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Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Regan, Donald T.: Files

Archivist: dlb/bcb

File Folder: [Reading File for Regan/Iceland Summit][1 of 5]

Date: 2/17/98

~~OA 14013~~ Box 105

| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE | SUBJECT/TITLE | DATE | RESTRICTION |
|-----------------------|--|------|--|
| 1. draft | The President's Message in Key States for the Last Ten Days, 5p. | n.d. | P5 Transferred to Personal File 12/15/00 |

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].
- C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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Chief of Staff - Ronald Reagan

File Reading Material

Ice Land Summit 10/86 -)

FG 006-01

FO 006-11

CO 165

Reading File for Don Regan during
the Iceland Reagan/Gorbachev summit in
Oct. 86.

~~ENCLOSURES FILED OVERSIDE ATTACHMENTS~~ 14013

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Donald T. Regan
FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin
RE: Attached drafts
DATE: October 17, 1986

Attached for your review, Don, are two drafts:

The President's Message In Key States
For The Last Ten Days

and

Themes For A Five Minute National Address
On Election Eve

DRAFT

THEMES FOR A FIVE MINUTE NATIONAL ADDRESS
ON ELECTION EVE

This election will set the course for the two remaining years I have to serve as your President. It is an election where you will make your choice for America's future, and I believe the alternatives are clear:

Do we go forward boldly and confidently, guided by the principles that have succeeded over the last six years, or do we go back to the failed policies of the past?

Given the choice, I think it's important that we briefly look back together at some of our accomplishments over the last six years. I say our accomplishments because the challenges weren't just mine, they were America's challenges. The challenges were great, and we faced many skeptics who said we couldn't meet those challenges. But, together we did it.

Think back to just six short years ago when inflation was _____ and interest rates were the highest since _____. They said we couldn't reduce inflation. They said we couldn't reduce interest rates. But, together we did it. And today inflation is _____ and interest rates have fallen another _____ just this year.

Just two years ago they said we couldn't reform the tax code that favored the rich and special interests with special tax loopholes and penalized most working Americans by making them pay more than their fair share. Well, together we did it, with the fair share tax reform bill that was just signed into law October 20th. The loopholes are now gone for the rich and special interests so now they'll have to pay their fair share. For most working Americans, those of you who used to pay more than your fair share, your taxes will be reduced so you will now pay only your fair share.

And we should not forget what we have accomplished in our negotiations with the Soviet Union concerning nuclear arms. When we began our negotiations there were many Americans who said our goals should be to control the proliferation of nuclear arms by negotiating a freeze.

We said a freeze was unacceptable; that the goal for mankind should be to eliminate nuclear weapons. They said it couldn't be done. But we knew that if our military and our resolve were strong, it could be done, and together, we're doing it. Today we negotiate with the Soviet Union toward the

elimination of nuclear arms, and in Iceland we took a giant step toward that goal.

Much has been done in the last six years, but it doesn't mean our work is done. We need to continue the fight to bring government spending under control. And, while we can be proud of the fact the country has enjoyed economic growth for over four years, we know there are those Americans who are not today enjoying the fruits of that growth, particularly in those states with farm and oil based economies. Together, we must work to ensure the participation of all Americans in our country's growth.

(short statement on the drug issue)

(short statement on the need to sustain military strength to secure our freedom and enable us to pursue negotiations for elimination of nuclear arms from a position of strength.)

Yes, we still face important challenges, but if we know one thing from our experience over the last six years, it is that together, we can do it. You've been the heart and soul of my Presidency and you are the heart and soul of America's future. When you vote on November 4th, I ask only that you remember the choice:

Do we go forward together, boldly and confidently, guarded by the principles that have succeeded over the last six years, or do we go back to the failed policies of the past?

Together, we can do it.

DRAFT

THE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE IN
KEY STATES FOR THE LAST
TEN DAYS

The following suggests communication objectives, strategy, key message elements and a theme for the remainder of the campaign.

Objectives

All campaign communications should be devoted to accomplishing three main objectives:

- o Establish a general theme for Republican candidates that is broad enough to encompass the hundred-odd parochial state issues, but specific enough to highlight, compare, and contrast the unique strengths of Republicans,
- o Define the ballot decision in Republican terms, and
- o Activate Republicans to maximize a favorable turnout.

Strategy

The critical leverage point for this election is the ballot choice as framed by the President in '84 and again to date in '86, i.e.

"Do we go forward boldly and confidently, guided by the principles that have succeeded over the last six years, or do we go back to the failed policies of the past?"

This one statement very effectively sets up and defines the enemy, establishes a framework for comparison, and drives to the future.

Message Elements

The President's campaign speeches should focus on his and Republican key strengths, i.e. the economy, fighting drug abuse and arms reduction. We must recognize, of course, that farm and oil states are not currently enjoying the benefits of economic growth. The President needs to acknowledge those situations, but put forth his proven principles as the means to recovery.

