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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: COY, CRAIG: Files

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File Folder: Syria (1 of 3)

Date: 8/17/99

Box ~~CPC-1, FBI 098~~ *FBI 098*

Wills - F97-108/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Oliver North, Coy, Robert Earl to John Poindexter, re: Non-Military Action re Libya, 1 p.	4/30/86	P1/F1
2. Paper	<i>R 5/15/03 F97-108/1 #71</i> Potential Non-Military Actions Against Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism, 4 p.	n.d.	P1/F1/ <i>RS</i>
3. Chart	<i>D 3/26/10 M08-097 #71a</i> re: Libya, 2 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
4. Memo	Ken Quinn to U.Sec. Wallis, Amb Ridgway, et al., re: Goals of Terrorism at the Summit, 1 p.	5/3/86	P1/F1
5. List	<i>D 8/19/02 F97-108/1 #73</i> Action Items, 1 p.	n.d.	P1/F1
<i>*</i> 6. Cable	<i>D #74</i> Cable #081312Z May 86, 7 p.	5/8/86	P1/F1
7. Memo	<i>D #75</i> Scott Sullivan to Bob Earl, re: Syria's Vulnerability to Sanctions, 4 p.	5/14/86	P1/F1
8. List	<i>PART 5/15/03 #76</i> Possible Economic Sanctions, 4 p.	nd	P1/F1
<i>*</i> 9. Cable	<i>D 8/19/02 F97-108/1 #78</i> Cable #240519Z May 86, 3 p.	5/24/86	P1/F1
<i>*</i> 10. Cable	<i>D #79</i> Cable #271043Z May 86, (notes on verso), 1p.	5/27/86	P1/F1
11. Cable	<i>R #80</i> Cable #271135Z May 86, 1 p.	5/27/86	P1/F1
12. Report	Prospects for Counterterrorism Cooperation Among Developed Countries, 32 p.	5/86	P1/F1, <i>83</i>
<i>*</i> 13. Paper	<i>D 4/13/06 #81</i> OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 2 p.	6/4/86	P1/F1
14. Paper	<i>PART #82</i> OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 6 p.	6/4/86	P1/F1
	<i>PART #85</i>		

** See pg. 2*

RESTRICTION CODES

- Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**
- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 - P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
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 - C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

- Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]**
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6. Cable #081312Z May 86, 7 pgs. 5/8/86 P1/F1
 D M08-097 #75 3/24/10
7. Memo Sullivan to Earl re: Syria's vulnerability 5/14/86 P1/F1
 Upheld Part. 5/20/11 M08-097 #76
8. List Possible Economic Sanctions, 4 p. nd P1/F1
 P UPHELD M08-097 #77
9. Cable #240519Z May 86, 3 pgs 5/24/86 P1/F1
 P 3/26/10 M08-097 #78, same ^{Part.} as P04-003 #78
10. Cable #271043Z May 86, (notes on verso), 1 pg. 5/27/86 P1/F1
 P 3/26/10 M08-097 #79, same Part. as P04-003 #79
13. Paper OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 2 pgs 6/4/86 P1/F1
 P 3/26/10 M08-097 #82

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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Collection: COY, CRAIG: Files

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File Folder: Syria (1 of 3)
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11. Cable	D #79 Cable #271135Z May 86, 1 p.	5/27/86	P1/F1
12. Report	R #80 Prospects for Counterterrorism Cooperation Among Developed Countries, 32 p.	5/86	P1/F1, B3
* 13. Paper	D 4/13/06 #81 OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 2 p.	6/4/86	P1/F1
14. Paper	PART " " #82 OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 6 p.	6/4/86	P1/F1
	PART " " #83		

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6. Cable	<i>D</i> Cable #081312Z May 86, 7 p.	<i>R 1/18/06</i> 5/8/86	<i>P04-003 #74</i> P1/F1
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11. Cable	<i>R</i> Cable #271135Z May 86, 1 p.	5/27/86	P1/F1
12. Report	<i>R</i> Prospects for Counterterrorism Cooperation Among Developed Countries, 32 p. <i>D 4/13/06 #81</i>	5/86	<i>P1/F1 #83</i>
13. Paper	<i>PART " " #82</i> OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 2 p.	6/4/86	P1/F1
14. Paper	<i>PART " " #85</i> OSG Discussion Paper - Syrian Terrorism, 6 p.	6/4/86	P1/F1

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D M08-097 #75 3/24/10

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P 3/26/10 M08-097 #78, same ^{Part.} as P04-003 #78

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P 3/26/10 M08-097 #79, same Part. as P04-003 ~~#78~~ #79

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P 3/26/10 M08-097 #82

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

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File Folder SYRIA (1)

FOIA

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ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	
13	PAPER	RE OSG DISCUSSION PAPER - SYRIAN TERRORISM (#82)	2	6/4/1986	<i>OPENED 6/21/2009</i>
14	PAPER	RE OSG DISCUSSION PAPER - SYRIAN TERRORISM (#83)	6	6/4/1986	<i>GC</i>

North #2

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SYSTEM II
90342

DECLASSIFIED

NLS 197-108/1 #71

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

BY CA NARA DATE 5/15/83

April 30, 1986

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CODEWORD~~

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
CRAIG P. COY
ROBERT L. EARLE

SUBJECT: Non-Military Action re Libya

Attached at Tab I are issues for use by the President on potential non-military actions that could be taken by the Summit Seven members. At Tab II is a summary chart of the status, steps taken, and discussion points for the individual countries on each of the issues.

We suggest that the President present the list of 15 items (Tab I) as a notional menu of steps that could be taken and urge that the Seven adopt several (4 or 5) that they can all agree on as an example of democratic solidarity. Please note that in its current form the Tabs are "U.S. TOP SECRET/NOFORN" due to source of the information.

Should you require any additional information on any of these items, we can provide it on relatively short notice. We have not, repeat not, coordinated this list with the Departments of State and Treasury. DOD and CIA concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you provide these Tabs to the President and urge him to proceed as above.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - "Potential Non-Military Actions Against Libyan-Sponsored Terrorism"
- Tab II - Country Charts

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By CS, NARA, Date 5/15/03

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CODEWORD~~

UNITED KINGDOM

CANADA

JAPAN

Status

- 5,000 British in Libya
- Import small amount of oil
- Limited commercial ties

Status

- 1,000 Canadians in Libya
- Significant commercial ties with Libya
- Imports 5,000 BBL/day

Status

- 300 Japanese in Libya
- Imports no oil
- Significant trade, but declining (approx \$3B)

Steps Taken

- Defense contracts and export credits cut
- Broke diplomatic relations in April 1984

Steps Taken

- Stopped support for exports
- Banned export of oil equipment
- Advised Canadians to leave
- Urged business not to fill-in

Steps Taken

- Urged business not to fill-in
- Banks have refused credit

Discuss

- Stop oil imports
- Credit embargo
- Stop flights

Discuss

- Stop import of oil
- Restrict cross-border travel of expelled Libyans

Discuss

- Cut export credits and insurance
- Close LPB

~~TOP SECRET~~
Declassify OADR

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2

~~CODEWORD~~

ITALY

FRANCE

GERMANY

Status

- 3,500 Italians in Libya
- Imports 250K BBL/day
- Libyan firms owe Italians \$700M


Status

- 900 French in Libya
- Imports 60K BBL/day
- Technicians servicing anti-aircraft missiles (demarche planned)

Status

- 1,500 Germans in Libya
- Imports 140K BBL/day
- Significant commercial ties - \$110M contracts (mostly oil)
- Libya owes Germany \$3B in credit guarantees

Steps Taken

- Total embargo on arms sales
- 
- Arrested former diplomat in assassination plan
- Expelled 10 LPB members

Steps Taken

- Stopped oil imports
- Reduced commercial ties
- Terminated servicing anti-aircraft missiles (demarche planned)
- Expelled 6 Libyans


Steps Taken

- Limited export cover
- Pledged to discourage backfill
- Expelled 22 members of LPB
- Recalled ambassador to Libya

Discuss

- Reduce oil imports
- Stop flights
- Citizens out of Libya
- Offer defense assistance
- Close LPB

Discuss

- Follow-up FoMin Raimond's comment to Whitehead on French willingness to take further actions against Libya
- Stop flights and servicing of Libyan Arab Airlines
- 

Discuss

- Reduce oil imports
- Stop flights
- Stop high tech exports
- Close LPB
- Completely eliminate credit subsidies to Libya

~~TOP SECRET~~

- Close LPB

~~TOP SECRET~~

~~CODEWORD~~

Ollie, ~~—~~
only you have
the CA item
(TOP 2 PGS). BESIDES
VIA XE

Jim

ROUTING

To	Name and Address	Date	Initials
1	O. North	6/3	
2	H. Teicher	6/3	
3			
4			
5			
6			

<input type="checkbox"/>	ACTION	<input type="checkbox"/>	FILE
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<input type="checkbox"/>	COMMENT	<input type="checkbox"/>	PREPARE REPLY
<input type="checkbox"/>	CONCURRENCE	<input type="checkbox"/>	RECOMMENDATION
<input type="checkbox"/>	DIRECT REPLY	<input type="checkbox"/>	RETURN
<input type="checkbox"/>	DISPATCH	<input type="checkbox"/>	SIGNATURE

REMARKS:


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National Security Council
The White House

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Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
Rodney McDaniel	_____	_____	_____
Don Fortier	_____	_____	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Florence Gantt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J</u>	_____
Rodney McDaniel	<u>1A</u>	<u>M⁵⁻²</u>	<u>A</u>
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____
<u>JIM RADZIMSKI</u>	<u>2</u>	_____	<u>A</u>

I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

Should be seen by: _____ (Date/Time)

Rod,
 We should convene a CPPG
 on Syria. J

Route to: TEICHER ✓
 WORTH ✓
 ROSS
 STUBBINS



~~SECRET~~

DEPARTMENT OF STATE

Washington, D.C. 20520

S/S 8613955

May 3, 1986

TO: E - Under Secretary Wallis
EUR - Ambassador Ridgway
EAP - Assistant Secretary Sigur
S/CT - Ambassador Oakley

FROM: S/S - Ken Quinn *KQ*

SUBJECT: Goals on Terrorism at the Summit

The NSC has informed us that the President has reviewed the attached list of possible actions vis-a-vis Libya. The President has determined that we should stress the following six objectives when seeking a consensus on future actions among Summit participants:

- 1) Close Libyan People's Bureaus
- 2) Boycott Libyan Oil
- 3) Monitor and Report Financial Transactions by Libyan Interests
- 4) Monitor or Close Down Islamic Call (Da'wa) Society Chapters and Bank Accounts
- 5) Monitor or Close Down Libyan Front Organizations Suspected of Involvement in Terrorism
- 6) Ban Sales of Arms, Spareparts and Sophisticated Equipment

Attachment:
As stated

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NLRR PO4-003#73

BY LOT NARA DATE 5/27/09

~~SECRET~~

CONFIDENTIAL

1. Close the Libyan People's Bureaus (LPBs)
2. Boycott Libyan Oil
3. Implement a Credit Embargo on Libya
4. Eliminate Credit Subsidies for Libya
5. Withdraw Western Deposits from Libyan Banks
6. Monitor and Report Financial Transactions by Libyan Interests
7. Monitor or Close Down Islamic Call (Da'wa) Society Chapters and Bank Accounts
8. Monitor or Close Down Libyan Front Organizations Suspected of Involvement in Terrorism
9. Prohibit Entry of Libyan-Flag Ships
10. Halt Flights to and from Tripoli
11. Restrict or Halt Flights of Libyan Arab Airlines
12. Order Citizens and Companies Out of Libya
13. Recall Ambassadors
14. Ban Sales of Arms, Spare Parts, and Sophisticated Equipment
15. Restrict Cross-Border Travel of Libyans

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NLS PO4-003 #74

BY CIS NARA DATE 1/18/06

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

~~TOP SECRET/UMBRA~~

May 14, 1986

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR BOB EARL

FROM: SCOTT SULLIVAN *AS*

SUBJECT: Syria's Vulnerability to Sanctions

Syria's economy--burdened by inept socialist management and the costs of confrontation with Israel--is in terrible shape and survives on assistance given by the USSR, Iran, and some Arab states. Syria is being forced to cope with an economic recession, large balance-of-payments deficits, and heavy defense expenditures. Imports of civilian goods are now being significantly cut back due to aid reductions from other Arab countries and the buildup of Syrian foreign debts. Syria faces a rise in domestic discontent, but the Assad regime has proved adept in mobilizing political support at home and surviving challenges to power. It is unclear whether Western economic sanctions could shake the regime, but they would certainly complicate Assad's goals of pacifying Lebanon and displacing Egypt as leader of the Arab world.

Syrian Economy In the Doldrums

The Syrian economy is performing far below its potential. The real Gross Domestic Product has declined over the past three years. Syria's balance of trade remains heavily in deficit. Although resources are scarce, the government continues to mobilize funding for an ambitious economic development program. The economic orientation of the Syrian government is rigidly socialist and strict controls greatly inhibit economic efficiency. Were Damascus to embark on reforms such as eliminating subsidies for government-produced commodities, the resulting dislocations would be extremely wrenching.

In its trade with the world, Syria is living a "hand to mouth" existence. Syria's imports exceed exports by a factor of nearly two-to-one, and Syria has been running a current account deficit of around \$1.9 billion for the past five years in a row. As a result, Syria's hard currency reserves have been significantly depleted.



Boosting exports in order to increase reserves is extremely difficult since oil, which provides nearly two-thirds of all hard currency earnings, is needed for domestic consumption. In fact, last year Syria actually purchased more oil from abroad than it sold.

