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(1,200-2takes)

White House push to change
impressions from the summit

By HELEN THOMAS
UPI White House Reporter

WASHINGTON (UPI) — A rampaging administration public relations campaign has turned the first somber impressions of defeat and failure of the Iceland summit into triumph and success, White House aides say.

The credit goes to spokesman Larry Speakes, who with the help of his deputy Peter Roussel devised a master plan to reverse the perception that President Reagan had struck out in extraordinary nuclear arms negotiations with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

Speakes and Roussel were public relations executives before joining the White House staff and they put their skills to work.

In an interview, Speakes said he had brought to Iceland a preliminary outline for Reagan's top advisers to brief reporters at the summit's conclusion, particularly since it would follow a news blackout.

The news blackout did not hold, but that is another story.

On Saturday and Sunday, Speakes said, he began to realize the historic proportions of the talks and felt it "imperative" to make sure the first impression of failure was "not a lasting one."

The first impressions were in many ways pictures: Images of an unusually gloomy Secretary of State George Shultz telling reporters Sunday of his deep disappointment; a grim Reagan escorting Gorbachev to his limousine; the Soviet leader offering conciliatory words, the president brusquely brushing him off.

By the time Reagan got into his limousine to motor to Keflavik airport, a NATO base, where U.S. airmen and their families had waited on him for eight hours, all concerned realized that they had to put the best face on the collapsed superpower summit.

Speakes said he knew immediately that a winner-or-loser label would be applied and he wanted to counteract it.

In the limousine on the way to the NATO base, White House communications director Patrick Buchanan and Dennis Thomas, right-hand man for White House chief of staff Donald Regan, wrote a speech for Reagan on 3-by-5 cards.

Reagan looked it over briefly and went before cheering crowds, smiling, telling jokes and declaring that Gorbachev wanted him to give up the "Star Wars" space defense shield.

"This we cannot and will not do," he said.

Buoyed by the crowd's wildly affectionate cheering, the president boarded Air Force One and in a quick huddle, Speakes impressed on the advisers the need for a massive campaign to capture world opinion.

Speakes produced the tieless and tired John Poindexter, the national security adviser, who gave reporters a detailed account of the sweeping negotiations, dramatic points won and lost and the decision to call it quits over the question of the space shield, called the Strategic Defense Initiative.

One of the remarkable aspects of the briefing was that it was "on the record," an extremely unusual stance for an administration that dispenses masses of information "on background," meaning the spokesman can only be identified as a "senior administration official."

In the interview, Speakes said the complexity of the issues and the need to be upfront was the motivation for letting Reagan's top aides go public.

Back in Iceland, reporters were still being briefed on background by officials who had not yet been notified that they could shed their anonymity.

Monday morning, Speakes huddled with the senior staff and a command decision was made to reach influential editorial boards, broadcasting networks and foreign media outlets, particularly television in the NATO countries.

"Fellows," Speakes recalled saying, "it is imperative that we do this."

A "lot of ground" had to be covered to fulfill that imperative, Speakes said. While some officials fanned out through Washington's media outlets, Shultz — by this time displaying tremendous stamina — volunteered to go to New York.

Five one-hour blocks of time were set aside for meetings with The New York Times, The Wall Street Journal and the three major networks.

Then, after an emotionally draining four-hour trip Thursday to El Salvador to assess earthquake damage in that nation, Shultz addressed the National Press Club Friday and appeared in a public television interview.

Other official business virtually came to a halt during the week. Reagan delivered a major address on television Monday night, evoking a tremendous outpouring of support. Tuesday, he briefed congressional leaders, television anchormen and commentators and government officials.

Some of the foreign television networks were astounded to be called by the White House and offered high officials for interviews. When Dutch television could not be reached, Speakes said they got in touch with Norwegian TV.

more

upi 10-17-86 04:00 ped

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOTED BY DTR
October 1, 1960

TO: DONALD T. REGAN

FROM JOHNATHAN S. MILLER *JSM*
Deputy Assistant to the
President for Administration

As of 8:55 this morning, the tally
of telephone calls received on the
President's Monday night address
is as follows:

Total:	7,769
Positive:	6,138
Negative:	1,631
Overall % Positive:	79%

NOTED BY DTR

October 14, 1986

WIRTHLIN 500 OVERNIGHT SAMPLE

<u>Job Rating</u>	Oct. <u>13</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>		
Overall	70	73	Pre Iceland	64
Foreign Affairs	68	66		60
USSR	69	70		67
Iceland	69	68		62
Economy	59	58		58

Speech Reaction

Oct 14

- | | | |
|---|-----------------------------------|--------|
| o | 57% saw or heard about the speech | 71%* |
| o | Favorably impressed 75/19 | 69/24* |

Iceland

	Oct. <u>13</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>
o Was Iceland meeting a success	48	53
o Was Iceland meeting a failure	44	38
o Of those who thought it a failure, who responsible?	RR 26	25
	USRR 49	50
o Only 11% Americans blame RR for "failure"- Oct. 13		
o Only 9% blame RR for "failure" - Oct. 14		

Best description of what RR accomplished at:

	<u>Iceland</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>	<u>Geneva</u>
Reduced tensions with USSR	32	NA	79
Got tougher with USSR	62	NA	19

Who gained the most at	<u>Iceland</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>	<u>Geneva</u>
US	43	39*	36
USSR	20	18*	20
Both	8	11	24
Neither	24	23	16

Was Iceland Arms Control setback?

	Oct. <u>14</u>
Setback	22% 18*
Part of larger negotiations process, No Setback	76% 80*

	<u>Agree</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>
U.S. strength allows U.S. to move more speedily with USSR towards breakthroughs on Arms reduction	73	69*	25	28
Building Star Wars defense more important to RR than Arms agreement	63	60*	36	37
Research on SDI is a good/bad	Now	75	74*	23**
	Sept	62	36	24
	July '85	67	30	
	<u>Agree</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>	<u>Disagree</u>	Oct. <u>14</u>
RR did all he could at Iceland short of caving to reach an agreement	66	NA	33	NA
Iceland shows RR doesn't want Arms Agreements as much as USSR	25	24	74	74
RR is influenced too much by the military industrial complex	51	49	48	48
RR missed his best chance to get an Arms Agreement	35	31	63	68*
Iceland was a Soviet trap to put U.S. at a continuous disadvantage	40	44	58	53*
U.S./USSR made progress in Iceland to reduce nuclear weapons	70	72	28	26
SDI is the only insurance policy U.S. has to be sure USSR will reduce their missiles	62	not asked	36	not asked
U.S. should be conciliatory with USSR.	32	32		
USSR is hostile, can't trust them, and U.S. should be hardline	67	67		

* Stat significant at .80

** Best ever

WIRTHLIN 500 OVERNIGHT SAMPLE

Job Rating

Overall	70	Pre Iceland	64
Foreign Affairs	68		60
USSR	69		67
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Economy	59		58

Speech Reaction

- o 57% saw or heard about the speech
- o Favorably impressed 75/19

Iceland

- o Was Iceland meeting a success 48
- o Was Iceland meeting a failure 44
- o Of those who thought it a failure, who responsible? RR 26
USSR 49

- o Only 11% Americans blame RR for "failure"

Best description of what RR accomplished at:

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Both	8	24
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Was Iceland Arms Control setback?

Setback 22%
Part of larger negotiations process, No Setback 76%

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
U.S. strength allows U.S. to move more speedily with USSR towards breakthroughs on Arms reduction	73	25
Building Star Wars defense more important to RR than Arms agreement	63	36
Research on SDI is a good/bad	Now 75 Sept 62 July'85 67	23 (best ever) 36 30

out 10/15/86

	<u>Agree</u>	<u>Disagree</u>
RR did all he could at Iceland short of caving to reach an agreement	66	33
Iceland shows RR doesn't want Arms Agreements as much as USSR	25	74
RR is influenced too much by the military industrial complex	70	23
RR missed his best chance to get an Arms Agreement	35	63
Iceland was a Soviet trap to put U.S. at a continuous disadvantage	40	58
U.S./USSR made progress in Iceland to reduce nuclear weapons	70	28
SDI is the only insurance policy U.S. has to be sure USSR will reduce their missiles	62	36
U.S. should be conciliatory with USSR.	32	
USSR is hostile, can't trust them, and U.S. should be hardline		67

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

10/14/86

To: Donald T. Regan

From: Thomas C. Dawson

The Commerce Department recollection is that computers and related equipment for "food processing" have been blocked on security sensitive grounds. They are trying to find details, including whether it was for a dairy product. However, Commerce is reasonably sure that there is at present talk about dairy equipment at a trade fair in Moscow, and there should be no problem with this.

We will have more details when Commerce finishes looking at its computers.

NOTED BY DTR

**THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON**

10/16/86

To: John M. Poindexter

From: Donald T. Regan

This is all I can find out so far. I have asked Dick Lyng to look into it a little more, but I still don't know what the General Secretary was talking about.

**DONALD T. REGAN
CHIEF OF STAFF**

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

THROUGH: ALFRED H. KINGON *AK*

FROM: EDWARD J. STUCKY *EJS*

SUBJECT: Dairy Equipment for the U.S.S.R.

You recently asked whether the U.S. government had denied export licenses to dairy processing plant equipment destined for the U.S.S.R. The answer is no.

The Department of Commerce examined their records from January 1, 1984 through the present. There is no record of a license request being denied or returned without action (i.e., needing more information from the exporter) for any equipment related to dairy processing plants for the Soviet Union. There also are no pending license requests for such equipment. From time to time concerns have arisen about computer equipment used in food processing (not dairy), usually in the context of the Soviets wanting spare parts or sophisticated training to repair computers. On occasion they have been denied the training or spare parts.

Commerce also quickly reviewed the license applications they have approved since 1984 and found that in January 1984 they approved an export license from Excello Corporation for a still liquid filling machine intended for use by the Soviet dairy industry. This is one indication that we are willing to provide technical assistance to the Soviet dairy industry.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 15, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: JOHNATHAN S. MILLER

SUBJECT: Update Summary of Calls Received on
President's Monday Night Address

As of 9:45 this morning, the tally of telephone calls received on the President's Monday night address is as follows:

Total:	6,673
Positive:	5,273
Negative:	1,399
Overall % Positive:	79%

It now appears that the Monday night address has generated the third highest number of telephone calls for an address made during the Ronald Reagan presidency.

The Grenada rescue mission speech generated 11,078 telephone calls and the President's April address on Libya generated 15,562 telephone calls. Please note, however, that both the Grenada and Libya speeches were over a slightly longer time period, while the total on the President's Monday night address reflects only a 36-hour time period.

cc: Patrick Buchanan
Larry Speakes

NOTED BY DTR

file

All figures are for the night of the event and the day after.

	3,409 - Total calls		
	PRO	CON	
KAL SHOOT DOWN (9/1-2)			
Grenada Invasion 10/27/83	10,336	742	93.30%
Bombing of Libya 4/14/86	11,091	4,564	70.85%

10/10/82

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at 6:00 P.M.

October 14, 1986

REMARKS BY THE PRESIDENT
DURING BRIEFING
WITH NETWORK ANCHORS AND COLUMNISTS

The Roosevelt Room

1:24 P.M. EDT

MR. BUCHANAN: Let me just state the ground rules very briefly. The President will be first. He will be ON THE RECORD, brief opening remarks, Q and A for 15 minutes, followed by the Secretary of State, the same thing; Don Regan, the same thing; and it will be over in an hour. We'll have a transcript available in Room 45 for everyone here, and we are going to release the transcript today to the press.

THE PRESIDENT: Please, sit down, and welcome to the White House. It is a particular pleasure to have you here so soon after returning from a meeting with General Secretary Gorbachev, and that meeting marked new progress in U.S.-Soviet relations.

For the first time on the highest level we and the Soviets came close to an agreement on real reductions of both strategic and intermediate-range weapons. For the first time we got Soviet agreement to a worldwide figure of 100 intermediate-range warheads for each side -- a drastic cut. For the first time we began to hammer out details of a 50 percent cut in strategic forces over five years. We were just a sentence or two away from agreeing to new talks on nuclear testing. And maybe most important, we were in sight of an historic agreement on completely eliminating the threat of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996.

I can't help remembering being told just a few years ago that radical arms reduction was an impossible dream, but now it's on the agenda for both sides. I think the first thing that is important to do is to put these talks and what occurred into perspective.

You'll recall that just over a week ago in talking about going to Iceland, I said that we did not seek nor did we expect agreements. We described our trip as a base camp before the summit to be held here in the United States. And if there was a surprise in Reykjavik, it was that we discussed so much and moved so far. No one a week ago would have thought there could have been agreement in so many areas. While we didn't sign a document, and there remains significant differences, we must not mistake the absence of a final agreement for the absence of progress.

Historic gains were achieved. As you know, after a great deal of discussion, our talks came down to the Strategic Defense Initiative -- SDI. I offered to delay deployment of advanced strategic defense for 10 years while both sides eliminated all ballistic missiles, but General Secretary Gorbachev said that his demand that we give up all but laboratory research on SDI -- in effect kill the program -- was non-negotiable.

Now the Soviets have made a strategic defense program for years, they've breached the ABM Treaty, and as I noted last night, may be preparing to put in place a nationwide ABM system. For us to abandon SDI would leave them with an immediate permanent advantage and a dangerous one, and this I would not do. Abandoning SDI would

MORE

also leave us without an insurance policy that the Soviets will live up to arms reduction agreements.

Strategic Defense is the key to making arms reduction work. It protects us against the possibility that at some point, when the elimination of ballistic missiles is not yet complete, that the Soviets may change their minds. I'm confident that the Soviets understand our position. They may try to see if they can make us back off our proposals, and I am convinced that they'll come back to the table and talk.

So here's how I would sum up my meeting with Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. We addressed the important areas of human rights, regional conflicts, and our bilateral relationship. And we moved the U.S.-Soviet dialogue on arms reduction to a new plane. We laid a strong and promising foundation for our negotiators in Geneva to build on. And I'm disappointed, of course, that Mr. Gorbachev decided to hold all agreements hostage to an agreement on SDI. But during our Geneva summit we agreed to move forward where we had found common ground, especially on a 50 percent reduction in strategic arsenals, and an INF agreement. I hope he will at least remember that commitment in the next few weeks, because for our part, we'll seek right away in Geneva to build on the democratic -- or the dramatic progress that we made in Iceland.

Now I think you have a few questions.

Q Mr. President, before going to Reykjavik you characterized Mr. Gorbachev as one of the more frank Soviet leaders with whom you have had dealings. Do you stand by that characterization or do you think Mr. Gorbachev has perhaps engaged in a little duplicity in Reykjavik?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I'm not going to use the word "duplicity" there, but I do say, having had an opportunity in these past several years and before him to speak to, while not their outright leaders -- their general secretaries, because they kept disappearing -- talk to other Russian leaders. And I think the very nature of the talks that we had in Iceland, and the fact that we were finding ourselves in agreement in the extent to which we would disarm and all.

But, yes, he was more open than I have experienced before, and it wasn't until we then got down to this proposal of theirs with SDI, but we ran into a roadblock and finally -- and he made it plain then that everything that we'd been talking about was contingent on our agreeing to that one phase.

But there's -- no, I'm not saying to you he's an easy mark in any way. He's totally dedicated to their system, and frankly, I think he is -- I think he believes sincerely their propaganda about us -- that we're beholding to industrial and military complexes and so forth.

Q Mr. President, now that you have met that base camp, is the summit -- how important right now is this summit that was originally scheduled for after the election? Is there a chance that there will be a summit, or doesn't it matter?

THE PRESIDENT: Well, he brought up the matter of summit, and referred to it several times as if he was expecting to be here for the summit. I have to say that our negotiators -- arms negotiators -- have gone back to Geneva. All of these things have gone with them, and it contains all of the notes and memorandums from all of the meetings as to the extent of the agreement that we had reached with regard to the various types of missiles and so forth.

And so I have to believe that as they continue to look at that and see that there was only one major point of disagreement that we had that -- I'm going to continue to be optimistic.

MORE

Q Mr. President, on the subject of the one sticking point that looms so large -- if you could just explain to us your reasons for the way you handled it, on one point particularly. When it became apparent that all of the concessions that General Secretary Gorbachev was willing to make in the offensive area were contingent on this demand with regard to SDI, did you feel that you had an option of saying, we'll get back to you -- we'll study this, we'll turn it over to our experts, I'll give it some more thought? If you had that option, you clearly didn't take it. You decided to make clear to him then and there and subsequently in public that you were rejecting it. Why was that necessary, particularly given the fact that you told us here only a week or so ago that no great agreements were expected out of this meeting? It's not as though we were all out there waiting for you to come out with either a big agreement or a big disagreement.

THE PRESIDENT: No, actually, as a matter of fact he, himself, from the very beginning had said that what we were talking about is the necessity for coming to some agreements that would then lead to being able to sign things and finalize things at the forthcoming summit.

So actually we progressed in those discussions farther than I think either one of us had anticipated we would. And with SDI, I think that is the absolute guarantee. First of all, I would pledge to the American people that there was no way that I would give away SDI. And looking at their own record -- the ABM Treaty -- they're in violation of that now.

Now the ABM Treaty, which he kept referring to as if it was the Holy Grail, I asked him once what was so great about a treaty that had our governments saying to our people, we won't protect you from a nuclear attack? That's basically what the ABM Treaty says. On the other hand, we know and have evidence that they have been going beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty with their Krasnoyarsk radar, which shows the possibility of being able to provide radar-directed missiles in a defense not just for one spot -- Moscow, as the treaty had provided. We never, of course, took advantage of the fact that we could defend one spot. We didn't think that was a very practical idea.

But that they are embarked on a strategic defense initiative of their own. And we feel that, first of all, there are other countries, other individuals, that now that everybody knows how to make a ballistic missile that could be and that are -- well, some have them already, others developing -- it's true that we are the two that endanger the world most with the great arsenals that we have.

But this would be the guarantee against cheating. You wouldn't have to be suspiciously watching each other to see if they were starting to replace missiles. This would be the guarantee against in the future a madman coming along. I've likened it, and I explained it to him in this way, that right after World War I -- and I reminded him that I was the only one there old enough to remember these times -- the nations got together in Geneva to outlaw poison gas, but we kept our gas masks, and thank heaven we did because now, years later, poison gas is being more and more recognized as a legitimate weapon.

