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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Parker Borg to Adm James Holloway, re: Task Force Report : First Draft, 8 p.	12/10/85	P1/B1
2. Paper	<i>PART 3/27/06 NLSF97-082/2 # 177</i> The Historical Development of the Office of Combatting Terrorism, 28 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
3. Attachment	Tab C, (marked as page 109), 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
4. Chart	<i>R</i> Proposed IG/T Actions, 3 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
5. Chart	<i>PART. 10/11/02 NLSF97-082/2 # 182</i> State Department Action List, 8 p.	1/17/86	P1/B1
6. Paper	<i>PART 3/27/06</i> Recommendation 9, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
7. Paper	<i>R</i> Recommendation 13, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
8. Paper	<i>R</i> Recommendation 14, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
9. Paper	<i>R</i> Recommendation 16, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
10. Paper	<i>R</i> Recommendation 17, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
11. Paper	<i>R</i> Recommendation 28, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
	<i>R</i> " " " # 189		

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 - P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
 - P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
 - P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
 - P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
6	PAPER	RECOMMENDATION #9	1	ND
		mvh 3/10/08		
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December 10, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: Admiral J.L. Holloway, III,
Executive Director,
Vice President's Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism:

FROM: Parker Borg, Acting S/CT
Department of State

PB

MASTER COPY

SUBJECT: Task Force Report: First Draft

We have just finished reviewing the first draft of the Task Force Report. As Bob Oakley has written separately, we believe that the report still needs a lot of work. It is admirable that the Task Force has been able to do so much work in such a short period of time, but the report reflects this hurried approach.

[REDACTED]

I understand that you would like this report to be a definitive statement about terrorism, a report which will be referred to within the Government for guidance and which will be the basis for a public document. We agree that this is an excellent idea, but the changes required to make the report reflect the government's current or any future approach to combatting terrorism are so extensive that it requires a major rewriting effort. Because so much work needs still to be done, we have not attempted to obtain any clearances outside of the Office of the Ambassador-at-Large for Counter-terrorism.

[REDACTED]

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DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED IN PART

NLS *F97082/2-179*
By *CU*, NARA, Date *3/27/06*

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The section dealing with the issues is beginning to look very good, reflecting the long hours of work and the inputs from many sources. If the report is to be equally strong, the Task Force should consider an extension of its work, perhaps for another month until January 20, to complete the task and create a document which will be valuable for the Administration and the base for a public document.

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This report is very important, given the wide dissemination it is destined to have and the uses to which it will be put. Therefore it is very important that this report reflect accurately US policies and their thrust in the future, and take into consideration the various special audiences that will review it carefully--the media, Congress, our allies, enemies and terrorists.

Given this importance, more time needs to be taken in preparing the report. It is difficult to see how a suitable report can be prepared within the narrow time limits currently before the Task Force. I would thus suggest that, at the Senior Review Group meeting December 11, consideration be given to extending the due date of the Task Force's final report to permit the completion of a more finished document, one which will make a stronger contribution to counterterrorism policy.

Attachments:
As stated

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Trends in Terrorism

Almost every day some new horror committed by terrorists seems to jump at us from the screens of our televisions, the front pages of our newspapers and the covers of our magazines. Twenty-five years ago we did not speak of Palestinian or Shia terrorists, hijackings of planes or ships, car bombs or violent attacks against American citizens around the world.

Terrorism is not a new scourge. It dates back to the First Century A.D. when the Zealots struggled against the Romans in ancient Palestine. Modern international terrorism, however, literally exploded on the world scene in 1970 when radical Palestinians hijacked four airliners to Dawson Field in Jordan where they blew the planes up before the world's television cameras. Over the course of the past fifteen years new groups have joined the scene employing new methods of violence--and always benefitting from prime time television.

Officials and politicians are continuously saying that more must be done to halt terrorism, and many steps have been taken. During 1985, for example, the combination of better intelligence, better security and better cooperation with other governments helped the US preempt or prevent about 90 incidents targetted against Americans. Looking ahead what are the trends which we can expect for the future?

First, terrorism is likely to be a prominent factor on the international political landscape for the rest of this century, despite all efforts to minimize it. All statistics show increases every year. There were 400 - 500 incidents in late 70's and early 80's, 700 incidents in 1984 and perhaps 1,000 for 1985. Terrorism will not disappear for many reasons: frustrated splinter groups recognize that they can more easily make their mark through acts of violence than any other form of opposition; a worldwide system of competitive arms sales makes weapons easily available to terrorist groups; travel is becoming easier between different countries and border controls are diminishing, particularly in Europe; weapons of mass destruction as well as increasingly lethal conventional armaments have made regular warfare potentially too costly; and terrorism is viewed by some countries as a cheap way to strike a blow at their enemies.

Second, the problem for Americans is likely to continue to be external to the U.S., not internal. Less than 1 % of the total terrorist incidents occur in the U.S. Several reasons have been suggested: the effective work of the FBI, the generally tighter control at US points of entry and the absence of radicalized segments of the U.S. population where terrorists can find support. Domestic terrorism could become a more serious problem in the future because of threats from disaffected internal groups such as ethnic separatists, religious fundamentalists and political fanatics or anti-American external groups such as Iranians who find support within immigrant communities, but terrorism for Americans will largely be an external problem. American citizens and US interests have been consistently the target of 30 to 35 % of worldwide terrorist attacks. When considering the terrorism threat, it is important to recognize that citizens of other countries, particularly our European allies, are also victims of such attacks--and they occur in their backyards.

Third, terrorist attacks are likely to be increasingly violent. Looking at recent tactical trends used by terrorist groups, the likelihood for further grotesque developments in the future becomes apparent. The seizing of Embassies and suicidal car bombs are actions which were unknown ten years ago. Look at the firsts from recent incidents: the TWA hijacking of June 1985 allowed us to see hijackers obtain reinforcements for their troops aboard the plane and take passengers from the plane as hostages; the Achille Lauro hijacking presented the first passenger shipjacking in the Middle East and the first murder by terrorists of a passenger aboard a cruise liner. Widespread media coverage gives terrorist acts a demonstration effect for other groups, but continuous repetition of such acts cannot hold the same media attention, leading terrorists to seek more spectacular acts of violence to propagate their messages.

Fourth, a broad spectrum of citizens will be the victims of terrorist attacks. Prominent public figures will undoubtedly remain the primary targets of terrorist attacks, but citizens from all walks of life--businessmen, journalists, tourists and even clergymen--have become increasingly the victims and in some cases the targets of terrorist attacks. In response to the threats against officials, the U.S. government has begun an extensive program to upgrade security at embassies around the world.

The U.S. corporate world can be expected to make similar investments if it wishes to remain active in high threat areas. The sorts of security procedures which we have come to accept before boarding a plane are likely to become more common for entrance aboard ships and into public buildings.

Fifth, open societies will remain the principal targets of terrorists, but no societies will be immune. Open and democratic societies are vulnerable to terrorism because on the one hand the terrorists might succeed more easily in bringing the democratic state to its knees, and on the other the overreactions by democratic states to the threat could more easily destroy the open nature of the society. In designing policies to halt terrorism, we must be careful to protect our basic liberties. We should also recognize that the means which are available to the opponents of democratic states are increasingly available also to the opponents of dictatorships. In Bulgaria there were several terrorist attacks during 1985, probably committed by its repressed minority Turkish population. During 1984 the Soviet Union ranked number seven on the terrorist victim list and during 1985 witnessed four of its diplomats in Beirut fall victim to the same style of kidnapping which has plagued Western governments.