~~TOP SECRET/UMBRA~~

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NLS 197-108/11 # 76
By GIS, NARA, Date 5/15/03

Putting the brakes on imports has proved equally difficult. Despite strenuous efforts by the government to limit imports (primarily by curbing the availability of foreign exchange to the private sector), foreign purchases continue to grow. Partly as a result of the crackdown on private sector imports, smuggling has become a major element in Syria's trade. More and more businesses appear to be turning to the black market for capital goods, spare parts, etc. Much of the smuggling comes through Lebanon with the tolerance if not complicity of the Syrian military. There is also evidence that corruption reaches into the highest level of the Syrian government.

Syria is able to tap three major sources of foreign exchange to offset its chronic trade deficit--foreign grant aid, foreign lending, and worker remittances. Unfortunately for Assad, income from all three has begun to taper off simultaneously.

- o Foreign grant aid: Under the Baghdad Accord, Syria was allotted \$1.8 billion per year in aid from other Arab states. However, Syria is presently receiving less than half that amount (\$700-\$800 annually) due to the failure of most Arab countries to keep their commitments. Although Iran has been generous in supplying oil on concessional terms, disputes over repayment delays may lead to reduced supplies.
- o Worker remittances: payments sent home by Syrian workers abroad amount to around \$500 million-\$1 billion per year, but these amounts are probably declining in tandem with falling oil revenues on the Arabian peninsula.
- o Foreign lending: World Bank statistics attribute to Syria \$2.7 billion in disbursed outstanding debt at the end of 1983. A growing number of banks have begun to report arrearages by the Syrian Commercial Bank (owned by the government) in covering even short-term obligations, and some lenders have suspended issuing new credits to Syria. Syria's status as a borrower in international commercial credit markets has been weak for some time and may be taking a turn for the worse.

Syria has limited but important commercial relations with E.C. countries. Syrian exports to Europe (mostly oil) earn around \$600 million annually, and E.C. nations provide approximately 18 percent of Syria's food imports. West European banks provide trade credits covering essential imports to Syria. Non-bank (private) deposits by Syrians in West European banks could be as high as \$500 million. The Syrian Foreign Commercial Bank maintains banking relationships with Western banks (mostly London and New York). The Syrian Arab Airlines service several European capitals, and several major Western carriers--Air France, SwissAir, Lufthansa, KLM, Al Italia, and the Austrian airlines--fly into Damascus.

Total Syrian indebtedness to the Communist bloc, including both military and economic assistance, is quite large--estimated to be at least \$7 billion.

Rumor has it that Syria fails regularly to comply with payment schedules on its military-related obligations, but Soviet leverage in exacting Syrian discipline in this regard appears limited.

Syrian Government Budget Under Strain

Syria's excessive dependence on external assistance is clearly revealed in the national budget. In 1983, sources of revenue for current expenditures included: local taxes and duties--S.P. 11.9 billion; free oil (from Iran)--S.P. 1.1 billion; support funds (foreign grant aid, primarily from other Arab states)--S.P. 7.7 billion; and foreign loans--S.P. 2.1 billion. Thus, the amount raised from abroad (S.P. 10.9 billion) nearly equals the amount of revenue generated locally (S.P. 11.9 billion).

The Syrian budget is stretched thin by Assad's ambitious commitments. He is pressing ahead with economic development plans at a time when he is attempting to exercise leadership in the Arab world through confrontation with Israel. Defense expenditures swallow up nearly 30 percent of all spending, and there has been a pronounced buildup of Syria's forces since the 1982 war.

Development costs are also substantial. The economic infrastructure (highways, electrical power, communications, etc.) and the production of government-approved commodities are constantly growing. One of Syria's top priorities is to boost production in the oil sector, where Western companies play an important role. A US company discovered a new field at Thayyem containing valuable, light crude reserves with low sulfur levels. The joint venture oil production company formed between Western firms and the Syrian Petroleum Oil Company to exploit Thayyem constitutes the first US direct investment in the country since the Syrian government nationalized major foreign investment in the 1960's. The new fields are crucial to Assad because they have the potential to displace most Syrian oil imports within two to three years, freeing Syria from its dependence on Iran.

The Future is Uncertain

The Syrians face a two to three year period of growing economic uncertainty and vulnerability to sanctions:

o

- o Export earnings will continue to fall while import needs grow. Earnings from the new oil discoveries will not materialize until late 1987. Food and oil imports will continue to be a major drain on hard currency accounts for the next few years.
- o Financial aid from Moslem states is steadily declining. Syria's major benefactor, Iran, is increasingly hard-pressed by declining oil revenues and the enormous cost of the war with Iraq, making it unlikely that the flow of aid from Teheran could be significantly stepped up.
- o The USSR--Syria's major non-Moslem benefactor--is also not in a position to provide substantial hard currency support, although the Soviets will probably continue to be generous in furnishing concessional military assistance.
- o Should economic sanctions be imposed by Western nations, chances are less than 50-50 that the moderate Arab states would rush to Assad's aid. Moderates are upset by Assad's support for Iran, his efforts to dominate the PLO, and his bid for leadership of the Arab world.

In conclusion, Syria's lackluster economic performance, combined with the cutback in aid from friendly states, are creating real problems for the regime. Syria is in the midst of a severe dollar shortage and has also experienced shortages of fruit, meat, and in some regions, bread. Skyrocketing food prices have led to increased public discontent. However, it would be wrong to underestimate Assad's skill at maintaining a balance of power between factions that compete for power, and his rule seems assured until his death. Nonetheless, increased financial difficulties will certainly complicate his efforts to confront Israel and dominate Arab politics.

cc: Ron St. Martin
Elaine Morton

~~TOP SECRET/UMBRA~~

Possible Economic Sanctions

I have grouped possible economic sanctions against Syria into three categories; financial, commercial, and political/military. Obviously, to the extent that sanctions from all three can be applied simultaneously, the pressure on Damascus increases exponentially.

FINANCIAL

1. Task Treasury to identify Syrian accounts in US banks and their foreign branches

Pro

- o We may be able to prevent terrorist incidents by blocking the transfer of funds.

Con

o

2. Seek Allied support to freeze Syrian private assets on deposit outside the country.

Pro

- o Could have a serious impact on Syria's ability to import food, spare parts, and machinery.

Con

- o The impact would be felt most by Syria's private sector, a possible source of pro-Western sentiment.

3. Invoke IEEPA unilaterally to freeze Syrian bank accounts in US branches and subsidiaries located abroad.

Pro

- o Could weaken Syria's credit rating and possibly capture a significant share of foreign exchange assets.

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By CU, NARA, Date 5/15/13

Con

- o The Allies might legally challenge the extraterritorial application of US laws. By proclaiming a "national emergency" the President may give the sanctions decision a higher profile than he intends.

4. Endorse pending legislation (S. 812) providing discretionary authority to monitor and block financial flows to Syria and other terrorist-sponsoring states on a "non-emergency basis" under the export administration act.

Pro

- o Syria would be discouraged from using its overseas accounts to finance terrorist operations.

Con

- o The international competitiveness of US banks could be adversely affected should S. 812 be enacted into law.

*EC
cooperation
required*

COMMERCIAL

Pro

- o The effectiveness of Syrian front organizations could be significantly curbed if the Allies cooperate.

Con

- o Western business interests would suffer.

6. Order US oil companies to withdraw from (Libya).

Pro

- o Would send a strong signal of disapproval to Assad.

Con

- o Foreign oil firms would probably step in quickly if US companies pull out and there would be minimal disruption to Syrian oil production.

plus loss of assets, as in Libya

7. Call on the Allies to Boycott Syrian Oil

Pro

- o Would require little in the way of economic sacrifice by the Europeans but could damage Syrian economy, and would send strong political signal.

Con

- o Boycott would be difficult to enforce and could drive Syrians further into Soviet orbit.

8. Call upon the Allies to bar entry by the Syrian Arab Airlines. Request Western air carriers to terminate flights into Damascus.

Pro

- o Would contribute to Syria's diplomatic isolation.

Con

- o Syria might retaliate by stepping up support for terrorism.

POLITICAL/MILITARY

9. Step up support for Lebanon's christian community.

Pro

- o Assad's goal of pacifying Lebanon would be harder to obtain.

Con

- o An increase in the level of violence in Lebanon would result.

hard to imagine...


10. Publicize instances of high-level Syrian corruption.

Pro

- o Would weaken support for the Assad regime as sanctions are being applied.

Con

- o Assad's brother Rifaat--considered "pro-Western"--could be implicated.



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File Syria

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BY CU, NARA, Date 1/18/06

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EXDIS

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, SY, GR
SUBJECT: PRIME MINISTER PAPANDEOU'S CONCERN OVER U.S.
REACTION TO ASAD'S VISIT TO ATHENS

REF: ATHENS 9602

1. */S* - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. THE DEPARTMENT APPRECIATES REFTTEL, AND BELIEVES WE
NEED TO GO BACK TO PAPANDEOU TO CORRECT SOME OF HIS
IMPRESSIONS ON SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM -- ABU NIDAL
IN PARTICULAR -- AS WELL AS MAKE SOME MORE GENERAL POINTS
WE HOPE HE WILL EXPRESS TO ASAD DURING HIS VISIT.

[REDACTED]

EMBASSY HAS ALREADY PROVIDED GOG
PAPERS ON ABU NIDAL, INCLUDING BOTH SYRIA AND LIBYA LINKS
AND CHRONOLOGY. ABU NIDAL PROBLEM WAS DISCUSSED DURING
OAKLEY VISIT LAST SEPTEMBER AND WHITEHEAD VISIT IN
JANUARY. ABU NIDAL CONDUCTED SEVERAL ATTACKS IN GREECE
DURING 1985.

3. FOLLOWING ARE POINTS YOU SHOULD MAKE TO PAPANDEOU
BEFORE THE ASAD VISIT:

-- PRESIDENT ASAD'S UPCOMING VISIT TO ATHENS OFFERS AN
OPPORTUNITY FOR GREECE DIRECTLY TO EXPRESS INCREASING
CONCERN STRONGLY FELT IN THE U.S. AND MANY WESTERN
EUROPEAN COUNTRIES OVER SYRIA'S SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM,
PARTICULARLY IN EUROPE. THE U.S. HOPES YOU WILL TAKE
THIS OPPORTUNITY TO MAKE THIS INCREASING WESTERN CONCERN
CLEAR TO ASAD.

-- THE U.S. AND SEVERAL OTHER EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS HAVE
SPOKEN IN BLUNT TERMS TO THE SYRIANS IN RECENT WEEKS
ABOUT SYRIA'S CONTINUING SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM.
INCREASING EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN RECENT

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ATTACKS IN LONDON, BERLIN AND ROME ARE THE BASIS OF THIS INCREASED LEVEL OF CONCERN, BUT SYRIAN SUPPORT FOR TERRORISM IN EUROPE, AS YOU KNOW, GOES BACK MANY YEARS. USG AND EC SPOKE SEPARATELY IN JANUARY TO SARG ABOUT SUPPORT FOR ABU NIDAL IN CONNECTION WITH VIENNA AND ROME AIRPORT ATTACKERS WHO DEPARTED FOR THEIR MISSIONS VIA DAMASCUS.

- WE HAVE DECIDED THAT IT IS IN BEST INTEREST OF LONG-TERM USG-SARG RELATIONS, JUST AS WE BELIEVE IT WILL SERVE EUROPEAN INTERESTS, TO CONFRONT ASAD WITH THE FACTS AND OUR VIEWS. IT WOULD BE A TRAGIC MISTAKE IF EUROPEAN GOVERNMENTS ARE NOT QUICK TO FOLLOW UP ON THE EVIDENCE OF SYRIAN COMPLICITY BEING DEVELOPED IN INDEPENDENT INVESTIGATIONS. NOT TO DO SO WILL SEND THE WRONG SIGNAL TO ASAD AND COULD LEAD TO CONTINUED TERRORISM BY ABU NIDAL.

-- WE HOPE THAT, DURING ASAD'S VISIT, YOU WILL EXPLAIN TO HIM THAT, IF THERE IS NO CHANGE IN SYRIAN POLICY ON TERRORISM, RELATIONS WITH THE WEST COULD BE SEVERELY DAMAGED. THE U. S. AND OTHER GOVERNMENTS TAKE VERY SERIOUSLY THE STATEMENT ISSUED AT TOKYO.

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THE MOST VISIBLE, BUT CERTAINLY NOT THE ONLY, SYRIAN CONNECTION TO TERRORISM IS THE ABU NIDAL PRESENCE IN SYRIA AND SYRIANCONTROLLED PORTIONS OF LEBANON. IF SYRIA IS SERIOUS ABOUT ENDING ITS LINKS WITH TERRORISM, IT WILL BREAK ALL CONNECTIONS WITH ABU NIDAL, INCLUDING REMOVING ABU NIDAL TRAINING CAMPS AND OTHER FACILITIES IN SYRIAN-CONTROLLED PARTS OF LEBANON. (THE MAIN LEBANESE SITES FOR ABU NIDAL TRAINING CAMPS ARE IN THAT PART OF THE BIQA' VALLEY OF EASTERN LEBANON WHICH IS OCCUPIED BY THE SYRIAN ARMY). CONTROL OF ABU NIDAL USE OF DAMASCUS AIRPORT IS ANOTHER IMPORTANT POINT.

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TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, YE, SY
SUBJECT: SYRIAN SUSPECTS REPORTED DEPORTED

REF: SANAA 3498

1. ~~S~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY. WE HAVE A REPORT THAT YEMENI NATIONAL SECURITY ARRANGED THE DEPORTATION OF THREE SYRIAN NATIONALS ON MAY 26 WHO WERE ALLEGEDLY INVOLVED IN THE ARRANGEMENTS TO SHOOT EMBASSY COMMUNICATOR POLLUCK AND IN AN ALLEGED PLOT TO KILL YASIR ARAFAT ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO SANAA.

END SUMMARY.

