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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, James: Files

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File Folder: W.H. Staff Memos - Military Office

Date: 11/24/98

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Regan to J. Baker re: presidential mission (1 p) R 8/16/02 F98-024 #5	6/28/83	P1
2. Memo	Hickey to J. Baker et al re: DOD costs (2 p)	5/11/83	P5
3. Summaries	DOD costs (tabs B and C, 12 p)	n.d.	P5

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III
MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *EV.H.*

SUBJECT: Periodic Depot Maintenance (PDM) for 27000
and 26000

The following is provided for your information.

We have planned to have mandatory PDM completed for both Presidential C-137C aircraft prior to August 1984 to ensure full availability of both aircraft next fall.

These maintenance dates were developed to preclude interference with international travel.

<u>C-137C #</u>	<u>PDM Schedule</u>
26000	1 Feb - 14 Mar
27000	13 Jun - 25 Jul

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

December 21, 1983

R.F.
✓

MEMORANDUM FOR MIKE DEEVER

FROM: DAVE GERGEN *DG*
SUBJECT: Communications Planning

Before breaking for Christmas, it would be a very good idea, I think, if we were to gather and talk through several events that are very likely to be upon us in the first two weeks in January:

Arms Verification & U.S.-Soviet Relations -- You know how this matter is proceeding through the system. It is very important that it be handled with care.

Beirut Bombing -- Secretary Weinberger is due to make a report to the President on the Long Commission and possibly on the House subcommittee report "within a matter of days."

Kissinger Commission -- Their report is also due in shortly.

Food Assistance Task Force -- Their report will be coming in about January 9. Jim Jenkins has been working on this one.

Grace Commission -- Craig says the final report should be coming in during the first two weeks. Presents some very positive opportunities on cost cutting.

It would be helpful if someone knowledgeable on each one of these subjects could brief a single planning group that could then plan out the entire period.

Thanks.

cc: Jim Baker ✓
Ed Meese
Bud McFarlane
Richard Darman
Craig Fuller
Mike McManus

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



November 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR.

EVH.

Effective this date, I have instructed that the WHCA Signal telephone service at Secretary Clark's residence in California be removed. It has been the policy of this office to install Signal drops only in the Washington residence of members of the Cabinet.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

October 6, 1983



MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM

EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *E. Hickey*

SUBJECT

Terrance Cardinal Cooke's Funeral

With regard to Cardinal Cooke's funeral in New York City on Monday, October 10, 1983; The Honorable William J. Casey will be the President's Representative and will be accompanied by the following Administration Officials:

The Honorable Raymond J. Donovan, Secretary of Labor

The Honorable Margaret Heckler, Secretary of Health and Human Services

The Honorable William P. Clark, Assistant to the President
for National Security Affairs

The Honorable Edward V. Hickey, Jr., Assistant to the President

Admiral J. D. Watkins, Chief of Naval Operations

The Honorable William Wilson, President's Special Representative
to the Vatican

The Honorable Clare Boothe Luce, Member, President's Foreign
Intelligence Advisory Board

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

August 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *E.V.H.*
SUBJECT: White House Aircraft Support


The aircraft options available to the White House include all DoD assets from 27000 and 26000 to Military Airlift Command assets, i.e., C-5A/C-141/C-130 aircraft.

27000 and 26000 are normally for the exclusive use of the President (Air Force One - 27000, and the backup aircraft - 26000). 26000 has been used on an exception basis by others for official purposes. The decision to use 26000 hinges upon the following interrelated criteria: the importance of the mission, the President's schedule, availability of other assets, and the availability of the National Emergency Airborne Command Post (NEACP) as a backup substitute.

The normal process for selecting an aircraft for a particular mission includes coordination between the Military Office and Headquarters, U.S. Air Force, to determine the relative priority of all scheduled missions, the availability of Air Force assets worldwide and the most effective and economical method of satisfying our requirement.

The use of 26000 in the current case can be justified in accordance with the aforementioned criteria. It involves a Presidential mission, there is a shortage of available Air Force assets due to the Congressional recess and NEACP is readily available. In summary, based on prior precedent, 26000 can be used for this mission, as could other Air Force aircraft. All of these options remain available to you.

8/83 MAT
Keep for file
Precedence.
J. H. Baker



(2) "I'm sorry - 'it wasn't my call'."

(3) Other aircraft avail.
(4) Destroy our own that we...

McClellan:
"Brown suggested 26,000 cases all other taken."

Cassey Brown -
Col. Nuddich

Brown:
① "McClellan requested 26,000 [Des. from West Coast is only one going on (R.R.).]"

We had some reluctance but thought it best under all the circumstances.

[all other planes are being used by Cong. delegations.
Other planes would have to request
NECAP - back up

all other aircraft committed.

