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Collection Name BAKER, JAMES: FILES

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File Folder NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICE (1)

FOIA

F97-0066/17

Box Number 9

COHEN, D

60

DOC NO	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date	Restrictions
1	RECEIPT	PHOTOCOPY OF CREDIT CARD RECEIPT	1	8/20/1984	C

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JAMES A. BAKER III - 1984 - 1/85 WHITE HOUSE STAFF MEMORANDA

23 File Folders:

1. Administration
2. Advance
3. Cabinet Affairs
4. Jim Cicconi File
5. Communication
6. Counsel's Office - 1/84 - 6/84
7. Counsel's Office - 7/84 - 1/85
8. Dick Darden's File
9. Mike Deaver File
10. Council of Economic Advisors
11. Intergovernmental Affairs
12. Issues
13. Mike McManus File
14. Military
15. Miscellaneous
16. National Security Office
17. Personnel
18. Policy Development
19. Political Affairs - 1/84 - 7/84
20. Political Affairs - 8/84 - 1/85
21. Press Office
22. Public Liaison
23. Vice President

Box # 2

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*Box 1
10513*

SUBJECT JAMES A BAKER III: 1983 WHITE HOUSE
MEMORANDA - ADMINISTRATION - CABINET
AFFAIRS - COMMUNICATIONS - COUNSEL 'S OFFICE -
MIKE DEEVER FILE - INTERGOVERNMENTAL AFFAIRS -
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS JAN 1983 TO JUN 1983 -
LEGISLATIVE AFFAIRS JUL 1983 TO DEC 1983 -
ED MEESE FILE - MILITARY - MISCELLANEOUS -
NATIONAL SECURITY AFFAIRS - PERSONNEL -
POLICY DEVELOPMENT - POLITICAL AFFAIRS -
PUBLIC LIAISON - VICE PRESIDENT - COUNCIL OF
ECONOMIC ADVISORS

10514

BOX 2: ADMINISTRATION - ADVANCE - CABINET
AFFAIRS - JIM CICCONI FILE - COMMUNICATION -
COUNSEL 'S OFFICE JAN 1984 TO JUN 1984 -
COUNSEL 'S OFFICE JUL 1984 TO JAN 1985 - DICK
DARMAN 'S FILE - MIKE DEEVER 'S FILE - COUNCIL
OF ECONOMIC ADVISORS - INTERGOVERNMENTAL
AFFAIRS - ISSUES - MIKE MCMANUS FILE -
MILITARY - MISCELLANEOUS;


10515

BOX 3: NATIONAL SECURITY OFFICE - PERSONNEL -
POLICY DEVELOPMENT - POLITICAL AFFAIRS JAN
1984 TO JUL 1984 - POLITICAL AFFAIRS AUG
1984 TO JAN 1985 - PRESS OFFICE - PUBLIC
LIAISON - VICE PRESIDENT;

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0381

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

1/15/85

Jim Baker:

FYI. We will
arrange this meeting if
you wish. Please advise.

Bob Kinnitt

cc Dick Darman

1/15 - 5:20 pm
KC advised no,
per JAB

January 15, 1985 ~~LIMITED OFFICIAL USE~~

re 2/20/89

**MEMORANDUM FOR MR. ROBERT C. MCPARLANE
THE WHITE HOUSE**

**Subject: Pakistan Finance Minister requests appointment with
White House Staff Director Baker**

Pakistani Finance Minister Ghulam Ishaq Khan is in Washington January 14-16 for discussions in preparation for the IBRD/IMF Development Committee formal meetings on international debt scheduled for April. The Minister is chairman of that committee.

The minister met earlier today for substantive talks with Secretary Regan. He has asked the State Department to forward to the White House his request for a 5 minute courtesy call on Treasury Secretary-Designate Baker either January 15 or 16 at Mr. Baker's convenience.



**Nicholas Platt
Executive Secretary**

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 9, 1985

Mr. Vice President:

Attached is the full text of Secretary Shultz's statement yesterday in Geneva. It includes the text of the joint statement already sent to you.

In addition, I have attached the Geneva-related items for tonight's press conference. These are the items given to the President in today's PDB.

Bob Kimmitt
Robert M. Kimmitt

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PAGE 01 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0200 DTG: 090510Z JAN 85 PSN: 002145
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UNCLAS SECTION 01 OF 03 SECTO 1029

SECSTATE FOR PA AND PA/PRESS
DEPARTMENT PASS NSC FOR MR. MCFARLANE'S OFFICE
WHITE HOUSE MR. SPEAKES AND MR. SIMS
USIA FOR PGM ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR COURTNEY
TOKYO HOLD FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT
CANBERRA AND SYDNEY FOR GENERAL CHAIN

E. O. 12356: N/A
TAGS: OVIP SHULTZ, GEORGE P.
SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE,
JANUARY 8, 1985, INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL, GENEVA, AT
11:00 P. M. LOCAL TIME

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WHITE HOUSE SITUATION ROOM

PAGE 02 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0200 DTG: 090510Z JAN 85 PSN: 002145

1. ACTION REQUEST: DEPARTMENT PLEASE REPEAT ALDAC,
IMMEDIATE.

2. FOLLOWING IS THE TEXT OF THE SECRETARY'S
STATEMENT TO A PRESS CONFERENCE IN THE BALLROOM OF
THE GENEVA INTERCONTINENTAL HOTEL AT 11:00 P.M. LOCAL
TIME ON TUESDAY, JANUARY 8, 1984. TEXT IS AS
DELIVERED. BEGIN TEXT:

- STATEMENT BY SECRETARY SHULTZ

I HAVE JUST SPOKEN WITH PRESIDENT REAGAN AND HE HAS
RECEIVED WITH SATISFACTION THE NEWS OF THE AGREEMENT
TO BEGIN NEW NEGOTIATIONS THAT HAS BEEN REACHED
BETWEEN MR. GROMYKO AND MYSELF AND THE TEXT OF WHICH
I AM GOING TO READ TO YOU. THIS THE TEXT OF THE
JOINT U.S. - U.S.S.R. STATEMENT:

- AS PREVIOUSLY AGREED, A MEETING WAS HELD ON
- JANUARY 7 AND 8, 1985 IN GENEVA BETWEEN GEORGE P.
- SHULTZ, THE U.S. SECRETARY OF STATE, AND ANDREI
- A. GROMYKO, MEMBER OF THE POLITBURO OF THE
- CENTRAL COMMITTEE OF THE CPSU, FIRST DEPUTY
- CHAIRMAN OF THE COUNCIL OF MINISTERS OF THE USSR
- AND MINISTER OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS OF THE USSR.

- DURING THE MEETING THEY DISCUSSED THE SUBJECT AND
- OBJECTIVES OF THE FORTHCOMING US-SOVIET
- NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS.

- THE SIDES AGREE THAT THE SUBJECT OF THE
- NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE A COMPLEX OF QUESTIONS
- CONCERNING SPACE AND NUCLEAR ARMS -- BOTH

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PAGE 03 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0200 DTG: 090510Z JAN 85 PSN: 002145

- STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE -- WITH ALL
- THESE QUESTIONS CONSIDERED AND RESOLVED IN THEIR
- INTERRELATIONSHIP.

- THE OBJECTIVE OF THE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE TO WORK
- OUT EFFECTIVE AGREEMENTS AIMED AT PREVENTING AN
- ARMS RACE IN SPACE AND TERMINATING IT ON EARTH,
- AT LIMITING AND REDUCING NUCLEAR ARM, AND AT
- STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY. THE
- NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED BY A DELEGATION
- FROM EACH SIDE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS.

- THE SIDES BELIEVE THAT ULTIMATELY THE FORTHCOMING
- NEGOTIATIONS, JUST AS EFFORTS IN GENERAL TO LIMIT
- AND REDUCE ARMS, SHOULD LEAD TO THE COMPLETE
- ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR ARMS EVERYWHERE.

- THE DATE OF THE BEGINNING OF THE NEGOTIATIONS AND
- THE SITE OF THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE AGREED
- THROUGH DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS WITHIN ONE MONTH.

WHILE THE STATEMENT SPEAKS FOR ITSELF, I WOULD LIKE TO GIVE YOU MY OWN VIEWS ON WHAT HAS BEEN ACCOMPLISHED DURING THESE TWO DAYS OF MEETINGS.

FROM OUR PERSPECTIVE, THESE MEETINGS REPRESENT AN

IMPORTANT BEGINNING. WE CAN'T BE SURE WHERE THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL LEAD AND CLEARLY WE HAVE A LONG ROAD AHEAD OF US; THERE ARE MANY TOUGH AND COMPLICATED ISSUES STILL TO BE RESOLVED. BUT WE HAVE, HERE IN GENEVA, AGREED ON THE OBJECTIVES FOR NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS. WE HAVE ALSO AGREED THAT THESE NEGOTIATIONS WILL BE CONDUCTED BY A DELEGATION FROM EACH SIDE DIVIDED INTO THREE GROUPS.

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PAGE 04 OF 04 USDEL SECRETARY IN 0200 DTG: 090510Z JAN 85 PSN: 002145

WE CAME TO GENEVA WITH HIGH HOPES, BUT REALISTIC
EXPECTATIONS. OUR PREVIOUS EXCHANGES HAD CONFIRMED
BT

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UNCLAS SECTION 02 OF 03 SECTO 1029

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USIA FOR PGM ASSOCIATE DIRECTOR COURTNEY
TOKYO HOLD FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT
CANBERRA AND SYDNEY FOR GENERAL CHAIN

E.O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP SHULTZ, GEORGE P.

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE,

THAT WE WERE IN GENERAL AGREEMENT THAT THE PROBLEMS
OF NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS ARE INTERRELATED, AND THAT
BOTH SIDES ATTACHED PRIORITY TO ACHIEVING RADICAL

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REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS AS THE FIRST STEP TOWARD THEIR COMPLETE ELIMINATION.

BUT WE ALSO KNEW THAT WE HAD OUR DIFFERENCES ON HOW TO GO ABOUT ACHIEVING THESE GOALS. THAT WE WERE ABLE TO REACH AGREEMENT TODAY ON NEW NEGOTIATIONS SIGNIFIES, WE HOPE, A SHARED INTEREST IN MOVING FORWARD IN THE NECESSARY GIVE-AND-TAKE REQUIRED TO REACH AGREEMENTS THAT SATISFY BOTH SIDES' CONCERNS.

AN IMPORTANT ELEMENT OF MY PRESENTATION TO MR. GROMYKO CONCERNED OUR VIEWS ON THE NATURE OF THE STRATEGIC RELATIONSHIP AND OUR GOALS FOR THE FUTURE. FOR THE NEAR TERM, IN ADDITION TO SEEKING RADICAL REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR WEAPONS, I STATED THAT WE SHOULD REVERSE THE EROSION OF THE ABM TREATY THAT HAS OCCURRED OVER THE LAST DECADE.

