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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, James: Files

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File Folder: W.H. Staff Memos - Political Affairs [3 of 3]

Box 5

Date: 11/25/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Nofziger to Meese et al (2 p)	2/17/83	P5
2. Outline	Re: OMB circular A-122 (2 p)	n.d.	P5
3. Memo	Wirthlin to Reagan re: State of the Union (3 p)	1/22/83	P5
4. Memo	Wirthlin to Reagan (14 p)	12/8/82	P6 <i>Transferred to Reagan Personal papers</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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JTB

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1050 Seventeenth Street N.W., Suite 1100, Washington, D.C. 20036, (202) 822-9010

TO: James A. Baker, III
FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin **RBW**
DATE: March 25, 1983
SUBJECT: Edward J. Corwin's Citizen Response Program

As you have requested, Jim, I have carefully reviewed the materials that were passed on to the President concerning a possible "mass participation feedback program." I spoke to Mr. Corwin four years ago about the system he was suggesting then. Basically, Jim, it involved using overlays on Holerith cards to record responses that would then be keypunched and entered into a computer.

I have no way of assessing the efficiency or cost of the program he is describing in his March 22nd letter. However, to process 150 million cards in 48 hours, while technically possible, would likely be expensive and, given the system that I reviewed, extremely cumbersome.

Furthermore, we know from the work done through the CUBE system, which tabulates electronically responses to questions using cable TV, neither huge samples nor the speed of response guarantees an accurate and projectable measure of how people feel about the issues.

If you desire, I would be happy to see if Mr. Corwin has made some breakthroughs since 1979. If there is then interest, we should test the practicality and cost effectiveness of the idea. On the other hand, if the system is pretty much as it was in 1979, I would have serious doubts about its effectiveness in measuring citizen attitudes quickly, accurately and inexpensively.

* Mr. Lee Roderick, Washington Bureau Chief of Scripps-Howard Newspapers, permitted me to copy this article with an apology for the typographical error in the name of Mr. T. J. Watson Jr. and a correction, replacing the "leave of absence" with "an early retirement and a consulting agreement". EJC

OPINION

One dream of democracy

WASHINGTON — Edward J. Corwin has a dream. But he needs a little help to carry it out. A little help, say, from 100 million Americans or so.

Corwin's dream goes something like this: President Reagan appears on television one evening — as he actually did recently — and explains the pros of his budget. Then a Democratic spokesman explains the cons.

Americans weigh the merits of two sides and take in hand pencils and simple coded response cards they have previously been furnished. They fill in blanks corresponding to their feelings about the budget and mail the cards to one of 10 regional processing centers.

Within 48 hours of the televised presentation, computers at the 10 centers have received and processed response cards from up to 150 million citizens and phoned the results to a central point from where the totals are announced. Citizens have given government decision-makers a swift, precise and reasonably detailed answer to what should be done with the budget.

THE WHOLE procedure could be repeated in many different forms, with other advocates and other issues.

Politicians would ignore such an authoritative mandate at their own risk. Many of them undoubtedly would prefer not to be faced so squarely by the "people's will." That's the bad news.



Lee Roderick

Washington Correspondent

THE GOOD NEWS is this: After nearly 12 years of pursuing his dream, Corwin, a former high-powered IBM executive, is ready to unleash it on America. The technology, both hardware and software, is in hand, and the idea has been field tested with remarkable results. It is clear that citizens have an urge to participate in democracy.

Former U.S. Rep. Joel T. Brodyhill of Virginia, for example, in 1974 used Corwin's approach to poll his constituents through a mailed questionnaire. The "massive response," reported Brodyhill, was "perhaps the highest in the history of congressional polling." He, received 63,000 cards back, representing about 35 percent of the registered voters in his district.

In 1977 the Northwest Regional Foundation, with Corwin's guidance, sent 100,000 questionnaires and response cards to four Washington State areas — Spokane, Tri-Cities, Capitol Hill section of

Seattle and Whitman County — seeking citizen views on a range of local issues.

Although the comprehensive surveys required an estimated half-hour to complete, about 18,000 citizens took the time to do so.

"People will really respond in great numbers if given an easy and effective means to speak up and are told by decision-makers that their opinions will matter," explained Corwin, a New Yorker, on a recent visit to Washington.

He is driven by the belief that the faith citizens have lost in their nation's government and many of its leading institutions can be restored if they are allowed to participate directly in major decisions affecting their lives.

IT IS A belief perhaps roots in Corwin's past. As a Polish army officer in 1939, he literally was on the front line when Hitler's army marched into Poland. Corwin spent over five years in German POW

camp, then later watched helplessly as Russia set up a puppet regime in his devastated homeland. He never forgot that both enemy regimes were virtually unanswerable to the people.

Years later, in 1970, Corwin chose to cut short his lucrative career at IBM in its prime, receiving an indefinite, paid leave of absence from board chairman Thomas J. Watson Jr. to pursue his goal of wedding computer-age technology to American democracy. Given enough support among Washington policy-makers, Corwin says he is now ready to make his dream a reality.

Corwin, who was set up a small, solely owned company called Citizens Response to market his concept, explains that "events are progressing so rapidly that our periodic elections do not provide a continuous mandate. A direct, ongoing contact is needed to assure current support of most people for important decisions."

"True leadership," he adds, "will not have to submit to the dictates of the polls." But it will be able to measure initial support for a given proposal and be better equipped to explain why a certain course of action was taken.

"Unless we achieve the participation of people in rebuilding the spirit of the country, we won't have people willing to risk their lives for it," Corwin believes. And if we don't have people ready to risk their lives, we are not going to remain a free nation."

CITIZENS RESPONSE®

COMPUTER HOTLINE ENTRY DEVICE™

Hotline to Ronald Reagan

Before this meeting starts please read the
WHY and HOW on the following pages.

Thank you, es were counted correctly.

Lift here: technology, which was field
ery large scale, it is feasible
to meet the requirements of a viable hotline
and tabulate the responses of 150 million
citizens within 48 hours following the
broadcast of the President's message.

As result of nine years of development
this method is easy to use, simple to
introduce and practical to run. It will
be operated by a non-profit organization,
funded by nominal membership dues.

OPERATION: Every citizen wishing to
participate should contact the hotline office
to receive a personal computer entry device

W H Y :

"The time is very short, and the choice is very clear. Either we preserve the vitality of this great free enterprise system - our way of life - or we face children some day when they will ask us where we were, and what we were doing, on the day that freedom was lost."

- Ronald Reagan

To meet the challenges facing the Nation, the President will need informed support from most citizens. This could be achieved by an on-going, credible and rapid dialogue : THE HOTLINE .

H O W : Viable communication should:

- enable all citizens to speak-up at the time of their own choosing,
- assure all participants that they will be promptly heard by decision makers,
- facilitate the updating of individual positions under the impact of events,
- count in rapidly individual new entries, keep or update previous ones, thus building a current instant reference database,
- enable all participants to verify that their entries were counted correctly.

Using a new technology, which was field tested on a very large scale, it is feasible to meet the requirements of a viable hotline and tabulate the responses of 150 million citizens within 48 hours following the broadcast of the President's message.

As result of nine years of development this method is easy to use, simple to introduce and practical to run. It will be operated by a non-profit organization, funded by nominal membership dues.

OPERATION: Every citizen wishing to participate should contact the hotline office to receive a personal computer entry device

Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States

Personal
By hand



Edward J. Corwin

200 Central Park South, New York, New York 10019

CITIZENS RESPONSE®

Mass Participation Feedback

March 22, 1983

Mr. President:

Recently, the majority of Americans were silent on vital issues just when their active support was needed. People just don't like to write or telephone. But orchestrated voices and the manifestations of relatively few attracted media attention.

The HOTLINE TO RONALD REAGAN can provide easy to use, two-way communication. It is rapid, credible, effective and can be self-supporting. Our future depends on giving each Member of Congress a verifiable number of constituents who speak out, rather than relying on national average polls, which sample only 1,000 out of 250 million citizens. The HOTLINE can deliver 150 million voices in 48 hours, tabulated by Congressional Districts and States. In 1984, The HOTLINE can help activate and win the disillusioned non-voters of 1980.

In 1978, I had an opportunity to speak to you briefly. My intense follow-up had no effect. Then, early in 1980 at the WNRC reception, through the courtesy of your charming wife, I sent a letter to you. Max Hugel responded promptly and we had an encouraging meeting, but later, he feared there was not enough time left to organize the use of The HOTLINE. I did not give up. Through Kitty LeRoy, I reached Bill Wilson, an unselfish patriot, now the Ambassador to the Holy See. He is thoroughly familiar with the HOTLINE program, and authorized me to use his name as a reference.

I hope, Mr. President, that you can read the enclosed two pages and designate a person to whom I should make a presentation, outlining how The HOTLINE TO RONALD REAGAN could be helpful to your weekly broadcasts and the appearances of your spokesmen.

Most respectfully and admiringly,

Edward J. Corwin

Edward J. Corwin

Ronald W. Reagan
President of the United States

Enclosures

cc: Ambassador W. Wilson
Mrs. Mervyn LeRoy

TABLE 1320

1. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
	====	====	====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1320 IS Q. 106 X Q. 153-----

SEX

MALE < 586>	49.	42.	9.
FEMALE < 640>	42.	47.	11.

CHISQ= 6.80 W/ 2 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 96.67 %.

**

TABLE 1321 IS Q. 117 X Q. 153-----

MARITAL STATUS/SEX

MARRIED MEN < 431>	50.	41.	9.
MARRIED WOMEN < 424>	43.	45.	12.
NON-MARRIED MEN < 156>	46.	46.	8.
NON-MARRIED WOMEN < 216>	40.	52.	8.

CHISQ= 12.45 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 94.74 %.

*

TABLE 1322 IS Q. 158 X Q. 153-----

MINOR CHILDREN IN HH/C

YES < 509>	45.	44.	11.
NO < 716>	46.	45.	9.

CHISQ= 2.43 W/ 2 D.F.

TABLE 1323 IS Q. 114 X Q. 153-----

AGE/C

18 - 24 < 112>	51.	43.	5.
25 - 34 < 269>	51.	38.	11.
35 - 44 < 230>	46.	41.	13.
45 - 54 < 196>	47.	46.	6.
55 - 64 < 207>	40.	51.	9.
65 AND OVER < 210>	39.	49.	11.

CHISQ= 20.31 W/ 10 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 97.36 %.

**

TABLE 1324 IS Q. 84 X Q. 153-----

EDUCATION

LESS THN HIGH SCHOOL < 350>	33.	55.	13.
HIGH SCHOOL GRADUATE < 467>	47.	43.	10.
SOME COLLEGE < 217>	54.	38.	8.
COLLEGE GRADUATE < 106>	56.	36.	8.
POST-GRADUATE WORK < 83>	56.	37.	7.

CHISQ= 37.15 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1325

1. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

(1) (2) (3)
% % %====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS> 46. 45. 10.

TABLE 1325 IS Q. 118 X Q. 153-----

OCCUPATION/C

PROFESSIONAL < 165>	53.	38.	9.
OTHER WHITE COLLAR < 295>	55.	37.	9.
BLUE COLLAR < 346>	47.	42.	11.
RETIRED < 273>	38.	52.	9.
OTHER/REFUSED < 148>	29.	60.	11.

CHISQ= 38.69 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1326 IS Q. 98 X Q. 153-----

INCOME

UNDER \$ 5,000 < 97>	36.	56.	8.
\$ 5,000 TO \$10,000 < 150>	25.	67.	8.
\$10,000 TO \$15,000 < 182>	39.	53.	8.
\$15,000 TO \$20,000 < 172>	47.	39.	14.
\$20,000 TO \$30,000 < 269>	49.	43.	9.
\$30,000 TO \$40,000 < 150>	55.	35.	10.
\$40,000 OR MORE < 137>	66.	26.	7.

CHISQ= 75.20 W/ 12 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1327 IS Q. 94 X Q. 153-----

PRIMARY WAGE EARNER

MALE < 961>	47.	43.	10.
FEMALE < 246>	39.	51.	10.

CHISQ= 5.14 W/ 2 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 92.33 %.

*

TABLE 1328 IS Q. 87 X Q. 153-----

LABOR FAMILY

YES < 258>	35.	52.	14.
NO < 966>	48.	43.	9.

CHISQ= 16.34 W/ 2 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 99.97 %.

TABLE 1329 IS Q. 123 X Q. 153-----

ETHNICITY

WHITE < 923>	52.	39.	9.
BLACK < 131>	8.	80.	11.
HISPANIC < 40>	20.	75.	5.
OTHER < 98>	46.	42.	12.

CHISQ= 107.97 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1330

1. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153: 1) REAGAN 2) MONDALE
 3) UNDECIDED

(1) (2) (3)
 % % %

====
 46. 45. 10.

<AGGREGATE RESULTS>

TABLE 1330 IS Q. 142 X Q. 153-----

BORN AGAIN/RELIGION

BORN AGAIN/BAPTIST < 207> 39. 51. 10.
 BORN AGAIN/CATHOLIC < 112> 33. 56. 11.
 BORN AGAIN/OTHER < 335> 51. 39. 10.
 NOT BORN AGAIN < 550> 47. 44. 9.

CHISQ= 16.32 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 98.79 %. **

TABLE 1331 IS Q. 127 X Q. 153-----

8-PT. GEOCODE

NEW ENGLAND < 50> 42. 43. 15.
 MIDDLE ATLANTIC < 232> 37. 50. 13.
 GREAT LAKES < 263> 48. 46. 6.
 FARM BELT < 74> 43. 50. 8.
 MOUNTAIN < 58> 61. 28. 11.
 PACIFIC < 156> 49. 43. 8.
 OUTER SOUTH < 270> 49. 40. 11.
 DEEP SOUTH < 123> 40. 50. 10.

CHISQ= 24.51 W/ 14 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 96.02 %. **

TABLE 1332 IS Q. 100 X Q. 153-----

REGISTERED TO VOTE

YES <1226> 45. 45. 10.

CHI-SQUARE IS NOT APPLICABLE.

TABLE 1333 IS Q. 85 X Q. 153-----

PARTY ID STRENGTH

STRONG REPUBLICAN < 120> 95. 5. 0.
 NOT SO STRONG REPUB < 162> 78. 15. 7.
 LEAN TO REPUBLICANS < 125> 87. 10. 3.
 INDEPENDENT/NO PREF < 157> 50. 27. 23.
 LEAN TO DEMOCRATS < 148> 21. 68. 11.
 NOT SO STRONG DEMO < 239> 31. 58. 11.
 STRONG DEMOCRAT < 264> 8. 83. 9.

