

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEEVER

FROM:

MEL BRADLEY *mb*

SUBJECT:

"Why President Reagan Will Have to Help Blacks"

I thought you might wish to read the views expressed in the above captioned forthcoming article by columnist Tony Brown whose audience among blacks is quite substantial. The column in which this is to appear -- "Tony Brown's Comments" is syndicated in 154 newspapers across the country. In addition, his weekly public affairs program -- "Tony Brown's Journal" -- which appears on public television reaches an audience of 4.5 million persons.

Attachment

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lets discuss

Meeting w/ "om"
blacks 1st =
then more -
hear them out



Tony Brown's Comments

•NATIONALLY SYNDICATED COLUMN•

WHY REAGAN WILL HAVE TO HELP BLACKS

The conventional wisdom, expressed by a Black columnist, is that Reagan will punish Blacks for backing Mondale. What's wrong with that bit of conventional wisdom is that it overlooks the fact that the Black problem in America is Reagan's problem. Moreover, he is trapped by the success of his economic recovery and the historical challenge of his vision.

The fact that Blacks generally have not benefited from the recovery is clearly evident. Nearly 36 percent of all Blacks lived in poverty last year (1.3 million more than in 1980), the highest Black poverty rate since the recordkeeping started in 1966.

Black middle-class families, according to the report by a non-profit public policy group, like Blacks in poverty, now have a

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lower standard of living than they had in 1980. Black family income fell 5.3 percent. Nearly half of all Black children now live in poverty.

Help will not be forthcoming from the fact that the majority of Blacks voted for Walter Mondale, nor from Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young's assertion that Blacks who voted for Ronald Reagan are "cold-blooded Black millionaires who are probably going to hell," nor from Black Republicans who say that these statistics will go away if only enough Blacks will play the two-party game and join the GOP.

Instead, it will come from Ronald Reagan's political reality, the reality that he cannot preserve peace and prosperity for 90 percent of the population if an organized 10 percent or 30 million are left out. This reality will be fueled by Reagan's own need for a place in history as a president who was fair and could fulfill the promise of his vision.

But be mindful, Reagan's philosophy prohibits quotas or "work" jobs programs or social programs that can be perceived as

"reverse discrimination." George Gilder, author of Wealth and Power and a guru of "supply-side" economic theory, knows the new language and the new logic necessary to help Reagan solve his problem of Black poverty. And Gilder believes that racism creates an economic paralysis of caste which John Kennedy's civil rights bill relaxed somewhat in the 60s.

To continue his economic achievement, Gilder warned in The Washington Post, "Reagan must remember...to inspire the Black poor with a new sense of participation in the U.S. economy...."

Thinking out loud for Reagan, Gilder reminds us that President Kennedy ignited a short-lived economic boom, subsequently sabotaged by surtaxes for the Vietnam War and venture capital-gains tax hikes, ironically introduced by his brother Sen. Edward Kennedy, that dried up venture capital. Moreover, "the Reagan presidency is at last on the verge of consummating the promise of the Kennedy years."

Reagan's supply-side revival, Gilder says, is similar to Kennedy's and is led by high technology investment. Furthermore, he concludes

that this economic health, along with revenues that can be reaped from tax shelters and a simpler tax code, "will reduce the deficit steadily through a second term -- if the tax rates are cut again."

It is precisely because of this optimistic model that the lingering Black economic depression embarrasses the Reagan people.

"Although the White House persuasively rebuts the charges that poverty is increasing at a time of surging income," Gilder says, "it cannot dismiss the clear testimony of a continuing tragedy in the midst of even our most flourishing cities." The job benefits that have been created have "mostly missed the single-parent households of the ghetto...." And this is further exacerbated by an 80 percent illegitimacy rate in inner cities.

Gilder summarizes it all as "not a racial problem. It is a crisis of the welfare state." And although Reagan did not create it, "its solution has become a central test of his conservative approach to social issues," he concludes.