Sixth, State sponsorship has become an increasingly dangerous factor in global terrorism. There has been an unmistakable rise in state terrorism in the past few years with Iran, Libya, Syria, Cuba and Nicaragua as the most active, determined and systematic supporters of terrorist groups. The growing direct government assistance in arms explosives, communications, travel documents, and training of fanatics goes a long way to explaining the shift in tactics toward bombings and armed attacks. Iran remains the major proponent of state terrorism. Its goal appears to be the establishment of fundamentalist Shiite regimes patterned after its own elsewhere in the Muslim World, reducing at the same time all traces of Western influence. In 1983 there were 50 attacks and in 1984 about 60 attacks directly indirectly tied to Iran. Libya, which directs most of its attacks against its own citizens abroad, but has also been active against neighboring countries, appears to have been involved in about 25 incidents last year.

Seventh, the responses from governments to terrorist attacks will tend to ebb and flow with events. Shortly after the bombing of our Embassy in Beirut in September

1984, there was a great outcry for action in the US which fostered the passage of the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism and other important related provisions. Some of the segments of this legislation had been proposed to several previous sessions of Congress; the entire package appeared likely to die in committee prior to the bombing. In London, following the shooting of a British policewoman from a window in the Libyan Embassy, there was a cry of outrage against Libyan terrorism. Similarly, in Europe after the discovery of collaboration among leftist terrorist groups and assassinations of prominent figures in France and Germany in early 1985, there was a rash of cooperative measures among the European states. A few months later when we have tried to talk with the British about stronger joint actions against the Libyans or with the Europeans about strengthening cooperation, the normal bureaucratic reasons for inaction have again dominated the dialogues. When Russians were being held hostage in Beirut, there were signs the Soviet Union might want to talk about terrorism, but when their hostages were released, this interest waned.

Terrorism will be a fact of life for Americans for the rest of this century, although it will affect us overseas more than at home. It will be increasingly violent and affect a broad range of victims. The root causes of terrorism must be studied and underlying conditions analysed, but it is unrealistic to expect that terrorism will disappear simply, either through bold military responses to one or two threats or by resolving fundamental political conflicts such as the Palestinian homeland question. There are no easy solutions. There are too many groups--and deranged individuals--who have learned from the demonstration effect of other fanatics that random violence gets the sort of attention and prestige that would be otherwise unavailable. Better intelligence, enhanced personal and building security, improved international cooperation and a wider realization by the media of their contributing role are essential, if we hope to live in a world where the violence of terrorism does not dominate world events.

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The Historical Development of
the Office for Combatting Terrorism

The phenomenon of political terrorism has beset members of the international community arena since 1968; however, the matter was not of bureaucratic concern to the United States Government until 1972 when President Nixon established the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The Committee was established after the terrorist incidents at Lod Airport in Tel Aviv in May 1972, and later that year in September at the Munich Olympic Games. Although neither of these incidents directly involved American citizens or diplomatic installations abroad, the United States Government took the imminent threat of worldwide terrorism seriously and began the necessary steps toward designing a policy structure. On September 25, 1972 a Presidential directive (Presidential Review Memorandum No. 30) established the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism. The first meeting of its Working Group was convened on October 2 by Secretary of State William Rogers.

The relatively inactive status of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism over the ensuing five years, coupled with President Carter's decision to create a stronger policy response to terrorism, led to the CCCT's formal abolition in

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September of 1977. Reorganized by the Carter Administration as the Interagency Working Group to Combat Terrorism, it was chaired by the Acting Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, John Karkashian. The Office for Combatting Terrorism was initially established on August 1, 1976 under the aegis of the Deputy Undersecretary for Management (M/CT). Ambassador L. Douglas Heck was appointed as Director on August 11. It should be noted that the official designation for the Office for Combatting Terrorism has changed from the original M/CT code, to D/CT temporarily, and back to M/CT. These changes will be elaborated upon in the chronological discussion of this Office.

Scope

It will be the purpose of this paper to trace the historical development of the Office for Combatting Terrorism. Pursuant to this objective, the paper will provide a brief overview of how the Office is integrated into the United States Government anti-terrorism policy formulation process. The initial stage of the paper will commence with a discussion on how the office was able to justify its existence in terms of the policy matters it considered. A brief discussion of its past leadership will also be woven into the section addressing historical development. The second section of the paper will examine

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the structural organization of the office with regard to its staff members and their responsibilities. Thirdly, in keeping with a general systems approach of examining complementarity of structure and function, the paper will probe into the functional dynamics of the office. Particular areas of discussion will be how the office interfaces with other agencies who also share a mutual interest in combatting terrorism. This will be elaborated upon by a description of the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) and the Advisory Group on Terrorism with respect to their goals, objectives, and agency membership. Finally, this will be followed by a similar description of the Special Situation Group and the Terrorist Incident Working Group whose functions are outlined in the National Security Decision Directive No. 30.

Early Years 1972-1975

As indicated, a considerable length of time passed between the initial point when the U.S. Government was confronted with the threat of terrorism until the government made its first formal bureaucratic response. President Nixon's Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism was the first such attempt at responding to terrorism. It was during this time under the Nixon Administration that the lead agency concept was implemented, delineating the bureaucratic responsibility for management of a terrorist situation.

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Convened for the first time on Monday, October 2, 1972, the Working Group of the Cabinet Committee was chaired by Ambassador Armin H. Meyer, the Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism. Key areas of discussion during this first meeting were intelligence collection and preventive measures since the Munich Olympic incident occurred one month prior. Other matters considered were contingency planning and international actions. By November 15, 1972, the Working Group of the CCCT focused its attention on preventive measures in the Federal Aviation Administration's anti-hijacking program with the implementation of a program in January 1973 of assigning "Skymarshals" on board commercial airliners.

The year 1973 saw the appointment of Ambassador Lewis Hoffacker as Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (S/CCT). In March of 1973, the Working Group of the CCCT attempted to reinforce the importance of publicizing punishment of the Black September Organization terrorists who during this month kidnapped and murdered Ambassador Noel and DCM Moore at the American Embassy in Khartoum, Sudan. Later in 1973, the issues of terrorism reappearing in Latin America and terrorists' use of biological and chemical agents became of increasing concern.

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In 1974, one year after the implementation of domestic airport screening measures, the FAA began to assist in improving the security of foreign airports. Also under consideration was the Atomic Energy Commission program for the protection of special nuclear materials in transit and on location and reinforcing the potential dangers of sales on the black market for use in sabotage and terrorism. The potential for future domestic political kidnappings was discussed since the Hearst kidnapping could have incited similar incidents. The collaboration between the FBI and Secret Service helped shed light on the case of manic-depressive hijacker Samuel Byck who planned to hijack a Delta airliner and crash it into the White House.

The next major area of concern appeared to be the activity of exiled anti-Castro Cubans. By and large, their attacks involved book bombs, and were directed against the Cuban Embassies in Mexico City, Lima, and Jamaica. The FBI later apprehended three members of the FLNC group. According to Mr. Philip Johnson of the State Department, the anti-Cuban activity during that time could perhaps be traced to the militant exiles being under the impression that the United States was going to alter its policy toward Cuba. Another incident that occurred on April 13, involved the ambush killing of three U.S. Naval officers

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in Subic Bay, Phillipines. In November, U.S. Customs Service announced plans to expand its enhanced airport security program to 28 major domestic airports. The program was evluated experimentally at O'Hare International Airport in Chicago and consists of x-raying hold baggage prior to passengers claiming it and closed circuit television monitor of all areas where passengers could be prior to going through Customs. Finally, the December 14 hijacking of a private plane from Tampa to Cuba provided an opportunity to evaluate the strength of the February 1973 agreement between the United States and Cuba of either prosecuting or extraditing hijackers.