Brown asked Marty Stuber in Pres. Pilot's office that 26,000 would give Col. Nuddich & his crew a chance to look at the route.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
August 11, 1983

FOR: MR. BAKER
FROM: MIKE MC MANUS

FYI

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

August 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM

EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *E. V. H.*

SUBJECT

Use of SAM 26000 for McManus Pre-Advance Mission, 28 August - 12 September 1983

The arguments set forth in the attached 22 June 1983 memorandum remain valid. In addition, however, the entire VC-137 and C-135 fleet is currently committed during the period of the McManus mission because it coincides with the Congressional recess. Utilization of an aircraft other than 26000 would require the reallocation of 89th Military Airlift Wing assets already committed to Congressional support or the delay of aircraft into scheduled depot maintenance at the cost of substantial contract penalties. Of course, the White House Military Office has the authority to preempt these commitments should you decide to do so.

*Can go beyond the 89th.
Another type of aircraft.
Windowless - but type used
by RB twice for Nixon.*

*W.H. Staff go back from Cal
commercially*

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

June 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *EVA*

SUBJECT Aircraft Support for Special Mission

Two different VC-137 aircraft are available to support your special mission scheduled for 17 July to 3 August 1983: VC-137C (26000) and VC-137B (58-6972). A discussion of the advantages and disadvantages of each follows and a schematic of respective cabin arrangements is attached. Please indicate your choice below.

Use of the Presidential Back-up Aircraft (26000) provides a greater-range (one less refueling stop) aircraft with a familiar and comfortable VIP configuration. It would also provide the most complete communications support. Its major disadvantage, however, is that no other aircraft except NEACP can provide the requisite backup for the Commander-in-Chief should 27000 become disabled. NEACP could provide such support for the only Presidential trip currently scheduled during the period (Florida - 18 July). Of course, delaying your departure 24 hours would vitiate the need for such extraordinary measures.

Use of an alternate aircraft from the VC-137B series such as 58-6972 would also avoid this problem. Further, 58-6972 can be configured to include bunking for 12 passengers, an attractive option considering the nearly 50 hours flying time scheduled. Its disadvantages, however, include the requirement for an additional refueling stop on the return flight from Hawaii to Washington and the absence of a private stateroom (a curtained room is available).

Inclousures

OPTIONS

- A. Utilize the Presidential Back-up Aircraft (26000) departing 17 July 1983.

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

- B. Utilize the Presidential Backup Aircraft (26000), but depart 18 July following the President's trip to Florida.

APPROVE _____


DISAPPROVE _____

- C. Utilize an aircraft from the VC-137B fleet (58-6972)

APPROVE _____

DISAPPROVE _____

VO137C-26000 PASSENGER SEATING ARRANGEMENT



FWD ENTRY AREA

FWD PASS COMP

STAFF ROOM

LOUNGE

STAFF ROOM

GUEST COMP

AFT PASSENGER COMPARTMENT & ENTRY AREA

10 FWD PASS COMPARTMENT SEATS

1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____
 5. _____
 6. _____
 7. _____
 8. _____
 9. _____
 10. _____

STATEROOM

1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____
 5. _____
 6. _____

LOUNGE

1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____
 5. _____
 6. _____
 7. _____
 8. _____
 9. _____

10 STAFF SEATS

TABLE #1
 1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____

TABLE #2
 1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____

SECRETARIAL UNIT

1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____

12 GUEST SEATS

ROW #1
 A. _____
 B. _____
 C. _____
 D. _____

ROW #2
 A. _____
 B. _____
 C. _____
 D. _____


ROW #3
 A. _____
 B. _____
 C. _____
 D. _____

16 AFT PASSENGER COMPARTMENT SEATS

1. _____
 2. _____
 3. _____
 4. _____
 5. _____
 6. _____
 7. _____
 8. _____
 9. _____
 10. _____
 11. _____
 12. _____
 13. _____
 14. _____
 15. _____
 16. _____

C-137B

Configuration A-1




Aircraft Numbers:
58-6971
58-6972

Normal:

Sleeps 10 Passengers
Seats 42 Passengers (excluding couches)
23 Crew

C-137B

Configuration A-2



Aircraft Number: 58-0971

58-0971

58-0972

Sleeps 10 Passengers

Seats 49 Passengers (excluding couches)

23 Crew

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

MOT
Daniel Chav

August 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER, III
FROM: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *EVH*
SUBJECT: Request for Designation of Presidential Mission

To date, the U.S. - Saudi Joint Commission has not been designated a Presidential mission. In 1978 and 1981, trips were conducted as Treasury missions on a revenue basis. I recommend no change to this procedure.

The channel of communications for Treasury Department missions should be direct to DOD with no White House involvement.