CHISQ= 547.38 W/ 12 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %. ***

TABLE 1334

1. DEMOGRAPHIC VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO
 Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
 3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1334 IS Q. 82 X Q. 153
 IDEOLOGY

VERY CONSERVATIVE < 198>	61.	31.	7.
SOMEWHAT CONSERVATIV < 540>	56.	35.	10.
MODERATE < 94>	35.	45.	20.
SOMEWHAT LIBERAL < 271>	29.	63.	8.
VERY LIBERAL < 87>	14.	76.	10.

CHISQ= 131.01 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1335

2. SUPPLEMENTAL DEMOS VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

(1) (2) (3)
% % %====
46. 45. 10.

<AGGREGATE RESULTS>

TABLE 1335 IS Q. 128 X Q. 153-----
4-PT. GEOCODENORTHEAST < 282> 38. 49. 13.
MIDWEST < 337> 47. 46. 7.
WEST < 214> 52. 39. 9.
SOUTH < 393> 46. 43. 11.

CHISQ= 16.02 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 98.63 %. **

TABLE 1336 IS Q. 160 X Q. 153-----
ELECTORAL VOTE GEOCODELARGE (20+ E.V.) < 593> 45. 45. 9.
MEDIUM (10-19 E.V.) < 358> 43. 47. 10.
SMALL (1-9 E.V.) < 276> 49. 41. 10.

CHISQ= 2.78 W/ 4 D.F.

TABLE 1337 IS Q. 109 X Q. 153-----
MEDIA MARKET CODEIN MARKET < 304> 49. 42. 9.
OUT OF MARKET < 922> 44. 45. 10.

CHISQ= 1.74 W/ 2 D.F.

TABLE 1338 IS Q. 161 X Q. 153-----
LEVEL: UNEMPLOY (DEC 82)LOW (LESS THAN 8.0%) < 222> 47. 39. 14.
MED-LOW (8.0-9.9%) < 348> 44. 45. 11.
MED-HIGH (10.0-11.9) < 245> 49. 44. 7.
HIGH (12% OR MORE) < 412> 44. 47. 9.

CHISQ= 9.69 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 86.15 %. +

TABLE 1339 IS Q. 162 X Q. 153-----
CHNG IN UNEMPLOY/1981-82LESS THAN 1.5% INCF < 289> 44. 45. 11.
1.5 - 2.9% INCREASE < 635> 47. 44. 9.
3.0% INCR OR MORE < 303> 44. 46. 10.

CHISQ= 1.76 W/ 4 D.F.

TABLE 1340

2. SUPPLEMENTAL DEMOS VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1340 IS Q. 115 X Q. 153-----

SEX/AGE

YOUNGER WOMEN(18-44) < 286>	42.	46.	12.
OLDER WOMEN (45+) < 352>	42.	48.	10.
YOUNGER MEN (18-44) < 325>	55.	35.	10.
OLDER MEN (45+) < 260>	42.	51.	7.

CHISQ= 21.66 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 99.86 %.

TABLE 1341 IS Q. 116 X Q. 153-----

SEX/EDUCATION

MEN: 1-11 YRS EDUC < 173>	34.	56.	10.
MEN: 12-15 YRS EDUC < 305>	54.	38.	9.
MEN: 16+ YRS EDUC < 105>	62.	31.	7.
WOMEN: 1-11 YRS EDUC < 177>	32.	53.	15.
WOMEN:12-15 YRS EDUC < 379>	46.	45.	10.
WOMEN: 16+ YRS EDUC < 84>	48.	44.	9.

CHISQ= 44.71 W/ 10 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1342 IS Q. 159 X Q. 153-----

MARITAL STATUS/CHILDREN

MARRIED/CHILDREN < 408>	46.	42.	11.
MARRIED/NO CHILDREN < 445>	47.	43.	10.
NOT MARRIED/CHILDREN < 100>	38.	50.	13.
NOT MARRIED/NO CHILD < 271>	44.	49.	7.

CHISQ= 8.54 W/ 6 D.F.

TABLE 1343 IS Q. 81 X Q. 153-----

SMALL BUSINESS

YES/WORK FOR < 206>	48.	40.	12.
YES/MANAGE < 30>	60.	23.	17.
YES/DOWN < 127>	68.	28.	4.
NO/REFUSED < 859>	41.	49.	10.

CHISQ= 41.64 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1344 IS Q. 156 X Q. 153-----

WOMEN WORK OUTSIDE/C

YES < 308>	41.	45.	13.
NO < 323>	43.	50.	8.

CHISQ= 5.56 W/ 2 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 93.78 %.

*

TABLE 1345

2. SUPPLEMENTAL DEMOS VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
 3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
	====	====	====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1345 IS Q. 81 X Q. 153-----
 SMALL BUSINESS
 YES/WORK FOR < 206> 48. 40. 12.
 YES/MANAGE < 30> 60. 23. 17.
 YES/OWN < 127> 68. 28. 4.
 NO/REFUSED < 859> 41. 49. 10.
 CHISQ= 41.64 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %. ***

TABLE 1346 IS Q. 156 X Q. 153-----
 WOMEN WORK OUTSIDE/C
 YES < 308> 41. 45. 13.
 NO < 323> 43. 50. 8.
 CHISQ= 5.56 W/ 2 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 93.78 %. *

TABLE 1347 IS Q. 121 X Q. 153-----
 TRI-RANGE INCOME
 LOW INCOME < 429> 33. 58. 8.
 MIDDLE INCOME < 591> 50. 40. 10.
 HIGH INCOME < 137> 66. 26. 7.
 CHISQ= 62.19 W/ 4 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %. ***

TABLE 1348 IS Q. 88 X Q. 153-----
 MILITARY VETERAN
 YES < 254> 51. 42. 7.
 NO < 971> 44. 45. 10.
 CHISQ= 4.22 W/ 2 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 87.89 %. +

TABLE 1349 IS Q. 125 X Q. 153-----
 RELIGIOUS PREFERENCE/C
 BAPTIST < 255> 40. 50. 10.
 OTHER PROTESTANT < 475> 52. 39. 9.
 ROMAN CATHOLIC < 297> 40. 49. 11.
 JEWISH < 29> 22. 73. 5.
 OTHER < 47> 46. 35. 18.
 AGNOST/ATHIEST/NONE < 109> 47. 44. 9.
 CHISQ= 30.20 W/ 10 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 99.92 %. ***

TABLE 1351

3. ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%
	====	====	====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1351 IS Q. 1 X Q. 153-----

RIGHT DIR/WRONG TRACK

RIGHT DIRECTION < 487>	75.	18.	8.
WRONG TRACK < 692>	26.	64.	10.
NO OPINION < 47>	37.	35.	28.

CHISQ= 307.71 W/ 4 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1352 IS Q. 2 X Q. 153-----

BETTER/WORSE OFF

BETTER OFF < 475>	62.	32.	6.
WORSE OFF < 457>	27.	62.	11.
ABOUT THE SAME < 291>	47.	39.	15.
NO OPINION < 4>	82.	18.	0.

CHI-SQUARE IS NOT APPLICABLE.

TABLE 1353 IS Q. 151 X Q. 153-----

RIGHT TRACK? BETTER OFF?

RIGHT DIR/BETTER OFF < 294>	79.	16.	5.
RIGHT DIR/WORSE OFF < 76>	58.	28.	14.
WRONG TRK/BETTER OFF < 156>	33.	62.	5.
WRONG TRK/WORSE OFF < 371>	20.	70.	10.

CHISQ= 257.74 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1354 IS Q. 4 X Q. 153-----

JOB RATING: REAGAN

STRONGLY APPROVE < 262>	93.	6.	1.
SOMEWHAT APPROVE < 338>	73.	15.	12.
SOMEWHAT DISAPPROVE < 203>	17.	69.	14.
STRONGLY DISAPPROVE < 374>	5.	85.	10.
NO OPINION < 50>	30.	48.	22.

CHISQ= 693.39 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1355 IS Q. 5 X Q. 153-----

REAGAN: ECONOMY

STRONGLY APPROVE < 223>	94.	5.	1.
SOMEWHAT APPROVE < 322>	71.	18.	11.
SOMEWHAT DISAPPROVE < 232>	27.	60.	13.
STRONGLY DISAPPROVE < 422>	11.	78.	11.
NO OPINION < 28>	46.	34.	20.

CHISQ= 558.81 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1356

3. ATTITUDINAL VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%
	====	====	====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1356 IS Q. 6 X Q. 153-----

REAGAN: FOREIGN AFFAIRS

STRONGLY APPROVE < 175>	82.	15.	3.
SOMEWHAT APPROVE < 333>	65.	26.	9.
SOMEWHAT DISAPPROVE < 281>	32.	56.	12.
STRONGLY DISAPPROVE < 329>	18.	70.	11.
NO OPINION < 108>	43.	41.	16.

CHISQ= 271.33 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1357 IS Q. 112 X Q. 153-----

REAGAN SUPPORT INDEX

STRONG APPROVAL < 236>	89.	7.	5.
MODERATE APPROVAL < 356>	70.	19.	12.
MODERATE DISAPPROVAL < 330>	24.	66.	10.
STRONG DISAPPROVAL < 290>	4.	85.	12.

CHISQ= 562.96 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1358 IS Q. 113 X Q. 153-----

ECON PGM:HELPS NATL & ME

HELPS NAT'L/HELPS ME < 480>	81.	12.	7.
HELPS NAT'L/HURTS ME < 209>	48.	41.	10.
HURTS NAT'L/HELPS ME < 24>	20.	75.	5.
HURTS NAT'L/HURTS ME < 396>	4.	85.	11.

CHISQ= 549.30 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1359 IS Q. 140 X Q. 153-----

#1 NATL PROBLEM/2ND C

UNEMPLOYMENT < 458>	34.	56.	9.
OTHER ECONOMIC < 317>	48.	38.	13.
FOREIGN AFFAIRS < 170>	51.	42.	8.
DOMESTIC/SOCIAL ISSU < 249>	57.	36.	7.
NO PROB/NO OPINION < 31>	58.	29.	12.

CHISQ= 51.79 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1361

4. POLITICAL VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
2) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

(1) (2) (3)
% % %====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS> 46. 45. 10.

TABLE 1361 IS Q. 136 X Q. 153-----

REGISTERED VOTERS/PARTY

REGISTERED GOP < 341>	84.	12.	4.
REGISTERED DEMOCRATS < 620>	23.	66.	11.
REGISTERED INDEPENDENTS < 167>	51.	36.	13.
REGISTERED OTHERS < 66>	42.	44.	14.
NOT REGISTERED < 33>	55.	24.	21.

CHISQ= 355.32 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1362 IS Q. 137 X Q. 153-----

RR VOTERS BY PARTY

REAGAN REPUBLICANS < 276>	90.	7.	4.
REAGAN DEMOCRATS < 155>	58.	30.	12.
REAGAN INDEPENDENTS < 78>	71.	14.	15.
REAGAN OTHERS < 37>	66.	19.	15.

CHISQ= 68.04 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1363 IS Q. 132 X Q. 153-----

PARTY ID WITH LEAN

REPUBLICANS < 407>	86.	10.	4.
INDEPENDENTS < 157>	50.	27.	23.
DEMOCRATS < 651>	19.	71.	10.

CHISQ= 505.61 W/ 4 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1364 IS Q. 133 X Q. 153-----

SEX/PARTY ID (W/ LEAN)

MALE REPUBLICANS < 212>	89.	8.	3.
FEMALE REPUBLICANS < 195>	82.	13.	5.
MALE INDEPENDENTS < 83>	42.	34.	24.
FEMALE INDEPENDENTS < 73>	59.	18.	23.
MALE DEMOCRATS < 284>	22.	70.	8.
FEMALE DEMOCRATS < 367>	17.	71.	12.

CHISQ= 515.96 W/ 10 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1365

4. POLITICAL VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%
	====	====	====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1365 IS Q. 143 X Q. 153 -----

GEOCODE/PARTY ID W: LEAN

NORTHEAST/GOP < 91>	80.	14.	6.
NORTHEAST/INDEP < 34>	38.	25.	37.
NORTHEAST/DEMO < 155>	13.	75.	12.
MIDWEST/GOP < 109>	90.	8.	2.
MIDWEST/INDEP < 49>	55.	30.	15.
MIDWEST/DEMO < 179>	19.	74.	7.
WEST/GOP < 81>	87.	8.	4.
WEST/INDEP < 26>	54.	31.	15.
WEST/DEMO < 101>	24.	66.	10.
SOUTH/GOP < 126>	85.	11.	3.
SOUTH/INDEP < 48>	52.	22.	25.
SOUTH/DEMO < 216>	22.	67.	11.

CHISQ= 528.96 W/ 22 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1366 IS Q. 134 X Q. 153 -----

PARTY ID/IDEOLOGY

CONSERVATIVE REPUBS < 230>	88.	8.	4.
MOD/LIB REPUBLICANS < 48>	68.	25.	7.
CONSERVATIVE INDEPNT < 266>	58.	30.	12.
MOD/LIB INDEPENDENTS < 156>	40.	46.	15.
CONSERVATIVE DEMOCRAT < 236>	26.	63.	11.
MOD/LIB DEMOCRATS < 243>	12.	80.	8.

CHISQ= 373.72 W/ 10 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1367 IS Q. 89 X Q. 153 -----

1982 CONGRESSIONAL VOTE

YES/REPUBLICAN < 381>	82.	13.	5.
YES/DEMOCRAT < 490>	17.	72.	11.
YES/OTHER < 33>	59.	23.	18.
CANNOT REMEMBER < 71>	46.	31.	23.
DIDN'T VOTE/NOT REG < 244>	44.	46.	10.

CHISQ= 391.75 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1368

4. POLITICAL VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153: 1) REAGAN 2) MONDALE
 3) UNDECIDED

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
	====	====	====
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1368 IS Q. 90 X C. 153-----

1980 PRESIDENTIAL VOTE			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%
	====	====	====
REAGAN < 564>	76.	15.	8.
CARTER < 387>	9.	82.	9.
ANDERSON < 77>	25.	69.	6.
CANNOT REMEMBER < 24>	19.	45.	36.
DIDN'T VOTE/NOT REG < 162>	40.	47.	13.
CHISQ= 501.82 w/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.			***

TABLE 1369 IS Q. 144 X C. 153-----

1980 PRESIDENT/1982 CONG			
	(1)	(2)	(3)
	%	%	%
	====	====	====
RR PRES/GOP CONG '82 < 326>	86.	9.	5.
RR PRES/DEMO CONG '82 < 106>	48.	37.	14.
JC PRES/GOP CONG '82 < 21>	22.	61.	17.
JC PRES/DEMO CONG '82 < 295>	7.	86.	7.
JA PRES/GOP CONG '82 < 12>	60.	32.	9.
JA PRES/DEMO CONG '82 < 50>	14.	81.	5.
CHI-SQUARE IS NOT APPLICABLE.			

