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File Folder: [Washington Summit Briefing Book:] The Meetings
of President Reagan and General Secretary
Gorbachev, Washington, DC, 12/08/1987-12/10/1987
(3)

Date: 08/25/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
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1. point paper	re regional issues, 3p <i>R 3/16/06 NLSF97-066/7 #195</i>	n.d.	B1
2. talking points	re regional issues, 1p	n.d.	B1
3. talking points	re Afghanistan, 2p <i>u #196</i>	n.d.	B1
4. talking points	re Afghanistan (if issues raised), 4p <i>u #197</i>	n.d.	B1
5. talking points	re Iran-Iraq War, 3p <i>u #198</i>	n.d.	B1
6. talking points	re Middle East peace process, 2p <i>u #199</i>	n.d.	B1
7. talking points	re southern Africa, 2p <i>u #200</i>	n.d.	B1
8. talking points	re Cambodia, 1p <i>u #201</i>	n.d.	B1
9. talking points	re Central America, 1p <i>u #202</i>	n.d.	B1
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11. talking points	re South Asian nuclear proliferation 1p <i>u #204</i>	n.d.	B1
12. talking points	re Berlin, 1p <i>u #205</i>	n.d.	B1
13. talking points	re Eastern Europe, 1p <i>u #206</i>	n.d.	B1
14. talking points	re international security, 1p <i>u #207</i>	n.d.	B1
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NLS F97-066/7 # 195

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CU NARA DATE 3/16/06
POINT PAPER: REGIONAL ISSUES

OVERVIEW

- Stress that if Soviet conduct makes negotiated solutions impossible, this will have serious repercussions for overall health of US-Soviet relations. Cite the negative experience of 1970's.
- We want to explore vague Soviet hints of flexibility on Afghanistan and Angola, and push Gorbachev to take concrete steps on these and Iran/Iraq. In other areas--particularly Cambodia--briefly lay down markers.
- Soviets may raise Mideast peace process, Central America.
- Key in most areas is to get foreign troops out, turn issue over to indigenous populations for negotiated settlement (as in your 1985 UNGA speech).

AFGHANISTAN

- Soviets hint Gorbachev will have "something to say" to you about withdrawal timetable, but are silent on details.
- Kabul regime announced 12-month withdrawal time table linked to end "outside interference."
- This likely to be center of Gorbachev's summit presentation on Afghanistan, but he could surprise us still.
- We should pressure him to announce all troops will leave Afghanistan by a date certain before end of 1988.
- Soviets should talk to the Resistance, as well as to Pakistan. Must recognize that Kabul regime has to go.
- Gorbachev may complain about your meeting with Resistance leaders.

IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- The Soviets hold the key to our efforts to end the war, but they have been unwilling to bite the bullet and support sanctions against Iran.
- Soviets claim they would consider a second (enforcement) resolution in Security Council, but they are clearly stalling and, in effect, shielding Iran from UN sanctions.
- When Iran attacked US ship and you responded by hitting command-and-control platform, Soviets denounced us for "aggressive acts."
- Soviets denounce our fleet buildup as cause of tensions. They propose a UN naval peacekeeping force, which they themselves know is not a serious proposal, although it plays well in some quarters, including in the U.S.

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- We would propose to Gorbachev that we instruct both our UN Ambassadors to sit down together this week in New York and begin drafting language for a second resolution.
- It is dangerous for our relations for the Soviets to be shielding Iran when Iran is shooting at American ships; for Soviet-made and Bloc equipment to be finding its way to Iran, possibly to be used against Americans; and for the Soviets to be caught in the middle if we have to strike back again at Iran.

MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- We are concerned about a stagnation; but Soviets are the demandants in this issue, seeking a greater role at no cost to them.
- The process is stalled, partly due to continued Soviet encouragement of intransigent positions by their friends in the region (e.g., Syria, PLO).
- If Gorbachev raises international conference, our answer is direct negotiations, launched in an agreed manner. Burden remains on Moscow, moreover, to prove its willingness to play constructive role.

SOUTHERN AFRICA

- You should reiterate our interest in exploring further possibility of cooperation with Soviets on Resolution 435.
- In this connection, emphasize importance of agreement on withdrawal of all foreign forces from Angola and Namibia.
- Savimbi just routed the Angolan regime's forces (with some South African help).
- Clearly a military stalemate; ripe for political solution. Our talks with Angolan regime going well. They accept need for Cuban withdrawal but haven't offered a quick enough timetable.

CAMBODIA

- You have promised our friends and allies in Asia you would raise this with the General Secretary.
- This can be done briefly: Soviets should urge Hanoi to get troops out, promote prompt settlement. (Recent Hanoi troop withdrawals were a rotation, not real.)

