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THE WHITE HOUSE

Office of the Press Secretary

For Immediate Release

October 14, 1986

PRESS BRIEFING

BY

SENATORS ROBERT DOLE, RICHARD LUGAR,  
ROBERT BYRD, SAM NUNN AND CONGRESSMAN ROBERT MICHEL

The Briefing Room

12:25 P.M. EDT

MR. SPEAKES: This is Senator Dole, Senator Lugar and Congressman Michel. Okay. They're here to talk about what the President told them about his meeting in Iceland.

Q Come on, guys. Come in. Do it. Be good soldiers.

Q Why are you here?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, we've had -- let -- just indicate we've had an hour and five minutes with the President. I think it was one of the better meetings I've ever attended down here, because it was a give-and-take session with Democrats and Republicans. I think everybody has hunger for an explanation of what really happened. We've been reading and hearing what happened, and we'd like to find out precisely what did happen. And I would hope, as I've indicated, that there's going to be a lot of unity across party lines in supporting the President. I didn't detect anything otherwise in the meeting.

Q Supporting him on what?

SENATOR DOLE: On his act of statesmanship in Reykjavik, and nearly historic breakthrough that we have, and the willingness on the part of the President to continue to do that. That was the positive -- positive impact I had from the meeting, that we were serious about it, the President's serious about it. Everything is still on the table, going to stay on the table. To me, that's good news. I think when you read yesterday morning's headlines about the collapse or failure, I think many people felt it was over. My view is that it's not over at all.

Q Well, was there total unanimity that it was a big success?

SENATOR DOLE: Sure. Yes --

Q Did the Democrats -- so much unity --

SENATOR DOLE: I don't know of any -- we didn't take a vote on whether or not it was a success. I think everybody ought to speak for themselves, but I didn't detect any partisan criticism.

Q Why shouldn't this be regarded as a lost opportunity? Clearly it was that, wasn't it?

SENATOR DOLE: It's not the last opportunity; I think that's the key.

SENATOR LUGAR: I think one of the important things of the session was that the President emphasized the ball game is still on. In other words, the negotiations continue, and the need for unity, in terms of our negotiating posture as we table these proposals at Geneva or wherever we can is essential. He sees it as

MORE

great progress, and the ball was pushed down the field a good bit, so we have some opportunities.

Q Senator Nunn, can I ask you a question? Senator Nunn? Or both you and Senator Byrd. Could you both answer why we need an insurance policy of SDI down the end of the road if all ballistic missiles have been eliminated?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, that's a big "if." You first have to eliminate them all, and then you have to make sure that other countries in the world, like France and China and England and others that we know to be nuclear powers are also part of the overall deal, and you then have to make sure you do something about the proliferation of nuclear knowledge. I don't know how anyone's going to put that back in the bag.

I guess the real question then is, what kind of strategic defense system do you have, and what kind do you need? It is my view that the first priority should be on reducing the Soviet offensive force. After we have accomplished that, it seems to me then we design the pace and the scope of our defensive system.

Now, you do have to talk about those things together, but when we get to the point the Soviets are really willing to reduce their first-strike weapons, and evidently we got close to that point this weekend, it seems to me at that stage, we go back to the drawing board in terms of designing our plans for defensive systems.

Q So why -- so just to understand your position on this, you're talking about designing SDI down the road after the agreements -- verifiable agreements have been reached on the strategic systems, and then deploy something on a smaller scale that matches the level of verifiably --

SENATOR NUNN: Yes. I think the important thing is, I think the United States has to think through what kind of defensive system we really need once we have made these dramatic reductions in offensive forces. I must add to that, however, we've got some other thinking to do that has not yet been done in my view, and that thinking is, how do conventional forces interrelate to strategic forces? After all, the United States has relied on nuclear weapons for our deterrence, for our primary deterrence since World War II. I would like to get away from that. I would like to have stronger conventional forces. I think our allies should build stronger conventional forces.

But I get very concerned when I hear the two leaders talking about eliminating all nuclear weapons in the next 10 years. I get very concerned unless we have a parallel course with bold and innovative conventional arms control proposals that would do something about the Soviets' overwhelming conventional superiority in -- particularly in Europe and also the Middle East -- and unless we also have a cohesive alliance plan to build up our conventional defenses. So I have a lot of questions on this, and I think the administration has a lot of thinking to do on this.

Q Senator Byrd, could you step forward and -- sir, could the President have handled this better so it didn't slip through his fingers?

SENATOR BYRD: I don't think that I would address my response to the question as to whether or not either of the leaders could have handled it better. It's unfortunate that -- it seems to me that we didn't just -- both sides say, well, we've seemed to have come a long way. Why don't we think about this further and reserve a final judgment until we meet at the summit in Washington to which we both have agreed? It seems to me that both leaders have committed themselves to continuing the quest for a way to bring about workable and effective arms control. Both say that their proposals are still on the table. It seems to me now that both should demonstrate their

commitment by going forward with these proposals in the fora that exists: for example, Geneva.

Q Did you tell the President that -- of why did he slam the door when he left and why didn't he say "We'll meet again," and why didn't he say "We'll continue right away?"

SENATOR BYRD: No, I didn't put it exactly that way -- almost. I just simply said --

Q Did he say why he didn't?

Q What did you say?

SENATOR BYRD: Well, I simply said it seems to me that with -- as I say now, that if we got this far and why not just withhold final judgment until Washington, which we've both agreed upon.

Q Senator Nunn?

SENATOR DOLE: I think the President indicated he did not slam the door. The door's still open. I mean, I don't know where that slamming the door comes from.

SENATOR NUNN: Both leaders indicated that the tables were -- the proposals were still on the table. I think that was very --

Q Senator Nunn, do you -- Senator Nunn, do you share the Republicans' view that this was a great progress and the summit was basically a success, or do you -- are you more concerned about the negative possibilities of what happened in Reykjavik?

SENATOR NUNN: Well, the thing that was negative from my perspective was that the Soviets evidently relinked the intermediate missile talks with the strategic and space talks. Now, that is a step backwards. The thing that was positive was that they made progress in all areas, but it was subject to the caveat of what we do about defense and offensive trade-offs. So, there was some positive and there was some negative and the question is now are the proposals still on the table on both sides. We were assured this morning by President Reagan they were. I found that encouraging. Both leaders say that they're going to go back to the drawing boards and go back to Geneva.

As I've already indicated, I think we have some real thinking to do on our side about our defensive system, about the definition of it, and about what kind of system we need down the road when the offensive threat is greatly reduced, if it's greatly reduced. And we also, most importantly, have got to think through the imbalances in conventional arms. It's one thing to say in a rhetorical speech that all the nuclear weapons in the world should be abolished, it's another thing to sit down at a summit conference and actually be discussing that seriously when there are profound conventional imbalances. So, these things have got to be thought through and I'm sure they will be thought through.

Q Then should we take that off the -- I mean, if all proposals are on the table, I gather what you're saying is that the particular one concerning the trade-off for the elimination of ballistic missiles in 10 years should be taken off the table in our best interest.

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I'm going to be making some further remarks on that after I do some thinking myself.

SENATOR DOLE: I think it's fair to say, as Senator Nunn pointed out, they delinked this at Geneva and now they've relinked it -- the Russians did, not the United States' position.

Q Could there be less --

Q Did the President tell you --

Q Could there be less funding for SDI now as a result of -- if we're going to have these big cuts, should the Congress be spending less on SDI?

SENATOR DOLE: I think that's a matter we'll address next year. I think we've addressed it this year, but I would hope not. I think this is an indication that there shouldn't be any undercutting of the President's position on SDI. There's going to be a press conference by Mr. Gorbachev at 2:00 p.m. Washington time and I've got to believe he's probably monitoring this session to see what Democrats and Republicans are saying.

Q Did the President tell you anything --

SENATOR DOLE: I think we're saying, in effect, that we're -

Q -- different today than he said in his speech last night? Did he go any further, did he explain anymore than he has said in --

SENATOR DOLE: I think he asked a lot -- Tip O'Neill asked questions, Bob Byrd asked questions, Sam Nunn asked questions, I made a statement -- there are a lot of questions. I think the President did say that Gorbachev reached for his briefcase first when it terminated.

Q Is that right?

MORE

SENATOR DOLE: So -- and Tip said, "Well, maybe he's reaching for another agreement." (Laughter.)

Q What were you about to say about Democrats and Republicans alike?

SENATOR DOLE: Me?

Q Yes. You didn't get to finish it.

SENATOR DOLE: Oh. Well, I think we are alike. I think we're supporting what we see as progress. Now, we may have different characterization of how much progress or whether it was a success or -- obviously, it could have been a smashing success if they signed something. That didn't happen. That doesn't mean it's a failure, doesn't mean it's a lost opportunity, it doesn't mean it's the last opportunity. So --

Q How --

SENATOR DOLE: I hope -- I haven't seen much partisan sniping over the weekend. I've seen a lot of other people give their conclusions, which is certainly fair. But with one or two exceptions, I think everybody's been fairly constructive.

Q Were you trying to say that Democrats and Republicans are united behind the President?

SENATOR DOLE: Well, Republicans are. And I think you'd have to ask Senator Byrd and Senator Nunn.

Q Senator Byrd, what about that?

Q Senator Byrd, would you answer that, please?

SENATOR BYRD: Democrats and Republicans are always united behind the President when it comes to the best interests of our country -- and we're talking about the national security interests. We may disagree on this or that or how we get there, but we're all in agreement as to the goal that we should achieve. It seems to me that we don't gain anything by talking about whether this was a success or not a success. It seems to me that both leaders ought to pickup the pieces here now. They both say that the invitations are still there, everything's still on the table. It seems to me they ought to pickup the pieces now and try to go forward and achieve something that's in the best interest of both countries and world peace.

Q Senator Nunn, if you think that there should be, perhaps, a different type of SDI down the road depending on what kind of offensive threat there is, then you've got to think -- the logical conclusion is that you think the President was wrong to insist on SDI deployment at the end of 10 years as the absolute demand that actually scuttled the negotiations.