Jim,
I concur with Ed Hickey!
Jr 8/5

called Daniel Chav on 8/8
566-5901

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

4670

July 22, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

FROM: WILLIAM P. CLARK *WPC*
SUBJECT: Request for Designation of Presidential
Mission

In our view, Secretary Regan's trip should be designated a Presidential mission, subject to the availability of aircraft.

*Close Case -
WPC*

Attachment:
Tab A - Treasury's Incoming
correspondence

cc: Ed Hickey

Ed Hickey
(1) What's aircraft avail?
(2) Do we normally designate
Joint Commission meeting
trips?

*Thaux
OKB*

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

4670



THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
WASHINGTON 20220

June 28, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR THE HONORABLE JAMES A. BAKER III
CHIEF OF STAFF AND
ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT
THE WHITE HOUSE

SUBJECT: Request for Designation of Presidential Mission

The eighth annual meeting of the United States-Saudi Arabian Joint Economic Commission, which I co-chair with Saudi Finance Minister Abalkhail, will be held in Riyadh this year. I hosted this event in Washington last year and have accepted Minister Abalkhail's invitation to lead the U.S. delegation to the meetings on October 23 and 24.

The U.S.-Saudi Joint Commission, established in 1974, is a stellar example of an effective bilateral joint commission. It has grown to encompass 19 ongoing projects and directly employs over 300 Americans from both the public and private sectors. Its existence has facilitated close working relationships between our governments in a number of matters of primary economic and financial importance.

While in Saudi Arabia I will also meet with key ministers and will very likely pay a courtesy call on King Fahd. After departing Saudi Arabia, I will spend one day in Kuwait where, again, I will meet with key ministers and the Amir. A previous visit to Kuwait scheduled for May 1981 was cancelled just hours before I was to arrive when the President summoned me back to Washington to help with passage of the tax package.

U.S. relations with these nations in the areas of commerce, finance, aid, and energy are of overriding importance. I believe it desirable and fully justified that this trip be declared a Presidential Mission and an appropriate military aircraft be provided. By doing so, we would demonstrate the President's personal support for these important meetings and help to ensure a successful trip.

Donald T. Regan

Classified by Ernest Chase/ICE
Declassify on OADR

DECLASSIFIED

NLS F98-024 #5

BY CS, NARA, DATE 8/16/02

~~CONFIDENTIAL~~

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

May 11, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR:

→ JAMES A. BAKER, III
MICHAEL K. DEEVER
RICHARD G. DARMAN
FRED F. FIELDING
JOHN F. W. ROGERS

FROM:

EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *EVH.*

SUBJECT:

Ronald Kessler Request for Information
Regarding DoD Costs in Support of the
President

At our last meeting, you asked that DoD cost data prepared in response to Ronald Kessler's letter (TAB A) be recomputed in 1982 constant dollars, and justifications provided where appropriate. This has been accomplished and is attached at TAB B.

Before these now comparable figures tempt us to opt for release of this information, I must emphasize that each and every assumption made in pulling together these figures is subject to argument, dispute and endless follow-on information. I also suggest that the anomalies therein are potentially equally as damaging as the originals.

There is inconsistency, also, in that we cannot convert aircraft costs to constant dollars. Too many variables are involved and, further, cost-per-hour figures are those which were publicly in effect for the years in question. Thus, we have the very real possibility of Kessler adding constant to actual dollars and still managing to achieve his ends.

I see other disadvantages to releasing this information, which has been summarized at TAB C.

We also discussed points which could be used in a non-response reply. These have been incorporated in the proposed draft at TAB D. The intent here is not only to make those specific points; but, to let Kessler know that it is not a standard, perfunctory kiss-off. Rather, I tried to give some sense of the effort, research and soul-searching which, you will agree, has gone into this matter.

I recommend very strongly that DoD support cost information not be released. Without question, the non-response reply will elicit an angry Post reaction. (Although, I wonder if they really expected us to cooperate. (?)) That appears to be preferable to the alternative, however. We are in a no-win situation and the only choice I see is between evil and lesser evil.

Hopefully, we can get together again as soon as possible to resolve this.

Attachments

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR ED HICKEY

FROM: Larry Speakes

Attached is the letter from Ronald Kessler of the Washington Post regarding his questions concerning money spent by the Defense Department in support of the President. It looks like he wants everything but the kitchen sink.

After you have time to look it over, let's see where we go from here.

cc: Mike Deaver
Jim Baker
Mark Weinberg

The Washington Post

1150 15TH STREET, N. W.

WASHINGTON, D. C. 20071

(202) 334-6000

WRITER'S DIRECT TELEPHONE NUMBER

334-6327

March 3, 1983

Mr. Larry Speakes
Deputy Assistant to the President and
Deputy Press Secretary to the President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Larry:

Thanks for your offer to provide the answers to our questions on spending in support of the President and his staff.

