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Date: 8/18/99 Wills - F97-108/1

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DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION	
1. Paper	Allied Cooperation/Assistance in Countering	n.d	P1/F1	
2. Report	Terrorism, 4 p. D 5/8/06 NISF97-108/1 #11 re: Irish Terrorism, 21 p. Palt 10/24/00 F97-108/1 # 119	3/86	P1/F1 , B7	
3. Memo.	Offiver-North to John Poindexter, re: U.S./UK Talks	3/3/86	P1/F1	**
4. Agenda	on Terrorism, 1 p. 4/3/4 US-UK Bilateral Meeting, (annotated), 2 p. DAGT	n.d.	P1/F1 - **	*
5. Memo	Robert Oakley to Dewey Claridge, Buck Revell, et	2/26/86	B1. B3	
6. Talking Pts.	al., re: US/UK Bilateral Meeting, March 5, 1986, 1 p. PART 8/19/01 F97-108/, #/2 re: U.S./UK Talks on Terrorism, 1 p.		1/18/06 P04 P1/F1	-603 n
7. Agenda	US/UK Bilateral Meeting, 2 p.	nd.	P1/F1	
8. Notes	Handwritten Notes on March 5, 1986 UK Meeting,	3/5/86	P1/F1	
	P.D " #125			
9. Chart	US/UK Communication, 1 p. # 176	nd.	P1/F1	
10. Memo	Oakley to Gen. John Moellering, Gen. W.H. Rice, et	3/14/86	PH/FT R3	
11. MemCon	al, re: Report of US-UK Bilateral Talks, 1.p. 74R+ 8/19/02 F97-108/1 #107 US-UK Bilateral Meeting on Terrorism, 10 p. #128	3/10/86 PATT 1/18/ 3/22/86	P1/F1 (0)3	#128
12. Memo	Nicholas Platt to Poindexter, re: US-UK Bilateral Talks on Terrorism, 1 p.		P1/F1	
13. MemCon	Copy of Item #11, 10 p. #130	PArt ~	P1/F1 (1)	9 30
14. Agenda	Copy of Item #7, 2 p. PAT + 4/15/06 " # 131	n.d.	P1/F1	

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]
P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].

P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].

Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].

Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of

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the FOIA].

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]
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Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information

[(b)(4) of the FOIA].
F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of FOIA].

Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].

Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]. Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of



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22 January 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. NOEL KOCH, PRINCIPAL DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY (ASD/ISA)

SUBJECT: Allied Cooperation on Counterterrorism

I have attached a copy of a concept paper which has been developed by JSOA and the Joint Staff concerning a possible approach to Allied cooperation/assistance in countering terrorism.

I have discussed this approach with Ambassador Bob Oakley who essentially agrees with the approach. Pending your approval of the concept, I would refest that the paper be forwarded to the Interagency Group for Terrorism (IG/T) for their further consideration.

JOHN H. MOELLERUNG
Lieutenant General, USA
Assistant to the Chairman,
Joint Chiefs of Staff

Attachment a/s

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
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MARCH 1986

FBI INVOLVEMENT IN IRISH TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

THIS DOCUMENT IS CLASSIFIED "SECRET." IT HAS BEEN PREPARED BY THE TERRORISM SECTION, CRIMINAL INVESTIGATIVE DIVISION, FBI HEADQUARTERS.

THIS DOCUMENT IS THE PROPERTY OF THE FBI. IT AND ITS CONTENTS ARE NOT TO BE DISSEMINATED WITHOUT PRIOR APPROVAL OF FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION HEADQUARTERS, WASHINGTON, D.C.

FBI INVOLVEMENT IN IRISH TERRORISM INVESTIGATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES

- I. INTRODUCTION
- II.
- III. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES
- IV. CONCLUSION

I. INTRODUCTION:

The Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) derives its authority for investigative matters relating to terrorism in the United States from existing Federal statutes. Presidential directives have designated the FBI as the "lead" agency for operational response to terrorist acts which take place within United States territory. Since these directives, the FBI has aggressively pursued Irish terrorism investigations in the United States as the primary investigative agency.

The FBI views terrorism investigations as two-fold in approach: intelligence and law enforcement. In this regard, the FBI must be prepared to assume either a preventive or reactive stance as the given situation dictates. Given a choice, the FBI would obviously prefer to prevent terrorist activity. Lawful intelligence gathering techniques such as informants, undercover operations, and court-ordered electronic surveillance are instrumental tools in this effort. The FBI also enjoys good working relationships with intelligence and law enforcement agencies at all levels, both in the United States and internationally.