SENATOR NUNN: No, I don't conclude that, because I don't know all the details of what the Soviets put on the table. I don't know all the details of our counterproposals. I'll be addressing this as we go along. If you want to look at what I think the SDI program ought to be shaped -- the shape it should be in, Senator Cohen and I had a bipartisan proposal, which became the report of the Senate Arms Services Committee. It's about two pages and it gives a pretty thorough path of where we think the SDI program ought to be going. That was thoroughly debated in our committee, thoroughly debated on the floor, and I think, hopefully, the administration will read that and will begin looking at it.

Q Senator -- would you --

SENATOR NUNN: Thank you.

Q I just don't understand, Senator Nunn -- I don't understand why the President insists on deployment.

SENATOR NUNN: Well, I'll -- I'll defer that -- I'll leave that one with the White House.

END

12:38 P.M. EDT

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON  
October 15, 1986

**NOTED BY DTR**

MEMORANDUM FOR DONALD T. REGAN

FROM: Peter Roussel

Al Hunt just called with the results of their Wall Street Journal/NBC poll, which shows:

-- Did he do the right thing (regarding decision to stick with Star Wars in Iceland?)

Approve: 72%            Disapprove: 18%

-- Do you approve of his handling?

Approve: 71%            Disapprove: 16%

-- Would you vote for a Member of Congress who supports the President on SDI?

Yes: 53%                No: 38%



Sneed & O'Malley  
**INC.**



### The Iceland caper ...

Here's a little lesson in history for those who thought the Soviets scored a coup by having Raisa Gorbachev attend the Iceland minisummit while Nancy stayed home: It was Nancy Reagan who played a major role in the reversals of Reagan's policy toward the Soviet Union in 1984. Ron probably never would have wound up in Iceland if Nancy hadn't used a blowtorch on him and started the thaw.

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

MEETINGS BETWEEN  
PRESIDENT REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV  
REYKJAVIK, ICELAND

October 10-11, 1986

October 3, 1986  
2:15 pm

COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

Meetings Between  
President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev  
Reykjavik, Iceland

Pre-Meeting Events

Friday, October 3, 1986

- o Event: Background briefing with Time, Newsweek, U.S. News by Don Regan and John Poindexter.

ACTION: Larry Speakes

- o Event: Background briefings by Don Regan and John Poindexter with major newspaper groups to include:

AP	New York Times
UPI	Washington Post
Reuters	Los Angeles Times
AFP	Wall Street Journal
USA Today	Knight-Ridder
New York Daily News	Copley
Washington Times	Scripps-Howard
Chicago Tribune	Newhouse

ACTION: Larry Speakes

Saturday, October 4, 1986 - 10 minutes

- o Event: Radio Address
- Subject: Bipartisan Congressional support on key issues - defense policy - essential to successful Iceland meeting.

ACTION: Pat Buchanan

Sunday, October 5, 1986

- o Event: Sunday News Shows:  
"This Week with David Brinkley", ABC:  
Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway

TOWER  
GPS

ACTION: Dan Howard

Monday, October 6, 1986

- o Event: Morning News Show  
"Today" - NBC: Donald Regan

ACTION: Larry Speakes

- o Event: WORLDNET Interview - Secretary Shultz

ACTION: Don Mathes

Tuesday, October 7, 1986

- o (T)Event: White House Briefing by Larry Speakes on  
logistics for trip.

ACTION: Larry Speakes

- o NOTE: Press Trip Briefing Books to be distributed.

ACTION: Roman Popadiuk

- o (T)Event: Secretary Shultz gives on-the-record pre-trip  
briefing in White House Press Briefing Room

ACTION: Larry Speakes

Wednesday, October 8, 1986

NOTE: Presidential Travel Day:

North Carolina  
Atlanta

Section of speech devoted to theme of  
Reagan/Gorbachev meeting.

- o Event: Morning News Shows  
"Today", NBC: ~~Donald T. Regan~~ *PPS?*  
ACTION: Larry Speakes
- o Event: ~~WORLDNET~~ Interview: Assistant Secretary of  
State ~~Rozanne Ridgway~~ *MATLON*  
ACTION: Don Mathes
- o Event: Background briefing by Assistant Secretary  
Rozanne Ridgway at Foreign Press Center  
ACTION: Dan Howard

Thursday, October 9, 1986

- o Event: Morning News Shows  
"Good Morning America", ABC: Secretary Shultz  
ACTION: Larry Speakes
- o Event: Departure Statement by the President  
ACTION: Pat Buchanan
- o Event: Arrival in Reykjavik Statement  
Open Press Coverage  
ACTION: Pat Buchanan  
Larry Speakes

Friday, October 10, 1986

- o Event: Morning News Shows  
"CBS Morning News", CBS:  
Secretary Shultz/Donald T. Regan  
ACTION: Larry Speakes
  
- o Event: Working photo of President in preparation for meetings.  
ACTION: Larry Speakes
  
- o Event: Daily White House Press Briefing  
ACTION: Larry Speakes
  
- o (T)Event: Secretary Shultz gives on-the-record briefing in Press Filing Center at Reykjavik.  
ACTION: Larry Speakes

Meeting Days

Saturday, October 11, 1986

- o Event: Opening day of meetings / Photo opportunities  
ACTION: Larry Speakes
  
- o Event: Radio Address - Summit Scene Setter  
ACTION: Pat Buchanan
  
- o Event: Daily White House Briefing  
ACTION: Larry Speakes

Sunday, October 12, 1986

- o Event: Final Summit Events / Photo opportunities

ACTION: Larry Speakes

- o Event: Daily White House Briefing

ACTION: Larry Speakes

- o Event: Secretary Shultz Briefing on Meetings

ACTION: Dan Howard

- o Event: Separate print background briefings scheduled with key officials:

Secretary Shultz: New York Times  
Washington Post  
Los Angeles Times  
Wall Street Journal

ACTION: Larry Speakes

Donald T. Regan: AP USA Today  
UPI N Y Daily News  
Reuters Washington Times  
AFP Chicago Tribune

ACTION: Peter Roussel

Assistant Secretary Newhouse  
Rozanne Ridgway: Knight-Ridder  
Copley  
Scripps-Howard

ACTION: Dan Howard

- o Event: Magazines - Final update for Time, Newsweek and U.S. News & World Report by Donald T. Regan and Assistant Secretary Rozanne Ridgway

ACTION: Peter Roussel  
Dan Howard

- o (T)Event: Mini News Conference by the President upon departure

ACTION: Larry Speakes

- o Event: Presidential Departure Statement

ACTION: Pat Buchanan

- o Event: Sunday News Shows: Bud McFarlane, other surrogates

ACTION: Dale Petroskey

Post-Meeting Events

Monday, October 13, 1986

- o Event: Evening Presidential Address to the Nation from the Oval Office.

ACTION: Pat Buchanan  
Larry Speakes



TO: GUSTAV ARNAR  
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ANSWERBACK: GENTEL IS

CC: LARRY SPEAKES  
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-H A N D D E L I V E R-

✓ DONALD REGAN  
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ATTENTION:  
JIM CASEY

FROM:

THOMAS MANN  
NBC RADIO NEWS  
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WASHINGTON, D.C.  
USA  
TELEPHONE: 202-885-4313  
FAX: 202-898-0389  
TELEX: 892685 (WRC WASH)

SUBJECT:

RECONSIDERATION OF DENIAL BY ICELANDIC PT&T AUTHORITY  
TO ALLOW NBC RADIO NEWS AUTHORITY TO COMMISSION AND OPERATE  
STANDARD "A" LAND BASED EARTH STATION WITH INMARSAT IN  
REYKJAVIK FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN'S VISIT THIS WEEK

DATE: OCTOBER 6, 1986

NBC RADIO NEWS URGES THAT YOU REVIEW AND REVERSE YOUR  
DECISION NOT - REPEAT NOT - TO ALLOW THE OPERATION OF  
STANDARD "A" SATELLITE TELEPHONES IN CONJUNCTION WITH VISIT  
BY PRESIDENT REAGAN 10/11 AND 10/12.

PERMISSION FOR USE OF THE SATELLITE TELEPHONES IS REQUESTED  
AS A EMERGENCY BACKUP TO ALL CONVENTIONAL PROGRAM AND  
TELEPHONIC CHANNELS IN THE EVENT OF FAILURE OR LACK OF  
CAPACITY, AND IS OF EXTREME IMPORTANCE TO THIS ORGANIZATION.

NBC RADIO FEELS THAT CONVENTIONAL FACILITIES MAY WELL BE  
OVERTAXED, ON THIS SHORT NOTICE, BY AN EVENT OF SUCH GLOBAL  
SIGNIFICANCE, AND FEELS THAT IT MUST HAVE THIS SERVICE  
AVAILABLE SHOULD, IT BE REQUIRED, TO REPORT THE NEWS.

SINCE NBC RADIO HAS ORDERED 7.5 KHZ PROGRAM CIRCUITS  
UNILATERALLY AND IS A MEMBER OF THE US RADIO POOL AS WELL,  
OPERATION ONLY IN THE EVENT OF AN EMERGENCY IS ANTICIPATED,  
AND IT IS NOT THE INTENT OF THIS REQUEST TO DEPRIVE  
ICELANDIC PT&T OF REVENUE.