Ambassador Hoffacker announced his plans to retire effective January 31, 1975. His position as Chairman of the Working Group/CCCT was filled temporarily by Mr. John N. Gatch, Jr., Acting Chairman of the Working Group. In April of 1975, Ambassador Robert A. Fearey was designated as the new Chairman of the Working Group and Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism.

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The first major incident directed against an American target under Ambassador Fearey's chairmanship was the conspiracy to kidnap Vice Consul John Patterson in Mexico in 1975.

Another major area of concern to Fearey's Working Group was the future of Palestinian terrorism by numerous Palestinian groups such as Al Fatah ("The Conqueror"), Al Sa'iqah ("The Lightning Bolt"), the Popular Democratic Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PDFLP), and the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine/General Command (PFLP/GC). Additionally, there were several kidnapping cases that were brought to the attention of the Working Group, such as the Sears & Roebuck executive Donald Cooper in Bogota, Colombia, Col. Ernest Morgan in Beirut, Charles Gallagher and William Dykes also in Lebanon, and the abduction of two American military personnel in Ethiopia by the Eritrean Liberation Front. Finally, 1975 ended with the locker bomb explosion at La Guardia Airport by Puerto Rican nationalists, and the Vienna OPEC incident in which "Carlos" was suspected to have been involved.

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Middle Years 1976-1980

The year 1976 was special for several reasons. In July there were the Bicentennial events and the Canadian Olympics which called for special security attention. At the same time on July 4, 1976, there was the Palestinian hijacking of an Air France airliner which was taken to Entebbe by the hijackers. Several American citizens were involved.

Organizationally important was the establishment of the Office for Combatting Terrorism on August 1, 1976 and the simultaneous abolition of S/CCT. At this time, the Office was assigned the official designation M/CT, and its administrative parent office within the Department was the Undersecretary for Management. On August 11, 1976, Ambassador L. Douglas Heck was appointed as chairman of the Working Group/CCCT and the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism (M/CT). The former title of Special Assistant to the Secretary and Coordinator for Combatting Terrorism (S/CCT), held by previous ambassadors chairing this position, was abolished.

The year 1977 began with a review of two unresolved American kidnapping cases; Curtis and Niehous. Mr. Brian Jenkins of the RAND Corporation was present for one of the first Working Group meetings of the year. He made an

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interesting point that no single policy toward political kidnappings will deter terrorism. Having a fixed and rigid policy would only inhibit creative thinking. For this reason, Mr. Jenkins was of the opinion that it would be more important to emphasize tactical flexibility.

An ongoing specific topic of interest was the development of new technical advances in letter bomb detection.

With regard to administrative changes, in June, Mr. John E. Karkashian was appointed as Acting Chairman of the Working Group/CCCT. He served in this capacity until October when Heyward Isham was appointed as Director. At this point the future status of the Working Group was reevaluated, and it was determined that the new National Security Council/Special Coordination Committee Working Group would replace the existing Working Group of the Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism, which was abolished on September 16, 1977. The new Working Group would consist of 28 federal agencies within whose jurisdiction it is to combat terrorism. Aside from the Working Group, there would also be an Executive Committee on Terrorism (ECT), whose membership would be selected by the NSC. The primary function of the Executive Committee and the Working Group

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was for "policy formulation and information exchange." For a more detailed explanation of the organization for antiterrorism planning, coordination, and policy formulation under the Carter Administration, see Figure 1, Appendix.

There was a strong emphasis in 1978 on anti-hijacking measures. Part of the Ribicoff Omnibus Anti-Terrorism Bill (S.2236) called for establishing a List of Dangerous Airports; however, this was later rejected in the belief that it could inhibit the FAA's efforts to enhance overseas airport security. A multi-national anti-hijacking agreement, the Bonn Declaration was signed into effect in July 1978 by the United States, United Kingdom, Canada, France, Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan. The Declaration calls for those member countries agreeing to terminate civilian airline service to any country who fails to either "prosecute or extradite" a hijacker. The first time the Bonn Declaration was invoked was in March 1981 when air service to Afghanistan was terminated because of Afghanistan's failure to impose sanctions against the Pakistan Liberation Army hijackers of a Pakistani International airliner in Afghanistan.

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The subject of terrorism in Latin America was of concern to the Working Group of the NSC/SCC. The ideological foundation behind this kind of terrorism was cited as being nationalistic in orientation which is characteristic of national liberation movements.

Ambassador Anthony C.E. Quainton was appointed Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism in July of 1978. Due to the size of the Working Group, Ambassador Quainton was of the opinion that it was too large to operate effectively. In an attempt to make the Working Group function more effectively, Ambassador Quainton divided the agency members into committees. Therefore, another administrative concern to the NSC/SCC Working Group on Terrorism was the clarification of responsibilities in each of the Working Group committees.

--The Research and Development Committee is intended to coordinate federal anti-terrorism research and respond to research proposals. The committee is also responsible for updating and identifying deficient areas of extant research.

--The Public Information Committee evaluates guidelines for media coverage of terrorist incidents, and identifies ways of dealing with the press during an incident.

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--The International Initiatives Committee functions as a liaison with the United Nations. It concluded that the United Nations General Assembly support for the Bonn Declaration would not be in the Declaration's best interest as it could decrease its authority.

--The Foreign Security Policy Committee aims to reinforce security at U.S. diplomatic installations abroad, implement programs to train USG employees, programs of assistance to American businessmen abroad, evaluate the effectiveness of the Security Watch Committee concept, and ways of streamlining inter-agency relationships.

--The Domestic Security Policy Committee (now defunct) was intended to focus on border management, interagency exchange of operational information, and evaluating the susceptibility of U.S. targets.

--The Domestic Crisis Management Committee (also defunct), was composed of four subcommittees: (a) Plans and Procedures; (b) Coordination and Communication; (c) Training and Evaluation; and (d) Intelligence Requirements and Access.

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--The Foreign Crisis Management Committee (also defunct), focused mostly on interagency communication links.

On October 17, 1979, the Office for Combatting Terrorism was placed under the purview of the Office of the Deputy Secretary and was to be known as D/CT until January 15, 1982 when it was once again designated as M/CT. A summary report of the Executive Committee on Terrorism activities from May to October of 1979 reveals that there was a considerable amount of attention devoted to security planning for the Pan American Games in San Juan and the Lake Placid Winter Olympic Games. Due to the location of the Olympic Games, there was extensive coordination with the Canadian government. The Research and Development Committee of the Working Group approved several research projects on various aspects of terrorism. The Domestic Security Policy Committee collaborated with the Contingency Planning and Crisis Management Committee in an effort to resolve security issues of intelligence and security information regarding terrorist threats and improved the exchange of training material such as films and security equipment.

Unfortunately, there was no information available on the involvement of D/CT in the American hostage situation in Tehran.

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1981 to Present

The year 1981 ended with the kidnapping of Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier by the Red Brigades in Italy. 1982 began with his dramatic rescue by Italian counter-terrorist police. During his captivity, an interagency task force was convened at the State Department. Due to General Dozier's military position, there were representatives of the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff.