Q But are you saying, sir, that he left you no choice but to say yes or no there on the spot, and that you had no option to say, very interesting, we'll study it, we'll get back to you?

THE PRESIDENT: There wasn't any need of that. There wasn't any way that I was going to back away from that -- from SDI.

Q Mr. President, are you confident that we are going to have another summit?

THE PRESIDENT: I can't say that I'm confident, that I

have any practical evidence other than the fact that he several times referred to the forthcoming summit that would take place here in the United States.

Q What did you say when he said that?

THE PRESIDENT: The only mention I made of it at all was at one point I asked him legitimately -- I said, "Would you like to propose a date -- suggest a date for that forthcoming summit?" And at that time his reason for not doing it, he said, was because, well, until we our people have all worked things out and we know about how long it's going to take to make the plans for the summit, why I think we should wait on naming a date. And that was the last time that it was mentioned.

Q Was that after the deadlock, sir? Was that after the deadlock or before the deadlock?

THE PRESIDENT: Oh, that was before the deadlock, yes.

Q Before?

THE PRESIDENT: Yes.

Q Mr. President, I'm puzzled about something. You two gentlemen talked for nearly 11 hours. Obviously there was harmony because there were unprecedented agreements between you two. And yet in the final analysis SDI became the major hang-up. I get the impression that all along Mr. Gorbachev never indicated to you that this was hanging back there in the dark. And my question is, was he deceitful?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm not going to use that word or say that because where this came up was, both of us finally at a point proposed that -- on Saturday night -- that our teams take all of these voluminous notes that had been taken in all of the meetings and discussions with all of the things that had been discussed, and they go to work that night, and they did, and they worked all night in two groups -- well, I mean there were two -- their groups and our groups, but two on each side. One of our groups was dedicated to putting together all the discussion that we'd had on human rights and regional conflicts and so forth. They worked until, as I understand it, about 3:30 a.m. in the morning. And the other group was to go through all the things to come back and find where had we really been in agreement, where there was no problem between us, and where were the sticking points that had not been resolved? And I guess that group worked until about 6:00 a.m. in the morning, didn't they? And then Sunday we went into that -- what was supposed to be a two-hour meeting and wound up being an all-day meeting.

They brought back to us -- put together the things that we had all proposed and that seemed that we could agree on, and the places where we were stuck. And that was the first time really that it became evident about SDI, because what I had proposed early on was what I talked about here. I told him that what we were proposing with SDI was that once we reached the testing stage we would -- well, before that, that right now we were ready and willing to sign a treaty -- a binding treaty that said when we reached the testing stage that both sides would proceed, because we told him frankly that we knew they were researching also on defense, nor was that ever denied. And we said we both will go forward with what we are doing. When we reach the testing stage, if it's us, we'll invite you to participate and see the tests. And if it develops that we have -- and I said or if you have perfected a system that can be this kind of defense that we're talking about, then we share, so that there won't be one side having this plus offensive weapons, but that we eliminate the offensive weapons and then we make available to all who feel a need for it or want it this defense system so that safety is guaranteed for the future.

Q Mr. President, you don't want to use the word "deceit," but I'm still puzzled. You wouldn't -- it seems to me that you wouldn't have agreed with Mr. Gorbachev as you agreed if you had known that once you got to the 11th hour he would spring this all on SDI or nothing at all.

THE PRESIDENT: Well, I think this came out of the summary then that came back from our teams to us where all of this was put together in a kind of an agreement. And what -- they weren't denying SDI openly. What they were doing was framing it in such a way that in a 10-year delay they would literally kill SDI, and there just wouldn't be any.

Q Mr. President, did you tell Mr. Gorbachev that SDI was, as you described it to us, an insurance policy that they will live up to agreements to reduce weapons? And what did he say to you in response?

THE PRESIDENT: I'm trying to remember all the things that were said. It was just that they were adamant, that -- and the use of words, it came down to the use of words, and their words would have made it not just a 10-year delay, but would have meant that we would come to the end of the reducing the weapons and we -- well, SDI would have been killed. And we proposed wording that the research that we were carrying on would be carried on within the provisions of the ABM Treaty, and this wasn't good enough for them.

MR. BUCHANAN: Thank you very much, Mr. President. Appreciate it.

THE PRESIDENT: The boss says I'm through here. You can take them up with the Secretary of State.

All right, thank you very much.

END

2:40 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at 6:00 P.M.

October 14, 1986

REMARKS BY
CHIEF OF STAFF DONALD T. REGAN
IN BRIEFING WITH
NETWORK ANCHORS AND COLUMNISTS

The Roosevelt Room

2:05 P.M. EDT

MR. REGAN: No statement. I kind of feel like the guy that -- couple guys get up, there's a home run before you, and you get up -- what are you going to do? Go ahead.

Q Can I just follow-up where we were right then, Don? Didn't the President's proposal leave us -- leave both sides with nuclear armed bombers with cruise missiles in the second five-year period, and don't we have an advantage in that area? In other words, the implication has been in public that nuclear weapons were going; it's nuclear missiles that are going -- isn't that right?

MR. REGAN: There's confusion about that, Rick. Our proposal was the reduction in the first five years. We said ballistic missiles, they said strategic nuclear arms, meaning everything. We agreed to that in the first five years -- 50 percent reduction. The second five years, we said ballistic missiles. They came back and said strategic nuclear arms, which would have included everything. There was discussion of that as to whether that meant such things, even down to artillery shells. And they said, yes, that's what they meant. But we never got a chance to finish that conversation, because the thing was swept off the table at the time of the break-up. They didn't finalize on that.

So at this point, I would say that we are at the ballistic missile elimination. They may or may not want to go further, or they may walk back from where they were; we don't know.

Q How have our European allies reacted to that proposal of ours -- eliminating ballistic missiles for 10 years?

MR. REGAN: I understand the foreign ministers discussed that yesterday, and as George said, for the moment, we catch a glimpse of a non-nuclear Europe and what to do about it, and they're starting to rethink their positions at this current moment, as to where does that leave everybody.

Q Does that keep giving them any anxiety?

MR. REGAN: I wouldn't want to characterize that, because I don't know. But I would say this, that it would be their job, it would be the jobs of their general staffs and their armed forces, to start thinking this through, as well as our own.

Q The President said that in his letter to Gorbachev, he had proposed the elimination of ballistics missiles before. Did he use the 10-year period then in the letter, or was it new at Reykjavik?

MR. REGAN: The 10-year period was never proposed by President Reagan before Reyjkavik. He did this in an effort to break the impasse. This was done in -- on Sunday afternoon after we caucused, during one of the breaks in that period, and that the effort was made at that time to see, well, what can be done. If we give them the 10 years that they are seeking -- and you've got to remember that the General Secretary was insistent upon that 10 years --

MORE

that as a matter of fact, he had started at 20 and had come down to 10.

All right, let's give him his 10 to see if then he'll agree on these other things. But in the last analysis, he did not.

Q Is the posture at the Geneva table now one of our side and their side going over minutely everything that the President and Mr. Gorbachev agreed to, to make certain both sides know where they stand before they go further?

MR. REGAN: I don't know what their side will be doing, but as you heard George Shultz say, we have provided detailed copies of all of our notes to our negotiators, so if they attempt to walk back from those agreements, either INF or nuclear testing, or indeed START, we will have the notes that this is what your people have already agreed to, and then we'll have, I dare say, a lot of discussion about that.

Q But they're saying that, now, that this is a package. Doesn't that not imply that they've -- without the whole thing, including SDI, they'd feel free --

MR. REGAN: The package came in at the very end. At the time that Gorbachev and Reagan were talking about should it be zero in Europe and 500-plus in Asia, or should it be 200 in Europe and 200 here, and 300 in Asia, or how should this be, and they finally got down to the 100-100. And Gorbachev said, all right, 100 in Asia for us and 100 in the United States for you, and Reagan said agreed. There's no mention of a package at that point. So at that point, they had agreed to this. Now, what he had in the back of his mind, we couldn't tell at that point. But he definitely didn't say at the end of that, and I link that to SDI; he did not say that.

Q But I thought that on Saturday, you had already understood, from listening to the conversation back and forth, that everything was tied, and SDI --

MR. REGAN: No, we did not understand that everything was tied. They had said -- they had talked about -- no, not that they would -- everything wouldn't be tied at the end of SDI? No, no. No. We never had an understanding of that; absolutely not.

Q That sounds like entrapment.

MR. REGAN: Pardon?

Q This sounds like entrapment.

MR. REGAN: Well, go ahead and state your question. What was the entrapment? (Laughter.)

Q Do you think it was entrapment?

MR. REGAN: No. It possibly was, but I honestly don't think that. I don't know. And it would be pure speculation on our part as to why did they, at the final hour, insist upon the package. Maybe they had gone too far in what they had agreed. Maybe in their caucusing, somebody reminded Gorbachev, you've gone pretty far on this, you better back off. Perhaps at the end, they were afraid of the world without ballistic missiles; we don't know; that would be speculation. But we do know that they used that as the deal-killer.

Q In your frank remarks at Reykjavik, you said in connection with whether there would be a future summit, no, there will not be a future summit -- that's the way they are, they don't want to give these things up. Right?

MR. REGAN: No. I said I don't see it in the near future, the possibilities of there being a summit.

Q But then you said --

MR. REGAN: And I'll stick on that statement.

Q -- then you said they don't want to give these things up.

MR. REGAN: I'll stick on that, too.

Q But what -- the impression one draws, the broad impression is that you discerned duplicity and fraud.

MR. REGAN: No. You've got to remember that each of us had different reactions. The President was quietly disappointed and concerned, tight-lipped.

Q Quietly?

MR. REGAN: -- quietly outside -- (laughter) -- the Secretary was disappointed, as was remarked earlier. His face and demeanor showed that at his press conference. My reaction was one of anger at the disappointment of that.

Q But may I ask you, Chief --

MR. REGAN: Sure.

Q -- after we've heard all these glorious achievements that occurred at Iceland -- we've heard them here, we've heard them this morning from Poindexter -- everybody is talking about the glorious achievements. Politically, why didn't you come out of that with an upbeat twist on it, instead of the downbeat twist that started all this pessimism --

MR. REGAN: I think you have to lay that to, "A," disappointment, "B," the fact that people were tired. It had been at the end of a very long day, people had been up during the night. Shultz, Poindexter, others of us had been up during the night conferring with the two teams that were working -- the human rights team and also the arms control -- arms reduction team. And then, the negotiations started, lasted much longer than anyone expected. It was then 7:00 p.m. in the evening, had been going for 12 hours with little sleep. You've got to expect, at that point in time.

Q Do you wish you put a -- that spin on it now, and --

MR. REGAN: No, I don't think we needed that spin. I think people now are beginning to realize what we did after we had had time to draw back from it, draw a deep breath and look at what had happened -- exactly where we were. It's very hard. Use any kind of a simile you want. You know, you're in the middle of the woods to discern, you know, the enormity of the forest, but there we were.

Q But if you go ahead from where you are now --

Q Have there been any communications, since the Sunday night, between Gorbachev and Reagan, directly or indirectly?

MR. REGAN: No. We have had a communication from their -- ambassador here that he would like to visit Secretary Shultz. But what that means, we don't know. But that's the only communication. I'm not sure.

One of the things that's been overlooked in our concentration here on the arms reduction phase of this is the human rights aspect of it, and we did -- the President told the General Secretary that we had a list of 11,000 names that Morris Abrams had given us, and we would be presenting that to him through Art Hartman in Moscow today, and he acknowledged that. He also told him about a list of 1,100 names, which he showed him, he had with him, from Chic

Hecht. And they went on to say -- to explain to the General Secretary why this release of Soviet Jewry is so important to us, that a man like Chic Hecht is the first -- well, second generation, I guess you'd call it -- his parents came here, and here he is a U.S. Senator. And to us, that's quite a story. And the more of those people we can get, we want. And this is why this is important to us.

So there were many things of that nature we talked about -- exchanges -- fusion, for example. We're all talking about nuclear explosions. Fusion is one of the things we've agreed to work on. And on November 1st, our teams are going to start working again on that. There are many other areas of agreement that were reached there, but of course, there all overshadowed by the arms reduction.

Q There's been no signal -- my real question is, has there been any signal since Sunday night from the Soviets that they understand that those agreements were made and they're still on the table the way you understand it?

MR. REGAN: I think through public diplomacy, we're letting them know that. Max Kampelman has talked about this since he's arrived in Geneva, we are sending people to European capitals to discuss that. George Shultz discussed it yesterday with the foreign ministers. We have gone public with the most intimate details of a major meeting between heads of state, and immediately making public the details of what they agreed to. Why? Obviously, to make certain that the world knows what was on the table so they cannot back away from it.

Q But have they said anything?

Q -- you're thinking?

MR. REGAN: Pardon?

Q Were -- in your contingency thinking, what are you going to do if you find out from Geneva that the Soviets indeed have an attitude of nothing is on the table because of SDI?

MR. REGAN: I'll fall back on a cliché: we'll cross that bridge when we get to that one.

Q Don, I think -- I think Gorbachev said that.

Q One of the intimate details that you --

MR. REGAN: Right here.

Q One of the intimate details that both the Secretary of State and you have laid stress on here today was the word, "agreed," said by President Reagan after the discussion on INF. Are you now, and is the Secretary of State today trying to nail down that agreement as something that the United States understands to have been agreed upon?

MR. REGAN: Yes. We think that that has been agreed upon between our countries, and will so state in our negotiations in Geneva.

Q If you could have divined last week before Reykjavik the outcome of Reykjavik in all of this detail, would you then have decided to go?

MR. REGAN: Yes. I think --

Q Does the President -- feel that way?

MR. REGAN: Yes, definitely.

Peter, you had a question?

Q I'm just curious sir. We've talked a lot about SDI and -- I'd like your own appreciation of this question of how afraid they are of the SDI, and -- we've asked various people to characterize their reaction to things we've said to them about sharing technology. What's yours?

MR. REGAN: Well, my own assessment is that they've been working on this, we understand, five to seven years. They had one of their leading scientists along with them, and was part of their negotiating team who literally understood the physics of this, and that this cannot be an offensive weapon, as is now conceived. And this -- I'm not sure whether it was the President or George said -- there are cheaper ways of getting at offensive weapons than to go through this. Now --

Q He said he understood that?

MR. REGAN: Pardon?

Q He said -- their scientist said that he understood that it couldn't be used --

MR. REGAN: No, no. I say, our -- we know that their scientist must understand this. These are basic laws of physics we're talking about -- immutable. And as a result, that being the case, we suspect that either they are afraid that we will have the first-strike capability, but we tried to overcome that by giving them the 10 years and the phase-out before we would deploy, which indicates that therefore they must either be afraid of what else we'll find out as we pursue SDI, or they literally don't want to get into that race because of the cost of it to them in terms of men, equipment, and the like.

Q But they don't say anything to you, right?

MR. BUCHANAN: This is the final question.

Q But they don't say anything to you? They don't characterize their views?

MR. REGAN: No, they do fall back on this first-strike. They keep telling us, that gives you the first strike.

MR. BUCHANAN: Final question.

Q If you felt that there was a separate standing agreement on INF as a result of that Sunday morning conversation, why did you all come out Sunday night and say there were no agreements on anything in the summit?

MR. REGAN: Look we weren't thinking that fast, being very frank.

Q But if you thought it was settled, you don't have to think fast.

MR. REGAN: No, wait a minute. They said at the end, all deals were off. You know, that "nyet," it's over. And they had tied the whole thing in as a package.

Q Well, you'd accepted that.

MR. REGAN: No, we didn't. What we said was, okay, if that's the way you feel, we'll leave. We left, or words to that effect. Now, we go back and reexamine what they've said, and go over our notes and so forth and realize the sequence of what had been happening.

Q My question still stands, if that was clear, why did you come out Sunday night and say there were no agreements?

MR. REGAN: No agreement, meaning that they had broken off the entire package.

MR. BUCHANAN: Jody, last question.

Q I just -- with all of this discussion about deceit and duplicity and who said what when and all, when Gorbachev was agreeing to all of these things that we had been wanting them to agree to, adopting the President's proposal on INF, largely adopting his proposal on the 50 percent reduction in strategic forces, didn't it occur to somebody that they probably were going to want something in return,

MR. REGAN: Yes.

Q -- and that what they might want in return for what they were giving on INF and strategic forces was a big piece of SDI?

MR. REGAN: Certainly. We knew that in advance, and that's why we tried during the course of the discussions to meet their requirements. Their requirements, they said, were 10 years.

Q So why were we surprised --

MR. REGAN: -- of adherence to the ABM.

Q So why were we surprised, if indeed we were -- that's the impression that I get here -- that when it came down to it at the end, that it all hung on the ability to cut an acceptable deal on SDI?

MR. REGAN: Because of what I just said. They had kept agreeing, agreeing, agreeing to all of these things. And then when we gave in at the last to their 10-year demand, they added another demand, and that was the laboratory.

MR. BUCHANAN: That's it.

END

2:21 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

NOTED BY DTR

October 14, 1986

MEMORANDUM FROM: MITCHELL E. DANIELS, JR.

SUBJECT: SDI POLLING DATA

Recent D/M/I survey material (Sept. 18-21, 1986) showed that 62% of all Americans believe that research on SDI is a good idea while 36% believe it is a bad idea.

Seventy-five percent of those questioned who identify themselves as Republicans believe research is a good idea as do 51% of those identified as Democrats. Conservatives support SDI research 66% to 32%; moderates support it 63% to 32%; and liberals by 55% to 44%. Interestingly, support for SDI was markedly weaker among the youngest voters: those 18-24 were split 51%-49%.

Regional support for SDI is consistently strong. Voters in the northeast support research funding 59% to 38%; in the mid-west 61% to 37%; voters in the south favor research 66% to 33% and in the west those polled support SDI 59% to 38%.

A July 1986 poll, sponsored by the Committee on Present Danger and conducted by the polling firm of Penn & Schoen Associates, also found strong support for SDI development. In this survey, 81% favored development of an SDI system, and 78% of those polled supported deployment of a system if it proves practical.*

* The discrepancy between the two findings is probably due to the difference in the questions asked. In the D/M/I survey, respondents were read the principal arguments pro and con before being asked their views on SDI.