CENTRAL AMERICA

- We support Guatemala plan. Soviet arms buildup in Nicaragua is one big problem. Other is Nicaragua's tyrannical attempt to suppress all internal opposition.

KOREA

- Latent Northern ambitions to reunify the peninsula and ROK political turbulence, despite movement toward greater tranquility between North and South, make it worthwhile to enlist Soviet support for stabilizing trends.

SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

- We want the Soviets to encourage India toward moves that dampen the Indo-Pakistani nuclear competition.

BERLIN INITIATIVE

- You should push Gorbachev to respond positively to your June 1987 Berlin initiative. You proposed to improve air access to the city, to promote exchanges, encourage sports events, and bring international meetings to Berlin. With the UK, France, and FRG, we will soon have ideas to present to the Soviets.

EASTERN EUROPE (If raised)

- You have called in speeches for Soviet repeal of the Brezhnev Doctrine. Soviet press spokesman Gerasimov indicated in a British interview that Moscow would no longer find it possible to intervene militarily in Eastern Europe.
- As opportunities arise, we want to reinforce this Soviet position because Eastern Europe is entering a period of instability and change. Soviet intervention in the region would be an enormous setback to East-West relations.

THE SOVIET "COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL PEACE AND SECURITY" (If raised)

- We should tell the Soviets that this is an impractical proposal that unnecessarily duplicates existing UN bureaucracies; but we would consider individual elements of the package in the appropriate UN bodies.

CYPRUS (If raised)

- We should tell the Soviets that an international conference would only complicate the problem; but both we and the Soviets should lend greater support to the UN Secretary General's mediation efforts between the two communities on the island.

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B. TALKING POINTS

TALKING POINTS: REGIONAL ISSUES

1. Introduction
2. Afghanistan
3. Iran-Iraq War
4. Middle East Peace Process
5. Southern Africa
6. Cambodia
7. Central America
8. Korea
9. South Asian Nuclear Proliferation
10. Berlin
11. Eastern Europe
12. Comprehensive System of International Security
13. Cyprus

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TALKING POINTS: REGIONAL ISSUES

INTRODUCTION

- As we set out to do at Geneva, we have expanded our regional dialogue. This has been useful.
- I propose that we affirm that this dialogue is a permanent fixture, and that we begin another cycle of expert talks early next year.
- But in itself, this dialogue is far from enough. Serious differences remain on these issues, and they could prove dangerous.
- My concern is twofold:
 - o Regional crises constantly risk drawing us into direct conflict. We all remember Berlin, Cuba, and the 1973 Arab/Israeli war.
 - o Even when they aren't major East-West confrontations, they can sour our relations. Angola and Afghanistan sounded the deathknell for detente in the '70s and for ratification of SALT II. These conflicts are still with us. Now Nicaragua and Iran-Iraq have joined the list.
- My goal (as in my 1985 UNGA speech) is reaching political solutions, a process that must begin with negotiations between the warring parties.
- Failure to end these conflicts--especially where Soviet forces or the forces you support are involved--will undermine the effort to promote cooperation on other issues.
- So, we should explore ways to resolve key regional issues. At the top of the list are Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq, southern Africa, and Cambodia.

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TALKING POINTS: AFGHANISTAN

- I hardly need to emphasize to you the positive impact of ending the Afghan conflict during the coming year. This can only come with rapid Soviet withdrawal.
- While we seek a rapid political settlement, our support for those striving to restore Afghan independence will continue until a settlement is reached.
- You tell us you have already decided to withdraw. But none of your proposals has any hope of acceptance by the Resistance and the refugees.
- We agree with you:
 - o that a short withdrawal timetable is essential; and that it not be linked to prior agreement on an interim government in Kabul;
 - o that there should be guarantees for the neutrality of Afghanistan.
- On the other hand, the timetable you propose (12 months) is too long; what we need is a shorter timetable and a date certain before the end of 1988 when it begins and ends.
- You have made no effort to negotiate with the Resistance. The role of the Resistance is central. How can you possibly settle this conflict without negotiating with them?

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-- We're also disturbed by your campaign of pressures against Pakistan. You should resume your dialogue with Pakistan, which you have let lapse. We will continue to support Pakistan, as will other governments.

-- The essential step is for the Soviet Union to commit to a specific timetable with beginning and end dates in 1988, including provisions for the early removal of a substantial body of your forces, i.e., front-loading.

(Proposal to Make:) I propose as our objective this week: announcement of a date certain before the end of 1988 by which time all Soviet troops will have returned home.

