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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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FOIA ID: F98-024

Date: 08/17/1999

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1.. Memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane re: Central America. 1p. <i>R, 6/30/00 NLSF 98-024/2 #4</i>	3/23/84	P1, F1
2. Memo	Charles Hill to McFarlane re: Central America. 3p. <i>" " " #5</i>	3/22/84	P1, F1

### RESTRICTIONS

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
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- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-5 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

TENTATIVE AGENDA FOR BREAKFAST  
MEETING ON CENTRAL AMERICA

- 7:45 a.m. Senators to arrive -- juice and coffee to be served.
- 8:00 a.m. Participants to be seated; breakfast is served; Jim Baker or Bud McFarlane to open meeting with brief comments on our Central America strategy.
- 8:10 a.m. Secretary Shultz to make comments.
- 8:20 a.m. Secretary Weinberger to make comments.
- 8:30 a.m. Jim Baker or Bud McFarlane to ask Senator Howard Baker to begin general discussion.
- 8:50 a.m. Jim Baker or Bud McFarlane to summarize and close meeting.

RECEIVED  
1984 JUL 24 PM 3:59

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

July 24, 1984



*THE PRESIDENT*

MEMORANDUM FOR RICHARD DARMAN

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Last Minute Items for  
Press Conference

Dick,

Attached are some points on foreign  
policy issues which could come up tonight.  
If you are sending other material to the  
President, please include them.

Bud

## Israeli Elections

### Background

- o Sensitive coalition negotiations are under way between the two large parties and small parties.
- o Anything we might say could become a factor in these negotiations, and we should therefore not comment.

### Points

- o Laud the robustness of the political process in Israel -- as over 78% of the people voted.
- o We look forward to working with the new government.

## Central America

(Note: some press reports seemed to indicate that President was not strongly urging continued US aid for the contras in Nicaragua. In fact, there might have been a slight problem in understanding all the English phrases that were used. In subsequent TV appearances, he said that aid for the contras IS related to what's happening in El Salvador!)

- o There are urgent needs in Central America:
  - Early enactment of pending supplemental which provides urgently needed economic and security assistance.
  - Longer term -- the Henry Jackson Plan, which includes 5-year program for peaceful development

## Polish Release

- o The Polish Government's announced intention to release all political prisoners represents an important and relevant step toward national reconciliation in Poland.
- o We have the Polish Parliament's decree currently under consideration and shall respond to this most welcomed measure when our review is completed.
- o This is a positive move.
- o We will be consulting with our Allies before deciding any next steps.
- o We hope the release of the political prisoners will lead the Polish authorities to take further steps to meet the aspirations so clearly expressed by the Polish people.
- o Lasting political, economic and social stability in Poland can only be achieved through genuine dialogue between the government and the people.

(Note: There are several possible initiatives under discussion such as admitting Poland to the IMF, giving Poland MNF - Most Favored Nation status, lifting other economic sanctions, etc. But these are all very sensitive and need to be thoroughly analyzed. It is too early to speculate on what our actions will be. We will discuss this with you Wednesday a.m.)

## Vienna Talks

- o We have accepted their proposal for a meeting without any preconditions.
- o We are in contact with the Soviets in normal diplomatic channels to work out the arrangements.
- o Assuming they have no preconditions, we assume the conference will take place.

(Note: Soviets have asked for a moratorium on all ASAT testing and deployment, but have not yet made it clear if they would come to the conference without such a moratorium.)

- o Demanding a moratorium would in effect be a precondition -- we are not imposing any preconditions, and we hope they are not either.

(Note: Soviets asked for a joint statement announcing the conference, which incorporated their original proposal. Yesterday, Speakes said we are pleased that Soviets have now responded to our suggestion that we work out the joint statement -- and we will respond promptly in diplomatic channels). We have done so.



## THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *rcm*

SUBJECT: Drop By Meeting with Council of the Americas

I understand that the possibility of a lunch involving the President and the Council of the Americas (David Rockefeller's Group) which Faith proposed, has been disapproved. I can understand that that much time just may not be available but I would like to ask your consideration of perhaps a 5-minute drop by to a meeting we could arrange at which we would brief the group and the President would say a few words.

The reason is as follows. After talking to Jim and B Oglesby, we have agreed to establish as our priorities for legislative action before the August recess, the '84 Supplemental (which contains our Central America money) and the FY '85 Aid bill (The Jackson Plan). In order to have a shot at getting either or both of these bills moved, we need a massive promotional effort on the Hill (including visits to D.C. by regional leaders, active effort by Kissinger Commission members, op ed pieces and breakfasts by Shultz and others, etc). The Rockefeller Group is perhaps the most credible group on our team (comprising leading business leaders and academics). To get them inspired, it would be extremely helpful to have at least a five-minute show of interest by the President. Could I ask you to consider this, Mike. It would really help us out. Many thanks.

cc: ✓ James A. Baker, III  
Faith Whittlesey  
B. Oglesby

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

June 25, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: ROBERT C. McFARLANE *R.C.M.*

SUBJECT: Leave

Unless you foresee a problem, I would like to take leave after the Congress leaves town for a belated 25th anniversary celebration. It would extend from June 30-July 8.

