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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

**Collection Name** Roberts, John: Files

**Withdrawer**

LOJ 7/29/2005

**File Folder** [ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, GENERAL  
ADVISORY COMMITTEE ON]

**FOIA**

2005-139

**Box Number** CF0578

COOKE

1001

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
19454	MEMO	ROBERT MCFARLANE TO WILLIAM R. GRAHAM, RE GAC REPORT	1	ND	B1
	<b>R</b>	<b>6/22/2006</b>			
19455	MEMO	SVEN KRAEMER TO MCFARLANE, RE GAC REPORT	1	6/26/1984	B1

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]

B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]

B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]

B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]

B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]

B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]

B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]

B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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~~SECRET~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

~~SECRET~~

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE WILLIAM R. GRAHAM  
The Chairman, General Advisory Committee  
Arms Control and Disarmament Agency

SUBJECT: General Advisory Committee Report (U)

As you know, the Defense Authorization Bill contains the following language:

"Transmittal to Congress of Report on Soviet Compliance with Arms Control Agreements

"Sec. (a) Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the text of the report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency entitled 'A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 (U),' dated November 1983. If the President determines that the report contains material the release of which to Congress would compromise United States intelligence sources, methods of intelligence gathering, or the national security of the United States, the President may furnish the text of such report after deleting or modifying such compromising material.

"Sec. (b) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress an unclassified version of the report described in subsection (a)."

In order to facilitate Presidential transmittal of the General Advisory Committee's Report to the Congress, the General Advisory Committee is instructed to review the intelligence material in its report to meet the requirement of Section (a) and to begin preparation of an unclassified version of the Report to meet the requirement in Section (b) of the amendment. Both versions of the report should be submitted for NSC review no later than 15 days after final passage of the Defense Authorization Bill. (S)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

Robert C. McFarlane

~~SECRET~~

Declassify on: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F05-139/1#19454

~~SECRET~~

BY hcs, NARA, DATE 6/22/06

# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

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ROBERTS, JOHN: FILES

*Withdrawer*

LOJ 7/29/2005

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[ARMS CONTROL AND DISARMAMENT, GENERAL  
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✓ p. 22 legal advice

Art; best Admin. Etc.:

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and not legally binding

✓ App. 3 : strengths + weaknesses

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led at last  
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press guidance ✓  
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3 p.m.

Charlie Kupperman

Trinitic paper, 5/8/81  
220

AAC ≠ ?

ing specific dedicated nuclear launchers of a range which permits the coverage of all potential targets from locations in the rear of the European NATO territory in the territory of the Warsaw Pact short of the territory of the Soviet Union, thereby reducing pressure from enemy action for early first use of nuclear weapons.

(3) Whether NATO should not, as a consequence of a change in policy described in paragraph (2), eliminate its inventory of dual-capable nuclear/conventional weapons in order to allow early use of artillery, aircraft, and surface-to-surface missiles for conventional missions rather than causing them to be withheld for possible nuclear use.

(4) Whether NATO should not place control and operation of tactical nuclear weapons in a single specialized command established for that purpose so that all other NATO force elements could be free to concentrate on pursuing conventional military missions with maximum efficiency.

#### REPORT ON WITHDRAWAL OF TACTICAL NUCLEAR WARHEADS FROM EUROPE

SEC. 1104. The President shall submit a report to Congress not later than 90 days after the final decision is made (based upon the recommendations of the Supreme Allied Commander, Europe) regarding the net reduction to be made by the United States in the number of tactical nuclear warheads in the territory of North Atlantic Treaty Organization European member nations pursuant to the decision of the Nuclear Planning Group of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization of October 17, 1983. The report shall—

(1) specify the types of warheads to be withdrawn in accordance with that decision, the number of each such warhead to be withdrawn, the schedule for the withdrawal, and the rationale for the selection of the particular warheads to be withdrawn; and

(2) any changes in force structure to be made resulting from the changes in the tactical nuclear warheads positioned in Europe.

#### REPORT ON UNITED STATES COUNTERFORCE CAPABILITY

SEC. 1105. (a) Not later than April 15, 1985, the President shall submit to Congress a report discussing the required strategic counterforce capability consistent with existing United States policy.