The trend in the geographic distribution of terrorist incidents has shown that in 1981, there were 91 countries that reported terrorist acts. Also in 1981, the citizens of 71 countries were victimized by terrorist attacks which was more than in any prior year since 1968, when statistical records on the incidence of terrorism were first kept. With regard to the type of victim most likely to be targetted, about half (40%) of the victims worldwide are Americans and almost half of this proportion are diplomats. Thus, American diplomats travelling abroad are highly susceptible to being victims of terrorist attack.

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A major activity of 1981 was the development of counter-terrorism training and assistance program to be made available to friendly foreign governments who are also beset with the threat of terrorism. However, the U.S. is unable to render such law enforcement assistance to foreign police forces would entail modifying Section 660 of the Foreign Assistance Act of 1974 to permit foreign countries to receive counter-terrorist training by the U.S. Government. Domestic law enforcement agencies that provide the training include the FBI, FAA, Treasury, and U.S. Customs.

There are five objectives behind the Antiterrorism Assistance Program. The first objective is to enhance law enforcement antiterrorism skills of those countries threatened by political terrorism, and to provide appropriate equipment to prevent terrorism. Second, the program aims to reinforce bilateral relations with friendly governments by offering assistance. Third, the program promotes cooperation between foreign police forces and the U.S. Government. Fourthly, the program through its training in modern police techniques will raise the level of law enforcement human rights. Finally, the program assists foreign governments in protecting American installations and interests from acts of international terrorism.

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On May 12, Ambassador Robert M. Sayre was appointed as Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, where he presently serves. He also chairs the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Advisory Group on Terrorism, and is the Coordinator for Security Policy and Planning.

Organizational Structure of M/CT

The current organizational structure of the Office for Combatting Terrorism consists of a "front office", two sections and one training program (see Figure 3, Appendix). Staff responsibilities are divided along functional and geographic lines. Ambassador Robert M. Sayre is presently the Director of the Office and pursuant to this role is also the Chairman of both the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Advisory Group on Terrorism, and Coordinator for Security Policy and Planning. The Director of the Office holds the administrative rank equivalent to Assistant Secretary. The senior Deputy Director is charged with the responsibility for overseeing the contingency planning and crisis management function, which is the reactive arm of the U.S. Government anti-terrorism response policy. Six Foreign Service Officers and three clerical staff comprise this section.

The second function is that of overall security policy and coordination which is the responsibility of an Assistant Coordinator of Security Policy.

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At this point it would be appropriate to discuss how the Office for Combatting Terrorism interfaces with other agencies who also share a mutual interest in combatting terrorism. As indicated, in addition to Ambassador Sayre's duty as Director of this Office, he is also the Chairman of the Department of State's Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and the Advisory Group on Terrorism. Until recently, the Advisory Group was formerly known as the Working Group.

The Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) consists of delegates from various federal agencies who bear a direct responsibility for responding to terrorism. The twelve agencies serving on the Interdepartmental Group are the Office of the Vice President, the National Security Council (Special Coordination Committee), Departments of State, Defense, Justice, Treasury, Energy, Transportation, Central Intelligence Agency, Federal Bureau of Investigation, Federal Aviation Administration, and Joint Chiefs of Staff. The Department of State chairs this group, seconded by the Department of Justice as the Deputy Chairman. The IG/T was established at the beginning of the Reagan Administration, pursuant to the abolition of the Executive Committee on Terrorism which was established under the Carter

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NSDD 30

By proclamation of National Security Decision Directive No. 30 (April 10, 1982), the United States Government organization for managing terrorist incidents is composed of the Special Situation Group (SSG), the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG), and the participating agencies Task Forces.

Special Situation Group

The role of the Special Situation Group is to monitor crises and generate response options for evaluation either by the NSC or by the President. The membership of the SSG is composed of the Vice President (Chairman), Secretary of State, Director of Central Intelligence, Attorney General/Director of the FBI, Director of the Federal Aviation Administration, Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency, National Security Advisor, Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, Counselor to the President, Chief

t of Staff to the President, Deputy Chief of Staff to the
s President, and any others as deemed necessary by the Vice
c President.

d
t The specific responsibilities of the SSG are to: (a)
I initiate contingency planning for a crisis; (b) monitor the
d crisis, utilizing available government resource agencies;
d (c) submit options for evaluation to the NSC or the
n President; (d) ensure that Presidential decisions are
s relayed to agencies for execution; (e) monitor the
c implementatioj of the Presidential decisions and directives
i and (f) provide communications and press guidance for use by
p the White House and State Department. There are several
t other provisions to NSDD 30 which will be discussed as
follows: TIWG, IG/T, White House Operations Group,
Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, and the
o Exercise Committee.

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Terrorist Incident Working Group

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The purpose of the Terrorist Incident Working Group (TIWG) is to aid the decision-making authorities in the White House in the resolution of on-going terrorist incidents. Its primary role is to provide operational assistance to the SSG. When the SSG is monitoring a terrorist incident, the TIWG will be directly accountable

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Chiefs of Staff, FBI, and FEMA. It should be noted that the Chairman reserves the right to alter the TIWG composition to suit the needs of each individual incident. As the nature of the incident changes, so may the agency personnel at the discretion of the Chairman.

Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism

The next provision of NSDD 30 is the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism. The Interdepartmental Group convenes at least once per month to discuss matters pertaining to counter-terrorism policy, contingency planning and protective security. Those matters of higher priority are referred by the Senior Interdepartmental Group to the National Security Council. By mandate of President Carter in 1977, the NSC was reorganized to oversee the Policy Review Committee and the Special Coordination Committee.

The White House Operations Group, which is chaired by the Director of the White House Military Office is another provision of NSDD 30. This Group is activated when terrorist threats or acts are perpetrated against the President, Vice President, or senior U.S. official. The NSC staff will act as a liaison between this group, the IG/T, and TIWG.

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The Interagency Intelligence Committee on Terrorism, is chaired by the Director of Central Intelligence. Its function is to provide interagency intelligence support to the SSG and the TIWG specifically in the area of counter-terrorism threat analysis.

The Exercise Committee is appointed by the Chairman of the IG/T and its purpose is to conduct exercise programs to ensure that U.S. counter-terrorist response capabilities are ready for deployment. It should be noted that no interagency exercise may be carried out at the national level without IG/T recommendation and approval of the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs.

"Lead Agency" Concept

With regard to which agency will assume the command over managing a terrorist incident, the "lead agency" concept is used. The organization of federal response will be delegated to that agency with the most direct operational role in dealing with that type of incident. For example, since acts of terrorism occurring outside the United States but perpetrated against target symbolizing American interests become a diplomatic matter, the Department of State becomes the lead agency. In response to acts of domestic terrorism occurring within the United States, the FBI within the Department of Justice will become the lead agency. Each FBI field office has developed contingency

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use of assault teams. In the event of a hijacking within U.S. air space, the lead agency will be the Federal Aviation Administration, or the FBI depending on the circumstances.

Summary

It has been the purpose of this paper to review the historical development of the Office for Combatting Terrorism, the Department of State's office for implementing the Department's lead agency responsibility for responding to acts of international terrorism. As indicated, the Office is directed by an Assistant Secretary level official, staffed by Foreign Service Officers, and is divided into three branches: crisis management, security policy, and a training program.