KINDEST REGARDS,

THOMAS MANN

MEETING/EVENT PARTICIPANTSDraft list of "possible" candidates for meetings/events

- \* THE PRESIDENT
- \* Sec. Shultz
- \* Amb. Nicholas Ruwe (U.S. Ambassador to Iceland)
- \* Amb. Arthur Hartman (U.S. Ambassador to Moscow)
- \* Donald T. Regan
- \* John Poindexter
- \* Rozanne Ridgway (Asst. Sec. for European Affairs)
- \* Paul Nitze (Ambassador at Large)
- \* Richard Perle (Department of Defense)
- \* Jack Matlock (NSC)
- \* Robert Linhard (NSC)
- \* Tom Simons (Notetaker - Deputy Asst. Sec. for European Affairs, State Department)
- \* Lynn Pascoe (Notetaker - Dep. Exec. Sec., State Department)
- \* Tyrus Cobb (Notetaker - NSC)
- \* Peter Sommer (Notetaker - NSC)
- \* Interpreter

THURSDAY, OCTOBER 9, 1986

Event I: Courtesy greeting with Government of Iceland Officials upon Arrival of Air Force One into Iceland

Time: 7:05 p.m. local Icelandic time

Location: Keflavik Base

## Proposed Participants:

- \* THE PRESIDENT
- \* Sec. Shultz
- \* Amb. Ruwe
- \* D. Regan
- \* J. Poindexter
- \* Others TBD (members of the U.S. working party on board Air Force One)

FRIDAY, OCTOBER 10, 1986

Event I: Luncheon Briefing

Time: Approx. 12:30 p.m.

Location: U.S. Ambassador's Residence

## Proposed Participants:

- \* THE PRESIDENT
- \* Sec. Shultz
- \* Amb. Hartman
- \* D. Regan
- \* J. Poindexter
- \* Others TBD (members of the substantive working party and staff)

10/06/86 8:00 a.m.

Event II: Courtesy Meeting with Government of Iceland Officials  
Time: Approx. 5:00 p.m. (T)  
Location: TBD

Proposed Participants:  
\* THE PRESIDENT  
\* Sec. Shultz  
\* Amb. Ruwe  
\* D. Regan  
\* J. Poindexter  
\* R. Ridgway  
\* P. Sommer (Notetaker)

SATURDAY, OCTOBER 11, 1986

Event I: First tete-a-tete meeting  
Time: Approx. 10:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m. (T)  
Location: Hofdi

Proposed Participants:  
\* THE PRESIDENT  
\* U.S. Interpreter  
\* G.S. Gorbachev  
\* U.S.S.R. Interpreter

Event II: Plenary Meeting during first tete-a-tete meeting  
Time: Approx. 10:30 a.m.-12:30 p.m. (T)

Location: Hofdi  
Proposed Participants:  
\* Sec. Shultz  
\* Others TBD depending upon subject matter

Event III: Briefing Lunch between first and second meetings  
Time: 1:00-2:00 p.m. (T)

Location: U.S. Ambassador's Residence  
Proposed Participants:  
\* THE PRESIDENT  
\* Sec. Shultz  
\* Amb. Hartman  
\* D. Regan  
\* J. Poindexter  
\* Others TBD (members of the substantive working party and staff)

Event IV: Second tete-a-tete meeting  
Time: Approx. 3:30-5:30 p.m. (T)  
Location: Hofdi  
Proposed Participants:  
\* THE PRESIDENT  
\* U.S. Interpreter  
\* G.S. Gorbachev  
\* U.S.S.R. Interpreter

Event V: Plenary Meeting during second tete-a-tete meeting  
Time: Approx. 3:30-5:30 p.m. (T)  
Location: Hofdi  
Proposed Participants:  
\* Sec. Shultz  
\* Others TBD depending upon subject matter

SUNDAY, OCTOBER 12, 1986

Event I: Third tete-a-tete meeting  
Time: Approx. 11:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m. (T)  
Location: Hofdi  
Proposed Participants:  
\* THE PRESIDENT  
\* U.S. Interpreter  
\* G.S. Gorbachev  
\* U.S.S.R. Interpreter

Event II: Plenary Meeting during third tete-a-tete meeting  
Time: Approx. 11:00 a.m.-1:00 p.m. (T)  
Location: Hofdi  
Proposed Participants:  
\* Sec. Shultz  
\* Others TBD depending upon subject matter

Event III: Courtesy greeting upon departure of Air Force One from  
Iceland  
Time: Approx. 3:45 p.m. (T)  
Location: Keflavik Base  
Proposed Participants:  
\* THE PRESIDENT  
\* Sec. Shultz  
\* Amb. Ruwe  
\* D. Regan  
\* J. Poindexter  
\* Others TBD (members of the U.S. working party on  
board Air Force One)

RECOMMENDED PRESS COVERAGE

1. Arrival/Departure at Andrews Air Force Base - OPEN PRESS COVERAGE  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
2. Arrival/Departure in Keflavik, Iceland - OPEN PRESS COVERAGE  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
3. Arrivals/Departures from U.S. Ambassador's Residence - OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER ONLY  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
4. Briefing Lunches at U.S. Ambassador's Residence - OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER ONLY  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
5. Courtesy Meeting with Government of Iceland officials on Friday, October 10th - PRESS POOL COVERAGE (beginning only)  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
6. Arrival at Hofdi for first meeting between Reagan/Gorbachev - PRESS POOL COVERAGE (outside only)  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
7. First tete-a-tete meeting at Hofdi between Reagan/Gorbachev - PRESS POOL COVERAGE (beginning only)  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
8. Plenary meetings between U.S./U.S.S.R. on Saturday, October 11th and Sunday, October 12th - OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER ONLY  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_
9. Departure from first meeting at Hofdi - OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER ONLY  
Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

10. Arrival/Departure at Hofdi for second meeting between Reagan/  
Gorbachev - OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER ONLY

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

11. Arrival at Hofdi for third meeting between Reagan/Gorbachev -  
OFFICIAL PHOTOGRAPHER ONLY

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

12. Departure from Hofdi after third meeting between Reagan/  
Gorbachev - PRESS POOL COVERAGE (outside only)

Approve \_\_\_\_\_

Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

MARCIA HOBBS

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

1. POTUS
  2. Stu <sup>> opt - Mrs.</sup>
  3. Reagan
  4. Pointexter
  5. Long Speaker
  6. Pat Buchanan
  7. Bill Henkel
  8. D. Thomas
  9. Tom Dawson
  10. Dr.
  11. Mil. Aide
  12. J. Kuhn
  13. \_\_\_\_\_
  14. K. Osborne
- KJD



THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

15. \_\_\_\_\_ (D.T.R. Secretary)

16. C. Luce

17. R. Ridgeway

18. e. hist-ye

19. A. Thompson

20. N.S.C. Secretary


21. P. Chat. S. G. G. G.

22. N.S.C.

23. V.S.S.S. COS

# SEATING DIAGRAM OF VH-3D

South Lawn to AAFB  
Saturday, November 16, 1985




## SEAT ASSIGNMENTS

- 1. Mrs. Reagan
- 2. THE PRESIDENT
- 3. D. Regan
- 4.
- 5. Secretary Shultz
- 6. R. McFarlane
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11. Dr. Hutton
- 12. J. Kuhn
- 13.
- 14.
- 15. USSS
- 16. USSS

*BEF*

# VC137C- 27000 PASSENGER SEATING ARRANGEMENT



## STATEROOM 1

1. THE PRESIDENT
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_

## STATEROOM 2

1. Mrs. Reagan
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_

## LOUNGE

1. D. Regan
2. Secretary Shultz
3. R. McFarlane JP
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_

## 10 STAFF SEATS

### TABLE #1

1. D. Thomas
2. J. Matlock
3. P. Buchanan
4. P. Dawson

### TABLE #2

1. Mil. Aide
2. J. Kuhn
3. W. Henkel
4. Dr. Smith

## SECRETARIAL UNIT

1. K. Osborne
2. B. Hayward

## 8 GUEST SEATS

### ROW #1

- A. L. Speakes
- B. P. Nitze
- C. C. Hill
- D. NSC STAFF

### ROW #2

- A. W. Hall
- B. Ofcl. Photographer
- C. J. Bengtsson
- D. \_\_\_\_\_

*USSS-CDS*  
*↓*  
*O.L.C.*

## 10 FWD PASS COMPARTMENT SEATS

### ROW #1

- A. USSS
- B. \_\_\_\_\_
- C. \_\_\_\_\_
- D. \_\_\_\_\_
- E. \_\_\_\_\_

### ROW #2

- A. USSS
- B. \_\_\_\_\_
- C. \_\_\_\_\_
- D. \_\_\_\_\_
- E. \_\_\_\_\_

## 16 AFT PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEATS

1. PRESS
2. \_\_\_\_\_
3. \_\_\_\_\_
4. \_\_\_\_\_
5. \_\_\_\_\_
6. \_\_\_\_\_
7. \_\_\_\_\_
8. \_\_\_\_\_
9. \_\_\_\_\_
10. \_\_\_\_\_
11. \_\_\_\_\_
12. C. Jennings
13. USAF
14. \_\_\_\_\_
15. \_\_\_\_\_
16. \_\_\_\_\_

AAFB to Geneva, Switzerland  
Saturday, November 16, 1985

AP-1 MANIFEST


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*[Handwritten notes and signatures]*

BACKUP PLANE MANIFEST

Andrews AFB to Geneva, Switzerland  
Saturday, November 16, 1985

VC137C-26000 PASSENGER SEATING ARRANGEMENT



10 FWD PASS COMPARTMENT SEATS	STATEROOM	LOUNGE	10 STAFF SEATS	12 GUEST SEATS	16 AFT PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEATS
1. USAF	1. _____	1. K. Adelman	<u>TABLE #1</u>	<u>ROW #1</u>	1. P. Young
2. _____	2. _____	2. _____	1. R. Riley	A. P. Thompson	2. M. Riccobene
3. _____	3. _____	3. _____	2. B. Elliott	B.B. McKinley	3. R. Sanvictores
4. _____	4. _____	4. B. Kalb	3. J. Rosebush	C. R. Linhard	4. P. Berania
5. AF STENO	5. _____	5. R. Ridgway	4. L. Verstandig	D. <del>P. Benton</del> S. Steiner	5. C. Sapanghila
6. G. Miller	6. _____	7. _____	<u>TABLE #2</u>	<u>ROW #2</u>	6. T. Huggins
7. T. Cobb		8. R. Perle	1. D. Chew	A. K. Hart	7. S. Emery
8. J. Miller		9. E. Rowny	2. W. Martin	B. <del>P. Benton</del> S. Steiner	8. N. Roberts
9. J. Bull			3. K. Small	C. E. Crispen	9. K. Timmons
10. S. Harrison			4. M. Palmer	D. J. Erkenbeck	10. E. Morris
			<u>SECRETARIAL UNIT</u>	<u>ROW #3</u>	11. J. Stein
			1. C. Cleveland	A. J. Benton	12. M. Paris
			2. K. Zerwick	B. C. Thompson	13. D. Graze
				C. S. Sestanovich	14. S. Brackman
				D. S. Steiner <i>NOONAN</i>	15. C. Hathaway
					16. L. Simkus

