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DLB 9/25/2014

File Folder [IRAN/ARMS TRANSACTION: DEAN MCGRATH'S FILES]; WILLIAMS & CONNOLLY DOCUMENTS REMOVED BY NORTH (5 OF 5)

FOIA

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SYSTEMATIC

179

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
165802	REPORT	RELEASE OF AMERICAN HOSTAGES IN BEIRUT	5	ND	B1
165803	PAPER	DUPLICATE OF #108469; TERMS OF REFERENCE U.S.-IRAN DIALOGUE	3	4/4/1986	B1

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

November 20, 1986

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR RODNEY B. MCDANIEL

FROM: OLIVER L. NORTH
ROBERT L. EARLE
CRAIG P. COYE

SUBJECT: Washington Post Questions

Attached at Tab I is a memo from you to David Chew forwarding the responses to the Washington Post questions (Tab A) requested by Tom Gibson (see Tab II).

Howard Teicher, Bob Linhard, Dennis Ross, and Peter Rodman concur.

RECOMMENDATION

That you initial and forward the memo along with the Q&As at Tab I.

Approve _____

Disapprove _____

Attachments

- Tab I - McDaniel Memo to Chew
- Tab A - Questions & Answers
- Tab II - Gibson Memo to McDaniel dated November 19, 1986

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

MEMORANDUM FOR DAVID L. CHEW

FROM: RODNEY B. McDANIEL

SUBJECT: Washington Post Questions

Attached at Tab A are NSC answers to the Washington Post questions that were forwarded by Tom Gibson.

cc: Tom Gibson
Pat Buchanan

Attachment
Tab A - Questions & Answers

November 20, 1986

1800

Q: DO YOU REALLY BELIEVE THAT THERE ARE MODERATE ELEMENTS WITHIN THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT? AND IF THERE ARE, CAN THERE BE ANY DOUBT THAT OUR ASSOCIATION WITH THEM WILL DIMINISH THEIR INFLUENCE IF NOT ELIMINATE THEIR PRESENCE IN THE POLITICAL STRUCTURE OF IRAN?

HOW DO YOU EVER AGAIN GO TO OUR ALLIES AND ASK THEM TO BE TOUGH ON TERRORISTS OR HOLD UP SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO OTHERS AFTER THE DISCLOSURE OF THIS KIND OF INVOLVEMENT IN IRAN?

A: From the earliest months following the Islamic Revolution in Iran, the U.S. Government has attempted to reestablish official contact with that country. Even before I took office, the Carter Administration determined that it was necessary to expand security, economic, and political relationships. These attempts included secret meetings between high-level government officials.

Numerous individuals and private parties have attempted to be helpful as intermediaries in establishing contact in Iran or in seeking Iranian assistance in the release of the hostages held in Lebanon. These efforts have included attempts by members of Congress on both sides of the aisle.

After many disappointments, about 18 months ago we were approached by a third party. He indicated that a group of influential Iranian officials had determined the need to reorient Iran's policy toward the West and the United States. After extensive work to verify the bona fides of the officials I decided to proceed. We viewed these officials as being pragmatic, guided by their own understanding of Iran's need and the importance of ending Iran's international isolation.

The question of credibility with our allies is easy. They know the United States has not tilted toward Iran and away from neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war. They know that the small amount of arms I authorized is insignificant to the outcome of the war and insignificant compared to the volume of arms supplied via Communist bloc countries or even Western Europe. Finally, they know that I have acted in the best interests of world peace, regional stability, and the safety of innocent hostages. Finally, our terrorism policy is clear and unequivocal -- we have not made concessions to terrorists and will not. What we will do is act in our own interests to maintain influence in a vital part of the world.

Q: WHAT PROVISION HAVE YOU MADE IN YOUR DEALINGS WITH IRAN TO ENSURE THAT NO MORE HOSTAGES WILL BE TAKEN?