ON THE SUBJECT OF THE STRATEGIC DEFENSE INITIATIVE, I EXPLAINED TO MR. GROMYKO THAT SDI IS A RESEARCH PROGRAM INTENDED TO DETERMINE WHETHER IT WILL BE POSSIBLE TO SHIFT TO A MORE STABLE RELATIONSHIP INVOLVING A GREATER RELIANCE ON DEFENSIVE SYSTEMS. I NOTED THAT IT IS FULLY CONSISTENT WITH THE ABM TREATY, AND THAT NO DECISIONS TO GO BEYOND RESEARCH HAVE BEEN MADE, NOR COULD THEY BE MADE FOR SEVERAL YEARS. WHILE THE ISSUES POSED BY SDI ARE FOR THE FUTURE, I TOLD MR. GROMYKO THAT WE WERE NOW NONETHELESS PREPARED TO DISCUSS THE QUESTION OF STRATEGIC DEFENSE.

OUR VIEWS DIFFER ON THIS QUESTION, BUT WE NOW HAVE AGREED ON A FORUM FOR TACKLING THE ISSUES HEAD ON, WITH THE OBJECTIVES OF SEEKING REDUCTIONS IN NUCLEAR ARMS AND STRENGTHENING STRATEGIC STABILITY.

IN ADDITION TO A GROUP IN WHICH WE INTEND TO DISCUSS

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SPACE ARMS, WHETHER BASED OR TARGETED ON EARTH OR IN SPACE, WE HAVE AGREED WITH THE SOVIETS TO ESTABLISH TWO OTHER NEW NEGOTIATING GROUPS TO ADDRESS LIMITATIONS AND REDUCTIONS IN STRATEGIC AND INTERMEDIATE-RANGE NUCLEAR ARMS.

I TOLD MR. GROMYKO THAT WE HAVE CONSTRUCTIVE NEW IDEAS TO EXPLORE IN ALL OF THESE AREAS, AND THAT WE HOPE FOR AN EQUALLY CONSTRUCTIVE APPROACH ON THE PART OF THE SOVIET UNION.

IN SUM, AS I AGREED WITH MR. GROMYKO, OUR EXCHANGES WERE FRANK, BUSINESSLIKE, AND USEFUL. WE ARE ADDRESSING THE SUBSTANCE OF THE MOST SERIOUS ISSUES BETWEEN OUR TWO COUNTRIES.

IT IS A TASK WORTHY OF OUR BEST EFFORTS. BOTH SIDES WILL BE GIVING THESE EXCHANGES CAREFUL CONSIDERATION AND WILL BE FOLLOWING UP THROUGH CONTACTS IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS, AS WE PREPARE FOR THE NEW NEGOTIATIONS.

THE SUCCESS OF OUR MEETING HERE IS DUE IN NO SMALL PART TO THE ADVICE AND SUPPORT OF THE STRONG DELEGATION THAT ACCOMPANIED ME HERE. EVERYBODY REALLY HELPED AND CONTRIBUTED, AND I ESPECIALLY THANK NATIONAL SECURITY ADVISOR BUD MCFARLANE. MEMBERS OF

OUR DELEGATION WILL BE BRIEFING OUR ALLIES AND FRIENDS IN THE NEXT FEW DAYS, AND WE WILL OF COURSE BE GIVING A THOROUGH READ-OUT TO THE CONGRESS.

I WILL BE REPORTING PERSONALLY TO THE PRESIDENT TOMORROW AS I DID BRIEFLY OVER THE PHONE TONIGHT THE RESULTS OF THIS MEETING. I KNOW THAT HE INTENDS TO PURSUE THESE NEGOTIATIONS WITH PERSISTENCE AND

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TOKYO HOLD FOR ASSISTANT SECRETARY BURT

CANBERRA AND SYDNEY FOR GENERAL CHAIN

E. O. 12356: N/A

TAGS: OVIP SHULTZ, GEORGE P.

SUBJECT: SECRETARY'S STATEMENT AT PRESS CONFERENCE,

DETERMINATION. END TEXT.

SHULTZ

DRAFT STATEMENT

EARLIER TODAY ON HIS RETURN FROM GENEVA, SECRETARY SHULTZ REPORTED TO ME ON THE FULL DETAILS OF HIS DISCUSSIONS WITH SOVIET FOREIGN MINISTER GROMYKO OVER THIS PAST JANUARY 7 AND 8.

AS YOU ARE AWARE, HIS MEETING WITH MR. GROMYKO HAS RESULTED IN AGREEMENT BETWEEN OUR TWO NATIONS TO BEGIN NEW NEGOTIATIONS ON NUCLEAR AND SPACE ARMS. OUR OBJECTIVE IN THESE TALKS WILL BE THE REDUCTION OF NUCLEAR ARMS AND THE STRENGTHENING OF STRATEGIC STABILITY, WITH THE ULTIMATE GOAL OF THE COMPLETE ELIMINATION OF NUCLEAR WEAPONS.

I WANT TO TAKE THIS OPPORTUNITY TO CONGRATULATE GEORGE SHULTZ, BUD MCFARLANE, AND THE REST OF OUR DELEGATION FOR A JOB WELL DONE. THEIR TEAMWORK IN GENEVA WAS AMERICAN DIPLOMACY AT ITS BEST.

OUR DIFFERENCES WITH THE SOVIETS ARE MANY AND PROFOUND. THESE NEW NEGOTIATIONS WILL INEVITABLY BE DIFFICULT AS WE GRAPPLE WITH THESE ISSUES THAT ARE SO CENTRAL TO PEACE AND THE SECURITY OF OURSELVES AND OF OUR ALLIES. WE NONETHELESS MUST MAKE THAT EFFORT.

WHILE WE MUST CONTINUE TO STAND READY TO RESIST ACTIONS BY THE SOVIET UNION THAT THREATEN THE FREEDOM AND VITAL INTERESTS OF OTHER NATIONS, WE MUST ALSO BE PREPARED TO WORK TOGETHER, WHEREVER POSSIBLE, TO STRENGTHEN THE PEACE.

WHEN I SPOKE BEFORE THE UNITED NATIONS GENERAL ASSEMBLY THIS PAST SEPTEMBER, I SET OUT MY OBJECTIVES AND MY PROPOSALS FOR A MORE STABLE AND CONSTRUCTIVE RELATIONSHIP BETWEEN EAST AND WEST.

TODAY, IT IS MY HOPE THAT THIS WEEK'S MEETING IN GENEVA, WHILE ITSELF ONLY A SINGLE STEP, IS THE BEGINNING OF A NEW DIALOGUE BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

IT IS ALSO MY HOPE THAT AS 1985 UNFOLDS, THE YEAR WILL EMERGE AS ONE OF DIALOGUE AND NEGOTIATION, ONE THAT ADVANCES US TOWARD BETTER RELATIONS BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND THE SOVIET UNION.

DIALOGUE TAKES TWO PARTNERS. ONE SIDE ALONE CANNOT CONDUCT SUCCESSFUL NEGOTIATIONS. WE HAVE MADE CLEAR OUR INTENTIONS AND OUR EXPECTATIONS FOR PROGRESS IN U.S.-SOVIET RELATIONS; SECRETARY SHULTZ HAS REINFORCED THAT MESSAGE IN HIS LENGTHY SESSIONS WITH MR. GROMYKO. WE NOW LOOK TO THE SOVIET UNION TO HELP TO GIVE POSITIVE SUBSTANCE AND ONGOING LIFE TO THAT PROCESS OF DIALOGUE.

THEMES TO STRESS

-- Our agreement with the Soviets at Geneva to begin new negotiations is a useful, first step. As Secretary Shultz stated, we have begun a serious dialogue on the substance of the most important strategic issues now facing our two nations.

-- We hope that through this dialogue, we can eventually achieve deep reductions of nuclear weapons and increased strategic stability that benefit both sides. We hope that the Soviets will be as serious and as flexible as the U.S. is prepared to be. Both sides have agreed to the eventual goal of the complete elimination of nuclear weapons, and on negotiations with a delegation from each side divided into three groups to do so.

-- We explained to the Soviet Union that in addition to START and INF, the third group of this delegation would address space and other defensive arms. In this forum, we plan to discuss ground-based systems which can attack targets in space, and space-based systems, as well as moving towards defense-oriented deterrence.

-- The President gave the Secretary and his delegation clear and creative instructions on how to proceed. The final result fully met the President's goals. The high-level delegation was fully unified and worked extremely well under the guidance of the Secretary.

-- This is, of course, only a beginning. We have a long road ahead of us with many tough issues yet to be resolved. With patience, persistence and determination, we are hopeful that this road can eventually lead to success.

-- While the issues posed by SDI are for the future, we are nonetheless prepared now to discuss space arms and the broader question of strategic defense, including existing Soviet defenses.

-- The U.S. and the Soviet Union have agreed that there is a relationship among all the different types of arms to be addressed in the negotiations. Offensive and defensive systems are closely related and cannot be considered in isolation from each other.

-- The vital task before us is to strengthen stability by moving over time to a different kind of strategic relationship, one less dependent on the threat of destruction and more dependent on defensive systems that threaten no one.

THEMES TO AVOID

-- The third negotiating group is devoted to space only.

It is not. Rather, this group will discuss defensive arms, whether based in space or on the earth, and views of deterrence in the future.

-- Negotiations on space will only address future "Stars Wars" types of systems. No. Negotiations on questions concerning space arms will also include existing Soviet defensive arms.

-- SDI is to be negotiated away. It is not. The Secretary explained clearly to Mr. Gromyko at great length the President's strong view that SDI research, if successful, could lead to a strengthening of deterrence and to less reliance upon the threat of mutual annihilation to preserve the peace. We intend to pursue this research to see if can contribute to stability.

-- The new arms control talks will lead to quick and easy results. These two days of talks demonstrated that large differences between Soviet and American views over what constitutes strategic stability remain. There will still remain large differences over approaches and proposals on START and INF, as large as they were in the previous Geneva talks. With Soviet willingness, however, we can proceed as far and fast as we hope.

FOREIGN POLICY QUESTIONS

1. Did you get the agreement you wanted to get at Geneva?
2. Now that you have agreed to begin negotiations with the Soviets, could you please tell us what happens next?
3. Where and when would you like to have the talks take place?
4. Why did the two sides not agree to a place and date while at Geneva?
5. What are your views now on the possibility of a summit. Would one be useful this year; perhaps when you are in Europe in May?
6. How long might it take to reach agreements -- in other words, what do you mean by long, hard bargaining?
7. Who do you have in mind as chief negotiator?