(b) The report under subsection (a) shall be developed taking into consideration current and proposed United States intercontinental ballistic missiles having an accuracy on the order of the MX missile (including specifically the MX missile, the D-5 Trident missile, and the small single-warhead missile) intended to be procured for United States strategic force modernization and the rationale for the overall counterforce capability that would be attained as a cumulative result of those procurements. The President shall include in the report a specific definition of what United States counterforce capability would constitute a so-called "first-strike capability" against the Soviet Union.

(c) The report shall also include an assessment of corresponding Soviet counterforce and first-strike capabilities.

#### TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

SEC. 1106. (a) Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the text of the report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency entitled "A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1956-1983 (U)", dated November 1983. If the President determines that that report con-

tains material the release of which to Congress would compromise United States intelligence sources, methods of intelligence gathering, or the national security of the United States, the President may furnish the text of such report after deleting or modifying such compromising material.

(b) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress an unclassified version of the report described in subsection (a).

#### REPORT ON NUCLEAR WINTER FINDINGS AND POLICY IMPLICATIONS

SEC. 1107. (a) The Secretary of Defense shall participate in any comprehensive study of the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear war and the implications that such consequences have for the nuclear weapons strategy and policy, the arms control policy, and the civil defense policy of the United States.

(b) Not later than March 1, 1985, the Secretary of Defense shall submit to the Committees on Armed Services of the Senate and House of Representatives an unclassified report suitable for release to the public, together with classified addenda (if required), concerning the subject described in subsection (a). The Secretary shall include in such report the following:

(1) A detailed review and assessment of the current scientific studies and findings on the atmospheric, climatic, environmental, and biological consequences of nuclear explosions and nuclear exchanges.

(2) A thorough evaluation of the implications that such studies and findings have on (A) the nuclear weapons policy of the United States, especially with regard to strategy, targeting, planning, command, control, procurement, and deployment, (B) the nuclear arms control policy of the United States, and (C) the civil defense policy of the United States.

(3) A discussion of the manner in which the results of such evaluation of policy implications will be incorporated into the nuclear weapons, arms control, and civil defense policies of the United States.

(4) An analysis of the extent to which current scientific findings on the consequences of nuclear explosions are being studied, disseminated, and used in the Soviet Union.

#### SENSE OF THE CONGRESS RELATING TO PEACEFUL NEGOTIATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION

SEC. 1108. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) An increasing number of scenarios (including misjudgment, miscalculation, misunderstanding, possession of nuclear arms by a terrorist group or a State sponsored threat) could precipitate a sudden increase in tensions and the risk of a nuclear confrontation between the United States and the Soviet Union, situations that neither side anticipates, intends, or desires.

(2) There has been a steady proliferation throughout the world of the knowledge, equipment, and materials necessary to fabricate nuclear weapons.

(3) Such proliferation of nuclear capabilities suggests an increasing potential for nuclear terrorism, the cumulative risk of which, considering potential terrorist groups and other threats over a period of years into the future, may be great.

(4) Current communications links represent equipment of the 1960's and as such are relatively outdated and limited in their capabilities.

(5) The President, responding to congressional initiatives, proposed the establishment of additional and improved communications links between the United States and

the Soviet Union and other measures to reduce the risk of nuclear confrontation, and has initiated discussions at a working level with the Soviet Union pertaining to—

(A) the addition of a high speed facsimile capability to the direct communication link (hotline);

(B) the creation of a joint military communications link between the Department of Defense and the Soviet Defense Ministry; and

(C) the establishment by the Governments of the United States and Soviet Union of high-rate data communication links between each nation and its embassy in the other nation's capital.

(6) The establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in Washington and Moscow could reduce the risk of increased tensions and nuclear confrontations, thereby enhancing the security of both the United States and the Soviet Union.

(7) These centers could serve a variety of functions, including—

(A) discussing procedures to be followed in the event of possible incidents involving the use of nuclear weapons by third parties;

(B) maintaining close contact during nuclear threats or incidents precipitated by third parties;

(C) exchanging information on a voluntary basis concerning events that might lead to the acquisition of nuclear weapons, materials, or equipment by subnational groups;

(D) exchanging information about United States-Union of Soviet Socialist Republics military activities which might be misunderstood by the other party during periods of mounting tensions; and

(E) establishing a dialog about nuclear doctrines, forces, and activities.

