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File Folder: R & D Counterterrorism (2 of 3) BOX 2 (FBI-099) RAL BOX Z

Date: 11/27/00 Wills/F97-108/2

DOX 2 (FDI-099) 7-1-1-1-1		WIIIS/F97-100/2	
DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Report	TSWG Funding Distribution by Subgroup (FY 86), 5 p. D 8 3 D1 F97-108 /2 #5	3/13/86	P1/B1 33
2. Paper	Response to House Foreign Affairs Subcommittee on International Operations Staff Questions on the Technical Support, 9 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
3. Draft Paper	Copy of part of Item #2, 7 p.	n.d.	P1/B1
4. Form	Routing Slip, 1 p.	5/27/86	P1/B1
5. Memo	Charles Allen to Donald Latham, re: Funding, 1 p. D 8/8/07 F97-108/2 #9	5/19/86	P1/B1, 83
6. Form	Routing Slip, I p.	5/29/86	P1/B1
7. Memo	Copy of Item #5, 1 p. 10/5/02 NLSF97-108/2 11/0 10 0/5/02 NLSF97-108/2 11/0	5/19/86	P1/B1,83
8. Memo	re: Funding, 1 p.	4/14/86	P1/B1, 83
	y 11 1, #12		

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
 P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
 P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or
- between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA]. Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of P-6
- Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of oift

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information ((b)(1) of the FOIA].

 B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency ((b)(2) of the
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statue [(b)(3) of the FOIA].

 B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information ((b)(4) of the FOIA).
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions ((b)(8) of the FOIA).
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

TERRORISM COUNTERMEASURES

R&D

ACTION PLAN


TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP (TSWG)

•FORMED BY THE IG/T AS AN INTERDEPARTMENTAL GROUP

TO COORDINATE THE AVAILABILITY OF IMPROVED

TECHNOLOGICAL COUNTERMEASURES TO COMBATTING TERRORISM

•PREPARED A COORDINATED PLAN TO FOCUS NATIONAL R&D ASSETS ON COMBATTING TERRORISM



TSWG OBJECTIVES

- •TO PROVIDE A FORUM FOR THE NATIONAL R&D COMMUNITY

 TO MAINTAIN AN AWARENESS OF THE THREATS AND VULNERABILITIES,
 as well as THE TECHNOLOGY THAT IS EMERGING TO COMBAT

 TERRORISM
- •TO IDENTIFY TECHNOLOGY GAPS WHICH CURRENTLY EXIST
 IN THE APPLICATION OF TECHNOLOGY TO COMBAT TERRORISM
- •TO COORDINATE AND FACILITATE TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT TO BRIDGE IDENTIFIED GAPS
- •TO INSURE THAT RESOURCES ARE APPLIED TO AREAS OF TECHNOLOGY DEVELOPMENT IN WHICH NO DEPARTMENT OR AGENCY HAS A CLEAR RESPONSIBILITY

TSWG MEMBERSHIP

•TSWG IS CO-CHAIRED BY DOE AND DOD

•MEMBERSHIP COMPRISED OF TECHNICAL EXPERTS

- •MEMBERS INCLUDE DEPARTMENTS OF DEFENSE, ENERGY,

 JUSTICE, STATE, TREASURY, HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES,

 and TRANSPORTATION, as well as CIA, and NSA
- •ALLOWS BROAD SPECTRUM OF TECHNOLOGY, EXPERIENCE, AND VIEWPOINTS TO BE APPLIED TO THE PROBLEM

THE BASIC R&D SUBGROUPS

- •PROVIDE THE TECHNICAL SUPPORT FOR THE NATIONAL COUNTERMEASURES R&D PROGRAM
- •FOCUS R&D ON BASIC NEEDS WITH BROAD INTERAGENCY
 APPLICATION OR INVOLVING VULNERABILITIES NOT OTHERWISE
 BEING' ADDRESSED
- •BUILD AND MAINTAIN A CORE R&D CAPABILITY TO SUPPORT COUNTERTERRORISM IMPROVEMENTS

TSMG
DOD/DOE
COCHAIRS

THREAT & TECHNOLOGY ASSESSMENT — CIA

EXPLOSIVE COUNTERMEASURES R&D — DOE

CONVENTIONAL INCIDENT — R&I / DOE

NUCLEAR INCIDENT — DOE

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT — PIK / DOI)

•

PRIORITY AREAS IN COUNTERTERRORISM R&D

- •CHEMICAL/BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT
- •LOW PROFILE DEFENSIVE COUNTERMEASURES
- •THREAT AGENT DETECTION
- CRISIS MANAGEMENT
- BARRICADED HOSTAGE SITUATION
- VULNERABILITY ANALYSIS