A: Throughout our contact we have reiterated our steadfast opposition to Iran's support for terrorism and subversion. We repeatedly emphasized the importance of removing the obstacle to improving the dialogue between our two countries, namely the freeing of the hostages held in Lebanon. Iran expressed its opposition to terror and clearly understands the consequences of resorting to terrorism. We clearly stated our policy of neutrality in the Iran-Iraq war and our belief that the war should end honorably with both sides maintaining their territorial integrity.

Q: AMONG ALL OF THE ISSUES AND PROBLEMS YOUR ADMINISTRATION FACES IN DEFINING THE NATIONAL INTEREST, IN WHAT ORDER OF PRIORITY WOULD YOU RANK THE FREEDOM OF THE HOSTAGES IN LEBANON?

A: From the outset, my objectives in our dealings with Iran were exactly as I have indicated. They were first to replace a relationship of total hostility with one of mutual understanding and respect. Next, we have consistently sought a negotiated end to the Iran-Iraq war which is one of the most important reasons for our arms embargo. Iraq, for some time, has expressed its readiness to pursue a mediated settlement of the war. We have also firmly told the Iranians

their continued support for terrorism and subversion in the region is unacceptable and must stop. Finally, at every meeting, we said that the continued holding of hostages by groups influenced by Iran constituted an obstacle to any future improved relations.

Q: IN TERMS OF INSTITUTIONAL ACCOUNTABILITY, IT WOULD APPEAR THE NSC (NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL) HAS PREEMPTED THE TRADITIONAL ROLE OF THE DEFENSE DEPARTMENT AND CIA IN CENTRAL AMERICA AND THE STATE DEPARTMENT IN IRAN. WHAT CONSTITUTIONAL OR LEGAL AUTHORITY HAS THE NSC TO AID AND ABET THE PROSECUTION OF WAR WITHOUT A DECLARATION THEREOF BY CONGRESS IN CENTRAL AMERICA, AND TO AUTHORIZE THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS IN VIOLATION OF EMBARGO STATUTES TO BELLIGERENTS IN THE MIDDLE EAST?

A: As with any sensitive intelligence or diplomatic initiative, participation by departments and agencies, as well as individuals, must be based on their need to know. All of my national security advisors were consulted and they in turn advised those officials within their departments who had a need to know. Involvement of the NSC staff was limited to a few individuals. This initiative was handled just like any other classified covert intelligence operation. The NSC staff, working with the CIA, was simply fulfilling its

function of advising me on national security issues, as well as carrying out my instructions. Under the law, I told CIA Director Casey to refrain from informing Congress because of the extreme sensitivity and the high risk to individual lives. We also intended and planned to fully inform the relevant committees of Congress when the time was appropriate. To remove any doubt as to our intentions and our actions, I have directed that all information relating to our initiative be provided to the appropriate members of Congress. Of course, some of the information will have to remain classified and not be made public in order to protect individual lives.

It is absolutely false that we were "aiding and abetting the prosecution of war without a declaration thereof by Congress." We have not declared war on Nicaragua -- nor do we intend to. What we have been doing is supporting the Nicaraguan democratic resistance forces in their efforts to restore democracy to Nicaragua. That support has always been within the terms of the relevant laws at the time.

Q: SINCE YOU PERMIT (VICE) ADMIRAL (JOHN M.) POINDEXTER TO APPEAR ON "MEET THE PRESS" AND "THE TODAY SHOW" TO ANSWER QUESTIONS, WILL YOU PERMIT HIM TO GO AND ANSWER QUESTIONS FROM MEMBERS OF CONGRESS IN A HEARING?

A: I have pledged that we will offer the fullest possible report to the appropriate members and committees of the Congress. Since this was largely an intelligence operation, I have asked CIA Director Casey to report fully to the intelligence committees, which are the most appropriate forums for discussing the aspects of this policy that remain highly sensitive.

My Assistant for National Security Affairs is a member of my Presidential staff and it would be unprecedented and inappropriate for him to be summoned to appear at a formal Congressional hearing. However, Admiral Poindexter has regularly engaged in informal consultations and briefings with members of Congress on a variety of issues since he took over his present position. I have asked him to make himself available for consultations on this issue as well, and he will do so.