TABLE 1370

5. 1984 VOTE VARIABLES VS. 153. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153:

1) REAGAN
 3) UNDECIDED

2) MONDALE

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1370 IS Q. 78 X Q. 153-----

REELECT RONALD REAGAN

REELECT REAGAN < 468>	92.	3.	5.
NEW PERSON < 658>	11.	77.	11.
DEPENDS < 82>	55.	21.	24.
NO OPINION < 19>	53.	26.	21.

CHISQ= 772.27 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1371 IS Q. 152 X Q. 153-----

RETENTION OF 1980 VOTE

RR IN 1980 AND 1984 < 362>	95.	2.	3.
RR IN 1980/NOT 1984 < 34>	65.	20.	15.
NOT IN 1980/RR 1984 < 201>	43.	39.	18.
NOT IN 1980 OR 1984 < 353>	4.	88.	9.
1984 DEPENDS/NO DPN < 99>	24.	64.	12.

CHISQ= 677.49 W/ 8 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1372 IS Q. 153 X Q. 153-----

REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

REAGAN < 558>	100.	0.	0.
MONDALE < 547>	0.	100.	0.
UNDECIDED < 121>	0.	0.	100.

CHISQ= 2452.97 W/ 4 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1373 IS Q. 154 X Q. 153-----

1980-1984/RR VS. MONDALE

80 REAGAN/84 REAGAN < 431>	100.	0.	0.
80 REAGAN/84 MONDALE < 86>	0.	100.	0.
80 REAGAN/84 UNDECID < 47>	0.	0.	100.
80 OTHER/84 REAGAN < 54>	100.	0.	0.
80 OTHER/84 MONDALE < 369>	0.	100.	0.
80 OTHER/84 UNDECIDE < 40>	0.	0.	100.

CHISQ= 2055.47 W/ 10 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.

TABLE 1374

5. 1984 VOTE VARIABLES VS. 1982. REG VOTER: RR VS MONDALE

ANSWERS TO

Q. 153: 1) REAGAN 2) MONDALE
 3) UNDECIDED

	(1) %	(2) %	(3) %
<AGGREGATE RESULTS>	46.	45.	10.

TABLE 1374 IS Q. 155 X Q. 153
 1982 CONG/RR VS. MONDALE

GOP CONG/REAGAN < 310>	100.	0.	0.
GOP CONG/MONDALE < 50>	0.	100.	0.
DEMO CONG/REAGAN < 85>	100.	0.	0.
DEMO CONG/MONDALE < 352>	0.	100.	0.

CHI-SQUARE IS NOT APPLICABLE.

TABLE 1375 IS Q. 163 X Q. 153

RR VOTERS: 82/84 PATTERN

GOP CONG/84 REAGAN < 243>	97.	2.	1.
GOP CONG/84 OTHER < 83>	55.	30.	15.
DEMO CONG/84 REAGAN < 45>	84.	4.	11.
DEMO CONG/84 OTHER < 60>	21.	62.	17.

CHISQ= 196.81 W/ 6 D.F. IS SIGNIFICANT AT 100.00 %.



Republican
National
Committee.

R.F. Pls.

File

March 14, 1983

Frank J. Fahrenkopf, Jr.
Chairman

TO: REPUBLICAN CONSULTANTS

FROM: FRANK J. FAHRENKOPF, JR. *J*
Chairman

SUBJECT: Washington, D.C. Advertising Schedule

Below please find the Republican National Committee's advertising schedule for March 14-23 in the Washington, D.C. market. I hope you will have an opportunity to view the commercial.

WDCA-TV CH 20

PROGRAM

March 14-20	8:00-10:00 p.m.	5x	Movie
March 20	10:30am.-6:00 pm.	3x	Movie
March 21-23	8:00-10:00 p.m.	2x	Movie

WDVM-TV CH 9

March 14-18	7:00-9:00 a.m.	5x	CBS Morning News
March 14-18	10:00-11:00 a.m.	5x	Morning Break
March 14-18	4:00-5:00 p.m.	3x	Hour Magazine
March 14-18	7:30-8:00 p.m.	3x	Lie Detector
March 15	9:00-11:00 p.m.	1x	Gone With the Wind
March 21-23	7:00-9:00 a.m.	3x	CBS Morning News
March 21-23	10:00-11:00 a.m.	3x	Morning Break
March 21-23	4:00-5:00 p.m.	1x	Hour Magazine
March 21-23	7:30-8:00 p.m.	3x	Lie Detector

WJLA-TV CH 7

March 14-18	9:00am.-4:00pm.	5x	Day Rotation
March 14-18	4:00-5:30 pm.	1x	Movie
March 14-20	5:30-7:00 p.m.	3x	News
March 14-18	7:30-8:00 p.m.	2x	Entertainment Tonight
March 14-20	11:00-11:30p.m.	1x	News
March 19	9:00-11:00p.m.	1x	Love Boat/Fantasy Island

March 21-23	9:00am.-4:00 p.m.	3x	Day Rotation
March 21-23	4:00p.m.-5:30pm.	1x	Movie
March 21-23	5:30-7:00 pm.	3x	News
March 21-23	7:30-8:00 pm.	2x	Entertainment Tonight
March 21-23	11:00-11:30 pm.	1x	News
March 21	8:00-9:00 pm.	1x	That's Incredible
March 22	8:00-10:00 pm.	1x	Prime Rotation

WRC-TV CH 4

March 14-18	4:00-5:00 p.m.	1x	Charlie' Angeles
March 14-18	5:00-5:30 p.m.	1x	People's Court
March 14	8:00-9:00 p.m.	1x	Little House
March 21-23	5:00-5:30 p.m.	1x	People's Court
March 21	8:00-9:00 p.m.	1x	Little House

WTTG-TV CH 5

March 14-18	9:00am.-3:00pm.	5x	Day Rotation
March 19	8:00-10:00p.m.	1x	Movie
March 20	10:30 am.-6:00 p.m.	3x	Movie
March 20	6:00-8:00 p.m.	2x	Movie
March 21-23	9:00am.-3:00pm.	3x	Day Rotation

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

R.F.

March 7, 1983



TO: James A. Baker, III
Edwin Meese, III
Michael K. Deaver

FR: Ed Rollins *ER*

RE: Democratic Presidential Activity

I. Walter Mondale

Former Vice President Walter Mondale officially announced his candidacy on February 21st, but immediately suffered a setback in the same week. The candidate he endorsed in the Chicago mayoral primary, States Attorney Richard M. Daley, came in third. The Minnesotan did not attend the AFL-CIO's annual convention in Bal Harbour, Florida because it came during his announcement week. However, he was well represented by former Labor Secretary Ray Marshall. In addition the President's of the following international unions are backing his candidacy: the United Automobile Workers, the International Brotherhood of Machinists, the Communications Workers of America, and the United Food and Commercial Workers.

Without question, Mondale is the top choice of labor leaders, but Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Cal.) was successful in his week long lobbying efforts. Cranston was able to secure a pledge that no international union will make an endorsement prior to the formal AFL-CIO endorsement that is set for December. This was a blow to Mondale who seemed assured of picking up the endorsement of the politically powerful American Federation of State, County and Munciple Employees in May, and apparently was counting on several additional key endorsements to give him momentum for the December meeting. In addition, Cranston picked up maximum financial contributions from four unions.

Mondale, the first Democratic candidate to qualify for federal matching funds, has said he plans to spend \$3 million to \$5 million this year -- primarily on direct mail fundraising -- with the rest targeted for the early 1984 primary states. Before his formal announcement, the former Vice President completed a series of major fundraising events in Dallas, San Antonio, Seattle, Detroit, San Francisco, and Miami.

II. John Glenn

Sen. John Glenn (D-Ohio) has named veteran New Hampshire political operative Joseph Grandmaison as his political director. The 39-year-old Grandmaison's appointment came after a long search, and is considered a coup for the Glenn camp.

Grandmaison, who will concentrate his early efforts on the New Hampshire primary, has been involved in every Democratic Presidential campaign since 1968. He managed George McGovern's (D) 1972 primary effort in the Granite State and was

an unsuccessful U.S. House candidate in '74. In addition, he was the architect of former Sen. John Durkin's (D-NH) 1975 victory, and Grandmaison is said to possess the single best list of state Democratic voters and volunteers.

From media reports, there appears to be a split within the Glenn camp between the Senator's longtime allies from Ohio, and his new supporters. Freshman Rep. Richard Ray (D-Ga.) and attorney Thomas Boggs, Jr. have been emerging as spokesmen for the latter group. Before Grandmaison's selection, Ray and Boggs had strongly urged Glenn to choose former Carter Chief of Staff Hamilton Jordan, or Carter operative Landon Butler as his Political Director. The Ray-Boggs group reportedly is advocating a strategy where Glenn would virtually ignore Iowa, have a strong second place finish in New Hampshire, and would receive outright victories in the South the following week.

The Senator is also continuing to expand his national campaign organization. To date, over 40 aides have been hired at his Washington headquarters and there are expected to be 90 full-time aides by April 1. Glenn has named Rick Sloan, former administrative assistant to Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio), as his New Hampshire coordinator. His Iowa coordinators will be Donald McDonough, who helped organize the state for President Carter in 1980, and Maureen Roach, a former assistant to Rep. Thomas Harkin (D-Iowa). So far, groundwork for Glenn's Iowa campaign has been handled by former Franklin County (Ohio) Democratic Chairman Grif Weld.

Glenn has raised nearly \$300,000 so far and says he has commitments of \$1.5 million. At a recent meeting of the Senator's National Finance Council, all 30 members promised to enlist 25 couples who would be able to contribute the legal maximum of \$2000.

Finally, Sen. Howard Metzenbaum (D-Ohio) has publicly said he is not ready to commit to Glenn's candidacy. Metzenbaum faced Glenn in two Democratic U.S. Senate primaries - defeating him in 1970 and losing to him in 1974 - and the two have never been close.

III. Gary Hart

Sen. Gary Hart (D-Colo.) officially announced his candidacy on February 17. Hart, the youngest of the Democratic hopefuls, is the only candidate who has not endorsed the domestic content legislation favored by organized labor. Although campaign aides have publicly conceded this could be a problem, Hart still plans to seek the AFL-CIO endorsement.

The Senator is concentrating a considerable amount of his efforts on Iowa's precinct caucuses. He has made 20 trips to the state since Labor Day and has just signed on Matthew Wanning, a former Iowa organizer for Sen. Edward Kennedy (D).

In other staff developments, Hart has promoted Kathy Bushkin from Legislative to Communications Director, and Bill Romjue from Iowa coordinator to Mid-West coordinator. The Senator has also announced that former Rep. Martha Keys (his sister-in-law) will handle his Kansas campaign, and that he has the endorsement of Peter Kelly, the Democratic City Chairman of Hartford, Connecticut.

Hart has now raised just over \$310,000 and has qualified for federal matching funds.

IV. Reubin Askew

Former Florida Gov. (1971-79) Reubin O'D. Askew (D) officially announced on February 23rd. In both his speech and initial press briefings, Askew tried to position himself on the moderate/conservative flank of the Democratic field. The former Governor has been avoiding many joint appearances at Democratic gatherings, and the reason might be his opposition to protectionism and gay rights, and his advocacy of Pro-Life legislation and Right to Work laws.

Askew, 54, has raised nearly \$350,000 and qualified for matching funds before his announcement. His current schedule calls for intense campaigning in New Hampshire and throughout the Northeast in March and April.

The Florida Democratic Party's delegate selection committee has approved changing the March 13, 1984 Presidential primary to a winner-take-all contest. The vote - which is all but certain of ratification by the Democratic State Central Committee - was a definite victory for the former Governor.

Askew has also joined with Mondale and Hart in ruling out acceptance of contributions from corporate political action committees.

V. Dale Bumpers

Sen. Dale Bumpers (D-Ark.) is now expected to enter the Presidential contest, although he still publicly insists he "is not yet ready" to formally announce. The Arkansas Senator is now meeting regularly with consultant DeLoss Walker, and has been calling Democratic opinion makers throughout the South. Walker has drawn up a proposed 1983 \$3 million campaign budget, which calls for \$1 million to be raised from Arkansas. While Bumpers would naturally be expected to enter the southern primaries that will come in mid-March, the Senator has said his former colleagues Harold Hughes and John Culver have both advised him not to overlook Iowa. Hughes, an early Kennedy backer, arranged a luncheon of 30 major Democratic leaders for Bumpers and accompanied the Senator on his Iowa tour a few weeks ago.

The biggest rumor in the Bumpers camp was that David Doak would be hired as campaign manager. Doak ran the successful Democratic gubernatorial campaigns in Texas and Virginia in 1982 and '81 respectively. He has already rejected an offer to be Glenn's political director, and he has had at least two meetings with Jim Johnson of Walter Mondale's staff.

In all of his appearances, the Senator emphasizes that he has opposed the Administration at least 64 percent of the time, and that he led the fight against the confirmation of Interior Secretary James Watt. However, his voting record has two possible drawbacks for liberal Democrats. He cast the deciding vote against the AFL-CIO's wishes on the labor law reform filibuster, and because of this he was denied their endorsement in 1980. In addition, the Senator was against extension of the ERA ratification deadline.

Bumpers addressed a testimonial dinner for Gov. Mario Cuomo of New York, and also a public employees union convention in Atlanta. He will make appearances in both Boston and Los Angeles this week.

When he does announce, Bumpers is expected to name Sen. David H. Pryor (Ark.) as his National Campaign Chairman.

VI. Alan Cranston

Sen. Alan Cranston (D-Calif.) spent practically an entire week at the AFL-CIO Convention, and reportedly made progress in at least temporarily halting Mondale's momentum toward the labor endorsement. The Senator says his fundraising plans are running ahead of schedule, although he has not yet formally qualified for federal matching funds.

Cranston also scored a significant boost in the black community with his endorsement of Rep. Harold Washington (D-Ill.) in the Chicago mayoral primary. Cranston was the only Presidential candidate in Washington's corner and endorsed the Chicago winner at the urging of California Assemblyman Speaker Willie Brown.