CHEMICAL & BIOLOGICAL INCIDENT RESPONSE R&D SUBGROUP (CBIRRDS)

OF THE

TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP

INTERAGENCY GROUP ON TERRORISM

CBIRRDS OBJECTIVES

-IDENTIFY R&D THAT WILL PROVIDE ENHANCED
CAPABILITY TO PREVENT C/B
TERRORIST INCIDENT


-IDENTIFY MANAGEMENT STRUCTURE AND RESPONSE CAPABILITY NEEDED TO COPE WITH C/B TERRORIST INCIDENT

CBIRRDS R&D PROPOSALS


MONITORING/DETECTION		25 🗸
COUNTERMEASURES		2
DECONTAMINATION/NEUTRALIZ	ATION	5
PHYSICAL PROTECTION		1
MEDICAL TREATMENT/PROPHY	LAXIS	7
TARGET HARDENING		4
COMMAND & CONTROL		10
TO	OTAL .	54

CBIRRDS PARTICIPANTS

- -DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
- -CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
- -ENVIRONMENTAL PROTECTION AGENCY
- -DEPARTMENT OF ENERGY
- -DEPARTMENT OF AGRICULTURE
- -NATIONAL TRANSPORTATION SAFETY BOARD
- -PUBLIC HEALTH SERVICE



THE TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES FROM OMB, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY BOARD AND SELECTED AGENCIES.



THE TECHNICAL AND FINANCIAL OVERSIGHT PANEL INCLUDES REPRESENTATIVES FROM OMB, SCIENCE AND TECHNOLOGY ADVISORY BOARD AND SELECTED AGENCIES.

SUMMARY OF FY 86 & FY 87 TSWG EFFORT

		,
SUBGROUP/TASK AREA	FUND FY 86	ING(\$K) FY 87
I. Threat & Technology Assessment		
Database	700	500
Vulnerability Analyses	-	500
Behavioral Effects	400	300
II. Defensive Countermeasures	•	
Airborne Detection & CM	900	1000
Waterborne Detection & CM	-	1000
Low Profile CM	-	2000
III. Conventional Incident Response		
Barricaded Hostage Situation	1000	2800
Crisis Management	-	1200
Terrorist Neutralization	· -	1500
IV. C/B Incident Response		
C/B Agent Detection	5100	1000
C/B Response	-	2200
V. Nuclear Incident Response		
Nuclear Detection	300	1000
VI. Explosive Ordnance Disposal		
Explosive Detection	700	1500
Portable Diagnosis & Disablement	800	2500
VII. Technology Transfer	100	1000
IX. Total	10000	20000

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QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS TECHNICAL SUPPORT WORKING GROUP INTERAGENCY R&D PROGRAM FOR TERRORISM

QUESTION: What is the TSWG?

ANSWER: The TSWG stands for Technical Support Working Group, an interagency working group formed under the Interdepartmental Group for Terrorism (IG/T). The TSWG coordinates, on behalf of the IG/T, the U.S. Government's overall R&D effort for counterterrorism. It is also charged with identifying those areas where counterterrorism R&D is warranted, but is not being addressed by a government agency.

The TSWG is co-chaired by the Departments of Energy and Defense and includes representatives from Health and Human Services, Justice, State, Treasury, Transportation, and the intelligence community. The TSWG is organized into seven subgroups which correspond to basic research areas. Subgroup chairmen come from those agencies with the greatest interest or expertise in the activities assigned to the subgroup:

SUBGROUP	<u>C</u>	HAIRMANSHIP
Threat Assessment and Database Management		CIA
Intrusion Detection and Countermeasures		DOD
Conventional Incident Response Technology		DOJ
Chemical/Biological Incident Response Tec	h.	HHS/DOD
Nuclear Incident Response Technology		DOE
Explosive Ordnance Disposal Technology		DOD
Technology Transfer To	Ве	Determi ned

QUESTION: Why is an interagency R&D program to counter terrorism necessary and important?

ANSWER: Terrorism is a problem which falls across the organizational and jurisdictional responsibilities of a number of U.S. government agencies and departments, but is not the sole responsibility of any one of them. In every agency it is one of many important but still peripheral responsibilities. Thus no agency focuses on all aspects of the terrorism problem. Instead, they concentrate on those aspects associated with their primary missions and the security of their people and facilities. For example, the FAA's R&D efforts are focused on explosive detection at airports, while those of DOE concentrate on quick detection and rendering safe of improvised nuclear devices.