The second phase of our approach involves traditional law enforcement activity after it has been determined that United States statutes have been violated. Principal emphasis here is on stabilizing the situation, if necessary, and on arresting the perpetrators. Continued successes in terrorism investigations have resulted in a precipitous decline in the number of incidents in the United States, (51 in 1982, 31 in 1983, 13 in 1984, and 7 in 1985).

The FBI has settled on the strategy of viewing terrorists as individuals associated in criminal enterprise. This allows for investigations predicated on criminal activity rather than stated political or ideological motivations. With this emphasis, there is less concern with why this activity is being employed than with the fact that crimes are being committed. FBI terrorism investigations involve identification of subjects and group leaders, development of associations, and tracing of financial and support structures. The focus is on the total network and the object is to gather evidence for eventual prosecution.

As a result of this aggressive investigative effort, the FBI has been successful in Irish terrorism investigations by obtaining a number of indictments and convictions. Numerous additional investigations are ongoing, the results of which should lead to further legal action.

The FBI has pursued these investigations from two principal perspectives: (1)



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
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
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III. SUMMARY OF SIGNIFICANT ACTIVITY IN THE UNITED STATES:

The following provides a summary of FBI successes in recent years relating to Irish terrorism matters. This is not intended to be all inclusive, but rather a highlight of significant Irish terrorist activity in the United States, and the FBI's investigative response. It is hoped that this brief review will provide an accurate reflection of the FBI's effort and areas of investigative emphasis.



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NOTE: The above arrests, indictments, and convictions, represent a significant deterrent against attempts to procure and illegally transfer weapons from the United States to Northern Ireland.

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
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IV. CONCLUSION:

As mentioned, the FBI is actively investigating suspected operations involving weapons and funding procurement in the United States and illegal transportation of same to



The FBI has enjoyed significant accomplishments against Irish terrorism in the United States and will strive for further developments pointing toward, at least, substantial decline in

this activity. Pursuit from both prevention and reaction standpoints appears to be the successful formula. Through its statutory mandates and Presidential directives, the FBI will stress the criminal aspect of this activity which will be followed through appropriate prosecutive means.

90133

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506 March 3, 1986

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH

SUBJECT:

U.S./UK Talks on Terrorism

Attached at Tab I is an agenda for the U.S./UK talks on terrorism scheduled for Wednesday, March 5, 1986. As we agreed earlier, the U.S. side will be represented by the OSG-TIWG and the UK is bringing appropriate counterparts. The talks begin with a morning meeting (8:15 a.m.-1:15 p.m.) and lunch (1:15-2:30 p.m.) at the State Department. Oakley and North will co-chair the U.S. side and David Goodall will head the UK delegation. The morning session will be followed by a meeting in the White House Situation Room (2:45-4:45 p.m.). The British participants are as follows:

Mr. David Goodall, Deputy Under Secretary Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Cabinet Office

Mr. Robin O'Neil, Assistant Under Secretary, FCO for Terrorism Mr. Martin Morland, Chief of Assessments Staff, Cabinet Office

(Assistant Secretary equivalent)

Vice Air Marshall James Higgs, Joint Staff

(Under Secretary equivalent)

Mr. Patrick Walker, MI-5, Home Office

Mr. Michael Jenkins, Minister, British Embassy (DCM)

Mr. Roger Bone, Counselor, British Embassy

(Name to be provided), Defense Attache Office, British Embassy

It is strongly urged that you "drop-by" the afternooh meeting in the WHSR for 5-15 minutes, using the talking points at Tab II. David Goodall has also asked for private 5 minute meeting with you at the conclusion of the talks.