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Release at 6:00 p.m.

October 14, 1986

PRESS BRIEFING
BY SECRETARY OF STATE GEORGE P. SHULTZ
WITH NETWORK ANCHORS AND COLUMNISTS

The Roosevelt Room

1:40 P.M. DT

Q Mr. Secretary, since the -- right after the summit when you had the meeting in the press room there, you had a, I thought, a very pessimistic account of what happened. What has changed since then? I mean, you said that you got nothing --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I didn't say that.

Q Well, what has changed? The mood has obviously changed.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, I got a good night's sleep, for one thing. And another, I went and met with my counterparts in NATO and described to them what happened and they were astonished at the progress that was made and very supportive of what happened. And reflecting on what took place, it is astonishing the amount of progress that was made. And, of course, we labored hard and long over a very exhausting day and we didn't quite get all of the things that we wanted and so you're always a little down as a result of that. But -- so you'll just have to attribute it to that.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you or any of the President's advisers urge him to accept the Soviet deal or something short of a flat rejection?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. I think it would have been a great mistake to have gone along with that and nobody so advised.

Q He did not hear any argument from his advisers?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: But the discussion about defense came all the way through, but then very heavily on Sunday afternoon. And it went on for an hour or so. Then we had a caucus for about an hour and half, I guess, during the -- about an hour of which I met with Shevardnadze along with our advisers and then we had a couple of other periods with caucuses. So it was a very intense effort to find an agreement.

The Soviets had put their position forward early on and I think we have to remember that they've been saying things about laboratory research for a long time, so it wasn't as though it was something new. But in the material they put forward, particularly in that first session on Sunday afternoon, there was a lot of emphasis put on the importance, while reductions were taking place, of a period of known nonwithdrawal, that is, nondeployment for the reduction period. And so we had discussed this off and on over a period of time and as a matter of fact, Don, we discussed it Saturday night quite a little with the President.

And during the course of our meeting there emerged -- and the President made some very creative suggestions about it -- a proposal that both preserved the essence of the strategic defense program and provided in, I think a very strong way, for a 10-year nonwithdrawal period. And, as a matter of fact, as we went back at it with the Soviets, the structure of that proposal did settle in, but then there were other aspects of it to be argued about. But the

MORE

central one, it turned out, was this question of their desire to have a change in the ABM Treaty -- they called it a strengthening -- that would restrict what could be done to the laboratory and I think we shouldn't talk about it as though it was an argument about a word or an argument about a definition. It wasn't. It was an argument about whether or not we would be able to do the work necessary to develop our ability to defend ourselves. And it became clear -- and this was gone at a lot and a lot and a lot -- that the President wasn't going to give and shouldn't give on that, and that the Soviets were not going to -- we were not going to be able to come to closure on that and so the meeting ended on that basis.

But it was a very creative fruitful exchange and the President was -- a lot of give and take and really tried to break through this and I think that that effort, after a long day, was perhaps more in our minds than in the perspective of things was warranted, because so much progress had been made. It was just gigantic.

Q Mr. Secretary, what objections did the Soviets put forward to SDI? Did they give reasons why they are opposed to the concept?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, they've given various reasons. They basically think that it would be used as an offensive system. I think the idea of using it as a direct offensive system is not sensible, because there are much cheaper and known ways of having an offensive system. The other kind of argument is different; namely, that if you have a defensive system and you have offensive systems in place, then the side that has the defensive system has an advantage and can conduct a first strike. However, having that in mind is among the things that led the President to propose in his letter to Mr. Gorbachev of some time ago and then in this most recent proposal, to have a period in which the offensive ballistic missiles are eliminated. So if you have no offensive ballistic missiles, it's hard to see how they could be used to conduct a first strike.

Now, I think that everybody has to think things over and maybe they'll think things over and we'll see what an important thing it is to have this 10-year nonwithdrawal period. But, at any rate, everybody is digesting and we'll see where we go.

Q Mr. Secretary, earlier the President told us if there was a surprise at Iceland, it was the amount of progress. Wasn't there, indeed, a great surprise to our delegation at Iceland at the degree and scope of the agenda that the Soviets had in mind? And is it a good idea to go into a summit meeting without any idea of an agenda?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We had a very good idea of an agenda and that we were going to have our full agenda and we did. The scope of work and the -- all of the ins and outs of various issues of arms control, as I'm taking that's the focus of your attention, have been worked over a lot. We were well prepared. We had our first team there to give backup on anything. And, I might say, we could be sure that they were very serious, because of the quality of people they brought, including the -- their top military person -- their Chief of Staff. So, that was clear.

Now, in the -- looking toward the meeting in Iceland, well, we thought it would be good to make some progress, make as much progress as possible. Exactly what remained to be seen. But when it -- and there was all of this talk that they had put out and people had written about -- you probably wrote about it -- that INF and nuclear testing was going to be the focus. And we had said to ourselves here, well, if that's it, so be it. But our object must be to get into START. That is where the bulk of these missiles are and those are the ones that threaten the United States. So we want to be sure that we get an adequate discussion of that.

Well, as this all emerged, the President could see that there were some real opportunities for getting somewhere in these areas and he just drove right into it. And, as a result, we came away from the meeting with astonishing progress in all of the areas without exception. And just because we didn't complete everything in a two-day period doesn't mean that the accomplishments aren't tremendous.

Q Mr. Secretary, you keep saying that all this is predicated upon --

Q Mr. Secretary, is it fair to say that you came into the Sunday meeting surprised, or maybe even stunned, at the success you had achieved up to that point -- compared to what you expected before you left Washington? Is that a fair statement?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it's not a fair statement.

Q You just said you were astonished.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I said that it was -- that these were very great accomplishments -- more than anyone could have expected. But to say that we were stunned is not the word that I would use. I would say that we went there well prepared and when we saw opportunities, we charged into them and tried to take advantage of them and work them out as best we could and by and large did so. It was a --

Q Mr. Secretary?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I might say, the President's performance was terrific.

Q On the ABM Treaty, were the Soviets -- was Gorbachev, in effect, arguing to reestablish what used to be called the narrow or the old traditional interpretation of the treaty?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No. No. The discussion wasn't about how do you interpret the treaty.

Q But, I mean --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That was not the discussion. The discussion was about a proposed change in the treaty, which they called a strengthening -- but a change in the treaty. The treaty has nothing in it about confining research to laboratories. This would be a change in the treaty. That's what he sought.

Q But that used to be our interpretation, as well.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, it was not -- the so-called narrow interpretation does not confine anything to laboratories. You find nothing in the treaty about laboratories.

Q Then leaving aside what the Soviets -- the way the Soviets are trying to change or strengthen the ABM Treaty, what exactly is our government's position in that regard? In your language to us in the press room on Sunday night, you used the phrase that was in the Reagan letter to Gorbachev, which is "...permitted with regard to research, development and testing."

SECRETARY SHULTZ: That is our position -- that our work is as permitted -- or which is permitted by the ABM Treaty.

Q So, assuming that much will hinge on how the coming months deal with this issue, it's important for us to understand whether we are now saying that whatever else happens, the ABM Treaty must be permissibly interpreted if it is to continue in effect. Is that the U.S. position?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Our position is that what we are doing is that which is permitted by the ABM Treaty. And that is our position.

Q Well, let me put the question differently. Is our position that the development and testing of nonground-based exotic defensive systems is permitted by the ABM Treaty?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Sure.

Q Is that -- that is the permissive or broad interpretation?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: The -- our position is as I've stated it, and I'm not going to get into, in a sense, bargaining about it with you. So, I don't think it's necessary that you know all of our positions.

Q You don't think it's necessary if we understand what the U.S. government's --

SECRETARY SHULTZ: No, I don't.

Q -- understanding of the ABM Treaty is?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think we are engaged in a process with the Soviet Union and we're going to conduct it.

Q Mr. Secretary, did you sense at the time of the discussion of SDI that there was any give in the area of testing in that you might want to sort that out further in conversation there and then with them or did they close you off by limiting even research to laboratory research? Was that what shut it off? And do you foresee down the road any give in the area of testing?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Descriptively, the discussion went on as I said. And in the end, it was clear that when it came to agreeing to things that, as we saw it, would cripple the program to get a strategic defense we wouldn't do it. And it was clear that they were driving hard at that and they weren't going to give up on that, at least not there. And, so, I think it was a good judgment on the part of both leaders to say, well, we've probably accomplished all that we can in these two days and, when you look at it, the amount accomplished, as I said, is really very great.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Admiral Poindexter said here yesterday, Mr. Secretary, that there was a possibility that once these things were fully explained to the Soviets that some change, some adjustment in our position might be possible that would bridge this thing. Can you see the potential for a bridge between our positions with which each side left Iceland?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, we're engaged in a major bargaining here and just how it's going to go we'll see. I will keep my cards here in my vest pocket and we'll just see, that's all.

Q Mr. Secretary?

Q Mr. Secretary, can I just ask about -- the President said that the Soviets there held all the other agreements hostage to the final agreement on SDI. In Geneva, are you seeking now to break that linkage and how optimistic are you that you can, in fact, deal with these other agreements separately from the SDI question?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: We had an intensive two days and we discussed a great many things kind of in a close packed amount of time. So you get a sense of relationships among them. Now, at the end there was all of this talk about linkage -- that's what people do

-- and so the meeting is over and we will proceed in Geneva and elsewhere to table our positions, which will be the positions that were worked out in Reykjavik, and move ahead. And we'll just make the assumption -- they may not -- that on INF, for instance, we have a deal. Yes, we had a moment of time during Sunday morning when, after what seemed like an endless amount of back and forth, finally Gorbachev said, well, all right, Mr. President -- bang, bang, bang, bang -- I'll accept the U.S. position on Asia. And the President said, "Agreed." So, that was the end of the INF discussion. Didn't have an opportunity in the call of the meeting to do what we had done with respect to START -- was to sit down with people who are technically into the subject and write it down carefully. So, there's always a problem in that. But, nevertheless, in terms of the basic structure, there was a deal just as -- in START, it was actually reduced to a very carefully stated piece of language. And in the space defense area, there was language out on the table and back and forth on that so that there is -- there has been a tremendous advance, compared with where we were before Reykjavik in just how that subject stands.

MR. BUCHANAN: Charles, last question. Excuse me.

SECRETARY SHULTZ: Well, let me put this in a little different way. The President's second meeting with Gorbachev was on Columbus Day, and if you think about Columbus, he came this way and he found a couple of islands. He went back, he didn't have any gold and, on the whole, he wasn't greeted that warmly. But then it began to dawn on people that Columbus had discovered a new world. And I think that in many respects the President discovered a new world at Reykjavik. The difference, however, is that he was able to recognize it. He was able to recognize it, because he had described it several years ago. One piece of the new world is what we call the INF, and what was agreed to is very close to zero, zero.

Another part of that world is cutting strategic forces in half. And, as you remember, when the President put those proposals forward, he was said -- probably by lots of you -- go look at your copy -- that that's ridiculous, it shows he isn't serious about arms control. But what was there he recognized, because he had proposed it.

On the subject of getting ourselves out from under the threat of offensive nuclear strategic missiles, which he described in March, 1983, he could recognize what was taking shape and we didn't finally make it. But, nevertheless, the contour is recognizable. The same is true for many areas in bilateral relations and, to a degree, the discussion of -- as the Soviets were willing to say publicly, although we never were able to issue the document -- for the first time to our knowledge in a bilateral statement -- to use the words discussion of humanitarian and human rights issues; that is, both used. So, that's a piece of the landscape that was recognized.

So, I think that we may look back on the Reykjavik meeting as a genuine watershed meeting and all of the things that were agreed to, to be sure, tentatively, are known. We have been going out of our way and the Soviets, I guess, too, to make public exactly what was agreed to. So, everybody knows it now -- it's there. And once it's there, people can see the meaning, the contours and the implications which are sweeping, and deep, important, and I think very much in the interests of the U.S.

The President called him the boss, but I won't do that.

MR. BUCHANAN: Do you want to take one more, Mr. Secretary, from Charles here?

Q The one piece of this -- I find rather hard to understand which is your offer to the Soviets to eliminate all ballistic missiles in 10 years. Given the conventional imbalance in

Europe and the fact that the Western Alliance is hinged on our strategic guarantee for the last 40 years, wouldn't this spell the end or, at least, the greatest crisis in the Western Alliance if that actually took place?

SECRETARY SHULTZ: I think that it's very important for the Alliance, very important for the United States to work on our conventional forces. And we've been doing that. And it seems to me very timely, because the fact of the matter is that aside from what was set out in Reykjavik, there is undoubtedly an unease in Europe and in the United States and all over the world somehow or other about nuclear weapons. And I believe it is true that the probability of their use is very, very small. But if that probability -- but that probability is not zero. So, if you have a small probability multiplied by an absolute calamity, it should get your attention. And if you can -- and it does.

So I think it is well to be thinking about conventional abilities and I might say that I don't -- here I speak as an absolute layman -- I have gotten -- all my military doctrine was in the Marine Corps in World War II, so I'm out of date -- but I, by no means, accept that the Soviets are automatically better than we are in our conventional capabilities. We have first class Navy, first class Air Force, very good equipment. Our equipment and their equipment has been pitted against each other on a number of recent occasions and we've done all right. And I imagine it must gnaw a little bit at the Soviets that here they are in Afghanistan right next door to them -- they can't handle those Afghan freedom fighters. They can't handle them.

So, they are a tremendous country with great ability and a truly awesome military capability. And I would say particularly when they are defending their homeland. But I would by no means sell our ability short to hold our end up in providing conventional deterrence.

MR. BUCHANAN: Thank you very much, sir.

END

2:04 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE
Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

PRESS BRIEFING
BY
ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER,
NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR

The Briefing Room

4:05 P.M. EDT

MR. HOWARD: Good afternoon. This briefing in ON THE RECORD, but not for camera, and our briefer is Admiral John Poindexter.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Because these issues are so complex, we made a decision yesterday evening that we would go ON THE RECORD with a great deal of detail about the discussions and talks in Iceland. So what I'd first like to do is to go through each of the major areas, specifically in the arms control, because I think the arms control areas are the most complex, and indicate to you what -- how the discussions went and what we achieved, and then after I finish all that, I'll take your questions. And then I may read something to you at the end, which is kind of a closing statement.

Q Why don't you read that first?

Q Yes, could we get to -- is there anything --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The bottom line first.

Q Yes.

Q -- that deals with the speech tonight?

Q Because we do have that pool report.

Q We're up against a deadline --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right.

Q -- that's going to force us to --

Q Is it true -- did you really kneel at the feet of the press on the plane yesterday? (Laughter.)

Q He asked our apologies.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not very long. It was too uncomfortable.

This very short statement here kind of summarizes what I think was the bottom line. We offered the Soviet side an agreement concerning strategic defenses that held the promise of a far safer and more stable world -- a world unburdened by offensive ballistic missiles in which defense would serve to ensure us both against third countries that might acquire these missiles and would ensure the free world against Soviet cheating.

In response to Soviet concerns, we offered to defer the

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deployment of strategic defenses for 10 years, until after all ballistic missiles have been eliminated. And we agreed that during the 10 years in which the disarmament process went forward we would abide by the terms of the ABM Treaty.

But Mr. Gorbachev demanded more than that. He demanded that we agree to limit research on strategic defense immediately in a manner that went far beyond the restrictions of the ABM Treaty. This demand could have no other purpose than to force the United States to abandon any hope of successfully developing the defenses that we would acquire to ensure that the disarmament process did not leave us hopelessly vulnerable to Soviet cheating as the last of our ballistic missiles were dismantled. And it would have required that we now abandon meaningful research on strategic defense without any assurance that the other elements of our proposed agreements would in fact be implemented fully and properly.

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Again and again, the President asked Mr. Gorbachev what possible objections he could have to the deployment of defenses after ten years. And after having eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. Again and again, the President pressed him to explain how defensive systems, wholly lacking in offensive capability could threaten the Soviet Union. The President never received a satisfactory answer, or even a plausible response.

To go through each of the areas -- well, let me give you a little bit of color, I guess, first. (Laughter.) We went to Iceland --

Q Empty-handed.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not empty-handed, by any stretch of the imagination. (Laughter.)

Q It's better than empty-headed.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's the Soviet line, though.

Q You've got that down, Helen. (Laughter.)

Q Come on --

Q Let's go.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We went to Iceland very well-prepared. Granted, we took all of you by surprise by agreeing to go so rapidly, but don't forget that we have been working toward a summit in the United States sometime near the end of this calendar year. We have been working for months on all of our arms control proposals, we had had expert-level meetings with the Soviets, both in Moscow and in the United States, as well as Geneva. So we very well knew what their positions were, and what our maneuvering room was. We had had expert- and political-level meetings in the other areas of our agenda on regional issues, human rights and bilateral issues.

But because we weren't sure whether the Soviets were ready to move on these various issues, we thought the best that we could probably hope to get out of Iceland was a focusing of the agenda for a Washington summit. But we were surprised, pleasantly surprised, that the Soviets were ready to talk in detail about some of the obstacles to progress, especially in Geneva.

So, out of the heads of state meetings and the working-level meetings that we held all throughout Saturday night and early Sunday morning, we were able to reach some significant solutions to many of the obstacles to progress. In the START area, we agreed with the Soviet Union that both sides, in a START agreement at some point in the future, would come down to 1,600 strategic nuclear delivery vehicles on each side, that we would come down to 6,000 nuclear warheads on each side. We cleared up some of the problems that we'd been having with the Soviets on the counting rules, on how you count those 6,000 warheads.

We wanted to, and did engage them in discussions of some sublimits that we think should exist in a START agreement, but they were unwilling, at least at Iceland, to agree on any of these sublimits, so those sublimits remain a matter for negotiation in Geneva. They did say, though, that they were prepared to make significant cuts in the heavy ICBMs, which is a very high priority for us. And we were unable to pin them down, though, on exactly what "significant" means. But I think we're moving in the right direction.

Q What was the 50 percent, then?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. The 50 percent, essentially is the 6,000 nuclear warheads -- is about 50 percent of where we are today.