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TALKING POINTS: AFGHANISTAN (IF RAISED)

12-Month Timetable

- We are aware of the 12-month withdrawal timetable proposed by the Kabul government. Your own interests as well as the interests of our relationship would best be served by a more expeditious withdrawal schedule; that is, in well less than a year.
- We're aware that it's linked, also, to an "end to outside interference." You know that that issue is covered by the documents already negotiated in Geneva. So it's not a real issue.
- We understand your desire to withdraw without unnecessary bloodshed and without extraordinary political turbulence in Kabul. For that to occur, however, you will need the acquiescence or active cooperation of the Resistance. Their experience with the DRA over the past eight years as well as past sham withdrawals and recent political developments that have consolidated power in Najib's hands obviously make them unwilling to accept offers by Kabul.
- The resistance will have no incentive to stop fighting unless your withdrawal is accomplished promptly, and unless there is a tangible earnest of your intent up front. This might be provided by removal of a substantial number of your troops -- say 40,000 -- within 60 days following signature of a Geneva Agreement, with comparable increments at regular intervals thereafter.

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- If you are prepared to take steps of this nature, there could be agreement at Geneva including an end to outside interference. We would also be willing to use our influence to facilitate ceasefires for your withdrawal and to avoid massive retaliation against the PDPA.
- If you are serious, the Geneva negotiations should be resumed as quickly as possible. Signature of the Geneva accords in January or February would permit a final withdrawal well before the end of 1988. You need to talk to Pakistan right away to confirm clear understandings on modalities prior to the next Geneva Round.
- The central issue is your withdrawal.

U.S. Support for the Resistance

- We want a political settlement and are prepared to be helpful.
- But, support by the U.S. and other countries for the Afghan resistance will continue until the signature of the Geneva accords.
- The vote of 123 governments at the UNGA shows the strength of support for the Resistance.

Peacekeeping Forces

- We would be prepared to discuss creation of an international peacekeeping presence as well as a massive international humanitarian presence as a means of enhancing stability in Afghanistan during a transitional period.

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- The record of such peacekeeping forces in situations of acute civil strife is not promising, and Afghanistan is a very difficult country. A limited peacekeeping role, say in Kabul, might make sense.
- Other issues to be addressed are economic reconstruction, relief, and return of refugees. International help here can also reduce civil strife and bloodshed.

Interim Arrangements

- We favor a government of genuine national reconciliation. This cannot be accomplished in the shadow of foreign troops. Only the Afghan people themselves can decide their own future, and this means reaching agreement with the Resistance.
- The announcement of a date certain timetable will provide a strong impetus for Afghan resolution of interim arrangements.
- We agree with you that the former King could play an important role in the process of forming an interim government -- provided the Resistance can be persuaded to accept him.
- However, you cannot expect the Resistance to welcome a significant role for the PDPA in any such process.

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Neutrality

- We agree to the idea of Afghan neutrality and nonalignment. Preferably, the Afghans should declare their own neutrality and nonalignment, so it doesn't seem to be something imposed on them.
- At the same time, the guarantor powers could undertake certain obligations -- including forming no alliance or security arrangement with Afghanistan, and neither introducing foreign military personnel nor establishing military bases or facilities there.
- Afghanistan would undertake similar obligations but would remain free to determine its political orientation and to participate in regional or international organizations.

Avoidance of Bloodbath and Soviet Withdrawal

- We believe that a major bloodbath can be avoided; and that a Soviet withdrawal can be done safely.
- This will require acceptance by the Resistance of proposals for withdrawal and political arrangements, establishment of international humanitarian presence and perhaps some peacekeeping forces, and departure from Afghanistan of some personnel from present regime (such as the Khad or secret police).

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TALKING POINTS: IRAN-IRAQ WAR

- Our exchange of letters last summer helped lead to Security Council adoption of Resolution 598.
- Frankly, that spirit of cooperation has faded away. Unity of the five in the Security Council is an alibi for inaction, while Iran continues to attack shipping and to build up its army for another major offensive against Iraq.
- Yet the Soviet Union continues to say "wait," and resisting any effort to put muscle behind the UN effort to end the war.
 - o When we agreed on Resolution 598, we knew that sanctions probably would be required.
 - o Continued inaction undermines the prestige and effectiveness of the UN and encourages Iran to persevere in its aggressive policy.
 - o The Arabs are demanding action by the UNSC and blame the USSR for blocking it.
- This could become a dangerous issue in our relations:
 - o You seemed to be shielding Iran diplomatically when Iran was shooting missiles at American ships.
 - o Your weapons (such as mines via Libya) are flowing into Iran and might end up being used against Americans.
 - o When we responded to Iranian attacks in October, you denounced us for aggression. This kind of rhetoric could give Iran the impression it will have your backing in a military clash with us. That's a dangerous impression for the Iranians to have.