1.4 (b)(d)

B6

3. ON MAY 27 [REDACTED] TOLD POLOFF THAT THREE SYRIAN NATIONALS, TWO MEN AND THE SPOUSE OF ONE, HAD BEEN IMPLICATED IN THE SHOOTING OF EMBASSY COMMUNICATOR ARTHUR POLLUCK AND ALSO IN A SEPARATE PLOT TO KILL YASIR ARAFAT ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO SANAA. SOURCE SAID THAT THE THREE WERE SHOP OWNERS OPERATING AN [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SOURCE SAID THAT THE THREE HAD BEEN "PUT ON A PLANE LAST NIGHT (MAY 26) AND DEPORTED." SOURCE DECLINED TO GIVE EITHER THE NAMES OR DESTINATION OF THE DEPORTEES.

1.4 (b)(d)

4. COMMENT. [REDACTED] IS NOT THE SAME MAN WHO SUPPLIED THE INFORMATION FOR OUR EARLIER REPORT OF A SYRIAN-LIBYAN PLAN TO KILL ARAFAT ON HIS NEXT VISIT TO SANAA [REDACTED]

RUGH
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Bill w/ Tom

prob w/ Albin & about

Frank in 2.

Golden Bay Hotel

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File: Syria

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C.

PAGE #1 DAMASCUS 3266 DTG: 271135Z MAY 86 PSN: 062459
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TERREP

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, SY, LE, IS
SUBJ: TALKING ABOUT ABU NIDAL

REF: STATE 165238

1. ~~CONFIDENTIAL~~ - ENTIRE TEXT

2. THE RECENT INSTRUCTION TO ATHENS CONCERNING ABU NIDAL ACTIVITIES IN SYRIA PROMPTS US TO SUGGEST SOME ADDITIONAL THOUGHTS FOR POSSIBLE FUTURE USE IN DISCUSSING THIS DIFFICULT SUBJECT WITH FRIENDS AND ALLIES.

3. WE HAVE NO KNOWLEDGE HERE OF CONTACTS BY ABU NIDAL REPRESENTATIVES WITH SYRIAN INTELLIGENCE OR WITH ABU NIDAL OPERATIVES WHO PASS THROUGH SYRIA, SO IT IS DIFFICULT TO SUGGEST THAT THE TWO OFFICES HERE ACT AS A BASE OF SUPPORT FOR ABU NIDAL OPERATIONS.

4. HOWEVER, IN TWO OTHER IMPORTANT WAYS, ABU NIDAL FIGURES IN DAMASCUS SEEM TO WORK HAND IN GLOVE WITH THE MAIN BODY OF THIS TERRORIST ORGANIZATION IN LIBYA. FIRST, LOCAL EUROPEAN EMBASSIES IN DAMASCUS HAVE RECEIVED VISITS OF LOCAL ABU NIDAL OFFICIALS IN THE AFTERMATH OF ATROCITIES IN AUSTRIA, ITALY, FRANCE AND PERHAPS ELSEWHERE. THE LINE IS INVARIABLY THE SAME, VERY SOFTLY BUT FIRMLY SUGGEST THAT THE DEATHS OF INNOCENT PEOPLE IS REGRETTABLE BUT THE ABU NIDAL ORGANIZATION HAS EVERY RIGHT TO CARRY OUT SUCH ACTIVITIES AGAINST ISRAELI TARGETS. THEN, IN SOME VERY CAREFUL, INDIRECT SENTENCES, THE OFFICIALS SUGGEST THAT IT SHOULD BE POSSIBLE TO AVOID FUTURE OPERATIONS OF THIS SORT BY REASONABLE ACCOMMODATIONS. NO TERMS HAVE BEEN SET IN THE INSTANCES WE KNOW OF AND EXPLICIT OFFERS OF NEGOTIATIONS HAVE NOT BEEN MADE. INSTEAD, THE DOOR IS OPENED. IT IS INTERESTING BY-PRODUCT, AND MAYBE A COINCIDENTAL ONE, THAT WITH ABU NIDAL REPS IN DAMASCUS EUROPEANS INVARIABLY ASK SYRIA

TO INTERVENE WITH ABU NIDAL AND HELP THEM RESOLVE THEIR PROBLEMS WITH TERRORIST ORGANIZATIONS. THE PRESENCE OF THESE ABU NIDAL OFFICES IN DAMASCUS, THEREFORE, SERVES TO SUBTLY ENHANCE THE OPPORTUNITIES SYRIA HAS TO PLAY A DIPLOMATIC ROLE.

5. THE OTHER FUNCTION OF THESE OFFICES IS INDEED CULTURAL AND INFORMATIONAL, AS PRESIDENT ASAD HAS CLAIMED, AND IT CONSISTS OF ABU NIDAL REPS HANGING OUT IN LOCAL HOTELS AND COLLARING FOREIGN JOURNALISTS AND OFFICIALS. INTERVIEWS ARE OFFERED IN THE BIQA', ALONG WITH ESCORTS AND GUARANTEES OF SAFETY. ONE CBS CREW VISITING DAMASCUS IN THE PAST WEEK SPOKE QUITE FRANKLY OF THEIR DISCUSSIONS IN THE SHERATON ALONG THESE LINES AND SAID THAT IF AN APPROPRIATE INTERVIEW WERE ARRANGED, THAT IS WITH AN APPROPRIATE OFFICIAL, CBS WOULD TAKE ITS CAMERA CREW IMMEDIATELY. HOWEVER, SYRIANS DO NOT NECESSARILY APPROVE THESE CONTACTS BY ABU NIDAL REPRESENTATIVES, AND HAVE ACTED QUITE HARSHLY AGAINST SOME JOURNALISTS WHO HAVE TRIED TO FOLLOW THEM UP, BUT THE FACT REMAINS THAT SYRIA PROVIDES ABU NIDAL WITH A PULPIT AND A STAGE WHICH WOULD BE DIFFICULT TO REPRODUCE ELSEWHERE.

RANSOM
BT

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BY CH, NMTA, JTC 8/19/02

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Director of
Central
Intelligence

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Prospects for Counterterrorist Cooperation Among Developed Countries

Interagency Intelligence Memorandum

~~Secret~~

NI IIM 86-10007
May 1986

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
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NI IIM 86-10007

PROSPECTS FOR COUNTERTERRORIST
COOPERATION AMONG
DEVELOPED COUNTRIES

Information available as of 31 March 1986 was used in the preparation of this Memorandum, approved for publication on 25 April 1986 by the Chairman of the National Intelligence Council.

~~SECRET~~

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SCOPE NOTE

This Memorandum assesses the current situation and some prospects for increased international cooperation on terrorism. In so doing it examines the orientation and effectiveness of counterterrorist policies in 11 West European countries¹ and Japan and the present potential for expanded counterterrorist cooperation among these countries with the United States.

¹ Austria, Belgium, France, Greece, Italy, Portugal, Spain, Switzerland, Turkey, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The Scandinavian countries have not been included in this analysis. While not entirely immune from terrorist incidents—as evidenced by the recent murder of Swedish Prime Minister Palme and problems arising from an influx of Middle Eastern refugees—Nordic countries are generally low-threat areas, and their governments heretofore have not been active in counterterrorist cooperation.

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KEY JUDGMENTS

While combating local terrorist organizations remains a high priority for the developed countries, the United States cannot count on effective multilateral action from its West European allies and Japan to thwart terrorist states and organizations and must depend largely on bilateral cooperation to combat terrorism fomented by nonindigenous, primarily Middle Eastern, elements. While strong bilateral relations are useful and important, an effective multilateral agreement—or web of bilateral agreements tantamount to a multilateral agreement—could lead to more efficient counteractions against increasingly mobile terrorists.

None of the 12 developed states under study in this IIM has taken, is taking, or contemplates taking a leadership role against states that sponsor terrorism. Varying degrees of action have been taken against foreign terrorist organizations that may or may not be active on the national territory of these developed countries.

Many forces preclude adoption of significant multilateral actions against foreign sponsors and perpetrators of terrorism. Chief among these forces are conflicting economic interests, competing foreign policy priorities, concerns not to abridge sovereignty, fear of terrorist retaliation, and concerns not to compromise intelligence. These considerations are often amplified in multilateral settings but may be more easily accommodated or sidestepped in bilateral dealings.²

Most European governments believe bilateral exchanges to be the most useful form of counterterrorist cooperation and, accordingly, in recent years have developed a series of such relationships with neighboring or friendly states. They nonetheless recognize the utility of formalized working-level contacts fostered by multilateral groupings. Recent terrorist violence in Western Europe and signs of limited cooperation among some European leftwing groups and increased “spillover” of Middle Eastern violence have made some governments

² The Director of INR believes that the IIM, through its emphasis on multilateralism as a method of counterterrorist cooperation, underestimates the importance of bilateral cooperative efforts and their prospects for success. As a result, the IIM does not pinpoint the areas where bilateral cooperation may be preferable to multilateral approaches and vice versa, nor the impact of international counterterrorist efforts on containing terrorism. Moreover, the IIM does not fully distinguish between the very different problems of multilateral action against states that sponsor terrorism as opposed to bilateral or multilateral action against selected terrorist groups, some of which have no major outside benefactor. The Director, however, believes that the IIM is valuable in that it pulls together for the first time a range of information on the organization and operations of multilateral counterterrorism fora.

more receptive than before to assistance and training from like-minded states and more willing to broaden counterterrorist discussions. Most West European countries, however, continue to be wary of potential US domination of counterterrorist initiatives in multilateral fora. []

Countries that have experienced a significant domestic terrorist threat—Italy, West Germany, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Turkey—are supportive of international cooperation as long as such cooperation does not conflict with other areas of national policy goals they consider more important. Although Belgium and Portugal each have made some progress against domestic terrorists—particularly the Belgians—both countries continue to grapple with inadequate counterterrorist resources, debilitating rivalries among services, and a dearth of experienced personnel. We believe, moreover, that both will continue to be circumspect about confronting foreign terrorists who operate on their soil. States that are troubled principally by foreign terrorists, such as Greece, are more resistant to joining international efforts, in part because of ideological sympathies with some groups, such as the Palestine Liberation Organization, that also engage in terrorist acts, but primarily for fear of terrorist or economic retaliation. Although Japan has a group capable of carrying out terrorist acts, the government goes along with international initiatives only when there is a clear consensus of countries in favor of specific counterterrorist measures. []

Despite the continuing promotion and export of terrorism by Libya, Syria, and Iran, most West European countries and Japan are not prepared to impose unilateral or multilateral sanctions against them because they believe such measures would put at greater risk the lives of their citizens residing in these countries, jeopardize existing economic equities and political goals, and have little or no impact on the behavior of these radical states. Their policies toward these states are for the most part permissive. Some, moreover, such as France and West Germany, have even moved to improve relations with one of the major sponsors of state terrorism—Iran. []

Attempts by the United States to elicit support for US observer status in the Trevi Group have not been successful. A more mutually satisfactory arrangement would be a regularized US liaison relationship with Trevi³—short of observer status—that would ensure US understanding of group deliberations on a more consistent basis than is now the case. []

The barriers to more active cooperation on a multilateral basis remain high. Closer counterterrorist cooperation with like-minded states probably will continue to evolve in response to particular crises. []

³ The Trevi Group, an outgrowth of European Political Cooperation, was established in 1976 to promote counterterrorist cooperation among EC member states. []

Although the West European members of the Bonn Group⁴ are likely to remain reluctant to agree on measures to increase mutual cooperation, we believe most would welcome an opportunity to hold bilateral rounds at the summit on salient terrorist and counterterrorist issues without, however, being held to commitments for multilateral statements of intent to act. []

Furthermore, group members probably would be more receptive to the concept of a "menu" of different types of actions they could take in response to specific types of international terrorist events. A flexible approach would provide a framework in which governments could choose response options that are compatible with their own national goals and not in direct conflict with their perceived interests. []

The European Economic Community's new permanent working group on terrorism and the abuse of diplomatic immunity, which met in March 1986, offers a promising avenue of clearly focused counterterrorist cooperation. Nevertheless, the countries involved will almost certainly avoid unraveling sensitive areas of international consensus regarding diplomatic privileges and immunities that the Vienna Convention on Diplomatic Relations has pulled together. []

In the past, allied sensitivities have constrained NATO's consideration of, and as a result actions against, international terrorism, but a series of anti-NATO terrorist attacks by indigenous West European groups since late 1984 has led to some positive shifts in attitudes. There has been little concrete action, however, on the part of the Alliance. Like the Bonn Group we expect that NATO talks on terrorism probably will reflect—and be limited by—a desire not to duplicate efforts in other multilateral fora. []

The Western Mediterranean Club, established in 1983, represents the first instance in which West European governments (France, Italy, Spain) have drawn two Arab countries (Tunisia and Morocco) into a multilateral arrangement in such a sensitive area of cooperation as counterterrorism. []

[] the formation of this group almost certainly signals an awareness among the West European participants that counterterrorism is best approached on a regional basis. []

⁴ The Bonn Group's members are the seven summit countries: Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States. []

Most bilateral extradition treaties between individual states addressed here date from the late 19th or early 20th centuries and are outmoded documents that do not take into account modern technologies of transportation, communications, and weaponry. Updated treaties have been negotiated since 1983 between the United States and Italy; the United States and the United Kingdom; Italy and the United Kingdom; and Spain and the United Kingdom. For many of the other countries; the primary reservation to extradition is their unwillingness to concede what they view as their legal rights as sovereign nations, which may be a pretext for domestic political considerations or broader foreign policy concerns.

Although multilateral cooperation to reduce or punish terrorist activity has prompted eight international agreements since 1969, including the well-known *European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism* (Strasbourg Convention) and the Summit Seven countries' *Bonn Declaration* on aircraft hijacking, these efforts have met with mixed success, which does not augur well for future initiatives. Some countries will remain reluctant to ratify the former, because of reservations about distinctions between political offenses and terrorist crimes and a hesitation to cede sovereign judicial authority.