While there may be contests where it is appropriate to cite a specific legislative issue to place a Republican candidate in the most favorable light, I would recommend the President generally focus on principles, not specifics. There are three important reasons for limiting specifics:

- o They may or may not be relevant to a particular campaign,
- o They may or may not serve as an effective and comfortable umbrella for the candidate's campaign, and
- o They may or may not serve as a basis for comparison and contrast to an opponent. More and more Democrats are trying to sound like Republicans in the economic and arms areas.

In summary, the President's communication would set up "the choice" based on the economic and nuclear arms reduction accomplishments and drive to the challenges of the future with a combination of principles and general concepts. Parochial and unique state issues deemed important to comparing and contrasting candidates should also be framed within the context of "the choice" positioning.

General Theme

In 1982 we were confined to the "Stay the Course" theme because of an absence of accomplishment. However, we can now take an aggressive pro-active stance with the electorate. I would suggest a theme which I believe embraces the President, the candidates, and the electorate; allows for the incorporation of different issues; and builds off what has been accomplished and how it was accomplished. Specifically,

"Together, we can do it!"

I've taken the liberty of outlining in the attached appendix one way this theme might be utilized in the President's speeches.

APPENDIX

By way of example, the "Together, we can do it" theme might be incorporated into the President's campaign speeches as follows:

- o Just six short years ago they said we couldn't reduce inflation. They said we couldn't reduce interest rates. Boy were they wrong. Together, we did it! (elaborate with sustained growth and job creation benefits.)
- o Just two short years ago they said we couldn't reform the tax code so every American would pay his or her fair share. Well, together we've done it with fair share tax reform. We've taken away the loopholes so the rich and special interests who used to pay less than their fair share will pay more. For most Americans, who used to pay more than their fair share, your taxes will go down so you now pay your fair share.
- o They've always claimed we Republicans would never create and pass legislation that would help the working poor. Well, again, together, we've done it. Under fair share tax reform those families with income at the poverty level will not only pay lower taxes, they won't pay any taxes. Even Tip O'Neill was heard to say that fair share tax reform is the best anti-poverty bill he's seen in the last decade.
- o When we undertook nuclear arms negotiations they said we should negotiate for a freeze. We said that's not acceptable. We said the goal should be to reduce nuclear arms to the end of eliminating them. They said it couldn't be done. We knew that if our military and our resolve were strong it could be done and together, we're doing it. The Soviets no longer talk of a nuclear arms freeze. Today, they negotiate with us toward nuclear arms reductions.

Note:

(1) The President when visiting a state should always:

- Make our Senatorial candidate "be heard".
- Contrast and compare the Republicans' "accomplishment" with the Democrat's failure.
- Speak to the particular issues / images driving the vote decision

Leverage

(2) Leverage events such as the signing of key legislation, the visits of foreign heads of states, and undertake on our own initiatives to highlight both the accomplishments and challenges of:

- The economy
- Foreign policy
- Anti-Drug campaign
- Key issues of regional importance

(3) Remember that virtually any Presidential success at this stage of the game is a political gain and vice versa.

0 Drug comments.

The transition from past accomplishments to the future can be made with a statement like, "...and we aren't done yet." After outlining general goals and principles we can then come back to the theme by characterizing the challenges as follows:

"It won't be easy, but to those skeptics out there, what do we say?"

"We can do it"

"Yes, together, we can do it"

A campaign rally crowd gimmick that further implies "do it for the Gipper" but focuses on the candidate is:

Get crowd to start "Four More Years" chant. President Reagan stops it with "No, no, no. But give me just two more years with _____'s leadership and support in the Senate and we can get the job done." This leads into the crowd chant of:

"We can do it!"

"_____ can do it!"

This would
have to
be coordinated
with Bill H..
How feasible?

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

11/1486

Tom,

Attached is translation
of the article on STR in
Raykjavik paper - done
courtesy of Iceland Embassy
here!

No.

BSL

VISITED FAMILIAR PLACES IN THIS COUNTRY

Stayed here as lieutenant in the U.S. marines during the war.

Donald Regan Chief of Staff in the White House in Washington is considered among the four most powerful men in the United States together with President Ronald Reagan, Secretary of State George Schultz and Secretary of Defense Caspar Weinberger. He was here accompanying President Ronald Reagan as the two leaders of the superpowers met here on the 11th and 12th of this month. In spite of his very busy schedule during those few days he stayed here, he took a short pause from the preparations for the summit meeting on Friday 10th and travelled with Geir Hallgrímsson the Governor of the Central Bank of Iceland to old familiar places. A reporter from Morgunbladid interviewed Donald Regan in the White House last week and satisfied her curiosity of his former acquaintance with Iceland. In spite of his busy schedule Regan reacted affably to the wishes for an interview in his stately office in the White House.

"I stayed for a few months in Iceland 45 years ago. I came to Iceland in the fall of 1941 and stayed there until March 1942" said Regan. He was then a lieutenant in the air defense units of the marines.