(8) The continuing and routine implementation of these various activities could be facilitated by the establishment within each Government of facilities, organizations, and bureaucratic relationships designated for these purposes, such as risk reduction centers, and by the appointment of individuals responsible to the respective head of state with responsibilities to manage such centers.

(b) The Congress—

(1) commends the President for his announced support for the confidence building measures described in subsection (a) and his initiation of negotiations which have occurred; and

(2) urges the President to pursue negotiations on these measures with the Government of the Soviet Union and to add to these negotiations the establishment of nuclear risk reduction centers in both nations to be operated under the direction of the appropriate diplomatic and defense authorities.

#### SENSE OF CONGRESS REGARDING A REPORT TO CONGRESS ON CERTAIN VERIFICATION PROGRAMS RELATING TO BIOLOGICAL AND CHEMICAL WEAPONS

SEC. 1109. (a) The Congress makes the following findings:

(1) The Iran-Iraq war has recently demonstrated a marked increase in the proliferation of technology on the production of chemical weapons and an increase in the willingness of nations to use such weapons in armed conflict.

(2) The President's Report to Congress on Soviet Arms Control Noncompliance concluded that the Soviet Union has refused to respond adequately to United States concerns about the transfer or use by the Soviet Union of lethal chemical warfare agents in Laos, Kampuchea, and Afghanistan and United States concerns about adherence by the Soviet Union to the 1972 Biological and Toxin Weapons Convention.

Lloyd	Olin	Smith (NE)
Loeffler	Ortiz	Smith (NJ)
Long (LA)	Oxley	Smith, Denny
Long (MD)	Packard	Smith, Robert
Lott	Parris	Snowe
Lowery (CA)	Pashayan	Snyder
Lujan	Patman	Solomon
Luken	Patterson	Spence
Lungren	Pepper	Spratt
Mack	Perkins	St Germain
MacKay	Petri	Stangeland
Madigan	Pickle	Stenholm
Mariennee	Porter	Stratton
Martin (IL)	Price	Stump
Martin (NC)	Pritchard	Sundquist
Martin (NY)	Pursell	Synar
Mazzoli	Quillen	Tallon
McCain	Ray	Tauke
McCandless	Regula	Tauzin
McCloskey	Reid	Taylor
McCollum	Richardson	Thomas (CA)
McDade	Rinaldo	Thomas (GA)
McEwen	Ritter	Udall
McGrath	Roberts	Valentine
McHugh	Robinson	Vandergriff
McKernan	Roemer	Volkmer
McNulty	Rogers	Vucanovich
Mica	Rostenkowski	Walgren
Michel	Roth	Walker
Miller (OH)	Roukema	Watkins
Minish	Rowland	Weber
Molinari	Rudd	Whitehurst
Mollohan	Schaefer	Whitley
Montgomery	Schneider	Whittaker
Moore	Schulze	Whitten
Moorhead	Sharp	Williams (OH)
Morrison (WA)	Shaw	Winn
Murphy	Shelby	Wise
Murtha	Shumway	Wolf
Myers	Shuster	Wortley
Natcher	Siljander	Wright
Neal	Sisisky	Wylie
Nelson	Skeen	Yatron
Nichols	Skelton	Young (AK)
Nielson	Slattery	Young (FL)
O'Brien	Smith (FL)	Young (MO)
Obey	Smith (IA)	Zschau

NOT VOTING—38

Alexander	Hance	Paul
Anthony	Hansen (ID)	Ridge
Barnard	Hatcher	Rodino
Bryant	Hawkins	Roe
Crockett	Howard	Rose
Dixon	Jeffords	Sabo
Dowdy	Jenkins	Sawyer
Dymally	Kolter	Sensenbrenner
Edwards (OK)	Leath	Simon
English	Lundine	Stark
Erdreich	Marriott	Vander Jagt
Gibbons	McCurdy	Wilson
Guarini	McKinney	

□ 2300

The Clerk announced the following pairs:

On this vote:

Mr. Dixon for, with Mr. Hance against.  
Mr. Crockett for, with Mr. Anthony against.