What we would like is the money spent by the Defense Department in support of, or on behalf of, the President and/or his staff in fiscal years 1979, 1980, 1981, and 1982, broken down by the year when the money was spent, the military unit that spent the money, where the money was spent, and for what purpose.

The President's staff, for purposes of this request, includes, but is not limited to, persons working for the White House Office, the Executive Residence, and the Office of Administration. The people in those categories specifically include those working for, or on behalf of, the President and/or First Lady in the White House complex, including the East and West Wings, mansion, residence, and adjacent grounds, or in the Old Executive Office Building.

The staff does not include people working for operational entities of the Executive Office of the President, such as the Office of Management and Budget, Council on Wage and Price Stability, Council of Economic Advisers, Office of Policy Development, and National Security Council. Nor does it include the Office of the Vice President or the Official Residence of the Vice President.

The expenditures requested include, but are not limited to, the following:

(over)

1. The cost of providing the White House complex with mechanical, electrical, electronic, and telephone equipment and service, as well as other equipment and services;
2. The cost of goods and services purchased or ordered through any military construction fund account or sub-account, including the one known as Project No. 74, used for support of, or on behalf of, the President and/or his staff;
3. The salaries and other expenses of the Military Office of the White House and of the White House Medical Unit;
4. The cost of providing the White House complex and grounds with Marine personnel;
5. The salaries and other expenses of Defense Department employees or consultants detailed either directly or indirectly through other agencies to support the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs;
6. The cost of providing rotary and fixed-wing air transportation for the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs or for others designated by them by the Air Force, Marines, or other services; the cost of providing such transport, equipment, and services in support of these trips before, during, or after they take place; and the cost of any other trips made at the request of the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs.
7. Provision by the Army or other services of ground transportation with vehicles housed at the White House garage or at other locations;
8. The cost of constructing, maintaining, operating, and guarding Camp David and related facilities and services in Thurmont, Md., by the Navy and Marines;
9. The cost of operating the White House dining room or staff mess and other facilities by the Navy or other services, with a separate listing of any income received each year to offset this expense;

In addition, we need a listing of any other expenditures in support of, or on behalf of, the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs not specifically mentioned here.


I would appreciate it if you would forward segments of the information requested as it is received. Should some of the information requested require an allocation of costs not already in existence, please inform me of those areas and provide a description of them with either an estimate of the costs or a statement that the total costs are not known and cannot be determined.

As an example of estimating costs, the cost of providing air transportation could be shown by listing the total number of hours of operation of each type of aircraft, the hourly cost of running each type, and a breakdown of the costs that make up the hourly cost figure. In the area of air transport, we would like a further breakdown by the type of trip -- those made by the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs, those made by others in support of the President's trips, and those that do not fall into any of these categories. Any reimbursement to the government for any of these trips should be listed as well.

Our purpose is to come up with the total cost of the Presidency. Toward that end, I will continue to request similar data from each of the other agencies that provide support to the President and/or his staff. To make that job easier, I would appreciate it if you would furnish me with a list of those other agencies. Should I run into difficulty, I will call on you.

Please call me if I can help in clarifying any portion of this request.

Sincerely yours,



Ronald Kessler

BY MESSENGER



Question No. 1

The cost of providing the White House complex with mechanical, electrical, electronic and other telephone equipment and services, as well as other equipment and services."

Answer

The electrical and mechanical support to the White House complex is provided by the National Park Service who should be contacted to provide this information. Likewise, much of the electronic fire and security equipment is under the cognizance of the US Secret Service, Department of the Treasury who may be able to provide this information to you. Telephone and radio communication services are provided to the Commander-in Chief by the White House Communications Agency. Since this worldwide network must be able to support the President, it is not totally possible to fully isolate those services provided exclusively to the White House Complex. Most of the base-station facilities are located within the 18-acre complex, the computer center, switchboards and support offices are included in this category but are sized and staffed to serve a far wider community than just the immediate office of the President or the White House compound. The costs for providing these services (including Operating, Maintenance, Minor Construction and Composite Military Salaries) in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$11,159,851	\$12,609,403	\$15,392,842	\$16,497,000

On the average, military personnel salaries account for 37% of the operating expenses at the White House Complex.

Due to the lack of modernization of equipment during the FY-79 and FY-80 periods, coupled with a steadily growing volume of communication traffic, a significant amount of work was required during FY-81 and FY-82 to replace outmoded and failing equipment with reliable communications services.

Question 2

The cost of goods and services purchased or ordered through any military construction fund account or sub-account, including the one known as Project No. 74, used for support of, or on behalf of the President and/or his staff."