Q: WHAT EFFECT DID THE UNITED STATES' PROVIDING SOME MILITARY EQUIPMENT HAVE ON THE BEHAVIOR OF THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT? HAS IRAN CHANGED ITS ATTITUDE TOWARD THE WAR WITH IRAQ, TOWARD TERRORISM, OR TOWARD ITS NEIGHBORS, INCLUDING THE SOVIET UNION?

A: Although it is too soon to give a complete assessment, we have indeed seen a number of positive effects. It is a fact that there has been a marked reduction in Iranian-sponsored terrorism over the last 18 months. Several Iranians responsible for instigating international terrorist acts have been arrested and are now jailed in Iran. Iran has also been helpful in both the TWA hijacking in Beirut in June 1985, as well as the Pan Am Flight 73 hijacking in Karachi last September. The comments of Iran's ambassador to the United Nations acknowledge the improvement in U.S.-Iranian relations.

Another positive result of our initiative is the release of three of the Americans held hostage in Lebanon. It is true that three more Americans were taken recently, but our information has been ambiguous whether this was Iranian-sponsored.

Q: YOU SAID THIS TRADE WAS TO HELP START A DIALOGUE WITH MODERATE POLITICAL FACTIONS IN IRAN. HOW DOES GIVING WEAPONS TO THE (AYATOLLAH RUHOLLAH) KHOMEINI ESTABLISHMENT HELP THIS?

A: That is a question that I asked myself. I can only say that I grappled with this decision for a long time. The Iranians themselves asked to purchase this equipment. After careful

consideration, our assessment was that the dialogue would only move forward if our Iranian interlocutors became convinced that our negotiators genuinely represented me. The Iranians believed that the authorization to purchase some military materiel was the only gesture that would demonstrate my involvement and commitment to this initiative. We were very explicit in our sale of this equipment to make sure that, first, it could not be used for offensive purposes and, second, that it could in no way affect the outcome of the war with Iraq.

In doing this, we were well aware of the risk and we understood this was a limited deviation from our arms embargo policy. Nevertheless, we proceeded because we saw a potential opening that could, if probed and cultivated successfully, have had long-term stabilizing effects on the regime and could have contributed to ending the war -- the very objective of the arms embargo.

Q: IF THE KHOMEINI AND (LIBYAN LEADER MOAMMAR) QADHAFI ROLES WERE REVERSED SO THAT QADHAFI WAS IN CHARGE OF THE MORE STRATEGICALLY IMPORTANT COUNTRY OF IRAN, WOULD WE BOMB KHOMEINI AND ARM QADHAFI?

A: Questions like this are pure speculation and avoid the heart of the issue. There is no debate over the strategic

importance of Iran. In this regard, it is notable that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran -- Egypt, Jordan, Morocco, Israel, South Africa, and the United States. Even Iraq continues to have diplomatic relations with Iran. The Iranians came to us threatened with growing Soviet military power and political influence along its borders and inside its territory. They also face increasing desperation brought on by the costs of the Iran-Iraq war and a deteriorating economic situation. It is neither in our interest nor the interest of any of our regional friends for Iran to unravel and descend into chaos. The more pragmatic Iranian leadership, the more Iran is likely to remain intact, to sustain its position as a strategic buffer to the Soviet Union, to end its practice of exporting revolution and threatening its neighbors.

When making my decisions in the Oval Office, I must deal with the world as it is and make judgments on what best serves the interest of our country, our people, and world peace. I cannot speculate nor can I compare two totally different sets of theoretical circumstances. In the case of our military actions against Libya on April 15, we had extraordinarily clear and unambiguous evidence of Libyan government involvement in a recent act of international terrorism against Americans in West Berlin. For the past 18 months, we have not had any such similar evidence of Iranian government involvement in terrorism against Americans.

Q: OUT HERE, WE DON'T EXPECT THE PRESIDENT TO DO ONE THING AND SAY QUITE ANOTHER. HOW DO YOU EXPECT TO LIE AND HAVE US TRUST YOU AGAIN?