RECOMMENDATION

1.	That	you	agree	e to	"dı	cop-by'	" the	after	rnoon	meet	ting,	using	the
tal	king	point	s at	Tab	II	(will	work	with	Flore	ence	for	time).	

talking points at Tab II (will work	with Florence for time).
Approve	Disapprove
2. That you agree to a private mee	ting with David Goodall.
Approve	Disapprove
Attachments Tab I - Agenda Tab II - Talking Points	DECLASSIFIED NIS F97-108/1 74/

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CRET CI NARA, DATE 4/10/06

US-UK BILATERAL MEETING

MARCH 5, 1986

AGENDA

0815 - 0830	Opening Comments
Allen Peper 0830 - 0845	Nature of the threat (CIA to do brief paper for advance circulation)
0845 - 0900 UK talks w/ Yogo's, Greece, Jar	Bilateral measures - review of US/UK inter-agency collaboration (UK prepared to give short presentation)
0900 - 0945	Review of Libyan situation and sanctions problems (State)
0945 - 1000	Coffee Break
1000 - 1045	Cooperation with Western allies in combatting terrorism: Summit Seven, EC, NATO, intelligence exchanges agreed upon among six governments under auspices of Ministries of Interior, other (State, CIA, FBI)
Molling 1100 - 1300 (and resume after lunch)	US-UK coordination in responding to terrorist incidents: Conclusions on use of force for preemption, resolution and retaliation to

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Conclusions on use of force for preemption, resolution and retaliation to be drawn from recent incidents (TWA 847, Achille Lauro, Egyptair 647, Rome and Vienna, Israeli interception of Libyan aircraft) -- (State, NSC, DOD)

Channels of communication -- (NSC, State, DOD/JCS)

FOIA(b) (|)

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d. Actual employment of US military assets, including use of UK facilities - (DOD/JCS)

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Washington, D.C. 20520

Pebruary 26, 1986

MEMORANDUM

TO:

CIA - Dewey Claridge

PBI - Buck Ravell

JCS - John Moellering

JSOA - Duff Rice NSC - Ollie Worth

FRON:

S/CT - Robert B. Oakley

SUBJECT:

US/UK Bilateral Meeting, March 5, 1986

To be sure we are all on board, here are additional . copies of the agenda for the March 5 US/UK talks. participants will be: David Goodall, Cabinet Office and JIC; Robin O'Neil, terrorism coordinator for PCO; Assistant Secretary equivalent Martin Morland, head of assessments for PCO; Under Secretary equivalent Vice Air Marshall James Higgs, UK Joint Staff; MI-5, UK Home /-4
Office. From the British Embassy there will be the Minister Michael Jenkins, Counselor Roger Bone and someone from the Defense Attache Office. It is my understanding that the UK will present their view first on the Western cooperation and channels of communication topics, as well as on bilateral cooperation and Irish terrorism. If John Moellering can provide in advance a period of time when he will be available (barring emergencies) and indicate which sub topics under US/UK coordination in responding to incidents he particularly wants to discuss, we can rearrange the agenda.

Attachment:

As stated

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TALKING POINTS FOR ADM POINDEXTER U.S./UK Talks on Terrorism

Wednesday, March 5, 1986 White House Situation Room

- -- As you are aware from your meeting here and at the State Department today, we have revised our structure for combatting terrorism. This change comes about as a consequence of recommendations made by the Vice President's Task Force on Combatting Terrorism. Their public report will be presented to the President tomorrow.
- -- The group you met with today is the interagency body which coordinates our counter-terrorist operations. As you have learned, it brings to bear the full spectrum of our government's effort: State, Defense, CIA, JCS, FBI, and NSC.
- -- We believe that this structural change will enhance our ability to plan and conduct counter-terrorist operations.
- -- I hope that the discussions you have had today have been fruitful and that you have had an opportunity to exchange views on issues which are of critical importance to both of us.
- -- The President asked that I again reiterate how much we value the special relationship we enjoy with Her Majesty's Government (HMG).
- -- He is aware that there have been some differences over the Libyan sanctions issue and we both hope that today's meeting has been helpful to resolving some of those concerns.
- -- As you know, we continue to work toward a unified position on terrorism among our closest friends and hope that this summer's summit will be fruitful in that regard.

FOIA(b) (/)	We are	especially	grateful	for HMG'	s support	7,0000,00		
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- -- Finally, we are very aware of the Irish terrorism problem and aim to do as much as we can to be of assistance in this regard.
- -- We continue to have hopes for Senate ratification of the amendments to the U.S./UK Extradition Treaty which we signed on June 25, 1985. This was an important element in the report of the Vice President's Task Force.