So the amendment was rejected.  
The result of the vote was announced as above recorded.

AMENDMENT OFFERED BY MR. COURTER

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I offer an amendment.

The Clerk read as follows:

Amendment offered by Mr. COURTER: At the end of the bill add the following new section:

TRANSMITTAL TO CONGRESS OF REPORT ON SOVIET COMPLIANCE WITH ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS

SEC. (a) Not later than 30 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress the text of the report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency entitled "A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 (U)", dated November

1983. If the President determines that that report contains material the release of which to Congress would compromise United States intelligence sources, methods of intelligence gathering, or the national security of the United States, the President may furnish the text of such report after deleting or modifying such compromising material.

(b) Not later than 60 days after the date of the enactment of this Act, the President shall transmit to Congress an unclassified version of the report described in subsection (a).

Mr. COURTER (during the reading). Mr. Chairman, I ask unanimous consent that the amendment be considered as read and printed in the RECORD.

The CHAIRMAN. Is there objection to the request of the gentleman from New Jersey?

There was no objection.

Mr. COURTER. Mr. Chairman, I will not prolong the matter. This is a full-disclosure amendment. It is a sunshine-type amendment. It is agreed to by both the majority and the minority.

Mr. STRATTON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield to me?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. STRATTON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, the gentleman has been good enough to show us his amendment and on behalf of the committee we accept the amendment.

Mr. COURTER. I thank the gentleman.

Mr. DICKINSON. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. COURTER. I yield to the gentleman from Alabama.

Mr. DICKINSON. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, we have examined the amendment and we have no objection to it.

Mr. DICKS. Mr. Chairman, I rise in opposition to the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, I would like to ask the gentleman from New Jersey (Mr. COURTER) if he could describe the amendment to us, please.

Mr. COURTER. If the gentleman will yield, I would be happy to describe the amendment.

Mr. Chairman, there is a report that was filed and prepared by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control. That report recited the Soviet compliance practices during the past 25 years in arms control.

The amendment directs that the administration supply an unclassified version of a chronological history of Soviet compliance practices to this body. It does so also stating that if there is a problem with national security, then the report could be changed. It also says if there is a problem with compromising intelligence-gathering capabilities, if sources and methods of intelligence would be compromised, then the report could be altered to satisfy those problems that the administration may have.

Therefore, the amendment simply requests an altered copy of this particular report, which has been completed probably a year ago.

Mr. DICKS. Is the trust of this report to point out a variety of Soviet compliance problems that the gentleman wants to use in order to undercut existing arms control agreements?

Mr. COURTER. No; not at all. The purpose is simply to inform this body of the entire chronological period of the last 25 years with regard to Soviet compliance practices. I think if the gentleman and we have a chance to look at it, it may show and probably will show that the Soviet Union has indeed complied with some agreements. There might be problems with others but it is very difficult to debate strategic systems without having a working understanding of compliance practices during the last 25 years.

Mr. DICKS. Why has this report not been released to the Congress before?

Mr. COURTER. I am not sure why it has not been released before. Administration after administration have been for whatever reasons somewhat reluctant to talk about compliance practices.

Mr. DICKS. But we do have a standing consultative commission in which these compliance issues are supposed to be worked out in secret, and that has been the way we have dealt with these issues over the past.

Mr. KEMP. Mr. Chairman, will the gentleman yield?

Mr. DICKS. I yield to the gentleman from New York.

Mr. KEMP. I thank the gentleman for yielding.

Mr. Chairman, I just wanted to enter the discussion because I know my friend from Washington is extremely interested in compliance by the Soviet Union, and I am a strong supporter of what the gentleman from New Jersey is attempting to do.

One reason that would broaden the study is the fact that this study takes a broader look at all of those areas of negotiation into which the United States and the Soviet Union have entered. It is not just strategic arms talks. I would say to my friend from Washington. It takes chemical and biological weapons, the nuclear threshold test ban treaty, the Helsinki treaty, and looks at them.

