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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

LATE ADDITIONS TO AGENDA

1. Linda Gosdin and Paul Manafort debate plans (detailed) Per Atwater Stu prefers to discuss with you alone.
2. Materials - organization - Per Atwater he and Rollins will discuss with you tomorrow.
3. Voter registration
4. Money left over from the primary if any - what's been done with it ?

MDT

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III ✓
MICHAEL K. DEEVER
DAVID A. STOCKMAN
RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: MARGARET TUTWILER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED AGENDA



Please find attached the agenda for the meeting today at
3:00 p.m. in Mr. Baker's office.

Thank you.

CSG AGENDA -- 9/27/84

- ✓ (1) Old Business
- ✓ (2) Poll data: what problems showing/where?
- ✓ (3) Themes
 - youth (revisited)
 - catch phrases (revisited)

✓ (4) Get-out-the-vote plans/activities] *Fact why voter register.
What's to be done w/ Bowling Green?*

✓ (5) Tone/content of Oct. 1 speech

(6) Contributions for debates -- wanted:

- suggested RR "zingers"
- suggested RR closing material
- comments re RR tactical approach
- notes re RR pitfalls

✓ (7) Press guidance re debates
(Speakes and Lake join at approx. 4:15)

8. 1.8 million left over

REAGAN-BUSH'84

The President's Authorized Campaign Committee


'84 SEP 27 P7:54

Ed Rollins

September 27, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO MARGARET TUTWILER

FROM: MICHELE DAVIS *md*
DATE: SEPTEMBER 27, 1984
RE: INTERESTING FACTS



Some interesting reading...

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

9/11



TO: JIM CICCONI

For your information.

MOT

To: JAB III
You may want to look
at this. Thanks
JT 9/13


MARGARET D. TUTWILER
Office of James A. Baker III
456-6797

REAGAN-BUSH'84

The President's Authorized Campaign Committee

'84 SEP 11 A8:10

MEMORANDUM FOR MARGARET TUTWILER

FROM: LEE ATWATER 
RE: South Texas
DATE: September 8, 1984

You may wish to pass the attached report on South Texas to Jim Cicconi. This is a follow-up to our previous correspondence on this subject.

SCHEDULE B

ITEMIZED DISBURSEMENTS

ANY INFORMATION COPIED FROM SUCH REPORTS OR STATEMENTS MAY NOT BE SOLD OR USED BY ANY PERSON FOR THE PURPOSE OF SOLICITING CONTRIBUTIONS OR FOR COMMERCIAL PURPOSES, OTHER THAN USING THE NAME AND ADDRESS OF ANY POLITICAL COMMITTEE TO SOLICIT CONTRIBUTIONS FROM SUCH COMMITTEE.

NAME OF COMMITTEE: NATIONAL REPUBLICAN CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEE EXPENDITURES

A. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
CATHERINE WHITAKER 916 E CAPITOL STREET WASHINGTON DC 20003 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	SALARY	1/06/84	\$308.53
	SALARY	1/20/84	\$553.38

B. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
WILAND AND ASSOC. INC P.O. BOX 5445 1101 INTERNATIONAL PARKW FREDERICKSBURG VA 22403 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	COMPUTER SERV.	1/16/84	\$2876.68
	COMPUTER SERV.	1/26/84	\$2912.47
	COMPUTER SERV.	1/26/84	\$3851.72
	COMPUTER SERV.	1/26/84	\$1566.48

C. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
KARL WILLIAMS 9511 GREENCASTLE LANE LORTON VA 22079 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	SALARY	1/06/84	\$348.53
	SALARY	1/20/84	\$629.11


D. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
GREGORY E. WILLIAMS 1420 N ST NW. #907 WASHINGTON DC 20005 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	SALARY	1/06/84	\$243.40
	SALARY	1/20/84	\$445.70

E. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
DAVID H. WINSTON 2717 36TH PLACE NW WASHINGTON DC 20007 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	SALARY	1/06/84	\$516.97
	TRAVEL EXPENSE	1/16/84	\$45.00
	SALARY	1/20/84	\$885.25

F. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
WOODWARD & LOTHROP DEPARTMENT 884 1127 FIRST ST., N.E. WASHINGTON DC 20013 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	PRINTING	1/16/84	\$3435.00

G. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
WRIGHT PATMAN CREDIT UNI LONGWORTH HOB WASHINGTON DC DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	SUPPLIES	1/06/84	\$1647.02

H. FULL NAME & ADDRESS:	PURPOSE OF DISBURSEMENT:	DATE	AMOUNT
WYATT STEWART & ASSOC INC 320 A ST. SE WASHINGTON, DC 20003 DISBURSEMENT FOR: N/A	PROF SERVICES	1/16/84	\$21941.48
	PROF SERVICES	1/18/84	\$5000.00
	PROF SERVICES	1/18/84	\$5500.00



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
FLASH RESULTS
NATIONAL TRACKING
Reagan-Bush '84
September 19-25, 1984

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The following tables contain the aggregate results for questions asked of the American public on behalf of the Reagan-Bush '84 Campaign on the dates indicated below.

Universe:	Adult Americans (persons aged 17 and older)
Mode of Interview:	Telephone
Date(s) of Interviews:	September 19-25, 1984
Sample Size:	1,750
Confidence Interval:	<u>±</u> 2.3 in 95 out of 100 cases



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6803 Poplar Place, Suite 300, McLean, Virginia 22101, (703) 556-0001

TO: James A. Baker III
Michael K. Deaver
Ed Rollins
Stuart Spencer

FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin

DATE: September 27, 1984

SUBJECT: National Tracking--September 18-25

SUMMARY

The following is a brief summary of key findings from the national tracking during the week of September 18-25.

- o When asked "What is the first thing that comes to mind when you think about Walter Mondale," 53% of Americans mention something negative while only 28% mention something positive--a 2:1 negative ratio. In contrast, top-of-mind mentions about Ronald Reagan are positive for 49% of Americans, compared to 39% who mention something negative.
- o Despite a flurry of publicity (including Mondale's efforts to attack Reagan over the incident), and a temporary 3-point rise in the number of people mentioning the Middle East as the number one problem, the recent bombing of the U.S. embassy in Beirut does not seem to have become a major Reagan liability. The President's approval rating in handling the situation in Lebanon over the last week has improved.
- o Mondale's and Ferraro's attacks seem to become more shrill with the release of each new poll. Nevertheless, the President remains popular and leads Mondale by 20 points. First-time presidential voters, approximately 12% of the electorate, are voting 2:1 for Reagan (62% Reagan-32% Mondale). We must get them out on election day.

- o Mondale may be attempting to halt the erosion of his base by suggesting that Reagan's references to Roosevelt, Truman, and Kennedy are inappropriate. His concerns are justified. The only group now firmly in his camp are Blacks. However, even among Blacks, the President garners a surprising 16% of their vote--fifty percent above the campaign target of 10%. Over the past weeks we have lost support among older voters (down 9%) and Southern White Baptists. The erosion of the former coalition is a consequence of the Mondale/Ferraro ads and attack speeches, and the latter was likely induced by the fade of Jesse Jackson.
- o Of the various issues tested, the President remains most vulnerable on the following: fairness, social security, education, and starting an unnecessary war. He retains a slight relative advantage over Mondale on the issue of negotiating a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union.
- o We will not be able to assess accurately the full impact of the President's U.N. speech or the Gromyko talks for another few days.

MOOD

Opinion over the past two weeks has been extremely stable. The number of Americans who think the country is moving in the right direction has remained steady at 54% compared to 37% who think it has gotten off on the wrong track.

This optimism remains broad-based, dipping only among the "have-nots," i.e., the less affluent, the less well-educated, blacks, and older Americans over age 55. Fifty-seven percent (57%) of Americans feel they are personally better off now than they were four years ago while one-quarter (25%) say they are worse off. Another 21% feel things are about the same for them. This includes 41% of blacks who say they are personally better off.

Realizing that Americans do feel they are better off, Mondale is now trying to portray the election as a referendum on the kind of people Americans are. His suggestion is that--in contrast to a majority of Americans--Reagan does not care about those for whom the economic recovery is not a reality. In this way, Mondale combines the questions of fairness and the future when he asks Americans to ask themselves "Will you be better off four years from now?"

Number One National Problem

The major concerns remain the foreign affairs/defense issue cluster (27%--up this week because of the Beirut bombing); other economic issues (16%); domestic/social issues (12%); and unemployment (12%--the lowest this indicator has been since before January 1982).

Deficits are mentioned by seven percent of adult Americans, primarily those who are better educated and more affluent. Of these, men (11%) consider deficits more important than do women (4%). Interestingly, the President's general popularity among men may offset the heightened concern men express over federal deficits; while men are concerned about deficits, they do not like Mondale. This phenomenon may further contribute to Mondale's inability to make deficits a major campaign issue.

Specifically, overwhelming numbers of Americans (69%) continue to favor Reagan's approach to handling the federal deficits.

REAGAN JOB RATINGS

General

Over the past week, the number of Americans approving of the way Reagan is handling his job as President increased four points--to 66%. Thirty-three percent (33%) strongly approve while only 18% strongly disapprove of the way Reagan is handling the presidency.

The Economy

Approval of the President's handling of the economy has risen three points to 61% approving and 36% disapproving. Even 51% of those earning less than \$15,000 a year approve.

Foreign Affairs

A stable majority (51%) of Americans approve of Reagan's handling of foreign affairs while 40% disapprove. Despite Mondale's best efforts, the stability of opinion about the President's handling of foreign affairs suggests that the fallout, if any, from the embassy bombing is minimal.

IMAGES

Top of Mind--Reagan

Among those who give favorable responses, frequent mentions include: strong leader (11%), honest and sincere (9%), doing a good job (8%), and his stand on the economy (6%). On the other hand, negative mentions include: favors the rich (7%), not honest (4%), doesn't represent the people (3%), and his age (3%).

Top of Mind--Mondale

Those mentioning a Mondale negative out-number those who mention a positive by a 2:1 ratio, Mondale's negatives include: not qualified/capable (12%), boring/old ideas (5%), poor vice president (4%), not honest/sincere (4%), appearance/personality (4%), indecisive/not strong (3%), and overpromising (3%). Mondale's positives include: cares for the people (7%), honest/sincere (7%), will do a good job (4%), and qualified/capable (3%).

Descriptors

Americans continue to believe that "cares and is concerned about people" is a better descriptor of Walter Mondale (44%) than it is of Ronald Reagan (39%). Public polls, and apparently Mondale's private polls, confirm this. Consequently, Mondale continues--through personal appearances, Ferraro, and commercials--to hammer the President on this issue in an effort to tie the issues of fairness and future together.

Although Mondale couches many of his attacks in terms of Reagan's failed leadership, Americans simply do not find his argument credible. Reagan continues to dominate the leadership dimension.

<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Mondale</u>	<u>Difference</u>
(%)	(%)	(%)

Leadership

Effective in getting things done	64	23	+41
Has the strong leadership qualities this country needs	64	24	+40
Will deal with the problems of the future effectively and boldly	56	31	+25
Trustworthy	46	31	+15

	<u>Reagan</u> (%)	<u>Mondale</u> (%)	<u>Difference</u> (%)
<u>Economic Issues</u>			
Will control inflation	59	27	+32
Will reduce the federal deficit by raising taxes	26	54	+28
Will reduce unemployment	51	34	+17
Will cut spending and reduce government waste	47	34	+13
<u>Social Issues</u>			
Will improve education	41	41	0
Will best handle the social security program	37	46	-9
<u>War and Peace</u>			
Will negotiate a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union	42	35	+7
Will start an unnecessary war	42	18	-24

Thermometers

The relative ranking of the Presidential and Vice Presidential candidates remains unchanged in terms of thermometer ratings: on a scale of 0 to 100, Ronald Reagan's average thermometer is 61; George Bush's, 56; Walter Mondale's, 50; and Geraldine Ferraro's, 49. Among women in general, Ferraro's thermometer rating is 51; it is 53 among women under 45 years of age. Catholics give Ferraro the same thermometer rating as the rest of the country.

NOVEMBER OUTLOOK

Reelect Reagan

A slightly higher number of Americans (58%) than last week think that Reagan has performed his job well enough to deserve reelection. Thirty-eight percent (38%) think a new person deserves a chance to do better. An overwhelming 92% of those who think he deserves reelection say they would vote for him.

With the exception of Jews (43%) and senior citizens (49%), a majority of all our key constituencies think the President deserves reelection.

Ballot

We are in the last week of September with the President maintaining a commanding 20-point lead. He garners 56% of the vote to Mondale's 36%.

Reagan continues to make inroads into Mondale's base vote--winning 39% of the conservative Democratic vote, 47% of conservative white Democrats (28% of the total Democratic vote), 55% of Independent/Leaners, and a majority (54%) of the women's vote.

Sixty-nine percent (69%) of Reagan voters are strongly committed, in contrast to the 55% of Mondale's vote which is strongly committed.

Analysts: Todd D. Remington
Gerrit W. Gong


Right Direction/Wrong Track

=====

"Generally speaking, would you say that things in this country are going in the right direction, or have they pretty seriously gotten off on the wrong track?"

	<u>Aug 28 Sep 4 1984</u>	<u>Sept 5-11 1984</u>	<u>Sept 12-18 1984</u>	<u>Sept 19-25 1984</u>
Right direction	54	55	53	54
Wrong track	40	38	39	37
No opinion	6	7	8	9

Right Direction/Wrong Track September 1 - 25, 1984




Better Off/Worse Off

=====

"How about you personally? Generally speaking, are you better or worse off now than you were four years ago?"

	<u>Aug 28</u> <u>Sep 4</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>5-11</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>12-18</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>19-25</u> <u>1984</u>
Better off	56	57	57	57
Worse off	25	23	24	24
Same	18	20	19	19
No opinion	1	0	0	0

Better or Worse Off September 1 - 25, 1984




Number One National Problem

=====
 "What would you say is the single most important problem facing the United States today, that is, the one that you, yourself, are most concerned about?"

	<u>Aug 28 Sep 4 1984</u>	<u>Sept 5-11 1984</u>	<u>Sept 12-18 1984</u>	<u>Sept 19-25 1984</u>
Unemployment	14	14	15	12
Inflation	4	5	6	5
Deficits	7	7	7	7
Economy/Other	18	15	17	16
Domestic/Social	5	9	11	12
Crime/Drugs/Morals	7	7	4	4
Foreign affairs/Defense	24	26	24	27
Government leadership	4	3	3	2
No problems/No opinion	4	3	5	4

Most Important Problem September 1 - 25, 1984




Reagan Job Rating -- General

=====

"Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President?"

	<u>Aug 28 Sep 4 1984</u>	<u>Sept 5-11 1984</u>	<u>Sept 12-18 1984</u>	<u>Sept 19-25 1984</u>
Approve	61	64	62	66
Disapprove	37	34	36	31
No opinion	2	2	2	3

Reagan Job Approval September 1 - 25, 1984



Reagan Job Rating -- General
(Approve)

=====

*Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling his job as President? Would that be strongly (approve/disapprove) or just somewhat (approve/disapprove)?"


	Aug 28 Sep 4 1984	Sept 5-11 1984	Sept 12-18 1984	Sept 19-25 1984
Aggregate	61	64	62	66
<u>Strength Constituencies</u>				
Base Republicans	92	92	93	93
Farm Belt States	63	73	60	64
<u>Swing Constituencies</u>				
Blue-collar workers	62	65	59	63
Senior citizens	56	63	59	57
Women	56	59	61	66
Catholics	65	67	67	71
Independents/Leaners	67	68	65	69
18-24 year olds	65	69	69	74
Professionals	63	64	65	72
Veterans	64	69	65	65
Irish	69	73	74	68
White Southern Baptists	57	62	60	61

Reagan Job Rating -- Economy

=====
"Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling the economy?"