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

PROPOSED TRAVELERS ON AF1 and 26000

TO

GENEVA, SWITZERLAND

SATURDAY, NOVEMBER 16, 1985

AIR FORCE ONE MANIFEST -

THE PRESIDENT

Mrs. Reagan

Secretary Shultz

D. Regan

R. McFarlane

P. Buchanan

L. Speakes

D. Thomas

F. Ikle

P. Nitze

T. Dawson

W. Henkel

J. Kuhn

J. Matlock

K. Osborne

C. Hill

W. Hall

B. Hayward

Dr. Hutton

Mil. Aide

Ofcl. Photographer

C. Jennings

J. Bengtsson

A. Castello

26000 MANIFEST -

K. Adelman

E. Rowny

D. Chew

B. Elliott

J. Rosebush


K. Small

26000 MANIFEST - DRAFT (con't)

R. Perle  
R. Ridgway  
B. Kalb  
W. Martin  
P. Noonan  
R. Riley  
M. Palmer  
L. Verstandig  
J. Benton  
P. Berania  
S. Brackman  
J. Bull  
C. Cleveland  
T. Cobb  
E. Crispen  
S. Emery  
J. Erkenbeck  
D. Graze  
S. Harrison  
K. Hart  
C. Hathaway  
T. Huggins  
R. Linhard  
B. McKinley  
G. Miller  
J. Miller  
E. Morris  
M. Paris  
M. Riccobene  
N. Roberts  
P. Rodman  
R. Sanvictores  
C. Sapanghila  
L. Simkus  
S. Sestanovich  
J. Stein  
S. Steiner  
C. Thompson  
P. Thompson  
K. Timmons  
P. Young  
K. Zerwick

### SEATING DIAGRAM OF VH-3D

South Lawn to AAFB  
Saturday, November 16, 1985



### SEAT ASSIGNMENTS

- 1. Mrs. Reagan
- 2. THE PRESIDENT
- 3. D. Regan
- 4.
- 5. Secretary Shultz
- 6. R. McFarlane
- 7.
- 8.
- 9.
- 10.
- 11. Dr. Hutton
- 12. J. Kuhn
- 13.
- 14.
- 15. USSS
- 16. USSS

SECRET

NOTIONAL SCHEDULE

ICELAND TRIP

Thursday, October 9

10:25 a.m. Depart South Lawn  
10:40 a.m. Andrews  
8:00 p.m. Arrive Keflavik  
(Local)  
-- Brief ceremony  
8:15 p.m. Depart for Embassy (Residence)  
9:00 p.m. Arrive Reykjavik  
-- Free evening

Friday, October 10

a.m. Private time/Washington Work  
12:00 Working lunch (Geneva format)  
p.m. Washington Work/Private Time  
5:00 p.m. Courtesy Visit  
-- Iceland President/Prime Minister/Foreign  
Minister  
-- Official Government House  
(2 minute drive)  
5:45 p.m. Return Residence  
-- Free evening/private Dinner

Saturday, October 11

10:30 a.m. RR/Gorbachev Meeting I  
12:30 p.m. RR/Gorbachev Meeting concludes



1:00 p.m. Working Lunch (Geneva format)  
3:30 p.m. RR/Gorbachev Meeting II  
5:30 p.m. RR/Gorbachev Meeting concludes

Evening Dinner Undetermined

Sunday, October 12

11:00 a.m. RR/Gorbachev Meeting III  
1:00 p.m. RR/Gorbachev Meeting concludes  
p.m. Departure/Remain overnight undetermined

SECRET  
Declassify: OARD

BILL HENKEL - THIS WAS PASSED TO GARY TERRY BY ICELANDIC FOREIGN  
MINISTRY OFFICIALS TODAY WITH PROVISIO THAT IT BE HELD CONFIDEN-  
TIALY AND NOT PUBLICLY ACKNOWLEDGED. PLEASE USE ACCORDINGLY.

J. HOOLEY

October 7, 1986

Suggestions for a programme for the visit  
of Madame Raisa Gorbachova to Iceland:

Saturday, 11 October 1986:

- 10:00 hrs. - Sightseeing tour of Reykjavik (f.ex. swimming pools etc.)
- approx.  
11:00 hrs. - Visit to Manuscript Institute.
- approx.  
12:00 hrs. - Visit to Museum of sculptor Einar Jónsson.
- 14:30 hrs. - Visit to "HRINGURINN" Childrens' Hospital, or to National Museum.
- 15:30 hrs. - Afternoon tea with President of Iceland at Bessastadir.
- 18:00 hrs. - Dinner at home of Prime Minister, Mávanes 19 (approx 10 guests).
- 19:45 hrs. - Opera performance at National Theatre (Tosca).

Sunday, 12 October 1986:

- 10:00 hrs. - Excursion to Thingvellir and lunch there.

Other suggestions:

Fashion show - Icelandic furs etc. Possible the "Hamrahlíf" Choir, the Horticultural School at Hveragerdi, childrens' home etc.



### **The story of the meeting place " HÖFÐI "**

The house was built in 1909 by the French consul general in Reykjavík by name of J. Brillouin. The house was imported from Norway and assembled at the location which then was at a considerable distance from other buildings in Reykjavík. Mr. Brillouin had a Norwegian wife which explains the origin and the architecture of the house.

Later the house was sold and has been in the possession of several owners among which was the famous poet and a business entrepreneur Einar Benediktsson. He gave the house the name of his childhood home, a farm in North East Iceland - Héðinshöfði. That name was later shortened to Höfði, which means " cape " or " headland " .

In 1938 the British consul moved into the house and among famous guests there during the Second World War were Winston Churchill and Marlene Dietrich.

The house was again sold into private hands in 1952, but when geothermal water sources were discovered on its grounds in 1958 it was bought by the city in order to acquire the drilling rights for hot water. The house was by then in a derelict condition and was marked for demolition. But the Mayor and the city's chief of the public works department at the time opted to renovate the house and turn it into a reception house for official functions of the Municipality. Years after the house had been restored to its original condition it was noticed that the renovation had never been mentioned in the city financial budget.

"Höfði" houses a highly valued collection of Icelandic art and it is frequently used for official receptions by the City of Reykjavík.

# Foreign Television Analysis

United States Information Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

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## NOTED BY DTR

October 24, 1986

SOVIET TV TREATMENT OF ICELAND, OCTOBER 1-13, 1986

### Summary

As presented on Soviet domestic television, Soviet leaders and propagandists played a major game before and during the meeting in Iceland. They tried to set the agenda totally on arms control issues and to raise expectations, all with the apparent aim of pressuring the U.S. to yield on SDI. What they said before the meeting, however, -- about possible INF agreements, regional conflict discussions, nuclear testing, and SDI -- did not coincide with what they did and said once the meeting was underway. By springing a comprehensive package of arms deals on the U.S. side, the Soviets left unclear whether they intended only to score propaganda points or hoped for a major breakthrough in Reykjavik.

End Summary

### The Early Soviet Line

From the time Soviet spokesmen announced the agreement to meet in Reykjavik, they stressed a few basic points. Soviet TV quoted foreign leaders and their own leaders to convey these themes. Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, at his UN Press Conference on September 30, hit on most of them:

- o The two leaders will agree upon a date for the U.S. summit at the Iceland meeting. This interim meeting does not take the place of the Gorbachev visit to the U.S. agreed on at Geneva.
- o The objective of the Iceland meeting is "to achieve progress in some questions relating to nuclear arms," though "matters of bilateral relations as well as those connected with regional conflicts, and all other problems of mutual interest" may also be discussed.
- o Soviet contacts with the U.S. had become "complicated" and the atmosphere was "sometimes dramatic," but not because of the Zakharov-Daniloff affair. "The real cause" of tension was "the deadlock on issues of nuclear and space arms."

All public statements, interviews, and press conferences seemed designed to reinforce this picture. The USSR wanted to raise expectations for positive -- even concrete -- results from Iceland. Soviet propagandists called Iceland an "historic opportunity." They tried to focus attention almost exclusively on arms control and disarmament questions, especially "the militarization of space" (i.e., SDI). Soviets represented the current bilateral situation, including ongoing negotiations in Geneva and elsewhere, as totally without movement and stymied.

At the same time, Soviet spokesmen and propagandists named several areas in which they thought agreements might be reached. These included INF and nuclear testing, but also regional conflicts. They worried aloud about alleged deep divisions within the Reagan Administration which might prevent substantive progress at the meeting.

These points were stressed by: Foreign Ministry chief spokesman Gennadii Gerasimov, many times, in American media; Soviet "experts" in Iceland at press conferences on Thursday (Aleksandr Bovin, Nikolai Shishlin, Evgenii Primakov) and Saturday (Evgenii Velikhov and Georgii Arbatov). Soviet domestic media, especially TV, emphasized the same themes by quoting, night after night, prominent foreigners (communist and noncommunist alike) who expressed hopes for arms control agreements and other concrete results from the Iceland meeting.

#### Gorbachev's Arrival

The Friday night edition of Vremia (television news show) led off with coverage of Gorbachev's departure from Moscow and arrival in Reykjavik. When he arrived he made a few brief remarks at the airport welcoming ceremony. In these comments he stressed that he felt a great sense of responsibility, to his own people and to other nations, for "the destiny of the world" (a theme he had stressed at Geneva also).