Answer

We have no knowledge of any fund, account or other entity titled "Project No. 74".

Question No. 3

The salaries and other expenses of the Military Office of the White House and of the White House Medical Unit."

Answer

The White House Military Office has no funding nor budget of its own, but is a coordinating office comprised of personnel from the various military services which have duties in direct support of the President. In constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars, the salaries for personnel assigned to the White House Military Office by the Department of Defense are:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$109,938	\$104,918	\$183,511	\$269,500

The White House Medical Unit serves the President as well as other government personnel within the complex. As with other White House support units, the cost of providing medical services is broad based, sized and operated over a wide geographical area. As such, the costs to provide medical services to the President only on the 18-acre complex must include the cost of operating the permanent offices and fiscal plant much of which is designed to be transported to field locations as required. The cost to operate and maintain the Medical Unit in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$228,825	\$247,601	\$253,246	\$263,661

The annual operating costs for the Medical Unit represents 74% for military personnel salaries, 10% for Travel and Per Diem and 7% for Operating and Maintenance expenses.

Question No. 4

"The cost of providing the White House Complex and grounds with Marine personnel."

Answer

Marine ceremonial, band and guard units are not assigned to the White House complex but are utilized on occasion for official functions on the compound much as they are used around the country. In recent years, several Marines have provided a ceremonial presence at the entrance to the West Wing office complex during those times when official visitors are being received. The cost of providing these personnel in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
0	0	\$19,236	\$32,976

Question No. 5

"The salaries and other expenses of Defense Department employees or consultants detailed either directly or indirectly through other agencies to support the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs."

Answer

All personnel attached to one of the White House Military Support Units are on permanent assignment to that unit and are not further detailed to other White House staffs. These personnel serve in direct support of the President on a full-time basis. The Department of Defense has no contractors providing direct support to the President or the First Lady.

Question No.6

"The cost of providing rotary and fixed-wing air transportation for the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs or for others designated by them, by the Air Force, Marines, or other services; the cost of providing such transport, equipment and services in support of these trips before, during or after they take place; and the cost of any other trips made at the request of the President and/or First Lady and/or their staffs."

Answer

The mission of Air Force One (89th Military Airlift Wing) and Marine One (Marine Helicopter Squadron One, HMX-1) are to provide routine transportation for the President and his assigns in the efficient execution of his duties. In addition, these two units have a secondary, contingency role to relocate the Commander-in-Chief and a portion of the constitutional successors to that office during times of national emergency. As such, these two airborne units are sized and staffed for their contingency roles and exercised through routine transportation requirements. It is not possible to isolate one mission from the other and hence an allocation of funding between routine and contingency missions is not possible. The costs to support and staff the aircraft of Air Force one in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$830,422	\$831,598	\$874,200	\$910,728

Air Force One costs consist of 73% military salary, 17% Travel and Per Diem expenses and 10% Operation and Maintenance.

The costs to support and staff the aircraft of HMX-1 in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$5,397,697	\$5,147,654	\$5,879,807	\$7,499,625

The break-down of HMX-1 costs consist of 66% military salaries, 21 % Travel and Per Diem and 13% Operation and Maintenance.

It should be noted that many of the services which HMX-1 must support in the general maintenance and operation (guards, aircraft rework, etc) of their aircraft are provided to Air Force One routinely by the 89th MAW in its general support role to all squadron aircraft whether or not in Presidential Support. HMX-1 therefore incorrectly appears to be a significantly larger unit than Air Force One.

Other than in the categories listed below, historical data is not maintained for the military transport scheduled by, in support of or at the behest of the

White House. Standard aircraft operating and maintenance costs (POL, spares, civilian pay, etc) and the hours flown by each type of aircraft in prior year dollars are as follows:

Type Aircraft	FY-79		FY-80		FY-81		FY-82	
	Total Hours	Hourly Cost	Total Hours	Hourly Cost	Total Hours	Hourly Cost	Total Hours	Hourly Cost
<u>Presidential</u>								
C-137	219.0	\$3,258	175.8	\$,738	181.0	\$5,221	168.1	\$5,566
C-140	2.0	1,070	15.6	1,296	---	---	2.1	1,872
VH-3D	134.5	690	152.5	870	177.1	840	179.6	1,334
VH-1N	---	---	---	---	---	---	5.1	493
UH-1N	---	---	5.0	374	---	---	---	---