State coordinators for the Cranston campaign have now been chosen in New Hampshire and Florida. State House Democratic leader Robert Raiche is Cranston's New Hampshire chairman, while Miami State Sen. Jack Gordon is running his Florida effort.

Assisting Raiche with the New Hampshire effort is Nashua public relations executive Phillip Grandmaison, brother of Glenn political director Joseph Grandmaison.

The Senator's son, Washington attorney Kim Cranston, has now left his law firm to work full-time on his father's campaign. Young Cranston will run field activities for the campaign, with particular concentration on the Iowa caucuses.

MEMORANDUM

TO: Ed Meese
Jim Baker ✓
Fred Fielding
Ed Rollins

FROM: Lyn Nofziger



Gentlemen:

I'm sure you are aware of OMB's circular A-122, "Cost Principles for Non-Profit Organizations." This, of course, is OMB's proposed limits on political advocacy of government contractors. I know that it was aimed primarily at those people using government grants to lobby the government. But in effect it goes far beyond that intent. It is also affecting many, many companies that do business with the Federal Government and many businesses to whom White Houses have traditionally turned when they wanted help in getting legislation passed.

I am enclosing a copy of an analysis that I asked to be drawn which shows you exactly what the proposal does. In addition, lawyers who have worked on this tell me the proposal is vague and may be subject to a number of interpretations. What this is going to do is force companies to keep detailed records on the political activities of their employees. If this is Constitutional, and I doubt much that it is, instead of getting government off of people's backs as we promised to do for 10 these many years, you are adding an intolerable burden onto

the backs of many, many people. I think that you could simplify the proposed rule by just saying that persons or organizations receiving grants from the government cannot use that money to lobby the government.

In any event, Gentlemen, you're going to make it almost impossible for a lot of people who want to help you get a lot of things passed from actually helping you. I really think you ought to reconsider this thing.

P.S. I am sending out only four copies of this to the named people. I certainly do hope that it doesn't spread far and wide.

PPS - The opposition is growing not only among the lobbyists but also among the Republicans on the bill. Jack Brooks is thinking about hearings. Also I'm told Bob Michel is upset.

LH

February 16, 1983

OMB'S PROPOSED LIMITS ON POLITICAL
ADVOCACY OF GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS

OMB HAS PROPOSED CHANGES IN THE COST PRINCIPLES APPLICABLE TO GOVERNMENT CONTRACTORS.

EXISTING LAW DISALLOWS PAYMENT OF "POLITICAL ADVOCACY" COSTS.

OMB'S DRAFT REGULATION (A-122) WOULD GO FURTHER BY DISALLOWING:

- The entire salary of any employee
 - whose work includes any political advocacy
 - this will inevitably include all corporate officers, lawyers, public relations activity, etc.
 - who has been "induced" to join any organization, other than a labor union, that has political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose
 - such organizations include industry associations like the Defense Preparedness Industry Association, the American Bar Association, etc.
 - who has been "induced" to engage in any political advocacy during non-working hours
- The entire cost of a building or office space if more than 5% of the usable space is used for any political advocacy
 - thus the presence of a corporate vice president or division head engaged (inevitably) in advocacy would taint his entire facility, if he and his support staff use more than 5% of the space
- The entire cost of items of equipment used in any part for political advocacy.
 - thus, one "political" use would impugn charges for all time of a
 - phone system
 - word processing system
 - company airplane

OMB'S DRAFT REGULATION WOULD GREATLY EXPAND THE DEFINITION OF POLITICAL ADVOCACY TO INCLUDE:

- Attempting to affect any local, state or federal decision by
 - communicating with officials or legislators, or
 - influencing public opinion
- Attempting to influence any federal, state or local
 - election and
 - referendum or initiative
- Starting, operating, or contributing to a PAC

THE PROPOSED CHANGES ARE OBJECTIONABLE BECAUSE THEY:

- Unfairly and unconstitutionally penalize government contractors for participation in public debate undertaken at their own costs
 - the value of a contractor's service to the government should not be reduced because, with his own funds, he is involved in public discussions
- Undermines precisely the kind of support the administration frequently requests from contractors
 - unsolicited Congressional appearances, phone calls, educative advertising, etc., are all proscribed
- Penalizes many activities required in the normal course of business
 - for example, participating in a municipal referendum affecting zoning, environmental control, etc.
- Creates an administrative nightmare and a source of gross inefficiency by demanding segregation of facilities and corporate officers.



EXECUTIVE OFFICE OF THE PRESIDENT
OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20503

For Immediate Release
January 20, 1983

OMB 84-4

The Administration announced today several steps designed to ensure that Federal dollars are not used, directly or indirectly, for political advocacy. The changes involve Federal contracts, including military contracts, and Federal grants to nonprofit organizations.

While assuring a full right of eligibility to compete for and receive Federal grants and contracts by organizations involved in political advocacy, the changes seek to assure that the Government does not subsidize such activities. Political advocacy includes lobbying and other attempts to influence legislation, as well as direct participation in elections or referenda, administrative processes and certain judicial processes.

Today's actions are designed to achieve a complete separation of costs involved in carrying out the Federal purposes for which grants or contracts are made, from costs associated with advocacy.

The separation of functions paid for by Federal grants and contracts from all kinds of political advocacy would mean a rigorous division of such "overhead" elements as office space and automobiles between those used for the Federal grant and those used for advocacy. For example, office complexes housing grantees or contractors where more than 5 percent of the space is used for political advocacy may not be charged to Federal grants or contracts, meaning that there would have to be physical separation of the two activities.

The changes would also deny payment of salaries from Federal grants or contracts for employees who engage in political advocacy as part of their jobs, or who are required, coerced or induced into joining advocacy organizations or participating in political advocacy activities on the job or during non-working hours. In addition, grant or contract funds could not be used to pay for membership dues in advocacy organizations.

For contracts, the changes would assure that the cost of lobbying Congress for specific weapons systems, for example, would not be included in the contract amount to be paid by the Government.

The changes announced are in two forms:

- o The Office of Management and Budget proposed for comment revisions in its Circular A-122, "Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations."
- o The main contracting agencies -- the Department of Defense, the General Services Administration and the National Aeronautics and Space Administration -- are simultaneously announcing proposed changes in their contracting regulations.



Allowable Costs

OMB PROPOSING DISALLOWANCE OF LOBBYING COSTS FOR CONTRACTS, GRANTS

The Office of Management and Budget is proposing a stringent, governmentwide policy on the charging of lobbying costs to federal contracts and grants.

Under the proposed policy, contractors and grantees would be barred from using federal funds for "political advocacy," a term that embraces far more than the traditional notion of lobbying as trying to influence a member of Congress to vote a certain way on a particular issue.

Political advocacy, as used in the OMB proposal, includes not only legislative activities but also efforts aimed at influencing rulemaking or other administrative processes in the executive branch of the government—the White House and the federal departments and agencies.

The term also includes participation in or contributions to the expenses of litigation other than litigation in which the organization is a party or has standing to participate in its own behalf.

In addition, participation in elections or referenda at any level of government, as well as contributions of membership dues, money, or services to any organization having political advocacy as a "substantial organizational purpose," are considered political advocacy and thus would be off-limits to those receiving federal funds, under the new proposal.

Currently, federal policies on lobbying costs vary from agency to agency. Under the lobbying cost policy issued by DOD last October, the costs of both lobbying and legislative liaison activities at all levels of government are unallowable on defense contracts (38 CFR 721, 741). A month later, the General Services Administration issued a lobbying cost principle for all non-defense contracts that disallowed lobbying costs but not costs for legislative liaison activities (38 CFR 760).

Commingle Forbidden

Under current lobbying guidelines, contractors may separate out the portion of time or other resources devoted to unallowable activities when computing their costs on a contract. But that will be virtually impossible to do under the proposed policy, since any item or activity above a bare minimum that is devoted to political advocacy renders the entire item or activity unallowable. In other words, contractors will be forced to keep their political advocacy items and activities strictly separate from those devoted to performing the functions of the contract.

For example, salary costs of individuals are totally unallowable if "the work of such individuals includes activities constituting political advocacy," or if the individuals' employer has "required or induced" them to "join or pay dues to an organization other than a labor union that has political advocacy as a substan-

tial organizational purpose, or to engage in political advocacy during non-working hours."

Regarding building or office space, the entire space is unallowable if more than 5 percent of it is devoted to political advocacy. The same applies to items of equipment or other items used in part for political advocacy; meetings and conferences devoted in any part to political advocacy; and publication and printing allocable in part to political advocacy.

Exception for Legislative Liaison

However, certain activities are specifically excluded from the definition of political advocacy under the proposal. Such allowable activities include:

- making available the results of a nonpartisan study or analysis, provided the distribution is not intended to influence the outcome of any federal, state, or local election, referendum, or other procedure, or any governmental decision;
- applying for or bidding on a grant, contract, unsolicited proposal, or other agreement, or providing information in connection with such application at the request of the government agency awarding the grant, contract, or other agreement;
- providing technical advice or assistance to a governmental body or to a committee or subcommittee in response to a written request.

This latter category includes certain legislative liaison activities presently disallowed under the DOD lobbying cost policy and in this respect would be more favorable to DOD contractors than the current policy, according to DAR Council director James Brannan.

At present, there is no specific lobbying cost principle governing all federal grants, though there are statutory prohibitions governing lobbying in general and certain grantmaking departments in particular.

If adopted in final form, the proposed policy would supersede both the DOD and GSA lobbying policies and ensure a uniform approach to the issue for all uses of federal funds, grants and contracts alike.

Proposed Circular A-122, DAR Changes

The changes as they affect grantees are being proposed as a revision to OMB Circular A-122, "Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations." The proposed revision is scheduled to appear this week in the *Federal Register* and carries a 45-day comment period.

Parallel changes are likewise being proposed to the Defense Acquisition Regulation, the Federal Procurement Regulations, and the NASA Procurement Regulation.

On Jan. 20, the same day that the proposed revision to OMB circular A-122 was formally released, DOD issued a letter to industry seeking comment within 45 days on the proposed DAR change. DOD, GSA, and NASA plan to coordinate their activities in order to achieve the desired consistency in policy.

The circumstances surrounding the development and issuance of the proposed lobbying policy are

puzzling. Although OMB has been working with an interagency group for several weeks on the proposed policy, many senior officials at DOD, GSA, and NASA were not aware that any change was being contemplated until the day it was issued.

Officials from those three agencies who were contacted by FCR were not happy with the proposal, and indicated that it was entirely OMB's initiative. All indicated that the comments they receive on the proposal will shape the final form of the cost principle, but the general expectation is that some changes to their current lobbying policies will be made in light of the OMB proposal.

John Lordan, head of OMB's financial management branch and the person directly responsible for coordinating the development of the policy, said merely that the initiative stems from the Administration's concern that federal dollars not be used in any way to subsidize political advocacy activities.

Text of the OMB proposal on lobbying that applies to grantees appears at page 230.

Text of the DAR letter to industry regarding the proposed cost principle on political advocacy follows:

The Administration is concerned with using Government funds for political advocacy purposes. In conjunction with proposed changes to OMB Circular A-122, "Cost principles for nonprofit organizations," concerning political advocacy, the attached proposed cost principle is under consideration by DOD, GSA, and NASA. The proposed changes define political advocacy and make those costs unallowable.

The definition of political advocacy used in this proposal is derived generally from the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. §4911, defining attempts to "influence legislation," with modifications designed to comprise direct participation in elections or referenda, administrative processes, certain judicial processes, and other activity of a political advocacy nature.

Your comments (15 copies) are requested within 45 days of the date of this letter. Please address your comments to:

Mr. James T. Brannan
Director, Defense Acquisition
Regulatory System, OUSDRE(AM)
Room 3C257, Pentagon
Washington, D.C. 20301

Sincerely,

WILLIAM A. LONG
Deputy Under Secretary
(Acquisition Management)

Attachment as stated

15.XXX.XX Political Advocacy (CWAS-NA)

(a) The cost of activities constituting political advocacy are unallowable.

(b) Political advocacy is any activity that includes:

(1) Attempting to influence the outcome of any Federal, State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar procedure, through contributions, endorsements, publicity, or similar activity;

(2) Establishing, administering, contributing to, or paying the expenses of a political action committee, either directly or indirectly;

(3) Attempting to influence governmental decisions through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof;

(4) Attempting to influence governmental decisions through communication with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or employee who may participate in the decisionmaking process;

(5) Participating in or contributing to the expenses of litigation other than litigation in which the organization is a party with standing to sue or defend on its own behalf; or

(6) Contributing money, services, or any other thing of value, as dues or otherwise, to an organization that has political advocacy as a substantial organization purpose, or that spends \$100,000 or more per year on activities constituting political advocacy.

(c) Political advocacy does not include the following activities:

(1) Making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research, the distribution of which is not primarily designed to influence the outcome of any Federal, State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar procedure, or any governmental decision;

(2) Providing technical advice or assistance to a governmental body or to a committee or other subdivision thereof in response to a written request by such body or subdivision;

(3) Participating in litigation on behalf of other persons, if the organization has received a Federal, State, or local grant, contract, or other agreement for the express purpose of doing so;

(4) Applying or making a bid in connection with a grant, contract, unsolicited proposal, or other agreement, or providing information in connection with such application at the request of the government agency awarding the grant, contract, or other agreement; or

(5) Engaging in activities specifically required by law.

(d) An organization has political advocacy as a "substantial organizational purpose" if:

(1) The organization's solicitations for membership or contributions acknowledge that the organization engages in activities constituting political advocacy; or

(2) Twenty percent (20%) or more of the organization's annual expenditures, other than those incurred in connection with Federal, State or local grants, contracts, or other agreements, are incurred in connection with political advocacy.

(e) The term, "governmental decisions" includes:

(1) The introduction, passage, amendment, defeat, signing, or veto of legislation, appropriations, resolutions, or constitutional amendments at the Federal, State, or local level;

(2) Any rulemakings, guidelines, policy statements, or other administrative decisions of general applicability and future effect; or

(3) Any licensing, grant, ratemaking, formal adjudication, or informal adjudication, other than actions or decisions related to the administration of the specific grant, contract, or agreement involved.

(f) Notwithstanding the provisions of other cost principles in this part:

(1) Salary costs of individuals are unallowable if:

(i) the work of such individuals includes activities constituting political advocacy, other than activities that are both ministerial and non-material; or

(ii) the organization has required or induced such individuals to join or pay dues to an organization other than a labor union that has political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose, or to engage in political advocacy during non-working hours.