	<u>Aug 28 Sep 4 1984</u>	<u>Sept 5-11 1984</u>	<u>Sept 12-18 1984</u>	<u>Sept 19-25 1984</u>
Approve	57	59	58	61
Disapprove	41	39	39	36
No opinion	2	2	3	3

Reagan Economic Approval September 1 - 25, 1984




Reagan Job Rating -- Foreign Affairs

=====
"Do you approve or disapprove of the way Ronald Reagan is handling foreign affairs?"

	<u>Aug 28</u> <u>Sep 4</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>5-11</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>12-18</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>19-25</u> <u>1984</u>
Approve	48	50	51	51
Disapprove	46	41	42	40
No opinion	6	9	8	9

Reagan Foreign Approval September 1 - 25, 1984



Presidential Characteristics

=====
 "Now I'd like you to think of two people running for President of the United States, Ronald Reagan and Walter Mondale. I will read you some statements. For each one, please tell me whether it best describes Ronald Reagan or Walter Mondale?"

	<u>Aug 28</u> <u>Sep 4</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>5-11</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>12-18</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>19-25</u> <u>1984</u>
Cares and is concerned about people				
Ronald Reagan	41	43	40	39
Walter Mondale	43	40	43	44
Both	8	9	10	11
Neither	4	4	4	4
No opinion	3	4	3	3
Will start an unnecessary war				
Ronald Reagan	46	43	45	42
Walter Mondale	16	18	18	18
Both	2	2	2	2
Neither	26	28	27	30
No opinion	10	9	8	7
Effective in getting things done				
Ronald Reagan	67	67	64	64
Walter Mondale	20	19	22	23
Both	2	2	2	3
Neither	4	4	4	4
No opinion	8	8	7	6
Trustworthy				
Ronald Reagan	41	41	43	46
Walter Mondale	31	30	32	31
Both	13	15	13	13
Neither	10	8	8	7
No opinion	5	5	5	4

Presidential Characteristics
(continued)

=====

	<u>Aug 28</u> <u>Sep 4</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>5-11</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>12-18</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>19-25</u> <u>1984</u>
Will deal with the problems of the future effectively and boldly				
Ronald Reagan	52	54	54	56
Walter Mondale	32	30	32	31
Both	4	4	4	4
Neither	7	6	6	5
No opinion	5	6	4	4
Has the strong leadership qualities this country needs				
Ronald Reagan	58	62	60	64
Walter Mondale	25	24	25	24
Both	4	4	4	2
Neither	7	6	8	7
No opinion	5	4	3	3
Will be most likely to reduce the federal deficit over the next four years				
Ronald Reagan	43	44	43	45
Walter Mondale	34	33	40	38
Both	1	1	1	1
Neither	16	17	12	11
No opinion	6	6	5	4
Will negotiate a meaningful arms control agreement with the Soviet Union				
Ronald Reagan	*	*	*	42
Walter Mondale	*	*	*	35
Both	*	*	*	5
Neither	*	*	*	11
No opinion	*	*	*	7

Presidential Characteristics
(continued)

=====

	Sept 19-25 <u>1984</u>
Will cut spending and reduce government waste	
Ronald Reagan	47
Walter Mondale	34
Both	2
Neither	11
No opinion	5
Will reduce the federal deficit by raising taxes	
Ronald Reagan	26
Walter Mondale	54
Both	10
Neither	4
No opinion	5
Will best handle the social security program	
Ronald Reagan	37
Walter Mondale	46
Both	2
Neither	7
No opinion	7
Will improve education	
Ronald Reagan	41
Walter Mondale	41
Both	6
Neither	5
No opinion	7

Presidential Characteristics
(continued)

=====

Sept
19-25
1984


Will reduce unemployment

Ronald Reagan	51
Walter Mondale	34
Both	3
Neither	6
No opinion	5


Will control inflation

Ronald Reagan	59
Walter Mondale	27
Both	2
Neither	7
No opinion	5

Margin Scores: Reagan - Mondale September 1 - 25, 1984



Margin Scores: Reagan — Mondale September 1 — 25, 1984



Taxes and the Deficit

=====

"Walter Mondale says that taxes must be raised in order to reduce the deficit.

Ronald Reagan says that the federal deficit can be reduced without raising taxes by stimulating the economy and cutting federal spending.

Do you favor the Reagan or the Mondale position?"


	Sept 12-18 <u>1984</u>	Sept 19-25 <u>1984</u>
Strongly favor Reagan	47	49
Somewhat favor Reagan	20	20
Somewhat favor Mondale	13	11
Strongly favor Mondale	17	14
No opinion	3	6

Reelect Reagan

=====
 "Thinking ahead to the November presidential election ... do you think Ronald Reagan has performed well enough as President to deserve reelection, or do you think it will be time to give a new person the chance to do better?"

	Aug 28 Sep 4 <u>1984</u>	Sept 5-11 <u>1984</u>	Sept 12-18 <u>1984</u>	Sept 19-25 <u>1984</u>
Aggregate	55/42	57/38	56/39	58/38
<u>Strength Constituencies</u>				
Base Republicans	92/7	91/7	93/5	92/6
Farm Belt States	59/38	64/29	57/40	54/42
<u>Swing Constituencies</u>				
Blue-collar workers	53/43	52/42	54/43	56/40
Senior citizens	53/43	56/37	53/41	49/43
Women	50/47	51/43	53/43	56/39
Catholics	57/39	57/38	61/35	62/35
Independents/Leaners	59/37	60/33	60/35	60/34
18-24 year olds	54/43	58/39	61/38	65/32
Professionals	55/42	58/38	58/38	63/33
Veterans	60/35	65/29	60/35	60/36
Irish	63/33	64/31	65/30	65/30
White Southern Baptists	46/48	52/44	49/45	57/39

Reagan Reelect September 1 – 25, 1984




Presidential Ballot -- Reagan/Bush versus Mondale Ferraro

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
"If the general election for President were held today, for whom would you vote, Ronald Reagan and George Bush, Republicans, or Walter Mondale and Geraldine Ferraro, Democrats?"

	<u>Aug 28</u> <u>Sep 4</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>5-11</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>12-18</u> <u>1984</u>	<u>Sept</u> <u>19-25</u> <u>1984</u>
Aggregate	53/38	55/36	55/36	56/36
<u>Strength Constituencies</u>				
Base Republicans	93/5	92/4	94/4	93/5
Farm Belt States	56/33	61/29	52/40	51/39
<u>Swing Constituencies</u>				
Blue-collar workers	53/39	51/39	55/38	54/38
Senior citizens	50/37	55/38	53/37	45/44
Women	47/42	49/41	52/38	54/38
Catholics	54/35	54/35	57/32	59/35
Independents/Leaners	58/27	58/29	57/30	61/30
18-24 year olds	52/41	55/35	56/37	63/32
Professionals	54/36	54/37	57/36	61/33
Veterans	60/30	63/29	61/30	58/34
Irish	59/31	61/28	65/29	62/31
White Southern Baptists	46/45	51/44	49/43	55/40


National Reagan — Mondale Ballot September 1 — 25, 1984



National Reagan - Mondale Ballot August 25 - September 27, 1984



Reagan Ballot Percentage As of September 27, 1984




RB84 PINS

Reagan Margin Percentage Over Mondale
As of September 27, 1984



RR %
Margin



Commitment to Presidential Choice

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
"How strongly are you committed to your choice for President?"

	Aug 28 Sep 4 1984	Sept 5-11 1984	Sept 12-18 1984	Sept 19-25 1984
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Reagan versus Mondale

Reagan/Very strong	37	37	38	39
Reagan/Somewhat strong	13	14	13	14
Reagan/Not strong	4	3	4	4
Undecided	8	8	8	6
Mondale/Not strong	3	4	3	3
Mondale/Somewhat strong	13	12	12	13
Mondale/Very strong	21	20	20	20

Bush — Ferraro Thermometer September 6 — 25, 1984



REAGAN-BUSH '84

The President's Authorized Campaign Committee

VOTER PROGRAMS

PHONE BANK I.D. PROGRAM

AS OF 9/23/84

TOTAL NUMBER OF PHONE BANK CALLS COMPLETED 403,499

<u>State</u>	<u>Completed Calls*</u>	<u>Reagan Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Mondale Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Undecided Number</u>	<u>%</u>
Alabama							
Arizona							
Arkansas	85,469	35,374	57.7	14,494	23.6	11,422	18.7
California							
Colorado	3,349	1,277	50.9	703	28.0	528	21.1
Connecticut							
Delaware							
Florida	41,444	12,548	43.0	10,037	34.4	6,570	22.6
Georgia	50,250	22,259	63.2	8,220	23.4	4,708	13.4
Illinois	62,822	22,961	46.0	14,174	28.4	12,749	25.6
Iowa	21,538	7,837	51.1	3,553	23.2	3,935	25.7
Kentucky							
Louisiana							
Maine							
Michigan							
Mississippi	33,490	18,066	61.9	6,269	21.5	4,857	16.6
Missouri							
New Jersey	22,562	7,960	48.9	3,793	23.3	4,527	27.8

*Total includes Refusals

<u>State</u>	<u>Completed Calls*</u>	<u>Reagan</u>		<u>Mondale</u>		<u>Undecided</u>	
		<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>	<u>Number</u>	<u>%</u>
New Mexico							
North Carolina							
Ohio	62,341	24,101	54.8	10,591	24.1	9,286	21.1
Oregon	20,234	9,261	50.4	6,385	34.8	2,711	14.8
South Carolina							
Tennessee							
Texas							
Vermont							
Virginia							
Washington							



Stu. FYI
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Mondale's Campaign Team: Can It Do the Job?

Early this year it was hailed as the best campaign team in the 1984 primary race, a deftly organized crew of political professionals with the know-how to pull off a national presidential campaign.

But in head-to-head combat with the Republican incumbent president, Walter F. Mondale's highly acclaimed campaign staff has faced some harsher judgments.

Critics have found Mondale's advisers insulated, overly cautious and mistake-prone, although few will say so publicly. One avowed Mondale supporter who did, Atlanta Mayor Andrew Young, derided the campaign staff as "a bunch of smart-assed white boys who think they know it all."

The outcome of the Nov. 6 election may ultimately determine whether Walter Mondale's campaign advisers were up to the job this year. But, as former Democratic Party Chairman John C. White observed, no matter how skillful the players behind the scenes, "the campaign is going to rise and fall on Mondale himself."

It is his staff, though, who will shape the public image of Mondale between now and Nov. 6. And if Mondale defies the polls and wins the election, it is likely these same men and women will move with him into White House offices.

Like most presidential candidates, Mondale surrounds himself with a group of longtime, trusted associates, most of whom have linked their own careers to Mondale's. They include campaign chairman James A. Johnson, treasurer Michael Berman, senior adviser John R. Reilly and press secretary Maxine Isaacs. The one newcomer in the inner circle is campaign manager Robert G. Beckel, once an aide to President Jimmy Carter.

In their personal loyalty, Mondale's crew resembles Ronald Reagan's "California mafia" and Carter's devoted group of Georgians, men who managed their candidate's climb to the presidency and then followed him to Washington.

—By Diane Granat

Beyond Inner Circle, Organization Is Loose

While Johnson, Berman, Beckel, Isaacs and Reilly form a tight circle around Mondale, the organization below them is not clearly defined. The press office said it was unable to supply an official list of who holds what job, and the campaign shuns the idea of a management flow chart.

In addition to the tactical team at the top, Mondale draws advice from a large pool of policy experts, many of them veterans of the Carter White House, with a few who served in the administrations of John F. Kennedy and Lyndon B. Johnson. Among the most influential of these experts are defense and foreign policy advisers David Aaron, Barry E. Carter and Madeleine K. Albright, and economic advisers Walter Heller, George L. Perry, Susan J. Irving, Sheldon S. Cohen and W. Bowman Cutter.

Unlike the tight clique of political strategists who surround Mondale, the policy advisers are a less structured group, and less easily identifiable as members of a "shadow Cabinet."

"Mondale has not wanted his views prejudged or anticipated by the

public reputations of his advisers," said campaign chairman Johnson. "If you have a shadow Cabinet, you take on the political and policy history of people who are your spokesmen. He wants to be his own spokesman on economics and foreign policy."

Making Mistakes

When the Democratic primary season opened in January, front-runner Mondale was credited with the most polished, best-organized campaign structure. It was a machine whose origins went back to Mondale's brief bid for the presidency in 1976 and his two vice presidential races. As early as 1981, it was revved up for a full-blown drive for the White House.

The campaign was forced to alter its early, cautious strategy when Mondale was faced with a series of primary upsets by Sen. Gary Hart of Colorado. But under Johnson's leadership, the staff engineered Mondale's comeback and his final capture of the nomination at the Democratic National Convention in July by converting Mondale into a more combative candidate.

Once the nomination was locked up, however, Mondale's staff started receiving heavier doses of criticism. Perhaps the biggest fault found with the group was their handling of the Bert Lance debacle in July, when the



"Mondale has not wanted his views prejudged or anticipated by the public reputations of his advisers."

—James A. Johnson, campaign chairman



Foreign policy adviser: David Aaron, one of Walter Mondale's key experts on matters of defense and foreign policy, confers with the candidate.

Georgia banker was abruptly named to replace Democratic Party Chairman Charles T. Manatt and just as abruptly shunted aside a few days later. (*Weekly Report* p. 1731)

The incident angered many party leaders, who felt they had not been consulted. The move was widely viewed as a mistake because of its poor timing — the weekend before the convention — and Lance's rocky history as Carter's budget director, a job he quit after a controversy arose concerning his past banking practices.

"The Bert Lance affair was the best indication [Mondale's advisers] were not listening to anyone but each other. They insulated themselves from the rest of the world and were tied up in a little room in Minnesota like a bunch of English professors poring over the Boswell papers," said one campaign observer.

Rep. Tony Coelho, D-Calif., chairman of the Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee, said there was a feeling among members of Congress and some party elders that "you need to stretch your inner circle a little bit. You need to let some people who want to help into it."

White, who headed the Democratic National Committee from 1977-81, said the complaint that campaign advisers run a "closed shop" is common in presidential races.

"All campaigns operate under the theory that you have to hold them tightly or they become total chaos, like

Hubert Humphrey's campaign of 1968," White said. "Ever since then, Republicans and Democrats have structured their campaigns to be extremely tight at the top. Mondale's this year is not that different from Reagan's or Carter's in 1976."

One difference with Mondale, White noted, is that with 24 years in public life "he has so many friends who feel compelled to help. There is more pressure to break in at the top of the decision-making structure. That has hurt some because there are a lot of people who have political skills and something to offer who haven't been consulted."

While trying to placate critics within the party, the campaign has stumbled over nuts-and-bolts problems. The Labor Day kickoff turned into an embarrassment when Mondale and running mate Geraldine A. Ferraro showed up for a New York City parade hours before the crowd arrived. Later that day, his microphones went dead at a speech. Mondale has shown up at factories only to find few workers to greet him, as sloppy advance work continues to mar the campaign. And reporters have had difficulties in getting campaign aides to answer fundamental questions, such as what Mondale's positions are on crime, food stamps and other issues.

Making Changes

To staunch the complaints of those Democratic regulars who felt

slighted by the campaign, Johnson and Beckel have brought in more advisers in the past few weeks.

In mid-August, Mondale met with two dozen agriculture experts, including several members of Congress, to discuss ways to win the farm vote. (*Congress*, box, p. 2309)

A week later he sought support from Democratic governors and mayors and met with the Rev. Jesse L. Jackson and other black leaders. And shortly after Congress returned from its August recess, Mondale spoke to the House and Senate Democratic caucuses.

Campaign officials also had former party Chairman Robert S. Strauss assemble a council of prominent Democrats to assist them, and they set up regular meetings with Coelho and Texas Sen. Lloyd Bentsen, chairman of the Senate Democratic campaign fund, to coordinate the presidential, House and Senate races.