"I have heard that you together with Geir Hallgrímsson went to the Vatnsendi hill on Friday 10 October. What were you doing there"?

Sneaked out before a meeting with the President of the United States.

"It is correct, that early on Friday morning before our daily meeting with the President of the United States, I actually sneaked out to see old places".

During the fall of 1941 we built airgunnery batteries and radar on top of the Vatnsendi hill. At that time the area or the slope towards Reykjavík from the Vatnsendi hill was perfectly empty and uninhabited. It was therefore very picturesque for me to revisit more than 44 years later and see this same slope crowded with new modern houses. I was

told that this suburb of Reykjavík is called Breidholt. There are empty spaces yet on either side of the road down from Vatnsendi from the radio antennas. I had with good assistance from General P.X. Kelly got a map of the area from the marines, which was made from a map of this area from 1941. This map I had with me on my trip to the Vatnsendi hill. Thus I was able to account for how our facilities had been located up there. Geir Hallgrímsson assisted me in reading the map so we were able to pinpoint the location. We found the antennas on the map and then I knew that Reykjavík had been in front of us, we had our backs to the antennas, looked towards Reykjavík, the ocean and Videy and tried that way to find the air-raid shelters. They had not been on top of the hill where the antennas were. From the contours of the map we then were able to place the shelters. I thought we could'nt place it better, so we turned back to where we had left the car.

Pictures:

Donald Reagan, Chief of Staff of the White House in his office in the White House.

"It was indeed one of the machine gun platforms we constructed" said Donald Regan and added that he might even suggest that citizens of Reykjavík would put down a few flowers and trees around this only monument left in the country since the days of the US marins in Iceland.

FOUND AIR DEFENSE INSTALLATION AT VATNSENDA HILL

Butyou hint that the story has not been all told?

Regan laughed and said: "We looked carefully around as we returned to the car and the driver pulled off slowly. Then he said suddenly: "Look", and what did we see? We looked in the direction that the driver indicated and there was a machine gun platform - a platform we installed 45 years ago. We, of course, walked over to it to have a look. It was, indeed, one of the gun platforms we constructed, it now seems ages ago". Regan added that the platform had been modified from the time he and his comrades built it. After the marines left Iceland in the spring of 1942 the U.S. Army had taken over their positions. "They have obviously improved on a lot of the construction we did. The gun position we built were for the most part made of sand bags but this platform is made of bricks with a concrete roof. I might even suggest that your countrymen put down a few flowers and trees in the area because this must be the only monument to the presence of the U.S. marines in Iceland during the war" Regan said.

I was, in fact, astonished and at the same time pleased to see how your city has grown and prospered since I was here during the war. I think I recall that 45 years ago the population of the city was about one thousand and Hotel Borg was the city's grandest restaurant. It is a great change to see all your new buildings, the new hotels, not to speak of the fact that you have succeeded in growing plants and trees in Reykjavík. I was sincerely happy when I saw this on my return. Even in the lava fields on Álftanes on the way to visit your President at Bessastadir, we saw beautiful plants and fir trees. There were not many trees in Reykjavík 45 years ago.

"When we visited your President" Regan said in conclusion, "we learned an interesting thing. When I told your Prime Minister, Mr. Steingrímur Hermannsson, where I had been in the morning he reminded us that it was his father Hermann, then Prime Minister of Iceland, who had signed the agreement Iceland made with President Roosevelt where the U.S. Armed Forces took the responsibility for the defense of Iceland".

October 15, 1986

AFTER REYKJAVIK: WHERE WE STAND

by Donald T. Regan

As the tanks of Nazi Germany overran Denmark in 1940, Winston Churchill dispatched British troops to occupy Iceland, the Danish crown's remote island colony. U.S. Marines were sent in July 1941 to replace the British garrison. Through foresight and quick action, we denied Hitler a strategic naval base in the North Atlantic.

Just as the events of World War II taught us the dangers of remaining weak in the face of totalitarianism, the superpower talks in Iceland showed the world what can be achieved when the United States negotiates with the Soviet Union from a position of strength.

In ten hours of intensive discussions, President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev made significant progress and enhanced the possibility of agreement on a range of vital issues. We were pleasantly surprised at Soviet readiness to talk in detail about certain longstanding obstacles to progress.

In the meetings at Reykjavik, the Soviets agreed with our proposal for 50 percent reductions to equal levels in strategic weapons. For the first time and at the highest level, the

Soviets said they were prepared to make significant cuts in heavy ICBMs -- a concession our negotiating team in Geneva had been seeking for nearly four years.

On intermediate-range nuclear missiles, the Soviets initially accepted our proposal for the elimination of such weapons from Europe, but balked at any reductions in their Asian arsenal. President Reagan emphasized to them our goal is not to shift the problem from Europe to Asia, increasing the threat now facing our Asian allies. Arms control must not be a shell game. Then finally on Sunday morning, Mr. Gorbachev agreed to a 100 percent reduction in these weapons in Europe and an 80 percent reduction in Asia -- taking that component of the Soviet nuclear arsenal from 1,323 warheads down to 100 worldwide. There is no other way to describe this change in Soviet thinking than as a breakthrough in arms control and a clear victory for the President.