To do this, "Reagan in his second term must confront the crisis

of the urban family." The author who describes a successful capitalism in terms of faith -- in man, the future, the mutual benefits of trade and the providence of God -- adds that the re-elected Reagan "can leave a legacy to his followers (and party) greater and more enduring than Kennedy's."

The reality of Afro-Americans is that Ronald Reagan will be their President for the next four years and Reagan's reality is that the crisis of the Black community now becomes the central test of his presidency. While he rejects a socialized economy and the use of governmental bureaucracies as the chief source of jobs, he must find a way to help Blacks help themselves.

Reagan can only accomplish both goals by unleashing the tremendous energies of Black enterprise.

A consumer-led revolution by Blacks could create a recovery in the Black community by using economics as an unremitting agent of emancipation. An organized redistribution of the \$187 billion economic buying power of Blacks with one another would create a new expansion, new Black business and jobs and keep families together.

This consumer-led growth would also enlarge the revenues of both the public and private sectors and therefore stimulate the national economy while freeing Blacks from a disproportionate dependency on the Federal government. It is also a plan that fits into the supply-side model of the next four years and Reagan's vision of economic growth and progress.

And history will find a place for all of the architects.

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ADMINISTRATIVELY CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: JAMES W. CICCONI

SUBJECT: Civil Rights Policy

During the President's first term, a pattern emerged in the area of civil rights which has been disturbing, and which has continually led to problems. In short, it boils down to this: our Administration has not formulated a specific civil rights policy framework. Instead, our policy has been determined on a case-by-case basis by the Civil Rights Division, with little or no White House involvement.

Civil Rights Policy-Making

Over the past four years, with only occasional exceptions, major civil rights policy decisions have not been brought before the President prior to some executive branch action which either constrained his options, or rendered any discussion purely informational. The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy was created in the wake of controversy over Administration civil rights policies, and was designed as a forum for identifying such issues and bringing them before the President for policy decision. This was expected to involve the normal debate of opposing viewpoints and consideration of options that the Cabinet Council system has produced in most other policy areas. The President, hearing the different positions and options, would then decide.

Unfortunately, the CCLP has failed utterly in fulfilling this function.

In the absence of a White House system for setting Administration policy in the multitude of areas encompassing the term "civil rights," a vacuum has developed. This has understandably been filled by the Civil Rights Division, which has been, quite clearly, making such decisions in place of the White House. Policy decisions are reflected in speeches, amicus briefs, interventions, and positions in various lawsuits which not only reverse longstanding Justice Department policy, but, in many cases, defy legal precedent.

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The point here is not whether we ended up in a proper or ill-advised position on a particular issue. It is that the civil rights policy process (if it can be called that) is operating beyond White House control or Presidential involvement, and without any considered, coherent strategy except, perhaps, on the part of the Civil Rights Division.

Policy Consequences

Beyond the issues of busing and quotas, there is a good deal of confusion about what this Administration stands for. As an example, the President has often spoken in a supportive way about affirmative action, yet DOJ actions can, in many cases, be interpreted as opposing ~~any racial preferences~~. Similarly, the President has supported minority set-aside programs on the federal level (even going so far as to reject agency goals, and impose higher ones), at the same time his Justice Department is fighting them on the state and local level. The President seems to distinguish between "goals" and "quotas," while DOJ files briefs equating the two.

These are symptoms of ad hoc policy-making. It is confused because we are confused. It is often contradictory because we often contradict ourselves (Bob Jones is one example; our position on the Voting Rights Act is another).

Instead of identifying and focusing on specific policy objectives, we have repeatedly found ourselves skirmishing over issues that were not of our choosing, such as Grove City and Bob Jones. Ill-considered positions in court have led to unnecessary controversy which, even when we prevailed legally, required us to confront legislation worse than the situation we sought to correct.