From a national perspective, however, agency specific research results in R&D "gaps" or areas where R&D is warranted but is not yet being done. The IG/T sponsored an in-depth survey to identify these gaps, and the TSWG, on behalf of the IG/T, has developed an interagency program to address them. Without interagency funding, the majority of these gaps will continue to exist.

QUESTION: Does the interagency R&D program for counterterrorism overlap or duplicate ongoing agency R&D programs?

ANSWER: As discussed above, the interagency program is designed to address "gap" areas which fall outside the specific R&D interests of individual government agencies. Since agencies with ongoing R&D programs for counterterrorism are represented on the TSWG, the TSWG is able to ensure that its interagency effort remains current. Like the threat, its overall R&D plan is flexible and dynamic. At least once a year, the TSWG surveys agency R&D programs capable of supporting the national counterterrorism effort. The TSWG program is then adjusted to accommodate new threats and technologies or to delete proposed R&D projects which member agencies have subsequently agreed to conduct and fund. For example, in its first proposed program the TSWG identified the need for R&D in the area of explosive detection. When the Congress provided funds to FAA to pursue this research, the TSWG immediately dropped this requirement from its own program.

QUESTION: How were the interagency needs for this R&D program identified?

ANSWER: In 1983 the IG/T commissioned a distinguished panel of scientists to look at the overall U.S. R&D effort for counterterrorism and to identify those areas where R&D was needed but was not being pursued. The scientists compared the threat and existing technologies with the R&D being pursued by the various government agencies. In their report, they recommended the establishment of an interagency working group, under the IG/T, to coordinate the various agency R&D programs for counterterrorism. They also identified five major research areas where interagency R&D programs were warranted: "Threat Assessment, Technology Assessment, Incident Response. Defensive Countermeasures and Technology Transfer." As noted above, these were later expanded to seven areas and assigned to TSWG subgroups.

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OFFICE OF THE ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

COMMAND, CONTROL. COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE

COVER BRIEF

TO: ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (COMMAND, CONTROL, COMMUNICATIONS AND INTELLIGENCE)

THROUGH: DEPUTY ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE (INTELLIGENCE)

FROM: ASSISTANT DIRECTOR, SPECIAL OPERATIONS 65/29/86

SUBJECT: CIA Comments on the TSWG R&D Program

PURPOSE: Provide a response to the CIA memorandum addressing TSWG funding priorities.

DISCUSSION: The comments that Charlie Allen made (Tab B) indicate that he does not remember the CIA position and actions regarding TSWG when the interagency effort got underway.

The CIA appears to underestimate the importance of agencies such as EPA and FDA in dealing with terrorism. These agencies have been active in and have made significant contributions to the interagency planning and requirements. CIA, on the other hand, has pursued its own interests. CIA interagency cooperation became apparent when they became aware that the TSWG program may be funded and their own program may not be funded.

Coordination of CIA counterterrorism efforts may need to be better coordinated as evidenced by their submission of two priority lists from two different groups. Tab C is a submission received prior to Mr. Allen's memorandum.


RECOMMENDATION: That you sign the response to Charlie Allen at Tab A.

COORDINATION:

SUSPENSE: 03 June 1986, \$86-05-304

Attachments As stated

Prepared by: E. Rice/SOT/x52844/er/29May86



ASSISTANT SECRETARY OF DEFENSE



COMMUNICATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301-3040

AND INTELLIGENCE

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. CHARLES ALLEN, NATIONAL INTELLIGENCE OFFICER FOR COUNTERTERRORISM

SUBJECT: Technical Support Working Group (TSWG) Interagency Counterterrorism Research and Development (R&D) Program

Your interest and concern over funding allocated for counterterrorism support is shared by me. Your comments may be misdirected, however, because the TSWG program was prepared in response to direction and guidance from the Interagency Group on Terrorism (IG/T) chaired by Ambassador Oakley of the State Department. OASD (C3I) provided a DoD Co-Chairman for the TSWG, but the program was prepared primarily by six subgroups specializing in the technological areas of concern.

It is my understanding that identification of the R&D shortcomings relating to counterterrorism was purposely divided into intelligence efforts and all other efforts. This was done because the intelligence community preferred not to participate in IG/T interagency efforts involving a large group of people. Based on the CIA lead, we supported fully the Intelligence Research and Development Council (IR&DC) concentration on the intelligence area R&D needs with a limited number of players. At the same time, the TSWG addressed all other areas with a broad interagency representation.