With respect to nuclear weapons testing, we were just a sentence or two away from agreement. And we expect to begin negotiations that will close that gap and obtain improved verification procedures.

Iceland brought progress on human rights as well. Both sides agreed on positions for a work plan that would provide over the next several months for a continuing dialogue on regional, bilateral, immigration, and other human rights concerns. We will

objective appears to be to kill SDI.

As the President returned Sunday night from his 5,000 mile journey to Iceland, some suggested he should have "cashed in" the Strategic Defense Initiative for whatever he could get at Reykjavik. These second-guessers are wrong.

The President knows SDI is "America's insurance policy" -- a guarantee that the Soviets will live up to whatever arms control agreements they make. While not questioning the sincerity or the trustworthiness of the present Soviet leaders, the fact remains that in the past the Soviets have not complied with treaties we have agreed to. In his Monday evening television address to the American people, President Reagan likened SDI to the need to keep our gas masks even though the nations of the world had outlawed poison gas after World War I -- because as we see today in the Iran-Iraq war where armies are using poison gas again, not everyone kept that pledge.

President Reagan told Mr. Gorbachev personally that he promised the American people he would neither give SDI away, nor trade it away. The President said he would sign an agreement today, pledging to share with the Soviets any of the technological breakthroughs we might make, so that the Soviet people could also be protected by a strategic defense.

All General Secretary Gorbachev had to do to conclude the agreement was to say yes, the U.S. can continue SDI research and testing, which is permissible under the ABM Treaty; in the meantime, we will talk about it. But he refused.

Ask yourself: Why do the Soviets fear SDI? The President asked the General Secretary this personally. Again and again, the President pressed him to explain how defensive systems, wholly lacking in offensive capability, could threaten the Soviet Union. There was no plausible response.

In the end, with great reluctance, the President, having worked so hard for these potentially tremendous achievements, simply had to refuse to compromise the security of the United States and our allies by abandoning SDI.

Where do we go from here? I believe we can find a way to preserve SDI and still have reductions in nuclear weapons. The Strategic Defense Initiative is not a barrier to negotiations and agreements; it helped bring the Soviets back to the bargaining table. It will again.

SDI is not a bargaining chip; it is the leverage that makes bargaining possible. Soviet conduct this past weekend is an answer to those naysayers who say strategic defenses don't work.

Negotiations have broken off before. But they were resumed. It may take some time. Both sides must reflect on what was said in Hofdi House.

We will continue to strive to have a constructive relationship with the Soviets. We will continue to negotiate with the Soviets in Geneva and elsewhere to resolve these problems. We're going to press ahead for progress in all the areas outlined by the President: arms control; human rights; regional conflicts; and cultural exchanges.

There was progress in Iceland. I believe the Reykjavik talks will have increasing historical importance because of the sweeping arms reduction proposals that both sides considered possible. The task ahead is to convert that progress into a lasting peace. And as Churchill said after stopping off in Iceland following his first meeting with Franklin Roosevelt, "we all have the chance to play our part and do our duty in some great design, the end of which no mortal can foresee."

(Donald T. Regan, White House Chief of Staff, was one of the U.S. Marines sent to Iceland in 1941.)

Note:

The material in this box has been rearranged, and partly relabeled, as part of an arrangement project involving the entire Donald Regan collection. The old box/OA numbers are on the folders, in brackets.

KDB 2/16/06



NOV 19 1986

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Dear Don:

The attached results from two post-Reykjavik telephone polls conducted by USIA's Office of Research in Britain, France and West Germany show that:

- o Public opinion is most troublesome for U.S. interests in Britain and West Germany, where upcoming elections will involve opposition parties committed to anti-nuclear policies threatening NATO's viability.
- o Support for U.S. SDI research has eroded significantly: the British public has joined the West Germans in opposing SDI research while the previously supportive French are now closely divided.
- o Fully half of European publics continue to be ignorant of Soviet strategic defense research.

Sincerely,

Charles Z. Wick
Director

The Honorable
Donald T. Regan
Chief of Staff
and Assistant to the President
The White House

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Foreign Opinion Note

United States Information Agency
Washington, D.C. 20547



Office of Research

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November 10, 1986

Flash Results Confirmed

BRITISH AND GERMAN ASSESSMENT OF REYKJAVIK REMAINS BLEAK,
FRENCH SUPPORT DECLINES; EUROPEANS TURN AGAINST SDI

This analysis is based on a USIA-sponsored telephone poll (October 31 - November 2) in Great Britain, France and West Germany conducted three weeks after the Reykjavik meeting. Results are compared to findings from a telephone poll conducted immediately after Reykjavik (October 15-17), and a similar poll conducted immediately after the Geneva Summit.