MEMORANDUM

## NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL



May 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JOHN S. HERRINGTON

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*SUBJECT: Presidential Delegation to Liberation of  
Rome Commemoration

As indicated in my May 14 memo to Jim Baker, NSC endorses State's proposal that the President name an official delegation representing him at the ceremonies commemorating the liberation of Rome on June 2, 1984. State has now formally forwarded a memorandum containing this proposal (Tab A), but suggests that the delegation be kept small and drawn mostly from those with a close connection to the Italian Campaign or to Italy. State has also provided a draft statement from the President which could be read at the principal ceremony.

We agree with State's proposed delegation and statement. However, we also believe it important to seek Congressional representation, especially Senators Dole and Inouye and Congressman Fасcell.

Attachment

Tab A - Incoming State Memo

cc: ✓ James A. Baker, III  
Richard G. Darman  
M.B. Oglesby

A



Washington, D.C. 20520

May 16, 1984

3831

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
AND MR. JOHN S. HERRINGTON  
THE WHITE HOUSE

Subject: Presidential Delegation to Commemorate the  
Liberation of Rome, June 2, 1984

Veterans of the First Special Service Force have been planning to commemorate their spearhead role in the liberation of Rome with the installation of a special plaque at the site of their entry into the city on the 40th anniversary of that event. Recently the Italian Government decided to convert this event into an important political ceremony that will involve both President Pertini and Prime Minister Craxi.

Ambassador Rabb has pointed out the potential symbolic importance of this event for Italo-American relations. He has suggested we use this occasion to emphasize the role of U.S. forces in the liberation of Italy and to recall for new generations of Italians the historic connection between the U.S. and the rebirth of Italian democracy.

Ambassador Rabb has recommended that the President name an official delegation that will represent him at the ceremonies, to be held in Rome on June 2. The Department strongly endorses this recommendation, with the suggestion that the delegation be kept small and that it be drawn largely from those with a close connection either to the Italian campaign or to Italy.

We consider the following to be appropriate members of a Presidential delegation. All of them have already indicated an intention to attend the ceremonies:

Ambassador Maxwell Rabb

General John W. Vessey, Jr., Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff, who received his battlefield commission in the Italian campaign

Secretary of the Army John Marsh

Lieutenant General David E. Grange, Jr., Chairman, Office for Coordination of Army Historical Observances, who served in the Italian campaign

**UNCLASSIFIED**

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- 2-

Ambassador at Large Vernon Walters, who was aide to General Mark Clark during the liberation of Rome

We suggest that this core group be supplemented, if possible, by a number of other prominent officials, including members of Congress. In this regard, seven members of Congress served in the Italian campaign. (A list is attached). All have been contacted previously by Ambassador Rabb and declined to attend. We believe some might reconsider if approached to serve on a Presidential delegation.

As possibilities for a chairman of delegation who would be most effective politically in Italy, we particularly recommend Senator Dole, Representative Fascell, or Senator D'Amato (not an Italian campaign veteran, but an Italo-American political figure who is extremely well known in Italy). We suggest that a senior official, able to speak for the President, seek a commitment from one of these three to serve as chairman.

We suggest that the delegation carry with it a statement from the President which could be read at the principal ceremony. A draft is attached for approval.

The Department of Defense concurs in the above recommendations.



Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

Attachments:

1. List of Members of Congress
2. Draft Statement from the President

UNCLASSIFIED

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *RCM*

SUBJECT: Baker-Javits Position on  
Jerusalem

Upon receipt of your memo, I talked to George Shultz who believes, as I do, that we should not encourage any "compromise" position on the Jerusalem resolution. Our current position of firm opposition to any legislation has led the proponents to reconsider. Although they may, on their own, go ahead with a bill or sense of the House/Senate resolution, we should deal with that after the fact and not indicate any willingness to be gracious about it.