As the gentleman from New Jersey points out, some of the treaties have been agreed to by the Soviet Union have not, but it is information that is critical to the formulation of public policy and the gentleman from New Jersey has been one of those who has been trying to get it released.

□ 2110

I have heard the briefing. I think it is the type of information that the Congress should require. I would urge my colleagues to support the gentleman from New Jersey in his very logi-

submit to the Senate Foreign Relations Committee and the Select Committee on Intelligence, and the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Permanent Select Committee on Intelligence a comprehensive report identifying and evaluating 1) existing and planned verification requirements to determine compliance with the 1972 Biological and Toxic Weapons Convention and a chemical weapons ban, and 2) the budget resources necessary to support these verification requirements. This report must be submitted to Congress not later than March 15, 1985.

--Arms Control Agreements

A classified version of the GAC Report must be submitted to Congress not later than 30 days after the enactment of this act (when the President actually signs the bill). Not later than 60 days after the enactment of this act, the President must transmit to Congress an unclassified version of the GAC Report.

--Soviet Compliance With Arms Control Commitments

The conferees request that the Administration provide a classified and unclassified report to Congress by December 1, 1984 reflecting any additional findings regarding Soviet compliance with their arms control commitments. This report is requested in order that Congress may have access to all the relevant information that bears on the U.S. ICBM modernization program, and it will be used in connection with Congress' vote to release FY 85 MX procurement funds.

--Pursue Outstanding Arms Control Compliance

- 1) It is the sense of Congress that the U.S. should vigorously pursue with the Soviet Union the resolution of compliance concerns through the SCC and other diplomatic channels. The U.S. should through December 31, 1985 refrain from undercutting the provisions of existing strategic offensive arms agreements so long as the Soviet Union does the same, or until a new offensive arms control agreement is concluded.
- 2) The President shall provide a classified and unclassified report to Congress reflecting additional findings regarding Soviet adherence to such a no-undercut policy by February 15, 1985.
- 3) The President shall provide to Congress on or before June 1, 1985 a report that describes the implications of the U.S.S. Alaska's sea trials for the no-undercut policy, assesses potential Soviet responses to the termination of the U.S. no-undercut policy, makes recommendations regarding the future of U.S. interim restraint, and reviews Soviet activities with respect to existing strategic arms agreements.



THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 10, 1984

TEXT OF A LETTER FROM THE PRESIDENT  
TO THE SPEAKER OF THE  
HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES AND  
THE PRESIDENT OF THE SENATE

October 10, 1984

Dear Mr. Speaker: (Dear Mr. President:)

When I forwarded a report from my Administration to the Congress on Soviet Noncompliance with Arms Control Agreements on January 23, 1984, I said, "If the concept of arms control is to have meaning and credibility as a contribution to global or regional stability, it is essential that all parties to agreements comply with them." I continue to believe that compliance with arms control agreements is fundamental to the arms control process.

Congressional amendments to the FY 1985 Defense Authorization Bill calling for Administration reports on compliance issues, as well as for the transmittal of classified and unclassified versions of the report, A Quarter Century of Soviet Compliance Practices Under Arms Control Commitments: 1958-1983 prepared by the bipartisan General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament, demonstrate the priority that Congress places on compliance.

In response to the Congressional requirement, an unclassified version of the General Advisory Committee's report, a summation prepared by the Committee, is provided herewith. Because the Committee's full report contains extensive classified intelligence information, the classified version is being transmitted to the two Select Committees of the Congress on Intelligence.

The General Advisory Committee's report to me resulted from a year-long analysis, by this bipartisan independent body, of Soviet practices with regard to arms control treaties, other agreements, unilateral political commitments, and statements of policy. Neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached in this report have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the U.S. Government. The report reflects the General Advisory Committee's attempt to assemble as complete as possible an historical record of Soviet behavior and to identify long-term patterns of Soviet compliance practices.

For its part, the Administration continues to be seriously concerned about Soviet behavior with regard to compliance with arms control obligations and commitments. We are actively pursuing several such issues in confidential discussions with the Soviet Union and are seeking explanations, clarifications, and corrective actions. Issues of concern continue to be intensively studied by appropriate agencies, and I intend to keep the Congress informed on this important matter in the future.

