than about the organization to deal with the terrorist incident. He agreed that we may not want to play up the change(s) being made. However, for the first time, we would have a real coordinator -- somebody who's in charge. He then endorsed Amo Oakley as an excellent candidate for the position of the coordinator. He reiterated his support for Recommendation #3 as originally written. It's not a new layer. This is not a matter of prestige; this must be at the NSC level. It is the only place it can be. It's a recognition of what ultimately happens; it's covering a gap that exists.

16. Admiral Crowe supported this by stating that there is a day-to-day problem, a gap. He said that our people don't have a central point of contact for the preparatory efforts (to an incident or the response to an incident). John Poindexter needs some staff help.

17. FBI Director Webster stated his focus was on domestic terrorism and that there was a need (for an NSC coordinator) only if there were a major policy question on action to be taken. That request would come through the Attorney General. We don't need another Ops Center.

18. The VP questioned whether there would be a new dimension if international terrorism (e.g. Qadaafi) were to strike here.

19. The Attorney General responded that the SSG currently exists. The more complicated we get at the federal level, the worse it will be at the state and local level.

~~SECRET~~

~~SECRET~~

20. Secretary of Transportation Dole supported Meese and Poindexter. She felt we should build the staff a bit, but not add another layer of bureaucracy.

21. The VP asked about the NSC specific problems with the rewritten recommendation.

22. Adm Poindexter ticked off the four specific changes. He stated that below Cabinet level, there can merely be "recommendations" (not policy direction). Responding to the Attorney General, he stated that we do think we need a TIWG support group because the principals are involved in a host of other matters. Your deputies are as busy as you are.

23. The Attorney General suggested that each TIWG member should have an alternate instead of having a separate support group. There would be confusion in a crisis whom to call.

24. Deputy DCI McMahon, when asked for his views, stated that CIA was prepared (as usual) to support one, two, or three bosses. More seriously, he stated that the system works well -- why not leave it the way it is? To spawn a new structure would be dangerous. (He did admit that he had vacillated back and forth on this issue....)

25. The VP suggested that Adm Holloway circulate the draft one more time and that if there were not consensus then, we may have to stay with the status quo. He suggested that we go back to the Poindexter amendments.

26. Secretary Shultz suggested that we consider dropping the issue.

27. Attorney General Meese added that the title itself was part of the problem. We already have an organization. Let's not convey to the public that we've got a problem.

28. Adm Holloway stated that he felt that the last iteration (of the recommendation) was close (to being on the mark). He then explained briefly the schedule and format for the final report.

29. Attorney General Meese conveyed his congratulations to Admiral Holloway for having only one problem out of 45 issues.

30. The VP added that he wanted some specificity to some proposed legislation to go along with the Task Force report. No one on the Hill would be against signing strong antiterrorism legislation. Perhaps protecting sources or FOIA or a modification to the War Powers Act?

31. Adm Holloway reported to the VP that we had already dropped the issue paper on the War Powers Act and Congressional oversight.

32. The VP adjourned the meeting precisely at 5 pm.

~~SECRET~~



~~SECRET~~

14 November 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL HOLLOWAY

Subject: Domestic vs. International Terrorism Distinctions in NSDDs

1. NSDD 3 (Crisis Management, 14 Dec 81) states explicitly:  
"The function of the SSG will be to advise the President with respect to decision options on domestic, foreign and military policies and actions."  
Clearly this could include a domestic terrorist incident.

2. NSDD 30 (Managing Terrorist Incidents, 10 Apr 82) states in the initial sentence that the US is opposed to terrorism domestically and internationally. The clear implication is that all subsequent use of the term "terrorist incidents" includes both.

Assignment of Lead Agency responsibilities includes both 'international' (i.e. "terrorist incidents that take place outside of US territory") and 'domestic' (i.e. "terrorist incidents which take place within US territory").

FEMA responsibilities assigned must be seen to apply primarily to 'domestic' terrorism.

Responsibility is not explicit but the implication is clearly to include both 'domestic' and 'international' terrorism within the purview of the following groups:

TIWG, IG/T, White House Operations Group, and the IICT.

3. NSDD 138 (Combatting Terrorism, 3 Apr 84) includes references to both forms of terrorism, although its primary emphasis (in its first sentence) is "especially abroad." The Lead Agency distinction in NSDD 30 ("outside US territory" vs "within US territory"), however, is confused somewhat by a definition of "international terrorist activity" that overlaps the NSDD 30 distinction:

"International terrorist activity, as referred to in this directive, includes conspiring about planning for or conducting terrorist acts by trans-national groups, whether the activity occurs in the U.S. or abroad." (8)

Thus, loose reference to State's Lead Agency role in 'international terrorism' is actually in error. Either State or DOJ can have Lead Agency responsibility for an "international terrorist incident;" the key is where the incident occurs -- inside or outside US territory.

The rest of NSDD 138 is full of relevant references such as:

"...domestic programs to deal with terrorist activities in the United States,"

"...action to improve protection/security of personnel and facilities in the U.S....,"

~~SECRET~~

F97-082/2 #58

LOI

10/11/02

~~SECRET~~

"Enhance coordination, analysis, and dissemination of federal law enforcement information regarding terrorist activities and the presence of foreign or international terrorists in the United States."

"Enhance cooperation among federal law enforcement agencies and state and local authorities in the investigation and prosecution of crimes committed by terrorists. (C)"

4. NSDD 179 (Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, 20 July 85) begins by stating:

"International terrorism poses an increasing threat to US citizens and our interests."

We (the Working Group) have interpreted our charter generally to include all forms of terrorism, but a "strict constructionist" could argue that the Task Force focus is only 'international terrorism' (although by NSDD 138 this includes incidents that occur inside or outside the US).

5. NSDD 180 (Civil Aviation Anti-Terrorism Program, 19 July 85) applies to "international civil aviation."

~~SECRET~~