*5/18*  
*Told Javits today -*  
*No. Certainly not now.*  
*JAB III*

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 8, 1984

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES BAKER

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Ruel*  
SUBJECT: President's May 11 Radio Talk

As you know, there is considerable concern over possible erosion of support for the Peacekeeper (MX) in the House and Senate. To complement the two breakfast meetings we are having with key Democrats and Republicans this week, a radio talk by the President this Saturday on the role MX plays for arms control and deterrence would be very timely. With the House vote on MX scheduled next week, there will be little opportunity for other public Presidential statements on the Program's importance before the vote. Let's discuss this at your earliest convenience.

cc: Mike Deaver  
Dick Darman  
B. Oglesby



MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

May 4, 1984

3298



MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES BAKER, III  
MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Rud*

SUBJECT: Poll Data Regarding Nuclear Freeze Issues and  
the President's Strategic Defense Initiative

The attached public opinion poll (Tab A), commissioned by the Committee on the Present Danger, contains results which strongly support the approach to a nuclear freeze, and arms control negotiations in general, adopted by the Administration. The findings, which reveal significant public skepticism that a freeze is in the U.S. interest and support strong verification requirements, also confirm earlier poll results, which I previously forwarded to you, which show broad public support for the goal of the President's strategic defense initiative.

Overall, these poll results are very supportive of the Administration's basic strategic security positions. The results will be useful for incorporating into Presidential remarks in the future.

Attachment

Tab A      Poll Data

TAB A

TAB A

3298



THE UNDER SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20301

20 APR 1984

POLICY

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR  
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: Important Opinion Poll on Defense Spending and  
Nuclear Freeze

Yesterday the Committee on Present Danger released the first part of an opinion poll they had conducted by a very reputable firm (which has worked for several Democratic politicians). It is based on a nationwide sample of 1000 US residents.

The first part of this poll shows that the American people all have widely different ideas to what the freeze means, but are generally in favor of something called "nuclear freeze." Yet, once asked whether they would accept a non-verifiable freeze, 70 percent are against. Also, most Americans are convinced that the Soviets have been violating arms control agreements. This nationwide poll also confirms High Frontier's California poll on Ballistic Missile Defense: three out of four Americans support the development of space-based "defensive weapons."

Of even greater importance, perhaps, are the results to be released next week on the questions of defense spending. Those results will show that that a majority favors either the present level or increased defense spending. Also, most people think we are spending a larger percentage of our GNP on defense and more on nuclear weapons relative to conventional ones, than is the case.

We in DoD intend to draw these findings to the attention of Congress and the public. I believe people in the White House, and perhaps the President himself, may also have opportunities to use them.

  
Fred C. Ikle

Attachment

Cf.  
Faith Whittlesey  
Ron Lehman

Committee on the Present Danger Press Conference

April 19, 1984

Jefferson Hotel

Monticello Room

11:00 A.M.

Attendees:

Air Force Association	Ms. Whittle
Air Force Association	Edgar Ulsamer
Congressional Quarterly	Steve Pressman
Copley News	L. Edgar Prina
Defense Week	Melissa Healy
Journal of Defense & Diplomacy	Jean-Loup R. Combemale
Kiplinger Letters	Admiral James Mayo
News Limited	Peter Samuel
Reuters	Robert Trautman
Scripps-Howard Newspapers	Eric Jennings
USA Today	Leslie Phillips
Washington Post	Mary McGrory
Associated Press	Ira Schwartz
Associated Press	Tim Ahern
CBS - RKO	Neva Grant
Syndicated	Holmes Alexander
Field Newspaper Syndicate	Cord Meyer
Defense Daily	Keith Wallace
Bangor Daily	John Day
German General News Service	Ralf Schultze and Mrs. Schultze (Mariom)
German Democratic-TV	J. Otto
Soviet Embassy	V. Churkin
TASS	Nicholas Orekhov
Embassy of USSR	Michael Lysenko
Kyodo News	Laura Smith
Mainichi News (Japan)	Ken Nakajima
Tokyo Broadcasting System Inc.	Toyohiro Akiyama

HOLD FOR RELEASE  
11:00 A.M. THURSDAY, 19 APRIL 19

COMMITTEE RELEASES NEW NATIONAL POLL ON ATTITUDES TOWARD NUCLEAR  
FREEZE AND NUCLEAR ARMS ISSUES

The Committee on the Present Danger today released the results of a comprehensive, national, in-depth poll on "U.S. Public Attitudes Toward the Nuclear Freeze and Other Nuclear Arms Issues." The poll was conducted for the Committee earlier this month by the independent polling organization of Penn + Schoen Associates.

The nationwide, scientific sample of 1,000 Americans showed strong opposition to a unilateral nuclear freeze and indeed to any arms control agreement that is not verifiable. It also showed strong public conviction that the Soviets are to blame for the breakdown of the Geneva arms control talks, and that they are violating existing arms control agreements. Further, it revealed that an overwhelming majority of Americans do not believe the Soviet Union is "willing to negotiate a nuclear freeze at equal levels of weapons."

