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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
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File Folder: [NSDD 207 NSC Staff: Craig Coy; Robert Earl] (6)

Date: 11/8/00

Page1 Box 9T956RAC Box 10

Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	W.H. Rice to Asst. Sec. of Defense, re: Progress Report on Implementation of NSDD-207, 2 p.	5/8/86	P1/B1
2. Memo	W.H. Rice to Principal Deputy Asst. Sec. of Defense, re: Progress Report on Implementation of ..., 3 p.	4/17/86	P1/B1
3. Memo	██████████ to Chairman, re: Assessment of Threat..., 2 p.	6/24/86	P1/B1, B3
4. Memo	Robert Oakley to ██████████, re: Threat Lists, 2 p.	2/11/86	P1/B1 B3
5. Memo	Powell Jensen to John Poindexter, re: Implementation of NSDD 207, 3 p.	6/24/86	P1/B1, B3
6. Memo	██████████ to DCI, re: Interagency..., 1 p.	6/25/86	P1/B1, B3
7. Memo	Robert Sims to Asst. Sec. of Defense, re: Public Affairs Taksing in NSDD 207, 2 p.	4/24/86	P1/B1
8. Paper	Detailed Status Report on NSDD 207 Actions, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
9. Memo	Oliver Revell to Arnold Burns, re: Recommendations of the VPTF on Combatting Terrorism, 1 p.	7/14/86	P1/B1
10. Cover Sheet	ODAG Executive Secretariat Control Data Sheet, 1 p.	7/15/86	P1/B1
11. Paper	re: Implementing the Recommendations..., 3 p.	7/18/86	P1/B1
12. Memo	L. Paul Bremer to Members of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T), re: Interagency Reception and Debriefing Plan, 1 p.	10/20/86	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Collection: COUNTERTERRORISM AND NARCOTICS, NSC:
Records

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File Folder: [NSDD 207 NSC Staff: Craig Coy; Robert Earl] (6)
Page2 Box 91956 RAC BOX 10

Date: 11/8/00
Wills/F97-082/2

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
13. Paper	re: Interagency Plan for Receiving and Debriefing Released U.S. Hostages, 5 p.	10/21/86	P1/B1 137
14. Memo	Copy of Item #12, 1 p.	10/20/86	P1/B1
15. Paper	Copy of Item #13, (with comments), 5 p.	10/21/86	P1/B1

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
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- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURES) *11/7/00*
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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

I- 21983/36
15 MAY 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. RODNEY B. MCDANIEL, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
SUBJECT: Progress Reports on the Implementation of NSDD-207

Attached for your information are the status reports
concerning the Defense Department's implementation of NSDD-207.

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "D. R. Brown".

David R. Brown
Executive Secretary

Attachment
a/s

Sec Def Cont Nr. X39235

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

FOIA(b) (1)
FOIA(b) (3)

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The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505

Rec'd 14 July

North N
Earl E
Coy CC

National Intelligence Council

NIC 023018-86
24 June 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: Chairman, IICT Subcommittee on Warning

FROM:

SUBJECT: [REDACTED] /Security Levels Overseas

REFERENCE: Memorandum to NIO/CT From Director State S/CT Ambassador
Robert Oakley dated 11 February 1986

1. Several participants at the 3 February 1986 meeting of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) discussed papers they prepare regularly for their respective agencies listing the threat/security levels at overseas locations. Specifically, four main lists exist, primarily for use by official travellers: those of the Departments of State and Defense, Federal Aviation Administration, and Central Intelligence Agency/Counterterrorism Center.

2. Subsequent to this 3 February meeting and a related 6 February meeting chaired by Ambassador Parker Borg, IG/T Chairman Ambassador Robert Oakley asked the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT) to examine this question and develop mechanisms for standardizing criteria and harmonizing these disparate lists (see Attachment).

3. Your memorandum to me reflects the view of your Subcommittee, and concludes that there is sufficient compatibility among the various agencies' assessments to preclude an official traveler's mistakenly venturing into a high-threat area. While I recognize the general validity of such an assertion, I am not comfortable with this conclusion. I believe means must be developed by which we can fashion an agreed-upon list of current threat levels and concomitant danger to official US travellers overseas.

4. I therefore request that you reconvene your Subcommittee with the objective of establishing a mechanism for maintaining a coordinated US Government listing of threat levels abroad. This list should be updated on a regular basis and disseminated as appropriate within US Government agencies.