Q But in the sublimits there were no percentages?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We had some percentages. I don't want to get into those right now, because we don't have agreement on them. But they were unwilling to agree to some of the specific sublimits. They were unwilling in Iceland to agree to a structure of sublimits. They said why not disagree on the 6,000 and then both sides can have whatever mix they want to make up the 6,000. We're not prepared to do that, because we want to make sure that we get proportional cuts in the more urgent, prompt delivery systems, such as the ICBM's.

Q Was this over a five-year period?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: In the discussions in -- on START up to this point, there wasn't any discussion of time periods. I'll get to that in a minute. That came later.

Q Was this the first time they've ever made the suggestion that they were willing to make significant cuts in the big ICBM's?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have --

Q -- heard that before?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't have my arms control expert here and I'm not sure enough to answer your question. I believe it is the first time, but I can't swear to that.

Q Well, presumably they're referring to the 308 SS-18s.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, exactly.

Q And do you have any notion what they mean by significant cuts at all?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No.

Q What would be significant from our perspective?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't want to get into that -- it gets into our negotiating position that's not agreed upon yet. But they say significant; we'll have to wait and see what that means.

All right. So, all of those things that I went over were agreed upon in the discussions on START.

Q When? This was on Saturday?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it was Saturday and Saturday night, Sunday morning -- the late night meeting.

Q When you -- Admiral, when you say these are agreed upon --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, yes --

Q -- do you feel that they remain agreed upon, despite the failure to reach an overall agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we are going to, as they say in the negotiating business, pocket these various pieces that they've said they would agree to. I think clearly whether they will admit now that they have agreed to these things or not remains to be seen,

but in the meetings they did agree to them and we will try to hold them to that agreement at some point in the future.

Q Didn't Gorbachev say that all of these proposals remain on the table?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Gorbachev -- that's what I was going to add, Sam. In the press conference, at least the summary of it that I read that he conducted in Reykjavik last night -- my read of that is that he's leaving these things that they're prepared to agree to on the table. So we will hold him to that.

Q As linked or --

Q -- a link?

Q -- as a link package or as a package in its individual --

MR. SPEAKES: Let me make a suggestion. Would it be better to have John walk everybody right through the whole thing, hold your questions until he finishes and then pick them up.

Q Yes.

Q Yes.

MR. SPEAKES: Because he's going to answer a lot of them as he goes through and he'll go through the negotiating back and forth in the evening and Sunday.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. On INF, it was raised on Saturday afternoon. Our position was that the Soviet SS-20s in Asia must be addressed and they must be reduced by some amount, roughly in proportion to the reductions in Europe. The Soviet position was zero-zero in Europe for both sides, and they wanted a freeze on the systems in Asia with the U.S. having the right to deploy an equal number in the United States as they had in Asia. That was unacceptable to us because we have not wanted to shift the locust of the problem from Europe to Asia and burden our Asian allies with a problem -- a bigger problem than they now face.

Also because of the mobility of the SS-20s, they could be moved back and forth across the Ural Mountains, and because in the Western parts of Asia the SS-20 can still reach parts of Europe, we felt that we had to simply get them to agree to some sort of reduction in Asia.

So the President held out there for cuts in Asia and finally on -- and the negotiating -- the working group that night held firm with that position for the Soviets. And finally on Sunday morning, Gorbachev agreed to make some cuts in Asia. What he agreed on was 100-100 warheads globally. With the 100 for the Soviets in Asia and the 100 for the U.S. in the United States.

We agreed to that. That would make a 100 percent reduction in Europe and an 80 percent reduction in Asia. Or, stated another way, that would bring the Soviets from today 1,323 warheads down to 100.

On INF, earlier in the discussions, they had agreed on freezing their short-range INF and beginning negotiations on short-range INF after the long-range INF agreement was signed. There was discussion on verification. We have three major points that we want to get accepted on verification -- an exchange of data both before and after the reductions take place; second, we want on-site observation of the destruction of the weapons; and third, we want an effective monitoring arrangement to put in place after the weapons are destroyed with the provision for on-site inspections during this monitoring.

The Soviets although did not want to -- as usual, they did not want to get into detail in talking about verification, indicated that in principle they didn't have any problem with those provisions. But I'm not naive enough to think that we don't have a lot of hard work ahead negotiating out these verification provisions. But we're very pleased with this agreement on INF. We think that this substantial reduction in Asia accounts for what we were looking for and certainly the zero-zero in Europe is desirable from our point of view.

On nuclear testing, I think you're all familiar with the statement that the President made, or Larry made for the President, the night we arrived in Iceland, which was a slight change to our game plan on nuclear testing. Are you familiar with that, or do you want me to go through that?

Q We're familiar with that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. The -- in the discussions with the Soviets, they essentially agreed with that sort of game plan -- that we would begin negotiations in which the first item would be improved verification procedures, and we would not move beyond that first agenda item until it was agreed upon, and then we would move on to negotiating further limitations on nuclear testing, with the ultimate goal being a comprehensive test ban, as we reached the point that we no longer have to rely on strategic nuclear weapons for deterrence.

Now, there was disagreement, though, with the Soviets on how we characterize such negotiations. They want to characterize the negotiations as negotiating a comprehensive test ban and we want to characterize it as negotiations on further limitations on nuclear testing. And there is, of course -- the reason for the difference in the way it's described, there's a -- each side has a slight different objective out of a set of negotiations like this.

They want us to agree to a comprehensive test ban very soon. We have indicated that we will agree to a comprehensive test ban in the future, but it's in conjunction with a program that brings the offensive forces down so at the time you reach zero strategic nuclear weapons, at that point we would be willing to agree to a test ban.

But I think, as time goes on, we will be able to work this out with the Soviets and begin a set of negotiations in the nuclear testing area that will result in improved verification procedures. And then we can get the two treaties fully ratified and move on to discussing further limitations.

So all of these things that I've said were agreed upon at this point are held hostage by General Secretary Gorbachev to our agreeing to what they want on the ABM Treaty. Their opening position in the meetings in Iceland was that the United States should agree not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for ten years and that we also agree to modifying the ABM Treaty to make it more restrictive than it presently is, even under our restricted definition of the ABM Treaty.

Q That was their opening position on Saturday morning?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's correct. In effect, they have -- that's not a new position for them. They have maintained that for a long period of time in Geneva, that they want us to agree to tightening up, making more restrictive -- they refer to it as strengthening the ABM Treaty.

Q The ten years was new.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The ten years was new in Iceland. Because up to this point, they had been talking about up to 15. Recall when they first started talking about this -- and I've lost track of time, but Gorbachev talked about 15 to 20 years. And then in -- I guess that was their June proposal in Geneva, 15 to 20 years.

And then, in Gorbachev's letter to the President, in response to the President's letter to him of July the 25th, Gorbachev said up to 15 years, and in Iceland, they came to 10 years.

Q Yes, sir. You mentioned -- you indicated that you believe that these agreements remain viable, yet Mr. Gorbachev holds him hostage to --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let -- yes?

Q I'm wondering whether they are viable in their separate parts, in your view, or whether it still is all interlinked?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they're still linked. But let me go on, because I haven't quite finished the basic facts here. The Sunday morning session was devoted almost exclusively -- well, they got the INF issue out of the way rather rapidly, and the rest of the session was devoted essentially to ABM and SDI.

After the break that came, I guess at 1:30 p.m. or so on Sunday when they stopped the morning session, Secretary Shultz and I and some others met with Shevardnadze and some of his people at 2:00 p.m., in which we sat down and tried to see if we could find some way of getting around this problem with the Soviets wanting us to adhere to the ABM Treaty for 10 years, and make this more restrictive change to the ABM Treaty.

After the session that the Secretary and I had with Shevardnadze, we met with the President when he came back to Hofdi House, and we worked out a compromise position, a new proposal for us, that the President then tabled when he met with Gorbachev at 3:00 p.m. It was about 3:30 p.m., I guess. And the proposal goes like this: that the United States is prepared not to withdraw, or is willing not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for five years, during which time both sides would achieve the 50 percent cuts that they had agreed upon in START, and the United States would continue the research, development and testing which is permitted by the ABM Treaty, and at the end of the five-year period, if the reductions take place,

and if the Soviets are willing to continue to reduce offensive ballistic missiles for the next five years so that by 1996, in this case, both sides would have eliminated all offensive ballistic missiles. Under those conditions the United States would be prepared not to withdraw from the ABM Treaty for the second five-year period, so for a total of 10 years.

At the end of that 10-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system if they so chose unless both sides agreed otherwise.

Now we felt that that was an imminently fair position, it was a change to what we have proposed in the past, but we thought that if Gorbachev was really interested in eliminating offensive ballistic missiles, this would clearly indicate to him that we were not interested in developing any sort of first-strike capability and we couldn't see that there was any way that deploying a strategic defensive system after the offensive ballistic missiles were eliminated could in any way threaten the Soviet Union.

After tabling this proposal, Gorbachev almost immediately said that they didn't agree, and they came forward with a revision to ours, which would have had us agree that all research, development and testing of space-based strategic defense systems would be banned except that that was done in the laboratory.

Q Was that tied to reductions? Was that their version of the ABM side of the equation?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That is correct. That was also -- that was tied to reductions.

Q May I just -- is this the -- when they came forward with this counterproposal, was it one that you suggested earlier, you were really familiar with from the Saturday discussion?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, they had never -- they hadn't put it quite that precisely, and linked in that way. They had talked about wanting to make more restrictive the provisions on research, development and testing in the ABM Treaty,

and they had talked in terms of strengthening it.

Q So, they had on Saturday morning said they wanted to make more restrictive the treaty. And here came the exact language of the proposal.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That's right. The way that they would make it more restrictive.

Q Thank you.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: At that point, or shortly after that, both sides caucused and we went over their rewrite of our proposal and moved their rewrite back in our direction by insisting on the ability to conduct research, development and testing, which is permitted by the ABM Treaty during the whole 10-year period. Their counter to our first one did not make explicit that at the end of the 10-year period, both sides would be free to deploy a strategic defensive system. They, obviously, would want to interpret that as being uncertain at that point and still open to negotiations at the end of the 10-year period, which we were unwilling to accept.

So we added the research, development and testing that's permitted by the ABM Treaty back into their proposal and we added the ability at the end of the 10-year period to deploy strategic defense -- we added that back in. After the caucus, the President -- in the caucus, the President decided that would be our last and final offer and he took that back in and Gorbachev would not agree. He insisted upon the research being restricted to the laboratory.

Now --

Q How long did that take, Admiral? Did that -- after the President goes back in with his final offer and the General Secretary turns him down, how long is this discussion at this point?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, let's see, I lost track. It was --

Q 5:00 p.m. to 6:30 p.m.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: -- 3:30 p.m. to 5:30 p.m. It would be about -- I guess --

Q 5:35 p.m.?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you probably have it better than I. I don't remember -- yes, I don't remember the times, because I wasn't looking at my watch.

MR. SPEAKES: It's just the end time of the second meeting. It started at 4:33 p.m.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It was the time from the -- when they went back in after the caucus until we -- they finally broke up about 7:30 p.m.

Q Do you have any color on that in terms of what was said and how it finally was broken off?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: The President said that after they had discussed it for a good long period of time, he realized they weren't going to get anyplace and so the President pulled his papers together and got up. And Gorbachev got up and they both walked out.

Q Can you explain how seriously would the Soviet restrictions on testing hurt us?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it would be, we think, essentially killing the SDI program.

Let me just see if I've got any other points I want to

make and then I want to assess what I think all this means and then I'll take your questions.

Q Well did the President say anything when he pulled the papers together?

Q Was there an exchange on that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sure there was but I don't have it verbatim and so I don't want to --

Q Do you have the gist of it -- I mean --

Q Can you take that question?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Beg your pardon?

Q Could you take that question? It's a fairly important historical point, what was said in the meeting, and I wondered if you would take the question and get us an official --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They want us to take the question on exactly what the President said when he got up.

MR. SPEAKES: We take a lot of questions.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: All right. (Laughter.)

MR. SPEAKES: We'll ask him when he comes over tonight and see if he --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Okay. We'll take the question.

Q Do you have the tone of it?

MR. SPEAKES: We'll take a family newspaper first.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I think that the President was somber. We recognize -- the President certainly recognized that what he was proposing was an historic proposal. It would have resulted in 10 years in both sides eliminating all ballistic missiles. The world would be a lot safer. But our problem is and we're not questioning the sincerity or the trustworthiness of the present Soviet leaders, but the history --

Q Why do you want insurance, then?

Q Let him finish.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Let me finish here. The history of the relationship is such that in the past they have not complied with treaties. And when the national security of the country depends on the Soviets complying with a treaty such as this, and the national security of much of the free world, then it absolutely essential and the only prudent thing to do is to have some sort of insurance policy against failure to make the reductions or failure to comply with the total ban on into the future.

The other problem is the problem of nuclear weapons possessed by third countries -- if at some point in the future non-proliferation breaks down, nuclear weapons spread -- I mean, there are third countries today that have nuclear weapons that we would prefer not have them -- and it is only prudent and reasonable that not only the United States but the Soviet Union, in reality, would want some sort of defensive system to guard against non-compliance or the weapons of a third country.

Now I think -- those are all of the main points I wanted to make so I'll open it up to questions now.

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Q I'm -- what I don't understand is why you expected that the Soviets would buy off on this in view of their -- the position that you say has been their traditional position they've maintained about SDI. Why was there a surprise that they wanted to restrict it to the laboratory and stick so strongly to this view?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, you know, one has to try to assess, you know, why are the Soviets opposed to SDI? Now, presumably, one of their concerns would be that they don't trust us, maybe, and they would think that what we were doing is working on a system that, once we achieved it, would give us a first-strike capability. So, you know, if we're willing before deployment to eliminate all offensive ballistic missiles, then the problem of first-strike doesn't exist. So if that was their problem, this would have solved it.

Q Admiral, I'm going to make sure I understand you now. You're saying the President broke off the final hour of the talks, and at that point, can you give us any sense of what Gorbachev said, when the President took his papers --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I just -- you know, we have been so busy today --

Q I understand that --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER -- and we have not gone back, and I have not read the translators' record, so I don't know exactly what was said.

Q But what did Gorbachev do when the President took his papers?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That Gorbachev folded up his folder and he got up, and they both got up, and they both walked out of the room.

Q Admiral, is it correct that at no point during these discussions the U.S. side tried to, say, sweeten the pot by delving into the difference between the narrow interpretation of ABM and the broad interpretation? You never told the Soviets, well, instead of this -- confined only to the laboratory, let's talk about definitions of what's in the treaty right now. That never took place?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, that did not, and you would not expect that to take place in such a short session. That's a very complex subject.

Q John, can you give us a little help on what's going to happen in the speech tonight -- what the President's trying to achieve, and --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: What he's trying to achieve is a clearer understanding by the American people what he proposed to the General Secretary, what that would have meant in terms of a safer world, why the strategic defense system is essential for our future, and why he was -- is unwilling and strongly supported by all of his advisers -- unwilling to give up the possibility of having a strategic defensive system in the next 10 years.

See, the problem here is -- I mean you can argue that, well, why not just restrict yourself to the laboratory for the ten years, then if you want to deploy a system, you go ahead and do it. But the problem -- there are several problems with that. One is that we feel that, frankly, SDI has been what has brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. We think that SDI will be the guarantor of their following up on the reductions they agreed to, and that, in the end, it will be the insurance policy against non-compliance.

Now, if you don't have a healthy SDI program, at the ten-year point, it's not a threat because you're still going to have maybe another ten years before you would ever be able to deploy such a system.

Q Admiral?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Barry.

Q Yes. You just said that, frankly, that SDI is what brought the Soviets back to the negotiating table. That suggests that you understand clearly that they see it as a bargaining chip, do you not?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, bargaining chip is not the right way to describe it. I think it's the lever that makes the bargaining possible. And what I'm adding today, as I think we've said before but maybe not put so much emphasis on it, we've always felt that it was the thing that would guarantee compliance.

Q But is it not clear from this weekend session that, in fact, without the Soviets seeing it as a bargaining chip which drew them back, that that's where its value lies almost exclusively?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I disagree because I don't think that we're through with this process. The Soviets in the past have broken off negotiations on various subjects and they come back. And I think that it's going to take a little time. Both sides need to reflect on what happened and we're going to continue to push ahead for progress in all the areas. And as I said in the beginning, even though he has linked all these other agreements to our agreeing to their position on the ABM Treaty, he himself has said that those agreements are still out there.

Way in the back.

Q Sir, why have you all allowed this impression to go out over the world since the conference was over that we lost, that we failed, that we're the cause of everything that failed, and from what you say in your speech here today, it sounds like there's a lot of good things here?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, we think --

Q -- we've lost this initiative on public relations or propaganda by not saying something -- this utterance sooner.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We can't control what the press prints or what the media shows on their television. (Laughter.) Wait, wait.

Q On that point, Admiral --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I just want to finish answering her question. We have tried very hard to get our story out. Secretary Shultz had a press conference last night in Iceland. The President spoke at Keflavik.

I had staff members on the press plane flying back last night. I spent an hour and a half on the record on Air Force One trying to set the record straight. And that is why the President is going on the air tonight.

Now --

Q Well, that speech tonight, Admiral, if we could focus on that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Just a second.

Q Do you feel that the Soviets reneged on their promise, not as a link with SDI, but with INF?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: They certainly backed -- went back on a position that we thought they had agreed on before.

Now, Terry?

Q On that point, will the speech tonight try to deal with the disappointment that has been expressed by some allies, and some of the public response, including the Congressional and others?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well --

Q Will the President try to deal with that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, I think so, in laying out the facts of what was proposed, why he took the position that he did, and why we feel that the Soviet position is so -- not understood by us as to why they won't agree to what is -- what we feel is a very reasonable, fair, non-threatening plan. And I'm convinced that we have a very strong understandable position, and the American people and the Congress, once they understand all the facts, will be very supportive. I'm very optimistic.

Q Admiral, I wonder if you could tell us if, at the end of this 10-year plan, the agreement had been implemented, what would have been left in the way of strategic bombers, cruise missiles, and other non-ballistic weapons -- tactical nuclear weapons?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, our proposal would have left the -- well, they would have been reduced under the START agreement, but we weren't proposing to make reductions in the non-ballistic missile strategic weapons in the second five-year period. We were proposing just offensive ballistic missiles.