White House Support and White House Mission

C-137	997.2	\$3,258	637.9	\$3,738	507.8	\$5,221	571.5	\$5,566
C-140	197.0	1,070	270.0	1,296	380.5	1,613	432.6	1,872
C-9	232.7	1,185	293.2	1,300	264.0	1,973	491.5	2,090
C-135	375.0	1,847	419.8	2,137	355.6	3,775	416.0	4,156
C-130	380.0	708	226.9	763	646.1	1,241	499.3	1,214
C-131	7.9	430	10.3	461	---	---	---	---
C-141	1,158.9	1,936	954.8	2,087	975.6	3,396	1,724.6	4,118
C-5	51.9	6,302	84.8	6,793	8.6	11,051	280.1	10,809
C-12	8.3	371	13.5	350	20.7	389	6.9	398
T-39	77.6	372	63.0	350	63.9	628	18.7	742
T-43	53.1	1,137	2.0	1,224	---	---	---	---
VH-3D	159.8	690	159.5	870	325.8	840	437.3	1,334
VH-1N	3.8	301	---	---	---	---	57.0	493
UH-1N	127.1	301	116.9	374	175.4	481	85.5	493
UH-1H	24.7	301	3.3	374	---	---	3.6	493
CH-46	10.8	743	51.4	737	7.5	817	32.6	1,496
CH-53	41.8	1,315	38.2	1,515	123.1	1,569	100.3	1,496
CH-47	2.4	1,150	5.3	1,215	---	---	---	---
HH-53	1.6	1,315	---	---	---	---	3.2	1,464

Reimbursements, given in prior year dollars, have been made to the government for unofficial and/or political travel performed during this administration. Similar information is not available for previous administrations:

	<u>(20 Jan 81 - 30 Sept 81)</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
Staff and Guests	\$ 6,100.54	\$ 7,128.25
Republican National Committee	14,113.73	85,368.91
Press	161,760.56	372,097.96

Question No.7

"Provision by the Army or other services of ground transportation with vehicles housed at the White House garage or at other locations."

Answer

Similar to the airborne transportation units, the White House Garage provides routine ground transportation services for the senior staff but is sized to respond to contingency relocation requirements. The cost to provide these services in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$1,213,889	\$1,327,572	\$1,568,938	\$1,700,541

Only the costs for providing personnel, Travel and Per Diem and the Operation of the vehicles was supported by the Department of Defense. The costs associated with the acquisition of these vehicles was not a DOD cost. Approximately 86% of these costs go to military salaries while 8% is for Travel and Per Diem and 6% to Operating and Maintenance accounts.

Question No. 8

"The cost of constructing, maintaining, operating and guarding Camp David and related facilities and services in Thurmont, Md by the Navy and Marines"

There were no construction costs at Camp David during the periods under question. The costs of operating the Camp facility in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars was:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$3,143,770	\$2,964,667	\$3,247,191	\$3,118,078

The above figures reflect 71% for military salary, 1% for Travel and Per Diem expenses and 28% for the Operation and Maintenance of the Camp.

As a matter of Presidential security, the costs associated with protection and security for the President is classified.

Question No.9

"The cost of operating the White House Dining room or staff mess and other facilities by the Navy or other services, with a separate listing of any income received each year to offset this expense."

Answer

The White House Staff Mess is a Navy "closed mess", operated under the guidelines established by the Department of the Navy for such facilities. The following operating costs in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars were realized for the years in question:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$1,367,839	\$1,415,724	\$1,417,084	\$1,446,824


These expenses represent 73% for military pay, 3% supporting Travel and Per Diem and 24% Operation and Maintenance costs.

During this same period offsetting revenues collected in constant Fiscal Year 1982 dollars were:

<u>FY-79</u>	<u>FY-80</u>	<u>FY-81</u>	<u>FY-82</u>
\$288,646	\$290,756	\$301,287	\$285,288

DISADVANTAGES
TO
PROVIDING INFORMATION

- o Precedent setting. This data not provided heretofore. No basis thereafter to decline additional requests for further information, press inquiries, details, elaboration, etc.
- o Release of this information will invite Congressional oversight of the full spectrum of DoD support activities. Subpoenas for drivers, pilots, Mess stewards, etc., are not inconceivable.
- o Release is tantamount to breaking faith with the Congressional committees who have supported our efforts in past years through the PEF.
- o Release will effectively uncover units that, for national security reasons, we would not want to be highly visible. (This information can be provided to you verbally at our next meeting.)
- o Release can lead to uncovering associated agencies with whom we do classified work. (This, also, can be provided at our meeting.)
- o Kessler's previous article demonstrates his intention to write the story in a completely negative and highly critical manner. Explanations and rationale provided will certainly be ignored, quoted out of context, or ridiculed.
- o Expect story to appear as a series of front page "exposes," citing "extravagant hidden costs," "DoD funds used to circumvent austere Federal budget," etc.
- o Headlines certain to be eye-catching, inflammatory, and resurrect the "Imperial Presidency" spectre.
- o Stories no doubt will be picked up by Post News Service subscribers, TV, other national media.
- o Probably will inspire other "investigative reporters."
- o Any new article keeps story alive.
- o Encourages would-be whistle blowers seeking their moment of glory. (There are thousands of personnel with present and former White House military support experience. Must assume that some will have axes to grind, or secrets they are anxious to share.)
- o If/as story picks up steam, someone sure to obtain a road map of the DoD budget.