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SUMMARY OF LEADERSHIP
OF THE
OFFICE FOR COMBATTING TERRORISM

<u>Ambassador</u>	<u>Period of Leadership</u>
Armin H. Meyer	October 1972 - June 1973
Lewis Hoffacker	July 1973 - February 1975
John N. Gatch, Jr. (Acting)	February 1975 - April 1975
Robert A. Fearey	April 1975 - July 1976
L. Douglas Heck	August 1976 - June 1977
John Karkashian (Acting)	June 1977 - October 1977
Heyward Isham	October 1977 - July 1978
Anthony C.E. Quainton	July 1978 - June 1981
Frank H. Perez (Acting)	June 1981 - May 1982
Robert M. Sayre	May 1982 - Present

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Appendix

Figure 1

Organization for Antiterrorism Planning, Coordination, and
Policy Formulation, Carter Administration

NSC Advisor	Secretary Defense	Director of
Vice President	Chairman JCS	CIA
Secretary State	other concerned agencies	

Executive Committee on Terrorism

State	Treasury	Energy
Justice/FBI	Transportation	NSC Staff
Defense/JCS	CIA	

Working Group on Terrorism

State	Army	ICA
Justice	Defense	LEAA
ACDA	DIA	D.C. Police
AID	Energy	NSA
CIA	FBI	NRC
Coast Guard	Fed. Prepared. Agy.	OMB
Commerce	Customs	FAA
Postal Service	Treasury	AT&F
Immig. & Natur. Svc	U.S. U.N.	HEW
Secret Service	Federal Prot. Svc	JCS

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Comittees of the Working Group

Research & Development

Security Policy

Contingency Planning & Crisis Management

Public Relations

International Initiatives

Source: Farrell, William R. The U.S. Government
Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy
Strategy. p. 60.

Federal Protective Service
Immigration and Naturalization Service
International Communications Agency
Joint Chiefs of Staff
Metropolitan Police Department
National Security Agency
Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Office of Justice Assistance, Research and Statistics
Office of Management and Budget
Office of Undersecretary of Defense
United States Coast Guard
United States Customs Service
United States Postal Service
United States Secret Service

References:

1. Farrell, William R. The U.S. Government Response to Terrorism: In Search of an Effective Strategy. Westview Press, Inc.; Boulder, Colo. 1982, p. 98.

2. "Heck Leads New Effort to Combat Terrorism," Department of State Newsletter, August-September 1976, p. 13.

3. U.S. Department of State Bulletin Reprint. "Combatting Terrorism." September 1982, p. 4.

4. (Ibid), p.10.

5. Farrell, William R. (Ibid).

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TAB C

Given this situation, and the obligation of the government to keep the families informed, there needs to be an effective "outreach" program to maintain personal contact with the families and share information with them as extensively as possible. Responsibility for this outreach program must be clearly fixed within the Executive Branch, so that an effective program is developed. The decision has been taken that in exceptional circumstances (such as an unusually prolonged hostage situation) primary responsibility for dealing with hostage families is assigned to a special committee within the Department of State. Improvements over the previous system include: assignment of individuals to maintain frequent personal contact with each family; the use of hot-lines or toll-free numbers, and more extensive information on the availability of professional counselling services. (U)

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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January 9, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO: IG/T Members

FROM: Robert B. Oakley, Chairman ^{CSO}

SUBJECT: Recommendations from the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism Which Require IG/T Consideration

I attach the recommendations from the subject Task Force report which require IG/T action, proposed inter-agency action and a suggested deadline. They are fully consistent with the recommendations of the Final Report of the draft NSDD. If you have any suggestions for additions or modifications, please bring them with you to the next meeting of the IG/T.

Attachment:

As stated

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Department of State
By dlb
Date 11/7/99
July 21, 1997
NADA, Dave

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DECL: OADR

IG/T meeting
1/9/86

VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON COMBATting TERRORISM

FOIA(b) (1)

PROPOSED IG/T ACTIONS

<u>Rec. No.</u>	<u>Action Agency or Group</u>	<u>S/CT Action Officer</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Recommendation/Action</u>
4.	PDWG	Kraft	3/30/86	TIWG has principle action, but PDWG should consider point 3 of recommendation on coordination public statements during an incident and prepare a report to the Chairman of the IG/T.
5.	State (S/CT)	Porter	3/6/86 <i>- report - committee</i>	Establish a temporary committee of the IG/T to prepare an inter-agency set of criteria on the use of force in response to terrorist incidents. Report should be prepared for the Chairman of the IG/T to submit to the NSC.
7.	State (S/CT)	Porter	Indefinite	Work with Defense on the deployment of counter-terrorism forces making use of the Emergency Support Team working group where appropriate.
8.	PDWG	Kraft	Indefinite	Work with Defense and the NSC staff to develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy regarding deployment of counter-terrorist forces.
11.	a) IG/T	Bentley	1/30/86	Consider proposal that FEMA become a permanent member of the IG/T.
	b) FEMA	Bentley	Undetermined	Pursue a program to identify US infrastructure vulnerabilities.
15.	Exr. Com. of IG/T	Stern/Porter	Indefinite	NSC action in coordination with the IG/T to plan and oversee a program simulating terrorist program simulating terrorist problem and conducting inter-agency exercises.
19.	State (S/CT)	Porter	Indefinite	Prepare a list of proposed countries and and action plan to pursue research, development and acquisition arrangements with friendly states, ensuring that all remain compartmentalized and structured on a quid-pro-quo basis.

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DECL: OADR

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| 20. | Justice
(CA) | Bentley | Indefinite | Undertake a review with State and Treasury of existing US systems of cross border travel of known or suspected terrorists. Results of review should be submitted through the IG/T to the NSC. |
| 21. | Mar. Sec.
Wk. Gp. | Bentley | 4/30/86 | Present a status report on actions to improve maritime security to be submitted through the IG/T to the NSC. |
| 22. | State
(S/CT) | Bentley | 3/30/86 | With the concurrence of the DCI, develop a program to ensure that policy guidance and analytical material are available for use in exchanges with foreign law enforcement and intelligence agencies; monitor that information from these exchanges is reported [REDACTED] |
| 26. | a) State
(DS) | Bentley | 1/30/86 | Develop a list of critical posts coordinated in State and with CIA. |
| | b) State
(S/CT) | Bentley | 2/6/86 | Draft a message to ambassadors on improved counter-terrorism coordination. |
| | c) CIA | Long | 2/6/86 | Submit to the Chairman of the IG/T a preliminary proposal on how the exchange tour program might operate. |
| 27. | TSWG | Stern | 4/30/86 | Examine in conjunction with the IICT the current terrorist counter measures program for incidents involving chemical or biological agents per the recommendation. Proposal to enhance the current efforts should be submitted to the Chairman of the IG/T for forwarding to the NSC. |
| 28. | PDWG | Kraft | 3/30/86 | Present to the IG/T chairman a preliminary report on plans to develop a long-range comprehensive strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. Consideration should be given to the specific program suggested in the recommendation. |
| 29. | PDWG | Kraft | 3/30/86 | Present to the IG/T chairman a report on plans to develop and implement a strategy to offset the capability of terrorists to exploit US press freedom to their advantage taking into consideration points in this recommendation. |

30. PDWG Kraft 3/30/86 Present to the IG/T Chairman a report on plans by the Psy-Ops Working Group of the PDWG to ensure that psy-ops to combat terrorism are closely integrated into the overall counter-terrorism effort, taking into consideration the points in recommendation 30.
33. State (L) Bentley 3/30/86 In concert with Justice and the CIA, take the lead to develop a unilateral or bilateral program of informant incentives and initiate legislative action to support such a program. A status report should be prepared for the Chairman of the IG/T.
34. a) State Kraft Ongoing Review guidance regularly on how to make the Rewards Program (DS) more effective.
- b) PDWG Kraft 3/30/86 Present to the IG/T Chairman a program to explore the more creative use of the rewards program in conjunction with Psy-Ops efforts against suspected terrorists.
39. Justice Bentley 4/30/86 report to the Chairman of the IG/T the status of the effort to (H PM) employ the expanded ITAR to control the provision of defense services to foreign nationals at mercenary camps in this country based upon a one year review of the existing law. Review should also consider the need for additional legislation.