(2) The following costs are unallowable:

(i) building or office space in which more than 5% of the usable space occupied by the organization or an affiliated organization is devoted to activities constituting political advocacy;

(ii) items of equipment or other items used in part for political advocacy;

(iii) meetings and conferences devoted in any part to political advocacy;

(iv) publication and printing allocable in part to political advocacy; and

(v) membership in an organization that has political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose, or that spends \$100,000 or more per year in connection with political advocacy.

Judicial Review

REVIEW OF PRE-AWARD PROTESTS IS LIMITED IN SCOPE, CLAIMS COURT SAYS

The scope of the Claims Court's review of pre-award protests is limited, the court decides. Only when an agency's pre-award decisions are clearly irrational or unreasonable should they be overturned, the court rules, adopting the District of Columbia Circuit's *Steinthal* standard. (*Baird Corp. v. U.S.*, Cls. Ct. No. 645-82C, 1/14/83).

Last year the Army issued a solicitation for night vision devices. The procurement was set aside for small businesses, and was limited to firms with less than 750 employees. Baird maintained that a larger, 1,000-employee size standard should have been used, and asked the Army to delay the award pending a ruling from the Small Business Administration's Size Appeals Board.

The contracting officer denied the request, and bids were opened as scheduled. Baird was low bidder, but was disqualified for noncompliance with the 750-employee size standard. The company filed suit in the Claims Court to block the award.

Standard of Review

Writing for the court, Judge Thomas J. Lydon points out that judicial review of an agency's pre-award decisions must be limited in scope. "The court should not substitute its judgment on such matters for that of the agency, but should intervene only when it is clearly determined that the agency's determinations were irrational or unreasonable."

Citing *M. Steinthal & Co. v. Seaman* (400 FCR A-1, D-1), the judge stresses that judicial intrusions into the procurement process should be infrequent. "In the absence of overriding public interest considerations, the court should refuse to look favorably on declaratory or injunctive relief requests in pre-award bid protest actions." Thus, an agency's pre-award pro-

urement decision should generally not be overturned unless a disappointed bidder can show that the decision lacked a rational basis, the court concludes.

Correct Size Standard Applied

Baird maintained that since the night vision devices would be installed in military tanks and other armored vehicles, the small business size standard (1,000 employees) applicable to manufacturers of military vehicles should have been applied. Moreover, the company noted, the larger size standard is also used for producers of periscopes and other types of daytime viewing devices used in military vehicles.

However, Judge Lydon points out, all production contracts for this particular night vision device since the mid-1970s have used the [750-employee] size standard for makers of light and heat detection devices. Furthermore, the SBA Size Appeals Board subsequently ruled against Baird, noting that the night vision device is not only installed independently of any daytime viewing aids, but also that its two major components (an image intensifier and a magnifier) are properly classifiable as light detection devices.

"The point here is that classification of an item is a discretionary act and reasonable minds may well disagree," the judge explains. Since the Army's use of the lower size standard was reasonable, there is no basis for the court to change it, he concludes.

Attacking the Set-Aside

Baird also contended that using a small business set-aside for the procurement was improper. The Army violated a Defense Acquisition Regulation provision which prohibits a total small business set-aside when at least one "planned emergency producer" wants to "participate in the acquisition," Baird maintained. The company argued that it had previously qualified for PEP status.

However, Baird hasn't qualified under the PEP program with respect to the particular night vision device needed in this procurement, Judge Lydon states. Rather, Baird had attained PEP status for another night viewing device with a different federal stock number. "It should not be left to the PEP supplier to determine on its own which item the government wants," he states.

Moreover, the procurement was not a total set-aside for small business, the judge adds. An Army form which provided information to prospective offerors did indicate that a 100 percent small business set-aside was contemplated, he concedes. However, in considering pre-award protests, the court must consider the totality of the procurement process, he explains.

In fact, the Army planned to buy nearly 2,300 of these night vision devices in 1982, and originally contemplated two separate awards, the judge notes. Baird won the first (unrestricted) contract, but the second solicitation (a partial set-aside) was the subject of several bid protests. As a result, the solicitation was split into two smaller procurements. Baird then won the first of these smaller contracts. The second procurement, which is the subject of this litigation, is a direct descendant of the partial set-aside, he emphasizes.

Thus, it is reasonable to conclude that the set-aside was part of a larger procurement, the judge declares.

OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

[Circular A-122]

Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations
AGENCY: Office of Management and Budget.

ACTION: Notice.

SUMMARY: This notice offers interested parties an opportunity to comment on a proposed revision to Circular A-122, "Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations." The proposed revision establishes special provisions for costs related to political advocacy. Similar revisions are being simultaneously proposed for civilian and defense contractors through appropriate actions by the Department of Defense, NASA and GSA, the three agencies with authority to issue procurement regulations. The purpose of these proposals is to ensure that federal tax dollars are not used, directly or indirectly, for the support of political advocacy.

Over the past 25 years, the volume of federal activity conducted through grantees and contractors has dramatically grown. Sound management of federal grants and contracts has correspondingly gained in importance. The responsibility of the President through OMB to improve the management of the executive branch of government with a view to efficient and economical service, and to fulfill other statutory and constitutional responsibilities, extends to issues of grant and contract management no less than to issues of direct federal activity.

In recent years, the problem of the use of federal funds for political advocacy by grantees and contractors has been identified by members of the public, by the Comptroller General, and by Members of Congress. As many of these parties have observed, the diversion to political advocacy of federal funds, and of equipment procured with and personnel compensated by federal funds, is an abuse of the system and an uneconomical, inefficient and inappropriate use of the public's resources. Moreover, the commingling of federal grant or contract activity with private political advocacy creates the appearance of federal support for particular positions in public debate. This appearance can create misunderstanding and interfere with the neutral, non-ideological administration of federally funded programs.

This proposal is designed to balance the First Amendment rights of federal

grantees and contractors with the legitimate governmental interests of ensuring that the government does not subsidize, directly or indirectly, the political advocacy activities of private groups or institutions. These governmental interests are based on concern for protecting the free and robust interchange of ideas.

Americans have the First Amendment right both to engage freely in speech and political expression, and to refrain from speaking, without interference or control on the part of the government or its agents. *Wooley v. Maynard*, 430 U.S. 705, 714 (1977). The proposed revision is intended to ensure that the use of Federal grants, contracts and other agreements by private organizations engaging in political advocacy does not erode or infringe these constitutional rights, or distort the political process by encouraging or discouraging certain forms of political activity.

The activities of government in a democracy necessarily involve a degree of political advocacy, since government officials are expected to communicate with the people, explain their programs, and provide leadership and direction to the nation. Thus, Members of Congress and their staffs, the President and his political appointees, necessarily participate in forms of political advocacy. However, it is a distortion of the market place of ideas for the government to use its financial power to "tip the electoral process," *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 353, 356 (1976), by subsidizing the political advocacy activities of private organizations and corporations. This proposal will ensure, to the extent consistent with the communications function of the government, that taxpayers are not required, directly or indirectly, "to contribute to the support of an ideological cause [they] may oppose." *Abood v. Detroit Board of Education*, 431 U.S. 209, 235-236 (1977). The proposal also seeks to avoid the appearance that, by awarding Federal grants, contracts, or other agreements to organizations engaged in political advocacy on particular sides of public issues, the Government has endorsed, fostered, or "prescribe[d] [as] orthodox" a particular view on such issues, *West Virginia State Board of Education v. Barnette*, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943).

The proposed revision would make unallowable the cost of political advocacy, whether direct or indirect. The revision would also make unallowable any costs of communications equipment, personnel, other equipment, meetings or conferences, or publications, where such cost items are used for political

advocacy in whole or in part. The revision makes unallowable the costs of buildings and office space where 5 percent or more of the space is devoted to political advocacy. When federal grant or contract recipients use facilities, equipment, or personnel funded in part with federal monies for political advocacy, they may create the appearance of government support for their positions. Moreover, if federal funds are used to defray the overhead costs of organizations engaged in political advocacy, it frees up the organization's other funds for use in this political activity.

The principal effect of the revision will be that federal grantees and contractors that choose to engage in political advocacy must separate their grant or contract activity from their political activity. If they mix the two, then they will not receive government reimbursement for the jointly allocable costs. Contractors or grantees will not be permitted to require or induce employees paid in part or in whole with federal funds to engage in political advocacy activities, either as a formal part of job responsibilities or on their own time.

The definition of political advocacy used in this proposal is derived generally from the Internal Revenue Code, 26 U.S.C. 4911, defining attempts to "influence legislation," with modifications designed to comprise direct participation in elections or referenda, administrative processes, certain judicial processes, and other activity of a political advocacy nature.

These proposed revisions will become effective 30 days after final notice in the **Federal Register**. The revisions will affect only grants, contracts, and other agreements entered into after the effective date. Existing grants, contracts, and other agreements will not be immediately affected. Agency contracts and regulations will incorporate these provisions to the same extent and in the same manner as they do other provisions of Circular A-122.

Violations of these provisions will be a basis for cost disallowance, and in instances of serious or willful violations, may be a basis for debarment or suspension.

Comments should be submitted in duplicate to the Financial Management Division, Office of Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503. All comments should be received within 45 days of this notice.

FOR FURTHER INFORMATION CONTACT: John J. Lordan, Chief, Financial Management Branch, Office of

Management and Budget, Washington, D.C. 20503, (202) 395-6823.

Issued in Washington, D.C., January 20, 1983.

Candice C. Bryant,

Acting Deputy Associate Director for Administration.

Appendix

The following questions and answers have been prepared by the Office of Management and Budget for informational purposes only.

Question: What is the purpose of these revisions?

Answer: The purpose is to ensure that federal contracts and grants are not used to support political advocacy either directly or indirectly. Thousands of contractors and grantees, administering hundreds of billions of federal dollars, have had wide latitude to engage in political advocacy activities, often using the same facilities and personnel paid for in part by the taxpayers. The current lack of a government-wide policy prohibiting the use of federal grant and contract funds for political advocacy has been criticized by the General Accounting Office. It is unfair to use federal tax money to support political causes. Nor is it an efficient or economical use of public resources to allow funds to be diverted from statutory purposes to political advocacy.

A particularly important abuse is that many contractors and grantees have been able to defray the overhead costs of their political advocacy, at public expense, by allocating some part of the cost to the administration of the contract or grant. Not only does this free up the organization's own resources for further political activity; it also creates the appearance that the government is supporting one or another side in a political controversy.

Question: How will the proposals work?

Answer: The proposals will revise cost principles applicable to federal grants, contracts (other than competitive, firm fixed price contracts), and other agreements. Recipients of federal grants, contracts, or other agreements will be barred from receiving government reimbursement for any activities connected with political advocacy at the national, state, or local levels. This includes membership or dues in trade associations or other organizations that have political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose. In addition, salary costs will be unallowable to recipients who either require their employees to pay dues to political advocacy organizations or require them to engage in political advocacy on the job or during non-working hours. Finally, government funds will not be permitted to pay for facilities in which significant political advocacy activities are conducted, thus requiring physical separation of such activities from those involved in the performance of grants and contracts.

Question: What is an example of how this will work?

Answer: Take the example of a defense contractor who leases a corporate aircraft for oversight and management of a federal contract. If the contractor chooses to use the aircraft also for lobbying or other political

activities—such as transporting corporate officials to discussions with Congressmen—then under the principles proposed by the Defense Department, the contractor cannot include the cost of the aircraft or of any use of the aircraft as part of overhead costs allocated in part to the contract.

As an example in the non-profit area, take an organization which receives a federal grant to promote better health services for low-income individuals, which decides to organize a political rally to promote more federal funding for medical programs. The organization could not be reimbursed for any portion of the salaries of individuals engaged in organizing the political rally or for any portion of other overhead costs (office machines, printing facilities, etc.) if the same overhead items were used for the rally. The organization would be free to hold the rally—but it would do so at its own expense, and without using people, facilities or resources partially funded by the Federal Government.

Question: How is it possible to define "political advocacy"?

Answer: The concept of political advocacy, or "influencing legislation," is used in the Internal Revenue Code restrictions on tax-exempt organizations. The Internal Revenue Code definition of "influencing legislation" is employed in this proposal, with several modifications to take account of changes in political practices (e.g., development of political action committees), Supreme Court developments (e.g., decisions declaring certain forms of litigation to be political expression), and shifts in the decisionmaking process (e.g., the growth of administrative agencies and referenda as means of political decisionmaking).

In particular, the scope of the Code definition ("influencing legislation") has been expanded to cover "governmental decisions" in general. Thus, for example, the Internal Revenue Code defines the term "influencing legislation" as including "any attempt to influence any legislation through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof." The proposed revision to Circular A-122, correspondingly, defines "political advocacy" as including "attempting to influence governmental decisions through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof." The body of experience in interpreting the Internal Revenue Code provision, as appropriately modified, is expected to aid in the interpretation of the proposed revisions.

The proposals thus include as "political advocacy" direct participation in elections or referenda by means of contributions, endorsement, publicity, administration of political action committees, or similar activity; contributions to political advocacy organizations; attempting to influence government policy made through the regulatory process as well as the legislative process; and attempts to influence government policy through litigation as an *amicus curiae*, on behalf of the members of the organization, or on behalf of another party. In addition, several categories of activity excluded from the Code definition of "influencing legislation" (e.g., communications with organization members on political topics and lobbying with respect

to the organization's own interest) have been included in the proposal's definition, to ensure that such activities are not conducted at the expense of the public.

Question: What is the penalty for violating these provisions?

Answer: Cost recovery, and in instances of serious or willful violations, suspension or debarment from federal grants or contracts.

Question: How does this proposal affect the First Amendment right of freedom of speech?

Answer: This proposal will promote the First Amendment value that a person can freely speak, or refrain from speaking, on political matters. The Supreme Court has recognized constitutional problems with requirements on a person "to contribute to the support of an ideological cause he may oppose." *Abouy v. Detroit Board of Education*, 431 U.S. 209, 235-236 (1977). Although government in a democracy necessarily involves some degree of political advocacy because of the need to communicate with citizens, taxpayers cannot rightly be required to support the political advocacy of private organizations and corporations through federal grants and contracts.

Moreover, the freedom of First Amendment political advocacy is jeopardized when the views of particular groups are financed by the government. The use of federal grants or contracts for the support of one side in a political debate, like the use of political patronage for the support of a political party, can injure the "free functioning of the electoral process." *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 353, 356 (1976). In the marketplace of ideas, where differing political opinions compete for public acceptance, the government should not be in the position of subsidizing the expression of views of particular organizations or corporations, as to defense or domestic policy. Nor should the government create the appearance of official support for the political advocacy of its grantees or contractors.