The poll showed that a bilateral nuclear freeze at equal levels is an ideal that a large majority of Americans would like to see achieved through international negotiations. But it

- more -

A nonprofit, nonpartisan educational organization of citizens devoted to the Peace, Security and Liberty of the Nation

Co-Chairmen: C. Douglas Dillon • Henry H. Fowler      Chairman, Policy Studies: Paul H. Nitze\*

Executive Committee: Charls E. Walker, Chairman and Treasurer • David C. Acheson • Kenneth L. Adelman\* • Richard V. Allen

Adda B. Bozeman • Valerie A. Earle • Andrew J. Goodpaster • William R. Graham • Clare Boothe Luce • Charles Burton Marshall

Richard E. Pipes • John P. Roche • Eugene V. Rostow • Hugh Scott • Lloyd H. Smith • Herbert Stein • William R. Van Cleave • Elmo R. Zumwalt,

Director: Charles Trowler, II

General Counsel: Max M. Kampelman

Special Counsel: Bernard T. Renzy

also showed that they do not believe this is a realistic expectation.

The poll found that most Americans view the nuclear freeze as "a way to reduce the expense of nuclear arms" rather than as a measure that would reduce the threat of nuclear war. The development of space-based defensive weaponry was also favored, with or without a nuclear freeze.

A substantial majority of Americans, the poll disclosed, support the threatened use of nuclear weapons to deter a Soviet attack against U.S. allies and favor American retaliation in the event of a Soviet attack on the United States, even at the risk of total destruction of both countries.

Among the poll's findings:

-- While 64% favor the concept of a nuclear freeze, 63% oppose a unilateral freeze, believing it would threaten U.S. security.

-- 70% oppose a mutual freeze if Soviet compliance cannot be verified.

-- 62% believe the Soviets are using the nuclear freeze issue "to try to gain a permanent advantage over the United States."

-- By a greater than five-to-one margin, Americans believe the Soviet Union is violating existing nuclear arms control agreements.

-- Three out of four Americans support the development of space-based "defensive weapons." |<

-- Two out of three Americans oppose telling the Soviets "that we will not respond with nuclear weapons if they attack our allies."

-- 63% favor American retaliation in the event of a Soviet attack on the United States "even though it may result in total destruction of both countries."

-- 70 % express confidence in the government "to make the right decisions" regarding American security.

A fuller analysis of the poll's findings and copies of the complete results may be obtained at the Committee's offices at 905 Sixteenth Street, N.W., Washington, D.C. 20006. Contact: William M. Moon, Research and Education Associate.

(Note: The materials referred to in the above paragraph are attached.)



Penn + Schoen  
Associates

1501 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10028 • (212) 734-3000

1120 Vermont Ave NW, Washington, D.C. 20005 • (202) 466-7530

Mark Penn  
Douglas Schoen

To: The Committee on the Present Danger

From: Penn and Schoen Associates

Re: Poll findings on the nuclear freeze

Date: April 16, 1984

#### SUMMARY

*The poll of 1,000 U.S. residents conducted between March 31st and April 2nd, 1984, shows that Americans oppose any unilateral nuclear freeze and would oppose any bilateral agreement that did not permit verification of Soviet compliance.*

*The poll shows that a bilateral nuclear freeze at equal levels is an ideal that Americans would like to see achieved through international negotiations, and overwhelming majorities support such an "ideal" agreement. But at the same time, most Americans see the reality of a nuclear freeze a long way off and believe that any unilateral nuclear freeze would threaten the security of the United States. An overwhelming majority believes that the Soviets would not agree to a nuclear freeze at equal levels and believes, even if they did, they could not be trusted to honor any such agreement.*

*Surprisingly, Americans see the nuclear freeze as a way to reduce the expense of nuclear arms rather than a measure*



to reduce the threat of nuclear war. And with or without a nuclear freeze, Americans overwhelmingly favor the establishment of a space-based defensive system.

Suspicious of the Soviet Union are at extremely high levels, as solid majorities believe that the Soviet Union is seeking to expand its territory, is using the freeze to its advantage and is violating international arms accords.

OVERVIEW OF THE PROJECT

Penn and Schoen was commissioned to undertake an in-depth national poll of 1,000 U.S. residents on the nuclear freeze and related issues. The firm drew a national, random probability sample of U.S. households and conducted the detailed survey by telephone. The questionnaire was designed in conjunction with the Committee on the Present Danger to cover a wide range of areas fully and fairly. All interviewing was done by our professional interviewers out of our offices in New York between March 31st and April 2nd.

The results have an overall statistical accuracy of plus or minus three percentage points at the 95% confidence interval. The exact text of the questions asked and their full results accompany this report.