8. Would you expect to name a negotiator who has been a participant in your senior arms control group as you prepared for Geneva, or is it more likely to be an outsider --like Max Kampelman or Brent Scowcroft?

9. Will the chief negotiator report to you directly, or through the Secretary of State?

10. Won't this framework of three negotiating groups, interrelated, give the Soviets -- or us -- a chance to stall or even veto progress?

10. Will the chief negotiator report to you directly, or through the Secretary of State?

11. How much more decisionmaking will be required to prepare for the talks -- are our substantive negotiating positions already set, or will you have to settle some significant differences between your advisers before the talks begin?

12. Won't the same old disagreements surface -- for example, will you be willing to negotiate a moratorium on anti-satellite testing, or is that ruled out?

13. How serious an impediment to progress is verification -- for example, how will you be able to reach agreements covering hard-to-verify weapons like cruise missiles?

14. Your report to Congress on Soviet treaty compliance, due February 1, is expected to give conservative members information to use to show that the Soviets cannot be counted to keep the agreements they make. Will you go ahead with this report and can you tell us what it will cover?

15. Did Secretary Shultz call or cable from Geneva to get additional instructions, or did he conduct the sessions and reach agreement with the Soviets entirely on his own? Followup: Does this mean you were detached from the process, not personally involved?

16. Did you make it clear to the Soviets that research on the "Star Wars" Strategic Defense Initiative is not-negotiable, not a "bargaining chip?" Or will it be on the table?

17. If you won't negotiate on SDI, what is there for the third group to address?

18. Do the Soviets now agree with you that SDI research could ultimately lead to the elimination of nuclear weapons, or do they think we are working on SDI in order to develop a first-strike capability?

19. You envision the Strategic Defense initiative as something that will be used to defend against missiles, so that they can be eliminated eventually. En route to that goal, do you foresee a negotiated arrangement in which defense would be used to enhance deterrence that still relied on offensive weapons, perhaps at a reduced level?

20. Do you believe it is sensible to consider sharing this research with the Soviets -- when would you do that?

21. Will your allies be consulted in these negotiations more fully than in past negotiations, and will you include British and French systems in the negotiations this time?

22. What are some of the "tradeoffs" you have in mind in the INF and START areas -- and did you give the Soviets a preview of them at Geneva?

23. Do you expect an all-out Soviet propaganda offensive against SDI to try to drive a wedge between us and our allies? If so, what impact will that have on the negotiations?

24. Can you clear up this report -- are reviving with the Soviets your proposal for a joint rescue mission in space?

25. Can you characterize the state of relations with the Soviets -- has it changed as a result of Geneva?


26. With U.S.-Soviet trade talks also going on now, are we leading toward something we used to call detente?

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 3, 1985

MEMORANDUM FOR: ROBERT C. McFARLANE

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: MEMORIAL PLAQUE FOR DR. RICHARD S. BEAL

I understand and appreciate your recommendation that an appropriate plaque be placed in the antechamber of Room 208 in the Old Executive Office Building honoring the major contributions Richard Beal made to improve White House communications and crisis management capabilities. A similar suggestion was made upon Joe Holmes' death and we decided at that time not to dedicate specific rooms in honor of individuals affiliated with this Administration.

The continued use of this room will itself honor Dr. Beal and his contributions to the security and preparedness of the United States. However, a small plaque in the antechamber of Room 208 which reads as follows would not violate this policy:

"In commemoration of the contribution
of Dr. Richard Smith Beal."

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 31, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: JOHN F. W. ROGERS
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT FOR
MANAGEMENT AND ADMINISTRATION

SUBJECT: MEMORIAL PLAQUE FOR RICHARD S. BEAL

This memorandum responds to Mr. McFarlane's of December 24, 1984 (attached) requesting a plaque in memory of Dr. Richard S. Beal be placed in the antechamber of Room 208 of the Old Executive Office Building (the Cordell Hull Conference Room) with a suitable inscription.

There is no doubt that Dr. Beal made a very substantial contribution to White House communications and crisis management capabilities. However, I think we should not now begin a policy of dedicating rooms in the Old Executive Office Building to specific individuals. The continued use of the room itself will honor Dr. Beal's memory and the contributions he has made to the security and preparedness of the United States.

Attached with the incoming is a memorandum for your review and comment or signature to Mr. McFarlane expressing this sentiment.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

12/26/84

John:

Will you be discussing this directly with JAB? If not, do you want to provide "comments" that I could attach to this memo for JAB's consideration?

Thanks.

Kathy Camalier
x6797

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM:

ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Rud*

SUBJECT:

Memorial Plaque for Dr. Richard S. Beal

The contributions Rich Beal made to the betterment of the White House communications and crisis management capability are known to all of us and will endure for future Administrations.

In gratitude to Richard and in memory of his many inspirational qualities, we would like to place an appropriate plaque in the antechamber of Room 208, OEOB, with the following inscription:

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF DR. RICHARD SMITH BEAL

He conceived and implemented a brilliant design for the management of responses to international crises. No White House had ever seen anything like it before, and none will be without it again. Not just the Presidency but the entire Nation owes him a debt of gratitude.

Ronald Reagan
1984

cc John Rogers

MEMORANDUM

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

January 3, 1985

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*

SUBJECT: NBC Request for Presidential Interview on V-E Day

NBC has written to the President Tab A requesting an interview on the occasion of the 40th anniversary of V-E Day. As part of their continuing series on Soviet-American relations, NBC would like to do interviews with General Secretary Chernenko and the President on the significance of wartime cooperation for the future of the Soviet-American relationship.


The NSC has no objection, in principle, to the concept of a Presidential interview timed to coincide with the commemoration of the V-E Day anniversary. However, it is probably premature now to commit to this project. We should be able to better gauge the value of such an interview once we have evaluated the success of the Shultz-Gromyko meetings in January and have a better sense of Allied thinking with respect to the scope of desired Soviet participation in the V-E Day commemorations.

In your discussions with NBC you might also inquire whether or not the network will be able to decide on the questions, or will Chernenko simply be given a major forum from which to expound Moscow's point of view? You may also wish to ask if any thought would be given to requesting reciprocal treatment of the interviews; i.e., would Soviet TV provide equivalent treatment of the President's remarks.

Attachment:

Tab A NBC Letter to the President dated December 17, 1984

cc: Baker
Speakes



THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 18, 1984

Bill
discuss
with RK
of let me
know

MEMORANDUM TO: ✓ MIKE DEEVER
BUD MCFARLANE
LARRY SPEAKES

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB*

The attached ~~two letters are self-explanatory.~~
They were personally brought in this morning by
Lawrence Grossman, President of NBC News Division.
~~Let's discuss at your convenience whether this is~~
~~something we have an interest in doing.~~

JAB, III

NBC

National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10112 212-664-4611

Lawrence K. Grossman
President
News Division

December 17, 1984

President Ronald Reagan
The White House
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:

There is perhaps no single event that better symbolizes the potential in American-Soviet relations than the joining of U.S. and Soviet forces at the Elbe--that moment when it became clear that Nazi Germany had been defeated and World War II had been brought to an end. With the commemoration of the 40th anniversary of that event in the Spring of 1985, I would, as President of NBC News, like to take this opportunity to invite you to participate in a special televised interview, during which you will be able to expound on the lessons drawn from such super-power cooperation in the past and the possible meaning of those lessons for the future.

For your information, Mr. President, I have also invited President Chernenko to join NBC News in another televised interview timed to commemorate the 40th anniversary of V-E Day.

For many months now, NBC News has been placing special emphasis on the issues of American-Soviet relations. In September, 1984, we reported for two weeks directly from the Soviet Union--those special segments appearing on the TODAY program and on NBC NIGHTLY NEWS. NBC News also broadcast an hour-long prime time special report on your strategic defense initiative. Last month, our Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Marvin Kalb, received a letter from

President Ronald Reagan
December 17, 1984
Page 2

President Chernenko, responding to four questions about U.S.-Soviet relations; and shortly thereafter, he was first to report the scheduling of Secretary of State Shultz's Geneva meeting with Foreign Minister Gromyko. Those reports received very broad coverage on NBC News and around the world. Obviously, there is great interest in the fact that the achievement of an arms limitation agreement with the Soviet Union is one of your top priorities.

A very special program--of the importance of a televised NBC News interview with the President of the United States--could be broadcast "live" from the White House, or taped "to time," meaning it would not be edited. The timing could be arranged, with due respect to your busy schedule next Spring.

Should you and President Chernenko agree to my proposals, we would obviously plan to schedule both of the special programs in a way that would provide a truly historic opportunity for the nation and the world to get a better understanding of Soviet-American relations and the prospects for an enduring peace.

Very truly yours,

Lawrence K. Gurbman

bc: Grant Tinker
Bob McFarland
Marvin Kalb

NBC

National Broadcasting Company, Inc.

30 Rockefeller Plaza
New York, N.Y. 10112 212-664-4611

Lawrence K. Grossman
President
News Division

December 17, 1984

President Konstantin Chernenko
The Kremlin
Moscow, USSR

Dear Mr. President:

No single event better symbolizes the potential in U.S.-Soviet cooperation than the meeting of American and Soviet forces at the Elbe, completing the destruction of Nazi Germany that ended World War II. In anticipation of the fortieth anniversary of that momentous event next Spring, NBC News would like to propose a historic television program -- a special interview with you, Mr. President, during which you could, in part, expound upon the geopolitical lessons of that War and their meaning for the future of Soviet-American relations, indeed, the future of the world.

For many months now, NBC News has been concentrating on this key relationship, broadcasting last September throughout the United States and with worldwide impact, reports from the Soviet Union. These reports appeared on all NBC News programs. Two months later, NBC News highlighted your responses to questions posed by our Chief Diplomatic Correspondent, Marvin Kalb, who then was first to disclose the agreement for Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko and Secretary of State George Shultz to meet in Geneva in early January.

An NBC News television interview with you, Mr. President, would be an extraordinary opportunity to advance understanding of your policy, not only among the American people but among all peoples, since such an interview would receive worldwide distribution and attention. Should you agree to this proposal, I would,

President Konstantin Chernenko
December 17, 1984
Page 2

as President of NBC News, send a team of experts to Moscow to help work out the arrangements and technical details. Such an interview might be broadcast "live" from the Kremlin, or taped "to time", meaning there would be no editing.

I should like to add, sir, for your information, that I am extending a similar invitation to President Ronald Reagan; and if both you and he should agree individually to my proposal, then NBC News would be pleased to broadcast both interviews, providing an unprecedented opportunity for global understanding of the Soviet-American relationship. In the context of the Spring fortieth anniversary celebrations, recalling a time of Soviet-American cooperation, such interviews by the two Presidents would, I believe, surely advance not only the cause of mutual understanding between our countries, but the prospects for world peace as well.