A: Because I haven't lied, I do expect that the vast majority of Americans will continue to believe and trust in what we say. We have only now begun to present the information concerning this sensitive initiative toward Iran. Although many Americans may still not agree with some of the actions taken, we expect that they will at least understand the strategic dimension of those actions as we have explained it. The choice may not have been easy, particularly given the risks; but there are times when a President must be prepared to run risks in the service of goals of great importance.

Q: WAS ANYTHING DONE (BY IRAN) AGAINST ITS OWN SELF-INTEREST IN RETURN FOR WHAT WE DID? ARE THERE ARRANGEMENTS WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO GIVE SUBSTANTIALLY MORE ARMS (TO IRAN) THAN THE AMERICAN PEOPLE HAVE BEEN TOLD ABOUT?

A: The officials in Iran who sought to reorient Iran's policy toward the West and the United States clearly had Iran's -- not America's -- interests in mind. They saw both the external threat to Iran from the Soviet Union and the

internal threat brought on by the exasperation with the war and a deteriorating economy. They are aware of the dangers of not dealing with Iran's growing internal problems and divisions. They recognized the need to reduce Iran's international isolation and improve relations with the West in order to respond to those threats. At no time did they act against Iran's self-interest nor would we expect them to do so. The fact of the matter is that there is a gradual congruence of interests between our two countries.

As I have said, our arms embargo remains intact and we have not and will not acquiesce in the sale of arms to Iran. The shipments I authorized were limited to defensive arms and the total of all these shipments could fit in a single cargo airplane.

Q: WHY NOT TREAT IRAN AS WE TREAT NICARAGUA, AS AN ENEMY?

A: We continue to have diplomatic relations with Nicaragua. We do so because it is my belief that we can help bring about a democratic solution to the unrest in that country by remaining there. It is important to remember that only a few major countries do not have relations with Iran. Even Iraq maintains relations with Iran.

Q: MR PRESIDENT, WHY DON'T YOU MAKE A FULLER ACCOUNTING OF WHAT YOU EXPECTED TO GET IN THIS TRANSACTION (WITH IRAN)? WHAT OTHER SHIPMENTS HAVE BEEN AUTHORIZED BY US? THERE ARE PEOPLE IN THE PENTAGON WHO CONTEND THAT SOME OF THE STUFF WAS VERY SOPHISTICATED, "BLACK BOX" EQUIPMENT. ARE WE GOING TO SHIP MORE OR DO WE INTEND TO ENCOURAGE OR ACQUIESCE IN THE SHIPMENT OF ARMS TO IRAN BY OTHER COUNTRIES?

A: We cannot and will not publicly go into the specific details of this arrangement. As I have said, all information pertaining to this operation will be provided to the appropriate members of Congress. I will reiterate that the sum total of all the equipment I authorized could fit in one cargo airplane and that there will be no further transfers of military equipment.

Q: IN LIGHT OF THE FIASCO OF IRAN, THE SWAP OF A SOVIET SPY FOR AN AMERICAN JOURNALIST, THE FAILURE OF REYKJAVIK TO MOVE TOWARDS EFFECTIVE ARMS CONTROL, THE SKIRTING OF U.S. LAWS BY SENDING AN AMERICAN ARMS-SUPPLY PLANE TO NICARAGUA, AND THE CLUMSY DISINFORMATION CAMPAIGN AGAINST LIBYA, WHAT CHANGES DO YOU PLAN TO RESTORE COMPETENCE AND CREDIBILITY TO THE CONDUCT OF U.S. FOREIGN POLICY?