Q So what would have been left in the arsenals of both countries?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: It would have been cruise missiles and air-breathing aircraft.

Q Admiral, the way you describe this today, the Soviets made a series of concessions on Saturday and Sunday -- START, some things on testing, INF on Sunday morning -- then finally came in at the end with the threshold that the President couldn't meet. Has anybody in the administration, reflecting on the whole range of events, come to the conclusion or even thought that maybe this was a trap that Gorbachev was setting for Reagan?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I don't think it was a trap. I think, you know, we have known all along that they were linking progress in START to agreement on the ABM Treaty, and

their way of thinking about strategic defense. So we were not surprised by that, but frankly, we saw a possibility of making an historic move forward here and that's why the President was willing to move to stay in compliance with the ABM Treaty for a 10-year period, which is twice as long as we've ever talked about before with the possibility of getting this major reduction in our strategic forces.

Q Well, if you knew all along that it was linked to that, although clearly from your description you didn't know at the outset how -- the specific language they were going to propose, why did you leave that to the end? Didn't anybody calculate that that was the toughest thing to do and they may come in at the end with a proposal you couldn't --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, no -- we -- I don't want to mislead you. I mean, it was very clear from the beginning -- before we got up there, as I said -- the connection with START. When we got to Iceland, it became clear -- the discussions -- and, as the discussions went on it became clearer -- and I think their position may have hardened a little bit, too, that they were linking the progress in START -- not only START, but INF and nuclear testing to our agreeing to their provisions on the ABM Treaty.

Q Admiral, you made a major point here -- and others have, too -- that the SDI got them at the negotiating table. What's the point of being at the negotiating table if SDI prevents you from reaching any agreement?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, SDI is not just simply a mechanism to get them to the negotiating table. We view SDI as the mechanism to eliminate ballistic missiles. That's been the vision all along that SDI would eventually make ballistic missiles obsolete, because they would be vulnerable to such a system. And so it doesn't make any sense just to use it for the factor of getting them to the negotiating table if you don't follow through. Because that's what drives the whole process we feel.

Way in the back.

Q Was there any discussion of technology sharing at the meeting?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President reiterated his proposal to share technology with the Soviet Union and indicated that he was willing to sign a treaty now that would be triggered at some point in the future when we decided to go into full scale engineering and development of such a system. And at that point, as he told the General Secretary in the July 25th letter, we'd be prepared to sit down and offer them a plan to share the benefits of SDI.

Q At what point in the meeting was that suggestion made?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was made on Saturday afternoon.

Q What was their response to it?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: This was simply -- but I must make clear, I mean, this was a reiteration of what he told the General Secretary July 25th. Their response is they don't believe that we would actually share it with them.

Q Sell it or give it to them -- the technology?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sorry.

Q Sell it or give it?

Q Will we sell it or --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: We have said share. We have not specifically gotten in to the details of how we would share, because at this point it is too difficult, not knowing exactly how the systems are actually going to be designed and built, to figure out what sharing arrangements might be possible. And you can also -- you can envision sharing that doesn't necessarily involve both sides having the equipment, their command and control systems that could be shared and all sorts of other things.

Q Admiral, what evidence is there now to refute the notion that both were at a serious impasse -- that each side was in an intractable position and relations and negotiations have essentially gone down the drain.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, it's our observation that the Soviets have taken very tough positions that look insurmountable in the past. Just for example, on INF -- they have consistently said they wouldn't make any reductions in Asia. Well, they're prepared to do that. And I think that we need to continue discussions with them and explore -- if they're doing this in good faith and we don't have any real reason to doubt otherwise, then we may be able to explain to them and overcome their concerns by adjusting our position a little bit.

Q But it seems at this point that SDI for each side is somewhat of a sine qua non. How do you get over this hurdle that you mentioned earlier that the Soviets perhaps mistrust us and think that we're going to use this for offensive purposes? How do you get over that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, now, at one point we did think that the Soviets -- one of their concerns of SDI was their fear that we would somehow develop an offensive system that could strike targets on earth. And we spend a lot of time looking at that -- the physics of the matter don't make that a realistic threat and we have talked informally with their scientists, they understand that. That, frankly, is a propaganda point with them and they aren't really worried about that.

Q They just came out with a study last week that reiterates that.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, they simply -- the problem is that from a, let's say, a space-based laser -- you can't get

enough energy down through the atmosphere to the Earth to cause massive destruction. I think -- you know, even with the largest type of laser that we've thought about, it would take something like a week to burn a city block. And that's not a credible threat. And if you want to destroy targets on Earth, the systems we've got today do that a hell of a lot better -- and cheaper.

Q Can you achieve a deployable SDI system in 10 years without going outside the existing ABM Treaty? I thought the existing treaty restricts certain things you need to do to make a full-scale SDI --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes, that is correct. Well, when you run it under the treaty, you run into problems when you begin to integrate the components into a system. And limiting the research, development and testing to the laboratory, we will need to calculate exactly how much time that would add to the development process. But it would be substantial, and we don't think that it is the same credible incentive to continue with the reductions. We'd also have problems on the Hill in terms of Congress continuing to support the program.

Jerry?

Q But excuse me. Can I follow-up? You said that after 10 years, you would then deploy. So if you stayed with an ABM for 10 years, what you're saying is, you would not be able to deploy, then, under the existing treaty. Is that right? That was the President's second proposal, another five years under ABM.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President's second proposal would add some more time on the end. It would probably be maybe as much as a couple of years.

Q Twelve years --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Maybe 12 years.

Jerry?

Q Sir, when the President and all of the senior advisers left Washington to go to Iceland, what was the element of surprise when the Soviets made so many, in spite of concessions, laid down -- characterized the "99 yard line." Can you describe that to me? Did you expect that?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, as I said earlier, Jerry, we weren't sure exactly what issues they were prepared to move on. They didn't move on any issues that hadn't been discussed. I would say in Geneva, they have talked about strategic nuclear delivery vehicles around 1,600 in that category, we've talked about numbers around 6,000, plus or minus a couple of thousand. Counting rules was an achievement, and that gets rather complex, but it involves how you count the bombers with the bombs and the short-range attack missiles.

The movement on Asia was hoped for, and we were pleased that they moved. I don't know whether I would characterize it as unexpected. It's just that I think the point here is that when we went to Iceland, we thought that the only thing that we might get out of it was just a decision by the two heads of state that we would push on INF, for instance, and nuclear testing, so that by the time of the Washington meeting, they would be prepared to sign agreements.

What we didn't expect them to do in Iceland, very frankly, was to agree to make these moves in START, that although the moves are not surprising; it's just that we didn't think they were ready to do that, because in Gorbachev's last letter to the President, I don't even think he mentioned START.

Q So when you went to Iceland, in effect, you had the summit there you expected to have in Washington?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, I don't think so. I wouldn't call that a summit because there wasn't enough time and there was no joint statement issued at the end. Even if we had reached all these agreements, we probably would have been much more closed-mouth at this point and had a very short thing, that they met, worked on the agenda and --

Q May I follow that up, sir? Given that you had rather minimal expectations when you left, and came back without those -- mainly INF, impulse or a summit date -- is the President sorry he went to Reykjavik?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not at all. Not at all. We think that we've made -- we know what solutions are possible in these areas where there's been conflict in the past and if we can figure out a way to bring the Soviets to our way of thinking about defense, I think that there's great promise.

Q Admiral, you said last night that now we know each other's barriers a little more clearly. You've also said that each side would go back and reassess, but that the President also wants to pursue these issues in other fora in Geneva. How long a time period will this reassessment take? When will you be able --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, our negotiators -- yes -- our negotiators are heading back to Geneva -- if not today, they'll probably leave tomorrow. I mean we're --

Q But will they take this matter up immediately or will they first take a reassessment time and go over what was and was not --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Karpov, their chief negotiator and the one that handles the defense and space talks, was in Iceland. Max Kampelman who handles it for us was there. And they were both -- they're both fully involved in all the discussions in Iceland. So they will pick up the agenda and keep working on it, keep trying to hammer away. And we'll try to get them to agree in Geneva to these INF provisions and to the START provisions.

Q Why would they agree there if they didn't agree in Iceland?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You know, it's like a drop of water on a rock. You know, just keep trying, just keep trying.

Q Do you think Gorbachev will change his mind and transfer to Karpov new instructions on this issue? Or you hope he will?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Not right away.

Q Admiral, how do you read what you describe as the failure of the General Secretary to give the President the satisfactory or even plausible explanation for his concerns about SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, that's a hard question that I don't want to speculate on the record. I've got some ideas as to what --

Q You said it's not a matter of questioning his sincerity. What does that leave?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well --

Q Could he have been testing our commitment?

Q You said they don't trust us.

MR. SPEAKES: Tell them you need it on background --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Let me -- let's go on BACKGROUND and I'll answer that question. I think there are two possibilities. One is that Gorbachev has gotten himself out on a political limb so far on being opposed to SDI that he can't figure out a way to back off of it. So I don't think politically that he could go back to Moscow -- assessing and thinking about it since last night, I don't think that he --

he may have felt that he couldn't go back to Moscow, agreeing to a plan in which we could say that he gave in on SDI. That's one possibility.

The other possibility is that their rhetoric about their willingness to reduce offensive ballistic missiles has gotten out in front of reality. In other words, their claims about wanting to and being willing to reduce offensive, nuclear ballistic missiles, is beyond what they're really prepared to do at this time.

Q Sir, can we get back to the --

SENIOR ADMINISTRATION OFFICIAL: Back ON THE RECORD.

Q -- back to the question of SDI timing, were there not the strictures of the ABM Treaty, how soon could you deploy? In other words, how much are you actually giving away by saying we won't deploy for 10 years?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I don't have a precise answer to that because we still don't have -- we're not at the point in our research and development to be able to specify the milestones that precisely. But that, Charles, is not so much the point as it is of the necessity we see of having a healthy, strong SDI program moving ahead as rapidly as we can afford because we think in the end it is a much safer way for us to be -- either with our having ballistic missiles or if we don't have them -- and certainly if we don't have them.

Q Let me follow-up on that, because you've given us two other time spectrums in saying that by the Soviet system it would take you an additional 10 years to reach a point of deployment, and by the President's proposal it would take you perhaps an additional two years. Earlier on you proposed this 5-2-6 month thing. Where would you have been in that sense? What I'm trying to do is establish the real technology vis-a-vis proposals here.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, what we have -- what we've generally said is sometime in the mid-90s, a lot of that -- it depends still of course on -- there's a lot of guess work, educated to be sure, as to how long it's going to take to get some of these technology improvements that we need, but 10 years is roughly right and that's why in the original proposal we agreed to a five-year, two-year, six-month provision and we think that's on the optimistic side as to what we'd be able to do.

Q Admiral, was there any discussion at all of these 25 Soviet Union employees? Did that come up?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. The President had not planned to raise that. That was to be a discussion between Shultz and Shevardnadze. And to my knowledge I don't think it was discussed because there just simply wasn't time. Shultz and Shevardnadze, except for the first hour of the meetings on Saturday, participated in all the other head-of-state meetings and so I'm relatively sure that George didn't have time to discuss that. But our position is still firm that 25 leave --

Q Today -- the deadline?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Beg your pardon?

Q Today's the deadline? Tomorrow's the deadline?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Tomorrow, I think, is the deadline. But I haven't talked to the Secretary about this and he may feel because they did agree to talk together about it in Iceland. If they haven't had an opportunity to do that, we may want to adjust that a few days.

Q Admiral, what is it in the September 19th letter that took the President to Iceland? And, in effect, didn't he break off the talks? He picked up his marbles and went home.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, no. The --

Q I mean, what was it that Gorbachev told him in this letter that took him to Iceland?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No, Helen. The President generally is always willing to talk and he felt that it was possible to get some decisions in some of these areas like INF, in particular. He thought that if you made it clear enough to Gorbachev that he wasn't going to agree on INF unless Asia was addressed, that he could get Gorbachev to move. And, in fact, he did. And the President still believes -- as I think I've told many of you before -- that he can be very persuasive in a face-to-face conversation. Now --

Q Well, what did Gorbachev tell him? I mean, did he say we can negotiate here and we can --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. What he said was -- and I don't think I brought the letter with me -- what he said was that he thought that it would be helpful if both heads of state met promptly in Iceland or another location to discuss the issues that are between us so that when we meet in Washington, progress can be made and out of these discussions he envisioned that there would be instructions to their foreign ministers to proceed ahead in making progress in specific areas.

Q Admiral? Admiral, you mentioned that you were surprised that the Soviets opened the agenda in a far more ambitious range than you had expected. You went in with a fairly modest agenda hoping to get INF, nuclear testing, and then go on to Washington summit. What puzzles me is now you're talking about pocketing INF. Did nobody on our side try to pocket INF when that was agreed to and say to the Russians, look, if we don't come out with a whole big package, can you at least agree to keep INF separate and let's go on to a Washington summit and take care of START and SDI at a later date?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Certainly we tried that. And that would be our preferable way of doing it. We are --

Q When did you try that in the two days of talks?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That was tried from the very beginning when arms control -- when the President discussed our position on arms control on Saturday afternoon. And that was discussed in the working talks on Saturday night and Sunday morning.

Q And did they immediately, then, link INF to SDI?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Yes. And that -- although in Gorbachev's discussion on Saturday afternoon, it was not clear but reviewing it in hindsight, it's pretty clear that even on Saturday afternoon he was linking progress in all the areas to our agreement on ABM and SDI.

Q What I'm trying to find out is were you, perhaps, lulled into a going along with a very dramatic range of objectives in Reykjavik and did not sufficiently stick to your moderate agenda and not insist enough to hold the things to what could be achieved instead of going for the whole thing and lose everything?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: No. Look, we're not in this thing to play games, you know. We're in this to make progress on these many serious issues that divide us. If they're prepared to talk about making -- agreeing to solutions to some of these knotty problems -- and, you know, it may seem trivial to you, but in terms

of reaching a START agreement, getting agreement on counting rules is an important achievement. And we're not -- if they're offering to talk about these things -- if they offer to talk about these things, we're not going to say, well, we didn't talk about them. We're always ready to talk and we're always ready to reach agreements.

MORE

But they've got to be agreements that are in our interests.

Q What is going to happen to SALT II now? Anything --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Interesting question. SALT II interim restraint did not come up over the whole weekend in Iceland.

Q Sir, could I follow up on that?

Q Did the President not make up his mind about --

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: He has not made up his mind yet. He will by the end of the year.

Q You said that the -- that Gorbachev went beyond the ABM restrictions in his counterproposal, but isn't it true that there is controversy within this administration and certainly in this country, including among the authors of the ABM Treaty, exactly what those restrictions are?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: You are correct. There -- we have -- we are presently following what we call a restricted -- restrictive interpretation of the ABM Treaty. We believe that a broader interpretation is legal. This is a result of a very substantial legal analysis of the treaty and the negotiating record, and there are some disagreements with some Members of Congress, and Abe Sofaer, the Counselor at State, and Paul Nitze are working with the Congress to resolve this misunderstanding, and if at some point in the future we want -- the President decides to move to the broader interpretation, we will certainly be consulting with Congress.

But the point I want to make is that what Gorbachev is talking about is not the difference between what we call the restrictive interpretation and the broad interpretation. He is talking about modifying the treaty to make it more restrictive than either side ever intended for it to be in the beginning.

Q But would his position coincide with --

Q -- the broad or the narrow interpretation?

Q Would his position coincide with the Warnke-Reinlander interpretation? Would Gorbachev's position coincide with the Warnke-Reinlander interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I am not that familiar with that -- their specific interpretation, so I can't answer that.

Q In Reykjavik, Admiral, were you -- was the administration offering five and 10 years delay on the broad or the narrow interpretation of the ABM Treaty?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Our position on that is that the five-year -- the way it was worded, it would be the same position that we've had since the July 25th letter to Gorbachev -- that we still reserve the right to go to the broad interpretation of the treaty at some point in the future, but at present we are -- our program is designed to be consistent with the restrictive interpretation, and that is what we're still following.

Q So it's really the broad one. As far as Gorbachev is concerned, he is entitled to say, that's what they're up to.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: That would be correct.

Q Admiral, you said that -- to make progress. I was reminded this morning about Robert McNamara's electronic wall that was supposed to stop infiltration in Vietnam. If we are in this to make progress, why allow a chance to get this much of a deal to be held hostage to something that may or may not be technologically

practical?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I'll use a word that has been used in the press for -- recently. Our problem is that we are afraid that the reductions that we would get without SDI would be illusory.

MR. HOWARD: One last question, please.

Q Admiral, you said -- Secretary Shultz gave us a very bleak report on the outcome of the summit. He not only said you came away with nothing, but indicated that he does not expect any sort of summit. There's no talk at all of a summit in '87. You seem to be trying to put a better face on it now, and as a matter of fact over in Brussels today he seemed to be trying to put a better face on it.

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: Well, I think last night everybody was tired.

Q Do you disagree with the assessment that Secretary Shultz gave us immediately after the summit?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I think -- you know, we recognize that there was the possibility here of achieving an historic agreement. And when we were unable to do that, everybody was somewhat disappointed. But I think, on reflection, everybody involved in the process -- and we were all tired. We'd been working hard and you become deeply involved in the issue. But upon reflection, I think overnight we realized that we've made significant progress and the possibility of, indeed, getting agreement outside of an agreement of SDI and ABM is a significant possibility.

Q Well, whose move is it now?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I don't think that I would want to characterize it that way. Our negotiating position will be reviewed and we will reflect on what moves they made and, as I said earlier, try to figure out some way to figure out what their concerns are, if they're being -- if they're negotiating here in good faith and if we find some way of convincing them that it's in both of our interests to move forward to a strategic defensive system.

You see, the think that's so imponderable here is if they're really serious about reducing nuclear weapons, it doesn't make any sense that they should be concerned whether we deploy a strategic defensive system or not at that point in the future because we would have -- except for our air-breathing and cruise missiles, we wouldn't have any nuclear weapons to attack them with. And that -- then you have to get into the question that I addressed on background as to, well, why won't Gorbachev agree. And maybe time will help solve some of those problems.