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NLS F 97-082/2 #192

By LOJ, NARA, Date 6/25/01

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5. Please expedite this effort and report to me at the next IICT meeting. Please have your Subcommittee work closely with the IICT Executive Secretary, [REDACTED] Questions regarding this tasking also may be addressed [REDACTED]

Attachment
As stated

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

~~SECRET~~

February 11, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO:

~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~
Central Intelligence Agency

FOIA(b) (5)

FROM:

S/CT - Robert B. Oakley

SUBJECT:

Threat Lists

At the meeting of the IG/T on February 3, several of the participants made reference to the separate threat lists which they prepared in their agencies, mostly for advice to official travellers. Parker Borg chaired a follow-up meeting on February 7 with representatives of the offices which prepared these separate lists (names and offices are attached).

The four separate threat lists for foreign countries are:

1. The State Department's quarterly threat list of all foreign service posts around the world is prepared by the Bureau of Diplomatic Security with input from all interested State Department bureaus including INR for the intelligence community. This list separately considers insurgency, specific terrorism threats, possibility for mob violence and crime in the vicinity of the foreign service post (Tab A). It is used primarily to determine security requirements at posts and also provides a basis for informal advice to travellers and businesses.
2. The Defense Department issued on 4 December 1985 a list of twelve countries which are considered high threat areas for the purpose of travel security. DOD has implemented standardized travel requirements for all DOD elements for countries on this list (Tab B).
3. The FAA lists all major non-American airports in four security categories. Their most recent list is dated 13 January 1986, but it is being revised after separate discussions with State and CIA. They have no

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NLS F97-082/2, 7 193

By CH, NARA, Date 3/27/02

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DECL: OADR

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-2-

objective criteria for the categories, but are becoming more systematic after their recent talks with State and CIA analysts. This list is used to determine the type of security requirements for American carriers and those servicing the US from these airports (Tab C).

4. The Counter-terrorism Group at the CIA maintains three color-coded categories of threat countries which are informally listed on a board in its office. The ratings are based upon intelligence regarding the possible threats. CIA personnel contemplating travel to different parts of the world apparently take guidance from this list. The CIA participant did not specify which countries were in which category.

Everybody at the meeting agreed that there ought to be an effort at harmonization since all are dealing with the same countries. I am particularly concerned that there might be an incident involving an American at one of these posts and it will become known that one agency had issued an alert, but another had not. This is not a responsible approach to a serious problem, and no bureaucratic prerogative nor protection of intelligence arguments can justify it.

There seem to be three issues: 1) security at airports (the FAA concern), 2) security for USG employees in transit (the DOD and CIA concern), which State does not consider but should and 3) in-country security (as assessed by State's threat assessment group) which is State's primary concern but should be equally important to all agencies.

It was agreed by the group that the issue should more properly be addressed by the IICT rather than a sub-group of the IG/T. Billie Vincent noted, however, that FAA is not a member of the IICT and that he would like his representative to participate in the sub-group responsible for developing standardized criteria. In this connection, let me recommend formally that a means be found to harmonize the separate FAA threat alert system for US airlines with the existing inter-agency threat alert system.

I refer the question to you for consideration by the IICT.

Attachments: As stated

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Memorandum



~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

Subject	Date
Implementation of NSDD 207	24 JUN 1986
DLJ:SST:VT:LL:KAM:SMW:gvr	
To	From
VAdm. John M. Poindexter Assistant To The President National Security Affairs	 D. Lowell Jensen Deputy Attorney General

Pursuant to your recent request, I am happy to provide you with the following status report on those tasks assigned by NSDD 207 to the Attorney General.

Recommendation No. 35: The Department of Justice continues to urge the passage of S. 1429 which will make it a federal crime to murder U.S. citizens overseas. S. 1429 passed the Senate in February. We are encouraging the Senate to include S. 1429 as part of the anti-terrorist bill, H.R. 4151, which is presently before the Senate. If the substance of S. 1429 is added to H.R. 4151, it is highly likely that the House will accept it when H.R. 4151 goes to conference.

Recommendation No. 36: In the context of pursuing the enactment of S. 239, the comprehensive death penalty statute, the Department has obtained the agreement of Senator Thurmond, Chairman of the Senate Committee on the Judiciary, to make a floor amendment to S. 239 that will provide for the death penalty when the murder of a U.S. national occurs during an overseas hostage taking episode. While it is likely that S. 239, with a death penalty provision for hostage taking, will pass the Senate, the outlook for its passage in the House is not favorable.