Question: Does this proposal infringe the First Amendment rights of recipient organizations?

Answer: No. Recipients remain free to engage in political advocacy on any side of any issue. The proposals merely ensure that organizations engage in political advocacy at their own expense—not the public's. If an organization chooses to exercise its First Amendment rights, it is only fair that it keep those political activities separate from its work at the expense of the public. It should not expect to have its political advocacy subsidized, or to be able to put facilities purchased in part by tax dollars to political use. Like federal agencies and employees, federal grantees and contractors are "expected to . . . execute the programs of the Government without bias or favoritism for or against any political party or group or the members thereof." *CSC v. National Association of Letter Carriers*, 413 U.S. 548, 565 (1973). Federal grant and contract activity will be more efficiently and fairly performed if it is not mixed with advocacy activities on one or the other side of political debate.

Question: Will these proposals prevent corporations or other organizations from lobbying in Congress or the agencies for grants or contracts?

Answers: No—but they will do it at their own expense, not the public's.

Question: Will organizations engaged in political advocacy be eligible to receive federal grants and contracts?

Answer: Absolutely. In a memorandum dated April 26, 1982, the Director of OMB made clear that:

"The Administration will continue to award grants and contracts to those parties who are most effective in fulfilling statutory purposes [and that] political advocacy groups may continue to receive grant and contract awards."

This policy will continue in effect, and just as agencies will be forbidden to award grants and contracts because of the political views of applicant groups, they will also be forbidden from discriminating against "parties most effective in fulfilling statutory purposes."

Question: What will be the practical effect on organizations that engage in political advocacy?

Answer: Federal grantees and contractors that choose to engage in political advocacy will need to separate their grant or contract activity from their political activity. If they mix the two, then they will not receive government reimbursement for the joint costs.

Question: What will be the effect on the employees of contractors and grantees?

Answer: Employees whose salary is paid in part with federal funds may not be required or induced to engage in political advocacy, either as a part of the job or on their own time. Nor may they be required to join or pay dues to an organization involved in substantial political advocacy. This will ensure that federal funds are not used to hire political armies or to generate political membership support—practices analogous to these held unconstitutional in *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347 (1976). Of course, individual employees remain free to engage in political advocacy on their own if they wish to do so.

Question: To what organizations do the proposals apply?

Answer: The proposed revision to OMB Circular A-122 will apply to all non-profit organizations receiving federal grants, contracts, or other agreements. Similar proposals are being applied by the Department of Defense, NASA, and the General Services Administration to civilian and defense contractors. The proposed revisions will apply to grants, contracts, and other agreements entered into after the effective date of the revisions. Existing grants, contracts, and other agreements will not be affected.

Question: Will these proposals interfere with organizations due process rights to

defend their interests in court?

Answer: No. So long as an organization appears in court on its own behalf, litigation is not defined as political advocacy. However, when an organization goes into court to represent others, or to support the claim of others, such attempts to influence policy through the judicial process are a form of political advocacy, as the Supreme Court has held. *NAACP v. Button*, 371 U.S. 415, 429 (1963); *In re Primus*, 436 U.S. 412, 428 (1978). Such activities should not be supported by federal grant or contract money, unless the grant or contract was made expressly for that purpose. Attorneys fee award statutes are not affected by these proposals.

Question: Will these proposals make it more difficult for the federal government to reward its political supporters?

Answer: Yes. Currently, the federal government may be able to reward its supporters, and punish its opponents, by granting or denying federal grants to organizations engaged in political advocacy. By making such awards to a friendly organization the government assumes a portion of that organization's overhead costs, and thus supports the organizations political activities. In this way, the government can influence the political process by inducing recipients of federal funds to conform their behavior to the governments desires. This was one of the dangers of the political spoils system recognized by the Supreme Court in *Elrod v. Burns*, 427 U.S. 347, 355-356 (1976). These proposals will help make the process neutral again, by eliminating the "political spoils" aspect of the government funding process.

Question: Will these proposals solve the whole problem of federal tax money being used to support political advocacy?

Answer: No, but they make a major step in the right direction. Congress and the agencies must continue to be vigilant to ensure that grants and contracts are not awarded for purposes that involve political advocacy.

Circular A-122—Cost Principles for Nonprofit Organizations

Circular A-122 is revised by modifying Attachment B as follows:

1. Insert a new paragraph "B 33 Political Advocacy."

a. The cost of activities constituting political advocacy are unallowable.

b. Political advocacy is any activity that includes:

(1) Attempting to influence the outcome of any Federal, State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar procedure, through contributions, endorsements, publicity, or similar activity;

(2) Establishing, administering,

contributing to, or paying the expenses of a political action committee, either directly or indirectly;

(3) Attempting to influence governmental decisions through an attempt to affect the opinions of the general public or any segment thereof;

(4) Attempting to influence governmental decisions through communications with any member or employee of a legislative body, or with any government official or employee who may participate in the decisionmaking process;

(5) Participating in or contributing to the expenses of litigation other than litigation in which the organization is a party with standing to sue or defend on its own behalf; or

(6) Contributing money, services, or any other thing of value, as dues or otherwise, to an organization that has political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose, or that spends \$100,000 or more per year on activities constituting political advocacy.

c. Political advocacy does not include the following activities:

(1) Making available the results of nonpartisan analysis, study, or research, the distribution of which is not primarily designed to influence the outcome of any Federal, State, or local election, referendum, initiative, or similar procedure, or any governmental decision;

(2) Providing technical advice or assistance to a governmental body or to a committee or other subdivision thereof in response to a written request by such body or subdivision;

(3) Participating in litigation on behalf of other persons, if the organization has received a Federal, State, or local grant, contract, or other agreement for the express purpose of doing so;

(4) Applying or making a bid in connection with a grant, contract, unsolicited proposal, or other agreement, or providing information in connection with such application at the request of the government agency awarding the grant, contract, or other agreement; or

(5) Engaging in activities specifically required by law.

d. An organization has political advocacy as a "substantial organizational purpose" if:

(1) The organization's solicitations for membership or contributions

(2) The organization's expenditures for membership or contributions

(3) The organization's expenditures for membership or contributions

acknowledge that the organization engages in activities constituting political advocacy; or

(2) Twenty percent (20%) or more of the organization's annual expenditures, other than those incurred in connection with Federal, State or local grants, contracts, or other agreements, or incurred in connection with political advocacy.

e. The term, "governmental decisions" includes:

(1) The introduction, passage, amendment, defeat, signing, or veto of legislation, appropriations, resolutions, or constitutional amendments at the Federal, State, or local level;

(2) Any rulemakings, guidelines, policy statements or other administrative decisions of general applicability and future effect; or

(3) Any licensing, grant, ratemaking, formal adjudication or informal adjudication, other than actions or decisions related to the administration of the specific grant, contract, or agreement involved.

f. Notwithstanding the provisions of other cost principles in this circular:

(1) Salary costs of individuals are unallowable if:

(a) The work of such individuals includes activities constituting political advocacy, other than activities that are both ministerial and non-material; or

(b) The organization has required or induced such individuals to join or pay dues to an organization, other than a labor union, that has political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose, or to engage in political advocacy during non-working hours.

(2) The following costs are unallowable:

(a) Building or office space in which more than 5% of the usable space occupied by the organization or an affiliated organization is devoted to activities constituting political advocacy;

(b) Items of equipment or other items used in part for political advocacy;

(c) Meetings and conferences devoted in any part to political advocacy;

(d) Publication and printing allocable in part to political advocacy; and

(e) Membership in an organization that has political advocacy as a substantial organizational purpose, or that spends \$100,000 or more per year in connection with political advocacy.

2. Renumber subsequent paragraphs.

[FR Doc. 83-2011 Filed 1-21-83; 1:28 pm]

BILLING CODE 3110-01-M

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

*Get w/ Ed. +
Call Jepsen*

February 4, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM BAKER
MIKE DEEVER
KEN DUBERSTEIN
MIKE MC MANUS
BILL SADLEIR

FROM: ED ROLLINS *ER*
RE: SENATE FUNDRAISERS


The Republican Senate Campaign Committee has requested that the President do the following fundraisers for incumbent Senators up for re-election in 1984.

In order of priority they are:

- 1. Rudy Boschwitz - Minnesota
- 2. John Warner - Virginia
- 3. Gordon Humphrey - New Hampshire
- 4. Larry Pressler - South Dakota
- 5. Roger Jepsen - Iowa

Although it is early to start predicting 1984 Senate races, holding the 19 Republican Senate seats that year will be difficult. At least 10 of our incumbents will be in hotly contested races. The five listed above will definitely be targeted by the Democrats and an early fundraising appearance by the President in their home states would greatly enhance their re-election efforts.

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6803 Poplar Place, Suite 300, McLean, Virginia 22101, (703) 556-0001

MEMORANDUM

TO: President Ronald Reagan
FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin
DATE: January 22, 1983
SUBJECT: State of the Union - Fifth Draft 1/22/83

COPIES TO: Michael Deaver ✓
Richard Darman
Aram Bakshian


The following comments might be of help to you, Mr. President, as you put the polishing touches on your speech.

Length

If our target audience is the 80 to 100 million adult Americans who will watch the speech on television and not just the assembled Congressmen and guests, it is imperative that we keep the length of the speech to no longer than thirty minutes.

It seems to me you might want to tighten up:

- The Introduction, pp. 1 - 2 (see comments on the "Pace" below).
- Keeping Faith with the Future, pp. 16 - 18.
- Foreign Affairs, pp. 18 - 22. We do need to stress our foreign policy successes and our drive toward meaningful arms reductions but, should you review most of our foreign initiatives in the detail of the draft, the only thing you will accomplish will be to dilute the impact of both this section and the speech generally.



President Ronald Reagan
January 22, 1983
Page Two


Pace

We must get into the substance of the speech more quickly. Almost half of those who begin listening to the speech will not be with us at the close. Twenty-five percent (25%) of the audience will disappear after the first 20 minutes, with a large proportion of those dropping out in the first 10 minutes (i.e. after the first six pages). Hence, during that first 10-minute period, we must sound our major themes clearly and concisely:

- . An unvarnished recognition that America is very troubled because of its economic difficulties.
- . Our commitment to providing more Americans with jobs sooner and to getting the economy moving again.
- . The success of resolving the social security issue through a bi-partisan effort and the promise that such a working arrangement -- which cuts across partisan lines -- holds in resolving the major challenges not yet met.
- . The high priority we give to pressing the initiative for the reduction of nuclear weapons in the context of an equitable and verifiable agreement with the Soviets.
- . The importance of doing all of the above in a fashion that will move us toward balancing the budget during our planning period (1983-1988).

Tone

The entire ~~tone~~ of the speech must be realistic but hopeful. Let us ~~not~~ trap ourselves by raising expectations too high about the prospects and immediacy of economy recovery. It is much better for us now to error just a little bit on the side of being a bit too pessimistic.



President Ronald Reagan
January 23, 1983
Page Three


Some Specific Suggestions

We over-use the word comprehensive -- "Comprehensive Federal Spending Freeze," "Comprehensive Employment Bill of 1983." Can't we simply call the later the Employment Bill of 1983?

On page 16, first paragraph, rather than "eliminate unjust discrimination on the basis of sex," it would be more forceful to say "eliminate unjust discrimination against women."

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

January 6, 1983



Margaret:

As you know, things look bleak these days from a public standpoint. The following memo makes the case that this is a structural problem that occurs during this time period regardless of how good or how bad things are.

Could you run this by JAB and see if he thinks any of these points are worth trying to get out.

Thanks.

Lee Atwater

No-
Good if
happens
but don't
lay out a
marker not
make if there
is detrimental.

JAB READING FILE
PLEASE — 1/6/83
MOT

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

This memo will advance three main theses:

I. The third year of a President's term is the most challenging. This has been true for virtually every modern President and it is likely to be true for President Reagan. As we move into the third year of the Reagan Presidency, we should be aware of this predictable pattern, so that we can help the President respond appropriately to the coming challenges.

II. There is an identifiable cycle of Presidential popularity within the span of a four year term. The cycle, when displayed on a chart, is shaped like a parabola. After starting from a high level right after his Inauguration, the President's approval rating slopes downward until it touches bottom around the middle of his third year in office. Toward the beginning of his fourth year, the President's approval rating shoots upward, but never as far as its original high level. This fourth year surge usually assures the President of re-election, should he seek it.

III. The parabolic shape of this cycle is not affected by the increasing "structural unpopularity" of the modern Presidency. Although declining Presidential approval ratings are a serious matter, these ratings cannot be relied upon to make long range forecasts about future election results.

I. THE THIRD YEAR OF THE MODERN PRESIDENCY

1983 will be the most challenging year of Ronald Reagan's Presidency. In terms of his effectiveness in office and his popularity, President Reagan will have his work cut out for him in his third year.

In his classic work Presidential Power, Richard Neustadt describes the third year of a President's term as the last opportunity he will have to make his program work before the tidal wave of electioneering washes over his fourth year. Richard Wirthlin recently observed that "Historically the third year is the one that makes or breaks a Presidency, and Ronald Reagan's third year is more critical for him than any President since World War II. It's the third year when people will judge the President not only by the goals he articulated during the campaign and the legislation he has passed, but also by how his program has affected their lives. It's also a year in which foreign policy will be given a severe test."

In 1976 Presidential scholar Stephen Hess composed a "composite portrait" of a President's first term. Passages concerning the third year of the Presidency are excerpted below:

"The midterm elections approach, and the President tries to restore his luster at the ballot box. He always fails [except for 1934]. His party loses seats. The new Congress is less receptive to the President's wishes...the President now devotes a larger part of his time to foreign policy. This is true even if his pre-Presidential interests had been mainly in the domestic area...the third year the exodus from government begins...personal alliances and rivalries have had full opportunity to develop within the Administration... by the second half of his term the President has accumulated a long list of positions, which must be promoted and defended and which will determine whether he is re-elected or not."

That Hess' description seems so timely and relevant six years and two Presidents later is a tribute not only to Hess' perspicacity but also to the predictable pattern of the third year of a President's term. Just how predictable this pattern is becomes apparent in the next section.