Johnson and Beckel have brought in aides who worked for Mondale's primary rivals, such as Hart's pollster Dotty Lynch and Jackson aide Ernest Green. They also have recruited Capitol Hill staffers to work on issues development.

"We've been trying to make sure that as we go into this general election period that all of the elements of the Democratic Party feel as though they have the right relationship with the Mondale campaign and that their ideas are being heard," Johnson said.

"We thought we were doing a good deal of outreach, but others disagreed. We need to do as much as people want, until they're satisfied that they're being heard," he said.

Stuart E. Eizenstat, Carter's domestic policy chief who has been helping the Mondale camp, said the campaign's efforts to reach out to others should be helpful.

"Any campaign tends toward myopia because you are talking to the same people," Eizenstat said. "The tendency is to give a candidate — like a president — good news, rather than what he needs to hear. By bringing outside people in, you bring in more reality."

Policy Advice

In contrast to the taut unit managing Mondale's political strategy, his policy advisers are much more loosely organized — to the point of almost not being organized at all.

There is a full-time issues director, University of Texas Professor

William Galston, on the campaign staff. And in a few domestic areas, such as agriculture, paid advisers are on the staff. But unlike many campaigns, there are not formal task forces of professors, business people and former Cabinet officers who make policy recommendations.

Instead, aides say Mondale's style is to seek advice on an informal basis, often impulsively telephoning experts on given topics to ask questions and solicit ideas. Many of the people he turns to are contacts he made in his 12 years in the Senate and four in the vice president's office.

Mondale's approach is different from Reagan's in 1980, when the Republican candidate assembled a team of more than 300 advisers from business, academia and former GOP administrations.

Johnson said one reason the campaign chose not to form advisory groups was to avoid a situation in which people would feel excluded. And if such policy councils involved too many people, they would be unworkable, he said.

Another problem with such groups, Johnson said, is that "in the past they have taken on positions that are different from the candidate's. The candidate wants to keep his own counsel until he reaches a decision on his position. If an advisory group comes out publicly with a recommendation, it limits his choices. You don't want to cut off his options."

But Eizenstat suggested that formal task forces might be useful. Such groups "give people a sense of involvement," he said, and while they may not produce many new ideas, "occasionally you'll pick up a gem here and there."

Key Policy Advisers

Within the campaign staff, however, there are several key policy advisers.

On defense and foreign affairs, the most influential trio includes Aaron, who was deputy to Zbigniew Brzezinski, Carter's national security adviser; Albright, a National Security Council staff member from 1978-81; and Barry Carter, who worked on Henry Kissinger's security council staff from 1970-72.

Before joining the Mondale camp, both Albright and Carter were professors at Georgetown University. After leaving the White House, Aaron went to work for Oppenheimer and Co., a New York investment firm.

Campaign manager: The man who suggested asking the question "Where's the beef," Bob Beckel is in charge of the day-to-day running of the Mondale operation and also oversees political activities.



Much like Mondale, Aaron, Albright and Carter are foreign policy moderates, who advocate a strong defense but emphasize the need for arms control negotiations.

Among the top outside experts called on for national security advice are Robert Hunter, of the Georgetown Center for Strategic and International Studies; Walter Slocombe, deputy under secretary of defense in the Carter administration and now a Washington lawyer; and Richard Holbrooke, assistant secretary of state under Carter.

Others include Washington lawyer Max Kampelman, a former head of the U.S. delegation to the Conference on Security and Cooperation in Europe; Warren Christopher, Carter's deputy secretary of state; Sol Linowitz, Carter's ambassador to the Organization of American States; Carter Defense Secretary Harold Brown; James R. Schlesinger, Carter's energy secretary and defense secretary under President Gerald R. Ford; and Carter arms control chief Paul Warnke.

Like his national security aides, Mondale's budget and tax advisers have résumés filled with prior Democratic administration experience. Several currently are associated with the Brookings Institution, the Washington think tank.

Two of Mondale's chief economic advisers are Susan J. Irving and W. Bowman Cutter.

Irving, who is on the campaign staff, was vice president of the Committee for a Responsible Federal Budget, a non-partisan educational organization, and staff director for the Council of Economic Advisers in the

Carter administration. Cutter, now a partner in the accounting firm of Coopers & Lybrand, was associate director of Carter's Office of Management and Budget.

Other leading economic thinkers include George L. Perry, a senior fellow at Brookings, and Walter Heller, a University of Minnesota economics professor — both of whom are viewed as traditional, liberal economists. Advice also comes from Sheldon S. Cohen, a Washington lawyer and former Internal Revenue Service commissioner; Benjamin M. Friedman, a Harvard economics professor; and Joseph Pechman, a tax expert at Brookings. Another is Robert D. Hormats, a deputy U.S. trade representative under Carter and assistant secretary of state for economic affairs under Reagan; Hormats is now with Goldman Sachs & Co., the New York investment bankers.

Eizenstat described Mondale's economic team as "basically pragmatic progressives. They're not conservative, nor are they far left wing. They're basically mainstream Democrats."


* * *

The following sketches describe the major players on Mondale's political campaign team:

James A. Johnson

The most powerful man in Mondale's organization is fellow Minnesotan Jim Johnson. As campaign chairman, he is the staff member with ultimate authority for all campaign operations.

Treasurer: Mike Berman's official duties are deciding how money will be spent, handling physical logistics and supervising scheduling. Regarded as the candidate's most savvy political operative, "he has Mondale's ear," an aide says.



Johnson, 40, is a reserved, serious man with a penchant for conservative suits and white shirts. He has worked with Mondale since 1972 and has been described as Mondale's alter ego.

Like his boss, Johnson is of Norwegian ancestry and was raised in small-town Minnesota. He grew up in a political family, with his father serving for 18 years in the Minnesota Legislature.

Johnson studied at the University of Minnesota and Princeton's Woodrow Wilson School of Public Affairs. His own political baptism came with work on the presidential campaigns of Eugene J. McCarthy in 1968 and Edmund S. Muskie in 1972.

Johnson started working for Mondale in the Senate in 1972. He was deputy manager of Mondale's 1976 vice presidential campaign, and served as Mondale's executive assistant while he was vice president. Johnson told an interviewer earlier this year, that in that job "I got to the White House before [Mondale] did every day. I left after he did every evening. I did every mile and every minute with him for four years."

After Mondale left office in 1981, Johnson opened a political consulting firm in an office down the hall from Mondale's at the Washington branch of Winston & Strawn, a Chicago-based corporate law firm. His main job, though, was gearing up for Mondale's 1984 presidential bid.

Johnson best described his low-key nature in an interview with *The Washington Post* during the Democratic convention. "When things get really tense and people are losing their

minds, I have a heartbeat every three minutes."

Robert G. Beckel

Day-to-day administration of the Mondale operation is in the hands of 35-year-old campaign manager Bob Beckel. Beckel also oversees political activities, such as relations with Democratic officeholders and Mondale's primary competitors. He also works with state political leaders to map out the fall strategy.

Beckel, who is more gregarious than Johnson, came up with the idea of using one of the primary season's more memorable lines: Mondale asking, "Where's the beef?" in reference to Hart's "new ideas."

Unlike the others in Mondale's inner circle, Beckel did not work for Mondale before 1983. He was born and raised in New York City, graduated from New York's Wagner College, served in the Peace Corps and worked for the liberal National Committee for an Effective Congress.

Beckel worked in congressional relations for the Carter White House and was Texas campaign director for the 1980 Carter-Mondale campaign. After Carter's loss, he ran his own political consulting firm.

Maxine Isaacs

Press secretary Maxine Isaacs is the only woman with a top position in the campaign.

Originally from Cleveland, 36-year-old Isaacs graduated from Skidmore College and worked as press secretary to Rep. Louis Stokes, D-Ohio, from 1971-73. She joined Mon-

dale's Senate staff in 1973 as a deputy press secretary and held the same job in the vice president's office. She also worked from 1974-75 as a free-lance reporter for National Public Radio.

In 1980, Isaacs was Mondale's campaign press secretary. After the Democratic ticket lost, she opened her own press relations consulting firm, Maximum, Inc. But she returned to work for Mondale in 1983.

Isaacs is extremely loyal to Mondale, and some reporters complain she shields him too much. Reporters also gripe that she is not open enough about the campaign's inner workings, which some attribute to the fact that she has dated Johnson for several years. Yet Isaacs also is praised for her professionalism and accessibility, and for treating reporters fairly.

Michael S. Berman

Mike Berman's history with Mondale dates back to 1964, when the two worked on the Johnson-Humphrey campaign. Since then, Berman, 45, has been associated with each of Mondale's own political races.

Berman, an affable, portly man, has the title of campaign treasurer and executive director of the Democratic National Committee. In those jobs, he decides how money will be spent and handles the campaign's physical logistics. As of Sept. 14, he also started supervising Mondale's scheduling and advance teams.

A native of Duluth, Minn., who received undergraduate and law degrees from the University of Minnesota, Berman has worked in a variety of jobs for Mondale. Besides managing

Media men: Richard Leone, below, coordinates "message making." Roy Spence, right, is a creative consultant.



several of his campaigns, he was an assistant in Mondale's Senate office and legal counsel when Mondale was vice president. He joined a Washington, D.C., law firm and taught at Georgetown University after Mondale's 1980 defeat.

Along with Johnson and Richard Moe, Berman is called one of Mondale's "most trusted political helpers" in Finlay Lewis' biography of Mondale. Described by Lewis as a "logistical wizard," Berman was ready in 1974 to open a national headquarters for a Mondale presidential effort, when the future vice president suddenly dropped out of the race.

Regarded as Mondale's most savvy political operative, Berman's greatest asset during this campaign, one aide said, is that "he has Mondale's ear."

John R. Reilly

One of Mondale's closest confidants is attorney John Reilly, whose official title simply is senior adviser.

Reilly coordinated Mondale's selection of a running mate this year and he frequently travels with Mondale, either seated next to the candidate or mingling with the press. A contemporary of Mondale at the age of 56, the gray-haired Washington lawyer says his job at times is to deliver the "un-

varnished facts" to Mondale, telling the candidate when he has given a bad speech, for example.

Originally from Iowa, Reilly met Mondale in 1959, when Reilly was working on John F. Kennedy's presidential campaign and Mondale was helping Hubert H. Humphrey. The two became friends in Washington, where Reilly worked for Robert F. Kennedy in the Justice Department. In 1964, he was appointed to the Federal Trade Commission and in 1968 worked on Robert Kennedy's presidential campaign.

Reilly is a senior partner in Winston & Strawn's Washington office. He arranged Mondale's \$150,000-a-year job there when Mondale left the vice presidency in 1981. The Winston & Strawn offices were the campaign's operating base in its early stages, before a Washington headquarters was opened in 1983.

Richard Moe

Although he has no formal role in this year's campaign and seems shut out of the inner circle, Richard Moe, along with Johnson and Berman, is the third member of what Mondale biographer Lewis described as the "political triumvirate" that has surrounded Mondale for years.

Some observers say the decision was made in the campaign's early stages that either Johnson or Moe would need total control, but that they couldn't jointly run the campaign. Moe, who served as Mondale's chief of staff in the vice president's office, said, "I decided four years ago when we left the White House that it was time to move on and do something

else, to spend time with my family and start a law practice.

A Minnesotan who is now a Washington attorney, 47-year-old Moe has served several functions for Mondale this year. He coordinated congressional strategy, recruiting delegate support for Mondale among members of Congress. Now he is helping as a "troubleshooter," focusing mostly on problems in the South.

Supporting Cast

Other political operatives with central campaign roles include:

• **Richard C. Leone.** A former New Jersey state treasurer and the unsuccessful primary opponent against New Jersey Democratic Sen. Bill Bradley in 1978, Leone played a leading role for Mondale in the New Jersey and New York primaries this year. A longtime friend of Johnson's, Leone, 43, serves as "media maven," coordinating speeches, television commercials and overall "message-making" for the campaign.

• **Paul Tully.** A consummate political operator, Tully, 40, is a veteran of numerous political campaigns, working in 1980 for Massachusetts Sen. Edward M. Kennedy. Committed to liberal causes, Tully told a reporter this year that "around the time of the midterm election, I start looking around for the candidate I'm going to work for for president." Tully is the political director, handling a variety of jobs, including running Mondale's platform-writing team in June.

• **Peter Hart.** A leading Democratic pollster who has worked for dozens of House and Senate candidates, Hart, 42, has handled polling for Mondale since 1983. As Mondale's primary foes left the race this year, Hart picked up aid from William Hamilton, who conducted surveys for Ohio Sen. John Glenn, and Gary Hart's pollsters, Dotty Lynch and Patrick Caddell.

• **Judy Press Brenner and Roy Spence.** Brenner, the president of her own New York advertising agency, is the campaign's in-house media director. Spence, a Texan who built his reputation on his media work for Texas Gov. Mark White's 1982 gubernatorial campaign, leads a group of creative consultants who design Mondale's television and radio ads. Brenner and Spence are having "a classic thumb-in-the-eye battle" over control of Mondale's media campaign, according to one insider, who predicted that the "war between them may spill blood sooner or later." ■

Mondale Turns to Allies on Hill for Advice

Presidential nominee Walter F. Mondale's relationship to his fellow Democrats who are members of Congress is a low-key affair.

Unlike the showy symbolism of Ronald Reagan meeting with congressional Republicans on the Capitol steps in 1980, Mondale meets with members privately, occasionally phoning them for advice on politics or issues. But more than in Jimmy Carter's 1976 or 1980 campaigns, members of Congress are considered valuable assets to the Mondale team.

Having served a dozen years in the Senate, Mondale "is a creature of the Hill and has enormous respect for the expertise that a lot of people have up there," said Richard Moe, a Mondale adviser. "He has good personal relationships with many people on the Hill and draws on that a lot."

Moe headed the campaign's most aggressive congressional effort in 1983 and early this year: recruiting delegate support among Democrats in Congress. Although most members attended the July Democratic National Convention as "superdelegates" who were technically unpledged, the majority had publicly endorsed Mondale by then. Moe viewed the Feb. 1 House Democratic Caucus delegate selection as the first primary, carrying as much weight as the Iowa and New Hampshire races. (*Weekly Report* p. 89)

Although Mondale calls on various members of Congress to tap their expertise in specific policy areas, there are a few with whom he consults regularly. In the House, according to Mondale aides, they include Speaker Thomas P. O'Neill Jr., D-Mass.; Majority Leader Jim Wright, D-Texas; Majority Whip Thomas S. Foley, D-Wash.; Ways and Means Chairman Dan Rostenkowski, D-Ill.; Democratic Congressional Campaign Committee Chairman Tony Coelho, D-Calif.; and Michael D. Barnes, D-Md., who was Mondale's spokesman on this year's platform committee.

Among the senators he calls on most frequently, aides list Texan Lloyd Bentsen, chairman of the Democratic Senatorial Campaign Committee; Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland; Patrick J. Leahy of Vermont; Thomas F. Eagleton of Missouri; and George J. Mitchell of Maine.

Two other representatives with key roles in the campaign are Charles B. Rangel, D-N.Y., and Barbara A. Mikulski, D-Md., who were named co-chairmen of the campaign and who serve as important links with blacks and women. And his most visible connection is his running mate, New York Rep. Geraldine A. Ferraro, a three-term House member.

Besides turning to lawmakers for political advice, Mondale relies on them for policy suggestions. On defense issues, for example, he often consults Georgia Sen. Sam Nunn, an influential Democrat on the Armed Services Committee. House Foreign Affairs members Barnes and Stephen J. Solarz, D-N.Y., are regularly consulted on foreign policy issues, while Leahy offers advice on agriculture and intelligence matters, reflecting the committees on which he serves. On tax matters, aides say, Mondale tends to call Rostenkowski, Sen. Bill

Bradley, D-N.J., and Rep. Richard A. Gephardt, D-Mo. Bradley, a Senate Finance Committee member, and Gephardt, a member of Ways and Means, are cosponsors of major Democratic tax reform legislation. In addition, the staffs of the House Budget and Ways and Means committees have helped draw up Mondale's economic program.