Increased understanding of compliance issues and a solid Congressional consensus on the importance of compliance to achieving effective arms control will strengthen our efforts to negotiate equitable and verifiable agreements and will assist as we seek the resolution of important unresolved compliance issues. I look forward to continued close consultation with the Congress as we seek to make progress in resolving compliance issues relating to existing arms control agreements and in negotiating sound arms control agreements.

Sincerely,

RONALD REAGAN

# # # # #

# Soviets' Violations Of Arms Curbs Cited

*Controversial Report Sent  
To Congress by President*

By Walter Pincus  
Washington Post Staff Writer

President Reagan yesterday sent Congress a controversial, long-awaited report charging that the Soviet Union over the past 25 years has broken half its arms control agreements with the United States through "violations, probable violations, or circumventions."

A 17-page unclassified summary of the 300-page secret report, prepared by a civilian advisory committee on arms control, concludes that the Soviet actions "demonstrate a pattern of pursuing military advantage through selective disregard" for its agreements.

The president, who was pressured to release the 10-month-old report by conservative Republicans in Congress, distanced himself from its findings by saying, in an accompanying letter, that "neither the methodology of analysis nor the conclusions reached . . . have been formally reviewed or approved by any agencies of the U.S. government."

The Reagan administration has been split for months over releasing the report by the General Advisory Committee on Arms Control and Disarmament. State Department officials have sought to keep it secret, fearing its unproved allegations and tough conclusions would arouse Moscow and further aggravate U.S.-Soviet relations.

Pentagon officials, on the other hand, have supported release of the report, arguing that it proved the need for tight verification provisions in any agreement with the Soviet Union.

One of the report's conclusions is that the "committee found recurring instances of Soviet conduct involving deliberate deception, misdirection and falsification of data during negotiations."

Last month, the release was delayed because of Reagan's talks in Washington with Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei A. Gromyko. At that time, White House aides promised legislators that the document would be sent to Capitol Hill before Congress adjourned.

The report describes 17 incidents going back to 1961, and concludes that they represent nine violations of agreements, two probable violations, four breaches of commitments and two circumventions of agreements.

The report also reviewed 15 "areas of Soviet activity that raise suspicion of further material breaches of arms control agreements."

Most of the recent incidents described in the unclassified summary and bearing on strategic arms agreements were contained in the president's own list of nine alleged "Soviet violations or probable violations," which was sent to Congress last January.

Other incidents, which some administration officials describe as less important, focus on older events such as venting in underground atomic tests that the report says violates the 1963 partial test ban; transiting the Turkish Straits with aircraft carriers, which violates the 1936 Montreux Convention, and using booby-trap mines and incendiary weapons against civilians in Afghanistan, which it describes as violating a 1981 conventional weapons convention.

The committee and the president apparently disagree on the best way to bring about Soviet compliance with agreements.

In his letter yesterday, Reagan said the administration is "actively pursuing" compliance "in confidential discussions with the Soviet Union."

The committee, on the other hand, charged that "near total reliance on secret diplomacy in seeking to restore Soviet compliance has been largely ineffective."

Instead, it calls upon the administration to develop a strategy "to deter and if necessary initiate measures to offset Soviet arms control noncompliance." One method, it suggests, would be to make public instances of noncompliance such as was done with Soviet use of chemical and toxic weapons in Afghanistan. That act, the report says, "may have contributed to limiting the extent of these prohibited activities."

National Security Council  
The White House

System # \_\_\_\_\_

Package # \_\_\_\_\_

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	_____	_____	_____
Tom Shull	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	_____	_____	_____
Bob Kimmitt	_____	_____	_____
NSC Secretariat	_____	_____	_____
Situation Room	_____	_____	_____

I = Information    A = Action    R = Retain    D = Dispatch    N = No further Action

cc: VP    Meese    Baker    Deaver    Other \_\_\_\_\_

COMMENTS                      Should be seen by: \_\_\_\_\_

(Date/Time)

*to John Roberts 106-  
with Counsel's Office*