DISCUSSION

Determinants of Counterterrorist Policy

1. An increase in the global level of terrorist violence has compelled many governments to reassess their counterterrorist policies and capabilities. The basic consideration that determines how governments deal with terrorism on their soil or against their interests is whether terrorism is domestic or foreign in its origin and affiliations. Another leading determinant is the official response public opinion will demand or support (see annex B). []

2. The nature and provenance of the terrorist threat are key factors in shaping a government's response. Most West European governments and Japan have shown a readiness to respond firmly to indigenous terrorism. In cases of separatist or ethnic terrorism—as in Spain and the United Kingdom—and instances of substantial sociopolitical or generational terrorism—as in West Germany and Italy—governments have not hesitated to act forcefully against the perpetrators. Belgium, Portugal, and Japan have generally responded in a similar manner with mixed results. On an altogether different scale, Turkey responded to widespread domestic political terrorism and the consequent possibility of civil war with full-scale military intervention. Official reaction to foreign terrorism may be muted, however, if foreign policy interests counsel restraint—as they often do in France and Greece—or if a tough response is perceived as potentially complicating an official policy of neutrality—as in the case of Austria and Switzerland. []

3. Public opinion is another major factor in determining how tough West European governments will be on terrorists. In West Germany, Italy, Spain, and the United Kingdom, in particular, where indigenous terrorist groups are active, terrorism has consistently ranked among the top noneconomic problems in surveys attempting to identify the most serious challenges to social order and political stability that a country faces (see annex B). Public perceptions of a significant terrorist threat have provided the impetus and the mandate for governments to adopt special laws and resort to tough counterterrorist measures. At the same time, however, public opinion is amenable to or sometimes demands that a government exercise leniency with "repentant" terrorists or negotiate with

terrorist groups rather than eliminate them through conventional police methods. For the British, Italian, Spanish, and, to a lesser extent, Turkish Governments, stern government countermeasures are encouraged because popular perceptions of official success in suppressing terrorism may have an impact on the ability to govern effectively. []

International Cooperation to Combat Terrorism

The Difficult Question of Sanctions Against State-Supported Terrorism

4. How to deal with state-supported terrorism of Arab and Middle Eastern origin continues to be a delicate question even for West European governments otherwise strongly committed to combating terrorism. For example, major West European countries and Japan traditionally have resisted adopting joint trade measures aimed at punishing or isolating states that sponsor international terrorist activity. Even in the case of Libya, increased concern among major West European governments about Libyan leader Qadhafi's promotion of terrorism does not, for the most part, outweigh the importance of their economic and political stakes in Tripoli. []

5. *Italy's* strong historic ties, extensive trade links, and geographic proximity argue against any measures that would endanger those interests or anger Tripoli. Indeed, despite indications of Libyan complicity in the December 1985 attack at Fiumicino airport, it appears that Rome currently has no plans to alter significantly its policy toward Libya. Libyan terrorism against exiles resident in Italy peaked in 1981 and has not reached that level since. []

Italy is a major participant in development of Libya's offshore oil resources. Tripoli imported more than \$2 billion in goods from Italy in 1984 and, moreover, holds a 14.5 percent interest in FIAT. The presence of some 10,000 to 15,000 Italians in Libya would give Rome pause even in the absence of economic interests. The Italians are also likely to avoid any moves they think might give Qadhafi reason to renew threats against the NATO INF base at Comiso, Sicily. With so much vested in bilateral relations, it appears that only a series of actions more massive and horrendous than

the airport attack and conclusively traced to Tripoli would prompt a reassessment by Rome. [redacted]

6. The terrorist events surrounding the siege at the Libyan People's Bureau in London in April 1984 prompted *Britain* to break diplomatic relations with Tripoli and press within the EC for a review of the 1961 Vienna Convention on diplomatic privileges and immunities with a view to better enforcement of its provisions. Although diplomatic ties remain severed, London's economic interests have not suffered as a result; on the contrary, British commercial links are largely undisturbed. Tripoli still refuses, however, to abandon efforts to stalk its opponents in the United Kingdom. While this provides London little impetus to restore relations, it also suggests that a diplomatic rupture has had a limited effect on Libyan behavior. [redacted]

7. *West Germany* values Libya as its third-largest oil source and as a market for German goods but was shaken when Tripoli seized and held West German nationals in Libya in 1983 in retaliation for the arrest of Libyan terrorists in West Germany. Following these and other terrorist acts, Bonn reached a "gentleman's" agreement with Tripoli calling for the avoidance of further confrontations. Foreign Minister Genscher sought and received assurances from Libyan officials in 1984 that terrorism on West German soil would cease. This understanding was broken early in 1985, however, in an incident in which two West Germans were wounded by a Libyan gunman. As a result, Bonn quietly expelled four Libyan officials in July and warned that it would cut diplomatic ties if Tripoli continued to attack anti-Qadhafi dissidents in West Germany. This was an unprecedented move, but we do not believe Bonn would carry out its threat as the Foreign and Economic Ministries fear retaliation against 2,000 West Germans in Libya and cancellation of commercial contracts worth \$4 billion. Recently Bonn has been quietly cutting back on its deliveries of Libyan oil in favor of other suppliers. [redacted]

8. *French* attitudes toward Libya turn more on Qadhafi's attempts to subvert former French colonies than they do on his policy of exporting terrorism. Although Prime Minister Chirac has expressed the new center-right government's strong support for international cooperation on terrorism and "strong action" terrorists, he recently told senior US officials that a "moderate" approach to Qadhafi would better serve US and French interests. Paris apparently believes its interests are best served by trying to entice Qadhafi by diplomatic means into such action as leaving Chad. Offers of limited arms sales play a role as well. [redacted]

[redacted]
[redacted]
[redacted] Qadhafi's recent actions aimed at destabilizing Tunisia are likely, in our view, to intensify Paris's focus on this aspect of Libyan behavior rather than its support for terrorism. Moreover, Tripoli is quite capable of repeating its 1983 step of holding French citizens in Libya hostage to obtain the release of Libyans arrested in France. [redacted]

9. West European nations also see their relations with *Syria* as enmeshed in a web of complex considerations that make it advisable not to focus too much on its involvement with terrorism. French relations with Syria make clear that Paris has decided to downplay the issue of Syrian support for terrorism as part of the price for improved relations. On the one hand, French security officials have long suspected Syrian complicity in a series of attacks on French interests in Lebanon—including the assassination of a French ambassador, the bombing of the French contingent of the Multinational Force, and the kidnaping of French diplomats and journalists. On the other hand, French policymakers have publicly acknowledged that Syria is a major regional power that must be reckoned with. Priority has been given to the political considerations, and Paris seeks to cultivate the Syrians through an expanding program of arms sales and high-level visits, while not pressing the terrorism issue. [redacted]

10. The West European posture toward *Iran* is characterized in the main by caution, with some countries trying to maintain a strict balance in their dealings with both Tehran and Baghdad, and avoiding confrontations with Iran over its export of terrorism aimed at regime opponents. The West Europeans are aware that Khomeini's adherents are willing to avenge any insults or actions against their fundamentalist zealots and might counter any Western moves to suppress Iranian terrorism by escalating bombing and assassination attempts. To this end, trade threats and diplomatic injunctions against Tehran appear fruitless—and dangerous. Most West European governments hope ultimately to restore full relations with Iran, and appear spurred in part by a perception that in the long term Iran will prevail over Iraq in the region. [redacted]

11. *Japan* is also uncomfortable with the idea of trade or diplomatic sanctions as a method for combating terrorism, and it has been reluctant in the past to subscribe to any measures not universally adopted. This applies especially to the Middle East from which Tokyo draws 70 percent of its crude oil supplies. Japan will let other governments take the lead in any

protests, [redacted]

[redacted] Most recently, pressure from the United States and South Korea induced Tokyo to impose trade sanctions on North Korea after the 1983 Rangoon bombing incident. Japan waited until the Burmese Government fixed blame on P'yongyang before acting, however, and lifted the measures this year. In the absence of Iranian or Libyan threats against Japanese interests, Tokyo almost certainly feels little compunction to volunteer for punitive trade measures. [redacted]

Clubs, Conventions, and Extradition Treaties

Multilateral Clubs

12. Despite their reluctance to use trade and diplomatic sanctions, most West European governments officially acknowledge that some sort of response to terrorist acts is necessary. In general, however, they prefer bilateral to multilateral counterterrorist responses or initiatives—as in the wake of the TWA hijacking and the Achille Lauro affair because achieving a consensus on concerted action by Allied or like-minded countries is so difficult.⁵ They nonetheless understand the utility of formalized working-level contacts among specialists, which are fostered by multilateral groupings. Although several governments, notably the British and French, assert that multilateral exchanges require that information in the group be geared to a lowest common denominator [redacted]

[redacted] they participate nonetheless in a variety of counterterrorist groups and organizations.⁶ Of the multilateral clubs, some function as vehicles for consultation and cooperation among security officials at the technical level such as the *Club of Bern* and the *Trevi Group*. Others deal with broader aspects of counterterrorist policy at the ministerial level. These include the *Council of Five*, the *Bonn Group*, the *Western Mediterranean Club*, and *NATO* (see annex C). [redacted]

13. The level of US access to the proceedings of these groups fluctuates. While the United States is not a member of the *Club of Bern*, the FBI is a recipient

⁵ Somewhat apart from this view, Tokyo often prefers a multilateral approach whereby hard political or economic decisions may be sidestepped and exposure to economic or terrorist retaliation thus avoided or limited. [redacted]

⁶ Turkey is the only country here that does not belong to any multilateral counterterrorist group, unless such talks within NATO are counted. Ankara has bilateral contacts, however, with the United States, West Germany, and other governments. [redacted]

of some of the information disseminated through its secure telex systems. Several efforts to elicit support for US observer status in the *Trevi Group* have not succeeded. The United States intermittently receives readouts, however, of aspects of Trevi's work that are of interest to the United States. In 1982 EC member states reluctantly agreed that the Trevi's chairing country—which corresponds to the rotation of the EC presidency—could brief the United States on Trevi proceedings and, moreover, that other member states could provide supplementary briefings. The thoroughness and detail of any briefing is at the discretion of the presidency country. During their respective chairmanships, the United Kingdom, Belgium, Denmark, and, in particular, West Germany have accommodated US interest in Trevi's activities. [redacted]

14. The well-known *Bonn Group* consisting of Canada, France (which often refrains from participation), Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, West Germany, and the United States traditionally has had problems agreeing on measures to increase counterterrorism cooperation. The four West European countries have expressed their wishes to avoid moving too far toward formalizing a "summit seven" counterterrorist group. Paris, in particular, asserts that such exchanges contribute little to progress against terrorism because of their high level of generality. Moreover, the French have stated that the summit should focus on economics as is its mandate, and avoid institutionalizing working groups on diverse topics, which tends to undercut the informal tone of exchanges among summit leaders. [redacted]

15. West European summit participants have also indicated that they believe more institutionalized multilateral intelligence exchanges or new counterterrorist initiatives would be an unnecessary duplication of effort in view of the existence of the *Club of Bern*, the EC's *Trevi Group*, and the *Council of Five*. In fact, the four West European summit participants each have expressed on many occasions their preferences for dealing bilaterally with the United States on terrorism matters rather than in a summit context. We believe most of the summit governments would welcome an opportunity to hold bilateral rounds at the summit on salient terrorist and counterterrorist issues without, however, being held to commitments for multilateral statements of intent to act. [redacted]

16. Indeed, in consultations in March 1985 the Summit Seven's aviation security authorities reached a consensus that sanctions—the only ones ever imposed under the terms of the *Bonn Declaration*—against Ariana Afghan airlines should be dropped as they have

not compelled Kabul either to prosecute or extradite hijackers or to abide by international antihijacking agreements. Moreover, the Afghans have more than once threatened to deny overflight rights to the airlines of the seven countries, which would particularly complicate flight patterns in the region for West European carriers. In order that the prospects of lifting sanctions not appear to be an abandonment of the Declaration's principles, representatives believe that, in the bargain, Kabul should make a public commitment to respect the Hague and Montreal Conventions governing air piracy. [redacted]

17. The *Western Mediterranean Club*, established in 1983 represents the first instance in which West European governments have drawn two Arab countries into a multilateral arrangement in such a sensitive area as cooperation on counterterrorism. Reportedly, the group intends to grapple with the problem of the harboring of terrorists by third countries. [redacted]

[redacted] Italian authorities may fear that a lack of preparedness on terrorist matters among other Western Mediterranean countries poses a potential threat to Italian security. The Spanish Government probably welcomes another avenue of access to officials in Morocco, where the security of the Spanish enclaves of Ceuta and Melilla, as well as unrest in the Western Sahara, are of concern to Madrid. France, for its part, would not want to be excluded from any forum in which francophone Maghreb countries participate. [redacted]

18. Although NATO dealings with terrorism traditionally have been limited, attacks since October 1984 against NATO and Alliance-related facilities have prompted members to reassess the terrorist threat in Western Europe, with a view to intensifying common measures against terrorism. Security at NATO headquarters and other installations has been tightened and personnel advised on additional safety steps. NATO member states are moving toward adopting a standardized alert system on terrorist activities and threats. In addition, statements last year by previously reluctant members [redacted] indicate a new willingness to expand Allied counterterrorist consultations. [redacted]

19. Continuing NATO talks on terrorism will reflect—and be limited by—a desire not to duplicate efforts in other multilateral fora. For this reason and individual national concerns for legal sovereignty, prospects for the development of a common Alliance political policy and strategy to combat terrorism, encompassing such aspects as a common extradition policy, are bleak. Despite a willingness to upgrade deliberations in NATO on the terrorist threat, a majority of member countries believe nonetheless that NATO talks regarding terrorism should be private, and any specific recommendations should take into account counterterrorist measures adopted in other multilateral groups. Moreover, many members will remain wary of potential US domination of such discussions in an Alliance context. Perhaps most important is the concern of some members that NATO convey a public image of firm resolve against terrorism without, however, creating false expectations of collective action that the Alliance is not capable of undertaking. [redacted]