Mondale's campaign employs a congressional liaison staff, headed by Robert Thomson, a White House lobbyist for Carter. Under Thomson, there are also several volunteers — mostly Washington lawyers and lobbyists — who handle congressional matters, such as notifying members when Mondale released his budget



"If he's calling me, a third-term member of the House, I assume he's calling others who are more experienced."

—Rep. Michael D. Barnes, D-Md.

plans. These congressional relationships, aides say, are among the campaign's highest priorities.

"For one thing, you get lots of good advice from people on the Hill," said one congressional liaison staffer. "These people have won elections in their states. We're trying to do the same thing.

"Secondly," the aide said, "these are people who have devoted their entire careers to certain issues. You can get valuable substantive advice from the Hill. And thirdly, there's the entire issue of unity. Democrats do better when they work together."

Some Democratic legislators have criticized the Mondale camp for not paying enough attention to members of Congress and other elected officials. But Barnes, who said he talks to Mondale "every couple of weeks" on various foreign policy issues, disagreed. "If he's calling me, a third-term member of the House," Barnes said, "I assume he's calling others who are more experienced."

Besides receiving advice from members of Congress, the Mondale campaign also has been besieged by Capitol Hill staff members who want to help with the election. Thomson says his biggest problem is finding "a meaningful role" for these aides, who want to volunteer after their regular working hours. Some have been put to work on debate preparation or writing position papers.

"If you have one of the leading tax experts in the city who wants to help, you can't put him to work opening envelopes," Thomson said.

—By Diane Granat

Mondale's Gamble:

Presidential Debates Usually Aid Challengers

Act Four of America's favorite televised political drama — the presidential debates — gets under way next month, and Democratic challenger Walter F. Mondale can only hope that this year's plot will resemble those of the past.

With President Reagan maintaining a double-digit lead in the polls, Mondale needs to score a major victory in a face-to-face encounter with the incumbent if his campaign is to have any prospect of victory.

Thanks to an agreement announced Sept. 17, the Democrat will get his chance: Reagan and Mondale will debate twice, on Oct. 7 and Oct. 21. Vice President George Bush will debate his Democratic challenger, Rep. Geraldine A. Ferraro, on Oct. 11. The debates will be sponsored by the League of Women Voters.

If history is a guide, Mondale has something to look forward to. Every presidential election that has featured a direct debate has been won by the candidate of the party out of power — Democrats John F. Kennedy in 1960 and Jimmy Carter in 1976, and Republican Reagan in 1980.

Indeed, the bonus given to challengers by debates is so strong as to raise the question of why Reagan agreed to one this year. The last two incumbents who declined to debate their opponents — Lyndon B. Johnson in 1964 and Richard M. Nixon in 1972 — both won by landslides.

In part, Reagan's willingness this year reflects the degree to which debates have become established political institutions at all levels. Once a fairly uncommon form — the Lincoln-Douglas debates of 1858 were the exception, not the rule — debates today are becoming virtually mandatory. The incumbent president who refuses to participate in one now risks losing more by that choice than he would lose in the encounter itself.

Beyond that, however, is Reagan's mastery of the debate format. His performance in the 1980 debates helped clinch the GOP nomination and added to his landslide general election win.

Setting the Rules

The latest round of debates was worked out after lengthy negotiation

between the Reagan and Mondale camps. Each side maneuvered to gain advantages in the number, timing and format of the debates.

Mondale opened the debate over debates the day after the Democratic convention by calling for six televised meetings with Reagan, with each one focused on a different subject. Democratic strategists hoped that prolonged debates would show that Mondale had a greater understanding of the complexities of current issues than did Reagan.

Like previous incumbents, Reagan sought to limit the number of debates. That strategy has not always worked for incumbents, however —

World Series in mid-October, which is likely to overshadow the debates in terms of audience appeal.

The scheduling compromise had costs for both candidates. Forced to wait until the second week of October, Mondale's campaign will be denied a desperately needed shot in the arm for two more weeks. But the second debate, only 15 days before the election, could leave Reagan with a problem if Mondale wins it decisively.

Reagan forces were more successful in controlling the debates' format. Mondale had wanted to foster a clear confrontation between the contenders by allowing each to question the other directly, with minimal interference from a moderator. But Republicans, backing the more traditional format, sought to put questioning in the hands of journalists. Under the agreement, a panel of four reporters will question the candidates.

Getting Ready

The crucial moments for the debates may come before they even begin. All four candidates are certain to devote hours of intensive effort to preparing for their time of testing.

That was not the case in the first presidential debates, in 1960. Nixon did almost nothing to prepare himself to face Kennedy, other than to try to get some rest after weeks of intensive campaigning. He spent most of the day of the first debate alone with his wife, getting only a 10-minute briefing from an aide as he raced to the television studio. Kennedy worked a little harder to get ready, but most of his preparation time was spent in informal conversations with aides.


Since then, debate preparation has become a science. The extraordinary lengths to which candidates go to prepare themselves was amply illustrated by the controversy over the 1980 Reagan campaign's receipt of Carter's debate briefing books.

While many of the details of the incident are still unclear, Democrats on a House subcommittee investigating the case found in May that the Reagan campaign had illegally obtained Carter's briefing materials on foreign policy and defense. The panel found that the stolen materials were



Carter's one-shot debate with Reagan in 1980 proved to be one of the biggest boulders in the landslide that buried him. A second debate four years ago might have given the beleaguered president an opportunity to recoup.

Timing was another sensitive issue this year. Like previous challengers, Mondale had two separate goals: to begin the debates as early as possible, ideally giving his campaign a lift, and to end them as late as possible, to deny the incumbent time to recover in case he made some serious error in the final showdown. Negotiators also had to contend with an extraneous scheduling complication — the baseball



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
MICHAEL K. DEEVER
DAVID A. STOCKMAN
RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: MARGARET TUTWILER

SUBJECT: ATTACHED AGENDA

Please find attached the agenda for the meeting today at
3:00 p.m. in Mr. Baker's office.

Thank you.

✓ (1) Latest polling data (5 min.)

✓ (2) Thematic focus

- (a) economy/growth/future through next week
[Note: goals/challenges stuff to be reintroduced]
- (b) world leadership -- Sept. 22 - Sept. 29 (or October 3)
- (c) what for likely debate period?

✓ (3) Media decisions

- (a) world leadership flight
- (b) what after that?

(4) Selected policy and related scheduling matters

- (a) steel: Is compromise set/enough? can/should it hold 'til Friday the 21st?
- (b) farm initiative: Is it a clear plus? (Note: It could hurt some small banks.) Will it cause any problem in Iowa that might affect scheduling/events?
- (c) environmental bill for Connecticut?
- (d) immigration bill: update
- (e) other?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III
MICHAEL K. DEEVER
DAVID A. STOCKMAN
RICHARD G. DARMAN

FROM: MARGARET TUTWILER *WOT*

SUBJECT: ATTACHED AGENDA

Please find attached the agenda for the meeting today at
3:00 p.m. in Mr. Baker's office.

Thank you.

CSG AGENDA -- 9/6/84

(1) Upcoming trips

- (a) overall
- (b) re Michigan, in particular (given auto strike)

(2) Themes for:

- (a) current cycle (supposedly economics, but is it really?
-- Note: documentary is on Sept. 11)
- (b) next cycle (tentatively "peace," but should it be
broadened to "character" -- see RGD memo; Note: UNGA
is Sept. 24)

Related questions: should VP be on same theme as
President for any given cycle? Should surrogates? Is
there a clear system for overall coordination of
details of all this?

(3) Debate "vulnerabilities" (see RGD note)

(4) Selected policy issues

- (a) steel
- (b) copper
- (c) corn
- (d) tobacco

(5) Problem States

✓ (6) Media (Note: Allow at least 45 minutes for this.)

INTRO: ADMONITION — unity among us outside this room)
— differences within this room only.)

✓ (1) Latest polling data (10 min.)

✓ (2) Upcoming trips

✓ (a) overall

✓ (b) re Michigan, in particular (given auto strike)

✓ (c) Hispanic heritage week — valley tour / Texas?

✓ (3) Themes for:

(a) current cycle (supposedly economics, but is it really?
-- Note: documentary is on Sept. 11)

(b) next cycle (tentatively "peace," but should it be
broadened to "character" -- see RGD memo; Note: UNGA
is Sept. 24)

Related questions: should VP be on same theme as
President for any given cycle? Should surrogates? Is
there a clear system for overall coordination of
details of all this?

✓ } Dean
} Bush

(4) Debate "vulnerabilities" (see RGD note)

✓ (5) Selected policy issues

✓ (a) steel

(b) copper

✓ (c) corn

✓ (d) tobacco

✓ (6) Problem States

✓ (7) Media (Note: Allow at least 45 minutes for this.)

REAGAN-BUSH'84

The President's Authorized Campaign Committee

'84 SEP -6 P6:32

M E M O R A N D U M

TO: Jim Baker
FROM: Jim Baker *OK*
DATE: September 6, 1984
RE: Secretary Block's Press Conference in Salt Lake City

*9/7
Discussed
w/
Block.*

As a part of our regular program of "bracketing" Mondale and Ferraro with our spokesmen, John Block was asked to talk about the impact of Walter Mondale's tax increases inasmuch as he was going to be in Salt Lake City at the same time Walter Mondale was to address the American Legion. He agreed to do so and was sent an identical copy of the attached talking points to use as a base for his attack.

Two problems have arisen which give me some concern. First, eventhough we paid for the Salt Lake City portion of the trip because of his campaign activities, he conducted a press conference in the Federal Building in Salt Lake City as he had previously arranged to do. We probably should have guided him more specifically, but one would expect him to know better than to hold a campaign press conference in a federal building. Second, and more important in my opinion, the remarks he made about Agriculture simply are not helpful. As you can see from the attached copy of the UPI story that resulted from that press conference, his remarks were just not appropriate in view of current economic climate in Agriculture. There must be a better way for him to address Agriculture policy if he is to be out on the road.

Obviously, we cannot control whether or not the press covers an event with the spin we would like to see developed. Sometimes they will carry our "tax story" other times they will not. That's the breaks. However, we should be able to develop a more sophisticated discussion of farm policy.

September 5, 1984



TALKING POINTS ON VOTER REGISTRATION

As of September 1, the Reagan-Bush '84 Voter Registration Program had registered 2,201,997 supporters of the President in 50 states, the District of Columbia and overseas.

In September, Reagan-Bush '84 hopes to register another 500,000 voters in support of the President.

Top 20 States -- New Reagan-Bush Registrants
(as of 9/1/84)

1. California	443,087
2. Texas	426,808
3. Florida	133,458
4. New York	102,544
5. Arizona	101,654
6. Iowa	83,244
7. Colorado	65,798
8. Georgia	60,760
9. South Carolina	50,464
10. Pennsylvania	49,866
11. North Carolina	47,298
12. Virginia	45,610
13. Oregon	44,708
14. New Mexico	40,963
15. Washington	40,896
16. Indiana	39,745
17. Illinois	39,431
18. Alabama	38,631
19. Ohio	37,990
20. Michigan	30,408

For some states, the Reagan-Bush registration drive will mean a huge leap in the number of voters in the presidential election.

Expressed in terms of the total vote in the 1980 presidential election, the Reagan-Bush '84 numbers in several states are impressive indeed:

Increase in Registrants As Percentage of 1980 Presidential Vote

1. Arizona	+11.6%
2. Texas	+9.3%
3. New Mexico	+8.9%
4. Iowa	+6.3%
5. South Carolina	+5.6%
6. Colorado	+5.5%
7. California	+5.1%
8. Wyoming	+4.5%
9. Georgia	+3.8%
10. Oregon	+3.7%

Note that the presidential election always draws a larger number and larger percentage of a state's voters than any other race. Therefore, this increase in registered voters could have an even greater impact on state and local races! We are building our Party at the grassroots.

Comparing registered voters to actual voters in 1980 may seem like comparing apples and oranges at first glance. But consider: these are voters identified, registered and within immediate contact of the Reagan-Bush state organizations. We've worked hard for these voters -- and we're going to turn them out in force on Election Day.

Can the same be said for voter registration drives by disparate special-interest groups? Hardly.

In several very close states in 1980, Reagan-Bush '84 has increased the likely GOP margin by thousands of votes -- that is, over and above the number of Carter voters who this year will vote for the President.

Registration Results in Close Reagan-Bush States, 1980

Alabama	17,000-vote margin	+	38,000 new registrants
Arkansas	5,000-vote margin	+	2,000 new registrants
Delaware	5,000-vote margin	+	8,000 new registrants
Kentucky	18,000-vote margin	+	16,000 new registrants
Massachusetts	3,000-vote margin	+	3,000 new registrants
Mississippi	11,000-vote margin	+	29,000 new registrants
South Carolina	11,000-vote margin	+	50,000 new registrants
Tennessee	4,000-vote margin	+	28,000 new registrants

Another factor to consider is the 1980 John Anderson vote, which some think may be a plus for Mondale given the former Congressman's recent endorsement of the Minnesotan. (Note: Many Anderson voters voted at the same time for Republican candidates, and have done so since; had Anderson not run, his voters would likely have not gone to the polls or split evenly for Reagan and Carter.)

In eight states, the number of new Reagan-Bush registrants exceeds the number of Anderson 1980 voters:

Alabama	38,631 new registrants vs. 16,481 Anderson voters
Arizona	101,654 new registrants vs. 76,952 Anderson voters
Georgia	60,760 new registrants vs. 36,055 Anderson voters

Louisiana	30,195 new registrants vs. 26,345 Anderson voters
Mississippi	29,407 new registrants vs. 12,036 Anderson voters
New Mexico	40,963 new registrants vs. 29,459 Anderson voters
South Carolina	50,464 new registrants vs. 14,153 Anderson voters
Texas	426,808 new registrants vs. 111,613 Anderson voters

If all of the Anderson voters moved to Mondale in these states -- a highly unlikely proposition -- they would be matched by new Reagan-Bush voters in those states, and in others throughout the nation:

--- California's 443,087 registrants matches more than 60% of the 737,000 Anderson supporters in that state from 1980.

--- Florida's 133,458 new registrants nearly matches the 189,000 Anderson voters from 1980.

The regional breakdown of the Reagan-Bush voter registration effort shows strong increases in both the South and West, which have had the largest rates of growth in recent years.

Regional Division of Reagan-Bush Registration Program

Northeast (12 states and D.C.)	202,857 new registrants
Midwest (12 states)	267,533 new registrants
South (13 states)	937,091 new registrants
West (13 states)	756,135 new registrants
Military Registrants (overseas)	38,381 new registrants
	<hr/>
	2,201,997 total

It should also be noted that the Northeastern and Midwestern states have had more static populations and a higher percentage of eligible voters already registered than the South and West.

The Reagan-Bush campaign regions' totals reflect the same patterns:

Northeast (Stone) -- 12 states & D.C.	236,669 new registrants
Midwest (Stanley) -- 7 states	215,443 new registrants
South (Kitchin) -- 11 states	454,665 new registrants
Southwest (Shelby) -- 7 states	500,252 new registrants
Rocky Mountain (Masson) -- 9 states	222,299 new registrants
Pacific (Pearce) -- 5 states	534,289 new registrants

The bottom line of the Reagan-Bush voter registration drive is to help re-elect the President through the involvement of more Reagan-Bush supporters in the political process, i.e. through voting.

To this end, the Reagan-Bush registration drive has been successful, according to information from a recent Gallup poll commissioned by the Joint Center for Political Studies.