British and Germans Continue to Label Meeting Unproductive^a

A large majority of British (68%) and West Germans (80%) aware of the meeting continue to view the meeting as unproductive. By contrast, a solid but shrinking French majority (65%) still think the meeting accomplished at least a fair amount in resolving issues between the U.S. and Soviet Union. While these results suggest Reykjavik was perceived as a failure, it is notable that the publics in all three countries had similar reservations concerning accomplishments at Geneva. (Table 1)

Both Sides Blamed After Reykjavik; But British and West Germans Still Blame Reagan More Than Gorbachev

The predominant opinion in all three countries blames both leaders for not accomplishing more at the meeting. However the British and West Germans (by at least a 3-to-1 margin) continue to fault President Reagan more than Gorbachev for a lack of progress. The harsh German attitudes toward the President have softened somewhat: only a third of the West Germans now blame the President compared to 43 percent immediately after Reykjavik. (Table 2)

^aIn both post-Reykjavik telephone polls, questions directly related to Reykjavik were asked only of those who had heard or read something about the meeting (about three-quarters of respondents).

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- 2 -

Perception of Greater Soviet Arms Control Effort Dwindles in Britain and Germany

While more British and West Germans believe the Soviets are making a greater effort toward arms control than the U.S., the differences have narrowed since immediately after Reykjavik. A plurality of the French still view the U.S. as making the greater effort on arms control. (Table 3)

Opposition to SDI Grows in All Three Countries Since Geneva

The British (47%) and West Germans (64%) predominantly oppose the U.S. continuing SDI research, while the French are now closely divided over the issue. In all three countries opposition to SDI has increased since Geneva, with the largest shifts toward opposition (about 20 points) occurring in France and West Germany. (Table 4)

Majorities in Britain (56%) and Germany (68%) and a plurality in France (47%) now say the U.S. should scrap SDI if necessary to reach a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviets. The number saying SDI is "too important to give up" has faded noticeably among the British and French since Geneva. (Table 5)

Half of Europeans Unaware of Soviet Anti-Missile Research

In each country half of the publics are unaware that the Soviets are researching anti-missile defense systems. (Table 6) These results mirror similar survey findings over the past year.

Europeans Want Intermediate Range Missiles Out, Even at the Expense of SDI

Majorities -- ranging from 68% in Britain to 84% in Germany -- favor an agreement eliminating all U.S. and Soviet intermediate range missiles from Europe. These people would still favor such an agreement even if that meant giving up SDI. (Tables 7 and 8)

U.S.-USSR Nuclear Testing Ban Catches On

Substantial pluralities in Britain and Germany believe a test ban is the most important issue for future arms control negotiations, naming such a ban twice as often as eliminating INF or cutting U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons. (Table 9)

Germans overwhelmingly rejected the view that the U.S. must continue testing to maintain its deterrent, a view that most British also rejected. In France, a majority accepted the U.S. view while nevertheless calling a test ban more important than INF or START. (Table 10)

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- 3 -

British and West Germans Remain Critical of President on Trustworthiness, Flexibility

When asked which leader is trustworthy, the West Germans give as much credit to Gorbachev as to President Reagan. The British said neither one is trustworthy but gave the edge to President Reagan. The French give a clear nod to the President.

Gorbachev is considered more "flexible in negotiations" in West Germany by a 39 to 21 percent margin. The British are almost equally divided on this score, while the French say President Reagan is more flexible.

In all three countries, more of the general public continue to see the President, rather than Gorbachev, as "understanding of European problems." But in Britain and West Germany Gorbachev has eroded the President's margin since Geneva. (Tables 11a-c)

Europeans increasingly see Gorbachev as more likely than previous Soviet leaders to seek a reduction in world tensions. (Table 12)

Prepared by: Steven K. Smith, P/R

N-11/10/86

Approved by: Nils H. Wessell, Director
Office of Research 485-2965

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-4-

Table 1. Accomplishments at Reykjavik

"How much do you think this meeting accomplished in helping to resolve the various issues between the United States and the Soviet Union -- a great deal, a fair amount, not very much, or nothing at all?"^a

| | BRITAIN | | | FRANCE | | | GERMANY | | |
|----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|--------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>10/86</u> (786) | <u>11/86</u> (909) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>10/86</u> (423) | <u>11/86</u> (380) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>10/86</u> (443) | <u>11/86</u> (417) |
| Great deal | 5% | 7% | 3% | 3% | 18% | 9% | 3% | 4% | 2% |
| Fair amount | <u>33</u> | <u>29</u> | <u>24</u> | <u>36</u> | <u>54</u> | <u>56</u> | <u>23</u> | <u>18</u> | <u>17</u> |
| subtotal | <u>38</u> | <u>36</u> | <u>27</u> | <u>39</u> | <u>72</u> | <u>65</u> | <u>26</u> | <u>22</u> | <u>19</u> |
| Not very much | 45 | 46 | 51 | 36 | 15 | 18 | 55 | 61 | 64 |
| Nothing at all | <u>9</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>17</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>8</u> | <u>8</u> | <u>10</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>16</u> |
| subtotal | <u>54</u> | <u>62</u> | <u>68</u> | <u>46</u> | <u>23</u> | <u>26</u> | <u>65</u> | <u>76</u> | <u>80</u> |
| Don't know | <u>8</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>5</u> | <u>9</u> | <u>9</u> | <u>2</u> | <u>1</u> |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> ^b | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |

^a 12/85 question wording: "How much do you think this [Geneva] meeting accomplished in resolving various issues between the United States and the Soviet Union?"