International Conventions

20. Several international conventions (see annex D) recognize specific terrorist crimes and set forth standards for legal treatment by signatory states in cases involving such offenses. The *Tokyo*, *Hague*, and *Montreal Conventions* address aspects of civil aviation security and appropriate legal response that arise from terrorist acts in the air and on the ground. In particular, they call for the safe passage of hijacked passengers, the return of aircraft and crew, and—most important—the extradition of hijackers or, failing that, local prosecution. Within this precept, the Hague Convention establishes that adhering states may not disclaim responsibility in airborne terrorist acts on the excuse that the offense took place outside of its territory or airspace. We know of no instances involving the countries discussed here in which these conventions have been violated. There have been cases, however, in which the country of destination has not prosecuted hijackers. [redacted]

21. Nonadherence to extradition, along with the principle of political asylum, remains one of the greatest hindrances to full enforcement of criminal and antiterrorist laws by effectively blocking the ability of states to prosecute fugitive terrorist suspects. For many states otherwise amenable to counterterrorist cooperation, the primary reservation to extradition is their unwillingness to compromise what they view as their legal rights as sovereign nations—sometimes a pretext in deference to domestic political considerations or broader foreign policy concerns. These con-

Signatory and Acceding States

	Tokyo Convention (14 September 1963)	Hague Convention (16 December 1970)	Montreal Convention (23 September 1971)	Convention on Suppression of Terrorism (27 January 1977)
Austria	Ratified	Ratified—1974	Ratified—1974	Ratified—1977
Belgium	Ratified—1970	Ratified—1973	Ratified—1976	Ratified—1986
France	Ratified—1970	Ratified—1972	Ratified—1976	Signed only
Greece	Ratified—1971	Ratified—1973	Ratified—1974	Signed only
Italy	Ratified—1968	Ratified—1974	Ratified—1974	Signed only
Japan	Ratified—1970	Ratified—1971	Ratified—1974	NA
Portugal	Ratified—1964	Ratified—1972	Ratified—1973	Ratified—1981
Spain	Ratified—1969	Ratified—1972	Ratified—1972	Ratified—1980
Switzerland	Ratified—1970	Ratified—1971	Ratified—1978	Ratified—1983
Turkey	Ratified—1975	Ratified—1973	Ratified—1975	Ratified—1981
United Kingdom	Ratified—1968	Ratified—1971	Ratified—1973	Ratified—1978
United States	Ratified—1969	Ratified—1971	Ratified—1972	NA
West Germany	Ratified—1969	Ratified—1974	Ratified—1978	Ratified—1978

This table is Unclassified.

cerns mean that despite the existence of multilateral conventions and bilateral agreements covering the extradition of criminals and terrorists, harboring states often refuse to extradite terrorist suspects to the requesting state on the grounds that the offense in question was politically motivated. The best alternate recourse for enforcement rests in the legal formula of "extradite or prosecute," whereby a government unwilling or unable to honor an extradition request would take steps to prosecute in the requesting government's stead. Even this meets with objections, however, as some harboring countries do not recognize as crimes the charges brought in a requesting country's extradition request. []

22. The most authoritative international document that deals with the extradition of terrorists is the 1977 European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism, more often known as the Strasbourg Convention. A product of the 21-member Council of Europe, the convention establishes that specific violent crimes—including hijacking, aircraft sabotage, hostage taking, bombing, and attacks on internationally protected persons—are to be considered extraditable crimes that do not fall in the category of the political offense exception that many states have traditionally invoked in terrorist cases and that has often prevented extradition. The fact that 20 of the Council's member states have signed the convention and 16 have ratified it was a positive step in the efforts of West European coun-

tries to strengthen law enforcement cooperation against terrorism. Several countries—France, Italy, Norway, Portugal, and Sweden—have filed reservations, however, that their governments retain the right to refuse extraditions for any offense they consider to be political in nature. The net effect of these reservations has been to undermine the ultimate effectiveness of the convention. []

23. Because all of the 12 EC countries⁷ are also members of the Council of Europe, the EC has tried to define how the Convention would be applied within the Community. This resulted in the Dublin Agreement of 1979, which narrowed interpretation of the Convention principally to reflect Irish reservations regarding extradition—long a sensitive point in relations between Dublin and London. France, however, refuses to ratify either the Convention or the agreement, arguing that provisions for compulsory prosecution violate French sovereignty. Because the Dublin Agreement cannot enter into effect until ratified by all EC members, none of the other members is inclined to ratify as long as France refuses. []

24. The political accords on Northern Ireland signed by London and Dublin last November led to Ireland's accession to the European Convention on

⁷ Among EC countries, Denmark, Luxembourg, the United Kingdom, Belgium, West Germany, and new members Portugal and Spain, have ratified the Convention. []

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Terrorism in February 1986. Dublin's status as a signatory improves chances—but does not guarantee—that automatic extradition of political offenders who commit criminal and terrorist acts in Ulster and are apprehended in Ireland will take place. We believe Dublin will insist that the final decision in such cases remain the prerogative of the Irish Supreme Court. In recent months, the Court has upheld several extradition orders issued by lower Irish courts. []

Bilateral Extradition Treaties

25. Limited international cooperation occurs within the context of formal bilateral legal agreements such as extradition treaties. Most of the treaties between states addressed here date from the late 19th or early 20th centuries. These are for the most part outmoded documents that do not take into account modern technologies of transportation, communications, and weaponry that have made criminality, including terrorism, vastly different than a century ago. Not only have the mobility and methods of modern criminals made these treaties in some respects obsolete, but the practice of enumerating specifically covered offenses in treaties results in such anomalies as extradition for bigamy or robbery but not for drug trafficking or hijacking. In the case of an Armenian terrorist, Vicken Tcharkhutian, for example, a French Appeals Court decided in August 1982 against the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA) member's extradition to the United States, where he was wanted for two bombing attempts in Los Angeles. The only charge that could be levied against him under the Franco-American extradition treaty of 1909 was arson, which the Court ruled did not apply. []

26. There have been several noted instances in which states have agreed to extradite a terrorist suspect, but only on the condition that he be prosecuted on criminal charges lodged by the requesting country that also exist under the sending country's law:

- In November 1977 *France* extradited Red Army Faction (RAF) lawyer Klaus Croissant in response to a West German Government request, but the terms allowed Bonn to try Croissant on only one of the 15 criminal charges against him.
- In October 1978 the *Netherlands* agreed to extradite wanted RAF member Knut Folkerts to West Germany on only two of several counts Bonn filed against him. Neither charge, however, related to his participation in the kidnaping and murder of German industrialist Hans Martin Schleyer, as Dutch law determined that action to have been politically inspired.

— Conversely, *Switzerland* allowed extradition of another RAF fugitive to West Germany on murder charges in Schleyer's death but under rules of reciprocity would not permit his prosecution for the charge of membership in a terrorist organization—a crime in West Germany but not in Switzerland. []

27. All too often, however, cases that appear to signal a more amenable general attitude on the part of some countries toward extradition reflect a coalescence of political factors that apply only to the case in question. This has long applied more to *France* perhaps than to other countries. For example, the French decision to extradite four ETA members to Madrid in September 1984 was made, in our view, primarily because Paris felt backed into a corner at that moment. The Mitterrand government was increasingly compelled to make a significant gesture of support for Spanish democracy and France's fellow Socialist government in Madrid, and at the same time try to discourage further activities by antiterrorist vigilantes in the French Basque region. []

28. Last year, however, Paris decided against the extradition of two Italian terrorists, choosing instead to expel them to Burundi. Three other Italian terrorists remain in French custody, but extradition of one already has been denied. We believe there is a reasonable chance that France may extradite the others to blunt criticism that it is a refuge for terrorists and to dissipate some of the rancor the issue has engendered with Italy. But, as in the case of the extradited Spanish Basques, we believe any new cooperation with Italy on extradition would not signal automaticity in extradition matters or a fundamental change in French policy. []

29. *Greece*, too, has created obstacles to extradition, but probably more from political indecision and fears of terrorist retaliation than from fundamental legal problems. Athens has long delayed the extradition to Italy of a Palestinian wanted in the 1982 bombing of a Rome synagogue. The Greeks reneged on their promise to allow Italian magistrates to interview the suspect, who had already received a light sentence for smuggling explosives into Greece. Although the Greek Supreme Court finally ruled in 1984 that the Palestinian's extradition would be constitutional, the government has made no move to extradite him to Italy. []

Prospects for Enhanced Counterterrorist Cooperation

30. We believe prospects are generally positive for at least a limited expansion of international counter-

terrorist cooperation because many countries perceive terrorism as a growing threat that cannot be effectively countered by only national or bilateral means. Moreover, recent resurgence of terrorist violence in Western Europe and indications of limited but new cooperation among some leftwing groups in Western Europe and the increased "spillover" of Middle Eastern violence have made some of the governments with misgivings, shortcomings, or a lack of experience in this area more receptive than before to international cooperation, such as assistance and training from like-minded states. They also appear to be more willing to broaden counterterrorist discussions and consider joint measures. Many governments will continue, however, to resist any new international initiatives that would seek directly to punish states that support terrorism by imposition of political or economic sanctions because they believe such measures may complicate their own vital foreign policy interests and economic equities and, in any case, have little positive effect. Most West European countries will also continue to be wary of potential US domination of counterterrorist discussions in multilateral fora. []

31. Although mindful of the positive public impact that may accrue from the fact or the appearance of multilateral cooperation or solidarity, most countries believe substantive international progress against terrorism is best achieved through bilateral channels. In such dealings, governments are not constrained by a "lowest common denominator," which often limits or diminishes the value of exchanges in larger groups. The bilateral counterterrorist relationships that many of the countries discussed here have developed among themselves and with the United States over the last several years affirm this view, and suggest that working-level intelligence exchanges and, in some cases, training assistance will continue to be the principal vehicles for such cooperation. []

32. One encouraging sign for increased multilateral efforts is that the meeting last July of the Summit Seven's Bonn Group experts on civil aviation security was the first international gathering to address concerns raised by the July 1985 TWA hijacking. Although the meeting produced no consensus that would lead to any new measures or initiatives to improve airport security against hijacking and sabotage, several members, particularly Canada and Britain, voiced support for the revitalization of the Bonn Declaration, which is increasingly perceived as ineffective. []

33. We believe lessons learned from deliberations among the Bonn Summit Seven Group following the July 1985 TWA hijacking and the failure of the

Group's December meeting to lead to any concrete action suggest a different approach to encouraging coordinated counterterrorist responses. Group members probably would be more receptive to the concept of a "menu" of different types of actions they could take in response to specific types of international terrorist events. This kind of flexible approach would provide a framework in which governments could choose response options that are compatible with their national goals and not in direct conflict with their perceived interests. []

34. With regard to expansion of US participation in such West European groupings as the Trevi Group, we believe the chances are slight that the United States will be invited to attend even as an observer or that it would be necessarily advisable to accept if we were. US participation or attendance at Trevi meetings would be complicated by the absence of a mandate for the FBI—the analogue of the West European internal services involved—to deal with foreign terrorism outside of the United States, and by the fact that the US State Department—rather than the counterparts of domestic West European ministries—would be the principal US interlocutor. These institutional disparities and the group's exclusive focus on terrorism within the region would only underscore the exceptional circumstances of US participation. Moreover, many of the previous obstacles to US involvement with Trevi still remain, and some EC member states would be resistant to the possibility of undue US influence in a heretofore European forum. []

35. EC reservations about a more active US role in Trevi suggest that the most mutually satisfactory arrangement would be a more regularized US liaison relationship with Trevi—short of observer status—that would ensure readouts of group deliberations on a more consistent basis than is now the case. This could be modeled along the lines of the current procedure for informing the United States of developments and discussions within European Political Cooperation, whereby the United States is given a meeting agenda beforehand for comments and receives a readout of proceedings after the talks. []

36. Some improvement in the functioning of the Trevi Group also may occur. In the past two years, officials of some EC countries have criticized Trevi's seeming lethargy and lack of initiative. The British, in particular, are encouraging revitalization of Trevi, whose working groups increasingly lack dynamism and reportedly produce little in the way of concrete joint counterterrorist measures or procedures. To this end, the EC Foreign Ministers advanced last spring's

Trevi meeting—on which the United States has yet to receive information—to accelerate technical coordination on communications and protection of embassies.

37. We believe that despite bona fide EC concerns about terrorism, several member states find it more desirable to improve counterterrorist cooperation by using existing laws and vehicles for consultation than to create new, possibly redundant structures within the EC framework.

38. In the absence of new initiatives, the EC will nevertheless not hesitate to condemn terrorism. At their July meeting last year, EC Foreign Ministers adopted a resolution condemning terrorism and air piracy and dedicated themselves to exploring possibilities of establishing and maintaining strengthened international standards for airline and airport security in order to prepare concrete recommendations in this area. This would include concerted action by EC states in the International Civil Aviation Organization (ICAO) and urging third countries that are not party to existing international conventions to adhere to them. Earlier, on 24 June, the EC Transport Ministers issued a statement condemning terrorist acts against civil aviation and called for renewed cooperative security efforts to thwart them. These and other such statements may not result in prompt action but are almost certainly politically important to EC member governments who intermittently must satisfy their domestic need to appear tough on terrorism.

39. EC member states have met twice in the past two years to explore and identify international standards of diplomatic practice and behavior that could be more rigorously enforced as a means of deterring and preempting certain terrorist activities. At its meeting last spring, the EC's working group on terrorism and diplomatic immunity looked at several practical measures of cooperation that they believed merit further examination:

- Examination of the Vienna convention with a view to applying its rules more strictly.
- Exchange of information on foreign diplomats suspected of abusing diplomatic immunity for purposes of terrorism.
- Uniform diplomatic visa policies.
- The removal of diplomatic status from foreign state commercial offices and trade centers in noncapital cities.
- Appropriate notification to receiving countries regarding incoming diplomatic personnel and proper declaration of diplomatic status.

- Measures of inspection and control of the weight and dimensions of diplomatic pouches.