Very truly yours,

Lawrence K. Goodman

bc: Grant Tinker
Bob McFarland
Marvin Kalb

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 24, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: ROBERT C. MCFARLANE *Bob*

SUBJECT: Memorial Plaque for Dr. Richard S. Beal

The contributions Rich Beal made to the betterment of the White House communications and crisis management capability are known to all of us and will endure for future Administrations.

In gratitude to Richard and in memory of his many inspirational qualities, we would like to place an appropriate plaque in the antechamber of Room 208, OEOB, with the following inscription:

DEDICATED TO THE MEMORY OF DR. RICHARD SMITH BEAL

He conceived and implemented a brilliant design for the management of responses to international crises. No White House had ever seen anything like it before, and none will be without it again. Not just the Presidency but the entire Nation owes him a debt of gratitude.

Ronald Reagan
1984

12/26/84

John Rogers will prepare comments + handle directly w/JAB

1/3 JFWK handled w/JAB directly. Done

cc John Rogers

1/2 KC ask John to call me re this. Thank JMB

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: BUD McFARLANE
FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III
SUBJECT: Karna Small's Convention Expenses

In response to your December 6 memo requesting that Karna Small be reimbursed for her expenses related to the 1984 Republican National Convention, I am afraid that I must decline this request.

On July 23, I advised Mike McManus that Karna could travel to the Convention, provided that she paid her own way. In checking with the Counsel's Office, there was/is no way that Karna could be paid for from "official" White House funds.

To compound this matter, the Counsel's Office ^{advised} ~~has advised me~~ that the Reagan-Bush '84 primary campaign funds are the only funds from which Karna could have been reimbursed. ~~In~~ checking with the campaign offices, these funds have long since been spent.

I ^{understand} appreciate your ^{desire to} interest in assisting Karna, but am afraid that nothing can be done at this late date.

*Karna could've
be pd.
because
on advice
of Counsel's
Office only*


*My staff reports that when in checking with the
campaigns
we are
advised
that there*

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 13, 1984

MEMORANDUM TO: BUD MCFARLANE

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III 

SUBJECT: Karna Small's Convention Expenses

In response to your December 6 memo requesting that Karna Small be reimbursed for her expenses related to the 1984 Republican National Convention, I am afraid that I must decline this request.

On July 23, I advised Mike McManus that Karna could travel to the Convention, provided that she pay her own way. With the exception of five staff persons whose travel is always considered official (i.e. those performing "official government duties"), no White House or other government funds were used to pay for convention-related activities or expenses of White House staff members.

To compound this matter, the Counsel's Office advises me that the Reagan-Bush '84 primary campaign funds are the only funds from which Karna could have been reimbursed. My staff reports that in checking with the campaign, we are advised that these funds have long since been spent.

I understand your desire to assist Karna, but am afraid that nothing can be done at this late date.

Miss C.
3-1914

*This NEEDS Your
ANSWERS - MAT
7/23*

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
July 20, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: MICHAEL A. McMANUS, JR. *MM*

SUBJECT: Requests for Additional
Personnel at the Convention

Attached are three memos requesting that additional staff members be added to the "official" White House traveling party, and paid for by Reagan-Bush.

These are for your approval/disapproval.

	<u>Approve</u>	<u>Disapprove</u>
Tony Dolan	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Peggy Noonan	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
Karna Small	<u> </u>	<u> </u>
John Marion	<u> </u>	<u> </u>

- separate list
- pay own way
- 100%

Thank you.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

July 19, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL A. McMANUS, JR.

FROM: ROBERT M. KIMMITT *Bob*
SUBJECT: 1984 Republican National Convention

It is requested that Karna Small be authorized to travel to the Convention and that she be manifested on the Braniff flights to and from Dallas and provided with room accommodations at the Anatole. Her responsibility at the Convention will be to provide support to the Assistant to the President for National Security Affairs and other White House officials.

Even though Karna Small has offered to pay her own way, she is travelling as a member of the official travelling staff and it is requested that the cost of her travel be covered in the same manner as others in the official White House travelling party.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 21, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEEVER
FROM: MIKE McMANUS
SUBJECT: Republican National Convention

I sent a memo out last week to all Assistants to the President requesting a list of staff who should be considered for inclusion in the White House Party at the Convention. The results from that memo are as follows:

Jim Baker - 8 rooms

Dick Darman - 5 rooms

Fred Fielding - 5 rooms

Craig Fuller - 2 rooms

John Herrington - 1 room

Ed Hickey - 1 room

Bud McFarlane - 3 rooms

B. Oglesby - 5 rooms

John Rodgers - 2 rooms

Larry Speakes - 9 rooms

Jack Svahn - 9 rooms

Lee Verstandig - 5 rooms

Faith Whittlesey - 11 rooms

*Bud McFarlane
Wilma Hall
Tom Skell*

This count totals 61 rooms which does not include your staff requirements or office space.

December 6, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM ROBERT C. MCFARLANE 

SUBJECT: Karna Small

At my request, Karna Small traveled to Dallas to assist me during the President's stay at the convention. Mike McManus indicated that you needed to approve Convention-related expenditures, and I would like to request that Karna be reimbursed for her expenses related to the trip, which she paid in anticipation of reimbursement. Total expense is \$792.30 (\$278 travel and \$514.30 for hotel). Receipts are attached.

Thank you.

Attachment
Receipts

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

August 27, 1984

FOR: WILMA
FROM: KARNA *K*

Attached are the statements you
wanted:

Airfare	\$278.00
Hotel	\$514.30
	<hr/>
Total	\$792.30
	=====

PASSENGER TICKET AND BAGGAGE CHECK SUBJECT TO CONDITIONS CONTAINED IN THIS TICKET
ISSUED BY

Piedmont Airlines

(CONJUNCTION TICKETS)

See below for Airline
Form, Serial Number

PASSENGER NAME
SMALL, CARNA

ATC PASSENGER COUPON
DATE OF ISSUE

08 AUG 64

ORIGIN
WASHINGTON NADEVON WALKER TVI

DESTINATION
WASHINGTON NAASDC INC

ISSUED IN EXCHANGE FOR
WASHINGTON DC

PSGR CPN

09 54959 2/WBOKIUI

NO	FROM	NOT GOOD FOR PASSAGE	CARRIER	FLIGHT	CLASS	DATE	TIME	STATUS	FARE BASIS	TKT. DESIGNATOR	NOT VALID BEFORE	NOT VALID AFTER	ALLOW
	WASHINGTON NATN		PI	205	H	21AUG	450P	OK	HAP3				
X	CHARLOTTE		PI	689	H	21AUG	720P	OK	HAP3				
O	DALLAS/FT WORTH		PI	78	H	24AUG	255P	OK	HAP3				
X	CHARLOTTE		PI	254	H	24AUG	720P	OK	HAP3				

FARE	BAGGAGE CHECKED	UNCHECKED	PCS.	WT.	UNCHECKED	PCS.	WT.	UNCHECKED	PCS.	WT.	UNCHECKED	PCS.	WT.	UNCHECKED
WASHINGTON NATN														

257.40 21AUG WAS PI-XCLT PI DFW128.70 PI-XCLT PI WAS128.70 TL257.40

20.60

TOTAL **278.00** FORM OF PAYMENT **AGENT CHECK NON REFUNDABLE** TOUR CODE

CPN AIRLINE CODE FORM SERIAL NUMBER CK ORIGINAL ISSUE

CONTROL NO
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030 7290155561 3

D302 **10**
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DATE AND PLACE OF ISSUE
DO NOT WRITE IN THESE SPACES
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OTHER THAN THE DESIGNATED CARRIER OF THIS AIRLINE

ROOM 2438	SMALL, KARNA (PRA)	MARKET	AUG 19 10:13 AM	AUG 24	TIME	ACCOUNT 128787	TYPE
95100	PRIVATE FRIENDS 1600 PENN S.W. WASHINGTON D.C. 20008	Y04 CA	137583 G				
PRS 1			CA. TRAN. DATE TIME METHOD	AMOUNT			
STD REG 30			372063690941008	05/86			

PAGE 1

DATE	REFERENCE	CHARGE	CREDIT	BALANCE
AUG 19 84	ROOM	95.00		
AUG 19 84	8% ROOM TX	7.60		
BALANCE				102.60
AUG 20 84	LOCAL CALL 935	.65		
AUG 20 84	ROOM	95.00		
AUG 20 84	8% ROOM TX	7.60		
BALANCE				205.85
AUG 21 84	ROOM	95.00		
AUG 21 84	8% ROOM TX	7.60		
BALANCE				308.45
AUG 22 84	LOCAL CALL 448	.65		
AUG 22 84	ROOM	95.00		
AUG 22 84	8% ROOM TX	7.60		
BALANCE				411.70
AUG 23 84	ROOM	95.00		
AUG 23 84	8% ROOM TX	7.60		
BALANCE				514.30

526 1:23 PM AUG 24 "THIS IS NOT A CASH RECEIPT"

2201 Stemmons Freeway
Dallas, Texas 75207



(214) 748-1200

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Withdrawer
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COHEN, D

Box Number
9

60

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<i>NO Document Description</i>	<i>pages</i>		<i>tions</i>

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Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

<u>Other</u>	<u>\$</u>
Marianne Andrews	RW
Betty Ayers	Govt - <i>detailed</i>
Jim Brady	RW
Sarah Brady	RW
Linda Bennett	Oglesby
Kathy Camalier	RW
Dick Darman	BT
Bob Dahlgren	RW
Dottie Dellinger	Gov't
- Dave Fischer	DOD
Craig Fuller	BT
Wilma Hall	Govt
Bill Henkel	Govt
Ed Hickey	Gov't (DOD?)
Linda Hoyt	Govt
Bob Kabel	Oglesby
Mike McManus	BT
Rick Neal	RB
B. Oglesby	Oglesby
- Kathy Osborne	DOD
Nancy Risque	Oglesby
- Dr. Ruge	DOD
Tom Schull	Govt
Dennis Thomas	Oglesby
Kim Timmons	RNC
Pam Turner	Oglesby
Andy Card	Delegate
- Mil Aides	DOD
Advance	

Photo Office:
Michael Evans
William Fitzpatrick
Jack Kightlinger
Peter Souza
Carol Greenawalt
Mary Anne Fackelman

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

October 29, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR

MR. CHARLES HILL
Executive Secretary
Department of State

COLONEL R.J. AFFOURTIT
Executive Secretary
Department of Defense

MRS. HELEN ROBBINS
Executive Assistant to the
Secretary
Department of Commerce

MS. KAREN CRAYTON
Acting Executive Secretary
Department of Education

MR. ALTON KEEL
Associate Director for
National Security and
International Affairs
Office of Management and
Budget

MR. DENNIS WHITFIELD
Executive Assistant to the
United States Trade
Representative

MR. JOHN A. SVAHN
Assistant to the President
for Policy Development

DR. GEORGE KEYWORTH
Director, Office of
Science and Technology
Policy

MR. C. WILLIAM LASALLE
Chief of the Executive
Secretariat
U.S. Information Agency

SUBJECT: Japanese Language Education for Industrial
Growth

Please provide agency comments on the attached draft NSSD on increasing Japanese language knowledge to help improve the U.S. industrial posture. Agency comments are due by COB Friday, November 9, 1984, to the NSC Executive Secretariat.