Based on the division of effort desired by the CIA, the TSWG did not address intelligence shortcomings. An intelligence TSWG subgroup was formed but, based on CIA desires, was asked to focus primarily on the threat. CIA representatives apparently did not approach the TSWG about a more integrated effort until it became apparent that the TSWG program might be funded and the IR&DC identified needs might not be funded.

Concerning priorities and funding allocations, it has been explained to me that the TSWG program addresses only gaps or shortfalls in R&D technology and does not compete with or supersede ongoing agency or department programs. For that reason, areas of current terrorist activity, such as explosive bombings, are already being addressed by high funding levels in various agencies and are not high on the TSWG priority list. For that reason also, the chemical and biological problem, which has received little funding in the agencies, was a principal justification for the program. I also understand that the TSWG program addresses the technology gaps identified by the technical

subgroups independent of agency shares of the effort. The areas of highest need were based on technology gaps and not on the sponsoring agency.


Despite the unfortunate limited participation by CIA, the DoD Co-Chairman of the TSWG assures me that every effort is being made to incorporate high priority intelligence needs into the TSWG program. To date the TSWG has received two different priority lists from the CIA. The differences are being resolved so that the true high priority intelligence needs can be incorporated. The technical subgroups, rather than the TSWG as a whole, are addressing the CIA input because they are responsible for identifying the program. CIA chairs one of those subgroups and it should also be participating on the other subgroups.

Aside from other considerations, the funding anticipated for the TSWG program does not address all of the TSWG needs. The intial FY 1986 program presented to State and OMB was \$27M and did not include intelligence requirements. The funding level submitted to Congress in the State supplemental budget was only \$10M. Currently, a list of unfunded project requirements totalling over \$25M has been identified for possible end of year DoD funding. The unfunded list includes CIA and DoD R&D projects with joint agency application potential which have not been included in the TSWG list for FY 1986 funding. I understand that Dewey Claridge has informed my staff that you are still seeking CIA funding as well. We can provide unfunded requirements for your consideration also so that this area of utmost importance is receiving the attention it warrants.

Again, this question rightly belongs to Ambassador Oakley, but because we share your concern in seeing that limited resources are properly allocated, I have tried to provide an answer.

Donald C. Latham

Copy to: Ambassador Robert Oakley



	OASD (C ³ I) RO	UTING SLIP
SUBJECT	re TSWG fundin	q priorities .
	ASSISTANT SECRETARY has not seem.	DASD (P & R)
×	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT LUKO 27 May	DIR, RM
×		DIR, P&PE
	ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT CENTER	
X	DASD (I)	DASD (C3)
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	DIR, NIS	DIR, T&TC3
	DIR, TIS	DIR, MA&E
	DIR, IR	SPECIAL ASST FOR
	L.	
	TYPE OF ACTION	REQUIRED
X	PREPARE REPLY FOR ASD(C3I) SIGNATURE	COORDINATE AND RETURN TO
	PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE	TAKE ACTION AS APPROPRIATE
	REPLY DIRECT/CLEAR SUSPENSE	COORDINATE REPLY WITH
	REVIEW AND RECOMMEND COORD POSITION TO C3I	INFORMATION AND FOR RETENTION
	PREPARE COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS	SEE ASD(C3I) COMMENTS
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OASD (C3I) ROUTING SLIP.

TSWG funding Priorities

X	ASSISTANT SECRETARY	DASD (P&R)
1	EXECUTIVE ASSISTANT WKO 29 May	DIR, RM
	0	DIR, P & PE
	ADMINISTRATIVE SUPPORT CENTER	
1	DASD (I)	DASD (C3)
	DIR, IP&T	DIR, IS
	DIR, SWS	DIR, S&TNFC3
	DIR, NES	DIR, T&TC3
	DIR, TIS	DIR, MA&E
	DIR, IR	SPECIAL ASST FOR
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TYPE OF ACTION REQUIRED

/	PREPARE REPLY FOR ASD(C3I) SIGNATURE	COORDINATE AND RETURN TO
-	PREPARE REPLY FOR SIGNATURE	TAKE ACTION AS APPROPRIATE
	REPLY DIRECT/CLEAR SUSPENSE	COORDINATE REPLY WITH
	REVIEW AND RECOMMEND COORD POSITION TO C3I	INFORMATION AND/OR RETENTION
	PREPARE COMMENTS / RECOMMENDATIONS	SEE ASD(C3I) COMMENTS

REMARKS

CHARLE HANDERS AND PETE BANNER LETI DISCHUS

THIS ASAP.

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F97-108/2 #10

EY LOT MAHA PATE 10/5/02

ACTION DUE DATE

ROUTING DATE

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