He narrowed his main concerns down to progress on arms control issues and expressed the desire "to remove the threat of nuclear war." He concluded by saying: "We call upon the entire world community to eliminate nuclear weapons by the end of this century."

The General Secretary had tried to seize the initiative by setting the agenda for the meeting. He had also adumbrated the major proposals that he would present to the U.S. side the next day. Contrary to the pre-meeting line, Gorbachev was ready to go far beyond modest talks on INF and other topics, and spring an entire new package of proposals on an unsuspecting U.S. delegation.

### The First Day and the End of the Blackout

In an effort to stay on the offensive in the public opinion war, Soviet commentators maintained the aggressive stance they had taken since arriving early in the week. Acting on the assumption that the media abhor a vacuum, Soviet propagandists broke the agreed-upon news blackout and began offering assessments of the course of the talks.

To the chagrin of White House spokesman Larry Speakes, the Soviets began characterizing the first day's sessions as offering cause for optimism. They opined that progress seemed likely. But Soviet domestic TV broadcasts did not carry these hopeful reports on Saturday and only hinted at the possibility of progress after the first meeting on Sunday. The optimistic coverage was directed, it appears, almost exclusively at foreign audiences and world public opinion. Although the apparent seriousness of Soviet negotiators suggests otherwise, this discrepancy may be taken as indirect evidence that Gorbachev may have been setting a trap for the President.

### The Second Day and Gorbachev's Press Conference

When the talks ended on Sunday, Gorbachev immediately held a press conference, carried live on Soviet TV and shown again in full on the nightly news. In his very lengthy talk and then in response to many questions from the world press, he stressed:

- o The USSR came to Iceland with a far-reaching, new package of arms control proposals; the U.S. President came to Reykjavik "empty-handed and with empty pockets." Further, "the U.S. delegation brought us the trash from the Geneva talks."
- o Reykjavik represented an "historic opportunity" but, while this chance was missed, the Soviet Union believes further progress on all important issues is still possible and will vigorously pursue them.
- o The U.S. side is to blame for any failure to come to agreement in Iceland, but the meeting itself was not unsuccessful: some progress was made on important issues of disarmament, misunderstandings were cleared away, and both sides see more clearly where they stand in the bilateral relationship.
- o President Reagan is not personally responsible for the negative U.S. response to Soviet overtures: he is virtually a prisoner of the U.S. military-industrial complex, which has too much at stake to agree to an end of the arms race.
- o A summit in Washington is still in Soviet plans, but only if substantive agreements are worked out beforehand for signing in the U.S.

- o The Reagan Administration, "having come to believe in its technological advantage, is trying to cut its way through SDI to military superiority."
- o Only one word (i.e., "laboratory") prevented the two sides from concluding the most important arms control agreements ever considered between the two countries.

By all he said, Gorbachev made it obvious that he was playing to the court of world public opinion. Asked by one correspondent if he would try to get American public opinion on his side, to force President Reagan to reconsider the new Soviet arms package, Gorbachev would only say: "Let's wait and see." But he continually invoked the sensibilities of the U.S. and world publics in claiming that Soviet positions fit perfectly their demands for peace and stability in the world.

#### The Unanswered Questions

While playing to world publics, Gorbachev also fundamentally aimed to reassure and make proud his own citizens at his press conference. But he left ambiguous -- in Reykjavik and in a major address on Soviet television the following evening -- several key questions about "where we go from here:"

Is Geneva still an appropriate forum for major negotiations on disarmament?

What is the interrelationship among various elements of the Soviet Reykjavik package? Are INF talks decoupled from strategic arms talks? Are both linked to SDI? To nuclear testing?

Will he come to Washington without preconditions?

Does he believe the U.S. position is unshakable (he told one reporter that "America has yet to make itself clear")?

What is his current attitude toward President Reagan personally?

#### Conclusion and Interpretation

The Soviet performance at Reykjavik, both by Gorbachev and other spokesmen, was masterful as public propaganda. The position they staked out before the meeting was virtually a reverse image of that projected by the U.S. and was well-designed to achieve Soviet aims.

First, Soviets raised expectations so that the U.S. might feel pressured to agree to some kind of agreements. Second, they attempted to focus attention almost exclusively on arms control questions. The U.S. four-part agenda was downplayed as much as

possible (though not ignored completely). In the event, both of these tactics were apparently aimed at the major coup of making the U.S. agree to forego its SDI program (a ten-year postponement of nonlaboratory testing being tantamount to a death sentence).

More subtly, by stressing that the relationship had come to a standstill, the Soviets tried to draw world attention away from the ongoing, difficult, but, in the final analysis, most reliable negotiating forum of Geneva and also away from a well-planned, carefully thought-out summit later in the U.S. They represented Iceland beforehand as a major departure in contacts, not as just one more point in a continuum. All of this hoopla was presumably intended to bring the Soviets a one-shot, quick fix in their diplomacy and arms policy. They hoped to railroad the U.S. into unwise concessions for the sake of public opinion.

Not incidentally, Soviets seized every opportunity to promote their own views. Arriving early, speaking to all who would listen, arranging press conference after interview after briefing, they put forth their positions endlessly to an eager press corps facing the gloomy prospect of a news blackout.

What remains unclear from Soviet media coverage during this period is whether Gorbachev actually was convinced that he would achieve a major arms-control deal, at the expense of his SDI bete-noire, or he only intended laying a trap for the President. If Gorbachev was convinced that the U.S. would never yield on SDI, he might have played the whole game only for the sake of scoring points in world public opinion. But that interpretation seems less convincing than the first. Gorbachev would probably benefit more in the long run from scaling back the arms race and concentrating on domestic reform. If so, he truly hoped to achieve a major breakthrough in disarmament because he felt that SDI, in the end, would be a bargaining chip.

Most intriguing, these two interpretations are not mutually exclusive. Gorbachev played a no-lose hand in Iceland. If he failed to obtain American acquiescence to his surprise package of arms proposals and to kill SDI, he stood to gain almost as much in three other respects: to win immediate public opinion support for seemingly accommodating Soviet positions; to decrease public and government support in Western Europe for American positions; and to build pressure within the U.S. Congress to repudiate the Administration's arms control policies and to cut appropriations for SDI.

Prepared by USIA Office of Research:  
Steven A. Grant, Analyst

FTA-10/24/86

Approved by:  
Nils H. Wessell, Director of Research  
485-2965



## NOTED BY DTR

V. H. KRULAK

If ever there were an example of the impact of news media on world affairs we saw it in its most dramatic form in the days before Reykjavik.

A large segment of the U.S. press wrote Mr. Reagan off. Their judgment was that he hungered so for a niche in history's pantheon of peacemakers that he was prepared to sacrifice almost anything to bring home an agreement. One news commentator declared that "the Strategic Defense Initiative, which was not supposed to be a bargaining chip, is certainly a bargaining chip now, and it will be on the table in Iceland". And a widely read newspaper editorialized about Reagan's "lust for the summit" saying, "He will, in short, put the foreign policy legacy of his six-year presidency at risk."

Mr. Gorbachev has a large corps of observers in the United States. They read the newspapers, watch the tube, study the news magazines, listen to the bureaucratic gossip of Congressional staffers, and then they report to Moscow. Thus, if Gorbachev went to Reykjavik with the conviction that he could ask for the moon, hang tough and come home with a triumph, his conclusions were understandable. That, after all, is what much of the American media were telling him.

In short, Gorbachev was the victim of disinformation --not so intended, but disinformation all the same --practised by elements of the news media on themselves, on the American public and on the Russians.

Given what he thought he knew, Gorbachev's strategy seemed sound. -- Negotiate seriously on a reduction of medium range missiles. After all, he knew that any agreed cut in numbers of

those weapons is not truly meaningful because there is no way for the United States to verify how many missiles per remaining launcher the Russians secretly stockpile. Furthermore, the current Soviet threat to Western Europe posed by the medium range weapons can largely be supplanted by their array of short range weapons positioned well forward in East Germany.

A second element to Gorbachev's game plan was to exhibit flexibility in response to President Reagan's proposals for quantum reductions in inter-continental weapons. Here again, he knew that there is little risk to the Soviets because the cuts would not be precisely verifiable.

But the key strategic element was, in conjunction with these tantalizing proposals, to demand that the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative be effectively shelved, and then to stick to it, based on the belief that Reagan would come to the meeting prepared to crumble, to exchange S.D.I. for signature on a weapons reduction agreement.

This Soviet preoccupation with S.D.I. sends us an eloquent message. It says, that Gorbachev, his generals and his scientists, are all convinced that our S.D.I. will work, that they must either have one too, or torpedo ours.

Mr. Reagan gave them the chance to deal with the issue in what has to be a challenging proposition: a mutual reduction of medium range missiles now; a progressive mutual reduction of intercontinental missiles over a ten year period, ending with their total elimination; concurrent development by the U.S. of S.D.I., a totally defensive mechanism that places nobody's life at risk; freedom for the Soviets to observe our tests; and, finally, when the intercontinental weapons are gone, sharing by

the U.S. of S.D.I. technology with the Russians. And Reagan was emphatic in saying that the offer remains on the table.

And now, post-Reykjavik, Mr. Gorbachev, and some of our own news media are describing the outcome of the hastily called meeting a "collapse", a "failure", or a "breakdown" simply because we did not buy, out of hand, the Soviet package.

To the contrary, Mr. Reagan's resolute behavior has put the ball in the Kremlin's court. They can now react by adopting a defiant posture, redoubling their efforts to improve and enlarge their I.C.B.M. force, in order to threaten us. They can accelerate the already ongoing development of an S.D.I. of their own, with the very great attendant costs and technology drain.

Or, under the pressure of our S.D.I. progress and the President's clearly demonstrated resolve, it is more likely that they will come to a major summit and negotiate further on Reagan's proposals for nuclear disarmament.