In Congress, too, we sometimes "missed the ^{heat} train" because of unrealistic assessments of what could be achieved. For example, in early 1981, instead of supporting a straight extension of the Voting Rights Act, which would have been applauded, we sought significant changes which were unjustly portrayed as an attempt to "gut" the law. The resulting controversy allowed the civil rights lobby to "up the ante." Though we ultimately decided to support a straight extension, it was too late: the bill that reached the President contained provisions ^{far} worse than the original Act.

Yet, the most striking aspect of the situation is that, for all the political ~~not our civil rights achievements,~~ but, instead,

R → Thus, in a number of civil rights areas, we have found ourselves in battles, by virtue of DOJ decisions, which continue to have repercussions in Congress, in the courts, and in the political arena. damage sustained by the President, we have achieved very little of substance in such battles. In fact, our main achievements have been in those areas where the President's policy is clearest and least controversial: busing and "true" quota cases. Unfortunately, ~~though,~~ it is our often unsuccessful "rollback" actions in the civil rights area which have been more likely to stick in the public mind. This is particularly true with blacks, the media, and those who view themselves as sensitive to civil rights. From a policy standpoint, this has made even our initiatives (e.g. fair housing enforcement) suspect, and vulnerable to being "trumped" by the civil rights lobby. From a political standpoint, the damage is more severe, and perhaps not reversible for many years. In effect, we have incurred the enmity of 90% of America's blacks, and cemented them to the Democratic Party. To be sure, voting trends among blacks have not been promising for the GOP. However, we have squandered our opportunities by a perceived assault on the civil rights laws-- an "assault" that was not planned, but was instead stumbled into through a lack of White House attention, and a failure to assert our coordinative prerogatives.

Future Republican candidates may not be capable of carrying the South, as President Reagan did, while losing over 90% of ~~the~~ black voters. ⁱⁿ It is politically imperative that we cut into this bloc vote ~~over~~ the coming years, even if our efforts yield only several percentage points difference. ~~The main way this can be done is by~~ Thad Cochran and Strom Thurmond have both proven that such efforts, rooted in more sensitivity to civil rights concerns, can turn a close election into a safe one.

(underline) More important, though is that Republicans begin to identify what we are for in the area of civil rights, in addition to what we are against. Otherwise, we risk being viewed as reactionaries seeking to undermine civil rights, mostly in a sub rosa fashion. By and large, Americans are proud of the civil rights progress we have made in the thirty years since Brown. Republicans have every right to share in that pride-- Kennedy may have sent federal marshals to Birmingham, but Ike sent the National Guard to Little Rock. By appearing negative today, we belie our own Party's contribution to the decline of state-sanctioned racism in the U.S. In fact, the subliminal message is that we could envision rolling back the clock, if only because our actions, combined with a failure to articulate limits, raise questions about how far we would go.

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Civil Rights Policy in the Second Term

There are a number of steps that I would recommend be considered in a second term:

1. We should revitalize the Cabinet Council on Legal Policy so that it indeed serves as a forum for developing policy options in the area of civil rights. For such discussions, both the chairman of the Civil Rights Commission and the chairman of the EEOC should sit as members.

2. It should be clearly directed that policy questions (as distinct from enforcement actions or case filings where there is ample precedent) must be brought to CCLP for discussion. The Administration has tended to allow Justice more discretion than necessary in deciding civil rights policy because of our unwillingness to interfere with their decisions about what, or whether, to file in particular cases. Unless our policy is already clear (and in most cases, it has not been), the Cabinet Council and the President should decide what the policy is; Justice would then file in accord with that policy. Simply because DOJ has broad discretion in its judicial filings does not mean the White House must also abdicate policy decisions to them.

3. A policy statement on civil rights should be drafted and then debated not only within the White House, but among Party leaders. Frankly, some black academic thinkers like Thomas Sowell have done a far better job of articulating a conservative civil rights policy frame-work than this Administration has. We simply must define what we are for, as well as what we are against, and why. This would counter the irrational fears conjured up by our opponents, and may be the only way we can give blacks a reason for rallying to our Party. It would also provide the Justice Department with the type of central policy guidance that has been lacking in the civil rights area.