Q Admiral, you mentioned SALT II, and the President has not decided yet. Would you expect that, whether or not you're able to hold the Soviets to the concessions they have made piecemeal will be part of that decision?

ADMIRAL POINDEXTER: I'm sorry, I missed the first part, and I've really got to go.

THE PRESS: Thank you.

END

5:15 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 13, 1986

ADDRESS BY THE PRESIDENT
TO THE NATION

The Oval Office

8:00 P.M. EDT

THE PRESIDENT: Good evening. As most of you know, I have just returned from meetings in Iceland with the leader of the Soviet Union, General Secretary Gorbachev. As I did last year when I returned from the summit conference in Geneva, I want to take a few moments tonight to share with you what took place in these discussions.

The implications of these talks are enormous and only just beginning to be understood. We proposed the most sweeping and generous arms control proposal in history. We offered the complete elimination of all ballistic missiles -- Soviet and American -- from the face of the Earth by 1996. While we parted company with this American offer still on the table, we are closer than ever before to agreements that could lead to a safer world without nuclear weapons.

But first, let me tell you that, from the start of my meetings with Mr. Gorbachev, I have always regarded you, the American people, as full participants. Believe me, without your support, none of these talks could have been held, nor could the ultimate aims of American foreign policy -- world peace and freedom -- be pursued. And it is for these aims I went the extra mile to Iceland.

Before I report on our talks though, allow me to set the stage by explaining two things that were very much a part of our talks, one a treaty and the other a defense against nuclear missiles which we are trying to develop. Now you've heard their titles a thousand times -- the ABM Treaty and SDI. Those letters stand for, ABM, anti-ballistic missile, SDI, strategic defense initiative.

Some years ago, the United States and the Soviet Union agreed to limit any defense against nuclear missile attacks to the emplacement in one location in each country of a small number of missiles capable of intercepting and shooting down incoming nuclear missiles, thus leaving our real defense -- a policy called Mutual Assured Destruction, meaning if one side launched a nuclear attack, the other side could retaliate. And this mutual threat of destruction was believed to be a deterrent against either side striking first.

So here we sit with thousands of nuclear warheads targeted on each other and capable of wiping out both our countries. The Soviets deployed the few anti-ballistic missiles around Moscow as the treaty permitted. Our country didn't bother deploying because the threat of nationwide annihilation made such a limited defense seem useless.

For some years now we have been aware that the Soviets may be developing a nationwide defense. They have installed a large modern radar at Krasnoyarsk which we believe is a critical part of a radar system designed to provide radar guidance for anti-ballistic missiles protecting the entire nation. Now this is a violation of the ABM Treaty.

MORE

Believing that a policy of mutual destruction and slaughter of their citizens and ours was uncivilized, I asked our military a few years ago to study and see if there was a practical way to destroy nuclear missiles after their launch but before they can reach their targets rather than to just destroy people. Well, this is the goal for what we call SDI and our scientists researching such a system are convinced it is practical and that several years down the road we can have such a system ready to deploy. Now, incidentally, we are not violating the ABM Treaty which permits such research. If and when we deploy the treaty -- also allows withdrawal from the Treaty upon six months' notice. SDI, let me make it clear, is a non-nuclear defense.

So here we are at Iceland for our second such meeting. In the first and in the months in between, we have discussed ways to reduce and in fact eliminate nuclear weapons entirely. We and the Soviets have had teams of negotiators in Geneva trying to work out a mutual agreement on how we could reduce or eliminate nuclear weapons. And so far, no success.

On Saturday and Sunday, General Secretary Gorbachev and his Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz and I met for nearly 10 hours. We didn't limit ourselves to just arms reductions. We discussed what we call violation of human rights on the part of the Soviets, refusal to let people emigrate from Russia so they can practice their religion without being persecuted, letting people go to rejoin their families, husbands and wives separated by national borders being allowed to reunite.

In much of this the Soviet Union is violating another agreement -- the Helsinki Accords they had signed in 1975. Yuri Orlov, whose freedom we just obtained, was imprisoned for pointing out to his government its violations of that pact, its refusal to let citizens leave their country or return.

We also discussed regional matters such as Afghanistan, Angola, Nicaragua, and Cambodia. But by their choice the main subject was arms control.

We discussed the emplacement of intermediate-range missiles in Europe and Asia and seemed to be in agreement they could be drastically reduced. Both sides seemed willing to find a way to reduce even to zero the strategic ballistic missiles we have aimed at each other. This then brought up the subject of SDI.

I offered a proposal that we continue our present research and if and when we reached the stage of testing we would sign now a treaty that would permit Soviet observation of such tests. And if the program was practical we would both eliminate our offensive missiles, and then we would share the benefits of advanced defenses. I explained that even though we would have done away with our offensive ballistic missiles, having the defense would protect against cheating or the possibility of a madman sometime deciding to create nuclear missiles. After all, the world now knows how to make them. I likened it to our keeping our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I.

We seemed to be making progress on reducing weaponry although the General Secretary was registering opposition to SDI and proposing a pledge to observe ABM for a number of years as the day was ending.

Secretary Shultz suggested we turn over the notes our note-takers had been making of everything we'd said to our respective teams and let them work through the night to put them together and find just where we were in agreement and what differences separated us. With respect and gratitude, I can inform you those teams worked through the night till 6:30 a.m.

Yesterday, Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev and I, with our foreign ministers, came together again and took up the report of our two teams. It was most promising. The Soviets had asked for a 10-year delay in the deployment of SDI programs.

In an effort to see how we could satisfy their concerns while protecting our principles and security, we proposed a 10-year period in which we began with the reduction of all strategic nuclear arms, bombers, air-launched cruise missiles, intercontinental ballistic missiles, submarine launched ballistic missiles and the weapons they carry. They would be reduced 50 percent in the first five years. During the next five years, we would continue by eliminating all remaining offensive ballistic missiles, of all ranges. And during that time we would proceed with research, development and testing of SDI -- all done in conformity with ABM provisions. At the 10-year point, with all ballistic missiles eliminated, we could proceed to deploy advanced defenses, at the same time permitting the Soviets to do likewise.

And here the debate began. The General Secretary wanted wording that, in effect, would have kept us from developing the SDI for the entire 10 years. In effect, he was killing SDI. And unless I agreed, all that work toward eliminating nuclear weapons would go down the drain -- cancelled.

I told him I had pledged to the American people that I would not trade away SDI -- there was no way I could tell our people their government would not protect them against nuclear destruction. I went to Reykjavik determined that everything was negotiable except two things: our freedom and our future.

I'm still optimistic that a way will be found. The door is open and the opportunity to begin eliminating the nuclear threat is within reach.

So you can see, we made progress in Iceland. And we will continue to make progress if we pursue a prudent, deliberate, and, above all, realistic approach with the Soviets. From the earliest days of our administration, this has been our policy. We made it clear we had no illusions about the Soviets or their ultimate intentions. We were publicly candid about the critical moral distinctions between totalitarianism and democracy. We declared the principal objective of American foreign policy to be not just the prevention of war but the extension of freedom. And, we stressed our commitment to the growth of democratic government and democratic institutions around the world. And that's why we assisted freedom fighters who are resisting the imposition of totalitarian rule in Afghanistan, Nicaragua, Angola, Cambodia, and elsewhere. And, finally, we began work on what I believe most spurred the Soviets to negotiate seriously -- rebuilding our military strength, reconstructing our strategic deterrence, and, above all, beginning work on the Strategic Defense Initiative.

And yet, at the same time we set out these foreign policy goals and began working toward them, we pursued another of our major objectives: that of seeking means to lessen tensions with the Soviets, and ways to prevent war and keep the peace.

Now, this policy is now paying dividends -- one sign of this in Iceland was the progress on the issue of arms control. For the first time in a long while, Soviet-American negotiations in the area of arms reductions are moving, and moving in the right direction -- not just toward arms control, but toward arms reduction.

But for all the progress we made on arms reductions, we must remember there were other issues on the table in Iceland, issues that are fundamental.

As I mentioned, one such issue is human rights. As President Kennedy once said, "And, is not peace, in the last analysis, basically a matter of human rights?"

I made it plain that the United States would not seek to exploit improvement in these matters for purposes of propaganda. But I also made it plain, once again, that an improvement of the human condition within the Soviet Union is indispensable for an improvement in bilateral relations with the United States. For a government that will break faith with its own people cannot be trusted to keep faith with foreign powers. So, I told Mr. Gorbachev -- again in Reykjavik as I had in Geneva -- we Americans place far less weight upon the words that are spoken at meetings such as these, than upon the deeds that follow. When it comes to human rights and judging Soviet intentions, we're all from Missouri -- you got to show us.

Another subject area we took up in Iceland also lies at the heart of the differences between the Soviet Union and America. This is the issue of regional conflicts. Summit meetings cannot make the American people forget what Soviet actions have meant for the peoples of Afghanistan, Central America, Africa, and Southeast Asia. Until Soviet policies change, we will make sure that our friends in these areas -- those who fight for freedom and independence -- will have the support they need.

Finally, there was a fourth item. And this area was that of bilateral relations, people-to-people contacts. In Geneva last year, we welcomed several cultural exchange accords; in Iceland, we saw indications of more movement in these areas. But let me say now the United States remains committed to people-to-people programs that could lead to exchanges between not just a few elite but thousands of everyday citizens from both our countries.

So I think, then, that you can see that we did make progress in Iceland on a broad range of topics. We reaffirmed our four-point agenda; we discovered major new grounds of agreement; we probed again some old areas of disagreement.

And let me return again to the SDI issue. I realize some Americans may be asking tonight: Why not accept Mr. Gorbachev's demand? Why not give up SDI for this agreement?

Well, the answer, my friends, is simple. SDI is America's insurance policy that the Soviet Union would keep the commitments made at Reykjavik. SDI is America's security guarantee -- if the Soviets should -- as they have done too often in the past -- fail to comply with their solemn commitments. SDI is what brought the Soviets back to arms control talks at Geneva and Iceland. SDI is the key to a world without nuclear weapons.

The Soviets understand this. They have devoted far more resources for a lot longer time than we, to their own SDI. The world's only operational missile defense today surrounds Moscow, the capital of the Soviet Union.

What Mr. Gorbachev was demanding at Reykjavik was that the United States agree to a new version of a 14-year-old ABM Treaty that the Soviet Union has already violated. I told him we don't make those kinds of deals in the United States.

And the American people should reflect on these critical questions.

How does a defense of the United States threaten the Soviet Union or anyone else? Why are the Soviets so adamant that America remain forever vulnerable to Soviet rocket attack? As of today, all free nations are utterly defenseless against Soviet missiles -- fired either by accident or design. Why does the Soviet Union insist that we remain so -- forever?

So, my fellow Americans, I cannot promise, nor can any President promise, that the talks in Iceland or any future discussions with Mr. Gorbachev will lead inevitably to great breakthroughs or momentous treaty signings.

We will not abandon the guiding principle we took to Reykjavik. We prefer no agreement than to bring home a bad agreement to the United States.

And on this point, I know you're also interested in the question of whether there will be another summit. There was no indication by Mr. Gorbachev as to when or whether he plans to travel to the United States, as we agreed he would last year in Geneva. I repeat tonight that our invitation stands and that we continue to believe additional meetings would be useful. But that's a decision the Soviets must make.

But whatever the immediate prospects, I can tell you that I'm ultimately hopeful about the prospects for progress at the summit and for world peace and freedom. You see, the current summit process is very different from that of previous decades; it's different because the world is different; and the world is different because of the hard work and sacrifice of the American people during the past five and a half years. Your energy has restored and expanded our economic might; your support has restored our military strength. Your courage and sense of national unity in times of crisis have given pause to our adversaries, heartened our friends, and inspired the world. The Western democracies and the NATO alliance are revitalized and all across the world nations are turning to democratic ideas and the principles of the free market. So because the American people stood guard at the critical hour, freedom has gathered its forces, regained its strength, and is on the march.

So, if there's one impression I carry away with me from these October talks, it is that, unlike the past, we're dealing now from a position of strength, and for that reason we have it within our grasp to move speedily with the Soviets toward even more breakthroughs.

Our ideas are out there on the table. They won't go away. We're ready to pick up where we left off. Our negotiators are heading back to Geneva, and we're prepared to go forward whenever and wherever the Soviets are ready. So, there's reason -- good reason for hope.

I saw evidence of this in the progress we made in the talks with Mr. Gorbachev. And I saw evidence of it when we left Iceland yesterday, and I spoke to our young men and women at our naval installation at Keflavik -- a critically important base far closer to Soviet naval bases than to our own coastline.

As always, I was proud to spend a few moments with them and thank them for their sacrifices and devotion to country. They represent America at her finest: committed to defend not only our own freedom but the freedom of others who would be living in a far more frightening world -- were it not for the strength and resolve of the United States.

"Whenever the standard of freedom and independence has been...unfurled, there will be America's heart, her benedictions, and her prayers," John Quincy Adams once said. He spoke well of our destiny as a nation. My fellow Americans, we're honored by history, entrusted by destiny with the oldest dream of humanity -- the dream of lasting peace and human freedom.

Another President, Harry Truman, noted that our century had seen two of the most frightful wars in history. And that "The supreme need of our time is for man to learn to live together in peace and harmony."

It's in pursuit of that ideal I went to Geneva a year ago and to Iceland last week. And it's in pursuit of that ideal that I thank you now for all the support you've given me, and I again ask for your help and your prayers as we continue our journey toward a world where peace reigns and freedom is enshrined.

Thank you and God bless you.

END

8:21 P.M. EDT

Q 3: Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling ...

HIS JOB AS PRESIDENT

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<i>Pre Summit</i> OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	209 42%	440 44%	230 46%	-	-
Total Approve	<i>64</i> 352 70%	717 72%	364 73%	-	- <i>↑6 (↑3)</i>
Total Disapprove	<i>34</i> 143 29%	277 28%	134 27%	-	-
Strongly Approve (1)	204 41%	411 41%	208 42%	-	-
Somewhat Approve (2)	148 30%	306 31%	156 31%	-	-
Somewhat Disapprove (3)	73 15%	127 13%	54 11%	-	-
Strongly Disapprove (4)	70 14%	150 15%	80 16%	-	-
No Opinion	5 1%	7 1%	2 *	-	-
Mean	2.0	2.0	2.0	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.06	1.07	1.08	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.05	-	-
Standardized Performance Score	66	66	66	133	133

Q 14: Some people say that the collapse in arms talks in Iceland was a major setback in arms negotiations with the Soviet Union and that we missed a historic opportunity to end the arms race. Other people say that the collapse in arms talks in Iceland was NOT a major setback in arms negotiations. They are just a small part of a larger process which actually helped both sides recognize areas of agreement and identify more clearly points of agreement.
Which is more closer to your opinion -- that the collapse in the Iceland summit talks was a major setback or was not a major setback?

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<u>Old</u>	<u>Both</u>	<u>New</u>		
	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
Setback	108 22%	199 20%	91 18%	-	-
<u>Not a setback</u>	<u>383</u> <u>77%</u>	784 78%	<u>402</u> <u>80%</u>	-	-
No opinion	10 2%	16 2%	6 1%	-	-

Q 19: If the Soviets feel so strongly about the United States' Strategic Defense Initiative, then they must feel it has a good chance, if developed, to shoot down intercontinental ballistic missiles.

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	236 47%	476 48%	244 49%	-	-
Total Agree	353 71%	709 71%	359 72%	-	-
Total Disagree	116 23%	233 23%	115 23%	-	-
✓ Agree strongly (1)	184 37%	394 39%	209 42%	-	- * ↑ <u>+5</u>
Agree somewhat (2)	168 34%	315 31%	150 30%	-	-
Disagree somewhat (3)	61 12%	131 13%	70 14%	-	-
Disagree strongly (4)	55 11%	102 10%	45 9%	-	-
No opinion	31 6%	58 6%	27 5%	-	-
Mean	2.0	1.9	1.9	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.00	0.99	0.98	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.04	-	-

G 20: Ronald Reagan missed his best chance so far to negotiate a meaningful nuclear arms agreement with the Soviet Union.

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	OCT 13	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE	500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	-	-
**Difference Score	-142 -28%	-333 -33%	-187 -37%	-	-
Total Agree	175 35%	327 33%	155 31%	-	-
Total Disagree	317 <u>63%</u>	661 66%	342 <u>68%</u>	-	-
Agree strongly (1)	82 16%	154 15%	73 15%	-	-
Agree somewhat (2)	93 19%	174 17%	82 16%	-	-
Disagree somewhat (3)	149 30%	299 30%	150 30%	-	-
Disagree strongly (4)	167 33%	361 36%	192 38%	-	-
No opinion	9 2%	12 1%	3 1%	-	-
Mean	2.8	2.9	2.9	-	-
Standard Deviation	1.08	1.07	1.07	-	-
Standard Error	0.05	0.03	0.05	-	-



+ 5

Q 26: Some people say that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles, such as SDI, is a good idea because it will help deter a Soviet attack, increase the chance of reaching an arms control agreement, and reduce the risk of war. Other people say that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles, such as SDI, is a bad idea because it will upset the balance of power between the U.S. and the USSR, accelerate the arms race, and increase the risk of war. Which statement is closer to your own opinion -- that research on a defense against nuclear-armed missiles is a good idea or bad idea?

B 1: ROLLING TWO DAY AVERAGES

	<i>Presummt</i>	OCT 13- OCT 14	OCT 14- OCT 15	OCT 15- OCT 16	OCT 16- OCT 17
BASE=TOTAL SAMPLE		500 100%	1000 100%	500 100%	- -
Good idea	<i>62</i>	377 75%	745 75%	370 74%	- -
Bad idea	<i>36</i>	112 22%	233 23%	119 24%	- -
No opinion	<i>2</i>	11 2%	21 2%	11 2%	- -

NOTED BY DTR



October 13, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Honorable
Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff and Assistant
to the President
The White House

FROM: Charles Z. Wick *CZW*
Director

SUBJECT: Special Report - Foreign Media Reaction
to Reagan-Gorbachev Summit

Attached is a special report on foreign media reaction to the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik, which we thought would interest you.