This, in anybody's book, is progress.

10-15-86



October 23, 1986

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Dear Don:

Enclosed is a copy of a USIA Foreign Opinion Note presenting British, French and German views on the meeting in Reykjavik. Telephone surveys conducted immediately after the President's speech to the American people show that:

- o Only the French say Reykjavik was productive; the British and Germans felt the meeting accomplished little or nothing. Nevertheless, all three publics believe the two leaders should meet again to narrow differences.
- o Both leaders are blamed for not accomplishing more in Reykjavik, but, unhappily, more Germans and British blame the President than Gorbachev.

These opinions stand in contrast to the optimistic tone of the West European press which tended to see Reykjavik as a new beginning for arms control, and to the generally supportive comments by government leaders.

We will be conducting a second round of telephone surveys in about 10 days to assess any changes in the public mood in Western Europe.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick  
Director

The Honorable  
Donald T. Regan  
Chief of Staff  
and Assistant to the President  
The White House

LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

# Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

## LIMITED OFFICIAL USE

Flash Phone Survey

October 21, 1986

### BRITISH AND GERMANS BELIEVE REYKJAVIK UNPRODUCTIVE, BLAME REAGAN MORE THAN GORBACHEV; FRENCH SUPPORTIVE

The attached results of a phone poll in the aftermath of Reykjavik point to a potentially serious lack of public confidence in the United States among the British and West German publics, who will go to the polls in the next 18 months. This analysis is based on telephone surveys in Britain, France and West Germany conducted October 15-17 (i.e. polling began 36 hours after the President's report to the Nation on Reykjavik).

#### Only French Say Reykjavik Was Productive

Majorities in Britain and Germany believe the Reykjavik meeting accomplished little or nothing in resolving the various issues between the U.S. and the USSR, including nuclear arms control issues. Only in France did a majority feel the meeting was productive and accomplished at least "a fair amount" in resolving such issues. (Table 1) Publics in all three countries view U.S.-Soviet relations as worse after Reykjavik than after Geneva. (Table 2)

Despite widespread British and German pessimism over Reykjavik, large majorities in all three countries feel the two leaders should meet again to narrow their differences.

#### British and Germans Blame Reagan More Than Gorbachev Although Many Blame Both

For lack of accomplishments at Reykjavik, Germans blame Reagan over Gorbachev (43% to 6%) even when offered the option of blaming both leaders. In Britain where half blame both, Reagan attracts four times more exclusive blame than Gorbachev (35% to 9%). A majority of the French blame both for not accomplishing more. But, unlike the British and Germans, about as many French hold Gorbachev exclusively responsible as Reagan (15% to 12%). (Table 3)

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British and Germans Believe Soviets Making Greater Arms Control Effort Than U.S.

By large margins the British (46% to 20%) and Germans (42% to 18%) believe the Soviet Union is making a greater effort than the U.S. to bring about a nuclear arms control agreement. In France, a plurality (35%) say the U.S. is making a greater effort. (Table 4)

More Germans Say Gorbachev, Not Reagan, Is Trustworthy, Flexible

More Germans believe Gorbachev is "trustworthy" and "flexible in negotiations" than is President Reagan. The British agree that Gorbachev is more flexible but find the President more trustworthy. However, a third in Britain say neither leader can be trusted. In France President Reagan outpoints Gorbachev on both counts.

In all three countries President Reagan is seen as more "understanding of European problems," but his margin has faded in Germany since Geneva. The President overwhelms Gorbachev by more than 10-to-1 in all three countries as a promoter of human rights. (Tables 5-8)

Prepared by: P/R Staff

N-10/21/86

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director  
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485-2965

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Table 1. Accomplishments at Reykjavik

"How much do you think this meeting accomplished in helping to resolve the various issues between the United States and the Soviet Union -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?"<sup>a</sup>

	<u>BRITAIN</u> (746)	<u>FRANCE</u> (423)	<u>GERMANY</u> (443)
Great deal	7%	18%	4%
Fair amount	29	54	18
subtotal	<u>36</u>	<u>72</u>	<u>22</u>
Not very much	46	15	61
Nothing at all	16	8	15
subtotal	<u>62</u>	<u>23</u>	<u>76</u>
Don't know	2	5	2
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

<sup>a</sup>Asked only of those who had heard or read something about the Reykjavik meeting.

Table 2. U.S.-USSR Relations

"How would you describe current relations between the United States and the Soviet Union? Would you say that relations between these two countries are very good, fairly good, fairly bad, or very bad?"

	<u>BRITAIN</u>		<u>FRANCE</u>		<u>GERMANY</u>	
	<u>12/85</u>	<u>10/86</u>	<u>12/85</u>	<u>10/86</u>	<u>12/85</u>	<u>10/86</u>
	(504)	(786)	(500)	(505)	(510)	(504)
Very good	2%	2%	3%	1%	2%	2%
Fairly good	58	45	57	48	53	44
subtotal	<u>60</u>	<u>47</u>	<u>60</u>	<u>49</u>	<u>55</u>	<u>46</u>
Fairly bad	31	38	29	34	33	45
Very bad	5	8	3	3	3	4
subtotal	<u>36</u>	<u>46</u>	<u>32</u>	<u>37</u>	<u>36</u>	<u>49</u>
Don't know	4	7	8	14	9	5
	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>	<u>100%</u>

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Table 3. Assigning Blame for Not Accomplishing More at Reykjavik

"Who do you think is mainly to blame for not accomplishing more at the Reykjavik meeting -- Mr. Reagan or Mr. Gorbachev? Or do you think they are both equally to blame?"<sup>a</sup>

	<u>BRITAIN</u> (746)	<u>FRANCE</u> (423)	<u>GERMANY</u> (443)
Mr. Reagan	35%	12%	43%
Mr. Gorbachev	9	15	6
Both	51	60	40
Neither [vol]	2	2	5
Don't Know	<u>3</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>6</u>
	100%	100%	100%

<sup>a</sup>Asked only of those who had heard or read something about the Reykjavik meeting.

Table 4. Country Making Greater Effort Toward Arms Control

"Which country do you believe is making a greater effort to bring about a nuclear arms control agreement -- the United States or the Soviet Union?"

	<u>BRITAIN</u> (786)	<u>FRANCE</u> (505)	<u>GERMANY</u> (504)
United States	20%	35%	18%
Soviet Union	46	20	42
Both [vol.]	14	13	23
Neither [vol.]	12	15	7
Don't Know	<u>8</u>	<u>17</u>	<u>10</u>
	100%	100%	100%

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Table 7. Who is Flexible in Negotiations

"Is Flexible in negotiations -- Does this statement best describe President Reagan or Soviet leader Gorbachev?"

	<u>BRITAIN</u> (786)	<u>FRANCE</u> (505)	<u>GERMANY</u> (504)
Reagan	24%	33%	23%
Gorbachev	38	18	32
Both [vol]	7	5	20
Neither [vol]	23	28	13
Don't know	<u>8</u>	<u>16</u>	<u>12</u>
	100%	100%	100%

Table 8. Who Promotes Human Rights

12D. "Promotes human rights -- Does this statement best describe President Reagan or Soviet leader Gorbachev?"

	<u>BRITAIN</u> (786)	<u>FRANCE</u> (505)	<u>GERMANY</u> (504)
Reagan	75%	67%	67%
Gorbachev	6	5	3
Both [vol]	3	2	6
Neither [vol]	11	15	15
Don't Know	<u>5</u>	<u>11</u>	<u>9</u>
	100%	100%	100%

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# Foreign Media Analysis

United States Information Agency  
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

October 21, 1986

## WEST EUROPEAN PAPERS NOW SEE REYKJAVIK MEETING AS A BASIS FOR A NEW BEGINNING

This analysis is based on USIS reporting of the major West European press, covering October 13 - 20, 1986. It reviews more than 100 editorials, commentaries and news analyses in 48 newspapers of 13 countries.

The major findings of a quantitative analysis of the examined papers are:

1. Almost all papers, across the political spectrum, agreed that the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Reykjavik ended in deadlock because of the President's refusal to give up SDI. Many of the editorials added that SDI may continue to prevent U.S.-Soviet arms agreements.
2. 90 percent of the editorials predicted continued U.S.-Soviet arms negotiations because of the positive post-Reykjavik comments of both sides.
3. 70 percent of the editorials were neutral to positive about the outcome and did not blame either leader for the inconclusive outcome. The remainder, mostly liberal/leftist, blamed the President for not agreeing to Gorbachev's demands to limit SDI research. This stand was almost unanimous among the liberal/leftist papers of West Germany.
4. 45 percent said Gorbachev "trapped" President Reagan with wideranging proposals, catching the U.S. side unprepared.
5. Most editorial writers did not take a stand on whether SDI research should be confined to the laboratory in order to get an arms control agreement.

### A General Tone of Optimism For Continued Negotiations

After the initial West European news headlines and some early commentaries told of "Failure at Reykjavik," most subsequent editorials appeared remarkably reasoned, realistic and balanced on the outcome of the Reagan-Gorbachev meeting in Iceland. They said that U.S. and Soviet post-Reykjavik statements reflected a general tone of optimism that "the door has not been closed" on arms talks.

Many papers suggested that Gorbachev "sprang a trap" on the President with far-reaching arms proposals that caught the U.S. unprepared. When President Reagan presented his own ambitious proposals, the papers said Gorbachev ended the talks with the proposal to scuttle SDI. There was widespread debate on why Gorbachev "gambled," because the papers said he must have known the President would not accept killing SDI. Some suggested Gorbachev wanted to show up the President as not really interested in arms talks. Others said the meeting ended in "dead-lock" when both sides realized they had gone too far.