VICE PRESIDENT TASK FORCE ON COMBATTING TERRORISM
STATE DEPARTMENT ACTION LIST

<u>Rec. No.</u>	<u>Action Office</u>	<u>S/CT Action Officer</u>	<u>Deadline</u>	<u>Recommendation/Action</u>
1	S/CT	Bentley	On-going	Assist the NSC in conjunction with OMB and Justice in maintaining the national program for combatting terrorism.
<i>DONE</i> 2.	-	Bentley	Indefinite	NSC action to issue a NSDD to supercede existing NSDDs on policy to combat terrorism.
3.	-	Bentley	Indefinite	NSC action to include in NSDD mechanism to strengthen coordination per recommendation.
4.	a) PA	Kraft	On-going	TIWG has action to refine mechanism for coordination of public statements at the time of an incident.
	b) H (PA)	Kraft	1/30/86	Develop with PA and S/CT a mechanism to keep interested Hill representatives systematically up-to-date on terrorist incidents.
	c) PDWG* (USIA, PA)	Kraft	3/30/86	Prepare a report to the IG/T Chairman on efforts to develop an action plan to implement point 3 of this recommendation.
5.	S/CT (PM)	Porter	3/6/86	Establish a temporary committee of the IG/T to prepare an interagency criteria on the use of force in preemption, reaction and retaliation regarding terrorist incidents per recommendation 5. Once approved by the IG/T, this set of criteria should be sent to the NSC.
6.	S/CT (PM, INR, Regional)	Bentley	Indefinite	NSC action to develop options in consultation with the IG/T and TIWG.

* PDWG: Public Diplomacy Working Group of the IG/T and the IIC includes as members: State (SC/T and PA), USIS, Defense and Justice.

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| 7. | S/CT (PM) | Porter | Indefinite | Primary action is with Defense and NSC to review CTJTF deployment criteria and policy, but recommendations should be kept under consideration during meetings of the EST Working Group. |
| 8. | PDWG* (PM) | Kraft | Indefinite | Primary action is with Defense, but they are to develop a comprehensive public affairs strategy in conjunction with the PDWG and the NSC on counter-terrorism for <u>us</u> . ? |
| 9. | M/MO (DS, M & Regional) | Porter | 3/30/86 | Institute a thorough review at all high-threat posts of personnel requirements of all agencies represented in the country to reduce our exposure to the minimum consistent with effectiveness. Review should be cleared appropriately and sent to the NSC as a Platt-Poindexter. |
| 10. | CA | Bentley | 3/30/86 | In conjunction with S/CT, institute a review of policy, guidance and training currently in effect regarding travel documentation. Review should also include plan for promulgation of guidelines through all USG agencies concerned. Interim report should be cleared appropriately and sent to the NSC as a Platt-Poindexter. |
| 11. | a) S/CT | Bentley | 1/30/86 | Consider at next IG/T meeting proposal that FEMA become a permanent member of the IG/T. |
| | b) S/CT | Bentley | 1/30/86 | Ensure that recommendation No. 11 has been forwarded to FEMA. |
| 12. | CA (NEA) | Kraft | Indefinite | Consider modifications in dealing with families of Lebanese hostages per recommendation No. 11 and mechanism to establish similar working group in other long-term hostage situations. |
| 13. | DS | Porter | Indefinite | Primary action with USSS, but DS should insure that IG/T is informed if USSS refrains from implementing this recommendation or chooses narrow interpretation of spouses to exclude other accompanying dependents. |

14. (DS) Porter Ongoing Action is with NSC and OMB to increase oversight of R&D related to terrorism. S/CT officer should keep Ambassador-at-Large informed if problems develop.
15. S/CT Porter/Stern Indefinite Action is with the NSC in coordination with the IG/T. Porter has action on military exercises and Stern on (DS & PM) chemical/biological and nuclear exercises.
16. a) M/FSI Stern 3/30/86 Develop a programs to require all Ambassadors, DCM's, COS's (PM, INR & Regional) and military attaches to be briefed on USG policies and resources committed to combatting terrorism. Submit to the NSC as a Platt-Poindexter, cleared with M, DS and S/CT.
- b) DS/TAG Stern 1/30/86 Risk assessments to a particular country or region should be (INR) included in the briefing. DS work with FSI to incorporate them in briefings.
17. S/CT Bentley 3/1/86 In the implementation of this recommendation, action office (Regional, PDWG, L & IO) should put together a public document of bilateral, multilateral and international understandings, agreements and conventions to combat terrorism which the US has pursued over the past year. This document should be disseminated in coordination with PDWG to interested public and Congressional groups. A similar document might be considered for preparation at about this time next year.
18. a) L Bentley 1/30/86 Develop a list of countries and proposed action plan to open (Regional) negotiations on extradition treaties to limit the scope of the political offense with States which have democratic regimes and fair judicial systems.
- b) L Bentley 1/30/86 Develop an action plan for the Senate approval of US-UK (EUR) extradition treaty. Any participation from other agencies should be requested formally in a Platt-Poindexter memo.

19. S/CT Porter 3/30/86 Prepare a list of proposed countries and action plan to pursue
(Regional, DS, PM, OES, & L) RD&A programs with friendly states, ensuring that all remain
compartmentalized and structured on a quid-pro-quo basis.
20. a) CA Bentley Indefinite Action is with Attorney General to undertake review of existing
US systems (e.g. AVALDS, TECS-T, CLASS, etc.) to upgrade US
effort to control cross-border travel of known or suspected
terrorists.
- b) CA Bentley Ongoing Continue to urge other countries to establish visa lookout
(Regional) systems and share the results with us.
- c) S/CT/ATA Bentley 2/27/86 Consider how the ATA program might be used to assist other
DS countries develop a uniform system to control cross border
travel.
21. a) EB Bentley 4/30/86 Action is with the Department of Transportation to continue
(IO) the work of the IG/T working group on Maritime Security. Status
report should be prepared for the IG/T to submit to the NSC.
- b) IO Bentley Ongoing Continue to press for action by the IMO on the development of
internationally agreed measures for better maritime security.
22. a) S/CT Bentley 3/30/86 With the concurrence of the DCI, develop a program to ensure
(INR, DS & Regional) that policy guidance and special analytical intelligence on
terrorism are available for use in exchanges with foreign law
enforcement and intelligence agencies; monitor that information
from these exchanges is reported in Terrep messages. Program
should be sent to all diplomatic posts.
- b) INR Bentley Ongoing Primary action is with CIA, but monitor further efforts to
(Regional & DS) develop precise and systematic exchanges of terrorist
intelligence with foreign governments.