Among the key points of this study (see Attachment #1 for more details):

- Newly registered white voters support the President over Mondale by a 42-point margin (68% to 26%).

- Among all white voters, the President has a 20-point margin (57% to 37%).

- Among all voters who have registered since 1982, the President has a 12-point margin (56% to 44%).

This last figure is especially important, for it includes the much-vaunted black registration drives that Democrats claim will turn the election in their favor.

The Republicans and the Reagan-Bush ticket is winning the battle for support among new registrants. The overall impact of new voter registration in the last two years has been in the President's favor, not against him as many today claim.

ATTACHMENT #1

ANALYSIS

Recent data conducted for the Joint Center for Political Studies by Gallup provides evidence that our registration effort is succeeding in skewing the national ballot in our favor.

Among white voters, the President leads Mondale by a 20 point margin, 57% to 37%. But among voters who have registered since the mid-term election, the President's margin balloons to 42%, 68% to 26%.

Though some of this dramatic increase can be attributed to the self-motivated registration of voters in the 18-24 range who are strongly supportive of the President, I think the numbers also indicate that our registration program has heavily impacted the ballot test.

Utilizing the Joint Center for Political Studies data I've extrapolated the following:

	<u>VAP</u>	<u>NEW REGISTRATIONS</u>	<u>REAGAN</u>	<u>MONDALE</u>
Blacks	18,335,000	1,283,450 (7%)	25,669 (2%) ¹	1,257,781 (98%)
Whites	146,626,000	5,865,040 (4%)	3,988,227 (68%) ²	1,876,813 (32%)

¹ Ballot test 98-2% Mondale among newly registered blacks extrapolated from 88-5% ballot among all black voters; this is not a prediction, but a pessimistic worst-case scenario.

² Reagan-Mondale ballot assumes worst-case scenario, that Mondale receives all 6% currently undecided.

This data, combined with the following reveals clearly the impact of voter registration since 1982.

REAGAN V. MONDALE: NEWLY REGISTERED VOTERS

	<u>NEW REGISTRATIONS</u>	<u>SUPPORTERS</u>	<u>%</u>
Reagan	7,148,490	4,013,896	56%
Mondale		3,134,594	44%

The conclusion: Far from badly losing the battle among new registrants, as the Democrats suggest we are winning it dramatically, by a 56 to 44% margin even based upon pessimistic assumptions.

To JAB From Stu

MEMORANDUM FOR

STUART SPENCER
LEE ATWATER
JOHN ROBERTS

FROM:

RICK HOHLT

DATE:

SEPTEMBER 5, 1984

SUBJECT:

BIPARTISAN BUDGET COALITION "CUT
THE DEFICIT" CAMPAIGN

The public relations representatives of the attached listed organizations met today to finalize the press events of September 11.

Presently, all organizations will attend a background press briefing breakfast at the Mayflower Hotel at 8:30 a.m. on September 11. All reporters (print/electronic) will be invited to hear Mr. Peterson and others provide background information.

The press conference, also at the Mayflower, has been scheduled for 10:30 a.m. Mr. Peterson will be the host/main spokesman and he also trying to get former Treasury Secretaries to attend. Each organization will be asked to make a brief statement on why they are participating in the effort (real gloom and doom). All will take questions.

A final copy of the advertisement scheduled to run September 12 in the Washington Post, New York Times and Wall Street Journal is attached.

I feel very strongly that if Mr. Peterson is successful in mobilizing established grassroots networks it will only cause significant problems in the days ahead.

The Bipartisan Budget Coalition

The Bipartisan Budget Appeal, an organization of over 600 former public officials and heads of law firms, investment banks, accounting firms, major corporations, universities, foundations and other organizations. Founding members of the Bipartisan Budget Appeal are: The Hon. W. Michael Blumenthal, Secretary of the Treasury, 1977-79; The Hon. John B. Connally, Secretary of the Treasury, 1971-72; The Hon. C. Douglas Dillon, Secretary of the Treasury, 1961-65; The Hon. Henry H. Fowler, Secretary of the Treasury, 1965-68; The Hon. Peter G. Peterson, Secretary of Commerce, 1972-73; The Hon. William E. Simon, Secretary of the Treasury, 1974-76.

The United States League of Savings Institutions, an organization of 3,500 savings and loan associations, savings banks and cooperative banks, with combined assets of more than \$900 billion.

The American Bankers Association, an organization of 13,000 commercial banks and trust companies with combined assets of \$1.9 trillion.

The National Association of Realtors, a federation of 50 state associations of Realtors and 1,848 local real estate boards with 637,000 Realtors and Realtor-associates.

The Mortgage Bankers Association of America, an association with 2,100 members, principally mortgage banking firms, commercial banks, savings institutions and insurance companies which engage in the mortgage banking business.

The National Council of Savings Institutions, an association of 600 savings banks and savings and loan associations with over \$400 billion in assets.

The National Association of Home Builders of the United States, an organization of 124,000 single and multi-family home builders, commercial builders, remodelers, architects, sub-contractors and others associated with the building industry.

The National Association of Casualty and Surety Agents,

The National Association of Surety Bond Producers,

The Manufactured Housing Institute,

The Mortgage Insurance Companies of America, an organization representing the mortgage insurance industry, with members having over \$175 billion of insurance in force on homeowners' mortgages made more affordable with low downpayment financing.

The Consumer Bankers Association, an association of more than 650 financial institutions, including commercial banks, thrifts, credit unions and other providers of consumer financial services with combined holdings of over 70 per cent of all consumer credit presently outstanding.

The Independent Bankers Association of America, an association of 7,500 community banks across the United States.

The National Forest Products Association,

The American Consulting Engineers Association,

National Association of Brick Distributors

National Independent Dairy Food Association

Automotive Service Councils, Inc.

Menswear Retailers of America

United Business Owners of America

Independent Media Producers Association

American Business Association

**TIME FOR A COMMON COMMITMENT
TO CUT THE DEFICIT**

**A CALL TO RONALD REAGAN, WALTER MONDALE,
MEMBERS OF CONGRESS AND CANDIDATES:**

We urge the candidates to commit publicly before the November 1984 elections to a deficit reduction plan to be implemented in the first budget following inauguration. This plan should cut the deficit--projected to be approximately 5% of GNP--to no more than 2% of GNP within three years and ensure that future budgets move steadily into balance. Deficit estimates should be based on prudent economic growth and interest rate assumptions.

Because of our common concern we are sending this message to all announced candidates for federal office. No candidate should face the voters without committing to a specific plan for reducing federal spending and deficits. Such a plan should embody the goals, principles and elements outlined below: defense, entitlements and taxes.

I. The Stubborn Deficit Problem

We are now enjoying strong economic growth. Yet the federal deficit for fiscal 1985 is venturing into unmapped fiscal territory, toward \$200 billion--despite the current recovery and the recent "down payment." Our national government must now borrow more than one of every five dollars it spends. Whatever assumptions are used, the problem will get worse rather than better in the years ahead unless something is done now. The recent deficit "down payment" action was a modest step in the right direction, though it relied too little on spending cuts and too much on tax increases -- increases which burdened savings and investment.

It took us nearly 200 years to amass a trillion dollar debt. At the current pace we could double that in a mere five years, thus adding over \$15,000 of debt in the name of each American family of four. Without new steps to cut expenditures and raise revenues, interest payments on the federal debt could rise to over \$200 billion annually by the end of the decade. This would be equivalent to more than a staggering \$3200 yearly tax for an average family of four! Just to pay the interest. Not a penny of this for anything of value. Indeed debt service costs are primed to grow faster than any other segment of the budget--making future deficits self-generating and casting a shadow over our children's economic future.

Huge deficits have serious consequences:

- o high interest rates
- o weakened long-term growth
- o an over-valued dollar
- o record balance of payments deficits
- o a crippled export sector
- o stunted capital spending in industry
- o agricultural recession
- o a housing slump
- o a growing international "debt bomb."

Uncontrolled spending and big deficits absorb the investment capital needed to create productive jobs and real income for tomorrow. Over the next few years, federal deficits will absorb 70% of our net savings, leaving only one-half to two-thirds the average of the 1960s or 1970s.

II. Decisive Action Needed Now

There will never be a better time to attack the problem. The current cyclical upturn should not distract us from confronting the long-term structural deficit. The strong 1984 recovery provides an ideal climate for making the tough but imperative fiscal policy choices. For example, if and when the current recovery slows, it will then be argued that it is politically and economically unwise to cut spending and increase taxes.

III. Principles to Guide action

We the undersigned unite behind three basic principles:

1. **Long-term Focus.** Reforms must be large, structural and permanent--in keeping with the size and duration of the problem. One-shot actions are not enough.
2. **Principles of Need, Fairness and Burden-Sharing.** Wide and fair sharing of the needed reductions is essential. The poor must be protected. In all the budget reductions to date, the programs that have barely been touched are the very large non-means tested entitlements and programs that confer a large part of their benefits on middle and upper income groups and have the effect of subsidizing consumption. With debt service, these programs plus defense spending amount to over 80% of the budget.

3. **Focus on Investment and Savings.** The objective should be to increase savings and investment. Massive deficits rob the future by depleting savings and absorbing capital needed to build productive jobs, strengthen international competitiveness, provide for home ownership and generate real income growth and a higher standard of living for all Americans. Cutting deficits by measures that would at the same time reduce savings and productive investment would make no long-term sense.

IV. Elements of a Three-part Program for Action--Entitlements, Defense and Taxes

If any of the following areas is placed out of bounds, no fair, effective or politically sustainable solution to the problem of runaway deficits is possible.

1. **Entitlements and Other Non-Defense Programs.** The broad-based non-means tested entitlement programs, principally Social Security, Medicare and pensions for the civil service and military, have been growing at an astronomical 15% annually for 15 years. These are now about 40% of the budget. Built-in cost-of-living (indexing) escalators--that have overstated the true increase in the cost of living--drive program costs ever higher. But even this fiscal accounting is misleading. It fails to identify the \$7 trillion of unfunded liabilities--nearly four and one-half times our official debt--that we are quietly passing on to our children. After years of ducking and posturing, Congress and the Administration must jointly and squarely face the need for restraint in these entitlement and transfer programs that heavily benefit the middle and upper classes. No spending program should be off-limits other than those essential to the poor.

2. **Defense.** The unprecedented peacetime defense build-up--from outlays of \$136 billion in 1980 to \$230 billion in 1984--responded to military weakness evident in the 1970s. Currently planned defense budget increases, however, should be scaled back from abnormal "catch-up" growth rates to a real growth rate closer to the sustainable growth capacity of the economy. A commitment to a multi-year moderately increasing defense budget would allow a significant build-up. It would allow more explicit planning for that build-up and lead to deeper and more sustained public support.

3. **Taxes.** While spending cuts are absolutely our top priority, we must also face the unpleasant fact that current law taxes will generate receipts in a range of only 19-20% of GNP; this compares to current spending commitments in a range of 24-25% of GNP. Thus, even with the strong spending restraints outlined above, there is a need to strengthen the federal tax base in order to achieve long-term fiscal balance. Any tax increases should be tied to and exceeded by spending cuts. To the extent that revenue is raised, it should be done in a way that enhances incentives for work, capital formation, savings and economic growth.

Specific Programs. Any serious effort to deal with the deficit will have to address each element of the three-part program. As to spending reductions, the Bipartisan Budget Appeal has proposed a freeze of at least one year--preferably two--in cost-of-living adjustments (COLAs) for the large, non-means tested programs; a cap on future COLA indexing (e.g., 60% of the consumer price index or to three percentage points less than the inflation rate); similar restraints on all other transfers, subsidies and programs beyond those for the poor; and a multiyear defense buildup at a more moderate pace. Once spending cuts of the type and magnitude described above are assured, any revenue measures needed to reach the deficit reduction goal should mainly rely on consumption-oriented taxes in order to avoid weakening incentives to work, save and invest. The particular program, however, is less important than the fact that each of the three elements must figure significantly in the solution.

Also, a bipartisan commission, council or other entity could help achieve greater deficit reductions for next year and later. If such an entity is established, it should enjoy the strong approval and support of the House, Senate and Administration. It should be initiated as soon as possible with results by January 1985, in time for the President to consider before submitting his budget and in time for consideration by the House of Representatives and Senate in their budget and appropriations processes.

* * *

We, the undersigned organizations, commit to urging our members, supporters, customers, depositors, savers, home builders, buyers _____ and _____ to communicate support for a deficit reduction program that embodies the principles and elements discussed above to Ronald Reagan, Walter Mondale, members of Congress and candidates. We urge every American to do the same.

SEP 05 1984

Comments from: B.SIERN (DAGU34) Posted: Wed 5-Sep-84 12:47 EDT Sys 97

Disposition: d

From: NEWS Posted: Wed 5-Sep-84 12:27 EDT Sys 97 (47)
Subject: AMERICAN LEGION :american legion national convention he said that if
* UPI STATE Wire (UTAH)

--More--

SX PRO WA

Block says Reagan putting farmers back on feet

By PAUL ROLLY

SALT LAKE CITY (UPI) — Agriculture Secretary John Block said today farmers should be better off once they are forced away from relying on government help and face the challenge of the free marketplace straight on.

"I'm in favor of lowering support payments, which encourage production," Block said at a news conference. The secretary was in Salt Lake City for the final session of the American Legion national convention.

He said that if farmers rely more on the true marketplace in their decision-making process, it would result in a more realistic supply-demand ratio.

Block also said deficits must be brought into line and interest rates controlled for the American farm industry to thrive. But he said Reagan's policies are more tuned to that goal than those of the president's Democratic challenger Walter Mondale, who Block shared the convention's podium with.

"Walter Mondale is going around the country telling everyone he will raise their interest rates," Block said. "President Reagan is saying we can attack the deficits in other ways — with the line item veto, the balanced budget amendment.

--More--

"We're saying we would raise taxes only as a last resort. Walter Mondale is saying he would raise taxes as a first resort."

Block said farmers have "the clearest choice between presidential candidates than they have had in the past half century."

He said Mondale was on the Jimmy Carter team that established the grain embargo against the Soviet Union, an unpopular move among U.S. farmers whose market severely dwindled.

"President Reagan lifted the embargo. He has once again established the U.S. as a reliable supplier of farm products."

Block told legionnaires following the news conference that the current farm policy established in 1981 needs to be refurbished. "Even though it's only three years old, it lacks flexibility. It's inconsistent. And it promotes surplus production both here at home and abroad. Moreover, it's at a time when the world market is squirming under excess supplies."

He said the department is preparing to write a new farm bill for 1985 that will call for "less government intervention and more market orientation."

He said the administration is also pushing the expansion of U.S. farm exports, "which may reach \$38 billion this fiscal year — up 9 percent from last year. That's like depositing a \$20 billion check in the bank to offset the massive trade deficit in nonfarm products."

--More--

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Disposition: d



"Employment"
:30 Television
Revised 9/4/84

AUDIO

The chance to earn your own way.
To work at an honest job. To earn a decent wage.

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Today, our dream lives again.
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A we ~~now have~~ more people working than
ever before.

B With 6 and a half million new jobs.

C And the best growth opportunity since World War II.

So now we can look to the day when no one can be
denied the promise that is America.

ASSERTION A

"WE NOW HAVE MORE PEOPLE WORKING THAN EVER BEFORE"

- o The labor force in the United States stands at 105.4 million as of July 1984. This is the highest total ever recorded since statistics were first kept in 1900. (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)

News

U.S. Department of Labor
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Washington, D.C. 20212



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THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: JULY 1984

Unemployment rose in July, returning to the May level, while the two major employment measures showed differing movements, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor reported today. The overall jobless rate, which includes the resident Armed Forces in the labor force base, was 7.4 percent, and the rate for civilian workers was 7.5 percent. Each measure rose four-tenths of a percentage point over the month, after identical declines in June.