SPECIAL REPORT

Foreign Media Reaction

United States Information Agency

Monday, October 13, 1986

CONCLUSION OF PRE-SUMMIT CONFERENCE

Summary

World media summed up the meeting between the President and Mr. Gorbachev as "a failure," and speculated on what was seen as slim possibility of a superpower summit in the United States this year.

Correspondents depicted Secretary Shultz as "weary" and "deeply disappointed" and Mr. Gorbachev as "angry." At the same time, some reported that the President appeared "cheery" and optimistic. A commentator for Paris' FR 3 TV said "Shultz seemed extremely disappointed." London's liberal Guardian said that "Mr. Reagan appeared in startlingly cheerful mood as Mr. Gorbachev was passing his grim judgement on the summit."

The conservative Times of London led today with "there is now little prospect of a full-scale summit in Washington...President Reagan said he made an historic offer on arms control but Mr. Gorbachev rejected it." Conservative La Libre Belgique of Brussels headlined "Failure and Disillusion."

The President's position on Star Wars was widely blamed for the "breakdown" in the talks. France Inter Radio reported that the President "will not yield on his principles."

Some saw serious political consequences for both leaders. Milan's centrist Corriere della Sera maintained that "the pre-summit of hope has turned into a devastating boomerang for Reagan and Gorbachev." A commentator for BBC-TV in London judged that the President's "teflon is wearing off."

A few foreign media writers refused to abandon all hope for arms talks and even a full-dress summit. One of these was Washington correspondent Fritz Wirth of Bonn's conservative Die Welt who insisted that "the collapse of the summit discussion does not mean the end of the arms control negotiations in Geneva." Seoul's liberal Donga Ilbo asserted that "one cannot hold the view that just because the summit failed, the two nations will commence a tension-filled relationship or will sever all dialogue."

Several correspondents reported the battle between the White House and Kremlin over the news blackout. A correspondent for Brussels BRT TV said that the "Americans are angry about the Soviet violation of the news blackout accord after a Soviet aide announced a spectacular Soviet proposal on reduction of ICBMs."

EUROPE

BRITAIN

"Summit Fails With Deadlock on Star Wars"

Headlines included "Summit Fails With Deadlock on Star Wars," "Nearing a Point of No Return," "Years Apart on Star Wars," and "Raisa's Delicate Touch of Diplomacy" (Times), "Summit Collapses Over Star Wars" and "Raisa Gorbachev Launches Icelandic Charm Offensive" (Guardian).

"U.S. Likely to Face Mixed Reaction at NATO Council Meeting"

Other headlines were "Summit Ends in Failure--Marathon Talks Founder Over U.S. Star Wars," "Gorbachev Displays his Anger" and "Summit Signals" (Daily Telegraph), "Talks Fail Over 'Star Wars,'" "Star Wars Is Stumbling Block," "U.S. Is to Blame Says Gorbachev," "U.S. Likely to Face Mixed Reaction at NATO Council Meeting," and "The President Was Magnificent--Shultz" (Financial Times), "Summit Ends in Total Failure," "Raisa Steals Show with Her Solo Act" and "One Slip on a Very Long Road" (Independent).

"Little Prospect of Full-Scale Summit in Washington"

The conservative Times' Reykjavik correspondent Michael Binyon reported, "The Reykjavik summit ended in deadlock yesterday after President Reagan refused to accept any limitation on his 'Star Wars' research program. There is now little prospect of a full-scale summit in Washington in the next few months.

"The breakdown, after eleven and a half hours of talks--almost twice the time scheduled for the summit--came despite potential progress on the whole range of arms control issues.

"President Reagan said he made an historic offer on arms control but Mr. Gorbachev rejected it. He told cheering U.S. servicemen before flying home that despite failing to agree on arms control 'we made great strides in resolving most of our differences and we are going to continue the effort...'

"A somber, weary and drawn Mr. Shultz...said the United States was 'in the end deeply disappointed at this outcome...'

"The breakdown appeared to come in the final marathon session, which had not been originally scheduled. Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev were both very disappointed at their inability to get over the disagreement..."

"Gorbachev: Only a Madman Would Have Accepted U.S. Conditions"

The paper's correspondent Christopher Walker reported: "An angry Mr. Mikhail Gorbachev last night described the two days of negotiations as a failure and openly accused the United States of scuttling them by refusing a Soviet demand that Star Wars should be limited to the laboratory.

"In an impassioned 57-minute address to 350 selected members of the world's press in an Icelandic cinema, Mr. Gorbachev claimed that 'only a madman' would have accepted the conditions demanded by the American side as part of a package of agreements on cutting nuclear weapons..."

"No Amount of Gloss Could Offset the Breakdown"

The liberal Guardian's Reykjavik correspondents Michael White and Hella Pick reported, "President Reagan refused to trade constraints in his Star Wars program in return for the elimination of both superpowers' strategic nuclear arsenals within a decade.

"In an attempt to put a bold face on the disappointment which has effectively dashed hopes of an early summit in Washington, Mr. Shultz stressed that a wide range of agreement had been reached between Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev..."

"But no amount of gloss on these issues as well as on regional, human rights and bilateral concerns on the Reagan agenda could offset the breakdown over the limits which Mr. Gorbachev sought on the research and testing of Star Wars..."

"Mr. Reagan appeared in a startlingly cheerful mood when he addressed staff at the Keflavik NATO base, as Mr. Gorbachev was passing his grim judgment on the summit..."

"Mrs. Gorbachev Drew Comment Upon the Absence of Mrs. Reagan"

In a separate report, White wrote, "Whether it was the fault of the adversarial media which followed her around swimming pools, museums and teacher training colleges, or a woman's intuition, Mrs. Gorbachev was drawn into comment upon the absence of Mrs. Reagan.

"This was already a sore point because Washington, not usually slow to spot an opportunity for publicity, had been miffed to find that Raisa was coming to a 'business meeting' when she was not supposed to..."

"SDI Proved Not to Be the Bargaining Chip That Some Suspected"

The conservative Daily Telegraph's Reykjavik correspondent Ian Brodie reported, "After the talks broke up, Mr. Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev blamed each other for the outcome..."

"His face grim from the strain of vigorous summitry, Mr. Shultz said: 'We saw the potential for a set of genuinely significant agreements with intermediate nuclear forces, and potentially the elimination of all ballistic missiles. But we came up to the end and didn't agree...'

"Putting as good a face as possible on the breakdown rather than the breakthrough of the most far-reaching proposals in arms control history, Mr. Reagan said: 'We have made great strides in Iceland to resolving our differences and we are going to continue...'

"The net result of the mini-summit was that the SDI, which was a big surprise when Mr. Reagan proposed it in March 1983, proved to be the insurmountable obstacle to arms control and not the bargaining chip that some suspected..."

"Gorbachev Accused Reagan of 'Scuttling and Frustrating' Summit"

Another correspondent in Reykjavik, Trevor Fishlock, reported: "In a spectacular display of measured anger, Mr. Gorbachev last night accused President Reagan of 'scuttling and frustrating' the mini-summit.

"Calling the talks a failure, he said the Americans had buried what would have been 'a major historic agreement' to end the arms race..."

"Could Be Significant Setback for East-West Relations"

The independent Financial Times' Reykjavik correspondents Patrick Cockburn, Stewart Fleming and Robert Mauthner reported, "The failure of the leaders...to produce any agreement, even on a future summit, could be a significant setback for East-West relations..."

"Mr. Reagan left for Washington within two hours of the end of his fourth and final session with Mr. Gorbachev. His critics on both the left and the right are bound to say that he committed a political blunder two weeks ago in accepting Mr. Gorbachev's proposal that they should meet on such short notice."

"The Teflon Is Wearing Off"

Early morning BBC-TV carried a report from Reykjavik correspondent Martin Bell who said of President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev, "their faces at their parting told it all..."

Bell reported that, among the American camp, there was no feeling of a "debacle." Commenting on the President, Bell said, "The teflon is wearing off....The great communicator is going to have a lot of communicating to do when he comes home."

FRANCE

"Summit Is a Failure"

FR-3 TV concluded October 12, "The summit is a failure. Secretary of State George Shultz did not beat around the bush during his press conference. He seemed extremely disappointed..."

"Star Wars Divides Reagan and Gorbachev"

According to France-Inter radio October 13, "Star Wars divides Reagan and Gorbachev....The U.S. President will have to be very convincing to soothe the disappointment of his compatriots."

"One of Main Victims of Summit Is George Shultz"

The radio's Washington correspondent Jean-Luc Hess added, "The President, who was suspected of looking for an accord at any price, has shown that he does not and that he will not yield on his principles. On this level, the White House saved face but it remains to be seen what the impact will be on the coming elections..."

"In any event, one of the main victims of the Reykjavik summit is George Shultz, who was responsible for the policy which just failed. A re-balancing in the Reagan Administration should be interesting."

"Failure After Hope"

Significant headlines in Paris October 13 read "'Star Wars' Was Reason for Failure" (France-Soir), "Raisa, Star of the Media" (Figaro), "Failure After Hope" (Les Echos) and "Summit Lost in Stars" (Liberation).

"Reykjavik Deadlock Is Perhaps a Good Thing"

In a front-page editorial, conservative Figaro held, "Gorbachev's insistence on the abandonment of SDI dissipated the ambiguities created by the Soviet leader's seduction campaign with American and European opinion....But Gorbachev's veto is also a way to show the world that Reagan is a bellicose leader..."

"The deadlock in Reykjavik is perhaps a good thing. It's at least an opportunity for reflection."

"Regrettable to See Only One Leader Blamed"

Left-of-center Liberation stated in an editorial, "Through the voice of Secretary Shultz, the Americans loyally accepted responsibility for the failure..."

"Why did the Administration take the risk of resuming the Cold War? One reason was perhaps that Gorbachev had a lot to ask but little to offer....It is also regrettable to see only one of the leaders blamed for the failure."

ITALY

"Devastating Boomerang"

Centrist Corriere della Sera ran the headline "Reagan-Gorbachev, a Failure" over a story that "the Pre-Summit of Hope has turned into a devastating boomerang for Reagan and Gorbachev."

"We are deeply disappointed," summarized George Shultz, but this analysis by the Secretary of State is not enough to give the exact measure of the deep disagreement, and this insurmountable disagreement now risks becoming irreversible..."

"Best Word to Summarize Conference Is Failure"

Conservative Il Giornale said, "Reykjavik can be summarized with just a few words. The first word, failure--the best word to describe the results--is the only one the spokesman avoided."

"Everything--mutual and bilateral concessions--has been censored by Gorbachev's arrogant gesture in the style of his many predecessors at the Kremlin..."

"Missed Opportunity"

Rome's conservative Il Tempo ran the headline "A Missed Opportunity Among Icelandic Ghosts" and said, "This does not mean that everything is compromised, and that a new cold war is approaching.

"The reasons for which Moscow and Washington decided to begin a dialogue are still valid..."

WEST GERMANY

"Reykjavik Meeting Fails Because of SDI"

Typical headlines in the FRG October 13 were "Failure of Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting in Reykjavik...No Date for Another Meeting" (Frankfurter Allgemeine), "Reykjavik Meeting Fails Because of SDI...Reagan: Far-Reaching Historic Arms Control Offer Rejected by Moscow...Gorbachev: Only a Madman Could Accept the U.S. Proposals" (General-Anzeiger) and "U.S. Disappointed with Reykjavik Meeting...Reagan Nevertheless Refers to 'Progress in Many Fields'...Soviets Say SDI Program Was Reason for Failure" (Die Welt).

"Reykjavik Collapse Not End of Geneva Arms Negotiations"

Washington correspondent Fritz Wirth reported on conservative Die Welt's front-page that "the collapse of the summit discussion does not mean the end of the arms control negotiations in Geneva..."

"However, the main task of the two delegations in coming weeks and months will be to do away with the debris left behind by the Iceland summit..."

"The outcome of the summit will expose Reagan to sharp criticism by those who had warned him not to accept Gorbachev's invitation to Iceland. There are indications that the Soviets will exploit the summit failure by starting a new propaganda campaign."

"SDI Development Probably Key to Radical Disarmament Measures"

The paper commented, "The pre-summit in Reykjavik has failed because of the SDI program....Secretary Shultz was right in pointing out that only the existence of SDI had prompted the Soviets to return to the bargaining table in Geneva and to go to the pre-summit in Reykjavik.

"Adherence to SDI development probably is the only means of realizing radical disarmament measures as envisaged by Reagan and Gorbachev...."

"Soviets Scored Points in Reykjavik"

Conservative Frankfurter Allgemeine said, "The Soviets have scored points in Reykjavik by their skillful performance...."

"The World Has Been Deprived of One Hope"

Bonn's independent General-Anzeiger remarked, "There is great disappointment....Expectations had been very high....The world has been deprived of one hope."

"One of the Worst Episodes in East-West Relations Since 1945"

A byliner in pro-CDU Bonner Rundschau commented, "Everything failed because the Americans refused to make concessions on SDI. That was a black weekend for the entire world..."

"Reagan will not have it easy now with his European allies and perhaps not even with many of his fellow Americans. However, things will be even tougher now for Gorbachev in Moscow..."

"Reykjavik was one of the worst episodes in East-West relations since 1945."

"Reykjavik Not a Failure"

A commentator from Reykjavik for TV Two questioned, "Has the meeting in Reykjavik been a failure? I don't believe so. The United States and the USSR have found a common language."

"Reagan Will Sell the Failure to the U.S. Public and the World"

Washington correspondent for TV One reported from Reykjavik, "President Reagan said that he could not sell out the security interests of the United States and the free world."

"At times he seemed old. Much older than in Geneva. Gorbachev seemed more dynamic. Reagan will sell the failure of this meeting to the U.S. public and the world."

"No Negative Consequences for U.S.-Soviet Relations"

And another reporter on TV One remarked, "I do not believe that Reykjavik will have negative consequences for U.S.-Soviet relations."

BELGIUM

TV Covered Americans and Soviets on Fourth Session

BRT TV last night said that the "Americans are angry about the Soviet violation of the news blackout accord," while they said a Soviet aide announced a "spectacular" Soviet proposal on reduction of ICBMs.

RTBF TV coverage of the Fourth session quoted Soviet comment that they made "an historic offer of enormous significance."

"Star Wars Jeopardized the Hopes of the Reykjavik Summit"

The disappointment of the Reykjavik meeting was the lead item in today's Belgian press under such headlines as "Star Wars Jeopardized the Hopes of the Reykjavik Summit" (Le Soir), "Reykjavik, Failure and Disillusion" (La Libre Belgique), "Acknowledgement of Failure at Reykjavik Summit" (La Dernière Heure), "New Ice Time" (De Morgen), "Reagan and Gorbachev at Finish Line" (De Standaard) and "Hope Leads to Deep Disappointment...Star Wars Remains Big Stumbling Block" (Gazet van Antwerpen).

"One of the Main Lessons of This Summit"

Independent Le Soir commented this morning, "The reason why President Reagan refused an agreement that would hamper SDI development is that the latter has become a central element of U.S. defense policy and consequently is no longer negotiable.

"It is one of the main lessons of this summit. It is also because the President has made SDI such a personal matter...

"But was it reasonable to expect a breakthrough? No one actually expected Ronald Reagan to give up his Star Wars project, nor Mikhail Gorbachev to give up his nuclear arsenals..."

"Stubbornness to Safeguard Principles"

Conservative Catholic La Libre Belgique contended, "Reagan and Gorbachev demonstrated such stubbornness to safeguard their principles..."

"Of course they will eventually be forced to put an end to the deadlock, but it is not sure that they will be able to do so. Both have their hands tied by domestic policy considerations."

"What the Critics Feared Has Come True"

It was the opinion of conservative Catholic Gazet van Antwerpen that "what the critics feared has come true, and the two-day summit...has become a complete failure.

"Reagan's hopes are dashed....What is worse, is that Reagan's SDI space defense program became the stumbling block...a program which is not popular with West European public opinion..."

"Cleverly Played by the Russians. And Stupid of Reagan"

The paper concluded, "The Soviets have played the game cleverly....Expectations were systematically and consciously raised until the Americans had to announce last night that the entire affair had failed because they did not want to yield on SDI.

"Cleverly played by the Russians. And stupid of Reagan. If there was someone who could have known that the Soviets were unreliable, it was certainly Ronald Reagan."

"Both Leaders Return Home With Damaged Prestige"

Liberal Catholic De Standaard held that "both Reagan and Gorbachev returned home with damaged prestige..."

"Tragic for Europe"

Socialist De Morgen commented, "For Europe this is really tragic....A voiceless Europe now risks being reduced forever to a missiles silo."

AUSTRIA

"World Hopes Dashed as Summit Fails"

Headlines in Vienna October 13 included "Deep Disappointment as Iceland Summit Founders on Reagan's Space Weapons" (Kurier) and "World Hopes Dashed as Summit Fails" (Kronen-Zeitung).

"This Is Macabre"

Austrian Socialist Party's Neue AZ commented in an editorial, "This is macabre. Regarded by experts as unfeasible, Reagan's space arms project has proved to be the big stumbling block on the way to hoped-for disarmament.

"Indications are that Reagan will have to forget about going down in history as the President who brought peace..."

NORWAY

"SDI Shuts Off Opportunities for Arms Control Accords"

Leftist, Labor Party-affiliated Arbeiderbladet of Oslo suggested October 13, "The gigantic weapons industry in the United States is not about to let go of the sweet candy that Reagan's Star Wars program represents.

"Nor is it unexpected that precisely this program has become the major obstacle to a more concrete result from the Reykjavik meeting..."

"The answer to America's SDI program is more long-range rockets in the Soviet Union--so many that some can slip through. Thus SDI shuts off opportunities for arms negotiations in other fields....There is little doubt that the ball is in the U.S. and Reagan's court."

FINLAND

"Whole World Is Disappointed at Failure"

Under the headline "Reykjavik Meeting Fails: SDI Stumbling Block for Disarmament," influential Swedish-language Hufvudstadsbladet said October 13, "The summit meeting between Reagan and Gorbachev ended in a total failure.

"Expectations that some kind of an agreement would be reached rose as the negotiations continued. The whole world is therefore greatly disappointed at the failure."

SPAIN

"The Thaw Never Got to Iceland"

Liberal El Pais commented under the headline "The Thaw Never Got to Iceland" that "none of the previous meetings held by leaders of the United States and the USSR have failed like this one. This failure comes as a surprise, since the little news from Villa Hofdi reflected optimism....The cause of failure is SDI, so-called Star Wars....The failure seems to imply that Gorbachev will no longer travel to the United States.