Although some of these measures may garner sufficient support for adoption and enforcement, individual national political sensitivities and foreign policy concerns—especially toward Arab states—are likely obstacles to the broadest possible approval for steps aimed at reducing diplomatic abuses that support terrorism. The countries involved will move cautiously to avoid unraveling sensitive areas of international consensus that the Vienna Convention has pulled together.

40. Most countries will continue to respond to indigenous terrorism firmly and unilaterally, but there may be instances in which bilateral or limited multilateral cooperation may be desirable. The series of "anti-imperialist" terrorist attacks over the past year by the Red Army Faction, Action Directe, and the Communist Combatant Cells (CCC), for example, has provided the impetus for regular trilateral consultations among West German, French, and Belgian security officials.⁸ Representatives of the Belgian Groupe Interforce Anti-Terroriste, (G.I.A.), the French Unite de Coordination de la Lutte Anti-Terroriste, (UCLAT), and the West German Bundeskriminalamt (BKA) have met three times since February 1985. They plan to meet bimonthly, and we expect further cooperation in an attempt to impede the flow of unchallenged transnational mobility of terrorists as a result of these meetings.

41. Similarly, following the Audran and Zimmermann assassinations early last year, West Germany and France declared a "united front against terrorism." Both governments have agreed to form a joint operational working group, set up a hotline between security headquarters in Paris and Cologne to intensify intelligence exchanges, and try to tighten the border controls.

42. Despite these efforts, we believe that tracking and monitoring terrorist movements in the region will continue to be complicated by porous borders. Among most EC states, border controls are virtually nonexistent. The extraordinary mobility across borders is probably unique among developed countries and will remain an important factor contributing to terrorists' ability to elude detection and capture.

43. A joint, multilateral approach to such regional, defensive counterterrorist measures may ultimately prove most effective. In the wake of the Achille Lauro

⁸ For a discussion of links among these groups, see IIM 85-10005 (Secret) April 1985, *West European Terrorism: The Indigenous Threat to NATO and US Interests*.

and EgyptAir hijackings, as well as the airport attacks at Rome and Vienna, most Allied and EC countries almost certainly will intensify basic security measures at air and sea ports of entry and increase identity checks and inspections at land frontiers. Although some individual states already have clamped down, EC member states may find themselves increasingly compelled—short of standardizing such procedures—to consult among themselves to ensure some consistency of standards within the region. []

44. Recent terrorist attacks in Western Europe have also heightened concerns about the proliferation of false or fraudently obtained Maghreb passports among Iranian and Levantine Arab terrorists. Holders of Moroccan, Tunisian, and Algerian papers do not need visas to enter most EC member states, which complicates counterterrorist efforts. Although existing immigration arrangements could not be easily changed without hurting the EC countries' relations with the countries involved, a few states have moved to adopt measures to intensify scrutiny of incoming Maghreb travelers. Nonetheless, in the absence of multilaterally agreed upon means of better and more uniformly

screening the entry of Maghrebians into Western Europe—where, as legitimate residents, they number in the hundreds of thousands—we believe terrorists will continue to “use” these nationalities to advantage. []

45. With respect to Belgium, Portugal, and Turkey, the forecast is mixed. Turkey has already established itself as a firm advocate of counterterrorist cooperation; its biggest challenge, however, will be to convince otherwise like-minded states that Ankara can pursue an aggressive counterterrorist policy and at the same time observe human rights and political freedoms—long sore points with other Allied countries. Belgium and Portugal both have had some success against domestic terrorists, but we believe Belgium has a better chance of gaining the upper hand over such groups. Although these countries continue efforts to upgrade counterterrorist capabilities and improve performance, they still suffer from meager budgets, internal squabbling and rivalries, and a lack of experienced personnel. Both Brussels and Lisbon, however, probably will continue to be circumspect in their dealings with foreign terrorists who operate on their soil. []

ANNEX A

The Domestic versus International Threat

1. Terrorist activity in the *United Kingdom* is dominated by the activities of Irish nationalist groups. In recent years, Middle Eastern terrorists also have stepped up their activities in the United Kingdom. In June 1982 an assassination attempt against the Israeli Ambassador to the United Kingdom by a Palestinian group got headlines and was a factor in precipitating the Israeli invasion of Lebanon. The April 1984 shooting of a British policewoman outside the Libyan People's Bureau in London dramatized the Libyan terrorist threat in the United Kingdom. []

2. *Spain* continues to be plagued by the separatist Basque terrorist group Euskadi ta Askatasuna (ETA) and its various factions. During the tenure of the current Socialist government, ETA periodically has escalated the number and ferocity of its attacks against military targets. Despite the considerable anti-ETA successes of the past one to two years, Madrid has recently witnessed another upsurge in ETA's lethal acts. []

3. Although ETA is the primary source of violence in Spain, the homegrown radical leftist GRAPO terrorists have also been active and intermittently have targeted US interests, most often with low-level bombings of US businesses. GRAPO may have been involved in the bombing of a restaurant near the Torrejon Airbase last year, which was frequented by US servicemen. []

4. With government counterterrorist resources focused on the Basque provinces and attentive to the security of ranking Spanish officials in Madrid, terrorism among Arab elements has increased. The capital has proved fertile ground for state supporters of terrorism (such as Syria) and dissident Palestinian factions (such as Abu Nidal) to attack diplomats and prominent figures from moderate Arab states. Spanish officials appear, however, to be stepping up surveillance of Arab nationals, as evidenced by the expulsion last December of four Libyan officials believed to be planning an attack at Madrid's airport. []

5. Foreign terrorist activity in *France* outstrips that of domestic terrorists, and, indeed, foreign elements are more active there than in any other West European country. Historical factors and political values—such as the French tradition of asylum and a tolerance

of dissent that often precludes extradition—make France fertile ground for both terrorists and their prospective targets. []

[] A plethora of Arab groups and subnational terrorist organizations have carried out acts against other foreigners but are generally careful to avoid French nationals and interests. []

6. Since their metamorphosis from ethnic activists, Armenian terrorists have been active and have enjoyed a measure of local support among France's significant Armenian population, but ASALA's bombing of the Turkish airlines counter at Orly Airport in July 1983, which killed eight and wounded 55, prompted a government crackdown on Armenian groups. Since then there have been no further Armenian attacks in France. []

7. Although Iranians and their surrogates have attacked French interests in the Middle East because of France's materiel and economic support to Iraq, Iran has not attacked French targets in France. Tehran focuses instead on members of the Iranian exile community. []

8. The Lebanese Armed Revolutionary Faction (LARF) carried out several assassinations, including that of the deputy US defense attache in Paris in 1982, and has attempted to kill three other US officials. A series of key arrests by Italian and French police since August 1984 appeared to have dealt a serious blow to LARF's operational capability in France and Western Europe. Remaining LARF members threatened reprisals for the arrests, but the subsequent kidnaping of a French diplomat in Beirut to swap for the group's leader imprisoned in France did not succeed. Although the diplomat was released, the simultaneous discovery of a LARF arms cache in Paris enabled French authorities to connect the suspect to several terrorist attacks and keep him in custody. Despite these setbacks for LARF, pressure for release of its leader has not subsided. Sympathizers have claimed a series of bombings in Paris since last December. []

9. Domestic groups have been less active than the foreign terrorists operating in France. Direct Action

(AD) is the most visible French domestic terrorist group. An extreme leftist anarchist group with probably fewer than 50 members, AD has perpetrated bombings to protest French, American, and Israeli foreign policies, as well as South African domestic policy. It is ideologically rather than ethnically motivated and has reported links to foreign terrorist groups, notably LARF. The newly elected Socialist government in 1981 amnestied imprisoned members of AD, including its two leaders. After the group carried out bombings against US and Israeli interests in the spring and summer of 1982, the government officially outlawed it, making any members automatically subject to fines and imprisonment. []

10. An escalation of symbolic bombings by the group in 1984—increasingly aimed at Alliance and military-related institutions—culminated in January 1985 in a joint declaration by AD and the RAF against NATO and Western "imperialism."⁹ This was underscored 10 days later by the assassination near Paris of Gen. Rene Audran, a senior official in the French Defense Ministry. There have been no arrests in the case, but French security officials believe there was RAF involvement in the killing. AD subsequently claimed a series of bombings in the Paris area in March and April 1985 and has been linked to the Belgian CCC as well. []

11. The principal terrorist threat in *West Germany* comes from indigenous groups such as the RAF and the Revolutionary Cells (RZ). Small neo-Nazi groups also occasionally engage in terrorism but do not pose the major threat to West German and foreign officials. Foreign terrorist activity stems from either the "diplomatic" activities of state supporters of terrorism, such as Libya, or dissident political activity within the significant foreign worker community—made up predominantly of Turks and Yugoslavs—who may be the targets of ethnic opponents or agents of their own governments. []

12. Even after repeated counterterrorist successes against the RAF over more than a decade, West German authorities acknowledge that the RAF has recovered from setbacks suffered since 1982, including the capture and imprisonment of important group members. The RAF launched a so-called anti-imperialist front terrorist campaign last year, declaring itself in league with AD in France. Last August, the RAF successfully planted a car bomb at Frankfurt's Rhein-Main airbase that killed two Americans and wounded

another 17 Americans and West Germans. The RAF issued a communique of responsibility for the bombing along with AD. []

13. State-supported terrorist activity, usually under cover of diplomatic missions, sometimes has resulted in deaths on West German soil and injunctions by the government against those responsible. Bonn expelled four Libyans last spring because of their involvement in the assassination of an anti-Qadhafi dissident—a shootout that wounded two West German bystanders—and warned Tripoli of a possible break in relations if such activity continues. When Lebanese Shia terrorists hijacked an Air France flight in 1984 from Frankfurt to Paris, however, and diverted it to Tehran, Iran's complicity was clear, but Bonn had little recourse. []

14. Although both foreign and domestic terrorism are relatively new to *Belgium*, the domestic threat currently holds the spotlight. The emergence of the CCC in October 1984 was accompanied by a series of bombings and arson attacks that nearly claimed the lives of two US military personnel and inadvertently killed two Belgian firemen. The group is Belgian but has supported West Germany's RAF and France's AD in their conduct of anti-NATO and "anti-imperialist" terrorist actions. Some individuals in the CCC also have close ties to AD members. The arrest of several key leaders last December and the subsequent discovery of arms caches and hideouts have made the CCC less of a threat to Allied, US, and Belgian interests. []

15. In April a previously unknown group calling itself the Revolutionary Front for Proletarian Action (FRAP) bombed the office of the North Atlantic Assembly in Brussels. Although the CCC has disclaimed any connection with FRAP, both target NATO facilities and defense-related industries and appear to share technical expertise. []

16. Historically, Belgium has offered shelter as well as intellectual sympathy to a variety of foreigners that has included terrorist elements. Spanish Basques, for example, established support groups in Brussels and Louvain around 1964. They have provided fugitive ETA members support ranging from safehouses to solidarity protests, according to a reliable source. Their only notable action was the bombing of the Palais de Justice in Antwerp last year after the government extradited two Political-Military Wing (ETA/PM) members to Madrid. Belgium is also host to numerous Albanian and Yugoslav exiles, as well as a diverse guest worker community of longstanding that includes Mediterranean and Maghreb workers. []

⁹ For an expansion on this relationship, see IIM 85-10005 [] April 1985, *West European Terrorism: The Indigenous Threat to NATO and US Interests*. []

17. Although *Italy* has dealt severe blows to leftist terrorist groups in recent years, there are signs of successful reorganization and rebuilding of the terrorist infrastructure, especially among the Red Brigades (BR). The assassination of a prominent labor economist in March 1985 marked the group's aggressive reassertion only two to three years after security officials rounded up more than 1,000 leftist terrorists and terrorist suspects during an antiterrorist crackdown that followed the successful release of the kidnaped General Dozier. Since the arrests last summer of two key leaders and other group members, the group may have lacked experienced leadership and operational guidance, but its tenacity, better security practices, and apparent ability to sustain periods of clandestinity while rebuilding indicate that a good part of the group remains intact and operational. The recent wounding of an economic counselor to the Prime Minister and the assassination of a former mayor of Florence appear to bear this out. []

18. The BR have not been party to the anti-NATO offensive declared by the RAF, AD, and the CCC. The group nonetheless has long openly opposed the presence of US forces in Italy and Italian membership in NATO. Individuals thought to be associated with the BR have been spotted carrying out surveillance activities near US and NATO military installations. []

19. Rightwing groups and individuals also pose a domestic terrorist threat. Four major bombings from 1969 through 1984 killed more than 200 and wounded hundreds more but remain unsolved. Despite tough action against leftist terrorists, similar enforcement against rightwing elements—a series of small neofascist groups—unaccountably has lagged. []

20. Libyans have been among the most active foreign terrorists in Italy, but assassinations of anti-Qadhafi dissidents in Italy at Tripoli's behest have dropped off since the early 1980s. Libyan complicity in last December's Rome airport attack may signal increased activity as Libya and radical Palestinian groups have begun to work together more closely. []

[] Operational terrorist planning by Iranians under cover of diplomatic missions has increased. In November 1984 Italian authorities, acting on a Swiss lead, arrested seven radical Lebanese Shias who had been preparing—with Iranian assistance—to bomb the US Embassy in Rome. []

21. Over the past decade, terrorism in *Greece* has been the product of both domestic and foreign groups. The targets of both, however, have been predominantly foreign. The most notorious Greek terrorist group is

the Revolutionary Organization 17 November, which has claimed responsibility for the murder of CIA Chief of Station Richard Welch in 1975, Greek police officials in 1976 and 1980, US Navy Capt. George Tsantes and his Greek driver in November 1983, and a prominent Athens publisher in February 1986. The group also shot and wounded US Army M.Sgt. Robert Judd in April 1984. People's Revolutionary Struggle (ELA)—thought to be an umbrella organization encompassing most Greek terrorists—continues to conduct intermittent violence against the US presence in Greece. []

22. Foreign terrorists are also increasingly active in Greece. []

[] growing numbers of foreign extremists are using Greece as a transit point, haven, and site to work out internecine differences. Greece's location—including its proximity to Cyprus—has made it a major point of passage between the Middle East and Europe, particularly since the frequent closures of the Beirut airport began in 1982. Further, Greece's lack of adequate means to monitor aliens and transients probably has encouraged an influx of foreign extremists. In addition, foreign terrorists in Greece generally have been safe from arrest and prosecution as long as they do not engage in violence on Greek soil. []

23. Often used as a haven by foreign terrorists, *Portugal* was largely untroubled by terrorism until the Popular Forces of 25 April (FP-25) appeared on the scene in 1980. The FP-25—a relatively small radical leftist faction of perhaps 40 to 50 hardcore members with limited goals—has carried out bombings and robberies and killed policemen, while claiming to defend the rights of workers and farmers against the government. Portuguese authorities were also shaken by two major foreign terrorist attacks in 1983, the assassination of PLO official Isam Sartawi and an Armenian assault on the Turkish Embassy, which demonstrated the ease with which international terrorists can operate. []

24. Although more than 70 suspected FP-25 members were arrested in a police sweep in June of 1984, sporadic attacks by the group continued last year, including ineffective mortar rounds aimed at the US Embassy in Lisbon and NATO-related targets and the assassination of a businessman at a Lisbon trade fair. The trial of the arrested terrorists, which recessed last July after the shooting and subsequent death of a key prosecution witness, resumed as a nonjury trial last October and is expected to continue through much of 1986. []

25. *Turkey's* experience with terrorism is unique among the countries discussed here. The violence and

terrorism that brought Turkey to the brink of civil war in 1980 have their roots in the sweeping demographic, economic, and sociological changes over the last three decades and were exacerbated by support to the terrorists from Soviet client states. Political terrorism also was fueled by the weaknesses of internally divided coalition governments and culminated in military interventions in 1960, 1971, and, finally, in September 1980, when up to 20 Turks were dying daily in terrorist attacks.