- c) DS/TAG Bentley Ongoing Drop from threat advisories to the extent possible the "No Foreign Dissemination" caveat. If this continues to be a problem, it should be reported to the IG/T.
- 23. INR (DS) Long Indefinite
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- 24. INR (DS) Long Indefinite
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- 25. DS & INR Long Indefinite (PER)

CIA action to oversee development of core of intelligence analysts devoting themselves to terrorism. If CIA's plans do not include programs for State officers, the IG/T should be informed.
- 26. a) DS Bentley 2/28/86 (INR & Regional)

In conjunction with CIA, INR and Regional Bureaus, DS should develop a list of critical posts for submission to the chairman of the IG/T as noted in recommendation 26. There should also be a statement submitted about the timing for the periodic revision of this list.
- b) S/CT Bentley 2/6/86 (DS & Regional)

Draft a message from S to Ambassadors requesting them 1) to designate a Mission counter-terrorism coordinator (probably the DCM), 2) note other supporting officers, 3) develop an assessment of the local terrorism situation, and 4) develop a plan to ensure that all counter-terrorist capabilities are properly coordinated and all local police/security agencies properly covered. Although recommendation 26 discusses only critical posts, this message should be directed to all countries where there is a potential terrorist threat.
- c) PER Long Ongoing (DS & INR)

CIA action to develop an exchange tour program, but PER, DS and INR should monitor it to ensure that State interests are taken into consideration.

- | | | | | |
|-----|-----------------------|---------|---------|---|
| | d)S/CT/ATA | Bentley | Ongoing | FBI and Treasury action to develop a program of briefings and instruction on the national program to be made available at Quantico and FLETC. |
| 27. | TSWG** | Stern | 4/30/86 | Examine in conjunction with the IICT the current terrorist counter measures program for incidents involving chemical or biological agents per the recommendation. Recommendations should be submitted to the chairman of the IG/T for forwarding to the NSC. |
| 28. | a) PDWG | Kraft | 3/30/86 | Present to the IG/T chairman a preliminary report on plans to develop a long-range comprehensive strategy to improve public understanding of international terrorism and the policies required to combat it. Consideration should be given to the specific program suggested in the recommendation. |
| | b) S/CT | Kraft | 1/30/86 | Prepare a recommendation for M/MO coordinated with PA to establish a high level position as coordinator to implement an action program designed to explain US counter-terrorism policies at home and abroad. |
| 29. | PDWG | Kraft | 3/30/86 | Present to the IG/T chairman a report on plans to develop and implement a strategy to offset the capability of terrorists to exploit US press freedom to their advantage taking into consideration points in this recommendation. |
| 30. | PDWG | Kraft | 3/30/86 | Present to the IG/T Chairman a report on plans by the Psy-Ops Working Group of the PDWG to ensure that psy-ops to combat terrorism are closely integrated into the overall counter-terrorism effort, taking into consideration the points in recommendation 30. |
| 31. | L
USIA &(Regional) | Bentley | Ongoing | Work with Justice to continue government-to government contracts and stimulate private and academic initiatives that address the relationship between terrorism and the domestic and international legal system. |

** Technical Support Working Group: Chaired jointly by Energy and Defense; State representatives include S/CT and DS.

- | | | | | |
|-----|---------------------|---------|------------|---|
| 32. | a) L (IO) | Bentley | 2/6/86 | Develop a plan to approach selected governments about tightening the interpretation and application of the Vienna Convention. |
| | b) IO (L) | Bentley | 2/6/86 | Consider a resolution for presentation to the UN General Assembly condemning the misuse of the provisions of the Vienna Convention. |
| 33. | L (H) | Bentley | 3/30/86 | In concert with Justice and the CIA, take the lead to develop a unilateral or bilateral program of informant incentives and initiate legislative action to support such a program. A status report should be prepared for the Chairman of the IG/T. |
| 34. | a) DS
(L) | Kraft | Ongoing | Review guidance regularly on how to make the Rewards Program more effective. |
| | b) PDWG
(L & DS) | Kraft | 3/30/86 | Present to the IG/T Chairman a program to explore the more creative use of the rewards program in conjunction with Psy-Ops efforts against suspected terrorists. |
| | c) L (H) | Kraft | Indefinite | Explore obtaining Congressional approval for increasing to \$1 million the current ceiling of \$500,000 that can be authorized in any one case. |
| 35. | L (H) | Bentley | Ongoing | Continue efforts with Justice in support of legislation which makes murder of US citizens outside the US a federal crime. |
| 36. | L (H) | Bentley | Indefinite | Action is with Justice to pursue legislation which makes murder during a hostage-taking subject to the death penalty. |
| 37. | L
(H & INR) | Bentley | Indefinite | Action is with Justice to secure passage of the Hyde proposal or similar legislation regarding streamlining the notification process on intelligence activities. |
| 38. | L
(A & PA) | Kraft | Indefinite | Action is with Justice to lead an inter-agency review of the provisions of the FOIA to determine validity of reported abuse of the intent of the act and develop appropriate corrective legislation. |

39. L Bentley 4/30/86 report to the Chairman of the IG/T the status of the effort to
(H PM) employ the expanded ITAR to control the provision of defense
services to foreign nationals at mercenary camps in this country
based upon a one year review of the existing law. Review should
also consider the need for additional legislation.
40. a) L Bentley Indefinite Primary action seems to be with Justice to pursue legislation to
(H, CA &NEA) facilitate the removal from the US of aliens engaged in
international terrorism and prohibit further entry of certain
nationalities.
- b) L Bentley Indefinite Work with Justice to consider using existing legal authorities
(NEA, CA &H) to restrict the actions of groups and nationals from Iran and
Libya and representing the PLO per the specific points of
recommendation 40. A report should be prepared for transmission
to the NSC under a Platt-Poindexter memorandum.
41. L Bentley Indefinite Action is with Justice to consider whether payments of ransoms
(CA, H & ARA) by private US companies and individuals should be made illegal.
42. OES Stern Indefinite Action is with Justice to pursue legislation to permit nuclear
(L & H) reactor licenses access to FBI criminal history files in order
to improve security for nuclear reactor facilities.

Drafted:S/CT:PW Borg⁸⁸
(Wang 0467K) 1/7/86

DISTRIBUTION OF RECOMMENDATIONS

H - 4, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 39, 40, 41, 42
PM - 5, 6, 7, 8, 15, 16, 19, 39
PA - 4, 8, 28, 29, 30, 34, 38
L - 17, 18, 19, 31, 32, 33, 34, 35, 36, 37, 38, 39, 40, 41, 42
AF - 6, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 31
ARA - 6, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 31, 41
EAP - 6, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 31
EUR - 6, 9, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 31
NEA - 6, 9, 12, 16, 17, 18, 19, 20, 22, 26, 31, 40
EB - 21
INR - 6, 16, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 37
IO - 17, 21, 32
OES - 19, 42
CA - 10, 12, 20, 40, 41
A - 38
DS - 9, 13, 14, 15, 16, 19, 20, 22, 23, 24, 25, 26, 34
M/DGP -25, 26
M/FSI -16
M/MO - 9
USIA -4, 8, 28, 29, 30, 31, 34

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THE WHITE HOUSE

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
January 20, 1986

~~TOP SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE VICE PRESIDENT
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE DIRECTOR, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
THE DIRECTOR, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION

SUBJECT: Transmittal of National Decision Directive
(NSDD) 207: National Program for Combatting
Terrorism (TS)

The President has signed the NSDD which implements the findings and recommendations of the Vice President's Task Force and is hereby promulgated for appropriate action. (TS)



John M. Poindexter

Attachment
NSDD-207

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D CLASSIFIED

White House G
By clk

just 28, 1997

11/7/00

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

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MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Progress Report on Implementation of NSDD-207

I attach an updated progress report on the State Department's action on items from NSDD-207 due for implementation by May 1, 1986.