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US-UK BILATERAL MEETING

MARCH 5, 1986

AGENDA

0815 -	0830	Opening Comments	
0830 -	0845	Nature of the threat (CIA to do brief paper for advance circulation)	
0845 -	0900	Bilateral measures - review of US/UK inter-agency collaboration (UK prepare to give short presentation)	đ
0900 -	0945	Review of Libyan situation and sanctions problems (State)	
0945 -	1000	Coffee Break	
1000 -	1045	Cooperation with Western allies in combatting terrorism: Summit Seven, EC, NATO, intelligence exchanges agreed upon among six governments under auspices of Ministries of Interior, other (State, CIA, FBI)	
1100 - (and res		US-UK coordination in responding to terrorist incidents:	
		a. Conclusions on use of force for preemption, resolution and retaliation to be drawn from recent incidents (TWA 847, Achille Lauro, Egyptair 647, Rome and Vienna, Israeli interception of Libyan aircraft) (State NSC DOD))

b. Channels of communication -- (NSC, State, DOD/JCS)

aircraft) -- (State, NSC, DOD)

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d. Actual employment of US military assets, including use of UK facilities --(DOD/JCS)

FOIA(b) (/)

1315 - 1430 Lunch at the State Department Buchanan Room - 8th floor

1445 - 1645 Meeting resumes in the White House Situation Room

Irish terrorism -- (UK ready to speak on
recent developments) - Final topic

Time to be decided

Meeting with National Security Advisor Poindexter

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United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

March 14, 1986

SECRET MEMORANDUM

TO

:Lt. Gen. John Moellering, JCS Maj. Gen. W. H. Rice, JSOA

CIA

Mr. Oliver Revell, FBI

Mr. Oliver North, NSC

Mr. Michael Klosson, EUR/RPM

FROM

:S/CT - Robert B. Oakley

SUBJECT : Report of US - UK Bilateral Talks

Attached is a memorandum of conversation reporting the US - UK bilateral talks of March 5. Thanks to the knowledge and frankness which you brought to the discussion, the talks went very well, and have provided a good basis not only for progress in our bilateral effort to counter terrorism, but for a better understanding and presentation of the US position when the UK speaks with its EC partners and others. I believe the memorandum of conversation accurately reflects the comments made; but I would appreciate your checking and providing your comments or corrections. Please send these to Gene Bailey, of my staff, or call him on 647-3451, by March 19, and I will get a final version to you by the end of next week.

Attachment : As Stated

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART NLS 197-108/12/19/02 NARA, Date 8/19/02

March 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

US-UK Bilateral Meeting on Terrorism, March 5, 1986, Washington, D.C.

PARTICIPANTS:

U.K.

Mr. David Goodall, Cabinet office and JIC Mr. Robin O'Neil, Terrorism Coordinator, FCO Mr. Martin Morland, Head of Assessments, FCO Air Vice Marshall James Higgs, U.K. Joint Staff MI-5, U.K. HOme Office Mr

Mr. Michael Jenkins, Charge d'Affaires, British Embassy

Mr. Roger Bone, British Embassy

Mr. Nicolas Alston, British Embassy Maj. John Holmes, British Embassy

Mr. Peter Ricketts, British Embassy

U.S.A.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, S/CT

Mr. Oliver North, NSC

Lt. Gen. John Moellering, JCS

Col Waldo Freeman, JCS

Maj. Gen. W. H. Rice, JSOA

Mr. Charles Allen, CIA

Mr. Dewey Clarridge, CIA

Mr. Oliver Revell, FBI

Mr. Michael Klosson, EUR/RPM

Mr. Eugene Bailey, S/CT

Copies To:

S/CT (cc)

NSC

JCS

JSOA

CIA

FBI

EUR/RPM

Embassy London

Ambassador Oakley welcomed UK team and pointed out importance of senior-level HMG representatives from the Cabinet Office, FCO, MI-5, and Joint Staff meeting with newly-established USG core group of senior representatives from NSC, State, DOD and JCS, CIA, and FBI. Countering terrorism effectively requires greater flexibility and cooperation and more rapid communications within and between governments than almost any other peacetime issue. Despite intensive USG efforts over past 2-3 years to improve its own

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DECLASSIFIED IN PART By OJ NARA, Date

security and intelligence and to try for better cooperation with other governments against international terrorism; USG has concluded that past approach has not yielded adequate results, must move to more active, offensive policy.

Numbers and casualties of international terrorism demonstrate who is winning despite our intensified defensive, containment approach. Problems being caused for USG relations with other countries and to USG interests abroad are increasing. US public and political opinion becoming increasingly agitated. We might add that European public opinion and tourist business is also becoming agitated. Conclusion of Vice President's Task Force strongly reinforces this position.