Total civilian employment--as measured by the monthly survey of households--fell by 350,000 in July after seasonal adjustment to 105.4 million. This first decline in the series in one and a half years, followed 2 months of exceptionally large increases. In contrast, the number of employees on nonagricultural payrolls--as measured by the monthly survey of establishments--rose by 300,000 over the month, continuing the steady growth that has occurred since early 1983. Despite these differing directions in July, the household series shows employment growth of 6.4 million over the course of the recovery, compared with job gains of 5.7 million in the payroll series.

Unemployment (Household Survey Data)

The number of unemployed persons increased to 8.5 million from June to July after seasonal adjustment, and the civilian worker unemployment rate rose to 7.5 percent; both figures returned to the levels posted in May. Since November 1982, the number of unemployed persons has declined by 3.3 million, and the jobless rate has dropped by 3.2 percentage points. (See table A-2.)

The July increase occurred primarily among adult women, whose jobless rate returned to the level that had essentially prevailed between February and May. The rate for adult men edged up to 6.5 percent, the same as in May, but was still below the rates posted earlier this year. Unemployment increased among both white and black workers. While the rate for white teenagers changed little, the rate for black youth, which is subject to wide fluctuation, rose by 8 percentage points in July to 42.4 percent; it had declined by a similar magnitude in June. (See tables A-2 and A-3.)

Most of the July increase took place among workers who had lost their jobs. There was little or no over-the-month change in either the number of persons who were on layoff (expecting to be recalled to their job), had left their job voluntarily, or were entering or reentering the labor force. The number of short-term (less than 5 weeks) and medium-term (5 to 14 weeks) jobless workers rose in July, while the number of long-term unemployed (15 weeks and over) was about unchanged. (See tables A-7 and A-8.)

Civilian Employment and the Labor Force (Household Survey Data)

Civilian employment fell by 355,000 over the month to 105.4 million, seasonally adjusted, after rising by 1.3 million in the prior 2 months. Civilian employment was 6.4 million above the November 1982 recession trough. (See table A-2.)

The civilian labor force was 113.9 million in July, unchanged from June. The proportion of the civilian working-age population in the labor force was 64.6 percent, the same as in the previous 2 months. Over the year, the labor force grew by 2.2 million, and the participation rate was up by about half a percentage point.




Centennial
of Labor
Statistics

EMPLOYMENT, UNEMPLOYMENT, AND WAGES

STATUS OF THE LABOR FORCE

Seasonally adjusted civilian employment rose 460,000 in June and unemployment fell 384,000.



[Thousands of persons 16 years of age and over, except as noted; monthly data seasonally adjusted except as noted]

Period	Noninstitutional population including resident Armed Forces NSA	Resident Armed Forces NSA	Labor force including resident Armed Forces	Employment including resident Armed Forces	Civilian labor force	Civilian employment				Unemployment		Labor force participation rate (percent)	
						Total	Agricultural	Nonagricultural		Total	15 weeks and over	Total ²	Civilian ³
								Total	Part-time for economic reasons ¹				
1978.....	163,541	1,631	103,882	97,679	102,251	96,048	3,387	92,661	3,298	6,202	1,414	63.5	63.2
1979.....	166,460	1,597	106,559	100,421	104,962	98,824	3,347	95,477	3,373	6,137	1,241	64.0	63.7
1980.....	169,349	1,604	108,544	100,907	106,940	99,303	3,364	95,938	4,064	7,637	1,871	64.1	63.8
1981.....	171,775	1,645	110,315	102,042	108,670	100,397	3,368	97,030	4,499	8,273	2,285	64.2	63.9
1982.....	173,939	1,668	111,872	101,194	110,204	99,526	3,401	96,125	5,852	10,678	3,485	64.3	64.0
1983.....	175,891	1,676	113,226	102,510	111,550	100,834	3,383	97,450	5,997	10,717	4,210	64.4	64.0
1983: June.....	175,793	1,668	113,573	102,411	111,905	100,743	3,479	97,264	5,886	11,162	4,486	64.6	64.3
July.....	175,970	1,664	113,489	102,889	111,825	101,225	3,499	97,726	5,700	10,600	4,398	64.5	64.2
Aug.....	176,122	1,682	113,799	103,166	112,117	101,484	3,449	98,035	5,866	10,633	4,078	64.6	64.3
Sept.....	176,297	1,695	113,924	103,571	112,229	101,876	3,308	98,568	6,027	10,353	3,889	64.6	64.3
Oct.....	176,474	1,695	113,561	103,665	111,866	101,970	3,240	98,730	5,724	9,896	3,655	64.3	64.0
Nov.....	176,636	1,685	113,720	104,291	112,035	102,606	3,257	99,349	5,848	9,429	3,527	64.4	64.0
Dec.....	176,809	1,688	113,824	104,629	112,136	102,941	3,356	99,585	5,712	9,195	3,369	64.4	64.0
1984: Jan.....	177,219	1,686	113,901	104,876	112,215	103,190	3,271	99,918	5,943	9,026	3,201	64.3	63.9
Feb.....	177,363	1,684	114,377	105,576	112,693	103,892	3,395	100,496	5,808	8,801	2,984	64.5	64.1
Mar.....	177,510	1,686	114,598	105,826	112,912	104,140	3,281	100,859	5,463	8,772	2,873	64.6	64.2
Apr.....	177,662	1,693	114,938	106,095	113,245	104,402	3,393	101,009	5,593	8,843	2,855	64.7	64.4
May.....	177,813	1,690	115,493	106,978	113,803	105,288	3,389	101,899	5,353	8,514	2,851	65.0	64.6
June.....	177,974	1,690	115,567	107,438	113,877	105,748	3,403	102,344	5,491	8,130	2,619	64.9	64.6

¹ Persons at work. Economic reasons include slack work, material shortages, inability to find full-time work, etc.

² Labor force as percent of noninstitutional population (both including resident Armed Forces).

³ Civilian labor force as percent of civilian noninstitutional population.

NOTE.—NSA indicates data are not seasonally adjusted.

Source: Department of Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics.

Employment Status of Noninstitutional Population

405

No. 669. EMPLOYMENT STATUS OF THE NONINSTITUTIONAL POPULATION 16 YEARS OLD AND OVER BY SEX: 1950 TO 1983

(In thousands, except as indicated. Annual averages of monthly figures, except as indicated. Based on Current Population Survey, see Appendix III. See also Historical Statistics, Colonial Times to 1970, series D 11-19 and D 85-86)

YEAR AND SEX	Noninstitutional population ¹	LABOR FORCE ¹								Not in labor force
		Number	Employed					Unemployed		
			Total ¹	Resident Armed Forces	Civilian			Number	Percent of labor force ²	
					Total ¹	Agri-culture	Non-agri-culture industries			
Total 1950	106,164	63,377	60,067	1,189	58,918	7,160	51,758	3,288	5.2	42,787
1955	111,747	67,087	64,234	2,064	62,170	6,450	55,722	2,852	4.3	44,660
1960	119,106	71,489	67,639	1,861	65,778	5,458	60,318	3,652	5.4	47,617
1965	128,459	76,401	73,034	1,946	71,088	4,361	66,726	3,366	4.4	52,058
1966	130,180	77,892	75,017	2,122	72,895	3,979	68,915	2,875	3.7	52,288
1967	132,092	79,565	76,590	2,218	74,372	3,844	70,527	2,975	3.7	52,527
1968	134,281	80,990	78,173	2,253	75,920	3,817	72,103	2,817	3.5	53,291
1969	136,573	82,972	80,140	2,236	77,902	3,606	74,296	2,832	3.4	53,602
1970	139,203	84,889	80,796	2,118	78,678	3,463	75,215	4,093	4.8	54,315
1971	142,189	86,355	81,340	1,973	79,367	3,394	75,972	5,016	5.8	55,834
1972	145,939	88,847	83,966	1,813	82,153	3,484	78,669	4,882	5.5	57,091
1973	148,870	91,203	86,838	1,774	85,064	3,470	81,594	4,365	4.8	57,667
1974	151,841	93,670	88,515	1,721	86,794	3,515	83,279	5,156	5.5	58,171
1975	154,831	95,453	91,524	1,676	88,846	3,408	85,438	7,929	6.3	58,377
1976	157,818	97,826	94,420	1,668	91,752	3,331	88,421	7,406	7.6	59,991
1977	160,689	100,665	97,673	1,656	95,017	3,283	91,734	8,991	6.9	60,025
1978	163,541	103,882	100,421	1,631	98,048	3,387	95,661	6,202	6.0	59,659
1979	166,460	106,559	103,421	1,597	101,824	3,347	99,477	6,137	5.8	59,900
1980	169,349	108,544	106,007	1,604	104,403	3,364	102,039	7,637	7.0	60,806
1981	171,775	110,315	107,042	1,645	105,397	3,368	103,030	8,273	7.5	61,460
1982	173,939	111,872	108,194	1,668	106,526	3,401	104,125	10,678	9.5	62,067
1983 June ³	175,793	113,600	110,454	1,668	108,786	3,522	107,264	11,146	9.8	62,193
Male 1950	51,875	44,969	42,728	1,150	41,578	8,002	35,576	2,239	5.0	6,906
1960	57,495	48,221	45,737	1,833	43,904	4,472	39,431	2,486	5.2	8,274
1970	66,385	53,309	51,071	2,081	48,990	2,862	46,128	2,238	4.2	13,076
1975	73,891	57,899	53,457	1,600	51,857	2,824	49,032	4,442	7.7	15,993
1980	80,877	62,932	58,665	1,479	57,186	2,709	54,477	4,267	6.8	17,945
1982	83,052	63,979	57,800	1,529	56,271	2,736	53,534	6,179	9.7	19,073
Female 1950	54,289	18,408	17,359	19	17,340	1,159	16,181	1,049	5.7	35,881
1960	61,610	23,268	21,902	28	21,874	986	20,867	1,366	5.9	38,343
1970	72,819	31,580	29,725	37	29,688	801	29,087	1,855	5.9	41,239
1975	80,938	37,553	34,067	78	33,989	584	33,404	3,486	9.3	43,386
1980	88,472	45,611	42,241	124	42,117	656	41,461	3,370	7.4	42,861
1982	90,887	47,894	43,395	139	43,256	665	42,591	4,499	9.4	42,993
PERCENT DISTRIBUTION										
Total 1950	100.0	59.7	56.6	1.1	55.5	6.7	48.8	3.1	(x)	40.3
1955	100.0	60.0	57.5	1.8	55.6	5.8	49.9	2.6	(x)	40.0
1960	100.0	60.0	56.8	1.6	55.2	4.6	50.6	3.2	(x)	40.0
1965	100.0	59.5	56.9	1.5	55.3	3.4	51.9	2.6	(x)	40.5
1966	100.0	59.8	57.6	1.6	56.0	3.1	52.9	2.2	(x)	40.2
1967	100.0	60.2	58.0	1.7	56.3	2.9	53.4	2.3	(x)	39.8
1968	100.0	60.3	58.2	1.7	56.5	2.8	53.7	2.1	(x)	39.7
1969	100.0	60.8	58.7	1.6	57.0	2.6	54.4	2.1	(x)	39.2
1970	100.0	61.0	58.0	1.5	56.5	2.5	54.0	2.9	(x)	39.0
1971	100.0	60.7	57.2	1.4	55.8	2.4	53.4	3.5	(x)	39.3
1972	100.0	60.9	57.5	1.2	56.3	2.4	53.9	3.3	(x)	39.1
1973	100.0	61.3	58.3	1.2	57.1	2.3	54.8	2.9	(x)	38.7
1974	100.0	61.7	58.3	1.1	57.2	2.3	54.8	3.4	(x)	38.3
1975	100.0	61.6	56.5	1.1	55.4	2.2	53.2	5.1	(x)	38.3
1976	100.0	62.0	57.3	1.1	56.2	2.1	54.1	4.7	(x)	38.0
1977	100.0	62.6	58.3	1.0	57.3	2.0	55.2	4.4	(x)	37.4
1978	100.0	63.5	59.7	1.0	58.7	2.1	56.7	3.8	(x)	36.5
1979	100.0	64.0	60.3	1.0	59.4	2.0	57.4	3.7	(x)	36.0
1980	100.0	64.1	59.6	.9	58.6	2.0	56.7	4.5	(x)	35.9
1981	100.0	64.2	59.4	1.0	58.4	2.0	56.5	4.8	(x)	35.8
1982	100.0	64.3	58.2	1.0	57.2	2.0	55.3	6.1	(x)	35.7
1983 June ³	100.0	64.6	58.3	.9	57.3	2.0	55.3	6.3	(x)	35.4
Male 1950	100.0	66.7	62.4	2.2	60.2	11.6	68.6	4.3	(x)	13.3
1960	100.0	63.9	59.5	3.2	57.4	7.8	66.6	4.3	(x)	16.1
1970	100.0	60.3	56.9	3.1	53.8	4.3	60.4	3.4	(x)	19.7
1975	100.0	57.4	52.3	2.2	50.2	3.8	56.4	6.0	(x)	21.6
1980	100.0	57.8	52.5	1.8	50.7	3.3	57.4	5.3	(x)	22.2
1982	100.0	57.0	52.6	1.8	49.8	3.3	56.5	7.4	(x)	23.0
Female 1950	100.0	33.9	32.0	(z)	31.9	2.1	29.8	1.9	(x)	66.1
1960	100.0	37.8	35.5	(z)	35.5	1.6	33.9	2.2	(x)	62.2
1970	100.0	43.4	40.8	(z)	40.8	.8	39.9	2.5	(x)	56.6
1975	100.0	46.4	42.1	(z)	42.0	.7	41.3	4.3	(x)	53.6
1980	100.0	51.6	47.7	.1	47.6	.7	46.9	3.8	(x)	48.4
1982	100.0	52.7	47.7	.2	47.6	.7	46.9	5.0	(x)	47.3

X Not applicable Z Less than .05 ¹ Includes resident Armed Forces ² Unemployment as a percent of the labor force, including resident Armed Forces ³ Seasonally adjusted, except for population and resident Armed Forces.

Source: U.S. Bureau of Labor Statistics, *Employment and Earnings*, monthly

major groups was changed to form more "families" of occupations. This applies especially to the "professional" and "service" major groups. Although there was an effort to limit changes between major groups, there were many cases where such changes were necessary. One such change is the treatment of apprentices. They were moved from "operatives" to "craftsmen" and are classified as a subcategory of their craft.

Two other changes in the census have an important effect on comparability: (1) The allocation of "not reported" cases to the major groups in 1970 increased the size of those totals relative to the totals for 1950 and 1960 when there was no allocation of these characteristics; and (2) the age coverage for statistics on these subjects to accord with past and current definitions of the labor force, as indicated in the table for series D 182-232.

The population census occupational classification system is generally comparable with the system used in U.S. Bureau of Employment Security, *Dictionary of Occupational Titles* (DOT), 3d edition, with the exception of the blue collar workers (i.e. manual and service workers). The DOT structure for these occupations is quite differ-

ent from that used by the Bureau of the Census. An important reason for this is that the two systems are designed to meet different needs and to be used under different circumstances. The DOT system is designed primarily for employment service needs, such as placement and counseling, and is ordinarily used to classify very detailed occupational information obtained in an interview with the worker himself. The census system, on the other hand, is designed for statistical purposes and is ordinarily used in the classification of limited occupational descriptions obtained in a self-enumeration questionnaire or in an interview with a member of the worker's family.

D 233-682. Detailed occupation of the economically active population, 1900-1970.

Source: See source for series D 182-232.

Dashes (—) are used in the columns of this table to denote that comparable data are not available because of changes in definitions and occupations.

See also text for series D 182-232.