^b In all countries, does not include those who had heard or read "nothing at all" about the Reykjavik meeting.

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-5-

Table 2. Blame for Not Accomplishing More at Reykjavik

"Who do you think is mainly to blame for not accomplishing more at the Reykjavik meeting -- Mr. Reagan or Mr. Gorbachev? Or do you think they are both equally to blame?"^a

| | BRITAIN | | FRANCE | | GERMANY | |
|---------------|-----------------------|------------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>10/86</u> (746) | <u>11/86</u> (759) ^b | <u>10/86</u> (423) | <u>11/86</u> (380) | <u>10/86</u> (443) | <u>11/86</u> (417) |
| Mr. Reagan | 35% | 32% | 12% | 14% | 43% | 34% |
| Mr. Gorbachev | 9 | 8 | 15 | 12 | 6 | 11 |
| Both | 51 | 51 | 60 | 58 | 40 | 44 |
| Neither [vol] | 2 | 3 | 2 | 4 | 5 | 6 |
| Don't Know | 3 | 6 | 11 | 12 | 6 | 5 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |

^a Does not include those who had heard or read "nothing at all" about the Reykjavik meeting.

^b Does not include those who thought the meeting accomplished "nothing at all."

Table 3. Who Makes Greater Effort Toward Arms Control

"Which country do you believe is making a greater effort to bring about a nuclear arms control agreement -- the United States or the Soviet Union?"

| | BRITAIN | | FRANCE | | GERMANY | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>10/86</u> (786) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>10/86</u> (505) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>10/86</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| United States | 20% | 28% | 35% | 36% | 18% | 24% |
| Soviet Union | 46 | 35 | 20 | 20 | 42 | 39 |
| Both [vol] | 14 | 11 | 13 | 9 | 23 | 21 |
| Neither [vol] | 12 | 15 | 15 | 16 | 7 | 9 |
| Don't Know | 8 | 11 | 17 | 19 | 10 | 7 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |

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-6-

Table 4. Continuation of SDI Research

"What is your opinion of the United States continuing this research on anti-missile defenses? Do you favor this research strongly, or favor it somewhat, or do you oppose this research strongly or oppose it somewhat?"

| | BRITAIN | | FRANCE | | GERMANY | |
|-----------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| Favor strongly | 18% | 20% | 25% | 7% | 10% | 9% |
| Favor somewhat | 36 | 18 | 33 | 33 | 23 | 18 |
| subtotal | <u>54</u> | <u>38</u> | <u>58</u> | <u>40</u> | <u>33</u> | <u>27</u> |
| Oppose somewhat | 22 | 15 | 13 | 26 | 23 | 20 |
| Oppose strongly | 16 | 32 | 13 | 18 | 25 | 44 |
| subtotal | <u>38</u> | <u>47</u> | <u>26</u> | <u>44</u> | <u>48</u> | <u>64</u> |
| Don't Know | <u>8</u> | <u>15</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>19</u> | <u>9</u> |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Table 5. SDI and Nuclear Arms Control Agreements

"Do you think the United States should give up SDI if that were necessary in order to reach any nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, or is SDI too important to give up?"^a

| | BRITAIN | | FRANCE | | GERMANY | |
|-------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| U.S. give up SDI | 49% | 56% | 40% | 47% | 64% | 68% |
| SDI too important | 42 | 31 | 53 | 37 | 24 | 22 |
| Don't Know | <u>9</u> | <u>13</u> | <u>7</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>12</u> | <u>10</u> |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% | 100% |

^a 12/85 Question wording: "Do you think the United States should give up research on an anti-missile system if that were necessary in order to reach a nuclear arms control agreement with the Soviet Union, or is SDI too important to give up?"

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-7-

Table 6. Soviet Anti-Missile Defense Research

"As far as you know, is the Soviet Union conducting research on an anti-missile defense system, or is it not conducting such research?"

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> (993) | <u>FRANCE</u> (501) | <u>GERMANY</u> (501) |
|-----------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Conducting res. | 46% | 52% | 46% |
| Not conducting | 12 | 7 | 5 |
| Don't Know | 42 | 41 | 49 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |

Table 7. Eliminating All Intermediate Range Missiles in Europe
"Would you favor or oppose an agreement eliminating all American and Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe?"