Recommendation No. 37: The Department is reviewing the Hyde proposal (i.e., establishing a Joint Committee on Intelligence) to determine whether the Department can be of any assistance to the Congress in making this determination. weak

Recommendation No. 40: The Department has under consideration draft legislation to permit the expeditious deportation from the United States of aliens who are suspected of engaging in support for or conspiracy to conduct terrorism. The Department is also considering the formation of a Departmental committee to improve our efforts concerning the exclusion and deportation of alien terrorists.

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NLRR 897-082/2 * 194

BY CY NARA DATE 12/4/07

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Recommendation No. 31: The Department has been encouraging private and academic initiatives addressing the relationship between terrorism and domestic and international legal systems. A good example of this effort is the fact that we have obtained the support of the American Bar Association for the US-UK Supplemental Extradition Agreement. *weid*

Recommendation No. 33: The Department has suggested to the Central Intelligence Agency and the State Department that the Intergovernmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) should *weid*

B1
B3

Recommendation No. 38: The Department is forming a Departmental committee to ascertain whether sufficient evidence exists to establish that terrorist movements or organizations are abusing the provisions of the Freedom of Information Act (FOIA). We are also monitoring Senator Denton's efforts to add S. 276 to H.R. 4151. (S. 276 would exempt from the FOIA all information "related to the investigation of terrorism or concerned with foreign counterintelligence operations.") *weid*

Recommendation No. 41: The Department is in the process of collecting information concerning the frequency of the payment of ransom to terrorists, the purchase of kidnaping insurance, and the purchase of interviews with terrorists, so that we can determine the scope of the problem caused by these practices. *weid*

Recommendation No. 39: The Department is overseeing the development of a memorandum of understanding among the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI), the Bureau of Alcohol, Tobacco and Firearms (ATF), and U.S. Customs Service. Included in the agreement is the investigative coordination of allegations of violations of federal law committed in connection with the operation of mercenary camps. The Department continues to monitor activities at mercenary camps to determine whether any significant gaps still exist in federal law.

Recommendation No. 42: The Department has supported S. 274, which would permit nuclear reactor licensees access to FBI criminal history files so that individuals can be more thoroughly screened prior to being granted unescorted access to nuclear reactor facilities. S. 274 has already passed the Senate. The Department has been encouraging its addition to H.R. 4151 during the full Senate's consideration of H.R. 4151.

Recommendation No. 3: The Department of Justice continues to monitor all terrorist investigations to determine existing gaps, relating to terrorism, in federal substantive and procedural laws. This review is ongoing. Presently, attention

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is being directed to gaps in procedural laws (e.g., substantive offenses for which a "wiretap" may be authorized by a federal district court).

If you require additional information in this regard, or in the event that an additional status report is required on a future date, please contact Stephen S. Trott, Assistant Attorney General, Criminal Division.

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~
The Director of Central Intelligence
Washington, D.C. 20505


FOIA(b) (1)
FOIA(b) (3)

National Intelligence Council


NIC 03056-86
25 June 1986


MEMORANDUM FOR: Director of Central Intelligence
Deputy Director of Central Intelligence

VIA: Acting Chairman, National Intelligence Council


FROM: 


SUBJECT: Interagency Counterterrorism Analysis Training


1. As Chairman of the Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism (IICT), I am pleased to report the IICT 

 The IICT is already planning intermediate and advanced seminars and courses to meet Community needs for training beyond the basic level.

2. The need for such a course has been well documented. The Critical Intelligence Problems Committee report entitled "The Challenge of Terrorism," highlighted the requirement, and the Vice President's report on combatting terrorism also stressed the need for training in relation to career development.


3. Development of this course is the result of outstanding cooperation among 14 Federal organizations involved in the war against terrorism. 

 This is perhaps the best example I have seen of the Community working together to produce near term, practical results. You may wish to commend their efforts informally at the next NFIB meeting.



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NLS F97-082/2 #195
By LOS, NARA, Date 6/25/01

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OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

27 JUN 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR NATIONAL
SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: NSDD-207 Public Affairs Tasking

Attached for your information and action is the Defense
Department's response to the NSDD-207 recommendation regarding
public affairs strategy for counterterrorist forces.