A: I do not plan any changes because of false perceptions created by misinformation. First, the Soviets cannot honestly conclude that they came out even in the aftermath of their espionage activities at the UN. Second, we and the Soviets agree that important progress was made at Reykjavik and that our arms control negotiations should resume where Reykjavik left off. Third, the downed aircraft that was attempting to bring supplies to the democratic resistance in Nicaragua was not a U.S. Government aircraft or involved in any U.S. Government operation. Finally, our policy toward Libya since April has been a policy of mobilizing a variety of pressures in order to deter Qadhafi's continuing use of terrorism; there was no policy of misleading or feeding false information to the American press. The one article in the Wall Street Journal that is charged with having been used for purposes of a disinformation campaign turns out to be about 90% accurate in its reporting of facts. The remaining 10% did not come from any U.S. Government officials or sources.

Our six-year record in foreign policy is a successful record. We have restored the strategic position of the United States in the world and have before us some opportunities for important new achievements. I plan no changes in the strong team of advisors who have served the Nation tirelessly and well.

Q: IS THERE AN ACCEPTABLE MIDDLE POINT BETWEEN YOUR POSITION ON SDI (STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE) TESTING AND THAT OF SOVIET LEADER MIKHAIL GORBACHEV? ARE THERE RESTRICTIONS ON THE NUMBER, TYPE, OR CONDUCT OF SDI TESTS THAT WOULD ALLOW RESEARCH TO CONTINUE AT AN ACCEPTABLE PACE AND ALSO ASSURE THE SOVIETS THAT THE U.S. PLANS NO BREAKOUT FROM THE ABM (ANTI-BALLISTIC MISSILE)?

A: We already have a signed agreement with the Soviets governing, among other things, strategic defense testing -- the ABM Treaty. In the context of our proposal to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet offensive ballistic missiles, we are prepared not to deploy advanced strategic defenses for a 10-year period and to confine ourselves to a program of research, development, and testing, which are permitted by the ABM Treaty. What we are not prepared to do is to accept Soviet attempts to kill the U.S. SDI program by directly or indirectly amending the ABM Treaty by restrictively redefining its terms.

SDI offers us the hope of a safer more stable world. Moreover, the Soviets, who have the world's only operational ABM system, also have a long-standing, active, and extensive program of strategic defense research, development, and testing. When the Soviets are prepared to drop their

propaganda attacks on SDI, this may give us the basis for an agreement on a transition to deterrence increasingly based on defenses.

Q: YOU HAVE CALLED FOR A WORLDWIDE DEMOCRATIC REVOLUTION. WHY HAVEN'T YOU PUSHED FOR SUCH A REVOLUTION WHERE YOU HAVE YOUR STRONGEST INFLUENCE, IN SUCH AREAS AS SOUTH KOREA AND SOUTH AFRICA?

A: The democratic revolution around the world is not something I have "called for;" it is an historical fact, vindicating the fundamental principles that all Americans have always held dear. In Central America, South America, Haiti, the Philippines, and elsewhere, we see inspiring examples of democratic advance. The United States has limited influence to shape events in other countries; but we use the influence we have, and we use it to further our goals of democracy, freedom, and human rights. In the Republic of Korea, we see an allied government, facing a grave security threat from the North, committed to an unprecedented peaceful transition to a civilian democratic government by 1988. In South Africa, the United States has exerted great efforts to promote black economic advances and a political negotiation which leads to a rapid and peaceful end to the repugnant apartheid system and its replacement by a system of constitutional democracy, racial justice, and human rights.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

November 19, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ROD McDANIEL

FROM: TOM GIBSON *TG*
SUBJECT: Washington Post Questions

The President has indicated his interest in replying to the 26 questions solicited by the Washington Post in their Federal Report of today's paper. The bulk of them concern Iran.

I would like to coordinate the production of a draft response, either in the form of letter or Op Ed. Brief one to two paragraph answers should be all that is necessary for each question, but respond with the length you deem necessary. I have noted the questions for your attention. Can we try to have drafts back to me by COB Thursday. We'll do an edit and then Chew will staff.

Thanks very much.

cc: Pat Buchanan
David Chew

SOME QUESTIONS FOR THE PRESIDENT



BY RICH LIPSKI—THE WASHINGTON POST

Today at 8 p.m., President Reagan will give his first news conference in three months—his seventh this year. The Federal Page asked dozens of Americans in public life to suggest questions that they would like to see the president answer; these are some of the questions we received.