It is anticipated that, after a NSSD is finalized and approved by the President, the State Department will chair an Assistant Secretary-level steering group with appropriate interagency, subordinate working groups to fulfill the provisions of the NSSD and to report on other matters concerning the NSSD. The Department of Education will serve as deputy-chair for this study, and the NSC staff will be

the study coordinators. This group would submit its final report and recommendations to the National Security Council for consideration by the President. Steps will be taken to ensure that the President's Commission on Industrial Competitiveness is kept abreast of the NSSD process.


Robert M. Kimmitt
Executive Secretary

Attachment
Draft NSDD

cc: Counsellor to the President
✓ Chief of Staff to the President

NATIONAL SECURITY STUDY
DIRECTIVE NUMBER

Japanese Language Education
for Industrial Growth

Various factors suggest that a greater percentage of American engineering, business and scientific communities should have an adequate working knowledge of the Japanese language to support the continued growth of their professional activities. The factors that point to the need for increased Japanese language in these groups include:

- Japan will become the second largest economy in the world in the next decade, yet American language skills are poorer in Japanese than in any other major language.
- The lack of Japanese language skills hampers U.S. businesses in the Japanese and Pacific Basin markets, as well as keeping abreast of the new and important technology being created in Japan.
- Trade deficits can only be reduced if, among other things, U.S. firms effectively use new technology as soon as it is developed throughout the world.
- Trade issues with Japan call for reaching out to expand business interaction on a reciprocal basis.
- U.S. firms have found that their management and engineers often find it too difficult to learn Japanese past their college years.

In answer to these points, an Assistant Secretary-level group, to be chaired by the Department of State with a Department of Education deputy chair and an NSC study coordinator, should explore what might be done to develop Japanese language skills among our next generation of business and technical leaders.

The following principles should be used as a guide in developing this effort. It should:

- be a cooperative effort between the United States and Japan;
- be supported and funded by the private sector (the U.S. Government's role should be to make people aware of the problem and lay the groundwork for private sector support); and
- be framed in such a manner so as to engender the support of the U.S. and Japanese educational, scientific and business communities.

The following is a possible concept for the Japanese language initiative:

- The United States and Japan would jointly pledge to work together to develop better cross language skills, particularly in America.

- A U.S. program would be instituted where candidates would be drawn from the top U.S. college-bound high school seniors. They would be eligible for a yearly grant (to institutions that offer Japanese) with the provisos that they meet certain testing minimums in Japanese every year and that they major in the scientific, engineering or business disciplines. Corporations would fund this grant inducement program, starting with a few thousand students in the first year of the program.

- Concurrently, the USG and the nation's business and academic communities would work together to ensure that the nation's leading universities (covering a geographically distributed area) have sound Japanese language education programs. Japan might help supply exchange teachers. Private sector financial support would endow these centers.

- A junior year exchange program should be established for these students between U.S. and Japanese universities.

This NSSD should result in a recommended course of action being forwarded to the NSC for Presidential consideration, based on appropriate input and commitments for support from the U.S. business and academic communities and the Japanese.

SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES



September 1984

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON


October 16, 1984

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER, III
Chief of Staff

SUBJECT: Selected National Security Issues

Enclosed are two copies of the September 1984 Selected National Security Issues book for your use. The book summarizes our objectives and accomplishments and provides talking points for the specific issues selected. We intend to publish an updated version quarterly. The National Security Council Executive Secretary has a limited number of additional copies.

I would appreciate any comments and suggestions you may have to assist us in updating and maintaining this book as a useful aid for dealing with national security issues.



Robert C. McFarlane

Attachment
Selected National Security Issues, September 1984

SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

This is a compilation of selected national security issues, national objectives, Administration accomplishments during the past four years, and key talking points for each issue. We selected these particular issues not only because of their significance in national security affairs, but also because of their high interest. This document is not intended to be a comprehensive or in-depth review of our national security policy. However, we do hope that it serves a useful purpose by providing insight into our selected national security policies.

Selected National Security Issues
September 1984

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SELECTED NATIONAL SECURITY ISSUES

OVERVIEW

The two most important foreign policy questions any Administration faces are:

- o Where does America stand?
- o What does America stand for?

Answers to these were increasingly in doubt in the 70's. They are no longer. By providing clear answers we have helped to make the world a safer place and to keep it safe in the future.

The Starting Point

Before January 1981, international affairs had come to seem especially troubling for Americans. The reason was simple -- the actions of the Carter Administration had raised doubts, around the world and for our own people, about basic questions like:

- o Military security: Would the U.S. continue to get weaker or regain her strength?
- o Domestic economy: Would we be able to lick the problem of inflation and low growth?
- o International economy: Would we continue to work for free trade or retreat into self-defeating protectionism?
- o Arms control: Would we continue to accept one-sided agreements or insist on equality and real reductions?
- o Alliances: Would we stand by our friends and be able to get them to follow through on commitments to us?
- o Regional crises: Would the U.S. continue to lose the influence necessary for promoting regional stability and peace? Was it still better to be a friend of the U.S. than Soviet Union?

A President must act. And he must be prepared to give clear answers to these questions. He can't expect to protect America's interests by:

- o Claiming the problems we face are too hard,
- o Pretending that Cuban troops roaming around the Third World are a "stabilizing" force,
- o Offering our friends just enough help to fail, or
- o Settling slowly but surely for second best.

If this is how we act, it's absolutely clear what we'll get. The Carter Administration claimed the invasion of Afghanistan opened its eyes to the danger of Soviet expansion, but then gave so little help to Pakistan -- the country most threatened by the invasion -- that it was rejected as "peanuts." Nothing isolates America more than weakness and unreliability.

Accomplishments

The job the American people asked us to do was to rebuild, and make the world a safer place again. This is precisely what we've done. Soviet aggression has not claimed one square inch of territory since 1981. We have made clear and steady progress in reversing the global trends that we inherited. And we have worked to restore the strength on which successful American diplomacy and effective agreements depend:

- o In Europe we and our allies stood up -- united -- to the most intense campaign of Soviet intimidation in 25 years.
- o On arms control we've made revolutionary proposals that would really increase everybody's security.
- o Our own recovery and the strategy we and our allies forged at the Williamsburg summit are helping to revive the international economy. We are showing that it can be done without resorting to trade-war tactics.
- o In the Middle East, we have presented the most far-reaching peace plan ever put forward by the U.S. And our friends in the region, Israel and the moderate Arabs, again know they can count on us. We are continuing to improve our relations with the moderate Arabs, while simultaneously expanding our security cooperation with Israel.
- o In Central America, we've met the challenge of military subversion and expansionism. We've helped the first democratic government of El Salvador in years to protect itself; working with Caribbean nations, we helped return the government of Grenada to its people.
- o In Africa we have been diplomatic mediators, helping to bring about the first non-aggression agreements ever between South Africa and her neighbors, and using our influence to seek solutions to problems rather than confrontation.
- o We have united the free world against repression in Poland and the Soviet war of conquest in Afghanistan. There is a powerful message in the fact that most of the world's

insurgencies are now fighting against the Soviet Union or Soviet clients. These are the true national liberation movements of our time.

- o The President's personal diplomacy has built the best relations our country has ever had with Japan and China. Good relations with each of these Asian powers has not been at the expense of bad relations with the other. We are working with both to improve their ability to defend themselves.
- o We are reaching out to all friendly nations of the Pacific Basin, to seek enhanced economic and security ties with this dynamic region so vital to America's future.
- o We have made dramatic progress in working with others to curb the spread of nuclear weapons to new states and to unstable regions of the world.
- o We no longer fear energy shortages -- oil imports are way down, our reserves are high, and we've forged effective emergency energy agreements with our allies.
- o We have taken control of the tide of strategic technology to the USSR, eliminated preferential credit terms for the Soviets, and reduced the risk of European dependence on Soviet energy.

This is where America stands. And because what we have achieved is deep and durable, it opens the door to still broader opportunities in the years ahead.

Next Steps: Looking Ahead

America is stronger today than four years ago. But we didn't restore our strength for strength's sake.

What America stands for is what it should always stand for -- peace, prosperity and democracy. And it has to do more than treat these as slogans -- it has to know what it takes to get there, and have the vision to set bold goals.

We've shown we can do that, but the American people deserve to know what the agenda for the next four years will be.

Peace. We are all for peace. Our people are entitled to security. The question is how to turn rhetoric into results.

o Goals:

- Conduct relations with the Soviet Union based on strict reciprocity and true restraint. Seek and achieve

agreements based on real reductions in nuclear forces. Our proposals are still on the table; we encourage the Soviets to come back.

- Affirm our long-term commitment to reduce mankind's terrible reliance on nuclear weapons, by exploring the technology of strategic defense, and by improving the conventional capabilities of this country and our allies.
- Seek immediate breakthroughs in other areas where peace is at risk: e.g., preventing proliferation of nuclear weapons to new countries, turning back the tide of international terrorism, resolving dangerous regional wars, and showing countries that have looked to the Soviet Union the viability of the democratic, free enterprise alternative.

Prosperity. Stirrings in the international economy reflect our own vibrant recovery. How to assure that this is not just a blip?

o Goals:

- Continue the responsible policies at home that have put us back on our feet. This is central to worldwide growth, but also to other goals. The discipline we showed in attacking problems has increased confidence in America across the board.
- This can be the basis of a second goal: reaching and implementing a world consensus on free market policies to assure an enduring economic recovery. In particular, focus on liberalized trade and financial stability.
- Put the protectionist temptation behind us. An open world economy is the best -- only -- way to sustain a recovery in which whole world participates. We want to get others to "swear off" too by reducing barriers to investment, etc.
- Solve the international debt problem in a way that treats the disease not just the symptoms. We are already helping democratic friends like Mexico and Argentina work their way out of their crisis, and on conditions that will require responsible economic management in the future.