D R A F T

Dear Mr. Kessler:

This is in response to your letter of March 3, 1983 concerning Department of Defense support of the President.

As commander-in-chief, head of government and chief of state, the President of the United States of America has duties and responsibilities unequalled by any other world leader. These, of course, necessitate instant availability to a multitude of resources which only the Armed Forces has the unique ability, facilities, trained personnel and requirement to provide. The Armed Forces support units must be prepared to meet national emergency contingencies and provide security assistance for the President, while affording routine administrative support, at a level mandated by Constitutional authority and vested solely in the President.

Routine administrative support services furnished by the military, while not appearing to be operationally critical, have been determined by the public, the Congress and succeeding administrations to be appropriate and befitting the Office of the President. The military units serving the President must be sized to meet the requirements of their contingency mission and practice for these potential contingencies through their day to day routine operations. Thus, routine services, highly visible to the public, provide the vital and continuing exercise of contingency requirements and capabilities needed to keep them militarily responsive should they ever be required. Occasionally, services are furnished by other units within the Defense establishment which have other mission responsibilities apart from White House support.

Thus, an organization providing support to the President and the White House may do so as a primary or collateral mission. In either case, it is most often of a dual nature with other factors also involved.

Security is a vital area of Presidential military support. Primarily, this is intrinsic to the facility itself, i.e., Air Force One, Camp David, etc. Communications, and certain other services are provided to assist the Secret Service in the execution of its protective responsibilities. The White House, however, does not discuss, comment upon, or otherwise provide information concerning either emergency contingency planning or security arrangements for the President, which could enable such procedures to be determined.

A thorough and concerted effort was made to amass the information requested in your letter and to compile it in the categories and breakdowns specified, although most of this data is not normally maintained, particularly in these formats. It became increasingly apparent, however, that separating -- or attempting to quantify -- organization^{al} and other costs to determine those which can be reasonably attributed to actual direct, daily support of the President is a difficult and, ultimately, impossible undertaking. Furnishing cost figures which include contingency, security, routine and collateral missions would

present an inaccurate and totally unrealistic picture, grossly distorting the true nature, and value, of the support provided by the Armed Forces to this and prior administrations.

This is not to say, of course, that the three enlisted Marines who alternate in manning the post at the White House West Wing Lobby -- and who received \$32,976 in total fiscal year 1982 compensation -- have additional, or emergency, duties. They do not. Nearly every other facet of Presidential military support does, however, have *raison d'etres* other than that which is most apparent to the public. Accounting systems do not differentiate between these missions, and they should not. It is neither practical nor desirable.

A case in point, and I offer this example now only on the assumption that the passage of time has effected *de facto* declassification, was the former Presidential yacht. Until its disposal six years ago, I am told the SEQUOIA -- and its predecessors -- provided an alternative means of relocating the President from the immediate D.C. area when other means of transport were inoperable.

Just as time and technology often change or eliminate requirements, events frequently dictate new or expanded measures. Following the 1981 assassination attempt, one of the areas

recognized as needing revamping was that of the White House Medical Unit. As a result, the functions of that facility now encompass far greater responsibilities than previously. While, on the surface, expenses associated with the Medical Unit could be perceived as excessive for what may be thought of as a dispensary or first-aid facility, the facts are otherwise. Costs, including recent increases, are not only legitimate but overdue. This cannot be elaborated upon, of course, since further explanation could compromise procedures and be of assistance only to those demented minds interested in their circumvention.

In this instance, therefore, as with other areas of your inquiry, right-to-know has had to be balanced against justifiable need-to-know. Obviously, Department of Defense support to the President is wide-ranging -- and, yes, admittedly substantial. Providing details of this support merely to satisfy curiosity can serve no justifiable or useful purpose. Indeed, it could prove harmful and damaging to the Nation's interests.

As a participant in this earnest, and enlightening, experience I want to assure you that the intent following receipt of your letter was to be as forthcoming, candid and responsive as possible. In fact, that was the actual direction given to

those involved in the attempt to research and develop answers to your many questions -- a very time-consuming effort, I might add. For the reasons cited, however, it simply is not feasible.

That same experience now permits me to take exception to the implication of your letter that Department of Defense funds and personnel are somehow used to secretly finance an extravagant "imperial Presidency." I realize that nothing I have already said, or could add here, will either change your mind or dissuade you from pursuit of your story to uncover corruption, root out evil and defend the American way.