Series D 1-10. Labor Force and Its Components: 1900 to 1947

(In thousands of persons 14 years old and over. Annual averages)

Year	Total labor force		Armed Forces	Civilian labor force	Employed			Unemployed		
	Number	Percent of noninstitutional population			Total	Farm	Nonfarm	Total	Percent of—	
									Civilian labor force	Nonfarm employees
1	2	3	4	5	6	7	8	9	10	
1947	61,755	57.4	1,590	60,165	57,812	8,256	49,557	2,356	3.9	5.4
1946	60,970	57.2	3,450	57,520	55,250	8,320	46,930	2,270	3.9	5.5
1945	65,290	61.9	11,430	53,860	52,820	8,580	44,240	1,040	1.9	2.7
1944	66,040	63.1	11,410	54,630	53,960	8,950	45,010	670	1.2	1.7
1943	64,560	62.3	9,020	55,540	54,470	9,080	45,390	1,070	1.9	2.7
1942	60,380	58.3	3,970	56,410	53,750	9,250	44,500	2,660	4.7	6.8
1941	57,530	56.7	1,620	55,910	50,350	9,100	41,250	5,560	9.9	14.4
1940	56,180	56.0	540	55,640	47,820	9,540	37,980	8,120	14.6	21.3
1939	55,588	56.0	370	55,218	45,738	9,710	36,028	9,480	17.2	25.2
1938	54,872	56.0	340	54,532	44,142	9,840	34,302	10,390	19.1	27.9
1937	54,068	55.9	320	53,768	46,068	10,000	36,068	7,700	14.3	21.3
1936	53,319	55.7	300	53,019	43,989	10,090	33,899	9,030	17.0	25.4
1935	52,553	55.6	270	52,283	41,673	10,110	31,563	10,610	20.3	30.2
1934	51,910	55.7	260	51,650	40,310	9,990	30,320	11,340	22.0	32.6
1933	51,132	55.6	250	50,882	38,052	10,090	27,962	12,830	25.2	37.6
1932	50,348	55.4	250	50,098	38,038	10,120	27,918	12,060	24.1	36.3
1931	49,585	55.2	260	49,325	41,305	10,240	31,065	8,020	16.3	25.2
1930	48,783	55.0	260	48,523	44,183	10,340	33,843	4,340	8.9	14.2
1929	48,017	55.1	260	47,757	46,207	10,541	35,666	1,550	3.2	5.3
1928	47,367	55.2	262	47,105	45,123	10,497	34,626	1,982	4.2	6.9
1927	46,634	55.2	259	46,375	44,856	10,529	34,327	1,519	3.3	5.4
1926	45,885	55.3	256	45,629	44,828	10,690	34,138	801	1.8	2.9
1925	45,431	55.4	262	45,169	43,716	10,662	33,054	1,453	3.2	5.4
1924	44,502	55.5	267	44,235	42,045	10,599	31,446	2,190	5.0	8.3
1923	43,699	55.8	255	43,444	42,395	10,621	31,774	1,049	2.4	4.1
1922	42,772	55.7	276	42,496	39,637	10,561	29,076	2,859	6.7	11.4
1921	42,341	55.9	362	41,979	37,061	10,443	26,618	4,918	11.7	19.5
1920	41,720	55.6	380	41,340	39,208	10,440	28,768	2,132	6.2	8.6
1919	41,239	56.4	1,543	39,696	39,150	10,498	28,652	546	1.4	2.4
1918	41,980	57.7	2,904	39,076	38,540	10,674	27,866	536	1.4	2.4
1917	40,742	56.6	719	40,023	38,175	10,788	27,387	1,848	4.6	8.2
1916	40,238	56.6	181	40,057	38,014	10,802	27,212	2,043	5.1	9.1
1915	39,774	56.8	174	39,600	36,223	10,953	25,270	3,377	8.5	15.6
1914	39,564	57.3	163	39,401	36,401	10,945	25,456	3,120	7.9	14.7
1913	38,832	57.3	157	38,675	37,004	10,974	26,030	1,671	4.3	8.0
1912	38,081	57.4	149	37,932	36,173	11,136	25,037	1,759	4.6	9.2
1911	37,623	57.6	145	37,478	34,960	11,107	23,853	2,518	6.7	13.0
1910	36,850	57.4	141	36,709	34,559	11,260	23,299	2,150	5.9	11.6
1909	35,855	57.2	134	35,721	33,897	11,163	22,734	1,824	5.1	10.3
1908	35,039	57.2	123	34,916	32,136	11,238	20,898	2,780	8.0	16.4
1907	34,295	57.2	112	34,183	33,238	11,493	21,745	945	2.8	6.0
1906	33,321	56.8	109	33,212	32,638	11,479	21,159	874	1.7	3.9
1905	32,408	56.5	108	32,299	30,918	11,187	19,731	1,381	4.3	9.5
1904	31,548	56.3	107	31,441	29,750	11,076	18,674	1,691	5.4	12.0
1903	30,804	56.2	106	30,698	29,494	10,869	18,625	1,204	3.9	9.0
1902	30,012	56.0	106	29,904	28,807	10,753	18,054	1,097	3.7	8.6
1901	29,268	55.8	115	29,153	27,948	10,916	17,032	1,205	4.0	10.1
1900	28,500	55.8	124	28,376	26,956	11,050	16,906	1,420	5.0	12.6



ASSERTION B

"WITH SIX AND A HALF MILLION NEW JOBS."

- o In December 1982, at the trough of the recession, a total of only 100.6 million Americans were working in the United States. But by July of 1984 (most recent figures), a total of 107.1 million Americans were employed. This represents a net gain of 6.5 million jobs. (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics.)
- o Department of Labor statistics indicate that 6.4 million civilian jobs have been gained over the course of the recovery. (Source: Bureau of Labor Statistics)
- o Unemployment fell for the first time below the rate inherited by the Reagan administration--7.5 percent in January 1981--as 460,000 more Americans found work in June. The rate peaked during the last recession at 10.7 percent in December 1982. Since then the economy has added 6.7 million jobs.
 - "U.S. Jobless Rate Hits 4-Year Low," The Washington Post, July 7, 1984 (emphasis added)
- o "Civilian employment surged last month [May], with 890,000 new jobs added to the economy . . . [I]t was the second best post-war employment gain . . . exceeded only by the 981,000 jobs added in June of last year"
 - "Jobless Rate Declines in May to 7.5% as New Jobs Surge," The Washington Post, June 2, 1984

News

U.S. Department of Labor
Bureau of Labor Statistics
Washington, D.C. 20212



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THE EMPLOYMENT SITUATION: JULY 1984

Unemployment rose in July, returning to the May level, while the two major employment measures showed differing movements, the Bureau of Labor Statistics of the U.S. Department of Labor reported today. The overall jobless rate, which includes the resident Armed Forces in the labor force base, was 7.4 percent, and the rate for civilian workers was 7.5 percent. Each measure rose four-tenths of a percentage point over the month, after identical declines in June.

Total civilian employment--as measured by the monthly survey of households--fell by 350,000 in July after seasonal adjustment to 105.4 million. This first decline in the series in one and a half years, followed 2 months of exceptionally large increases. In contrast, the number of employees on nonagricultural payrolls--as measured by the monthly survey of establishments--rose by 300,000 over the month, continuing the steady growth that has occurred since early 1983. Despite these differing directions in July, the household series shows employment growth of 6.4 million over the course of the recovery, compared with job gains of 5.7 million in the payroll series.

Unemployment (Household Survey Data)

The number of unemployed persons increased to 8.5 million from June to July after seasonal adjustment, and the civilian worker unemployment rate rose to 7.5 percent; both figures returned to the levels posted in May. Since November 1982, the number of unemployed persons has declined by 3.3 million, and the jobless rate has dropped by 3.2 percentage points. (See table A-2.)

The July increase occurred primarily among adult women, whose jobless rate returned to the level that had essentially prevailed between February and May. The rate for adult men edged up to 6.5 percent, the same as in May, but was still below the rates posted earlier this year. Unemployment increased among both white and black workers. While the rate for white teenagers changed little, the rate for black youth, which is subject to wide fluctuation, rose by 8 percentage points in July to 42.4 percent; it had declined by a similar magnitude in June. (See tables A-2 and A-3.)

Most of the July increase took place among workers who had lost their jobs. There was little or no over-the-month change in either the number of persons who were on layoff (expecting to be recalled to their job), had left their job voluntarily, or were entering or reentering the labor force. The number of short-term (less than 5 weeks) and medium-term (5 to 14 weeks) jobless workers rose in July, while the number of long-term unemployed (15 weeks and over) was about unchanged. (See tables A-7 and A-8.)

Civilian Employment and the Labor Force (Household Survey Data)

Civilian employment fell by 355,000 over the month to 105.4 million, seasonally adjusted, after rising by 1.3 million in the prior 2 months. Civilian employment was 6.4 million above the November 1982 recession trough. (See table A-2.)

The civilian labor force was 113.9 million in July, unchanged from June. The proportion of the civilian working-age population in the labor force was 64.6 percent, the same as in the previous 2 months. Over the year, the labor force grew by 2.2 million, and the participation rate was up by about half a percentage point.



Centennial
of Labor
Statistics

ASSERTION C

"THE BEST GROWTH OPPORTUNITY SINCE WORLD WAR II."

- o This year the Gross National Product has risen at an average rate of 8.8%. This represents the highest rate of growth since 1943. (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis)
- o The first quarter GNP of 10.1% is the highest recorded GNP since 1943. (Source: Bureau of Economic Analysis)
- o In February 1984, total industrial production rose 15.9%. On a yearly basis since 1945, production has never risen this much. (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
- o During the one year period between June 1983 and June 1984, industrial production rose by an average of 13.7%. This was the highest annual rise since 1950, just five years after World War II. (Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System)
- o For the last 18 months, the boom in capital investment has been the strongest since World War II, which economists attribute in part to the Reagan Administration's large tax cuts for capital goods"
 - "Economic Growth at High 7.5% Rate in Second Quarter," The New York Times, July 24, 1984 (emphasis added)
- o The growth of productivity in the private sector, which averaged around 3% in the two decades after World War II, slid to an anemic rate of less than 2% from 1970-78 and was virtually flat from 1978 through 1982, the worst performance since the early days of the Depression. Now some experts predict that annual growth rates in output per work hour in the nonfarm sector could run as high as 3% a year for the rest of this decade"
 - "The Revival of Productivity," Businessweek, February 13, 1984

CHANGES IN GNP, PERSONAL CONSUMPTION EXPENDITURES, AND RELATED PRICE MEASURES

[Percent change from previous period, quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates.]

Period	Gross national product					Personal consumption expenditures				
	Current dollars	Constant (1972) dollars	Implicit price deflator	Chain price index	Fixed-weighted price index (1972 weights)	Current dollars	Constant (1972) dollars	Implicit price deflator	Chain price index	Fixed-weighted price index (1972 weights)
1972	10.1	5.7	4.2	4.1	4.0	9.6	5.8	3.7	3.6	3.5
1973	11.8	5.8	5.8	6.0	6.0	10.2	4.2	5.7	6.1	6.1
1974	8.1	- .6	8.8	9.1	9.4	9.4	- .7	10.1	10.4	10.4
1975	8.0	- 1.2	9.3	9.2	9.1	9.9	2.2	7.6	7.7	7.8
1976	10.9	5.4	5.2	5.7	5.8	11.0	5.6	5.1	5.3	5.3
1977	11.7	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.3	11.1	5.0	5.8	6.0	6.2
1978	12.8	5.0	7.4	7.6	7.8	11.8	4.5	7.0	7.3	7.4
1979	11.7	2.8	8.6	8.9	9.5	11.9	2.7	9.0	9.3	9.7
1980	8.8	- .3	9.2	8.9	9.8	10.7	.5	10.2	10.7	11.1
1981 ^r	12.4	2.5	9.6	9.5	9.7	10.9	2.0	8.7	9.2	9.4
1982 ^r	3.8	- 2.1	6.0	6.6	6.4	7.3	1.4	5.9	6.1	5.9
1983 ^r	7.7	3.7	3.8	4.3	4.2	8.6	4.8	3.7	4.1	4.0
1982: I ^r	- .2	- 4.6	4.6	6.0	5.6	8.6	2.9	5.5	5.7	5.4
1982: II ^r	4.7	- .8	5.6	5.3	4.7	6.3	2.2	4.0	4.2	3.7
1982: III ^r	2.5	- .9	3.4	5.8	5.8	8.5	2.2	6.1	6.3	6.6
1982: IV ^r	3.9	.5	3.4	5.0	4.6	7.3	5.1	4.0	5.0	4.9
1983: I ^r	8.5	3.3	5.0	3.4	3.3	4.8	2.6	2.2	2.5	1.9
1983: II ^r	12.3	9.4	2.6	4.3	4.1	14.5	10.0	4.1	4.4	4.5
1983: III ^r	10.1	6.8	3.1	4.4	4.7	7.6	3.8	3.7	3.7	3.9
1983: IV ^r	10.6	5.9	4.4	4.1	3.9	9.2	6.8	2.3	3.6	3.4
1984: I ^r	14.9	10.1	4.4	4.9	5.0	8.6	4.6	3.8	4.7	4.9
1984: II ^r	10.9	7.5	3.2	3.4	3.5	9.1	6.9	2.1	3.1	2.9

NOTE.—Annual changes are from previous year and quarterly changes are from previous quarter. Series revised beginning 1981.

Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

NONFINANCIAL CORPORATE BUSINESS—OUTPUT, COSTS, AND PROFITS

[Quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates.]

Period	Gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business (billions of dollars)		Current-dollar cost and profit per unit of output (dollars) ¹							Output per hour of all employees (1972 dollars)	Completion per hour of all employees (dollars)	
	Current dollars	1972 dollars	Total cost and profit ²	Capital consumption allowances with capital consumption adjustment	Indirect business taxes ³	Compensation of employees	Net interest	Corporate profits with inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments				
								Total	Profits tax liability			Profits after tax ⁴
1972	678.0	678.0	1.000	0.092	0.113	0.659	0.028	0.107	0.049	0.058	7.664	5.052
1973	759.4	731.9	1.038	.093	.114	.692	.031	.107	.055	.053	7.849	5.429
1974	818.9	708.2	1.156	.112	.127	.786	.042	.090	.059	.030	7.555	5.957
1975	890.0	694.2	1.282	.137	.140	.837	.044	.124	.059	.065	7.774	6.507
1976	1,001.3	745.5	1.343	.141	.141	.878	.040	.144	.071	.073	7.998	7.021
1977	1,128.4	795.8	1.418	.145	.141	.928	.040	.163	.075	.088	8.141	7.555
1978	1,276.2	846.3	1.508	.155	.144	.998	.044	.168	.079	.089	8.209	8.191
1979	1,416.8	876.1	1.617	.171	.149	1.094	.050	.154	.079	.075	8.194	8.961
1980	1,540.7	859.5	1.793	.198	.172	1.218	.065	.140	.078	.062	8.118	9.884
1981 ^r	1,739.2	883.3	1.969	.217	.201	1.307	.076	.167	.072	.095	8.271	10.811
1982 ^r	1,778.4	857.4	2.074	.245	.210	1.397	.084	.138	.052	.086	8.357	11.677
1983 ^r	1,917.7	896.4	2.139	.243	.219	1.409	.077	.191	.065	.126	8.634	12.166
1982: III ^r	1,787.8	858.5	2.083	.247	.211	1.404	.080	.141	.052	.089	8.406	11.801
1982: IV ^r	1,772.4	846.5	2.094	.254	.217	1.419	.081	.123	.043	.080	8.398	11.913
1983: I ^r	1,812.3	855.7	2.118	.250	.218	1.421	.079	.151	.049	.102	8.464	12.027
1983: II ^r	1,887.6	886.2	2.130	.243	.222	1.408	.076	.182	.064	.118	8.617	12.131
1983: III ^r	1,956.6	912.4	2.144	.241	.220	1.400	.077	.206	.073	.133	8.728	12.224
1983: IV ^r	2,014.2	931.1	2.163	.239	.219	1.408	.077	.221	.072	.149	8.725	12.283
1984: I ^r	2,084.2	956.9	2.178	.236	.217	1.415	.078	.233	.078	.155	8.801	12.454

¹ Output is measured by gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business in 1972 dollars.