Q: Do you really believe that there are moderate elements within the Iranian government? And if there are, can there be any doubt that our association with them will diminish their influence if not eliminate their presence in the political structure of Iran?

How do you ever again go to our allies and ask them to be tough on terrorists or hold up shipment of arms to others after the disclosure of this kind of involvement in Iran?

—Walter F. Mondale, former vice president and Democratic presidential nominee in 1984

Q: What provision have you made in your dealings with Iran to ensure that no more hostages will be taken?

—John Steinbruner, director of the foreign policy studies program at the Brookings Institution

Q: Among all of the issues and problems your administration faces in defining the national interest, in what order of priority would you rank the freedom of the hostages in Lebanon?

—Norman Ornstein, political scientist

Q: In terms of institutional accountability, it would appear the NSC [National Security Council] has preempted the traditional role of the Defense Department and CIA in Central America and the State Department in Iran. What constitutional or legal authority has the NSC to aid and abet the prosecution of war without a declaration thereof by Congress in Central America, and to authorize the shipment of arms in violation of embargo statutes to belligerents in the Middle East?

—Rep. Jim Leach (R-Iowa), Foreign Affairs Committee member

Q: Since you permit [Vice] Adm. [John M.] Poindexter to appear on "Meet the Press" and "The Today Show" to answer questions, will you permit him to go and answer questions from members of Congress in a hearing?

—Kirk O'Donnell, former counsel to House Speaker Thomas P. (Tip) O'Neill Jr. (D-Mass.) and president of the Center for National Policy

Q: What effect did the United States' providing some military equipment have on the behavior of the Iranian government? Has Iran changed its attitude toward the war with Iraq, toward terrorism or toward its neighbors, including the Soviet Union?

—John C. West, former Democratic governor of South Carolina and ambassador to Saudi Arabia

Q: You said this trade was to help start a dialogue with moderate political factions in Iran. How does giving weapons to the [Ayatollah Ruhollah] Khomeini establishment help this?

—Michael (Mickey) Kantor, Los Angeles lawyer (partner of former Democratic National Committee chairman Charles Manatt and former senator John Tunney) and Democratic activist

Q: If the Khomeini and [Libyan leader Moammar] Gadhafi roles were reversed so that Gadhafi was in charge of the more strategically important country of Iran, would we bomb Khomeini and arm Gadhafi?

—Senate Appropriations Committee Chairman Mark O. Hatfield (R-Ore.)

Q: Out here, we don't expect the president to do one thing and say quite another. How do you expect to lie and have us trust you again?

—Deborah Howell, executive editor of the St. Paul Pioneer Press and Dispatch

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Q: Was anything done [by Iran] against its own self-interest in return for what we did? Are there arrangements with other countries to give substantially more arms [to Iran] than the American people have been told about?

—Sen. Patrick J. Leahy (D-Vt.), vice chairman of the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence

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Q: Why not treat Iran as we treat Nicaragua, as an enemy?

—Dinesh D'Souza, managing editor of Policy Review, the Heritage Foundation journal

North NSC Not discuss specifics

Q: Mr. President, why don't you make a fuller accounting of what you expected to get in this transaction [with Iran]? What other shipments have been authorized by us? There are people in the Pentagon who contend that some of the stuff was very sophisticated. "black box" equipment. Are we going to ship more or do we intend to encourage or acquiesce in the shipment of arms to Iran by other countries?

—Jody Powell, press secretary to President Jimmy Carter

NSC Done.

Q: Looking back over the past six years, what are the foreign policy achievements of your administration to date?

—Stansfield Turner, Central Intelligence Agency director, 1977-81

Q: Have you looked at the election results in the Upper Midwest—North Dakota, South Dakota, Minnesota—and concluded that you need to change your administration's policy toward rural America?

—Rep. Vin Weber (R-Minn.), a leader of the Conservative Opportunity Society and narrow reelection winner in an economically depressed farm district

Q: How in God's name can you go to sleep at night as a conservative with a \$200 billion [annual federal budget] deficit looking at you every year—as the biggest deficit spender in American history?