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> (993) | <u>FRANCE</u> (501) | <u>GERMANY</u> (501) |
|------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Favor | 68% | 70% | 84% |
| Oppose | 21 | 17 | 9 |
| Don't Know | 11 | 13 | 8 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |

Table 8. Eliminating INF at Expense of SDI

"Do you favor eliminating all intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe even if that would mean giving up SDI?"^a

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> (671) | <u>FRANCE</u> (350) | <u>GERMANY</u> (421) |
|------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Favor | 69% | 69% | 88% |
| Oppose | 21 | 15 | 6 |
| Don't Know | 10 | 16 | 6 |
| | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> | <u>100%</u> |

^a Asked only of those who "favor" an agreement eliminating all American and Soviet intermediate range nuclear missiles from Europe.

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-8-

Table 9. Issues for Future Arms Control Negotiations

"Which one of the following issues do you think is the most important for future arms control negotiations? -- eliminating intermediate range nuclear missiles stationed in Europe; cutting the number of U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear weapons, that is missiles and bombers; or banning all testing of nuclear weapons? [11/86]

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> (993) | <u>FRANCE</u> (501) | <u>GERMANY</u> (501) |
|-------------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Eliminate INF | 13% | 10% | 21% |
| Strategic weapons | 25 | 18 | 24 |
| Nuclear testing | 49 | 56 | 47 |
| Don't Know | <u>13</u> | <u>16</u> | <u>8</u> |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

Table 10. U.S. and Nuclear Testing

"Now, a question on nuclear testing. Do you agree or disagree with the view that the United States must continue nuclear testing in order to maintain its nuclear deterrent against the Soviet Union?"[11/86]

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> (993) | <u>FRANCE</u> (501) | <u>GERMANY</u> (501) |
|------------|-------------------------|------------------------|-------------------------|
| Agree | 39% | 51% | 13% |
| Disagree | 50 | 35 | 80 |
| Don't Know | <u>11</u> | <u>14</u> | <u>7</u> |
| | 100% | 100% | 100% |

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-9-

Table 11a. Who is Trustworthy

"Is trustworthy -- Does this statement best describe President Reagan or Soviet leader Gorbachev?"^a

| | BRITAIN | | | FRANCE | | | GERMANY | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>10/86</u> (786) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>10/86</u> (505) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>10/86</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| Reagan | 20% | 29% | 26% | 35% | 47% | 45% | 22% | 26% | 26% |
| Gorbachev | 5 | 21 | 15 | 5 | 10 | 15 | 14 | 33 | 26 |
| Both [vol] | 20 | 8 | 8 | 21 | 7 | 8 | 30 | 15 | 15 |
| Neither [vol] | 43 | 32 | 39 | 27 | 25 | 21 | 19 | 17 | 26 |
| Don't know | <u>12</u> 100% | <u>10</u> 100% | <u>12</u> 100% | <u>12</u> 100% | <u>11</u> 100% | <u>11</u> 100% | <u>15</u> 100% | <u>9</u> 100% | <u>7</u> 100% |

Table 11b. Who Understands European Problems

"Understands European Problems -- Does this statement best describe President Reagan or Soviet leader Gorbachev?"^a

| | BRITAIN | | | FRANCE | | | GERMANY | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>10/86</u> (786) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>10/86</u> (505) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>10/86</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| Reagan | 34% | 44% | 36% | 41% | 47% | 45% | 41% | 33% | 34% |
| Gorbachev | 17 | 27 | 26 | 6 | 12 | 16 | 12 | 28 | 25 |
| Both [vol] | 16 | 7 | 9 | 19 | 7 | 9 | 27 | 13 | 16 |
| Neither [vol] | 27 | 16 | 18 | 27 | 23 | 16 | 13 | 16 | 20 |
| Don't know | <u>6</u> 100% | <u>6</u> 100% | <u>11</u> 100% | <u>7</u> 100% | <u>11</u> 100% | <u>14</u> 100% | <u>7</u> 100% | <u>10</u> 100% | <u>5</u> 100% |

^a 12/85 question wording: "Now I am going to read several statements. For each one, please tell me if you think it best describes President Reagan or the Soviet leader Gorbachev, or does it describe both of them or neither of them."

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-10-

Table 11c. Who is Flexible in Negotiations

"Is Flexible in negotiations -- Does this statement best describe President Reagan or Soviet leader Gorbachev?"^a

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> | | | <u>FRANCE</u> | | | <u>GERMANY</u> | | |
|---------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>10/86</u> (786) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>10/86</u> (505) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>10/86</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| Reagan | 22% | 24% | 27% | 27% | 33% | 33% | 29% | 23% | 21% |
| Gorbachev | 7 | 38 | 31 | 12 | 18 | 17 | 14 | 32 | 39 |
| Both [vol] | 24 | 7 | 8 | 20 | 5 | 4 | 36 | 20 | 15 |
| Neither [vol] | 38 | 23 | 24 | 25 | 28 | 25 | 12 | 13 | 18 |
| Don't know | <u>9</u> 100% | <u>8</u> 100% | <u>10</u> 100% | <u>16</u> 100% | <u>16</u> 100% | <u>21</u> 100% | <u>9</u> 100% | <u>12</u> 100% | <u>7</u> 100% |

^a 12/85 question wording: "Now I am going to read several statements. For each one, please tell me if you think it best describes President Reagan or the Soviet leader Gorbachev, or does it describe both of them or neither of them."