USG response to Abu Nidal attacks upon Egypt Air, Vienna and Rome airports should be seen as a signal to other governments and to world public opinion that business as usual with terrorists and states who support them is over. The time has come for more active counterterrorism.

If Libya can be forced to cease its activities, it would reduce the threat considerably and also send a useful signal to others. But Libya is not the only source of terrorism, nor is pressuring Libya the only effective counter-action. Other state supporters of terrorism need to get the signals directly, as well as via Libya. States which deliberately provide indirect support (such as USSR) need to get the same signal, as do those who merely grant terrorists freedom to use their territory. And there needs to be more direct action against individual terrorists and terrorist groups.

We hope this effort can be multilateral, as it will be more effective. But we are prepared to act bilaterally, or alone, if need be. That was Deputy Secretary Whitehead's message and remains our very firm position. We would like to use today's talks to go over a range of items which form or should form the basis for close US-UK cooperation as part of this broader, more active effort.

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Oakley replied that every other government which Whitehead had visited had ultimately told us privately that it had no doubt as to basic Libyan support for terrorist actions, including Abu Nidal, even if there were questions about details of Libyan involvement in specific incidents. Quibbling over such details could be used as a pretext for taking no action; but this is different from disbelief of basic principle.

Oliver North of NSC added that the USG is indeed becoming more active and is also feeling frustrated by futility of trying to get our allies to respond to what we see as a common threat.

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angle made USG position more difficult, but we will not back down. Moreover, initial support for Qadhafi at home and from other Arabs has passed and was almost completely rhetorical. Libya is now confronted with harsh reality of plummetting oil revenues, deep debt level, negative political signals from all Europeans, no new money from Arabs, and lack of media attention on which Qadhafi thrives. This is as projected by USG; and we are trying hard to avoid having media spotlight again focussed upon Libya. We intend to tighten pressure on oil revenues by

working with US companies and foreign governments, and we will be making specific demarches to governments whose companies or citizens are filling in behind departed Americans. Moreover, those governments should be aware of greater danger to their citizens in Libya. Our citizens have mostly left and USG has much less political or moral obligation to those who remain despite all efforts made to get them to leave. This is going to be a very long-term effort.

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Oakley and North observed that this is a much more positive attitude than simply saying nothing at all can be done because HMG does not wish to seek new legislation. What HMG did in 1984 was salutary but over time such measures tend to be diluted. Even USG had found that our citizens in and trade into Libya had been increasing, sending wrong political signal, prior to latest decisions by President Reagan. HMG could use increased Libyan support for IRA as political justification for additional action vs. Qadhafi.

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The US side then described the EST concept. an

interagency team with flexible composition,
whose purpose is to assist
others to resolve a terrorist incident but not actually to use force itself. Once they arrive in a country, the US

Ambassador is in charge. Oakley pointed out the need for use of facilities, such as for prepositioning equipment used by EST and possibly for positioning of EST before it moves to a third country. This is different from deployment or employment by an operational military force:

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Lt. Gen. Moellering noted the long history of close US-UK cooperation and joint exercises. JSOC Commander Steiner has just returned from talks with his British and French counterparts and will be responding to a

There have been no military-to-military problems between US and UK on special operations, including use of

Moellering had sent a message back that it would be better to do it on an interagency basis, just as these US-UK talks are being held on an interagency basis. Both the US and UK sides thought this to be an excellent idea which should be pursued very soon.

Discussion then turned to consideration of how to

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North noted that USG policy was to consider terrorists legally criminals, and to apprehend and prosecute them as violators of the law. US has no problem with negotiations, but sometimes police have to use weapons. Use of force must be successful with minimum loss of life. Our main approach

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is to prevent incidents, make world small place for terrorists. CIA, at President's direction, being reorganized to improve CT effort; FBI given extra legal authority, but if innocent people are deliberately being killed then someone must respond to end the incident. In the Egypt Air incident, for example, the worst thing was delay due to reluctance of other countries to allow use of force.

North agreed that is also US preference and that US experts advise waiting until lives are clearly threatened by the terrerists. Revel noted this is US practice domestically, and that in over 150 incidents only one passenger has been lost and only five hijackers killed - force is a last resort. He added that JSOC and the FBI hostage rescue teams train together and share the same philosophy as well as techniques. Both place priority on hostage negotiations, but are prepared to use force if necessary.