"There is no doubt as to the seriousness of this step backward in the process of detente between the two superpowers..."

"Failed Mini-Summit"

Catholic conservative Ya's editorial comment was headlined "Failed Mini-Summit" and said, "Does (it) mean that the summit was more of a success for Gorbachev than for Reagan? No reason to think so..."

"Nevertheless, these summits can help to bring about an increased consciousness on the part of the leaders that they... have to deepen understanding among the nations of the world."

PORTUGAL

"Fruitless Dialogue"

Lisbon's rightist O Dia headlined "Fruitless Dialogue in the Haunted House; Gorbachev Refuses Reagan Offer" on October 13. Its story read, "Eleven hours of conversation in Reykjavik's 'haunted house' ended in nothing..."

"What was more or less on everybody's mind became a reality: the summit between the two giants was a total failure."

IRELAND

"Reagan Would Not Compromise Over His Favorite Toy"

In the editorial opinion of the liberal Irish Times October 13, "What makes the disappointment bite so painfully is that the immovable object proved to be Star Wars--the Strategic Defense Initiative, a science fiction idea which may never be capable of realization but is bound up with the critical Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty. President Reagan would not compromise over his favorite toy..."

"Unexpectedness was the running theme of the Reykjavik drama. The tenacity of Mr. Gorbachev found striking expression in the final extension of the talks yesterday afternoon, when he seemed to be playing the part of the sinner in the Bible who wrestled with the angel, insisting that 'I will not let thee go unless thou bless me.'..."

TURKEY

"The Summit Ended in Disappointment"

Headlines in Turkey October 13 included "Reagan and Gorbachev Could Not Agree...The Summit Ended With Disappointment" (conservative Milliyet), "They Could Not Agree...Neither U.S. nor USSR Retreated on Star Wars" (left-of-center Cumhuriyet) and "Fearsome Result at the Iceland Meeting...Ties Are Severed" (independent Hurriyet).

SOVIET UNION

"Can the Meeting Be Called Fruitless? Of Course Not"

Moscow radio's correspondent in Reykjavik reported in Russian October 13, "Can the Soviet-U.S. working summit meeting in Reykjavik be called absolutely fruitless? Of course not."

"After all, the exchange of opinions did take place, and, as Comrade Gorbachev emphasized, this meeting showed that the need for dialogue has grown even further, no matter how difficult it might be."

YUGOSLAVIA

"Accusations Instead of Agreement"

Under the above headline, a byliner in Belgrade's Politika concluded that the Iceland meeting ended as a complete fiasco.

He said, "The Soviet side asked that in the field of anti-missile arms research all tests be limited to laboratories and that a ban on experiments in space be signed. It seems...that the latter was the biggest stumbling block, since Reagan did not want to give up Star Wars."

"The Meeting Was a Complete Failure"

TV Zagreb's "Sunday Diary" said October 13, "The meeting was a complete failure. No positions were changed, leaving everyone disappointed. Reagan and Gorbachev were never before so close to agreement and thus their failure comes as a surprise....The meeting (was) a step backwards."

EAST ASIA AND PACIFIC

JAPAN

U.S. Stood Firm on SDI

All Tokyo dailies gave top coverage Monday morning to correspondent reports from Reykjavik on the final day of the conference emphasizing progress on arms control such as the INF problem, but reported that the United States stood firm on the SDI issue.

TV networks gave top coverage to reports on "the failure" of the Reagan-Gorbachev talks to reach agreement due to differences on the SDI problem.

"Soviet Union's 'Historic Proposal'"

Moderate Yomiuri reported, "President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev held an unscheduled fourth meeting because the two leaders were unable to reach agreement on arms control.

"After the third meeting, U.S.-Canada Research Institute Director Arbatov stated that the Soviet Union made a historic proposal calling for major reduction of strategic and INF weapons.

"Presidential Deputy Press Secretary Speakes stated that there was partial progress on disarmament, but intensive efforts were continuing on strategic nuclear weapons, INF, SDI and nuclear testing as President Reagan is taking a firm stand."

"Speakes' Anger"

The paper also gave inside-page play to the news blackout problem. The report said, "Speakes expressed anger at (the Soviet spokesman) Velikhov for stating that an agreement was near on a major reduction of strategic weapons and withdrawal of intermediate-range missiles.

"However, Soviet spokesman Arbatov also stated in violation that the Soviet Union made a historic disarmament proposal, including major reduction of strategic nuclear weapons.

"The eyes and ears of the press corps were concentrating on the Soviet side because of its dramatic announcements compared to the U.S. announcements which did not have anything special on the substance of the talks."

"Heated Exchange"

Liberal Mainichi's correspondent team said, "There was a heated U.S.-Soviet exchange outside the meeting on whether there was an agreement..."

"It appeared that the Reykjavik talks exceeded the status of preparatory discussions for the next summit as both leaders seemed to be boiling down the issues to seek a concrete agreement."

"Soviet Leaks"

The economic journal Nihon Keizai carried a page one Kyodo News Service report saying "Deputy Press Secretary Speakes told a news conference that Soviet spokesman Velikhov leaked the substance of the U.S.-Soviet summit talks in an interview with BBC.

"Therefore, Speakes stated that the news blackout agreement was lifted.

"Speakes criticized the Soviet side for violating the agreement and stated that the U.S. side will not be bound by the blackout agreement hereafter."

"Basic Differences"

NHK-TV, TBS-TV and Fuji-TV carried the highlights of Reykjavik talks and noted that there was no agreement due to basic differences on the SDI problem.

As a result of the differences, the networks noted that there was no announcement of the next U.S.-Soviet summit.

"Age of Confrontation"

Publicly-financed NHK-TV said, "failure to reach agreement at Reykjavik indicates that U.S.-Soviet relations will enter the age of confrontation."

The network also reported that "the Soviet Union is expected to launch a peace offensive toward Western Europe and Japan."

"Foreign Ministry Expressed Regret"

A commentator talked to a Foreign Ministry official who expressed "regret over the failure at Reykjavik to announce the date of Gorbachev's visit to Washington since it affects the Soviet leader's plan to visit Japan."

The official "disagreed with reports that the talks ended in rupture, as there was near agreement on other arms control issues -- except for SDI."

HONG KONG

Shultz Announcement

Center-right Sing Tao Jih Pao ran the headline "Extra Time for U.S.-Soviet Mini-Summit, Ends at Three This Morning; Shultz Calls for Press Conference Afterwards, Announces No Agreement on SDI."

Close Agreement

An editorial in the paper prior to Secretary Shultz's announcement commented: "It looks likely that the issue of medium-range missiles has reached the resolution stage. Also, the USSR has agreed that the UK and France could have their individual nuclear forces, and will not insist on including them in the U.S. missiles total..."

"From this, people should appreciate that the United States and USSR can make concessions on such important issues as nuclear weapons.

"Of course, it is because both sides have clearly realized that as long as the deadlock continues, the nuclear arms race will be red hot..."

"U.S.-USSR Have Realized the Truth"

Pro-PRC Ta Kung Pao ran the view of a columnist expressed prior to the end of the conference, stating, "In fact, neither the United States nor the USSR can conquer the world merely by nuclear weapons. Whoever starts a nuclear war will not be free from being devastated. Today, the United States and the USSR have realized this truth.

"Under continuous urging from the world's countries, an East-West detente is the main trend in the world situation. The United States and USSR can only follow this trend to solve their...conflicts. Then there will be real detente in the world."

SOUTH KOREA

"Rupture Due to Discord Over SDI"

Headlines in all major Seoul papers October 13 read "U.S.-Soviet Summit Ended in a Rupture Due to Discord Over SDI."

"Prospects for Summit Blurred"

KBS-TV Washington correspondent Lee Chung-su reported from Reykjavik that "the United States and the USSR failed to reach an agreement on arms control because of Soviet opposition to SDI through the end of the meeting.

"This rupture in the U.S.-Soviet Reykjavik summit also blurred the prospects for a second summit which was expected to be held in the United States."

"Clouded Prospects for Summit"

MBC-TV's Washington correspondent Kwak Sung-mun said, "Despite the fact that the two leaders held four rounds of meetings, the U.S.-Soviet talks were broken off.

"This clouded the prospects for improving the two nations' relationship through the second Summit meeting."

"Unfortunate for Global Peace"

Liberal Donga Ilbo editorial remarked, "It is unfortunate for global peace that the persistent differences in the U.S.-Soviet positions on SDI led to a failure of the pre-summit..."

"This makes us acutely aware of the thick wall which separates the two superpowers....However, one cannot hold the view that just because the summit failed, the two nations will commence a tension-filled relationship or will sever all dialogue..."

"Despite some warnings that the summit would fail, the fact that President Reagan and Gorbachev made efforts to resolve the arms control issue by holding an unscheduled fourth meeting deserves our appreciation..."

"U.S. Rejection of Unilateral Concession Welcome"

Independent Joongang Ilbo's editorial said, "The rupture of the summit meeting may overshadow prospects for U.S.-Soviet and the more general East-West relationships as well as regional issues and nuclear problems..."

"But, we cannot but welcome that the United States rejected its unilateral concession to the Soviet side over SDI and that an agreement on the medium-range nuclear negotiations which could have left Northeast Asia unprotected under the Soviet nuclear threat could be delayed due to the failure of the summit."

"Heartfelt Hope Turned to Disappointment"

Government-dominated Kyunghyang Shinmun declared, "The world's heartfelt hope and expectations for the beginning of a 'new detente' have turned to disappointment and Asians could not be saved from the horribly destructive power of Soviets' SS-20 missiles deployed to Asia..."

"However, we cannot but pay serious attention to the fact that Korean Peninsula problems were reportedly discussed during the Reykjavik gathering..."

"Yet, the discussions themselves became meaningless due to the collapse of the meeting."

"Possibility of Summit Has Not Completely Disappeared"

The paper's Washington correspondent Yoon Koo held that "the possibility for resuming the U.S.-Soviet summit has not completely disappeared, despite the cloudy prospects for the ratification of a treaty for reducing nuclear weapons before President Reagan's term expires..."

"How the American people react to President Reagan's role in Reykjavik will determine the influence of the pre-summit on the off-year elections.

"Their choice would be either a President who too hurriedly approached the pre-summit or one who was tough enough not to make unilateral concessions to the USSR over SDI."

PHILIPPINES

"Keep on Talking"

An October 13 editorial in the independent Philippine Star said: "In this complex maze of personal motives and superpower positioning, the fact stands out that the rest of humanity benefits each time the Soviets and Americans agree to talk.

"Already, the Soviets have indicated their willingness to pull out some of their troops from Afghanistan as a sign of earnestness to narrow the dangerous differences they have with the United States. Now, if only the superpowers would keep on talking."

MALAYSIA

"Both Sides Blamed Each Other"

Radio Malaysia on October 13 reported that "the Reykjavik meeting ended in failure with both sides blaming each other."

"Glacial Progress"

The conservative New Straits Times, in an October 12 editorial with the above headline, observed that "there is a lack of details of what transpired between the American and Soviet leaders in their meetings, so all we can do is look for hopeful signs...such as the fact that the American strikes on Libya and the recent spy charges didn't put off the summit."

THAILAND

The Meeting and World Peace

The October 13 issue of middle-of-the-road Dao Siam of Bangkok stated, "If this meeting could not produce a reconciliation of the political and ideological conflicts, it would be too naive to assume that the reductions of arms alone will bring about world peace."

CHINA

"An Arduous Dialogue"

The Xinhua News Agency on October 13 noted in a report with this headline that "the two-day summit...ended today with no specific agreement finalized and no exact date fixed for a full-scale summit, due to be held in Washington by the end of this year. Both sides felt disappointment at the hurriedly-arranged meeting and blamed each other for the failure..."

"Observers in Washington noted that the summit...once again showed that the two superpowers hope to continue their dialogue and relax their tense relations, but their dialogue is an arduous road, a road full of twists and turns."

SOUTH ASIA

PAKISTAN

Afghanistan Was a Top Item at Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting

The leftist Pakistan Times on October 13 ran an AFP report saying that Afghanistan had emerged as a top item on the agenda of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting.

MIDDLE EAST AND NORTH AFRICA

EGYPT

"Sharp Differences Over Star Wars"

Cairo's semiofficial al-Ahram ran wire service stories on the conclusion of the meeting that quoted statements by Secretary Shultz and various U.S. and Soviet officials. Typical headlines were "Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Ends Without Agreement Because of Sharp Differences Over Star Wars...Shultz: 'We Are Disappointed at Outcome.'"

"Middle East Was Among Topics Discussed"

Government-affiliated al-Akhbar carried similar news agency stories from Reykjavik and a report by its own correspondent which included a statement by a Soviet spokesman that "the Middle East crisis was among the topics discussed."

ALGERIA

"The Meeting in Itself Is Positive Step"

Algier's Government-owned Ash-shab of October 12 judged in an editorial on the Iceland event that "the meeting is in itself a positive step....(However), it is expected that hot issues in the third world and especially the Middle East will not be tackled in this meeting because the two superpowers consider them as regional issues which will be solved only by the people of their respective regions."

SAUDI ARABIA

"Reagan Won the First Round"

Moderately conservative al-Jazira, as reported in an October 13 press roundup, asserted that "confusion was caused in the Soviet delegation by President Reagan hours before the meeting when he suddenly declared his willingness to halt nuclear tests..."

"Thanks to this surprise, President Reagan won the first round in a brilliant maneuver aimed at introducing several regional and international issues into the agenda."

KUWAIT

U.S. Human Rights Stand a "Joke"

The October 12 issue of pro-Palestinian al-Watan, commenting on the Iceland meeting, ran a byliner's opinion that the U.S. stand on human rights was a "joke" for "demanding the immigration of Soviet Jews to live on Arab lands in Palestine..."

ISRAEL

"Problem of Soviet Jewry One of Two Major Issues at Meeting"

Israel Radio on October 12 led with a report from Washington correspondent Shimon Shiffer that "it emerges from briefings by President Reagan's aides that, along with disarmament, the problem of Soviet Jewry has become one of the two major issues at the Reagan-Gorbachev talks.

"The President made it clear to the Soviets that if they do not let a great number of Jews leave Russia, Gorbachev would find it difficult to visit the United States and would meet with mass demonstrations if he does come."

Gorbachev Would Like to Renew Diplomatic Ties With Israel

Independent Yediot Aharonot front-paged a story on the same day by CBS-TV that "Gorbachev indicated to Reagan that he would like to renew diplomatic ties with Israel. Gorbachev may be prepared to pay the price of an admission ticket to the Mideast diplomatic process."

Note: Israeli media comment on the conclusion of the Reykjavik meeting was unavailable on October 13.

AFRICA

KENYA

"Americans, Soviets Accuse Each Other"

On October 13 the independent Nation of Nairobi carried AP and Reuters reports under such headlines as "Gorbachev, Reagan Wind Up Talks With Expert Help," "Americans, Soviets Accuse Each Other" and "Pre-Summit Deal 'Is a Trick.'"

SWAZILAND

An "Historic Offer" on Arms Cuts

On October 13, the Times of Swaziland stated in its lead paragraph that "President Reagan and the Soviet leader yesterday made an 'historic offer' on (arms) cuts in Reykjavik..."

LATIN AMERICA

BRAZIL

"A Total Failure"

TV Globo on October 12 introduced its evening report from Iceland by saying the meeting was a "total failure" and that the mood in Reykjavik was one of "frustration and disappointment." Film clips showed Secretary Shultz saying the two sides "had come closer than ever before to an agreement," and also excerpts of President Reagan's remarks to American troops in Iceland and General Secretary Gorbachev's press conference.

"Why Did Gorbachev Refuse Reagan's 10-Year Offer on SDI?"

In New York October 13, liberal Folha de Sao Paulo's correspondent Paulo Francis remarked, "All came to nothing because of the disagreement about Star Wars....It was a triumph for those who do not want any U.S.-USSR accord..."

"Gorbachev's attitude also is foxy. Why refuse Reagan's 10-year offer? There will be a new President in the United States by 1989. With the reduction of nuclear arms proposed and the reductions already in effect in Star Wars he would maintain the USSR's strength and would have greater support from the world's pacifists..."

Two Leaders Blamed Each Other

Rio de Janeiro's independent Jornal do Brasil headlined its report October 13 "U.S. and USSR Do Not Reach Any Accord" and noted, "President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev ended two days of meetings in Reykjavik blaming each other for the loss of a 'historic opportunity.'"

ARGENTINA

"Failure Creates Uncertainty for Whole World"

Buenos Aires' business journal Ambito Financiero commented October 13, "The failure of the Reykjavik summit now creates a state of uncertainty for the entire world, which relies on a U.S.-Soviet agreement for its strategic security..."

"Soviets Gained Some Advantage in Reykjavik"

Moderate La Nacion's Washington correspondent Julio Crespo judged, "The results of the pre-summit do not seem to measure up to even the modest expectations prevailing before Saturday ...Was anyone the winner in this encounter? A quick balance immediately following the statements by Reagan, Gorbachev and Shultz would lead us to think that the Soviets gained some advantage.

"They succeeded in making arms control talks prevail in an absolute manner over other issues....The Soviets furthered their purpose of presenting SDI as a stumbling block--perhaps the most serious one--to stable peace. They carried forward, and not without some success, the public relations campaign started by Gorbachev..."

CHILE

"Reagan-Gorbachev Meeting Failed"

Santiago headlines October 13 reported the "failure" of the meeting and the "lack of agreement." Conservative El Mercurio bannered "Reagan-Gorbachev Summit Meeting Failed...U.S. President Said He Made 'a Historical Offer on Arms Control,' but Gorbachev Rejected It...Soviet Leader Said World Is Heading Toward Point of No Return."

TRINIDAD AND TOBAGO

"No Doubt That the Iceland Meeting Was a Historic Failure"

Port of Spain's liberal Daily Express, in an editorial titled "A Historic Failure," said October 13: "Every time the leaders of the two superpowers meet the world's hopes are raised only to be dashed after the glow of the meeting has faded. This time we were not allowed even the luxury of a glow..."