² This is equal to the deflator for gross domestic product of nonfinancial corporate business with the decimal point shifted two places to the left.

³ Indirect business tax and nontax liability plus business transfer payments less subsidies.

⁴ With inventory valuation and capital consumption adjustments.

NOTE.—Series revised beginning 1981, except last two columns beginning 1976.

Sources: Department of Commerce (Bureau of Economic Analysis) and Department of Labor (Bureau of Labor Statistics).

TABLE B-5.—Changes in gross national product, personal consumption expenditures, and related price measures, 1929-83

[Percent change from preceding period; quarterly data at seasonally adjusted annual rates]

Year or quarter	Gross national product					Personal consumption expenditures				
	Current dollars	Constant (1972) dollars	Implicit price deflator	Chain price index	Fixed-weighted price index (1972 weights)	Current dollars	Constant (1972) dollars	Implicit price deflator	Chain price index	Fixed-weighted price index (1972 weights)
1929	6.6	6.6	0.0							
1933	-4.2	-2.2	-2.1			-5.7	-2.0	-3.8		
1939	7.0	7.8	-0.8			4.6	5.3	-0.7		
1940	10.0	7.6	2.2			6.0	4.6	1.3		
1941	25.0	16.3	7.5			13.8	5.9	7.4		
1942	26.7	15.3	9.9			9.7	-1.0	10.8		
1943	21.3	15.1	5.3			12.2	2.9	9.0		
1944	9.6	7.1	2.4			8.8	2.8	5.8		
1945	9	-1.5	2.4			10.5	6.2	4.1		
1946	-1.2	-14.7	15.7			20.3	11.1	8.3		
1947	11.1	-1.7	12.9			12.5	1.6	10.7		
1948	11.3	4.1	6.9			8.0	2.1	5.8		
1949	-5	5	-9			1.9	2.3	-3		
1950	10.9	8.7	2.1			7.8	5.6	2.0		
1951	15.5	8.3	6.6			7.9	1.3	6.5		
1952	5.2	3.7	1.4			4.8	2.5	2.3		
1953	5.4	3.8	1.6			5.8	3.8	1.9		
1954	0	-1.2	1.2			2.7	1.8	0.9		
1955	9.0	6.7	2.2			7.6	6.5	1.0		
1956	5.4	2.1	3.2			4.9	2.9	1.9		
1957	5.3	1.8	3.4			5.4	2.1	3.3		
1958	1.3	-4	1.7			3.2	1.0	2.2		
1959	8.5	5.0	2.4			7.4	5.4	1.9		
1960	3.8	2.2	1.6	16	1.5	4.5	2.6	1.9	17	1.5
1961	3.6	2.6	0.9	12	1.1	3.1	2.1	1.0	11	0.9
1962	7.7	5.8	1.8	14	1.2	6.0	4.5	1.5	11	0.9
1963	5.6	4.0	1.5	13	1.1	5.5	3.8	1.6	14	1.2
1964	6.9	5.3	1.5	14	1.2	6.9	5.5	1.4	14	1.1
1965	8.4	6.0	2.2	19	1.7	7.5	5.6	1.8	15	1.3
1966	9.4	6.0	3.2	31	2.9	8.1	5.1	2.9	27	2.4
1967	5.8	-7	3.0	30	3.0	5.4	2.9	2.4	25	2.4
1968	9.2	4.6	4.4	43	4.1	9.5	5.3	4.0	38	3.6
1969	8.1	2.6	5.1	50	5.0	8.4	3.7	4.5	45	4.4
1970	5.2	-2	5.4	53	5.2	6.9	2.2	4.6	46	4.5
1971	8.6	3.4	5.0	4.9	4.8	8.1	3.7	4.3	4.3	4.2
1972	10.1	5.7	4.2	4.1	4.0	9.6	5.8	3.7	3.6	3.5
1973	11.8	5.8	5.8	6.0	6.0	10.2	4.2	5.7	6.1	6.1
1974	8.1	-6	8.8	9.1	9.4	9.4	-7	10.1	10.4	10.4
1975	8.0	1.2	9.3	9.2	9.1	9.9	2.2	7.6	7.7	7.8
1976	10.9	5.4	5.2	5.7	5.8	11.0	5.6	5.1	5.3	5.3
1977	11.7	5.5	5.8	6.1	6.3	11.1	5.0	5.8	6.0	6.2
1978	12.8	5.0	7.4	7.6	7.8	11.8	4.5	7.0	7.3	7.4
1979	11.7	2.8	8.6	8.9	9.5	11.9	2.7	9.0	9.3	9.7
1980	8.8	-3	9.2	8.9	9.8	10.7	5	10.2	10.7	11.1
1981	12.2	2.6	9.4	9.4	9.5	11.3	2.7	8.4	9.0	9.2
1982	4.0	-1.5	6.0	6.5	6.4	7.3	1.4	5.8	5.9	5.7
1983	7.7	3.3	4.2	4.4	4.3	8.4	4.2	4.0	4.2	4.1
1981										
I	20.5	9.0	10.6	9.6	10.2	14.7	5.9	8.3	9.9	10.6
II	6.6	7	5.9	7.6	7.9	7.5	5	7.0	7.3	7.5
III	13.3	2.6	9.4	9.0	8.9	11.4	3.5	7.7	7.8	7.5
IV	3.7	4.9	9.0	8.2	8.4	3.9	-3.0	7.0	7.0	6.8
1982										
I	-1.4	-5.5	4.3	5.6	5.3	7.5	2.4	5.0	5.2	4.8
II	6.6	1.0	5.6	5.2	4.7	7.2	3.1	4.0	3.9	3.5
III	2	-1.0	3.7	5.9	5.9	7.5	9	6.5	6.4	6.7
IV	2.1	-1.3	3.8	5.0	4.7	7.8	3.6	4.1	5.1	5.1
1983										
I	8.2	2.6	5.5	3.6	3.4	5.2	2.9	2.2	2.3	1.6
II	13.3	9.7	3.3	4.3	4.3	15.1	10.0	4.6	4.7	4.9
III	11.5	7.6	3.6	4.5	4.7	6.5	2.2	4.2	4.2	4.4
IV	8.6	4.5	3.9	4.6	4.5	9.9	6.5	3.1	4.5	4.5

Note.—Changes are based on unrounded data and may differ slightly from changes computed from data shown elsewhere in these tables


Source: Department of Commerce, Bureau of Economic Analysis.

PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY



INDUSTRIAL PRODUCTION AND CAPACITY UTILIZATION

Industrial production rose 0.5 percent in June following an increase of 0.4 percent in May. The index for June was 11.7 percent above its year earlier level.


INDEX, 1967 = 100* (RATIO SCALE)



INDEX, 1967 = 100* (RATIO SCALE)



PERCENT*



SEASONALLY ADJUSTED
SOURCE: BOARD OF GOVERNORS OF THE FEDERAL RESERVE SYSTEM

SOURCE: ECONOMIC ADVISERS

[Monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Period	Total industrial production		Industry production index - 1967=100					Capacity utilization rate, percent (Federal Reserve series) ¹	
	Index, 1967=100	Percent change from year earlier	Manufacturing			Mining	Utilities	Manufacturing	Industrial materials
			Total	Durable	Nondurable				
1967 proportion	100.00		87.97	57.98	35.97	6.36	5.69		
1974	129.3	-0.4	129.4	125.7	134.6	115.3	143.7	83.7	87.0
1975	117.8	-8.9	116.5	109.3	126.4	112.8	146.0	72.9	73.3
1976	130.5	10.8	130.3	122.3	141.8	114.2	151.7	79.6	81.1
1977	138.2	5.9	138.4	130.0	150.5	118.2	156.5	82.2	82.6
1978	146.1	5.7	146.8	139.7	156.9	124.0	161.4	84.7	85.6
1979	152.5	4.4	153.6	146.4	164.0	125.5	166.0	86.0	87.6
1980	147.0	-3.6	146.7	136.7	161.2	132.7	168.3	79.6	80.4
1981	151.0	2.7	150.4	140.5	164.8	142.2	169.1	79.4	80.7
1982	138.6	-8.2	137.6	124.7	156.2	126.1	165.7	71.1	70.1
1983	147.6	6.5	148.2	134.5	168.1	116.6	172.4	75.2	75.2
1983: June	146.4	5.6	147.4	133.2	167.8	112.6	169.8	74.9	74.4
July	149.7	7.9	150.6	136.8	170.6	115.0	176.0	76.4	76.5
Aug	151.8	9.7	152.8	138.8	172.9	116.1	179.3	77.3	77.4
Sept	153.8	12.0	155.1	141.6	174.6	117.1	179.3	78.4	78.6
Oct	155.0	14.2	156.2	142.8	175.6	118.3	176.5	78.9	79.5
Nov	155.3	15.1	156.4	143.6	174.8	121.1	176.3	78.8	79.6
Dec	156.2	15.5	156.8	145.0	173.9	123.7	182.5	78.9	79.6
1984: Jan	158.5	15.4	159.5	148.6	175.2	124.8	181.0	80.1	80.6
Feb	160.0	15.9	161.4	150.5	177.2	124.1	176.5	80.9	81.9
Mar	160.8	14.9	162.1	151.4	177.6	123.8	180.0	81.0	82.2
Apr	162.2	13.7	163.6	152.8	179.2	123.1	182.9	81.6	82.7
May	162.8	12.7	164.2	153.3	179.9	124.6	182.5	81.7	82.7
June	163.6	11.7	164.8	154.1	180.2	126.0	185.1	81.8	82.9

¹ Output as percent of capacity

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System

PRODUCTION AND BUSINESS ACTIVITY

TABLE B-42.—Industrial production indexes, major industry divisions, 1929-83

[1967=100, monthly data seasonally adjusted]

Year or month	% Change from year earlier	Total industrial production	Manufacturing			Mining	Utilities
			Total	Durable	Non-durable		
1967 proportion.....		100.00	87.95	51.98	35.97	6.36	5.69
1929.....		21.6	22.8	22.5	23.2	43.1	7.4
1933.....		13.7	14.0	9.1	19.9	30.6	6.7
1939.....		21.7	21.5	17.7	26.1	42.1	10.7
1940.....		25.0	25.4	23.5	27.5	46.8	11.8
1941.....		31.6	32.4	31.4	33.3	49.7	13.3
1942.....		36.3	37.8	39.9	34.6	51.3	14.9
1943.....		44.0	47.0	54.2	37.1	52.5	16.5
1944.....		47.4	50.9	59.9	38.6	56.2	17.5
1945.....	-14.1	40.7	42.6	45.2	38.5	55.1	17.8
1946.....	-10.6	35.0	35.3	31.6	39.7	54.2	18.6
1947.....	+12.6	39.4	39.4	37.7	41.3	61.3	20.1
1948.....	+4.3	41.1	40.9	39.3	42.7	64.4	22.4
1949.....	+5.6	38.8	38.7	35.7	42.0	57.1	23.9
1950.....	+15.7	44.9	45.0	43.5	46.7	63.8	27.2
1951.....	+8.5	48.7	48.6	48.9	48.3	70.0	31.0
1952.....	+3.7	50.6	50.6	51.9	49.2	69.4	33.7
1953.....	+8.3	54.8	55.2	58.7	51.2	71.2	36.5
1954.....	+5.3	51.9	51.5	51.8	51.6	69.9	39.3
1955.....	+12.5	58.5	58.2	59.2	57.2	77.9	43.9
1956.....	+4.4	61.1	60.5	61.1	60.1	82.0	48.2
1957.....	+1.3	61.9	61.2	61.6	61.1	82.1	51.5
1958.....	+6.5	57.9	57.0	59.9	61.6	75.3	53.9
1959.....	+1.9	64.8	64.2	61.9	67.7	78.7	59.3
1960.....	+2.2	66.2	65.4	62.9	69.3	80.3	63.4
1961.....	+0.5	66.7	65.6	61.8	71.5	80.8	67.0
1962.....	+0.2	72.2	71.5	68.5	75.8	83.1	72.0
1963.....	+6.0	76.5	75.8	73.1	80.0	86.4	77.0
1964.....	+6.5	81.7	81.0	78.3	85.2	89.9	83.6
1965.....	+8.9	89.8	89.7	86.0	90.9	93.2	88.7
1966.....	+8.2	97.8	97.9	96.9	96.7	98.2	95.5
1967.....	+100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0	100.0
1968.....	+6.3	106.3	106.4	105.5	106.2	104.2	108.4
1969.....	+5.5	111.1	111.0	110.6	111.5	106.3	117.3
1970.....	+5.0	107.8	106.4	102.3	112.3	112.2	124.5
1971.....	+1.7	109.6	108.2	102.4	116.6	109.8	130.5
1972.....	+1.7	119.7	118.9	115.7	126.5	113.1	139.4
1973.....	+7.4	129.8	129.6	127.1	133.8	114.7	145.4
1974.....	+2.9	129.3	129.4	125.7	134.6	115.3	143.7
1975.....	+17.8	117.8	116.3	109.3	126.4	112.8	146.0
1976.....	+130.5	130.5	130.3	122.3	141.8	114.2	151.7
1977.....	+138.2	138.4	138.0	130.0	150.5	118.2	156.5
1978.....	+146.1	146.8	146.8	139.7	156.9	124.0	161.4
1979.....	+152.5	152.5	153.6	146.4	164.0	125.5	166.0
1980.....	+147.0	147.0	146.7	136.7	161.2	132.7	168.3
1981.....	+151.0	151.0	150.4	140.5	164.8	142.2	169.1
1982.....	+138.6	138.6	137.6	124.7	156.2	126.1	168.7
1983.....	+147.7	147.7	148.5	134.6	168.5	116.5	172.7
1982.....							
Jan.....		140.7	138.5	127.1	155.1	144.5	171.8
Feb.....		142.9	140.9	129.3	157.8	142.4	170.4
Mar.....		141.7	140.1	128.2	157.3	138.1	170.0
Apr.....		140.2	138.7	126.7	156.1	134.1	171.0
May.....		139.2	137.9	126.1	155.0	128.9	170.9
June.....		138.7	137.7	125.5	155.3	123.5	169.4
July.....		138.8	138.1	125.9	155.7	120.1	167.7
Aug.....		138.4	138.0	124.9	156.9	116.9	168.5
Sept.....		137.3	137.1	123.5	156.7	114.7	167.5
Oct.....		135.7	135.0	120.3	156.2	115.9	167.8
Nov.....		134.9	134.0	119.3	155.3	116.8	166.7
Dec.....		135.2	134.5	119.9	155.6	118.4	164.2
1983.....							
Jan.....		137.4	136.7	122.5	157.4	121.9	163.1
Feb.....		138.1	138.2	123.9	159.0	115.6	162.0
Mar.....		140.0	140.4	126.3	160.7	112.6	165.8
Apr.....		142.6	143.1	129.1	163.3	111.6	169.3
May.....		144.4	145.1	131.0	165.4	112.8	169.7
June.....		146.4	147.4	133.2	167.8	112.6	169.8
July.....		149.7	150.6	136.8	170.6	115.0	176.0
Aug.....		151.8	152.8	138.8	172.9	116.1	179.3
Sept.....		153.8	155.1	141.6	174.6	117.1	179.3
Oct.....		155.0	156.4	143.0	175.8	118.6	176.9
Nov.....		156.1	157.2	144.0	176.3	120.9	178.8
Dec.....		156.9	157.8	145.0	176.3	123.4	183.4

Source: Board of Governors of the Federal Reserve System.