—George McGovern, former senator (D-S.D.) and Democratic nominee for president in 1972

Q: Mr. President, you came into office on a conservative platform and offered a number of measures to cut down governmental activity.

Do you think you have changed the thinking of the American people and have opened up a lasting trend toward reducing the presence of government in our daily lives?

—George Reedy, press secretary to President Lyndon B. Johnson, now journalism professor at Marquette University

Q: What are your plans for reducing the trade and budget deficits? And when are you going to stop kidding the American public and start talking about raising taxes?

—Sen. Thad Cochran (R-Miss.), Appropriations Committee member

Q: Given your reluctance to increase taxes and your reluctance and Congress' reluctance to breathe the words "Social Security," how in the world do you think you will ever cut the deficit much below \$200 billion a year? And is that [large deficit] the legacy you want to leave?

—Carol Cox, president of the Committee for a Responsible Budget

Q: You insist that budget deficits are the fault of Congress, yet in the last six years Congress has appropriated less than you have requested and you have vetoed only two appropriations bills. How do you explain these inconsistencies?

—Rep. Marvin Leath (D-Tex.), member of the Budget Committee and challenger to Rep. Les Aspin (D-Wis.) for chairmanship of the Armed Services Committee

Q: Mr. President, under the Reagan administration, the federal-city partnership has deteriorated from its historically supportive role to an adversarial relationship. When you were last in Chicago, you ducked a question about federal funding for Chicago, by citing the release of federal transit funds, which had been committed long ago and had nothing to do with the real issue facing the cities. On another occasion, you suggested that urban Americans should "vote with their feet."

My question is: What do you advise urban Americans, caught between the rock and the hard place, between the consequence of your added trillion-dollar deficit and the new tax policies on one hand, and the loss of social programs formerly funded by the federal government on the other? That is, are you still suggesting that we just mosey along somewhere else, or do you have a policy for the cities?

—Harold Washington, Democratic mayor of Chicago

Q: In light of the fiasco of Iran, the swap of a Soviet spy for an American journalist, the failure of Reykjavik to move towards effective arms control, the skirting of U.S. laws by sending an American arms-supply plane to Nicaragua and the clumsy disinformation campaign against Libya, what changes do you plan to restore competence and credibility to the conduct of U.S. foreign policy?

—John Brademas, president of New York University and former congressman (D-Ind.)

Q: The GOP lost the Senate. Republican candidates lost 13 of 16 races you campaigned in, the chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff apparently disagrees with the position you took in Iceland, and only 14 percent of the American public believes that your statement about not trading arms for hostages is essentially true. Haven't you lost a little zip off of your fast ball?

—Harrison Hickman, Democratic pollster

Q: Is there an acceptable middle point between your position on SDI [Strategic Defense Initiative] testing and that of Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev? Are there restrictions on the number, type or conduct of SDI tests that would allow research to continue at an acceptable pace and also assure the Soviets that the U.S. plans no breakout from the ABM [Anti-ballistic Missile] Treaty?

—William E. Colby, CIA director, 1973-76

Q: You have called for a policy of strength, saying this was the only way to get the Russians to behave. Can you point to one example where your military build-up and your rhetoric have succeeded in making the Russians behave better?

—Rep. Barney Frank (D-Mass.)

Q: You have called for a worldwide democratic revolution. Why haven't you pushed for such a revolution where you have your strongest influence, in such areas as South Korea and South Africa?

—Andrew Young, Democratic mayor of Atlanta and former U.S. ambassador to the United Nations

Q: Do you intend to support Vice President Bush or someone else for the GOP nomination in 1988?

—Richard Nathan, professor at Princeton, former assistant budget director and deputy undersecretary of health, education and welfare in the Nixon administration

NSC Rodman

NSC L. Hubbard

NSC - SDI; Done

NSC Rodman

THE WASHINGTON POST

WEDNESDAY, NOVEMBER 19, 1986

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