The progress report transmitted April 18 included the status of every recommendation assigned for action to the Department of State or the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism and its Working Groups. This report provides information only on those items due for implementation by May 1, 1986, which were not fully covered in the April 18 document.

Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary

Drafted: S/CT: SBenko, in Cleared: See attached Recommendations
5/8/86 Each cleared separately
Wang 0613P

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S) *dh 14/100*

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Recommendation 9

Review of Mission Staffing

Status

The Department of State submitted a memorandum on April 17 to VADM John Poindexter outlining the results of its review of mission staffing in accordance with this recommendation.

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Part 1!

Drafted: S/CT: SBenko } *SB*
Cleared: S/CT: PWBorg } *W*

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NLS F97-082/2#184

CU, NARA, DATE 8/27/06

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Recommendation 13

Protection of Foreign Dignitaries in the United States

Status

The Secret Service began protecting accompanying spouses of heads of state and government on May 1, 1986. The Bureau of Diplomatic Security will protect non-accompanying spouses and family members, and other categories of high-level visitors, as appropriate.

Why would we have to protect a non-accompanying person at all?

The issue of funding has not been resolved. As State reported earlier, the USSS has asked Congress for \$1.6 million reimbursement from State for FY 87 for the protection of accompanying spouses. State has provided the same services in the past at a maximum cost of \$132,000 annually. Thus, a fundamental disagreement regarding scope and costs exists between State and the USSS. The Department of State does not take issue with the \$1.6 million request per se, but opposes the transfer of that amount from State's account.

We note further that the USSS will receive an undetermined amount of additional funding from the Deconcini amendment which took approximately \$100 million in authority and \$50 million in outlays from State's 150 account.

Drafted: DS: DTice }
Cleared: S/CT: PWBorg } *sch*

Continuing bureaucratic warfare...

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CAS
NARA, DATE 3/27/11

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Recommendation 14

Research and Development for Combatting Terrorism

Status

Funding for Inter-Departmental Group on Terrorism (IG/T) research and development efforts has been included in the FY-86 "Inman" supplemental request currently before the Congress. When they are available, State will transfer funds as appropriate to the responsible agencies conducting R&D efforts in specific anti-terrorism subject areas. In the interim, the IG/T, through its Technical Support Working Group (TSWG), is coordinating individual agency programs.

Drafted: DS: DTice }
Cleared: S/CT: PWBorg }
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 } *for*

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ON NARA, DATE 3/27/02

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Recommendation 16

Country Team Briefings

Status

The Bureau of Diplomatic Security has been in touch with FSI on how threat analysis information will be factored into FSI's courses for specific target groups, and this role will be reflected in upcoming briefings.

Limp disk, partial response

Drafted: DS: DTice }
Cleared: S/CT: PWBorg } *SEN*

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CU NARA, DATE 3/27/62

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Recommendation 17

International Agreements for Combatting Terrorism

Status

Substantial progress has been made in the past month on agreements on several levels to curb Libyan terrorism. On April 21, after intense consultation with USG officials, the Foreign Ministers of the European Community (EC) announced a new policy of restrictions on and expulsions of Libyan diplomats and other alien residents from their countries. Since that announcement every EC country except Greece has condemned Libyan support for terrorism, and has taken measures to reduce the Libyan diplomatic presence in their countries.

Also in April, Ambassador Oakley attended, with Attorney General Meese and FBI Director Webster, a meeting of the Trevi Group. The purpose of this meeting was to discuss the coordination and implementation of multilateral efforts to combat international terrorism at the working level.

At the Tokyo Summit in early May, the leaders of the UK, Italy, France, Germany, Canada, US and Japan produced a strong statement denouncing international terrorism and specifying Libya, by name, as a major culprit of support and engagement in terrorist activities.

The State Department is now in the process of building on these actions to strengthen bilateral and multilateral relationships with these and other countries.

Drafted: S/CT: SBenko }
Cleared: S/CT: PWBorg } *SEB*
EW

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NLS F97-082/z #188
CU, NARA, DATE 3/27/06

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Recommendation 28

Monitoring and Influencing Foreign and Domestic Attitudes and Perceptions Toward Terrorism and U.S. Counterterrorism Policy

Status

In response to the recommendations of the Public Diplomacy Working Group, USIA has proposed an international public opinion poll. The following memo outlines the proposed plans for the poll and for follow-up activity.

The increased level of international terrorist activity and uncertain support on the part of allied governments, publics and media for effective counter-terrorist actions warrant a new opinion survey of West European attitudes toward terrorism. The survey will update and expand upon a poll reported last June (attached) by exploring the bases of support (and its lack) by West European publics for more active measures to combat terrorism.

Two products are envisioned: 1) a report on public opinion in the area; 2) a more sophisticated analysis identifying relationships among various perceptions and attitudes in order to suggest ways of constructively influencing West European public opinion.

Survey Report

The survey would entail personal interviews in late March 1986 with about 1000 adults in seven countries (Belgium, UK, Italy, Germany, France, Greece, and Sweden). It would address both general and specific questions, including: 1) what are the perceived causes of terrorism; 2) what are recent trends in public opinion on terrorism; 3) how do attitudes toward specific measures against terrorism relate to perceptions of specific perpetrators, victims and underlying causes; 4) how do the attitudes of different countries or demographic groups compare.

Analysis of Implications for Public Diplomacy

The follow-on study, providing policy-relevant implications, will probe apparent contradictions in public attitudes toward terrorism. For example, European publics generally support harsh counter-terrorist measures (the death penalty) at home, but not abroad (military retaliation); and they identify as "major" causes of terrorism both political injustice and excessive tolerance of terrorist activities. Specific areas of inquiry will include:

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1) how do public attitudes compare with media commentaries and official policies; 2) which rationales for counter-terrorist measures seem most persuasive and among which groups? 3) do West Europeans feel vulnerable to economic or terrorist reprisals -- and from whom -- if measures are taken against countries supporting terrorists; 4) do West Europeans fear that some counter-terrorist measures risk military confrontation and, if so, among which states and with what results; 5) what particular actions are believed to be acceptable and effective responses to terrorism?

Such analysis would pinpoint suitable themes for public diplomacy by identifying which are most likely to work in specific European countries and which may be counter-productive.

Timing

A proposed personal interview questionnaire of approximately 35 questions will be fielded in the seven indicated countries in late March with initial results anticipated in early April. Preliminary results would be reported by about April 15.

Quick Reaction: Flash Survey

Rapid-reponse data will be obtained in advance of these field surveys by polling a small sub-sample with respect to five questions asked by telephone in two countries (France and UK). This flash poll could also serve as a dry run for a quick-reaction phone survey to be implemented immediately after a future terrorist act. Results of such a poll, probing the immediate reactions of European publics, could be reported within 72 hours, provided advance clearance is forthcoming.

Estimated Costs

Because the USIA Office of Research has limited resources at its disposal, funding assistance from the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism would be helpful in fielding a full-scale survey in this area.

Personal interview surveys of approximately 35 questions:

Belgium	\$16,000	France	\$20,000
UK	16,000	Greece	27,000
Italy	26,000	Sweden	25,000
Germany	15,000	Total	\$145,000
Phone poll option in France and UK:		Total:	\$7,000

*What?
No wonder these guys can't accomplish anything -- they don't understand how USG is organized.*

Drafted: USIA: JFishman

Cleared: S/CT: PWBorg

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