Democracy. America believes in a future of democratic possibilities, and knows that in the long run democracy is the best peace program we have to offer. Progress -- 90% of Latin America's people now live in countries that are democratic or on

a transition timetable. And countries that seemed to have no hope of democracy -- like Argentina and Guatemala -- have made major breakthroughs.

o Goals:

- o -- Make the Americas the hemisphere of democracy in this decade. The steadiness of this Administration's policies is one part of making this possible. The recommendations of the bipartisan Kissinger Commission on Central America must be a further pledge to this process. Issue the challenge of democracy to nations around the world, doing what we can to encourage trends toward democracy and to discourage those who would repress their people or help others whose formula for government is repression instead of democracy.

REGIONAL ISSUESSOVIET UNIONIssue:

- o How can the United States further deter Soviet direct and indirect aggression and reduce the risk of a U.S.-Soviet war?

Objectives:

- o Reduce, and eventually eliminate, the use and threat of force in solving international disputes;
- o Reduce the vast stockpiles of weapons in the world, particularly nuclear weapons, on a balanced, stabilizing, and verifiable basis;
- o Establish a better working relationship with the Soviet Union, one marked by greater cooperation and understanding; and
- o Deter Soviet aggression and to facilitate negotiation of agreements which would reduce tension and diminish the threat of war.

In pursuing these objectives, our approach is based on three guiding principles:

- o Realism, which means that we must recognize the nature of the world we live in and the Soviet system, and must not sweep problems under the rug, but must deal with them forthrightly.
- o Strength, which is more than military power; it is an amalgam of political unity and will, economic health, and an adequate defense. The Soviet Union respects strength; it takes advantage of weakness.
- o Dialogue, which means that we are prepared to discuss the problems that divide us and to work for practical and fair solutions on the basis of mutual compromise.

Accomplishments:

- o The world is safer today than it was four years ago. Our ability to deter aggression is being restored, and the growing tide of Soviet direct and indirect aggression we saw in the 1970's has receded.
- o Our global alliances and traditional friendships, essential to deterring Soviet aggression, have been repaired and are sound.

- o The Soviet Union has also avoided actions which could cause direct conflict between us as opposed to what happened, for instance, in 1973, when Soviet preparations to intervene directly in the Middle East caused us to go on a world-wide strategic alert. NATO's call for the deployment of INF missiles in Europe to counter the threat of the Soviet SS-20's is a case in point.
- o We have placed far-reaching and ambitious arms reduction proposals on the table.
- o We have moved to place our working relationship on a more businesslike footing, and to increase contacts between our societies.
- o We have made it clear that our cooperation with the Soviet Union will depend to a great extent on Soviet compliance with existing agreements; including those on arms control, human rights, and other major issues.
- o We have established a pattern of consultation on regional issues. Despite our fundamental disagreements on many of these, consultations help us and the Soviets to avoid actions which could escalate into direct conflict.
- o We have in place a policy designed for the long term, since management of our relations with the Soviet Union must be steady and must avoid the rapid fluctuations of the past, which weakened our ability to defend our interests. It is based upon a realistic assessment of the Soviet Union, and on the recognition that we must preserve peace between us as we work toward solving problems.

Talking Points:

- o Our policy vis-a-vis the Soviet Union is aimed at achieving a lessened reliance on the use or threat of force, a reduction in nuclear and other armaments, and a more constructive U.S.-Soviet working relationship. We also seek to deter further Soviet direct and indirect aggression in the world.
- o During the 1970's the USSR increased its military power far beyond its defensive needs and used force and the implied application of force to expand its control over other countries.
- o Either directly or through surrogates the Soviets have supported the establishment of communist regimes in Africa (Angola, Ethiopia), in Asia (Vietnam, Kampuchea and Laos), in Latin America and the Caribbean (Nicaragua, El Salvador and Grenada), and blatantly invaded a neutral country (Afghanistan). They turned Communist Cuba into a base for

aggression in Latin America and Africa. At the same time, they are attempting to undermine NATO by deploying SS-20 nuclear missiles against Western Europe.

- o This pattern of aggression not only poses a threat to many independent nations, but ultimately to American security and to the American way of life.
- o During the same period, the Soviet Union reached nuclear parity with us, and in some areas pulled ahead of us, in some aspects of strategic nuclear capabilities and particularly in conventional armaments.
- o This Administration has moved decisively to contain Soviet expansionism. No country has fallen to Soviet aggression since 1981 and, despite its frequent saber-rattling and truculence, Moscow has been more cautious in its military behavior over the past four years. This is largely due to our refurbishing of our deterrent capacity and strengthening of our alliances.
- o At the same time, we have created a sound basis for realistic and peaceful management of our overall relationship with the Soviet Union. In the past four years, the United States has made dozens of specific proposals to the Soviet Union which, if accepted, would reduce tensions, lower arms levels and provide for a better and more realistic working relationship.
- o We have agreed to upgrade the "hotline" for crisis communications between our capitals.
- o We are discussing extending our agreements on avoiding incidents at sea and on cooperation in fishing.
- o We have proposed reviving agreements on cooperation in environmental protection, housing, health, and agriculture.
- o We have renewed our agreement on consular, economic, industrial, and technical cooperation.
- o We have proposed conducting a joint simulated space rescue mission.
- o We are discussing again the proposal to open consulates in New York and Kiev.
- o We are negotiating to resolve differences on our maritime boundary off Alaska.
- o We are proposing to discuss new uses of the hotline, search and rescue procedures for those lost at sea, and joint military and diplomatic communications.

- o While Moscow has refused since December 1983 to negotiate with us on reducing nuclear arms, we believe that it is in the interest of both countries to negotiate verifiable agreements for lower arms levels, and to improve our relationship in other respects. We will continue our efforts, and believe that the Soviet leadership will eventually come to understand that such negotiations are in its interest as well.
- o Until the Soviets agree to real arms reductions, it is essential for us to continue our currently planned defense modernization program. If this program is curtailed without verifiable agreements to constrain threatening Soviet programs, the Soviet leaders will have little incentive to negotiate, but will simply wait in the hope of achieving their objectives without any concessions on their part.
- o The Soviets have effectively exploited Western strategic technology to modernize their military capabilities. Our own modernization program is based on achieving conventional deterrence through technological superiority, rather than numerical equality. We will continue our determined efforts to stem the flow of strategic technology to the Soviets to ensure that we derive the maximum deterrent value from our modernization program.

EASTERN EUROPEIssue:

Given U.S.-Soviet tensions and the Soviet campaign to reimpose more stringent controls on Eastern Europe, how can we maintain and improve our relations with East European countries?

Objectives:

- o Differentiate our policies toward East European countries to encourage domestic liberalization, diversity, and more autonomous foreign policies.
- o Promote security through enhanced trade, economic and political cooperation.
- o With those countries that manifest foreign policy autonomy or domestic liberalization, stimulate and further develop the East-West dialogue through cultural and scientific exchanges, international meetings, high-level visits, bilateral councils, and government-to-government contacts.
- o Help foster genuine national reconciliation in Poland that includes dialogue among the Government, Church, and the people (especially the Polish workforce); restoration of free trade unions; implementation of economic reform; and an enhanced role for the Church.
- o Maintain our strong support for an independent, unified, non-aligned, economically viable, and stable Yugoslavia.

Accomplishments:

- o In spite of U.S.-Soviet tensions and tighter Soviet controls in East Europe, we have succeeded in preventing the deterioration of U.S. relations with several East European countries and, in fact, have strengthened bilateral ties with Hungary and Romania through a policy of differentiation.
- o We have improved U.S.-Hungarian relations significantly, as manifested in a series of mutual high-level visits, resolution of all family reunification cases, Hungary's adherence to the conditions of MFN status, and our support for their membership in the IMF in 1982.
- o We have improved the special U.S.-Romanian relationship through frequent exchanges and mutually beneficial political and economic steps. Romania has continued its independent foreign policy -- most visibly in its criticism of Moscow's new nuclear deployments and its decision to ignore the Soviet Olympic boycott. Also, by

establishing the U.S.-Romanian Human Rights Roundtable, we have been able to communicate successfully the importance we attach to immigration and overall human rights issues.

- o The Vice President's trip to Eastern Europe in September 1983 served as a visible manifestation of our differentiation policy and furthered bilateral dialogue with key East European leaders. His visits to Yugoslavia, Romania, and Hungary provided a foundation for durable improvement in U.S.-East European relations, and his speech in Vienna during the trip was the first clear, high-level articulation of our differentiation policy.
- o Our sanctions policy toward Poland has contributed to the recent moderation displayed by Warsaw (the declaration of amnesty for all political prisoners); has served and will continue to serve as an effective lever to encourage the Polish Government toward more concrete progress (economic reform, restoration of free trade unions, etc.); and has also enabled us to respond to positive measures taken by the Polish Government with equally significant steps.
- o Over the last three years, we have provided over \$100 million in humanitarian aid to Poland. Specifically, the Administration has assisted voluntary agencies (CRS, CARE, and Project Hope) by providing food, medicine and other humanitarian aid to the Polish people through non-governmental channels.
- o We have bolstered our bilateral relations with Yugoslavia through such steps as the multilateral "Friends of Yugoslavia" economic assistance package in which the U.S. played a key role; and hosting the visit of President Spiljak to the U.S. in 1984 -- the first top-level Yugoslav visit to the U.S. since 1978.

Talking Points:

- o We have successfully maintained, through our policy of differentiation, good bilateral relations with several East European countries, despite overall East-West tensions and persistent Soviet efforts to tighten political controls.
- o We have rejected any notion of there having been a "lawful" division of Europe. There was no agreement at Yalta to divide Europe into "spheres of influence." Rather, the Soviet Union pledged itself to grant full independence to Poland and other states in East Europe, and to hold free elections. The Soviet violation of these obligations is a root cause of East-West tensions today.

- o Our strong economic recovery has enabled us to support some East European (Yugoslavia, Romania, Hungary) efforts to resolve short-term liquidity problems and implement long-term economic reform and stabilization efforts.
- o With respect to Poland, we have maintained, a measured, effective step-by-step approach under which we are easing our sanctions in direct response to meaningful liberalization measures taken by the Polish Government. We have also provided humanitarian aid through non-governmental channels (totaling over \$100 million) over the last three years. It is essential that the regime move toward genuine dialogue and reconciliation with all elements of Polish society, including the workforce.
- o With respect to Yugoslavia, we have maintained good relations through high-level visits, continued bilateral trade and mutually beneficial commercial activity.

WESTERN EUROPEIssue:

How can the United States most effectively expand and strengthen our longstanding and deep political, economic, and military ties with and interests in Western Europe?