II. THE CYCLE OF PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY

There is an identifiable cycle of Presidential popularity within the span of a single four year term. Professor James A. Stimson of the State University of New York at Buffalo first described this cycle. As he wrote in 1976:

"The curves that characterize approval ratings for American Presidents can be modeled quite simply. They are parabolas, concave upward, with a focus [bottom point] in the latter half of the Presidential term...after that point approval rises slightly until the end of the term, but never attains its original level."

In other words, the President's popularity starts to decline soon after he is sworn in. This decline goes on for his first two years, bottoming out in the President's third year. Around the beginning of the fourth year the President's popularity surges (see charts 1 and 2, following pages). Usually this fourth year surge assures the President's re-election, as in 1948, 1956, and 1972. Carter in 1980 was an exception which needs to be examined if we are to reach a judgment about the predictive power of Stimson's cycle.

THE CYCLE OF PRESIDENTIAL POPULARITY

8

JAMES A. STIMSON




FIGURE 1. AGGREGATED PRESIDENTIAL APPROVAL. FIT TO THE PARABOLIC MODEL

NOTE: The parabolic line representing the general cycle of Presidential popularity is mathematically derived from the dot diffusion pattern. The diffusion pattern represents the actual plotting of Presidential approval ratings onto the chart.

CHART 2

THE POPULARITY CYCLES OF SEVEN PRESIDENTIAL TERMS
1945-1973

PUBLIC SUPPORT FOR AMERICAN PRESIDENTS

13




FIGURE 2. APPROVAL CURVES FOR SEVEN PRESIDENTIAL TERMS


Carter's term in office is an excellent test of the Stimson cyclical model which was developed in 1976, a year before Carter took office. Charts 3 and 4 on the following pages show that Carter's Gallup Poll approval rating does indeed form a parabola. We can see that Carter's popularity descended steadily throughout his first two and one-half years in office. [We can see that Carter's rating took a sudden jump in the last quarter of his third year and continued to rise into his fourth year, just as the Stimson cycle predicted it would. Carter's problem was that the fourth year rally was not sustained. Within a few months Carter was back to his third year lows.]

Do the Carter ratings fit Stimson's parabola? Was Carter's trendline determined by the Cycle of Presidential Popularity? The answer is unmistakably yes.


The reader may object that the cause of Carter's surge in late 1979 was the hostage crisis. Stimson's response would be that every Presidency is unique with something happening at each stage in the cycle. But how can one explain the remarkably similar approval ratings in Presidency after Presidency? Is it just coincidence that every President bottoms out in the third year before rallying in the fourth? That hardly seems possible.

What causes Presidential popularity ratings to follow this cycle? Nobody really knows. Stimson, the man who first identified the cycle's parabolic shape, argues that the major variable in Presidential cycles is the mere passage of time. In other words, as a President moves chronologically through his term, he gets progressively more unpopular until around the end of his third year, whereupon the President's ratings pick up.

CARTER'S GALLUP POLL APPROVAL RATING: AVERAGE BY QUARTER,
1977-1980



CARTER'S GALLUP POLL APPROVAL RATING: AVERAGE BY YEAR 1977-1980



Stimson and others argue that Presidential popularity is relatively unaffected by the characteristics or actions of the incumbent, or even by conditions prevailing at the time. In his book The State of the Presidency, Thomas E. Cronin states the situation too crudely, although a shell-shocked President and his aides may think his description of the popularity dynamic hits the nail on the head:

"No matter what Presidents do, their popularity declines. It hardly seems to matter what they attempt or even who is President. When news is good, a President's popularity goes down, when news is terrible, it merely goes down faster."

Certainly one advantage that every President seeking re-election has as he goes into his fourth year is the power of incumbency. The President is a known quantity - much better known than his challenger. Many voters are "small 'c'" conservatives when the Presidency is at stake - they don't want to change leaders just for the sake of change. Thus the burden of proof is on the challenger. As they say, the ballot cast for President is the most important and serious vote a citizen can make. It may have gotten easier to beat an incumbent President, but it has not gotten easy. Knowledge of the cycle of Presidential popularity may strengthen us as we prepare to help the President face the rigors of 1983.

III. STRUCTURAL UNPOPULARITY AND LONG RANGE POLITICAL FORECASTING BASED SOLELY ON APPROVAL RATINGS

Presidential approval ratings are going down. That is the most notable trend regarding Presidential popularity in the forty-five years since Gallup first began asking Americans if they approve or disapprove of the way the President is handling his job.

Below are data from the Gallup Polling Organization, showing the average approval rating for the full term in office of each of the last eight Presidents, showing a definite downward trend. President Reagan is not on the list, since he has not finished his term.

Average Approval Rating for Presidency

Carter	47
Ford	46
Nixon	49
Johnson	55
Kennedy	70
Eisenhower	64
Franklin D. Roosevelt	75 (average for 1938-45, no data prior to 1938 available)

The above trend is unmistakable, but where does President Reagan fit? To find out we need to compare the average approval rating for President Reagan's first two years in office with the average approval ratings of other Presidents in their first two years. As it happens, the latest Gallup Poll data for President Reagan are from October. Therefore, the averages for all Presidents listed below cover only the first twenty-two months of their terms. Since the data only goes back to 1938, Roosevelt is not listed. Again the trend is decisively downward.

Average Approval Rating: First 22 Months in
Office

Reagan	50
Carter	51
Ford	46
Nixon	60
Johnson	71
Kennedy	74
Eisenhower	68
Truman	58

When economists see that unemployment steadily ratchets upward, year after year, they begin to speak of "structural unemployment." When we see Presidential popularity ratcheting downward, year after year, indeed decade after decade, perhaps we should start thinking in terms of "structural unpopularity." Why this structural unpopularity? A host of possible explanations come to mind: Vietnam, Watergate, the decline of political parties, the rise of special interests, etc.

These explanations all seem plausible enough, but I believe they are symptoms of the disease afflicting the Presidency, not the disease itself. The underlying disease is slow economic growth. Consider the slowdown in the growth of American productivity - one of the key indicators of prosperity:

Compound Annual Growth Rate of Productivity, Average by Decade

1940's	3.5
1950's	3.2
1960's	2.9
1970's	1.5
1980's	.6

Since the days of Roosevelt, the public has expected the President to ensure prosperity. It is therefore certainly reasonable to assume that the particularly abrupt economic slowdown in the 1970's had a lot to do with the weakness of the Presidency in the last decade.

Ronald Reagan saw clearly in 1980 that the American spirit was not suffering from "malaise," it was suffering from a decade of stagflation. His prescription was a bold overhaul of government policies to redirect America toward growth and prosperity. I believe that the Reagan prescription - a booming economy - for the nation's morale also will work to restore the Presidency to its rightful leadership position.

An important caveat against over-reliance on poll data to make long term predictions must be inserted here. Although it may seem logical, using Gallup Poll approval data to make a judgment about future Presidential elections is a fruitless undertaking.

For example, an examination of Presidential approval ratings twenty-five months prior to the general election compared to his percentage in the general election shows no discernible pattern.

The chart below shows how Presidents stood in the ratings twenty-five months prior to the general election - the decision to use twenty-five months is made so that the latest Gallup Data for President Reagan can be used.

President	Poll Date	T-25 Months Rating	Election Day % of Popular Vote	Change in % from T-25 to Election Day	Win/Lose
Reagan	10/82	41	--	--	
Carter	10/78	49	41	-8	Lose
Ford	10/74	52	48	-4	Lose
Nixon	10/70	58	61	+3	Win
Eisenhower	10/54	61	57	-4	<u>Lose</u> ? WIN
Truman	10/46	32	50	+18	Win
FDR ('44)	10/42	70	53	-17	Win
FDR ('40)	10/38	60	55	-5	<u>Lose</u> ? WIN

Presidents ranked by the change from T-25 months to Election Day shows an enormous variation:

1. Truman +18 W
2. Nixon + 3 W
3. Eisenhower - 4 W
4. Ford - 4 L
5. FDR ('40) - 5 W
6. Carter - 8 L
7. FDR ('44) -17 W

TO: President Ronald Reagan
FROM: Richard B. Wirthlin
DATE: December 8, 1982
RE: Political Challenges We Face in 1983 and Beyond

I. INTRODUCTION

The next six months promise to be the most critical period of your presidency. Regardless of whether or not you decide to run for reelection in 1984, what is done now will determine whether your policies will remain in force over the next two decades and open up a new era of freedom and opportunity for Americans, or whether your policies will give way to the old agendas of the past.

You face, Mr. President, some very tough decisions regarding unemployment, defense, social security, and bringing the federal budget eventually into balance.

II. THE LEGACY OF THE 1982 ELECTION

With a 10% unemployment rate announced four weeks before the vote, redistricting losses, and the historical "in party" disadvantage of an off-year election, 1982 could well have dealt us a fatal political blow. That did not happen.

Nevertheless, we must clearly recognize that the political environment now is much more hostile. This holds because of the losses we experienced in the House and in the states, and also because the 1982 election induced perceptual changes that endanger your presidency.

A. Some Erosion of Your Perceptual Strengths

While your job rating remained stable through the election the Democratic focus on our economic failures and the "fairness" issues damaged the way Americans view you. Between September 27 and November 8 the following changes were measured in the way the electorate describes you.

	<u>Sept</u>	<u>Nov</u>	<u>Change</u>
● Is trustworthy	61%	53%	-8%
● Effective in getting things done	52	45	-7
● Really knows what he's doing	43	38	-5
● Has the strong leadership qualities this country needs	51	46	-5
● Cares about the needs of the elderly and poor	33	30	-3

B. Coalitionally We Suffered Substantial Losses
in the House of Representatives

With 26 fewer Republicans in the House and the loss of 11 state legislatures, the political-legislative environment has become much tougher.

We can expect the House of Representatives to be more antagonistic and confrontive than it was in 1982. In point of fact, the major threat to our programs may generate more from congressional attitudes than from the partisan advantage of the Democrats.

The MX vote last night could be a preview of things to come.

C. Potential Senate Problems

Even though we have kept our margin of control in the Senate, it appears that many senators read the results of the 1982 election as a mandate for a more independent and assertive course of action. Several are already sounding the charge on our policy goals.

D. The Election Heightened the Perceptions that Our Policies are "Unfair" and "Won't Work"

The Democratic rhetoric and the 1982 results caused considerable damage in the way our economic policies are perceived:

- In August 54% thought that our economic policies were "fair." That fell to 47% right after the election. The unfairness issue was a major theme sounded by the Democrats and it took its toll not only on Republicans running for election but also on the Administration.
- Sharp erosion also occurred in the number of adult Americans who feel that our economic programs will help the country. In August 58% said our programs would help, that fell 11 points in the post-election period.

While the electorate still exudes some patience, nevertheless we would be foolish to conclude anything but that time is beginning to run out. People want to see concrete signs that the economic recovery is underway soon.

E. The Coalitional Tide Ran Against Republicans

The single most disturbing aspect of the 1982 election was that our policies, their impact, and the way those policies were criticized by the Democrats created a core of deep-running hostility we cannot ignore.

- It is not unusual for Blacks to vote against Republicans. However, the consistency with which Blacks voted against Republicans, were they conservative or liberal, does create some concern. Blanchard of Michigan got 97% of the Black vote, Celeste of Ohio 89%, Earle in Wisconsin 98%, Cuomo in New York 93%, and in Alabama the Black vote went 5:1 for Wallace. Observers of the Alabama race conclude that this overwhelming support for Wallace was due not to his attractiveness but to the fact that Blacks were consistently voting a straight Democratic ticket as a protest against our policies. Their anger also generated unusually high turnout.
- Women, with an alarming degree of regularity, also supported Democratic candidates over Republicans.
- On the other hand, there was weaker support than normal for Republican candidates among some Republican strength groups -- small businessmen, conservative Democrats, and sharp drop-off among the swing constituencies -- union members, ethnics, and blue collar workers.

One of the most critical tasks that has to be performed early in 1983 is to identify precisely which coalitions offer the best hope for you, or any Republican seeking the presidency in 1984, so that we can begin to target those groups in 1983 and bring them back into the Republican fold.

III. THE TURNING POINT: 1983

A. A New Course Guided by Ideological Consistency

Your presidency is unique precisely because your campaign and your presidency to date have been framed by well-articulated, ideological goals -- curbing federal government, reducing regulation and taxes, encouraging economic growth and seeking peace through strength.

While we have been somewhat successful in moving toward those goals (assuming economic growth will come on line next year) the one ideological goal that we have failed miserably to achieve is moving toward a balanced budget.

These goals act as pillars which bear the whole weight of our action mandate. For whatever reasons, when and if those pillars are kicked away, then the whole expectational structure that elected this Administration will come tumbling down.

B. Next Year

Historically, the third year of a president's term has been both the most difficult and the most decisive in establishing its policy legacy and the verdict of history.

C. Some Challenges

The Democratically-dominated House of Representatives, as well as elements within the Republican Senate, will mount a major effort to move the mantle of national leadership from the White House to the Congress. We must anticipate and pre-empt that shift. If we are not successful in doing this we will lose control of our agenda for change.

- In 1983 we should expect that the Democrats, who in 1981 and 1982 could not articulate any concise or consistent response to our policies, will get their act together. Furthermore, the media will give these policy alternatives high visibility inasmuch as many of the policy initiatives will spring from potential Democratic presidential opponents. They will begin organizing their campaigns in the spring of 1983 and they will consciously create opportunities to criticize our programs and policies in a highly visible fashion.

Senator Ted Kennedy's decision not to seek the presidency in 1984 will heighten his and others' criticism of our policies because:

- there will be more Democrats who will view themselves as presidential timber, and
- Kennedy will try to keep the liberal flame and his own political prominence alive by hounding us more than ever.
- Furthermore, as long as your plans for 1984 remain unannounced, we can also expect some Republican contenders to position themselves "advantageously" in 1983 to make their bids for 1984. Clearly, that positioning may not in all cases be in our own best interest.
- Republicans -- particularly senators who hold key chair positions and governors up for reelection in 1984 -- will likely distance themselves from our policies more sharply than in 1981-82.

- While economic recovery, should it come robustly and by mid-year 1983, will take some sting out of the charge that our Administration has been "unfair," we must deal specifically and early with the fairness issue by resolving the social security dilemma and by judging every administrative action against the criterion:
 - Is this policy even-handed and fair to all members of our society?