James F. Lemon
James F. Lemon
Executive Secretary

Attachment
a/s

Sec Def Cont Nr. X39714

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Bob. tayl

DETAILED STATUS REPORT ON NSDD-207 ACTIONS

Four policy actions and five procedural actions from NSDD-207 merit attention during the early August NSC meeting. Using the numbering of the recommendations by the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism, these issues are:

POLICY ACTIONS

- No. 5 - NSDD-207 calls for developing a policy framework for making decisions on the use of force in response to international terrorist attacks. An interagency meeting to work on this action was postponed from May until July.
- No. 10 - A government-wide policy on passports and other travel documentation for U.S. employees was recommended. State is still in the process of consulting with other agencies.
- No. 29 - A dialogue with the media should be continued. Though the Secretary of State held a 9 July conference with foreign journalists sponsored by USIA, no other substantive steps have been taken to improve our relationship with the media in such a way as to reduce our vulnerability to leaks of very sensitive counter-terrorist operational information. Specifically, we need to determine whether or not we want to provide briefings to selected members of the media during on-going terrorist incidents that would not be made public until after the episode.
- No. 41 - The Department of Justice was to evaluate whether activities by some U.S. companies, such as paying ransoms, buying kidnapping insurance, and purchasing interviews with terrorists, might be made illegal. No substantive action has been taken to date.

PROCEDURAL ACTIONS

FOIA(b) ()

No. 13 - Protection of foreign dignitaries in the U.S. remains uncomfortably split between the Secret Service and the State Department. A specific NSDD-207 refinement regarding accompanying spouses of visiting Heads of State is caught up in funding disagreements between agencies.

No. 28 - The formation of a new public diplomacy working group for terrorism matters should be discussed at the early August NSC meeting.

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NLS 997-082/2*197

By LOJ, NARA, Date 10/11/02

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No. 38 - No substantive action has yet been taken to review alleged Freedom of Information Act (FOIA) use by terrorist groups.

No. 40 - No substantive action has been taken to expedite deportation proceedings against Libyan, Iranian, and PLO activists who have violated their visa status.

It is also important that the principals at the early August NSC meeting discuss the realistic requirements for increases in our CT personnel resources overseas

as they relate to NSDD-207 direction for a State-led review of USG overseas presence in high-threat areas. U.S. personnel overseas involved in the national program to combat terrorism must be seen as "mission essential" and therefore exempt from security-related and Gramm/Rudman cutbacks in overseas personnel. The entire community needs to have your guidance on this matter so that we do not delay the positioning of essential personnel assets overseas because of other ongoing efforts to reduce overseas personnel.

FOIA(b) (1)

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Memorandum

ATTORNEY GENERAL/DEPUTY ATTORNEY GENERAL ACTION



Subject Recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism	Date July 14, 1986
---	-----------------------

To Acting Deputy Attorney General
Assistant Attorney General/CRM

From Oliver B. Revell
Exec. Asst. Dir. -
Investigations - FBI

Action Required:

Final Action By:

Due Date: _____

Attorney General

Deputy Attorney General

Previous Background Provided:

Summary:

Comments:

Concurrences: DAG AAG OLC OLP OLA PAO JMD

Initials

Date

See Reverse For Instruction

Memorandum

~~SECRET~~



To : ✓ Honorable Arnold I. Burns
Acting Deputy Attorney General

Date July 14, 1986

~~xxxx~~: Honorable Stephen S. Trott
Assistant Attorney General
Criminal Division

~~xxxx~~

From: *OB* Oliver B. Revell
Executive Assistant Director - Investigations

Subject: RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORISM

Enclosed is a document submitted to the President on July 10, 1986 by Admiral John Poindexter, Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs. This document conveyed the status of the various recommendations made to the President by the Vice President's Task Force on Combating Terrorism and approved by the President in NSDD 207 dated January 20, 1986. I received this document at an OSG/TIWG meeting on July 10, 1986.

As the lead agency for combating terrorism within the United States, the Justice Department/FBI has an important role in implementing and carrying out most of the recommendations of the task force. In this regard, the National Security Council (NSC) staff was somewhat critical of the Department's progress in implementing or pursuing the goals set forth in the following recommendations: 26, 34, 38, 40 and 41. According to the NSC staff, there will be an NSC meeting on August 5, 1986 to review the status of NSDD 207 implementation.

Enclosure

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NLRR 197-082/2 #198

BY CN NARA DATE 12/4/07

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Ann: FYI

Re: NSDD 207.

We should be
sure Bankin gets
a copy & get up to speed

DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
ODAG EXECUTIVE SECRETARIAT CONTROL DATA SHEET

REVELL, OLIVER B., FBI

ACTING DAG & CRII

Date Received: 07-15-86 Date Due: NONE Control #: 6071510011

Subject & Date

07-14-86 MEMO RE RECOMMENDATIONS OF THE VICE PRESIDENT'S
TASK FORCE ON COMBATING TERRORISM W/ATTACHMENT.