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- o If Iran attacks Americans or American ships, we will hit back to defend ourselves. You don't want to be caught in the middle.
- An arms embargo won't end the war by itself. But it will isolate Iran and pressure Tehran to negotiate.
- It may also pressure other suppliers, including China, North Korea, and Eastern Europe.
- You assume Security Council presidency in December. I hope you will provide leadership in moving forward on 598.
- (Proposal to Make) Let us instruct our UN Ambassadors in New York to sit down together this week and begin drafting language for a second resolution.
- Let us furthermore agree to complete the drafting exercise, together with the other permanent members of the Security Council, during your tenure as Council President this month.
- (Contingency: if Gorbachev refuses to commit himself to this action.) In the interest of seeking the earliest possible end to the Iran-Iraq War, the United States is now prepared to push for a second resolution in the Security Council, with or without your support.

The US Naval Presence (If Raised)

- We have had a naval presence in the Gulf since 1949.
 - o We expanded our presence earlier this year in response to a rising threat to freedom of navigation.
 - o We acted at the request of Kuwait and with the agreement of the other Gulf Arab states. You had agreed to do the same.

- We have no hidden purpose. As tensions go down, we will reduce our naval presence to its traditional levels.
- The best way to reduce tensions is to end the war.
- Your propaganda campaign against the US naval presence deliberately confuses the result with the cause of the tension; it encourages Iran to continue the war in the Gulf and on land; attack and it also adds to danger that Iran will again attack US ships, an attack to which you can be certain we will respond.
- We will keep the Strait of Hormuz open. The Gulf is an area of vital interest to the U.S.

Creation of a UN Force in the Gulf (If Raised)

- This idea is impractical. While there is provision for a role for the UN in implementing 598, we should not be sidetracked into discussing a UN force only for the Gulf before 598 is implemented.
- If we can't agree on carrying through what we started last July, it is pointless to discuss a UN force. It is another form of creating pretexts behind which Iran continues its aggression. It shows you are not serious.
- The deliveries of Soviet-Bloc weapons to Iran, including sophisticated Soviet mines, create further dangers.
- You know that the Arabs have seen through your pretext and refused to consider it.
- In any case, a UN naval force could never substitute for our naval presence in the Gulf. The Arabs want us to stay.

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TALKING POINTS: MIDDLE EAST PEACE PROCESS

- Over past two years, the US has been consulting intensively with all the parties in the region.
- The strength of the moderates is growing. Many of the key parties are actively searching for the proper framework to bring peace about.
- We, and the key parties (Jordan, Egypt, Israel), have found some common ground:
 - o Direct negotiations.
 - o Renunciation of violence.
 - o Peace based on UN Resolutions 242 and 338.
- You have advocated an international conference, and we do not rule one out. But we would first have to define its terms.
- We have some concerns about accepting a greater Soviet role in the peace process. Among them:
 - o Your continued close identification with parties like Libya, the PLO, and Syria that refuse to renounce violence and seem to have little real interest in achieving a peace acceptable to all;
 - o Your refusal to resume normal diplomatic relations with Israel, underscored by your recent UNGA vote to deny Israel its rightful place in that body;
 - o The continuing problem of Jewish emigration from the Soviet Union, on which your intentions are unclear.

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- The way you have misused the idea of action by the Five Permanent Members of the UN Security Council on the Iran-Iraq War also raises very serious questions about your conduct in an international conference.
- If the Soviet Union is genuinely willing to help achieve peace in the Middle East, we would welcome that--but we remain to be convinced by your actions that you are ready to do so.

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TALKING POINTS: SOUTHERN AFRICA

- The Angola/Namibia issue is one that may now be ripe for a negotiated solution.
- As you know, we see Namibian independence in the context of a deal that gets all foreign forces, including Cubans, Soviets, and South Africans, out of Namibia and Angola.
- We've had talks with the Angolan regime and they've come part way on Cuban troop withdrawal. The next step is for them to make a better proposal for quicker Cuban withdrawal. We hope this will occur at our next meeting with the Angolans in mid-December.
- If they make a serious proposal, we will put our full weight behind it with South Africa to implement UN Resolution 435.
- After Luanda's recent military setbacks, it should be obvious that a negotiated political solution is the only viable option.
- Kaunda and Chissano have told me how much they want our negotiating effort to succeed. We will give it our best shot.
- If you are serious about wanting political solutions in southern Africa, you should use your influence with the Angolan regime to make an acceptable proposal on Cuban withdrawal.