After the initial shock of "failure" in the news stories, the editorials that followed upon reflection generally predicted continued arms negotiations. West Germany's conservative Die Welt said typically: "The poker game continues and there is no reason for anyone to be deeply disappointed because the improbable did not become probable." Others added that the amazing thing about Reykjavik was not its failure to produce tangible results but its success in narrowing the gap. Some papers suggested that Reykjavik is a warning against poorly-prepared top-level meetings.

#### Assessments Split Along Ideological Lines

Most of West Europe's conservative, centrist and independent press saw in Reykjavik a new impetus for more successful U.S.-Soviet arms control agreements. Opinions of these papers ranged from euphoria about the possibilities of a nuclear-free world to caution that all missiles should not be destroyed because of Western Europe's vulnerabilities in the face of superior Soviet conventional forces.

There were only a few negative comments about the President in these papers and no specific assessment of blame on either the President or Gorbachev. A number of conservative papers praised President Reagan and said he did not suffer any loss of prestige. Britain's conservative Daily Telegraph said of the President's position: "It does not matter whether some existing hardware is scrapped as long as the free world preserves its freedom of action." France's conservative Figaro added: "SDI has shown its power. It's the fear of SDI which inspired Gorbachev to make his historic concessions in Reykjavik." Most conservative papers agreed that "Gorbachev had resorted to the sledge hammer at Reykjavik to kill SDI." They said that this continues to be his objective.

Major European left-of-center papers generally expressed deep disappointment about what they called "the Reykjavik fiasco." A number of these papers expressed a deep anguish that "madness and the hawks of both sides prevailed." After many of these papers initially blamed both the President and Gorbachev for the "breakup," most of the leftist press subsequently blamed

the President alone for "missing the chance of the century to eliminate nuclear weapons" because of his "intransigence" on SDI. However, many of these papers expressed renewed hope when both the United States and the USSR "initiated a rather positive post-Reykjavik propaganda campaign in an attempt to turn failure into success."

The West German liberal/leftist press almost unanimously held the opinion that "'Star wars' ruined the summit" and said that the President was responsible. These and other leftist papers called SDI "an unachievable science fiction quagmire that Europe has never wanted." Sweden's Social Democratic Aftonbladet said typically that "a weapons system that does not exist and an idea that most likely will never be realized upset an historic opportunity." Many said that for Europe, SDI is a political rather than a military problem, and that it should remain no more than a negotiating chip and a laboratory research project.

#### Gorbachev Seen As a Man In a Hurry To Kill SDI

Most West European editorials saw Gorbachev as "a man in a hurry," constantly keeping the United States off balance before a world audience, trying to create the image of a peacemaker by making new arms control proposals. Many agreed that the Soviet leader was largely driven by the need to build the perception of USSR as an equal of the United States. They said he still needs to consolidate his own power in the Kremlin and ease arms expenditures to shore up a stagnant civilian economy. Gorbachev was seen as a strong personality at the head of a weak power base, despite all the Soviet Union's military strength.

Most importantly, however, European papers viewed Gorbachev as out to kill SDI at all costs because of the Soviet Union's inability to compete technologically with the United States. Many papers saw him as sincere in making arms cut proposals. Others said the proposals were for propaganda effect, to keep his "formidable foe" in Washington continuously on the defensive. Conservative papers counseled caution about cheating, the Soviet drive for unilateral advantage over the last decade, and the need for verification.

#### President Reagan Portrayed As a Strong Leader of the West

West European editorial perception of President Reagan was full of contradictions. He had emerged from the Daniloff-Zakharov cases as "weakened," having "given in" to what looked like a "spy swap." He was further seen as weakened from "entrapment" into a fullscale negotiation he had claimed would be only a pre-summit. When he rejected confining SDI to the laboratory, he was seen in the immediate aftermath of Reykjavik as intransigent and inflexible.

However, a few days after Reykjavik, conservative, independent and centrist papers appeared to rally to him as a strong leader of the West, unwilling to bargain away the security of the free world. Most liberal/leftist papers acknowledged this strength with reluctance, but continued to criticize him severely for his SDI stand. Most editorials across Western Europe reacted with surprise to the U.S. opinion polls that gave the President majority support on his performance in Reykjavik as well as his stand on SDI.

Italy's centrist La Stampa echoed many editorials: "Reagan's America certainly appears as the most powerful among powerful nations. Gorbachev, risking more and perhaps losing more, is trying to isolate Reagan's strength." The papers said that Gorbachev has a major task, for despite the President's problems with Congress and reluctant European allies, he appears stronger and more popular than ever.

Editorials across the political spectrum said both the President and Gorbachev deserve credit for preventing "undue acrimony." They said that even though one predictably blamed the other for the breakdown at Reykjavik, both have insisted that the negotiations in Geneva must continue.

#### SDI Remains the Sticking Point

Toward the end of the examined period, SDI, a summit in Washington and the possibility of an agreement on cutting back or altogether removing both American and Soviet intermediate-range missiles from Europe remained as the major issues of debate in West European editorials. Opinions were split on a Reagan-Gorbachev summit in Washington. Some said that after Reykjavik it seems unlikely Gorbachev will visit the U.S. during President Reagan's term of office, while others predicted a summit next year.

Most of the debate, however, centered on the future of SDI. Many papers contended that there will be no arms agreement of any kind unless either Gorbachev or the President changes his stand on the issue. The editorials reserved judgment and began a watch on which leader will blink first.

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**NOTED BY DTR**

TOTALS

Pre-Summit Media Events .....	13
At-the-Summit Media Events .....	14
Post-Summit Media Events .....	82
	—
TOTAL	109

Donald T. Regan .....	31
Secretary Shultz .....	17
Admiral Poindexter .....	12
	—
TOTAL	60

As of: October 22, 1986

Departure of Soviet Espionage Agents from the US

The United States advised the Soviet Union this morning of a number of steps designed to respond to the Soviet expulsion of five US diplomats and to ensure that from this point forward the Soviet diplomatic representation in Washington and San Francisco will be based on the principle of Soviet equality in numbers with our counterpart representation in Moscow and Leningrad. Specifically, Soviet representatives were informed:

- That the number of personnel in the Soviet Embassy in Washington and the Soviet Consulate General in San Francisco must be reduced by November 1 to levels equal to those, respectively, of the US Embassy in Moscow and Consulate General in Leningrad. New, equal ceilings for the two countries' combined bilateral missions will thus be established as follows: for Embassies -- 225 positions; for Consulates General -- 26 positions. Fifty Soviet Embassy and Consulate employees who will be obliged to depart the United States pursuant to this measure have been identified by name.
- That, as a result of the recent Soviet action to expel five US diplomats, an additional four members of the Soviet Embassy in Washington, and one member of the Soviet Consulate in San Francisco, are declared persona non grata, and must depart the United States by November 1.
- We have repeatedly informed the Soviets -- most recently when we expelled 25 named officials from the Soviet UN Mission in September -- that we would not tolerate abuse of their UN Mission as a safehaven for espionage activities. Moreover, when we expelled the 25 in response to their abuse of the UN Mission, we indicated that we would not tolerate action against our Diplomatic Mission. There is no counterpart US presence in the USSR to Soviet UN Mission.

The United States regrets that the Soviets have insisted on taking actions that have made these steps necessary. In taking the actions described above, the United States has simply corrected a long-standing imbalance in our relationship. This action is an eminently fair, equitable and reasonable proposition.

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6-10-56

Q: What effect will this decision have on U.S.-Soviet bilateral relations?

A: -- WE HAVE TOLD THE SOVIETS THAT WE DO NOT THINK THIS SHOULD HAVE ANY EFFECT ON THE OVERALL RELATIONSHIP.

-- THE SOVIETS HAVE FOR YEARS HAD FAR MORE PERSONNEL IN THE U.S. THAN WE HAVE HAD IN THE USSR. OUR REDUCTIONS ONLY SERVE TO BRING THE SITUATION INTO BALANCE.

-- THE SOVIETS KNEW BEFOREHAND WHAT RESPONSE WOULD BE TO EXPULSION. THERE SHOULD HAVE BEEN NO MISUNDERSTANDING.

-- THEY DECIDED TO TAKE THIS ACTION KNOWING FULL WELL WHAT THE U.S. RESPONSE WOULD BE.

-- WE HAVE EVERY INTENT TO CONTINUE DIALOGUE.

-- WE WILL NOT LET THE NECESSITY OF TAKING THIS STEP INTERFERE, NOR SHOULD THE SOVIETS.



Q: Isn't this an overreaction - throwing out 55 Soviets in retaliation for 5 Americans?

A: -- NO. WE ARE SIMPLY BRINGING SOVIET DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN U.S. IN LINE WITH U.S. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN USSR. WE ARE MOVING TO PARITY -- SOMETHING CONGRESS HAS INSISTED ON FOR SOME TIME AND A STEP WE INDICATED TO THE SOVIETS WE WOULD TAKE IF THEY TOOK AN UNJUSTIFIED ACTION AGAINST OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSION.

-- IN ADDITION, WE ARE EXPELLING 5 SOVIETS - 4 FROM THE EMBASSY AND IN ADDITION ONE FROM THE CONSULATE GENERAL IN SAN FRANCISCO - IN RESPONSE TO THE UNJUSTIFIED SOVIET EXPULSION OF 5 AMERICANS ON OCTOBER 20.

-- WE HAVE REPEATEDLY INFORMED THE SOVIETS - MOST RECENTLY WHEN WE EXPELLED 25 OFFICIALS FROM THE SOVIET UN MISSION IN SEPTEMBER - THAT WE WOULD NOT TOLERATE USE OF THEIR UN MISSION AS A SAFEHAVEN FOR ESPIONAGE ACTIVITIES. MOREOVER, WHEN WE EXPELLED THE 25 IN RESPONSE TO THEIR ABUSE OF THE UN MISSION, WE INDICATED THAT WE WOULD NOT TOLERATE ACTION AGAINST OUR DIPLOMATIC MISSION. THERE IS NO COUNTERPART U.S. PRESENCE IN THE USSR TO SOVIET UN MISSION.