NOTE: ENTIRE PACKAGE IS "SECRET."

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Remarks

[REDACTED]

Date: Remarks

FILE

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NLRR F97-082/2 #199

BY CW NARA DATE 12/4/07

18 July 1986

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The Department of State has reviewed the initial comments by the NSC staff on the status of implementing the recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force Report on Combatting Terrorism. These comments reveal problems which have plagued previous work related to the Task Force Report, including the drafting of NSDD 207.

The NSC staff summary of several of the recommendations is misleading or inaccurate. For example, action in these summary comments is sometimes assigned to a different agency than specified in the Task Force recommendation, (e.g., 31, 33, and 35.) In comments on the status of implementing many of the recommendations, the NSC staff has ignored one or more of the status reports the State Department provided them. Other recommendations which contain inaccuracies or misleading statements are as follows.

1. The Report directs that "the NSC staff" will maintain the programming document, not the OMB.
4. The Report directs that the Terrorism Incident Working Group, not the National Security Advisor directly, shall have action on public affairs during an incident. The comments ignore the role of the Public Diplomacy Working Group mandated by the Report, and also omits reference to the media work done by the State Department during the Libya raid.
5. In private consultations between the State Department and the NSC staff, a consensus was reached that a contractor should be used to develop detailed criteria on the use of force, as noted in the June 18 State status report. The issues now pending resolution are who should pay for the work and who should perform it. In the interim, S/CT has a summer intern currently working fulltime developing a conceptual framework. The urgency of this action is debatable, given the Administration's ability to make good decisions on Libya without a detailed blueprint..
6. The Report directed the NSC staff to "maintain a list of current options for response to terrorist threats or incidents." [REDACTED]

FOIA(b) (1)

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NLS 197-082/2 #240
By AS, NARA, Date 3/27/06

8. After careful evaluation, DOD and the Public Diplomacy Working Group decided that no further changes were needed in their public affairs strategy regarding operational security of counterterrorism forces.
 9. State action is complete on reassessing the U.S. presence abroad. However, the Report also directed the NSC to create an interagency committee with all agencies represented overseas to conduct similar reviews with other agencies. This apparently has not been done.
 10. State's review of policy on passports/documentation for government employees is completed, and is now awaiting comment from other agencies.
 12. The comments note that State has not established a hot-line for the hostage families. This idea was suggested, not specifically directed, by the Task Force, and is one which was rejected on the basis of cost. Alternative arrangements have been made so that hostage families have rapid, free telephone communication with the State Department. The NSC staff was kept fully informed on this matter. State already makes available to all hostage families all information they desire on counseling services.
 13. The NSC comment on the program for protection of spouses of foreign dignitaries ignores the central fact: such protection is now being provided. ?
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14. The Task Force assigns action on coordination oversight of R&D related to terrorism to the NSC and OMB. The NSC comment overlooks the funding for R&D which the IG/T through the Technical Support Working Group obtained in the Security Supplemental, for which a prioritized list of projects is available for rapid action.
 15. Although Exercise Pocketmouse was held, it was six weeks late due to NSC-requested postponements. update
 16. State's April 18 status report on country team briefings noted that FSI now gives terrorism seminars for all new ambassadors and DCMs, that CIA and DOD provide briefings for their own personnel, and mentions the Coping with Violence seminar given to all USG employees going overseas. All ambassadors departing for post are required first to meet with the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-Terrorism. All ambassadors and DCMs overseas have been briefed by cable. Seventeen high-threat posts have received special EST briefings.

20. The NSC comment focuses only on the technical aspect of controlling cross-border travel of terrorists. State reported to the NSC on the other work done by State and other agencies working with other governments in this area.

FOIA(b)(1)

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26. The Task Force assigned principle action on increased coordination with law enforcement elements overseas to the IG/T. State's report of June 18 noted the extensive work S/CT has done in this area, including identifying high-risk posts, directing those posts to appoint counterterrorism coordinators, and hiring a consultant to visit our critical posts to gather information and assess their terrorism reporting capabilities. This report is expected soon.

27. The Task Force assigned action on the chemical and biological threat to the Technical Support Working Group of the IG/T, not the DCI directly.

29. The NSC comments misstate the Task Force directive on government-media relations during a terrorist incident: "The NSC through the Public Diplomacy Working Group...." The action lies with the NSC.