4. The President should ^{be} engaged directly. He should be at the center of discussions on what our policy is, and what we stand for in the area of civil rights. The President should also be exposed periodically, in small sessions, to the views of the black community. Too often in the past, the President has been surprised by outcry among blacks about his Administration's policies. Exposure to black viewpoints on such issues (including Republicans such as Bill Coleman and Ed Brooke) will give the President a direct understanding of how certain civil rights issues are viewed by the black community. ~~Since such views have largely been absent when civil rights policy is discussed with the President, it is important that they be available to him from other sources.~~

5. Legislative strategy on civil rights issues must be controlled by the White House. On a number of occasions, we have been insufficiently attentive to such issues in Congress, leaving them in DOJ's hands until they have passed beyond our power to control (e.g. the Voting Rights Act). In the past year, we have done better on several potentially volatile issues (insurance equity, comparable worth, Title IX/Grove City legislation) because we have asserted White House control at an early stage.

I will be happy to discuss these points further if you desire.

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Civil Rights Policy-Making

Over the past four years, with only occasional exceptions, major civil rights policy decisions have not been brought before the President prior to some executive branch action which either constrained his options, or rendered any discussion purely informational. The Cabinet Council on Legal Policy was created in the wake of controversy over Administration civil rights policies, and was designed as a forum for identifying such issues and bringing them before the President for policy decision. This was expected to involve the normal debate of opposing viewpoints and consideration of options that the Cabinet Council system has produced in most other policy areas. The President, hearing the different positions and options, would then decide. Unfortunately, the CCLP has failed utterly in fulfilling this function.

In the absence of a White House system for setting Administration policy in the multitude of areas encompassing the term "civil rights," a vacuum has developed. This has understandably been filled by ~~Brad Reynolds who~~ has been, quite clearly, making such decisions in place of the White House. Policy decisions are reflected in speeches, amicus briefs, interventions, and positions in various lawsuits which not only reverse longstanding Justice Department policy, but, in many cases, defy legal precedent.

To be sure, the Civil Rights Division cannot be faulted for these developments. There has indeed been a vacuum in the civil rights policy area which the White House has not moved to fill. Failing White House insistence that policy be decided here, the decisions in any policy area will, predictably, be made at the departmental level. The "vacuum" is more than a problem of systems, though:

the Civil Rights Division, which

it extends to the particulars of our policy itself. We have not fleshed out the President's philosophy in this area, and, after four years, are still left with only certain statements, expanded somewhat by last year's ABA speech (e.g. favoring affirmative action, against rigid quotas and busing). The Civil Rights Division has thus been free to interpret their preferred courses of action as being consistent with the President's philosophy, largely due to the absence of contrary Presidential pronouncements. This has given Reynolds' division a degree of policy leeway enjoyed by few, if any, comparable offices. In contrast, White House involvement has invariably been limited, ad hoc, and often after-the-fact. The White House usually receives information in one of the following ways:

- a. consultation limited to a few individuals in the White House or OMB who tend to be sympathetic with the Civil Rights Division's position;
- b. limited information provided to either the Counsel's Office or Cabinet Affairs, often at the last minute; or
- c. particular White House staffers will hear of an issue "through the grapevine," and will request more detailed information from Justice.

Since the necessary information reaches the White House senior staff either right before, or right after a particular action is taken by DOJ, options are constrained accordingly. Meetings are set up to brief appropriate White House officials and to answer questions. However, the White House options are usually limited:

- a. Justice is given tacit approval to proceed, usually when a position has already been filed (the Dade County example);
- b. the Justice position is modified in some way so as to satisfy significant White House concerns, while remaining consistent with the overall DOJ thesis (the Grove City example); or
- c. the Justice position remains intact, though a different, and more politically palatable rationale for the stance is presented (the Bob Jones example).