-- WE REGRET THAT THE SOVIETS STILL INSISTED ON TAKING AN ACTION AGAINST OUR EMBASSY AND CONSULATE.

Q: What effect does this have on the progress that was made at Reykjavik and the outlook for a U.S.-Soviet summit this year?

A: -- WE REMAIN COMMITTED TO PURSUING THE DIALOGUE STEMMING FROM THE REYKJAVIK MEETING IN ALL AREAS OF OUR RELATIONSHIP.

-- WE HAVE INDICATED THIS TO THE SOVIETS.

-- THIS IS A SEPARATE MATTER, AND SHOULD NOT INTERFERE.

-- WE ASSUME THE SOVIETS WILL NOT LET IT INTERFERE, SINCE THEY KNEW BEFORE THEY TOOK THEIR ACTION WHAT THE U.S. RESPONSE WOULD BE.

Q: What is the total number of Soviets (actual employees) being expelled?

A: -- 55

-- SINCE THE SOVIETS HAD A TOTAL PRESENCE OF 301 AT THEIR EMBASSY AND CONSULATE GENERAL AND WE ARE ESTABLISHING A NEW CEILING OF 251, EQUAL TO THE U.S. DIPLOMATIC PRESENCE IN USSR, THIS REQUIRES A REDUCTION OF 50 PERSONNEL CURRENTLY ON BOARD. THE ADDITIONAL 5 DIPLOMATS BEING DECLARED PERSONNA NON GRATA, 4 IN WASHINGTON AND ONE IN SAN FRANCISCO, CAN BE REPLACED. THIS MAKES A TOTAL OF 55 ACTUALLY BEING ASKED TO LEAVE.

## QUESTIONS AND ANSWERS

Q: Can you tell us the names of the Soviets you have expelled?

A: The names of the five are available. We are not going to announce the names of the other 50.

Q: Do they include personnel who are engaged in espionage or intelligence collection activities?

A: We have reason to believe that all the persons we have named are affiliated with the Soviet espionage apparatus in this country.

Q: How sure are you of those affiliations?

A: We are confident of our judgments.

Q: What are they based on?

A: I have no further comment.

Q: With whom did the President consult before making this decision?

A: The President discussed the situation with the Secretary of State, the Attorney General, the Director of Central Intelligence, and his National Security Adviser before making a decision.

Q: What will you do if the Soviets respond with further expulsions of U.S. diplomats in the USSR?

A: I am not going to speculate as what the Soviets might do, or what we would do in response.

Q: How far are you prepared to go with this?

A: The principle of equality is the governing consideration in dealing with the situation. We think it is in the interest of both countries to let the matter rest where it is, and we hope the Soviets will understand that as well.

Q: Isn't this action likely to have an adverse impact on our ability to follow through on the discussions at Reykjavik and achieve significant progress with the Soviets in important areas?

A: We hope not. As the President has made clear, we are ready to go forward with the Soviets on the full range of issues discussed at Reykjavik to find the basis for mutually beneficial agreements. It would be unfortunate if the Soviets let the issue of the size of our respective diplomatic establishments interfere with that process, particularly when all we are insisting on is equality in that relationship.

Q: Why didn't the Administration act against these spies earlier?

A: The fact is that the Soviets have maintained a large espionage establishment in this country for decades. The steps we are taking now to reduce the Soviet official presence in this country to something that reasonably approximates their legitimate requirements for diplomatic representation is an important step forward in dealing with the Soviet abuse of their diplomatic presence.

Q: Were the Soviets warned in advance that any expulsion of American diplomats would entail consequences such as those that have occurred today?

A: They were informed in mid-September, after we had identified by name the twenty-five Soviet personnel to leave the Soviet Mission to the UN, that if they retaliated by acting against personnel assigned to our bilateral institutions in the Soviet Union -- that is, our Embassy in Moscow and Consulate General in Leningrad -- we would permanently reduce the Soviet numbers at their counterpart institutions in the U.S. to equality with U.S. numbers in the USSR, and then further reduce the Soviet presence by a number equal to the reduction of the U.S. presence in the USSR.

Q: When you add reductions that take the Soviets below equality, as in this case, how can you characterize it "equal"?

A: In the case of the additional numbers, that is, the numbers that take the Soviet below equality, those numbers do not become part of the permanent ceiling, and the Soviets can backfill to replace those personnel.

Q: By what means was the warning passed to the Soviets?

A: I am not going to discuss the means or methods of diplomatic exchanges.

Q: Was there any Soviet reply?

A: I am not going to comment on that.

Q: Isn't our response in this case grossly disproportionate to what the Soviets have done?

A: There is nothing disproportionate about equality. It is an equitable and eminently fair proposition. We warned the Soviets clearly about the consequences that would ensue if they did what they have done, and it is important they understand we keep our word.

Q: If the Soviets hadn't expelled the five U.S. diplomats, would we have continued to allow the Soviets to mount a large espionage operation from their Washington embassy?

A: As you know, we have acted against Soviet espionage in this country in a number of ways, including increased counterespionage activity, illustrated by the increasing number of cases brought to trial in the last few years. We have also acted to reduce Soviet personnel in their UN Mission by 105; and, with today's action, reduced their bilateral diplomatic establishment to equality with ours in the Soviet Union. These actions represent major progress in dealing with a serious threat to our national security.

Q: Will today's measures affect the number of Soviets currently at the United Nations?

A: No. As you are aware some time ago we imposed a ceiling of 218 on the Soviet UN Mission for October 1. The Soviets are currently below the ceiling. The next phase of reductions for the Soviet Mission at the UN is scheduled for April 1, 1987; and further reductions will follow on October 1, 1987 and April 1, 1988, for a total reduction of 105.

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AS WE SEE IT

REVISE 4

One of television's greatest accomplishments is its ability to bring us events in real time—that is, as they unfold. One of television's greatest flaws is that it often acts as a filter, inserting itself between the events it covers and the viewer.

Seldom have television's positive and negative qualities collided so glaringly as during ABC, CBS and NBC's coverage of the Reykjavik summit between President Ronald Reagan and Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev.

The two leaders met for more than 11 hours of one-on-one talks but failed to agree on any far-reaching arms-control policies. The implications of that failure were unclear on Sunday, Oct. 12: would U.S.-Soviet relations worsen because there was no settlement, or would they, in the long run, improve?

Television news rushed to judgment. NBC's Tom Brokaw, treating events more like a ballgame than a summit, declared: "The meeting has ended in failure."

Worse, the networks, having made their snap calls, gave viewers almost no perspective. The summit's end had the bad luck to fall during football games and baseball playoffs. Given a choice between world peace and sports, the networks chose sports.

So, on CBS and NBC, Secretary of State George Shultz's press conference was cut short in favor of football. When President Reagan spoke at Keflavik air base, and General Secretary Gorbachev held a lengthy news conference, their remarks, too, were eviscerated, reinforcing the networks' instant analysis that the summit was a failure. Only CNN carried the Shultz and Reagan comments in their entirety, providing context.

The networks should not expect summits to be as easily packaged as ballgames. As they cover these events, with their potential for causing major changes in our world, they should do what they do best: show us what is happening, as it happens. They should not act as prisms or filters, altering reality to suit their purposes—and their schedules.

**NOTED BY DTR**

END

Q. There have been conflicting press reports over whether the President proposed elimination of all ballistic missiles or of all nuclear weapons during his discussions in Reykjavik. Can you clarify what was said?

A.

-- THE PRESIDENT MADE HIS POSITION CLEAR IN HIS REPORT TO THE NATION MONDAY NIGHT.

-- IN THAT REPORT HE SAID: [QUOTE] WE PROPOSED A 10-YEAR PERIOD IN WHICH WE BEGAN WITH THE REDUCTION OF ALL STRATEGIC NUCLEAR ARMS. . . . THEY WOULD BE REDUCED 50 PERCENT IN THE FIRST FIVE YEARS. DURING THE NEXT FIVE YEARS, WE WOULD CONTINUE BY ELIMINATING ALL REMAINING OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES, OF ALL RANGES. [UNQUOTE]

-- THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS HAS, OF COURSE, LONG BEEN ONE OF THE PRESIDENT'S GOALS. HIS STRONG SUPPORT FOR THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, FOR EXAMPLE, IS, IN PART, BECAUSE THAT INITIATIVE IS A STEP ALONG THE ROAD TO THE ABOLITION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

-- FOR THE PRESENT, HOWEVER, GIVEN THE MASSIVE SOVIET INVESTMENT IN CONVENTIONAL FORCES, NUCLEAR WEAPONS ARE INDISPENSABLE TO THE SECURITY OF THE UNITED STATES AND OUR ALLIES.

-- IN JANUARY 1986 GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV PROPOSED THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF ALL NUCLEAR WEAPONS BY THE YEAR 2000. IN HIS RESPONSE, THE PRESIDENT SUPPORTED THE GOAL OF COMPLETE ELIMINATION, BUT NOTED THIS COULD ONLY COME ABOUT WHEN INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS -- INCLUDING THE CONVENTIONAL BALANCE OF FORCES -- HAVE CHANGED SIGNIFICANTLY.

-- THUS BOTH LEADERS HAVE EXPRESSED A COMMON GOAL OF ULTIMATELY ELIMINATING NUCLEAR WEAPONS. THIS WAS DISCUSSED IN ICELAND.

-- THE PRESIDENT'S PROPOSAL IN ICELAND, HOWEVER, AS HE REPORTED IN HIS SPEECH, WAS TO ELIMINATE ALL OFFENSIVE BALLISTIC MISSILES DURING THE NEXT TEN YEARS.



"We are just as close to doomsday as we have ever been. Closer, in fact, because every time the United States and the Soviet Union fail to agree the barometer of world tensions rises...

"A new propaganda war has begun with both sides blaming the other for the meeting's failure and if the jury is still out as to whether Mr. Reagan did offer Mr. Gorbachev an historic agreement, there is no doubt that the Iceland meeting was a historic failure."