32. The NSC comments misinterpret the Task Force directive on reviewing the Vienna Convention. The Task Force report says nothing about applying sanctions nor about State having to monitor abuses. The statements in the April 21 EC Communique and the May 5 Summit statement plus the expulsion of over 100 Libyan diplomats from Europe and EC agreement with the USG view on tighter application of the Vienna Convention are evidence of the work that has been done in this regard.

39. The NSC comments ignore the April 18 and June 18 State responses to this item concerning prohibition against terrorist/mercenary training camps in the U.S. The Task Force report actually directs government agencies to "employ expanded ITAR" regulations, which State is doing, and with which State and Justice are in full agreement.

40. The NSC comments again misstate the Task Force report, which assigns action on foreign terrorist activities in the United States to both the Justice Department and State. The Task Force suggests those departments consider various proceedings against Libyan, Iranian, and PLO activists; it was not an imperative, as the NSC language states, to the Justice Department.



United States Department of State

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October 20, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism (IG/T)

FROM: Ambassador-L. Paul Bremer *lbr 10/20*

SUBJECT: Interagency Reception and Debriefing Plan

Attached you will find a proposed revision to TAB A of the NSC "Interagency Plan for Receiving and Debriefing Released U.S. Hostages (TS). The revision is the work of two interagency meetings and includes the recommendations of Ambassador Mike Newlin who recently led the U.S. team to Wiesbaden Germany to receive and interview the American victims of the Pan American #073 incident.

Since most members have already had several opportunities to comment on both the Newlin report and the attached revision, I will presume all concur unless I hear otherwise before November 1.

Attachment:

As stated.

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 197-082/z #201

AS NARA. DATE 3/07/06

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DECL: OADR



CONFIDENTIAL

United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 21, 1986

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY PLAN FOR RECEIVING AND DEBRIEFING
RELEASED U.S. HOSTAGES

PLAN SUMMARY

The Department of State will coordinate the overall reception and debriefing effort of American hostages being held abroad. The FBI will coordinate the interagency effort to debrief the hostages and disseminate the information to all interested USG agencies. If possible, receptions and debriefings for hostages from the Middle East will be held at the [REDACTED] according to the established format below - medical examinations, psychological screenings and formal debriefings. Other sites to serve returnees from other areas of the world will be identified and surveyed beginning with Latin America and the Pacific. To improve on the TWA experience, the reception effort will be extended to a minimum of three days, assuming the hostages do not object. This will permit more detailed debriefings and provide the individuals more time to transition from captivity to freedom.

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There are a number of precedents which argue strongly for the Administration to provide free transportation for two or three close family members to the debriefing site and back to the United States (with the released hostages), particularly in high-profile hostage cases. This is an important consideration which must be kept in mind so that timely decisions can be made at the time of a hostage release. For groups of ten or more family members, this would require a White House designated air mission from Washington DC to the reception site. For groups less than ten, the use of commercial transportation will normally be the preferred alternative. In all cases, the family members could return to Washington DC on the USG aircraft returning the freed hostage(s).

The reception site and debriefing team require at least 24 - 48 hours to properly prepare for the arrival of the hostages and their family members. The interagency debriefing team, therefore, needs to be dispatched at the earliest opportunity, once it is certain that there will be a debriefing. To respond quickly and ensure that, if necessary, the team's deployment is kept secret, requires a

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NLS F97-012/2 #1202

By UI, NARA, Date 3/27/00

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White House designated air mission from Washington DC to the reception site for the debriefing team and its equipment. Upon release, freed hostages should be flown by military air from the point of release to the pre-selected reception site. A psychiatrist and a physician should accompany the hostages from the release point to the reception site. During a terrorist incident these two physicians (to include a psychiatrist) will be identified and put in place prior to the conclusion of the incident. Upon recovery of the hostages, they will assess their medical and psychological needs and brief them on the reception and interview program.

If a tactical debriefing by JCS is warranted prior to arrival at the reception site, it should not begin until government physicians and psychiatrists have had an opportunity to examine each released captive. There should be no formal debriefings until medical personnel at the reception site give their approval. State will ensure that family members are escorted to the reception site, briefed on the reception/debriefing program and provided sufficient opportunity to visit with their loved ones. State will also coordinate all USG relations with the media at the debriefing site.