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IP

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Thus, in a number of ^{civil rights} areas, we have found ourselves in battles ~~which~~ by virtue of DOJ decisions, which continue ^{in congress, in the courts, and} to have ~~legal~~, ~~political~~, and ~~legislative~~ repercussions. Yet the most striking aspect of the situation is that, for all the ~~political~~ ~~capital~~ damage sustained by the President, we have achieved ~~almost~~ ~~nothing~~ ^{very little} of substance ^{in such battles.} In fact, our

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and least controversial:
Unfortunately, though, it is our often unsuccessful ...

6:30 / 7:15 /

Tax plan to FSD

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

November 15, 1984

✓ JAB
in the
reading
file
FBI

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM BAKER

FROM: MEL BRADLEY *mb*

SUBJECT: "Why President Reagan Will Have to Help Blacks"

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• **NATIONALLY SYNDICATED COLUMN** •

WHY REAGAN WILL HAVE TO HELP BLACKS

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The fact that Blacks generally have not benefited from the recovery is clearly evident. Nearly 36 percent of all Blacks lived in poverty last year (1.3 million more than in 1980), the highest Black poverty rate since the recordkeeping started in 1967.

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Help will not be forthcoming from the fact that the majority of Blacks voted for Walter Mondale, nor from Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young's assertion that Blacks who voted for Ronald Reagan are "cold-blooded Black millionaires who are probably going to hell," nor from Black Republicans who say that these statistics will go away if only enough Blacks will play the two-party game and join the GOP.

Instead, it will come from Ronald Reagan's political reality, the reality that he cannot preserve peace and prosperity for 90 percent of the population if an organized 10 percent or 30 million are left out. This reality will be fueled by Reagan's own need for a place in history as a president who was fair and could fulfill the promise of his vision.

But be mindful, Reagan's philosophy prohibits quotas or "make-work" jobs programs or social programs that can be perceived as

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It is precisely because of this optimistic model that the lingering Black economic depression embarrasses the Reagan people.

"Although the White House persuasively rebuts the charges that poverty is increasing at a time of surging income," Gilder says, "it cannot dismiss the clear testimony of a continuing tragedy in the midst of even our most flourishing cities." The job benefits that have been created have "mostly missed the single-parent households of the ghetto...." And this is further exacerbated by an 80 percent illegitimacy rate in inner cities.

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To do this, "Reagan in his second term must confront the crisis

of the urban family." The author who describes a successful capitalism in terms of faith -- in man, the future, the mutual benefits of trade and the providence of God -- adds that the re-elected Reagan "can leave a legacy to his followers (and party) greater and more enduring than Kennedy's."

The reality of Afro-Americans is that Ronald Reagan will be their President for the next four years and Reagan's reality is that the crisis of the Black community now becomes the central test of his presidency. While he rejects a socialized economy and the use of governmental bureaucracies as the chief source of jobs, he must find a way to help Blacks help themselves.

Reagan can only accomplish both goals by unleashing the tremendous energies of Black enterprise.

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Please consult listing.

Mr. James Baker K WST

Jim,

If you missed this, it's worth reading. Clearly a lot of good can be achieved in the next four years.

So glad to hear you are staying on. Congratulations on a terrific four years and second successful campaign.

Warmest regards,

Prescott S. Bush, Jr.

There is an element of truth here but also some gross distortion. Poor blacks certainly have a need for the social safety net, as do poor people of any race, but we doubt that many truly aspire to welfare state dependency. Moreover, polls indicate that blacks support many of the president's positions—on school prayer, abortion, busing and school vouchers, among others. The visceral and passionate distaste among blacks results not so much from policies, we suspect, as from a perception that Mr. Reagan is unconcerned about their feelings.

What brought about that alienation? Well, for one thing, some of the nation's most vocal black leaders developed a strong economic and political stake in the Carter administration's anti-poverty and inner-city programs. They proclaimed in 1980 that Mr. Reagan's election would be the worst thing for blacks since slavery. Many of these same leaders told blacks they would realize "real power" by voting Democratic en masse this year. And indeed, the Rev. Jesse Jackson is now proclaiming that blacks have become the backbone of the Democratic Party.