Objectives:

- o Strengthen the NATO Alliance and our political and military relations with other Western European nations.
- o Neutralize Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from its West European Allies.
- o Make effective and meaningful arms control an essential element in strengthening peace and security.
- o Stimulate further the economic recovery of our European Allies and friends.
- o Promote closer U.S.-West European coordination of trade and financial policies.
- o Ensure that we and our Allies have access to sufficient energy supplies to meet Western security needs.
- o Curb the flow of militarily significant technologies, products, and resources from the West to the Soviet Union and its Allies.
- o Devise an effective U.S.-Allied policy to combat international terrorism.

Accomplishments:

- o The Administration has put relations with our European friends and Allies on a stronger and steadier course. This was partly accomplished via frequent meetings between the President and key European leaders, including two Presidential trips to Europe.
- o We have worked closely with our Allies to develop coordinated policies for addressing problems beyond the NATO area. This has included especially close consultations with regard to the Middle East and the Iran-Iraq war, where we have reached agreement within the International Energy Agency on how to handle a major reduction in oil supplies. This has helped to calm the oil market and keep the price of oil down.

- o In the absence of an arms control agreement, we have begun deploying INF missiles in Europe, thereby shoring up the deterrent whose credibility was being called into question by Soviet deployments of SS-20 missiles and other significant force improvements.
- o INF deployment, begun after the closest and most intensive consultations in NATO history, has helped neutralize Soviet efforts to decouple the U.S. from Europe and has sent Moscow a strong signal of Alliance resolve and solidarity.
- o At the same time, we and our Allies remain fully committed toward achieving significant arms reduction. The Alliance recently demonstrated its continuing interest in moving in this direction by deciding unilaterally to withdraw an additional 1400 nuclear warheads from Europe.
- o We have played a major role in developing measures to improve NATO's conventional defenses through better utilization of emerging technologies and enhanced arms cooperation, as in the U.S.-FRG Patriot program.
- o The Administration has successfully renewed military basing agreements with Spain, Portugal, and Greece that are vital to our deterrence strategy.
- o The U.S. economic recovery has helped stimulate robust non-inflationary economic growth in West European countries. (European economies grew 2.4% in 1983; the forecast for 1984 is 4.5%.)
- o Agreement has been reached to discuss GATT and a new round of trade negotiations, including trade with and among developing countries. These initiatives will strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S. and Western Europe, and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.
- o Together with our Allies, we have begun to develop a comprehensive approach to resolving the world debt problem.
- o We have agreed with our Allies not to subsidize the Soviet economy or aid Soviet military expansion by offering preferential trading terms or easy credits.
- o We have agreed with our Allies to restrict the flow of products, materials, and technology which would increase Warsaw Pact military capabilities.
- o We have helped to foster a more balanced and realistic understanding among our Allies of the Soviet threat and the means by which the Soviets seek to achieve their aims.

- o We have agreed with the Europeans on a strategy to reduce European dependency on the Soviet Union as an energy supplier.
- o We have reached agreement with our Allies to explore the possibility of a joint space station.
- o We have agreed with our Allies on concrete steps to combat international terrorism.

Talking Points:

- o Our objectives in our relations with our Western European Allies and friends have been to expand and strengthen our political, economic, and military cooperation; to assist in spurring their economic recovery; and to negate Soviet efforts to sow discord among us.
- o The Western Alliance system has become strong again. We have excellent relations with all of our Allies, and President Reagan has developed strong personal ties with many European leaders. As President Reagan said when he met with the NATO Foreign Ministers in May 1984, "For us, our NATO partnership is an anchor, a fixed point in a turbulent world."
- o We are working closely with our Allies in a number of areas of fundamental importance to us all. These include: the pursuit of peace and arms control with the Soviet Union; planning cooperative responses to a possible oil shortage; resolving the world debt problem; restricting the flow of sensitive technology to the Soviet Union and its Allies; reducing European dependency on Soviet energy; exploring the possibility of a joint space station; and combating international terrorism.
- o The Alliance is in fundamental agreement regarding the nature of the challenge posed by the Soviet Union and its Allies. Despite Soviet threats, NATO is deploying INF missiles to counter the SS-20 deployments, has reached a new consensus on preventing the flow of militarily significant technologies to the East, and has undertaken a program to enhance NATO's conventional defense capability.
- o The U.S. economic expansion has provided the impetus for robust non-inflationary growth in West Europe. Other joint initiatives, designed to eliminate protectionist tendencies and promote trade with developed as well as less-developed nations, will continue to strengthen the economic expansion in the U.S. and West Europe and help spread the recovery to the LDCs.

JAPANIssue:

How should the United States manage the increasingly complex relationship with Japan?

Objectives:

- o Maintain and strengthen our excellent bilateral relations.
- o Encourage Tokyo to meet its declared commitments for self-defense.
- o Continue to manage our economic and trade relations in a careful and sustained manner.
- o Enhance our ability to compete openly with the Japanese in high-technology.
- o Seek Japanese support for our key security and other policies in other parts of the world.
- o Urge Japan to import more U.S. energy.

Accomplishments:

- o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have established a close personal working relationship which has led to increased U.S.-Japanese cooperation in economic and security areas.
- o In the trade area, Japan has liberalized its market to enable greater import of U.S. goods, including beef and citrus.
- o The Japanese have faithfully abided by the voluntary auto restraint agreement, limiting their export of automobiles to the U.S.
- o The President and Prime Minister Nakasone have agreed to a long term energy cooperation program which will mean thousands of newly created U.S. jobs and greater security for both nations.
- o The Finance Ministers of each country have endorsed a plan to further open Japanese financial markets, which, by "internationalizing" the yen, should improve the yen-dollar relationship over the longer term.
- o In the defense area, Japan has agreed to an expanded defense role which, if carried out, will aid global and regional deterrence.

Talking Points:

- o The U.S.-Japan relationship remains the foundation of U.S. policy in the Pacific.
- o The President's trip to Japan in November 1983 and the Vice President's follow-up in May 1984 strengthened U.S.-Japanese ties and the partnership for peace existing between our two countries.
- o Japan has opened further its trading and financial markets, has committed itself to importing more energy from the United States over the longer-term, and has agreed to increase its regional defense expenditures.
- o We are pleased that the Japanese have allocated more funds to improve their defense establishment, and that they have committed themselves to pursue more market-opening measures. Nonetheless, Japan has an obligation to take on even greater responsibility in both the military and international economic areas.

PEOPLES REPUBLIC OF CHINAIssue:

How can the United States facilitate continued, steady improvement in a long-term relationship with China?

Objectives:

- o Provide conditions conducive to continued growth in our cultural, economic, and trade relations.
- o Increase our dialogue with Beijing on political and strategic matters of joint concern.
- o Demonstrate to the Chinese the similarity of our global objectives.
- o Enhance our mutually beneficial relationship with China without compromising our moral and legal commitments to the people of Taiwan.

Accomplishments:

- o The highly successful visits of Premier Zhao to the U.S. and President Reagan to China reflect both countries' strong determination to improve their ties.
- o Over the past three years, we have signed a number of agreements which will lead to expanded commercial and cultural ties, including most recently a tax treaty, which will avoid double taxation and facilitate joint commercial ventures, and a protocol on cooperation management, industrial science, and technology.
- o The U.S. has liberalized controls over exporting high-technology products such as computers and laboratory instruments to China.
- o The U.S. and China have begun a limited but important cooperative relationship designed to strengthen Chinese military defensive capability.
- o The U.S. welcomed the Chinese to the 1984 Olympics after a hiatus of 32 years, along with a team representing the People of Taiwan.

Talking Points:

- o With Premier Zhao's visit to the U.S. last January and the President's return visit to China in April, we have shown the world how important the relationship is to both countries and how determined Washington and Beijing are to

strengthen it. Under President Reagan's leadership, our ties with China have become closer than they have been at any time since our re-establishment of relations in 1972.

- o We are realistic about our relationship, frankly acknowledging the fundamental differences in ideology and institutions between our two societies. We do not minimize our differences, but neither are we dominated by them.
- o We seek to enhance our mutually beneficial relationship with China in the areas of cultural, economic and trade relations, without compromising our moral and legal commitments to the people of Taiwan.
- o U.S.-Chinese cooperation and understanding contribute to peace and stability in Asia and in the world. We share many of the same foreign policy objectives. We have begun a limited but important cooperative arrangement designed to strengthen Chinese defensive capability.
- o President Reagan feels that bilateral progress in five areas -- trade, technology, investment, student exchanges, and exchanges of scientific and managerial expertise is particularly promising in assisting China's modernization efforts.
- o Our trade with each other shows great promise for the future, particularly in areas such as machinery, technology, oil equipment, petroleum, agricultural, and manufacturing products.
- o Americans have invested almost \$700 million in joint ventures and offshore oil exploration in China, making the U.S. China's largest foreign investor. Some 50 Chinese firms have established offices or branches in the United States, and China has invested in several joint ventures in the U.S.

EAST ASIA/PACIFIC BASINIssue:

What should the United States do to facilitate the growth of secure, prosperous, and politically stable nations, closely associated with U.S. principles and goals, in Korea, Southeast Asia, and the Pacific Basin?

Objectives:

- o Continue developing a comprehensive Pacific Basin development strategy that will enhance regional cooperation with the U.S. throughout the area.
- o Support the continued strengthening of U.S. economic, political, and security ties with the members of the Association of Southeast Asian Nations (ASEAN).
- o Deter North Korean aggression by continuing to provide a U.S. force presence as well as security assistance to the Republic of Korea.
- o Encourage direct talks between North and South Korea while discouraging efforts to involve the U.S. in them.
- o Resolve the Southeast Asia POW/MIA issue as a matter of the highest national priority.
- o Maintain our historically close ties with Australia and New Zealand and enhance regional security cooperation under the ANZUS treaty organization.
- o Encourage the development of friendly, democratic Pacific Island nations with foreign policies supportive of U.S. interests.

Accomplishments:

- o The President's trips to Asia in 1983 and 1984, the Vice President's trip last May, and Secretary Shultz's visit this summer clearly affirmed our commitment to a policy of close cooperation with the countries of the region.
- o We have moved well along with our friends and Allies in the region in the process of forging a Pacific Basin development strategy. The endeavor was discussed regionally for the first time at ASEAN's July meeting in Jakarta, where the members agreed to concentrate first on human resources development throughout the area.
- o We have actively supported the economic development of the ASEAN countries and have established excellent bilateral relations with each of them.

- o U.S.-Korean relations are excellent, security ties have never been stronger, and our expanding economic relationship is taking on increasing significance.
- o This Administration has established close personal ties at all levels with Australian and New Zealand officials.
- o Bilateral treaties of friendship with four Pacific nations -- the Cook Islands, Kiribati, Tuvalu, and New Zealand (for Tokelan) -- were signed by the President and ratified by the Senate. The treaties resolve long-standing conflicting territorial claims and preserve U.S. fishing rights and other interests.