The FBI will coordinate the interagency debriefing effort along the guidelines used for the TWA 847 effort. If JCS conducts a preliminary debriefing, it will immediately provide the formal debriefing team an interim written report of its interview. The FBI will also ensure that preliminary reports of the debriefing are disseminated as quickly as possible and that a final report is transmitted via State's EXDIS DEBRIEF channel prior to the team's departure from the reception site. Follow-up debriefings by the individual agencies are encouraged, but must be coordinated with State and the FBI.

NEW REQUIREMENTS:

- Downgrade the overall TOP SECRET classification to Confidential.
- Add a Department of Justice representative to the team to provide legal guidance on issues pertaining to potential prosecution in the U.S..
- For airline hijackings add a^N FAA representative to the team.

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- Acquire and test a capability to send and receive record traffic from the reception site to all USG agencies.
- Ensure all participants on the interagency reception and debriefing team have standing travel orders and GTR's to support the mission.
- Survey U.S. medical facilities in Latin America and the Pacific to determine suitable reception sites for those areas.
- Draft cable deploying team to include names of participants and support requirements.
- Draft an ALDAC cable explaining the hostage reception and interview process.
- Draft a cable which provides specific instructions to the post receiving and handling released U.S. hostages and casualties.
- Draft a cable for sending two physicians (to include one psychiatrist) to the incident country during an ongoing incident.

PRE-RELEASE ACTIONS:

The IG/T Hostage Reception and Debriefing Working Group, on behalf of the NSC, will accomplish the following pre-release actions:

- Provide appropriate overseas diplomatic posts, theater commanders and other governmental agencies the tentative USG plan for receiving/debriefing U.S. hostages to permit them to pre-plan their own support effort.
- For the Washington component, determine overall team leadership and composition to receive/debrief single and multiple releases of the U.S. hostages. For planning purposes, the configurations below provide a good guide:

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- Identify personnel from each agency (HLTF included in CIA numbers) and develop necessary alert and deployment rosters.
- Ensure designated reception sites are aware of the team's administrative and personnel support requirements - office space, billeting, communications, security, etc.
- Review team's communication requirements to ensure:
 - SATCOM from reception site to incident country and Washington.
 - Record traffic capability from reception site to all USG agencies.
 - Secure phone and fax between the reception site and Washington.
 - Hand-held radios and beepers for reception site.
- Coordinate in advance the interagency strategy and individual agency responsibilities for handling the media.
- Develop an interagency debriefing plan which meets the needs of USG agencies and includes a coordinated list of questions.
- Develop a plan for notifying families of hostages being released of the USG plans for:
 - Receiving and debriefing of freed family members.

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- For escorting selected hostage family members to and from the reception site.
- For hosting both released hostages and family members during the debriefings.
- If appropriate, brief non usg agencies (^{airline} Pan American etc.) on the reception and debriefing process and the cooperation the USG desires.
- For an ongoing incident, dispatch two physicians (to include one psychiatrist) to the incident country to await the conclusion of the incident.

RELEASE ACTIONS:

- Send pre-drafted cables to posts explaining the hostage reception and debriefing procedures.
- Notify concerned Washington agencies and implement pre-coordinated alerting procedures (which include support requirements) to appropriate overseas diplomatic posts and military commands.
- Formalize size and composition of reception and debriefing team and appropriately notify individuals.
- Request military airlift through OSD/ISA according to previous agreements. Use NSC channels as a back up.
- Formalize procedures for notifying family members and escorting them to the reception site.
- Dispatch an advance element or the entire debriefing team as appropriate.

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United States Department of State

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October 20, 1986

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MEMORANDUM

TO: Members of the Interdepartmental Group on
Terrorism (IG/T)

FROM: Ambassador-L. Paul Bremer *LPB 10/20*

SUBJECT: Interagency Reception and Debriefing Plan

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Since most members have already had several opportunities to comment on both the Newlin report and the attached revision, I will presume all concur unless I hear otherwise before November 1.

Attachment:

As stated.

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NLS F97-082/2 #203
AS 3/27/04

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DECL: OADR



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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

October 21, 1986

SUBJECT: INTERAGENCY PLAN FOR RECEIVING AND DEBRIEFING
RELEASED U.S. HOSTAGES

PLAN SUMMARY

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By Cal, NARA, Date 3/27/06

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
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
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- Dispatch an advance element or the entire debriefing team as appropriate.



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PRESS GUIDANCE

November 7, 1986

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Task Force on Terrorism reappraisal

The Washington Post this morning reported that the Vice President will reconvene the Task Force on Terrorism.

The President has asked the Vice President to assess the capability of the United States to combat terrorism. This review comes nearly a year after the recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force on Terrorism were adopted by the administration. The recommendations were submitted to the President on December 20, 1985, and were adopted January 20, 1986.