## DETAILED ANALYSIS OF THE QUESTIONS

### I. Attitudes toward the nuclear freeze

The sample was first asked to describe in their own words what a nuclear freeze means to them. To most of the sample (69%), the term "nuclear freeze" means the stopping of the production of nuclear weapons. Typical responses were:

A nuclear freeze means:

"Not building any more weapons by all nations"

"Freeze production and development of nuclear weapons"

"Stop making nuclear weapons"

"Stopping the spending of money on nuclear arms"

More than 80% of the sample had a response to the open-ended question, showing that the term "nuclear freeze" is known to the overwhelming majority of Americans. And when asked whether they favored the "nuclear freeze," based on their own understanding of it, 64% said they favored it, 27% opposed it and 9% had no opinion.

However, when various alternatives to the nuclear freeze were explained to the public, attitudes on the nuclear freeze changed drastically.

When asked whether they favored "a unilateral halt by the U.S. of all production and all deployment of new nuclear weapons, regardless of whether the Soviets decide to continue building up weapons," only 30% favored it while 63% opposed it. Sixty per cent said that such a unilateral halt to the production of nuclear weapons would "threaten the security of the U.S." rather than just show our peaceful intentions.

There was near universal support for "an agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union calling for both nations to freeze their nuclear weapons at current levels." Eighty-one per cent favored such a freeze while 16% opposed it and 4% had no opinion. Such a situation clearly represents an ideal that the American public yearns for.

But support for even a bilateral freeze erodes significantly when it is suggested that such an agreement would leave the Soviet Union with much more nuclear firepower than the

U.S. Given these facts, support drops by almost 30 percentage points to a bare majority of 51%.

And if we were unable to verify that the Soviets were living up to their part of the agreement, support for the "freeze" collapses. Only 22% would favor it without verification while 70% would oppose it and 8% had no opinion. In arms negotiations to date, the Soviet Union has steadfastly rejected any plans to allow verification of the results.

When asked how important verification is in any nuclear arms agreement, 76% of the sample answered that verification was "very important."

Thus, while the term "nuclear freeze" is a popular catch-all term for a world without more nuclear weapons, agreement with the concept should not be interpreted as an American desire for a lesser defense or for abandoning nuclear weapons willy nilly.

Americans have an ideal of international cooperation which is their first preference for a world order. In the absence of cooperation from and trust of the Soviet Union, the overwhelming majority believe that it is important to keep American nuclear defenses strong.

## II. Attitudes toward Soviet cooperation.

The American public blames the Soviet Union for the "breakdown in arms-control" negotiations. Fifty-six per cent said the Soviet Union is to blame while 13% said it is the U.S. government that is at fault.

Since the downing of the Korean airliner, American distrust of the Soviet Union has remained at extraordinary levels. Seventy-one per cent believe that the Soviets cannot be trusted to honor an agreement to freeze nuclear weapons at current levels while only 21% say they could be trusted. A majority of all demographic groups -- including both men and women -- did not trust the Soviets to honor a freeze agreement.

In addition, 70% said they believe that the Soviet Union is "violating existing nuclear arms-control agreements." And 78% think that the Soviets are presently "trying to expand their territory and influence rather than just trying to defend their own territory."

It is this very deep suspicion and mistrust of the Soviets that makes verification a very important issue in determining their attitudes on proposed arms-control agreements.

Without verification, Americans see arms-control agreements as tantamount to unilateral arms reductions, which they oppose.

Americans are also highly suspicious of Soviet motives. Most (59%) do not believe that the Soviets are willing to agree to a nuclear freeze at equal levels, and a larger majority (62%) believe that the Soviets are trying to use the nuclear freeze issue "to try to gain a permanent advantage over the U.S."

### III. Americans have high trust in the U.S. government.

In contrast, the sample expressed high confidence in the United States government "to make the right decisions when it comes to protecting the security of the United States." Seventy per cent said they had such trust and confidence in the government while 24% did not have trust in the government.

Trust was highest among men, older people, and the better educated. A majority of all demographic groups, however, expressed trust in the government.

IV. Americans favor nuclear weapons as a deterrent and are willing to retaliate against a nuclear strike.

About two-thirds of the sample said that they opposed telling the Soviets that we will not respond with nuclear weapons if they attack our allies. College-educated respondents were the most opposed to telling the Soviets that we would not use nuclear weapons to defend our allies.

Sixty-three per cent favored retaliation against the Soviet Union after a nuclear attack on the United States, even though such action might result in the destruction of both countries. Interestingly, the college-educated citizens were most opposed to the actual use of nuclear weapons. This same group was the most in favor of keeping up the threat of their use to defend our allies.

V. Americans favor a space defensive system.

By overwhelming numbers, Americans favor plans "to develop defensive weapons that would operate in space in order to protect the U.S. by destroying any incoming missiles." Seventy-five per cent agreed with that, while 17% opposed it.

Even if a nuclear freeze was negotiated, 54% would still favor continuation of plans for a space defense while 35% would advocate abandoning such plans.