Talking Points:

- o The nations of the Pacific Basin represent the most dynamic and fastest-growing economies in the Free World. The President has noted that: "I see America and our Pacific neighbors as nations of the future going forward together in a mighty enterprise to build dynamic growth economies and a safer world."
- o We have strongly supported ASEAN's economic and political activities and have simultaneously increased our security cooperation with the individual member states. We have encouraged the ASEAN countries to continue their forward-looking economic policies based on free trade. We are encouraging increased U.S. trade and investment in the region.
- o We are supporting ASEAN nations in forging a Pacific Basin development concept.
- o The U.S. strongly backs ASEAN's quest for a negotiated settlement in Kampuchea. At the same time we have made it clear that the POW/MIA matter remains the most important bilateral issue between ourselves and Vietnam. This issue must be fully resolved to our satisfaction before there can be any discussion of normalizing our relations with Hanoi.
- o The United States will maintain its security commitments to the Republic of Korea. We will continue, however, to urge North and South Korea to ease tensions through bilateral negotiations.
- o We conducted a major review of the ANZUS Treaty in 1983 when a new government came to power in Australia. The review reaffirmed the organization's relevance and

importance to the security of all three partners. That relevance and importance is unaffected, we believe, by changes in the political parties exercising power in any of the member countries.

ISRAEL/ARAB STATES/LEBANONIssue:

How can the United States effectively improve prospects for a lasting peace between Israel and her Arab neighbors and assist Lebanon in attaining unity and stability?

Objectives:

- o Resolve the Arab-Israeli conflict through a just and lasting settlement, achieved by direct negotiations among the parties to the conflict.
- o Facilitate the improvement of relations between Egypt and Israel in accordance with their peace treaty.
- o Ensure the security of Israel within defensible and recognized international borders.
- o Expand U.S. relations with selected Arab states.
- o Support the development of a strong, independent central government in Lebanon.
- o Obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces from Lebanon.

Accomplishments:

- o The United States took the lead in setting up the Multinational Force and Observers in the Sinai. The success of this venture made it possible to return the Sinai to Egypt.
- o The President's peace initiative of September 1, 1982 set forth a balanced set of positions which the parties to the Arab-Israeli conflict know the U.S. will stand by as soon as negotiations are resumed.
- o The agreement of May 17, 1983 providing for the withdrawal of Israeli troops from Lebanon, although since abrogated by Lebanon under Syrian pressure, was achieved as the result of strenuous efforts by the United States.
- o We did the right thing by pursuing our peacekeeping effort in Lebanon which helped preserve a relative peace for almost fifteen months and reduced the daily slaughter of innocent civilians.
- o The presence of our Marines and the Multinational Force in Beirut also gave the government of President Amin Gemayel a sorely needed opportunity to organize and reduce the fighting in his country.

- o At the request of the Government of Egypt, we assisted -- in cooperation with other Western nations -- in mine-clearing operations in the Gulf of Suez following the mining of this vital waterway by an unknown party. We also assisted the Saudi Government in like manner in their waters near Jidda and Yanbu.
- o We reached agreement with Israel late last year to set up a Joint Political Military Group to plan and coordinate strategic cooperation and to begin negotiations leading to the establishment of a free trade area. We continue to make progress on both fronts.

Talking Points:

- o Israel and her Arab neighbors have been in conflict since the State of Israel was founded in 1948. Ever since that time, it has been our policy both to help Israel survive and defend itself and to work with Israel and the Arab States to help them resolve their differences peacefully. This Administration has reaffirmed and re-emphasized these two key aspects of our overall Middle East policy while attempting to help both parties understand that U.S. security cooperation with them is essential to achieve our mutual goal of peace in the region.
- o As a nation, we have invested a great deal in working for peace in the Middle East. Although not all these investments have yet paid tangible dividends, they serve to demonstrate our deep interest in helping bring peace, freedom, and prosperity to all the peoples of the region.
- o American-Israeli relations have been on the upswing. Cooperation between us reached a new high level when we agreed at the time of Prime Minister Shamir's visit here last November to work closely together against Soviet intervention in the region and to establish a free trade area.
- o Israel faces serious economic problems that only she, through serious efforts of economic discipline, can solve, but we will support those efforts.
- o We support Lebanese efforts to obtain the withdrawal of all foreign forces from their country. We believe that any settlement between Lebanon and Israel should be reached through direct negotiations and should ensure the security of Israel's northern border while respecting Lebanese sovereignty.

IRAN-IRAQ WARIssue:

How can the United States contribute to international efforts to improve the security of the Persian Gulf region?

Objectives:

- o Support diplomatic efforts to end the Iran-Iraq war and prevent its spread to the Persian Gulf and other countries.
- o Assist our friends in the Gulf to meet their legitimate self-defense needs in the event that the Iran-Iraq conflict expands.
- o Eliminate Soviet opportunities to exploit the conflict and further destabilize the region.
- o Ensure that the Strait of Hormuz remains open to international shipping.
- o Maintain our current state of military readiness to deter, and if necessary, defend against possible escalation of the conflict, thereby reducing the threat to non-belligerent oil and shipping interests.
- o Continue to urge our Allies and regional states to cooperate in the event of a crisis to avoid panic oil-buying and subsequent oil price increases and shortages.

Accomplishments:

- o By providing U.S. AWACS aircraft and surface-to-air missile systems to Saudi Arabia, we have demonstrated to our friends in the Gulf that we are committed to helping them meet their legitimate self-defense needs.
- o By encouraging restraint by both combatants, by not supplying arms to either side, and by discouraging the sale of military equipment to Iran by Western suppliers, we have helped prevent a widening of the war.
- o In response to instability in the Persian Gulf, the U.S. has led a process within the International Energy Agency to improve international energy emergency preparedness. An IEA decision (July, 1984) calls for a coordinated stock draw in the event of a crisis coupled with other measures (demand restraint, increases in indigenous production) to

avoid a rush to the spot market. In addition, all nations which do not have adequate stocks have agreed to make best efforts to increase them.

- o The Soviets have not yet improved their position in this important region.

Talking Points:

- o The United States is and has been concerned about this four-year-old conflict because it threatens the security of the other states in the Persian Gulf and the flow of Gulf oil to the West.
- o We support efforts to prevent a widening of the Gulf War and to bring about a negotiated settlement. We have worked closely with our Allies in efforts to contain the conflict and to prepare for any temporary disruption of the flow of oil from the region.
- o We are committed to helping our friends in the Gulf meet their legitimate self-defense needs and to help keep the Gulf open to the shipping of non-belligerents.
- o We are attempting -- so far successfully -- to avoid direct Soviet or other external involvement that would further destabilize the region.

AFGHANISTAN/SOUTH ASIAIssue:

What should the United States do to help end the Soviet military occupation of Afghanistan, enhance Pakistani security against external aggression, and encourage peaceful relations among all South Asian nations?

Objectives:

- o Support U.N. resolutions calling for Soviet withdrawal from Afghanistan.
- o Assist in obtaining the restoration of Afghanistan's neutral and non-aligned status, self-determination for the Afghan people, and the opportunity for Afghan refugees to return home in peace, freedom, and honor.
- o Improve bilateral relations with all South Asian countries.
- o Promote regional understanding and cooperation in order to reduce the possibility of an all-out arms buildup, especially in nuclear weaponry, in the area.
- o Assist Pakistan to remain free and secure despite the threats posed by the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan.

Accomplishments:

- o We have helped keep the issue of Soviet aggression in Afghanistan before world public opinion; there is overwhelming international condemnation of Soviet behavior there.
- o The United States has contributed heavily to the support of the 3.4 million Afghan refugees who have fled their homeland; we are the largest contributor to the refugee relief effort in Pakistan.
- o We have been in the forefront of those nations encouraging a political settlement that would allow the Soviets to withdraw from Afghanistan.
- o Thanks largely to the provision of \$3.2 billion in American aid, Pakistan's security has been enhanced.
- o We have enhanced our commercial relationship with India and have generally improved bilateral relations with all South Asian countries.

Talking Points:

- o U.S. policy on South Asia has focused on seeking an end to the Soviet occupation of Afghanistan, strengthening Pakistan's security against potential Soviet aggression and, promoting regional South Asian peace and understanding.
- o Our position on Afghanistan has been shared by 117 nations which have consistently voted with us on UN General Assembly resolutions regarding Afghanistan. We have also helped promote the search for peace by supporting Pakistan's efforts to seek a political solution to the Afghan dilemma through the good offices of the UN Secretary General.
- o Our observance of Afghanistan Day has helped international efforts to keep the Afghan issue in the spotlight.
- o We have made a strong commitment to help Pakistan protect itself, providing it with \$3.2 billion over the next several years in economic and military assistance.
- o We have worked through the International Atomic Energy Agency and other organizations to reduce chances of nuclear weapons proliferation into the region.
- o We have conducted a dialogue at the Head of State level with India, Pakistan, Nepal, Sri Lanka, and Bangladesh in the last three years. Our contacts have also continued at other levels.
- o We have encouraged South Asian countries in general, and India and Pakistan in particular, to develop strong and peaceful relations.
- o We have supported efforts to improve regional ties such as the South Asia Regional Cooperation forum. We see these efforts as being the best way to build future stability in the area.

NORTH AFRICAIssue:

What can the United States do to help curb Libyan aggression and terrorism in North Africa and facilitate the resolution of the Western Sahara conflict?

Objectives:

- o Pressure Libya, through cooperative measures with our friends and allies, to stop using terrorist tactics and military aggression abroad.
- o Support negotiations aimed at resolving the Western Sahara dispute.
- o Develop further our commercial ties with Morocco and Tunisia to help these two states economically.
- o Foster improved relations with Algeria.
- o Support efforts at rapprochement by the Maghreb states.

Accomplishments:

- o Measures have already been agreed upon with our Allies to contain Libyan terrorism and aggression. U.S. and Allied assistance to Chad and Sudan has helped blunt Libyan destabilization efforts in the region.
- o Relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria have never been better.

Talking Points:

- o Libyan-sponsored terrorism poses a direct threat to Libya's North African neighbors as well as to many other states. We vigorously oppose such acts and are joining with our friends and Allies in doing everything we can to curtail these activities.
- o The long struggle between Morocco and the Polisario over control of the Western Sahara remains unresolved. We support efforts to get the contending parties to negotiate an end to the conflict and endorse the resolutions of the Nairobi OAU summits of 1981 and 1982 which specify that the solution to the conflict should include a cease-fire preceding a referendum as an expression of self-determination.
- o We have improved our relations with Morocco, Tunisia, and Algeria and stand ready to assist them in meeting the problems that they face.