The Vice President will undertake this review in the next few months.

Productive Nation To Be the Objective

By David Hoffman
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan told the Cabinet yesterday that his overall theme for the last two years of his administration will be an effort to create "a more productive America," and he asked members to make proposals for his State of the Union address, White House chief of staff Donald T. Regan said.

Regan also said the president plans a renewed effort next year to cut domestic spending, to seek a modest defense-spending increase and to try to avoid tax increases. He said the president has not ruled out additional "user fees" to raise revenues but would oppose an oil-import fee.

Office of Management and Budget Director James C. Miller III told the Cabinet that he estimates the federal budget deficit for fiscal 1987 at \$163 billion. If no action is taken to reduce it, the deficit would be \$162 billion in fiscal 1988, he said, according to officials at the Cabinet meeting.

The deficit target for fiscal 1988 in the Gramm-Rudman-Hollings balanced-budget law, which Reagan has promised to meet, is \$108 billion.

In an interview with reporters, Regan said the new theme of a more "productive" nation would encompass several initiatives in the areas of combating crime and drug abuse, revising antitrust law, enforcing the immigration law signed yesterday, improving education, helping the troubled energy industry and revising product-liability laws, among other items.

He also mentioned transportation and health care as areas that the administration plans to study as part of the "broad-brush" theme.

"Energy is one of the things we have to look at," Regan said. "Have we done right by the oil industry, the nuclear industry? Let's take another look at that. I'm not sure we have a good energy policy for the 1990s."

Regan also said Vice President Bush has decided to reactivate the deregulatory task force he headed early in the administration.

Bush spokesman Marlin Fitzwater said the vice president would spend only a few months on it and, rather than carry out a rule-by-rule examination, will conduct an overview of what has occurred since the group finished work in 1983. Fitzwater also said Bush is planning to reconvene his task force on terrorism for a similar reappraisal.

Asked to define what he meant by a more "productive" nation, Regan said, "This is more than productivity on the assembly line." He said it was not only an effort to improve efficiency.

"Efficiency again smacks of the assembly line, the profit-and-loss type of thing," Regan said. "When you come to education and medical, you don't necessarily want to be just efficient, you want to make sure the impact on human life is such that it makes for a more productive human being."

"Now, what he produces may be happiness, may be good will, may be anything. It's not just in terms that he works harder or works longer hours."



BY JAMES K.W. ATHERTO

Black leaders clasp hands at Roundtable '86 Election Roundup meeting here. They are, from left, Rep. Jesse Jackson, Rep. Charles Rangel, Rep.-elect Mike Espy, Del. Walter Fautroy and Rep. Edolphus Sanders.

Blacks Remain Loyal to Democrats Elect Four New Southern Senators

BLACKS, From A1

precincts that gave President Reagan less than 20 percent of the vote in 1984. Most of those precincts were heavily black.

While there were no national themes to the election, Williams said, there were "three unifying themes" among black voters. He said these were a desire to elect candidates who are sympathetic to black economic and social concerns, prevent the "packing" of the federal judiciary with conservatives who are critical of civil rights laws, and elect more blacks to public office.

The continuing overwhelming black support for the Democrats "does not mean that there are not tensions within the Democratic Party," Williams said. "Jesse Jackson's candidacy [in 1984] grew out of those tensions. With blacks giving the Democratic Party and mostly white Democratic candidates this kind of lopsided support, why

shouldn't they expect white Democrats to give black candidates that kind of support?"

Thomas C. Griscom, executive director of the National Republican Senatorial Committee, said, "We are not anywhere close to being

... "we will remind them in December ... that we want them to deliver for black America."

— Del. Walter E. Fautroy (D-D.C.)

able to have an impact on the black vote. We have not done a good job presenting the Republican Party as a viable alternative to black voters."

Griscom noted that the strong black support for Democrats is a special handicap for Republicans in

most southern states very hard to figure out how you can pull the vote for that numerical black vote," he said.

A group of black leaders yesterday that black voters provided the margin Democrats in a number of races Tuesday and should be given a greater power in the 100th Congress.

"We delivered for them and we will remind them in December [when the House organizes] that we want them to deliver for black America," said Del. Walter E. Fautroy (D-D.C.).

The new House will include more black members who participates in deliberations but is not voting. One of the new members will be lawyer N. B. Caldwell (Miss.) in the Delta. Caldwell is the first black elected to the Mississippi since Reconstruction.

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