Support for such a defense, even with a nuclear freeze, reinforces the finding that the freeze is seen more as a budget-cutting measure than an answer to the country's defense problems. Only one-third said that a nuclear freeze would reduce the chance of a nuclear war while 55% said it would "only reduce the expense of continuing to develop nuclear weapons."





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Mark Penn  
Douglas Schoen

HOLD FOR RELEASE  
11:00 A.M. THURSDAY, 19 APRIL 1984

## COMMITTEE ON THE PRESENT DANGER, NO. 613

The following volume contains the general summary, detailed tabular results and open-ended responses of a survey conducted by Penn + Schoen Associates for the Committee on the Present Danger. A total of 1,000 interviews with adult U.S. citizens were conducted between March 31st and April 2nd, 1984. All interviews were conducted from Penn + Schoen's New York City phone facilities.

Mark Penn

Douglas Schoen

April 4, 1984

"The Nuclear Freeze and Other Nuclear Arms Issues"



Penn + Schoen  
Associates

1501 Third Avenue, New York, N.Y. 10028 • (212) 734-3000

1 Exchange Place, Jersey City, N.J. 07302 • (201) 434-0700

Mark Pen  
Douglas Schoe

OPEN-ENDED RESPONSES\*

THERE HAS BEEN A LOT OF TALK LATELY ABOUT A NUCLEAR FREEZE. WHAT DOES THIS TERM MEAN TO YOU?

TOTAL NUMBER OF RESPONSES-806

CODE	CATEGORY	% RESPONSE
1	FREEZE WEAPONS/STOP BUILD-UP	69
2	SPECIFICALLY THE U.S. STOP BUILD-UP	2
3	SPECIFICALLY U.S. & OTHERS, SUCH AS USSR, STOP BUILD-UP	6
4	ELIMINATE NUKES/ARMS REDUCTION	5
5	NEGATIVE ON FREEZE	4
6	OTHER	13

\*See back section for individual responses.

NO. 1.

QUEST: Based on what you understand a "nuclear freeze" to be, would you favor or oppose the nuclear freeze?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	64	27	9

NO. 2.

QUEST: Here are some different arms control propositions. For each one, tell me whether you favor or oppose it. A UNILATERAL HALT BY THE U.S. OF ALL PRODUCTION AND ALL DEPLOYMENT OF NEW NUCLEAR WEAPONS, REGARDLESS OF WHETHER THE SOVIETS DECIDE TO CONTINUE BUILDING-UP WEAPONS. Do you favor or oppose this?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	30	63	7

NO. 3.

QUEST: An agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union calling for both nations to freeze their nuclear weapons at current levels. Do you favor or oppose this?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	81	16	4

NO. 4.

QUEST: Freezing both countries at the present levels of nuclear weapons would leave the Soviets with considerably more nuclear firepower than the United States. Given this fact, do you favor or oppose the proposal to freeze both countries at current levels?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	51	41	8

NO. 5.

QUEST: An agreement between the U.S. and the Soviet Union calling for both nations to freeze their nuclear weapons at an equal but lower level. Do you favor or oppose this?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	81	13	5

NO. 6.

QUEST: Do you think that a nuclear freeze would reduce the chances of a nuclear war or would it only reduce the expense of continuing to develop new nuclear weapons?

	reduce war	reduce expense	don't know
ALL	33	55	12

NO. 7.

QUEST: Some people have called for a unilateral nuclear freeze, meaning that we would stop producing nuclear weapons no matter what the Soviets do. Do you think that such a move would threaten the security of the U.S. or would it just show our peaceful intentions?

	security	peace intent	don't know
ALL	60	31	9

NO. 8.

QUEST: How important is verification in any arms control agreement -- very important, somewhat important or not very important?

	very import	smwht import	not very imp	don't know
ALL	76	16	3	4

NO. 9.

QUEST: If the Soviet side of a nuclear freeze agreement with the U.S. could not be verified, would you favor it or oppose it?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	22	70	8

NO. 10.

QUEST: Do you think the Soviets can be trusted to honor an agreement to freeze nuclear weapons at the current levels?

	trusted	not trusted	don't know
ALL	21	71	8

NO. 11.

QUEST: Do you believe that the Soviet Union is adhering to or violating existing nuclear arms control agreements?

	adhering	violating	don't know
ALL	13	70	17

NO. 12.

QUEST: Where does the fault lie for the breakdown in arms control negotiations -- mostly with the Soviet Union or mostly with the United States?

	Soviet Union	United States	don't know
ALL	56	13	31

NO. 13.

QUEST: Do you favor or oppose plans to develop defensive weapons that would operate in space in order to protect the U.S. by destroying any incoming missiles?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	75	17	8

NO. 14.