26. Violence also stems from Turkey's serious minority problems. The Kurds in the southeastern provinces constitute 10 percent or more of the population and are second only to ethnic Turks in supplying recruits to radical leftist groups. The Alevi religious community, concentrated in eastern Turkey and comprising perhaps 15 percent of the population, is another significant minority. The complexity of the causes of violence is matched by the diversity of terrorist groups that sprung up in Turkey. Leftist organizations predominate and more than 50 such groups were in existence before the 1980 coup, with no trace of a common organization.

27. Despite the military's crackdown on radical groups, violence has not been eliminated. The government claimed in 1983 that nearly half of the illegal groups active at the time of the coup were still in operation.

28. Armenian terrorism, although it has garnered more headlines abroad, is a less serious threat at home. Armenian-sponsored terrorism for the most part has taken place outside Turkey and has not contributed significantly to political instability in Turkey. In fact, Armenian terrorism tends to unite Turks and reinforce government efforts to portray the problem of terrorism simply as a result of foreign subversion. Even so, attacks by ASALA and the Justice Commandos for the Armenian Genocide (JCAG)—now calling itself the Armenian Revolutionary Army (ARA)—have unnerved the Turkish foreign service, generated unfavorable publicity about Turkey, and further burdened the security services.

29. Neither *Austria* nor *Switzerland* has significant domestic terrorist activity but both have been host to a variety of foreign terrorist incidents, including hostage takings, assassinations, and bombing attempts. The presence in both countries of the headquarters of several international organizations, multiple diplomatic missions, and international businesses and banks ensures a plethora of potential targets for foreign terrorist elements. The central location of *Austria* and *Switzerland* for air travel to and from Middle Eastern

and Mediterranean countries, as well as the rest of Europe, provides access to prospective targets.

30. The territory of *Switzerland* is host to established terrorist infrastructures for states that support terrorism and for subnational terrorist groups as well. Libyan diplomatic missions, in particular, reportedly play a significant logistic and support role for Tripoli's terrorist operatives elsewhere in Europe. Armenian terrorist activity has included a botched bombing incident in 1980 for which two ASALA members were arrested, but subsequently released following a series of reprisal attacks by ASALA against Swiss interests. The group's 1981 assassination of a Turkish diplomat in Geneva and the arrest of the perpetrator resulted in threats from ASALA, but the assassin in this case was not released.

31. Other West European terrorist groups and their sympathizers also transit *Switzerland* and occasionally carry out activities there. West Germany's Revolutionary Cells, for example, bombed the West German Consulate General in Zurich in 1982. In January 1985 a Zurich-based group claiming to be supporters of the West German RAF staged a temporary takeover of the International Red Cross building in solidarity with RAF hunger strikers.

32. Most terrorist acts in *Austria* have been committed by foreign groups. In 1984, for example, ASALA carried out two assassinations in Vienna, and Austrian authorities thwarted a planned attack by the Pakistani antiregime terrorist group Al-Zufiqar. As in *Switzerland*, Libyan and Iranian diplomatic missions support terrorism elsewhere in Europe, but the organizers generally avoid endangering the hospitable climate in which they function by refraining from any acts on Austrian soil. However, a Libyan dissident was wounded last spring in Vienna, probably on orders from Tripoli.

33. Terrorism came sharply to the fore in *Japan* in the early to mid-1970s, when Tokyo confronted several international incidents instigated or executed by the Japanese Red Army (JRA), but the threat posed by this group has diminished considerably. Today the JRA is a small expatriate group based in the Middle East and affiliated with the Popular front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP).

34. Official concerns about guerrilla incidents currently center on the radical group Chukaku-Ha, or Nucleus Faction, which Japanese authorities say numbers about 3,500 members, half of whom are students. The Faction, whose declared objective is to prevent

the expansion of Tokyo's Narita Airport, has carried out a number of incendiary and bombing attacks, including one against the US Consulate General in Kobe in January 1985, and large-scale sabotage of the Tokyo national rail system that paralyzed the city for two days last November. Members of the group are radical elements from the fringes of Japanese society who, despite years of struggle, have elicited no appre-

ciable popular support, even among the farmers whose land is threatened by airport development and in whose interests the Nucleus Faction purports to act. Japanese police believe a similar, smaller group was responsible for a late March incendiary attack against the US Embassy in Tokyo, and authorities believe this group attempted to disrupt the Economic Summit in May.

ANNEX B

Country Attitudes

1. Public attitudes toward terrorism in *West Germany* have been volatile over the past decade, but on balance they have affirmed the correctness of Bonn's aggressive counterterrorist policies against indigenous groups. The country successfully weathered terrorist challenges that undermined authority in the late 1970s to the extent that today fewer than half of the West Germans view terrorism as a major problem. A 1985 multicountry survey by the US Information Agency (USIA) found that 58 percent of West Germans believe terrorism to be no threat—or only a minimal threat—to the political system. Nonetheless, there appears to be little complacency: public approbation for extraordinary measures to combat terrorism remains firm, as 75 percent approve giving police special powers to search out terrorists. []

2. A rich body of public opinion data on *Italy* from a reliable survey organization indicates that from 1979 through 1982, terrorism was identified by a majority or a strong plurality as the most serious problem confronting the nation. Notably, some key legislation was passed during this period, and the government scored an impressive series of counterterrorist successes. []


3. Although terrorism dropped slightly in importance among respondents in 1983 surveys, it continued nonetheless to figure as a national concern. Moreover, according to USIA's April 1985 poll, 78 percent of Italians believe terrorism still threatens the country's political system to some extent. The same survey also found that 75 percent of respondents approve of giving police special powers to search out terrorists. Because nearly 87 percent also oppose the goals of terrorist groups operating in Italy, the government has a firm counterterrorist mandate. []

4. Since the resurgence of violence in Northern Ireland in 1969, public opposition to terrorism in the *United Kingdom* has increased to reflect the intensity and ferocity of the terrorism itself. Episodes such as the 1984 Brighton Hotel bombing and, in a foreign vein, the siege at the Libyan People's Bureau have also helped harden popular views of the terrorist threat and the government's proper response. The USIA's 1985 poll, for example, found that 70 percent of the

British believe the death penalty should be imposed for terrorists in the United Kingdom. Congruently, a majority of Britons think terrorism threatens the government. Only Italians questioned in the same survey felt similarly menaced, which almost certainly reflects both countries' experience with leaders killed or nearly killed by terrorists, as well as terrorism's direct challenge to the state. []

5. *Spain* outdistances its West European neighbors in its concern over terrorism, which 88 percent of Spaniards named a major national problem in a recent poll. While concern about terrorism has remained high for several years, support for ETA—the leading terrorist organization—among Basques has steadily declined as Madrid has devolved powers of autonomy since 1979. A survey for a leading Spanish newsmagazine this year revealed that more than 75 percent of Spanish Basques believed ETA should lay down its arms, and 45 percent felt the group no longer had a reason to exist. With a majority of Spaniards viewing terrorists as criminals (rather than idealists or misguided individuals), there appears to be a sufficiently tough-minded opinion of Basque terrorism in particular to give Madrid a green light on continuing aggressive counterterrorist policies and tactics. []

6. Terrorism in *France* most often has involved foreign players and, as such, has not aroused or sustained significant public perception of a terrorist threat. Increasing activity among domestic terrorist elements, however, and international targeting of French interests and symbols abroad appear to have elevated terrorism somewhat in the French hierarchy of national concerns. A poll taken in late 1984 by a reputable French firm determined that terrorism is considered the "primary menace" by 61 percent of the population. In another 1984 survey, nearly 83 percent of French respondents agreed that terrorism is a major problem in their society—a level of concern similar to Italians and Spaniards. Yet although 63 percent of the French feel terrorism is "never justified," according to USIA's 1985 poll, they lag considerably behind the surveys of British, Italian, and West German respondents, of whom about 80 percent hold this view. []



7. In *Belgium*, where terrorist violence is still a relatively new phenomenon, the actions of the CCC already have elicited public outcry. More than 1,000 Belgians held a demonstration against terrorism in the streets of Brussels last May following a bombing by the CCC that killed two firemen. Perhaps more important to perceptions of a threat to public order and safety are the increased number of armed criminal attacks that have resulted in the deaths of many bystanders. If such acts continue, terrorism along with criminality will be of greater popular concern, and public sentiment in favor of tougher measures against terrorists almost certainly will increase.

8. Nonetheless, in countries where terrorist activity has been limited and sporadic or aimed primarily at foreigners, the public has not generally determined terrorism to be a leading problem. Public identification of terrorism as a major national threat does not appear strong in *Portugal* despite terrorist activities by the perpetually resurgent FP-25 group and occasional episodes by foreign terrorists. Popular opinion has focused instead on government efforts to enact new internal security legislation, some of which, ironically, could help official counterterrorist efforts. The Portuguese public has expressed concern about possible infringements on civil liberties—a reaction conditioned by memories of decades of secret police abuses under the Salazar-Caetano dictatorships.

9. In both *Austria* and *Switzerland* popular opinion does not place terrorism high on the national agenda. This may be due largely to the absence of significant indigenous terrorist groups. At the same time, the Swiss and Austrian Governments appear well aware of the potential threat to their national interests from foreign terrorist activities. The Government of *Greece*, in contrast, has been forced to recognize the dimensions of the terrorist threat there. The Greek public attaches little importance to terrorist activity, even that aimed at Greek nationals. The absence of public demands for a tougher official counterterrorist stance suggests that any progress by Athens will continue to lag.

10. In both *Turkey* and *Japan*, public attitudes toward terrorism currently have less significance, albeit for different reasons. The level of terrorism and political violence in Turkey was so great in the months preceding September 1980 that military intervention was almost inevitable and, based on historic precedent, would have taken place in order to preclude a civil war regardless of popular sentiment. In fact, public expressions of relief at the cessation of violence were widespread, despite the immediate cost in terms of civil liberties. In Japan, where terrorism has not significantly affected Japanese interests at home or abroad, terrorism and the government's response to it is not a particularly salient public issue. In a 1981 public opinion poll, 58 percent of Japanese respondents believed all terrorism should be condemned;

Japanese citizens queried in a 1984 survey identified terrorism as one of several major international problems.