Mr. Reagan can't be blamed for this, but he and his advisers can be

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There could be greater efforts to win black support for such programs as enterprise zones, which would provide impetus for business development and job creation in depressed urban areas; a new homestead act to give public-housing tenants an ownership stake; a subminimum wage for teen-agers, which would make employment of unskilled black teen-agers more feasible for employers; and tuition tax credits, which might help some needy blacks to extract themselves from any public schools that have become substandard. The president might be surprised at the response. The National Conference of Black Mayors, for example, recently announced its support of a subminimum wage for teen-agers.

Mr. Reagan may have some distaste for bloc-vote politics. We sympathize. Working toward national colorblindness is a worthy aim. But we aren't there yet, black voters will be quick to respond. By speaking directly

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We need

to think

about

following

this

again.

P.S. Bush, Jr.

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Blacks vs. Reagan

Black voters, if you believe the exit polls, expended 90% of their presidential ballots on Walter Mondale, exceeding all other voting blocs that displayed any antipathy toward Ronald Reagan. In hardheaded political terms, that could be interpreted to mean the Reagan camp is relieved of any debts to blacks. The nasty thought may even have flitted across some Republican minds that black opposition actually helped them with whites in the South and industrial North.

Let's hope such ideas don't gain currency. If Mr. Reagan wants to be the president of all the people, further the long-term interests of his party and foster social progress, he should be asking how his party can recapture a respectable share of the black vote. It need not be hard.

Popular opinion has it that blacks are hostile to Mr. Reagan because his policies have grievously hurt them. They are angry, the story goes, because he has cut programs vital to their sustenance, demonstrated an indifference to legislation of symbolic importance to them (like the Martin Luther King holiday bill), and brought about an economic expansion at their expense, leaving them hopelessly mired in poverty.

There is an element of truth here but also some gross distortion. Poor blacks certainly have a need for the social safety net, as do poor people of any race, but we doubt that many truly aspire to welfare state dependency. Moreover, polls indicate that blacks support many of the president's positions—on school prayer, abortion, busing and school vouchers, among others. The visceral and passionate distaste among blacks results not so much from policies, we suspect, as from a perception that Mr. Reagan is unconcerned about their feelings.

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could have made some difference in campaigns for other offices, particularly those House seats that the Reagan administration needed so badly and didn't win. If the president had taken his case directly to the black populace, explaining how he held many of the same fundamentally conservative values they held, and how much they had to gain by working with his administration to solve their problems, we have little doubt that he would have won more black votes.

History shows that blacks are willing to embrace Republican presidents who, without patronizing, make them feel that their interests are being considered. President Nixon managed to win approval of 30% of blacks, and President Eisenhower 63%. Neither of those Republican presidents did any more for blacks than Mr. Reagan has. They were just perceived by blacks to be more caring.

The first thing Mr. Reagan should do is express some concern about black alienation. He should spend less time in his second term answering partisan charges that his policies are unfair to blacks, and more time highlighting his many policies and initiatives that will meet long-term black needs. Liberals have managed to convince blacks that they live in what amounts to a zero-sum society where they can hope to prosper only if the "American pie" is redivided. The supply-side expansion of the past two years exploded the zero-sum notion and should give blacks hope that, indeed, the pie can be made larger.

There could be greater efforts to win black support for such programs as enterprise zones, which would provide impetus for business development and job creation in depressed urban areas; a new homestead act to give public-housing tenants an ownership stake; a subminimum wage for teen-agers, which would make employment of unskilled black teen-agers more feasible for employers; and tuition tax credits, which might help some needy blacks to extract themselves from any public schools that have become substandard. The president might be surprised at the response. The National Conference of Black Mayors, for example, recently announced its support of a subminimum wage for teen-agers.

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