The question then turned to the role of the media.

Allen agreed, noting that as the Achille Lauro was at sea it kept the terrorists from the press. In the TWA hijack the media paid for setting up the terrorist's press conference and excused their action by claiming to have helped secure the release of the hostages. Press/media is a major problem. Revel noted that US practice is to set up a perimeter and cut off the media, at least deny them tactical information.

The final question before lunch posed by Goodall concerned retaliation. Oakley noted that such a policy had not worked all that well for Israel, that one needed a clear objective, and that use of force could be only an element of

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broader strategy. Goodall agreed this matched his thinking. Following lunch the meeting resumed in the White House situation room and discussion returned to the question of retaliation.

North noted that we should not necessarily constrain ourselves to attacks against terrorist targets, but hit other targets as well, for example in Libya target the military.

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North said that President Reagan was concerned that any response be effective. To the extent that other nations join US in peaceful measures, then other actions are less necessary. North noted that the longer we allow Qadhafi to continue, the longer we shall suffer terrorism.

The US does not agree, North said, and terrorism is becoming worse because of the increased support of states; US is looking for best ways to stop states supporting terrorism, not simply considering military action. The US is stepping up its efforts, but feels new pressures are needed on state supporters. US is looking for cooperative measures, if they are forthcoming that lessens the need for military action. Libyan behaviour makes it an outlaw regime. North noted that his personal feeling is that next attack out of Libya will generate a military response.

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The discussion ended with a UK presentation on IRA terrorism.

US side assured that it would not allow the treaty to be gutted by these changes.



NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

March 25, 1986

SECRET

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. McDANIEL

FROM:

OLIVER L. NORTH~

SUBJECT:

State Department Memcon on Bilateral U.S.-UK

Terrorism Talks

Attached at Tab I is the State Department's Memorandum of Conversation of the U.S.-UK bilateral talks on terrorism here in Washington on March 5. ADM Poindexter attended the last half hour of these talks and met privately with the senior British official, Mr. David Goodall, immediately after the talks.

This memcon should filed "for the record."

RECOMMENDATION

That you authorize the attached to be filed "for the record."

Approve Disapprove

Attachment

Tab I - Platt Memo to Poindexter of March 22, 1986

White House Guidelines, August 28, 1997 By NARA, Date 8 18 74

Declassify: OADR



SECRET United States Department of State

Washington, D.C. 20520

2359

March 22, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR VADM JOHN M. POINDEXTER THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: US-UK Bilateral Talks on Terrorism, March 5, 1986

The semi-annual and very frank talks with the UK on terrorism (participants list and agenda attached), covered bilateral cooperation; a review of the Libyan situation and sanctions problems; multilateral cooperation with western allies; US-UK coordination in response to a terrorist threat; retaliation/use of force; and, very briefly, Irish terrorism. Key UK points:

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Memorandum of Conversation reporting the talks is attached.

Nicholas Platt Executive Secretary

Attachments:

- 1. Memorandum of Conversation of US-UK Bilateral Talks on Terrorism
- 2. Agenda of the talks
- 3. List of participants

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POY-003 -179

NARA, Date 1/1 (/06)

March 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM OF CONVERSATION

SUBJECT:

US-UK Bilateral Meeting on Terrorism, March 5, 1986, Washington, D.C.

PARTICIPANTS:

U.K.

Mr. David Goodall, Cabinet office and JIC
Mr. Robin O'Neil, Terrorism Coordinator, FCO
Mr. Martin Morland, Head of Assessments, FCO

Air Vice Marshall James Higgs, U.K. Joint Staff Mr. MI-5, U.K. HOme Office

Mr. Michael Jenkins, Charge d'Affaires, British Embassy

Mr. Roger Bone, British Embassy

Mr. Nicolas Alston, British Embassy

Maj. John Holmes, British Embassy

Mr. Peter Ricketts, British Embassy

U.S.A.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, S/CT

Mr. Oliver North, NSC

Lt. Gen. John Moellering, JCS

Col Waldo Freeman, JCS

Maj. Gen. W. H. Rice, JSOA

Mr. Charles Allen, CIA

Mr. Dewey Clarridge, CIA

Mr. Oliver Revell, FBI

Mr. Michael Klosson, EUR/RPM

Mr. Eugene Bailey, S/CT

Copies To:

S/CT (cc)

NSC CIA JCS FBI

EUR/RPM

JSOA

Embassy London

Ambassador Oakley welcomed UK team and pointed out importance of senior-level HMG representatives from the Cabinet Office, FCO, MI-5, and Joint Staff meeting with newly-established USG core group of senior representatives from NSC, State, DOD and JCS, CIA, and FBI. Countering terrorism effectively requires greater flexibility and cooperation and more rapid communications within and between governments than almost any other peacetime issue. Despite intensive USG efforts over past 2-3 years to improve its own

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NES POY-003 #130 NARA, Date 1/18/66 security and intelligence and to try for better cooperation with other governments against international terrorism; USG has concluded that past approach has not yielded adequate results, must move to more active, offensive policy.

Numbers and casualties of international terrorism demonstrate who is winning despite our intensified defensive, containment approach. Problems being caused for USG relations with other countries and to USG interests abroad are increasing. US public and political opinion becoming increasingly agitated. We might add that European public opinion and tourist business is also becoming agitated. Conclusion of Vice President's Task Force strongly reinforces this position.

USG response to Abu Nidal attacks upon Egypt Air, Vienna and Rome airports should be seen as a signal to other governments and to world public opinion that business as usual with terrorists and states who support them is over. The time has come for more active counterterrorism.

If Libya can be forced to cease its activities, it would reduce the threat considerably and also send a useful signal to others. But Libya is not the only source of terrorism, nor is pressuring Libya the only effective counter-action. Other state supporters of terrorism need to get the signals directly, as well as via Libya. States which deliberately provide indirect support (such as USSR) need to get the same signal, as do those who merely grant terrorists freedom to use their territory. And there needs to be more direct action against individual terrorists and terrorist groups.

We hope this effort can be multilateral, as it will be more effective. But we are prepared to act bilaterally, or alone, if need be. That was Deputy Secretary Whitehead's message and remains our very firm position. We would like to use today's talks to go over a range of items which form or should form the basis for close US-UK cooperation as part of this broader, more active effort.

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Oakley replied that every other government which Whitehead had visited had ultimately told us privately that it had no doubt as to basic Libyan support for terrorist actions, including Abu Nidal, even if there were questions about details of Libyan involvement in specific incidents. Quibbling over such details could be used as a pretext for taking no action; but this is different from disbelief of basic principle.

Oliver North of NSC added that the USG is indeed becoming more active and is also feeling frustrated by futility of trying to get our allies to respond to what we see as a common threat.

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angle made USG position more difficult, but we will not back down. Moreover, initial support for Qadhafi at home and from other Arabs has passed and was almost completely rhetorical. Libya is now confronted with harsh reality of plummetting oil revenues, deep debt level, negative political signals from all Europeans, no new money from Arabs, and lack of media attention on which Qadhafi thrives. This is as projected by USG; and we are trying hard to avoid having media spotlight again focussed upon Libya. We intend to tighten pressure on oil revenues by

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working with US companies and foreign governments, and we will be making specific demarches to governments whose companies or citizens are filling in behind departed Americans. Moreover, those governments should be aware of greater danger to their citizens in Libya. Our citizens have mostly left and USG has much less political or moral obligation to those who remain despite all efforts made to get them to leave. This is going to be a very long-term effort.

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for additional action vs. Qadhafi.

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The US side then described the EST concept, an

interagency team with flexible composition, whose purpose is to assist others to resolve a terrorist incident but not actually to

use force itself. Once they arrive in a country, the US

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North noted that USG policy was to consider terrorists legally criminals, and to apprehend and prosecute them as violators of the law. US has no problem with negotiations, but sometimes police have to use weapons. Use of force must be successful with minimum loss of life. Our main approach

is to prevent incidents, make world small place for terrorists. CIA, at President's direction, being reorganized to improve CT effort; FBI given extra legal authority, but if innocent people are deliberately being killed then someone must respond to end the incident. In the Egypt Air incident, for example, the worst thing was delay due to reluctance of other countries to allow use of force.

North agreed that is also US preference and that US experts advise waiting until lives are clearly threatened by the terrerists. Revel noted this is US practice domestically, and that in over 150 incidents only one passenger has been lost and only five hijackers killed - force is a last resort. He added that JSOC and the FBI hostage rescue teams train together and share the same philosophy as well as techniques. Both place priority on hostage negotiations, but are prepared to use force if necessary.