IV. WHAT MUST BE DONE?

A. Keep Control of the Legislative Agenda

While Congress cannot lead, it can block the implementation of our policies; therefore, we must:

- Refocus and narrow our legislative objectives given a more hostile Congress. We learned in 1981-82 that presidential proposals are viewed as presidential actions even when those proposals were rejected by Congress. (Remember the abortive May, 1981, social security proposal.)
- We should pick our proposals with great care:
 - Can we get them enacted?
 - Do they raise false expectations?
 - Are they consistent with our general goals?
- Remember that when we propose legislation that does not have a realistic chance of passing, we risk:
 - eroding the strength of your leadership,
 - raising expectations among those who favor the policy that are later dashed, and
 - drawing criticism from those who oppose the position.

All of these reduce our options and our leverage for the next round of legislative battles.

- Prioritize our legislative proposals to bring maximum presidential resources to bear on:
 - economic recovery,
 - growth,
 - social security,
 - defense,
 - a budget that is moving toward balance, and
 - a limited number of constituency issues.

- Sensitize White House congressional relations and personnel to the absolute need of smoothing the thousand ruffled feathers of our congressional "friends" in 1983-84.

B. Propose, and Press Congress to Pass, an Issue Agenda That Will Advance Your 1980 Mandate

You have initiated changes that may remain in place long after you leave the presidency that will reduce the scope of the federal government. Only two things now threaten that possibility:

- the economy, and
- the perception that our changes have been "unfair."

The Democrats, on the net, successfully exploited those two threats through fears of "unemployment" and "social security collapse" in the 1982 elections.

In considering our agenda for 1983-84 these two threats must be given paramount importance.

1. Social Security. We must quickly resolve the social security issue. This is perhaps the most critical, and most time-sensitive, issue we face. As indicated above, it is absolutely essential that you reassert your leadership with Congress. The longer the social security issue stews, the more your leadership with Congress will be compromised. This issue, more than any other, is the well-spring of the perception of "unfairness" -- a perception that marshalled the high Democratic turnout, hurt us among older voters, and eroded Republican support among some historically strong support groups.

It is extremely important that you build your proposals on the recommendations submitted by the National Commission on Social Security Reform. It is your commission. It is also bipartisan and you can leverage those recommendations and demand quick action from the Congress. You might even provide an expected timetable.

However, should the study commission not be able to make recommendations, then you must move to secure some kind of resolution quickly. Given the strongly entrenched congressional and public attitudes now held, this is one program reform that you, Mr. President, will not be able to explain and "sell" at the grass roots on our terms. You should go after everything you can get from the Congress, but our political position is so weak on this one, that we should be prepared to end up with something that involves a lot of give and take.

But time on this one is of the essence.

2. Economic Recovery. If the economy does not recover strongly by the end of 1983, our policy and political tasks are going to be most difficult indeed, if not impossible. On the other hand, given the probability that that recovery will occur by then, we must now do everything we can to accelerate the recovery without reigniting the fires of inflation.
3. Economic Growth. Given the opportunity that we have next year of pulling out of the recession, policies must be put in place early in 1983 to drive the growth rates as high as possible without compromising ourselves on the inflation issue.

Without question, our policy-political payoff will come when the country begins to expand production at the 5% to 6% real rates it can reach as it emerges from the recession.

These rates may be high. But before you accept OMB/CEA projections, you should press the question, "Can we do better and still keep inflation in bounds?"

4. Balanced Budget. While all of the above have budget implications, perhaps the most difficult and important task that must be resolved in the first part of 1983 is to show how all of our policies (especially building a stronger defense and reducing taxes) fold together to lead toward sharply lower deficits in the out-years.
5. Defense and Foreign Affairs Issues. Seventy-seven percent (77%) of adult Americans, Mr. President, believe that you have been successful in building America's military strength. But there resides less support now for increasing defense spending. By pressing too hard for what the Congress may view as too much, we may end up with very much too little. It is imperative that we must actively seek options that satisfy both the goals of national security and a balanced budget.

Further, our focus must be kept on the ultimate objective of peace. We can expect further harassment from groups small and large (the Catholic church) who press for disarmament. But those pressures can be alleviated if we drive toward mutually agreed-upon strategic arms reductions with the Soviets and, hopefully, put in place the conditions that would lead to a constructive summit with Yuri Andropov in early 1984.

C. Strengthen the Cabinet

Your cabinet served your policy goals these last two years in a mixed fashion. Some members did exceedingly well -- others fell short.

Given the most serious threats to your governance and the heat of the battle that soon will be upon us all, we must tap the very best for the cabinet. Hopefully, this group would eventually include another woman and perhaps an Hispanic.

D. Consolidate Political Power Within the Republican Party as Quickly as Possible

Those who have presidential stars in their eyes will carve out positions on issues and relationships with the press to provide them maximal opportunity to run if you decide not to.

Other things being equal, it would be greatly advantageous for you to announce your intention to seek reelection (if that is your desire) as early as possible. Only this action will stem the dilution of our efforts by those in our party who are looking at a possible 1984 contest.

Even then there are going to be Republicans -- some who hold key senate committee assignments -- who will take us on frontally next year. Additionally, we can expect many of the Republican governors -- scared by the 1982 vote -- to criticize some of our proposals.

And, of course, the Democrats will hound our every step.

But keep this in mind: if we strengthen our political base through 1983 at the grass roots, these divisive elements -- inside and outside our party -- will not be able to weaken your leadership. Thus, while we must drive hard to reach our policy objectives, our success will depend directly on our skill in marshalling broad grass roots support.

E. Broaden Our Coalitional Base

1. Why coalition building? Coalition-building not only establishes the base from which you might run a successful presidential campaign in 1984, should you decide to undertake that task, but also (and in some ways more importantly) will broaden our 1983 and 1984 policy options.

(See Appendix for a more detailed review of some coalition-building issues.)

In 1982 your name, Mr. President, did not appear on any ballot. Nevertheless, the vote pattern that emerged from the 1982 election identifies, tentatively, who constitutes our bedrock coalition and where we should go to secure a strong, "swing" constituency. Our data bases are sufficiently large now to identify these groups through cluster analysis very precisely over the next month or so, but on a broad guage the following holds.

First and foremost, we must cultivate and nurture our conservative Republican base, then bolster our strength coalitions, and then deal with the swing constituencies.

2. The strength coalition remains:

- Republicans,
- small businessmen,
- farmers,
- upper-middle-income blue collar workers,
- ticket-splitting conservatives, and
- Westerners.

3. The critical swing constituencies:

- women (in particular those who work out of necessity),
- Catholics,
- older voters,
- ethnics (especially Irish, Italians, Eastern Europeans and Hispanics),
- lower-middle-income voters,
- conservative southern Democrats and Independents, and
- ticket-splitting moderates.

- a) Gender gap. We must block out a strategy to reduce the gender gap. We cannot let the gender gap become institutionalized and self-reinforcing. We cannot ignore women's issues -- job rights, education, and fairness -- with impunity. The bare-bone elements in the strategy would be:

- Keep legislative and rhetorical focus on economic recovery with stable prices (accounts for the biggest difference between men's and women's perceptions that impact how they rate you). Achieving some success in meeting this general goal will do more for us with one blow than any other single thing.
 - Take a much more visible and active role in demonstrating this Administration's commitment to quality education.
 - Propose policies that will enforce equal pay and reflect an understanding of and sensitivity to the unique problems of working women -- especially those who are heads of households.
 - Keep the emphasis on our peace negotiations and your desire to reduce nuclear weapons with verification.
 - Propose legislation (if needed) to put teeth into child support.
 - Boost and highlight what we have accomplished for women by our appointments, policies, and legislation.
 - Highlight our appointments of women and minorities but be sure these individuals are committed to you and the goals of your administration.
- b) Catholics. This group was very instrumental in electing you to the presidency in 1980. They are now under some cross pressure (jobs and the nuclear issue) and, unless we are careful, could go back into the Democratic fold.
- c) Ethnics' traditional values. Your stand on Poland and the East bloc will be important to this group.
- d) Lower-middle-income blue collar workers. Hurt by high unemployment they are still attracted to some of our positions, but their support remains very precarious.
- e) Conservative southern Democrats. Most voted for Democratic congressional candidates in 1982. Support in 1984 will depend upon economic recovery, Soviet relations, and some of the social issues.

4. A New Coalition for 1984?

It may well be that we cannot put the same coalition together that elected you to the presidency in 1980.

We must reach out to the swing constituents particularly women and bleach-collar workers and add four or five more percentage points to our support among the strength groups tagged above.

V. CONCLUSION

In 1981 we were successful in pushing through Congress many of our legislative programs. This, according to presidential scholars, has led to a landmark Administration that can alter the Presidential Agenda for the next two decades.

However, the centrifugal forces that will disperse and dissipate your presidential power are enormous. We start 1983 less strong politically than we were in 1981. Only:

- by focusing on the strengths of our general goals,
- by dealing to the constituents we need to keep our grass roots support strong, and
- by developing an issue agenda that will put us in a position of maximal advantage in 1983

can we properly prepare the ground for Republican successes in the 1984 election.

But more importantly, only by doing these things in 1983 can we keep the Reagan Revolution alive for another two decades.

APPENDIX
COALITION-BUILDING ISSUES

Given a robust recovery by mid-1983, a powerful, general theme of 1983-84, consistent with our early goals, would be expanding hope, individual opportunity, and justice. Some key pieces of that recovery theme could be:

- 1) Education. Highlight our strong commitment to quality education. Our rhetoric of eliminating the Department of Education has been read by too many Americans as shorthand for "They don't care about education."

Americans and, in particular, women and minorities, hold education as one of the single, most highly esteemed personal values. We should do all we can to demonstrate this Administration's commitment to education. Some programs which hold particular promise might be:

- establishing an educational "I.E.A." that would permit students and their parents to save, tax-free for future educational needs,
 - putting into force, in conjunction with state and local governments and private enterprise, a program to teach the 24 to 34 million functionally illiterate how to read, and
 - pushing private corporations to support their local/state education efforts through the "adopt a school" program.
- 2) Small business regulation and taxes. We can do more in terms of regulation and taxes to assist this key constituency.
 - 3) Crime. The crime issue is of concern to all Americans, but in particular to the conservatives.
 - 4) Minority rights. Whenever you can, you should strongly express your support for equal rights. A major speech next year on equal rights would be very much in order. It is a sad day when this Administration is linked to the KKK. That tie should have been laughable.

Watch carefully the signals the Administration sends that have racial overtones. Actively and visibly support programs expanding educational opportunities for minorities that lead to technical careers. This Administration has been given a bum rap on civil rights because we blundered in 1981. We cannot afford that in 1983 and 1984.

5) Foreign trade. Foreign trade policies represent a particular challenge for this Administration. On the one hand, never before has there been such high levels of public support for protectionism. On the other hand, we need foreign markets to boost our economic growth. Two possibilities, among others, might be given consideration:

- Restructure opportunities for American businesses so they can compete more effectively in the world markets, and
- Use our bargaining position to enhance the export of agricultural goods.



This is the news
release we propose
to give to the press.

bond announcement news release--12/9/81

DONE

RELEASED TODAY

WASHINGTON, D.C.--December 10, 1981--Richard Richards, chairman of the Republican National Committee (RNC), today announced the appointment of Richard N. Bond to the post of deputy chairman, effective January 15, 1982. Bond will be responsible for supervising all RNC activities pertaining to the political, communication and administration divisions. These include the allocation of resources, media, training and campaign programs.

"We are fortunate Rich Bond will be the person directing our political effort in 1982. He has the background that will allow us to achieve our principle goal of gaining control of the House of Representative," Richards said.

"1982 is going to be a very challenging year. We have 36 governor's races, all members of the House, 33 Senate seats and thousands of other state and local offices. The role of the national committee in assisting these candidates is tremendous. It is going to take an exceptional political organization at the national committee to meet our responsibilities. With the leadership of Rich Bond, we can do the job," he added.

Bond, 31, currently serves as the deputy chief of staff for Vice President George Bush. Bond held the same post during the transition period.

Prior to joining the Vice President's staff, Bond directed the 1980 campaign for U.S. Senator Charles (Mac) Mathias in Maryland.

Earlier in 1980 and 1979 Bond served as campaign director for the state of Iowa, Connecticut and California for George Bush's Presidential effort. Additionally, he held the post of director of caucus and convention states for the Bush campaign.

-more-

See
chart.
Rights.
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It should.

2-2-2-2-2

In 1978, Bond was news secretary to Congressman S. William Green of New York. During the 1976 campaign, Bond was a member of the Republican National Committee's field force, working in the New England states and also as the campaign manager for state Senator Fred Korry's congressional campaign in Arizona.

Bond participated in an around the world cruise as a crewman in 1977 on the yacht Dragon.

From 1972 until 1975, Bond held a variety of posts in the Nassau County government in New York, principally with the county executive. During this period, he directed the campaign for Lieutenant Governor of New York for Ralph Caso.

Bond is a native of Rockville Centre, New York on Long Island and is a 1972 graduate of Fordham University. Currently, he resides in Alexandria, Virginia with his wife, the former Valarie Muller of Yonkers, and their six year old son, Matthew.

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This was the
organizational chart
under Bill Brock.

NEWS

From The Republican National Committee

RNC 81-060
FOR IMMEDIATE RELEASE

CONTACT: JENNIFER HILLINGS
(202) 484-6550

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 18, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE WHITE HOUSE STAFF

FROM: JAMES A. BAKER, III *JAB III*

SUBJECT: REASSIGNMENT OF FUNCTIONS PERFORMED
BY THE OFFICE OF POLITICAL AFFAIRS

With the establishment of the re-election committee, Reagan-Bush '84, the White House Office of Political Affairs will go out of existence.

The responsibilities performed by that office are to be transferred to the following individuals:

- Margaret Tutwiler, Special Assistant to the President and Executive Assistant to the Chief of Staff, will become the White House Liaison with the Republican National Committee, the Republican Congressional Campaign Committee, the Republican Senate Campaign Committee, and the Reagan-Bush '84 Committee. Her office (in conjunction with the Administrative Office) will also coordinate and approve any political travel by White House staff or any White House event in which Republican National Committee funds might be used, and will be responsible for coordinating White House assistance to the re-election efforts of Republican Members of Congress.
- Michael A. McManus, Assistant to the President and Deputy to the Deputy Chief of Staff, will be the White House liaison on all matters relating to the 1984 Republican Convention. He will also coordinate with the Reagan-Bush '84 Committee on Presidential scheduling and advance activities, as well as the Cabinet surrogate program.
- Ken Duberstein, Assistant to the President for Legislative Affairs, and his office will now serve as the White House liaison with Republican Members of Congress on non-legislative political matters.

All contacts with the RNC and the campaign committees should be coordinated through Margaret Tutwiler unless such contacts are in accordance with procedures specifically approved by the Chief of Staff.