Nevertheless, I am compelled to state categorically that such is not the case. Nor, have I seen any evidence that it ever was.

The members of the Armed Forces assigned to Presidential support duty fill a very valid -- and necessary -- role. With the grace of God, the complete spectrum of that support will never be demonstrated, or completely known. If it is, however, hopefully you will then join in agreeing that the expense was worthwhile.

Sincerely,

Mr. Ronald Kessler
The Washington Post
1150 15th Street, N.W.
Washington, DC 20071

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR MICHAEL K. DEEVER

FROM EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *E.V.H.*

The attached was forwarded to me from John Rogers which I appreciate greatly.

It would be helpful in the future if your comments and my comments were solicited prior to response to such requests, in light of our feelings in keeping Camp David a private and secured retreat for the President.

January 17, 1983

Ecl

*I thought you
should know about
this request*

J

Dear Senator Lugar:

On behalf of the President, I would like to thank you for your letter of January 10 requesting that the Senate leadership and 19 Senate incumbents be invited to Camp David for a campaign planning session during a weekend this Spring.

Your suggestion is most appreciated, and please know that I have brought your request to the attention of the White House Scheduling Office for further review. I have asked that you be contacted as soon as we are able to make a determination.

With best wishes,

Sincerely,

Kenneth M. Duberstein
Assistant to the President

The Honorable Richard G. Lugar
United States Senate
Washington, D.C. 20510

KMD:CMF:MDB

cc: w/copy of inc to Bill Sadleir - for further action

cc: w/copy of inc to John Rogers - FYI

cc: w/copy of inc to Ed Rollins -. FYI

cc: w/copy of inc to Jim Baker - ~~FYI~~ for recommendation
WH RECORDS MANAGEMENT HAS RETAINED ORIGINAL INCOMING

SENATOR RICHARD G. LUGAR
CHAIRMAN

National Republican Senatorial Committee

January 10, 1983

119124

The President
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

JAB
Howzboot Blair House?
RKD

*Working mty at
W.H. + dinner
(Friday) w/ RR
following*

Dear Mr. President:

Next to your own reelection, the preservation of a Republican Senate majority is the most crucial political necessity of the next two years. As Senate campaign committee chairman, I recognize how closely interrelated these goals are.

Fresh from a difficult reelection of my own, I also recognize how essential it is that each of our nineteen Senate incumbents get off to a fast start during 1983. I am looking for ways to stimulate our candidates to early campaign planning, to a spirit of mutual support and empathy, and to a sense of common purpose with the Presidential campaign effort to follow.

2/1 (MST)
Talked w/ Lugar
He likes this idea. Will get back to me with some dates.
RKD

A conversation this week with Howard Baker produced the best idea I have heard for launching our 1983-84 program. Would it be possible for you to invite the nineteen Senators plus the leadership to Camp David during part of a weekend this Spring? I would take responsibility for constructing a useful program of discussions and seminars, but the gesture of the invitation by itself would mean a great deal in terms of our ultimate goals.

I know that the policy and logistics questions raised by this request are formidable, but I am convinced that the benefits would justify the trouble. I hope that you will authorize Jim Baker or another of your assistants to explore the possibility with me very soon.

Many thanks for considering this admittedly extraordinary suggestion.

Best Wishes,

Richard G. Lugar
Chairman

RGL:mds

cc: Senator Howard Baker
Senator Paul Laxalt
Mr. James Baker

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON
January 20, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: JAMES A. BAKER III
FROM: EDWARD V. HICKEY, JR. *E.V.H.*
SUBJECT: AIR FORCE ONE REPLACEMENT

Air Force One procurement (DC-10) differential cost.

(\$ FY83 in millions)

	<u>2 New Aircraft</u>	<u>2 - Export/Import Bank</u>
Aircraft	168.4	.0*
Interior Modification	44.6	39.6
Initial Spare Parts	39.6	26.7
Support Equipment & Training	7.0	7.0
TOTAL	259.6	73.3*

* Paper cost to the Export/Import Bank is \$60.0 million. Storage costs for the 5 DC-10s of \$.4 to \$.5 million annually are a definite offset.

The Air Force has legitimate missions for all 5 aircraft, 2 of which could be programmed into the Presidential mission at a later date.

Congressional direction is necessary to transfer the aircraft from one government agency to another without a money exchange. A precedent was set recently as Congress directed the Air Force to transfer an aircraft to the Coast Guard.

I received a briefing from Boeing representatives on 13 January during which they indicated the cost of 2 used 747SPs would be approximately \$70 million (\$35 million each) excluding reconfiguration costs.

1/20/83 E.V.H.

If the Air Force wants to obtain the planes they need, they should go to the White House and get the necessary approval from the President. I will be glad to help.

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