The question then turned to the role of the media.

Allen agreed, noting that as the Achille Lauro was at sea it kept the terrorists from the press. In the TWA hijack the media paid for setting up the terrorist's press conference and excused their action by claiming to have helped secure the release of the hostages. Press/media is a major problem. Revel noted that US practice is to set up a perimeter and cut off the media, at least deny them tactical information.

The final question before lunch posed by Goodall concerned retaliation. Oakley noted that such a policy had not worked all that well for Israel, that one needed a clear objective, and that use of force could be only an element of

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broader strategy. Goodall agreed this matched his thinking. Following lunch the meeting resumed in the White House situation room and discussion returned to the question of retaliation.

North noted that we should not necessarily constrain ourselves to attacks against terrorist targets, but hit other targets as well, for example in Libya target the military.

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North said that President Reagan was concerned that any response be effective. To the extent that other nations join US in peaceful measures, then other actions are less necessary. North noted that the longer we allow Qadhafi to continue, the longer we shall suffer terrorism.

The US does not agree, North said, and terrorism is becoming worse because of the increased support of states; US is looking for best ways to stop states supporting terrorism, not simply considering military action. The US is stepping up its efforts, but feels new pressures are needed on state supporters. US is looking for cooperative measures, if they are forthcoming that lessens the need for military action. Libyan behaviour makes it an outlaw regime. North noted that his personal feeling is that next attack out of Libya will generate a military response.

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The discussion ended with a UK presentation on IRA terrorism.

US side assured that it would not allow the treaty to be gutted by these changes.

US-UK BILATERAL MEETING

MARCH 5, 1986

AGENDA

		00 X
0815	- 0830	Opening Comments
0830	- 0845	Nature of the threat $$ (CIA to do <u>brief</u> paper for advance circulation)
0845	- 0900	Bilateral measures - review of US/UK inter-agency collaboration (UK prepared to give short presentation)
0900	- 0945	Review of Libyan situation and sanctions problems (State)
0945	- 1000	Coffee Break
1000	- 1045	Cooperation with Western allies in combatting terrorism: Summit Seven, EC, NATO, intelligence exchanges agreed upon among six governments under auspices of Ministries of Interior, other (State, CIA, FBI)
(and	- 1300 resume r lunch)	US-UK coordination in responding to terrorist incidents:
		a. Conclusions on use of force for preemption, resolution and retaliation to be drawn from recent incidents (TWA 847, Achille Lauro, Egyptair 647, Rome and Vienna, Israeli interception of Libyan aircraft) (State, NSC, DOD)
		<pre>b. Channels of communication (NSC, State, DOD/JCS)</pre>

FOIA(b) (/)

DECL: OADR

-2-

d. Actual employment of US military assets, including use of UK facilities --(DOD/JCS)

FOIA(b) (/)

1315 - 1430 Lunch at the State Department Buchanan Room - 8th floor

1445 - 1645 Meeting resumes in the White House Situation Room

Irish terrorism -- (UK ready to speak on
recent developments) - Final topic

Time to be decided

Meeting with National Security Advisor Poindexter

US - UK Bilateral Meeting on Terrorism March 5, 1986, Washington, D.C.

PARTICIPANTS:

U.K.

Mr. David Goodall, Cabinet office and JIC

Mr. Robin O'Neil, Terrorism Coordinator, FCO

Mr. Martin Morland, Head of Assessments, FCO

Air Vice Marshall James Higgs, U.K. Joint Staff

Mr. Patrick Walker, MI-5, U.K. HOme Office

Mr. Michael Jenkins, Charge d'Affaires, British Embassy

Mr. Roger Bone, British Embassy

Mr. Nicolas Alston, British Embassy

Maj. John Holmes, British Embassy

Mr. Peter Ricketts, British Embassy

U.S.A.

Ambassador Robert B. Oakley, S/CT

Mr. Oliver North, NSC

Lt. Gen. John Moellering, JCS

Col Waldo Freeman, JCS

Maj. Gen. W. H. Rice, JSOA

Mr. Charles Allen, CIA

Mr. Dewey Clarridge, CIA

Mr. Oliver Revell, FBI

Mr. Michael Klosson, EUR/RPM

Mr. Eugene Bailey, S/CT