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- If a deal is achieved, the US and the USSR ought to be able to reduce their involvement in the Angolan conflict and let the Angolan regime and Jonas Savimbi work out a settlement with all outside interference ended.
- If we can decide genuinely to work together on this, that agreement should be registered at the end of our meeting as an incentive to regional parties to come to terms.

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TALKING POINTS: CAMBODIA

- The key to a political settlement is the prompt withdrawal of all Vietnamese troops from Cambodia.
- This should not be linked to national reconciliation, which must be left to the Khmer people themselves. Nor should the withdrawal be postponed to 1990.
- Vietnam counts on massive Soviet aid to finance its occupation of Cambodia. This gives you a lever. We would like to see you use it.
- There is growing international consensus that Prince Sihanouk should play a key role in a political settlement; we believe your government shares this view.

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TALKING POINTS: CENTRAL AMERICA

- The US supports genuine democracy throughout Central America. This includes inside Nicaragua. The civil war going on within Nicaragua is the core of the conflict.
- The Sandinistas' effort to maintain themselves in power by force and deception will not succeed.
- There is firm bipartisan agreement in the US that Nicaragua not be permitted to become a Soviet base for aggression. There is also widespread hemispheric consensus on this.
- The massive transfer to Nicaragua of Soviet arms, which have increased in volume and sophistication, is destabilizing. You can clearly demonstrate your commitment to the Guatemala plan by stopping the flow of arms.
- Your arms transfers and other activities have been and continue to be a significant source of friction in our relations.

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TALKING POINTS: KOREA

- Both our nations share an interest in reducing tensions on the Korean peninsula; the goal should be a better, more stable, political environment.
- The political dialogue between north and south is critical. We should use our influence to encourage our respective partners to work toward its speedy resumption.
- The Seoul Olympics will soon be upon us. It is in everybody's interest that it be a celebration, not a source of friction. We hope to see you there.

North Korean proposals for the Olympics (If Raised)

- The International Olympic Committee has made fair proposals for North Korean participation in the games. Pyongyang should accept these and plan to attend.

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TALKING POINTS: SOUTH ASIAN NUCLEAR PROLIFERATION

- We are very concerned that a nuclear arms race could develop between India and Pakistan. This would damage the worldwide nuclear nonproliferation system we both support, and would increase the risk of nuclear conflict.
- We hope the Soviet Union can work with us to encourage India and Pakistan to engage in serious discussion of steps to limit nuclear arms in South Asia. Pakistan has put forward several far-reaching proposals.
- In an effort to move this process along, I have written to Rajiv Gandhi, following up on our discussions when he was here. We have also been in touch with the Pakistanis.

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BY CN, NARA, DATE 3/10/06

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TALKING POINTS: BERLIN

- We both visited Berlin this year and saw for ourselves the cruel way the city is artificially divided in two.
- Let's work together to end this division. As a first step, I outlined in Berlin last June some modest ways to improve air travel to the city, promote exchanges, encourage sports events (including a future Olympics), and bring international meetings to Berlin.
- We along with the French and British will be sending your government a letter shortly, inviting you to send your Ambassador to East Germany to a four-power meeting in Berlin to discuss these ideas.
- I ask that you cooperate with us in this effort to improve the situation in Berlin.

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TALKING POINTS: EASTERN EUROPE (IF RAISED)

- I was pleased to hear Soviet spokesmen say that the Soviet Union is reevaluating the Czechoslovak reform of 1968 and would not again intervene militarily in Eastern Europe.
- The countries of this region suffer from problems similar to those you are grappling with in the Soviet Union.
- It is in the interest of both our countries that evolutionary change take place in Eastern Europe so that East-West crises are avoided.

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TALKING POINTS: COMPREHENSIVE SYSTEM OF INTERNATIONAL SECURITY
(IF RAISED)

- We have looked at your proposal carefully and have serious problems with it:
 - o First, it poses a direct challenge to the UN Charter;
 - o Second, it seems aimed at unnecessarily duplicating existing UN bureaucracies.
- We remain prepared to consider individual elements of the package in the appropriate UN bodies.
- We do welcome your recognition of the importance of the UN to international peace and security, and we stand ready to work together to make the current system function better.
- One way to strengthen the UN would be to extend increased support for existing UN efforts to end regional conflicts in Afghanistan, Iran-Iraq and southern Africa.

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CYPRUS (IF RAISED)

- Division of Cyprus regrettable, but solution must be worked out between two communities on the island.
- Both of us should lend greater support to UN Secretary General, who has been trying to mediate between two communities. International conference would only complicate problem.

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