Table 12. Gorbachev and Soviet Foreign Policy

"Some people say that Mr. Gorbachev is doing more to reduce tensions in the world than previous Soviet leaders. Others say that Soviet foreign policy under Mr. Gorbachev is not really changing? Which view is closer to your own or haven't you heard enough to say?"

| | <u>BRITAIN</u> | | <u>FRANCE</u> | | <u>GERMANY</u> | |
|-----------------------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|-----------------------|
| | <u>12/85</u> (504) | <u>11/86</u> (993) | <u>12/85</u> (500) | <u>11/86</u> (501) | <u>12/85</u> (510) | <u>11/86</u> (501) |
| Gorbachev reducing tensions | 60% | 69% | 52% | 61% | 66% | 74% |
| Soviet policy not really changing | 14 | 10 | 25 | 26 | 18 | 18 |
| Don't Know | <u>26</u> 100% | <u>21</u> 100% | <u>23</u> 100% | <u>13</u> 100% | <u>16</u> 100% | <u>8</u> 100% |

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dt 10/3/86

AGENDA

Iceland Planning Meeting

October 3, 1986

Brief Report on Arrangements

Henkel Meetings/Recommendations ✓

- Schedule ✓
- Meeting Site(s) ✓
- Housing ✓
- RR/staff
- Social Events ✓
- Iceland Courtesy Visit/Reception
- Dinner

Press Plan - Larry

Schedule of interviews/activities

- Pre event/post event

Coordinator -- should be "one stop shopping" re Press

Remarks/Speeches - Pat

Departure Remarks

Arrival Remarks

Report to the Nation

Radio Address 10/4 and 10/11

Need to discuss

Briefings

For RR ✓

For Experts ✓

-- NSC/former Cabinet types/Leaders

Actions Requiring Decisions

Dinner/no dinner - Iceland/US/Soviets

Post Meeting Schedule

-- NATO Briefing?

Sign off on Press Plan

ICELAND GIVES JEWS BOUND FOR SUMMIT

TUESDAY, OCTOBER 7, 1986

COLD SHOULDER TO

WASHINGTON — Iceland is barring a group of 50 American Jewish leaders from this week's summit meeting.

The government has denied landing rights to a plane chartered by the National Conference on Soviet Jewry.

The New York-based group wants to bring the Jewish leaders to Reykjavik to protest the treatment of Soviet Jews.

Iceland's Prime Minister, Steingrimur Hermansson, said, "Frankly, I hope that these Jewish people will just stay at home because I want to avoid any demonstrations."

Members of Con-

By NILES LATHEM
Bureau Chief

gress immediately called on President Reagan — who will meet with Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev at the summit — to repudiate Hermansson's remarks.

Rep. Ray McGrath (R-L.I.) wrote Reagan yesterday saying that "thousands" of his constituents were "angered and offended" by the remarks.

Noting that the plight of Soviet Jews and other Soviet human rights abuses is on the agenda at the summit, McGrath added:

"Any effort to hide this brutal aspect of the Soviet system is

reprehensible."

A spokeswoman for the Union of Councils for Soviet Jewry called the remarks "disparaging and extremely disappointing."

There was no immediate response from the White House to the furor last night.

The Icelandic government, responding to enormous security problems associated with the summit, has issued a general crackdown on all foreigners wishing to enter the country during the Oct 11-12 meeting.

Jerry Goodman, executive director of the National Conference on Soviet Jewry, said he believes Hermansson's remarks and the refusal to allow his group into Iceland was an "overreaction" to security concerns, not an anti-Semitic policy.

All foreigners wanting to enter the island must show proof of accommodation in Iceland under an emergency law.

Goodman noted that his delegation, which planned to stay in Iceland for only a few hours before flying home Friday, is still negotiating with Reykjavik.

Raisa's Reykjavik trip leaves Nancy on ice

WASHINGTON — Soviet leader Mikhail Gorbachev threw President Reagan a curve when he announced that he would be bringing his photogenic wife, Raisa, to the mini-summit in Iceland, White House officials believe.

The White House said First Lady Nancy Reagan would stick to her plan to stay home despite Mrs. Gorbachev's sudden decision to fly to Reykjavik.

White House officials said Mrs. Gorbachev's trip to Iceland is an ominous sign that the Soviet Leader may be trying to upstage Reagan by injecting "theater" into the talks.

— NILES LATHEM