QUEST: If a nuclear freeze were negotiated, should development of such defensive space weapons continue or should development be abandoned?

	continue	abandon	don't know
ALL	54	35	11

NO. 15.

QUEST: Do you think presently that the Soviets are trying to expand their territory and influence or are they just trying to defend their own territory?

	expand	defend	don't know
ALL	78	16	6

NO. 16.

QUEST: Do you think that the Soviets are willing to negotiate a nuclear freeze at equal levels of weapons or not?

	willing	not willing	don't know
ALL	29	59	12

NO. 17.

QUEST: Do you think that the Soviets are using the nuclear freeze issue to try to gain a permanent advantage over the U.S. or is this not the case?

	gain	not gain	don't know
ALL	62	24	14

NO. 18.

QUEST: Do you favor or oppose telling the Soviets that we will not respond with nuclear weapons if they attack our allies?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	20	66	14

NO. 19.

QUEST: In the event of Soviet nuclear attack on the United States, would you favor or oppose American retaliation even though it may result in total destruction of both countries?

	favor	oppose	don't know
ALL	63	22	14

NO. 20.

QUEST: Do you trust the government to make the right decisions when it comes to protecting the security of the United States?

	trust govt	don't trust	don't know
ALL	70	24	6

NO. 21.

QUEST: What is your age?

	18-34	35-49	50-59	60+
ALL	42	25	12	20



NO. 22.

QUEST: Into which of the following categories does your family income fall?

	< \$7,000	\$ 7-\$15,000	\$15-\$25,000	\$25-\$35,000	\$35,000+
ALL	9	21	28	20	22

NO. 23.

QUEST: What is the last year of school you have completed?

	<high school	high school	some college	college	college+
ALL	12	35	27	17	9

NO. 24.

QUEST: What is your occupation? (If unemployed, get usual occupation)

	executive	businessman	semi-skilled	skilled	unskilled
ALL	25	8	11	13	3

	homemaker	doesn't work	student	other
ALL	13	15	8	3

NO. 25.

QUEST: Generally speaking, do you consider yourself as liberal, moderate or conservative?

	liberal	moderate	conservative	don't know
ALL	24	37	34	6

NO. 26.

QUEST: Are you registered to vote in the United States?  
(IF YES) Are you registered as a Democrat, Republican or Independent?

	not regis	Democrat	Republican	Independent	don't know
ALL	14	41	25	17	3

NO. 27.

QUEST: Are you or any member of your household a member of a union?

	union	non-union	don't know
ALL	27	72	1

QUEST:	Code sex	
	male	female
ALL	49	51

QUEST:	NO. 29. Region			
	northeast	south	midwest	west
ALL	28	29	20	22



3/28 MDI

Pls keep for me.

Thank

JAB

Kirkpatrick Trips

HICKEY APPROVAL	{	April 1981	New York
		April 1981	New York
		April 1981	Geneva
		May 1981	New York
		May 1981	New York
		Aug 1981	Latin America
		Aug 1981	South Asia
		Sep 1981	New York
		Sep 1981	New York
		Sep 1981	New York
		Sep 1981	New York
JAB APPROVAL	{	Mar 1982	Cape Canaveral
		Jun 1982	Cape Canaveral
		Jun 1982	Africa/Middle East
JAB APPROVAL		Feb 1983	Central America
JAB APPROVAL		Mar 1983	Middle East
HICKEY APPROVAL		Aug 1983	Marsailles to Rabat only
JAB APPROVAL		Nov 1983	Dominican Republic

CALL  
NB

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

3/24/84

Done →

Jim Baker 3/27

B Oglesby

We've been  
talking  
w/ Sen. +  
Martin about  
doing this. Will  
you support.

Bud McFarlane asked me

to pass these State memoranda  
to you.

Bob Kinnitt

3/24

- ① Decision w/ RBD + MBO
- ② Then implement on Mon. 3/26



Washington, D.C. 20520

March 23, 1984

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

84 MAR 24 A 7: 12

MEMORANDUM FOR ROBERT C. MCFARLANE

THE WHITE HOUSE

WHITE HOUSE  
SITUATION ROOM

Subject: Follow-on Memo regarding Central American Strategy

On March 22, we transmitted a memo proposing that Jim Baker call Senator Howard Baker on behalf of the Administration to urge that he form a core group of seven Republican Senators to work with Senator Percy to get an acceptable Senate Foreign Relations Committee bill on our Central American legislative package implementing the recommendations of the National Bipartisan Commission on Central America. We suggest that the mandate of the group be expanded to the entire FY-85 Foreign Assistance request. The Committee begins its mark-up on March 27.

We believe the core group approach has merit. Frequently, the most effective legislative strategy is devised and implemented by the Senators. Senators see each other on a frequent basis and can assess what the political traffic can withstand. The Administration will remain in close and constant contact with the core group.