ANNEX C

Multilateral Groups

1. *The Club of Bern*, established in 1971, is a nine-country intergovernmental group of West European security services that specializes in information exchanges on counterintelligence and counterterrorism. Members include Belgium, Denmark, France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands, Switzerland, the United Kingdom, and West Germany. The Club holds meetings twice a year that are hosted on a rotational basis by the chiefs of the national security services, in their respective headquarter cities. In addition to working groups at the "experts' level," which confer on counterterrorist enforcement and analysis problems, the Club [redacted]

[redacted] disseminate information on terrorists to member governments:

[redacted] Although Club members reportedly discussed admitting Spain a few years ago, to our knowledge this has not yet occurred and membership of these countries is not currently envisaged. [redacted]

2. Cooperation against terrorism among the EC countries has proceeded over the past decade at the technical and working levels in the *Trevi Group*.¹⁰ Made up of representatives of the interior and justice ministries, sometimes the chiefs of security services, and occasionally the ministers themselves, Trevi parallels but stands outside of the regular European Political Cooperation mechanism. The Group consults regularly on internal security matters and terrorism questions within Europe. The Trevi Group does not always produce formal agendas or reports. Working Group I (which deals with exchanges of information

¹⁰ The name is an acronym for Terrorism, Radicalism, Extremism, Violence International. New EC members Spain and Portugal were admitted originally as observers in 1982. Since then, Austria and Switzerland reportedly were accorded similar status. [redacted]

on terrorism) and Working Group II (for coordination of technical police activities) are supposed to meet twice a year, while a Committee of Senior Officials (primarily a consultative body that prepares the way for ministerial conferences) meets annually. There is no set schedule for ministerial level meetings. [redacted]

3. *The Council of Five* (also known as the Group of Five or the Club of Vienna) is a smaller, more informal multilateral group whose founding—determined by geography—resulted from Italian initiative. Immediately after the kidnaping of Aldo Moro in 1978, the Italian Interior Minister met with his counterparts from Austria, France, Switzerland, and West Germany to coordinate border security measures that would hamper any attempt by the abductors to spirit Moro out of Italy. The Council has convened semiannually since then and, in addition to meetings of the Interior Ministers, the chiefs of the national police forces also meet. Council gatherings apparently continue to focus on upgrading police cooperation against terrorist and criminals who would transit the borders of these alpine countries in flight from authorities or for illicit purposes. [redacted]

4. The most recent effort to promote multilateral cooperation against terrorism on a largely geographic basis is the *Western Mediterranean Club*, first proposed in 1983 by the then chief of Italy's military intelligence service. [redacted]

[redacted] The Club's mission is to identify common threats to its members from Palestinian and Armenian terrorists and examine the efforts of Libya, Syria, Iran, and Iraq to destabilize the Mediterranean region. [redacted]

[redacted] The Club's chairmanship is said to rotate annually, but we do not know which services have taken the helm following Italy's initial tenure. [redacted]

5. *The Bonn Group*, or the Summit Seven experts on terrorism, evolved from preparations for the annual

economic summit, where terrorism was increasingly discussed by the late 1970s. The seven countries that participate in the annual summit that has taken place since 1975 are Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United Kingdom, the United States, and West Germany. The Group, which generally plays a peripheral role in summit planning, attempts to identify the terrorist issues of common concern that might be fruitfully pursued in discussions among heads of state and government at the summit itself. Before previous summits, the experts' group submitted a draft declaration on some aspect of terrorism for the leaders to incorporate in their final summit statement. In the past, this process has helped smooth the way for agreements such as the 1978 Bonn Declaration on

aircraft hijacking and the 1980 Venice Declaration on the protection of diplomats.¹¹ []

¹¹ The Bonn Declaration states that, in cases where a country refuses to extradite or prosecute hijackers and/or does not return hijacked aircraft, governments of the summit countries should take immediate action to cease all flights to that country. Summit governments will also initiate action to halt all incoming flights from that country or from any country by the airlines of the country concerned. []

The Venice Declaration denounces terrorist or criminal actions against diplomatic or consular personnel or premises in contravention of the norms of international law and practice. The summit governments resolve to provide "support and assistance" in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic or consular establishments or personnel. The declaration also recalls that states have the duty under international law to refrain from supporting or engaging in terrorism. []

ANNEX D

International Conventions and Declarations

1. *The Tokyo Convention* (Convention on Offenses and Certain Other Acts Committed on Board Aircraft) entered into force in December 1969, calls for states to make every effort to restore control of a hijacked aircraft to its lawful commander and to arrange for the prompt onward passage of the aircraft, passengers, cargo, and crew.

2. *The Hague Convention* (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Seizure of Aircraft) entered into force in October 1971, requires adhering states either to extradite skyjackers or to submit them to local prosecution.

3. *The Montreal Convention* (Convention for the Suppression of Unlawful Acts Against the Safety of Civil Aviation) entered into force in January 1973, extends The Hague Convention's extradite-or-prosecute provisions to acts committed on the ground against civil aircraft in service and against associated ground facilities.

4. *The UN Convention on the Prevention and Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons Including Diplomatic Agents* entered into force in February 1977, applies the extradite-or-prosecute formula to acts committed against protected persons (chiefly diplomats and people who have been granted political asylum) and their premises and vehicles.

5. *The Strasbourg Convention* (European Convention on the Suppression of Terrorism) is an agreement drafted in Strasbourg (at the initiative of France and

West Germany) in November 1976 by the Council of Europe and signed in January 1977 by all members of the Council except Ireland and Malta. It entered into force in August 1978. The convention declares that—regardless of the motivation—certain violent crimes, including kidnaping, hijacking, bombing, and attacks against internationally protected persons, are not subject to the “political offense exception” that might otherwise prevent extradition of the perpetrators; if extradition is denied for some other legal reason, the denying country must prosecute under its own laws.

6. *The Bonn Economic Summit Declaration on Hijacking* of July 1978 asserted that the participating countries (Canada, France, Italy, Japan, the United States, the United Kingdom, and West Germany) would halt all air traffic with any country harboring a hijacker or refusing to return the aircraft and passengers. This was the first effort to put teeth into the antiskjacking conventions; previously there had been no way to punish countries that violated the provisions of these conventions.

7. *The Venice Economic Summit Declaration on the Protection of Diplomats* of June 1980 is a denunciation by the Summit Seven of terrorist or criminal actions against diplomatic or consular personnel or premises in contravention of the norms of international law and practice. The summit governments further resolve to provide “support and assistance” in situations involving the seizure of diplomatic or consular establishments or personnel.

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OSG DISCUSSION PAPER

SUBJECT: SYRIAN TERRORISM -- POLICY OPTIONS

BACKGROUND:

- SYRIA HAS CLEARLY BEEN LINKED TO INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
- FOLLOING THE U.S. RAID ON LIBYA AND THE ABORTED EL AL BOMBING, ASSAD HAS MADE A CONCERTED EFFORT TO PUBLICLY DISTANCE HIMSELF AND SYRIA FROM TERRORISM (e.g. POST INTERVIEW, TRIP TO GREECE, PUBLIC DISCLOSURE TO ATTEMPTS TO FREE HOSTAGES.
- SYRIAN MILITARY BUILD-UP IN LEBANON, RECENT BOMBINGS IN DAMASCUS, AND SYRIA'S POOR ECONOMIC SITUATION ARE EXAMPLES OF INCREASED THREATS TO ASSAD'S LEADERSHIP BY ISRAEL, THE LEBAN~~OX~~ESE CHRISTIANS, AND INTERNAL ELEMENTS
- U.S. MEDIA CONTINUE TO REPORT ON MIXED ASSESSMENT OF USG POLICY AND OPINION VIS-A-VIS SYRIA

OBJECTIVE:

- USG OBJECTIVE^S_A AND POLICY FOR SYRIA: *attainable*
 - 1 - REDUCE/ELIMINATE SYRIAN SUPPORT OF INTERNATIONAL TERRORISM
 - 2 - ENCOURAGE SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN POSITIVE RESOLUTION OF PEACE PROCESS WITH JORDAN, ET AL *unrealistic -- not attainable?*
 - 3 - REDUCE SOVIET INFLUENCE IN SYRIA *- incidental?
(ie. not a primary obj....)*

OPTIONS:

- MILITARY: NOT REALISTIC AT THIS TIME
- DIPLOMATIC: PASS MESSAGE EXPRESSING:
 - USG KNOWLEDGE OF SYRIAN INVOLVEMENT IN TERRORISM *- done by Murphy*
 - IMPORTANCE OF HOSTAGES RELEASE AS SIGNAL OF SYRIA'S SINCERITY *already known by Syrians*
 - USG WILLINGNESS TO OPEN ECONOMIC TIES IF VISIBLE SIGNS OF CEASING SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND JOINING JORDAN IN TALKS WITH ISRAEL
Does Syria want this carrot?
- ECONOMIC: LITTLE REAL INFLUENCE OR ABILITY NOW

-- PUBLIC: STATEMENT ACKNOWLEDGING SYRIAN'S SUPPORT OF TERRORISM AND OUR CONDEMNATION. WE MUST ELIMINATE THE CONFUSED IMPRESSIONS OUT OF WH AND STATE

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FOIA(b)(1)

~~TOP SECRET~~

E.O. 11652
As Amended
3.3 (b)(1)

Our only real policy option at this point, it seems to me, is nitty gritty intel/evidence showing of Syrian complicity (eg the 1983-86 paper enclosed here) with our allies and begin to talk with them about what might be done (eg. reduced numbers of Syrian diplomats at embassies, closer scrutiny of all Syrians crossing any international border, visa processing delays for Syrians, scrutiny of Syrian international financial transactions, etc) Most of these "first steps" in addition to sending a signal to the Syrians ("stop your support of intl terrorism") could also be "sold" as efforts to collect more info on the extent of Syrian involvement in terrorism.

~~TOP SECRET~~

OSG DISCUSSION PAPER

Syrian Terrorism and USG Response

4/13/02
FOIA(b)(1)

Background:

(Syria and Terrorism)

Syria is clearly linked to international terrorism. During the last three years, Syria has changed markedly the nature of its involvement. Prior to 1986, Syria used its own operatives to attack opponents of the Assad regime at home or abroad. Since early 1983, however, Damascus has turned increasingly to surrogate groups: Syrian-supported groups have been involved in at least 75 attacks against Jordanian, U.S., Palestinian, and Israeli targets (Tab A).

The attempted El Al bombing in London and the German-Arab Friendship Union bombing in West Berlin provided the strongest evidence of direct Syrian involvement in terrorism in Western Europe since the early 1970s. Syrian-supported groups have attacked U.S. facilities in the Middle East 11 times since 1983, and attacks by Abu Nidal operatives have killed or wounded over 100 U.S. citizens during this time.

Syrian involvement in terrorism is authorized -- at least in general terms -- by President Assad. He relies on a select group of trusted lieutenants to implement policy, often ignoring formal institutional lines of authority; [and] Syrian involvement in terrorism follows the pattern of the President's personalistic style of work.

~~TOP SECRET~~

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 597108/1 483
By 01, NARA, Date 4/13/02

-- Military Intelligence Chief Ali Duba reportedly dispatches Palestinian terrorist squads to Arab and West European countries.

-- Air Force Intelligence Chief Muhammad al-Khuli's involvement in terrorism is well-documented and he was probably involved in the El Al operation. *(Nizar Hindawi identified as aide to Khuli as one of his points of contact.)*

Finally, the Syrians run training camps and provide support, diplomatic cover, and facilities for numerous terrorist organizations in Syria, Lebanon, and elsewhere.

→ Current Syrian Situation: *no underline*

Syria has conducted a serious military build-up in Lebanon.

→ Their reinforced positions have led to increased tensions between Syria and Israel. The U.S. raid on Libya reportedly raised *Assad's* concerns [in Assad] over the quality of his Soviet-supplied air defenses as well as concerns over a possible U.S. attack on Syria.

→ Economically, Syria is performing far below its potential. The real GNP has declined over the past three years. Syria's balance of trade remains heavily in deficit. Although resources are scarce, the government continues to mobilize funding for an ambitious economic development program at the same time [they] spend over 50% of ^{its} [their] budget on the military. Reports indicate that Syria cannot maintain this level of military spending.

Syria's imports exceed exports by a factor of nearly 2 to 1, and Syria has been running a current account deficit of around \$1.9B for the past 5 years. As a result, Syria's hard currency reserves have been significantly reduced; estimates of hard currency holdings are [of] less than \$200M or only 20 days worth of civilian imports. Boosting exports is extremely difficult since oil, which provides nearly two-thirds of all hard currency earnings, is needed for domestic consumption. In fact, last year Syria actually purchased more oil from abroad than it sold.

Syria is able to tap three major sources of foreign exchange to offset its chronic trade deficit:

- Foreign Grant Aid: Under the Bagdad Accord, Syria was allotted \$1.8B per year from other Arab states. The drop in oil resources has provided only \$800M instead. Iran has been supplying oil on a concessional basis.
- Worker Remittance: Payments sent home by Syrians abroad amount to \$500M-\$1.0B, ^{annually}.
- Foreign Lending: World Bank statistics attribute about \$2.7B in outstanding debt. Syria's credit rating is slipping.

European Community (E.C.)

→ Syria has limited but important commercial relations with the E.C. ^{Syria} They exports (mostly oil) about \$600M annually, and the E.C. provides approximately 18% of Syria's food imports. Western banks provide trade credits and the Syrian Foreign Commercial Bank maintains banking relationships with most major Western banks, including U.S. The Syrian Arab Airline services Western carriers -- Air France, Swiss Air, Luthansa, KLM, Al Italia, and the Austrian airlines -- ^{with} fly into Damascus.

→ In conclusion, Syria's poor economic performance, increased military commitments, and Assad's poor health combine to create real problems for the Syrian regime. However, it would be wrong to underestimate Assad's skill at maintaining a balance of power between factions that compete for power. His close ties to the Soviets make policy options for Syria very different from Libya.

Options:

no underline
Our goal for curtailing Syrian support for international terrorism should be to build on the Tokyo Summit in an attempt to lead our allies to work with us. It is understood that this will be a long-term process to build public, diplomatic, economic,

(if necessary)
and finally, military pressure on Assad's regime. However, the immediate first steps should be coordinated efforts to increase our collection of information about Syrian involvement in terrorism (e.g. closer scrutiny of activities of Syrian diplomats), which also "send a message" to Assad (ie. "We're cracking down on your support to terrorism").

a
{Public}

-- Coordinated statements by USG officials acknowledging Assad's involvement in terrorism.

→ -- Publication of a "Syria White Paper" with detailed chronology of Syrian involvement, ⁱⁿ and support ^{of international} in terrorism.

-- Background briefings on role of Syrian intelligence and diplomatic facilities in terrorism.

{
(Diplomatic)

-- Recall ambassador.

→ -- Formerly ^{al} downgrade diplomatic representation.

-- Seek expulsion of Syria from international organizations.

-- Slowdown/stop visas for Syrians to U.S.

-- Prohibit U.S. travel to Syria.

-- Expand discussions with Summit Seven on Syrian involvement in terrorism.

-- Monitor cross-border travel of Syrians.

-- Reduce size of Syrian diplomatic missions. ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~ ~~Redacted~~

{
(Economic)

-- Urge boycott of Syrian oil.

-- Urge reduction of trade credits to Syria.

-- Monitor and report Syrian financial transactions.

-- Ban sales of arms, spare parts, and sophisticated equipment
(COCOM).

-- Press for reduction of commercial ties by U.S. firms.

-- Monitor and report Syrian front organizations *supporting terrorism*

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(Military)

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