Having key influential Senators involved and working these issues would broaden responsibility and reduce the burden on the President in getting Senate approval of an acceptable foreign assistance program. Specifically, we would recommend that the President invite the seven Senators (Percy, Mathias, Domenici, Lugar, Boschwitz, Rudman, and Wilson) for a White House meeting and encourage them to group together on action to push this legislation so important to the Administration. We believe at this point that the President could better energize this group, rather than leaving it to Senator Baker.

*Covey*

Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

DECL: OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-024/2 #4

BY dlh, NARA, DATE 6/30/01



Washington, D.C. 20520

March 22, 1984

84 MAR 22 AIO: 46

CONFIDENTIAL

MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCFARLANE  
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Central America Legislative Strategy

As part of our Central America legislative strategy we recommend that Jim Baker call Senator Howard Baker on behalf of the Administration to urge that he form a core group of seven Republican Senators, including several members of the Foreign Relations Committee, to work with Senator Percy on getting an acceptable markup of our Central America legislative Package from the SFRC next week.

While we are fully engaged in the effort to win Congressional approval of our emergency requests for Central America this week, we must not overlook the critical mark-up of the worldwide foreign aid request, including the President's Central America Initiative, that will take place in the SFRC next week (March 27-31). In light of the uncertain future for our Central America Initiative in the House, it is vitally important that the Senate Foreign Relations Committee report out a version of the bill with Central America language acceptable to the Administration. Even if there is no authorization bill this year, a broad-based SFRC agreement could help set the basis for the Continuing Resolution.

Despite the Republican majority on the SFRC, it is by no means certain that this Committee will report out an acceptable bill; in fact, the odds appear against it. We can expect that all or virtually all of the eight Democrats on the Committee will insist on imposing severe human rights conditions unacceptable to the Administration. They will also probably want to slash our El Salvador funding requests. Of the ten Republicans on the Committee, in our view only four can be counted on to give solid support to the Administration's draft bill, (Senators Baker, Lugar, Murkowski, and Hawkins). Senator Helms condemned the Bipartisan Commission report because of concerns for population programs, land reform, and the extent of state intervention in the Central American economies. Senator Kassebaum is proposing an amendment that would require a biannual Congressional Resolution of Approval for all military aid to El Salvador. Senator Mathias, one of the eight

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DECL:OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-024/2 #5

BY dlb, NARA, DATE 10/30/00

Congressional counselors to the Kissinger Commission, basically supports the Commission package, but his commitment to our bill is uncertain. Senator Pressler's position is completely unknown. Finally, Senator Percy's own position on conditionality is uncertain; last year he supported Committee draft amendments that were severely restrictive. If Senator Percy is to create a majority from this Committee for a bill the Administration can support, he is going to need help.

To help Senator Percy create a majority in the SFRC for a Central America bill the Administration can support, we recommend creation of a core group of six Republican Senators to work with him, as follows:

Domenici  
Percy  
Lugar  
Boschwitz  
Wilson  
Rudman  
Mathias

This idea was discussed in the Secretary's meeting with Senator Domenici on Monday. Domenici thought it a good approach, but urged that Senator Baker take the lead in setting up the core group. We believe the active engagement of our recommended core group of Senators could not only be decisive in winning a Republican majority for an acceptable Central America bill in the SFRC, but could also play a major role in winning approval of the full Senate.

We believe the request to Senator Baker to form this core group should come from the White House, and Jim Baker in particular, to give it the full weight of an Administration request. The White House should also touch base with Senators Hatfield and Kasten to ensure there is no misunderstanding about their non-inclusion in the core group for protocol reasons. (As Appropriations Committee and Subcommittee Chairmen, it would not be appropriate for Hatfield and Kasten to join in the core group of Senators participating in drafting a bill for an authorizing Committee.) We have, however, included Senator Rudman of Kasten's Subcommittee in our suggested core group to give it Appropriations Committee participation. We have also included Senators Lugar, Boschwitz, and Mathias of the SFRC in the hope that they can help swing the remainder of their Republican colleagues on the Committee (including Percy) behind a good bill. Senator Domenici, in addition to being Chairman of the powerful Senate

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- 3 -

Budget Committee, was one of the eight Congressional counselors to the Kissinger Commission and involved himself very closely in the Commission's work. He was disappointed and perhaps bitter in January when the Administration did not ask him to join in the drafting of our Central America initiative (although we did consult with him and his staff a number of times in the drafting process). Senator Wilson, a member of the Armed Services Committee, is an enthusiastic supporter of our Central America policy.



Charles Hill  
Executive Secretary

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III



The President asked me today what happened to the confidence building measures that were being considered involving the Soviet Union? Could you arrange for him to be briefed on this as soon as convenient.

Thanks.