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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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File Folder: W.H. Staff Memos - Legislative Affairs 1/83 - 6/83 [4 of 4] Date: 11/24/98

Box 4

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Memo	Duberstein to J. Baker re appointment (2 p)	2/17/83	<i>PS CB 10/5/00</i>

RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 19, 1983



MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM BAKER
DAVID STOCKMAN
DONALD REGAN
DICK DARMAN
DAVE GERGEN

FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN *KD*

Attached is a draft (the final version is virtually identical) of the letter sent by the House Ways and Means Committee to the House Budget Committee on the FY84 Budget Resolution. I want to call your attention to the section on revenues where Chairman Rostenkowski writes: " The Committee anticipates that it will be possible to enact legislation raising an additional \$8.0 billion in revenues. Increases in revenues beyond this will be more difficult to achieve."

In light of the Jones Budget Resolution including over \$30 billion in new revenue for FY84, this statement by the Ways and Means Committee should be very helpful to us in developing our arguments against the Jones Budget Resolution.

SAM M. GIBBONS, FLA.
 J. J. PICKLE, TEX.
 CHARLES STANFORD, N.Y.
 FORTNEY M. (PETE) STARK, CALIF.
 JAMES R. JONES, OKLA.
 ANDY JACOBS, JR., IND.
 HAROLD FORD, TENN.
 ED JENKINS, GA.
 RICHARD A. GEPHARDT, MO.
 THOMAS J. DOWNEY, N.Y.
 CECIL (CEC) HEFTEL, HAWAII
 WYCHE FOWLER, JR., GA.
 FRANK J. GUARINI, N.J.
 JAMES M. SHANNON, MASS.
 MARTY RUSSO, ILL.
 DON J. PEASE, OHIO
 KENT HANCE, TEX.
 ROBERT T. MATSUI, CALIF.
 BERYL ANTHONY, JR., ARK.
 RONNIE G. FLIPPO, ALA.
 BYRON L. DORGAN, N. DAK.
 BARBARA B. KENNELLY, CONN.

BARBER B. CONABLE, JR., N.Y.
 JOHN J. DUNCAN, TENN.
 BILL ARCHER, TEX.
 GUY VANDER JAGT, MICH.
 PHILIP M. CRANE, ILL.
 BILL FRENZEL, MINN.
 JAMES G. MARTIN, N.C.
 RICHARD T. SCHULZE, PA.
 BILL GRADISON, OHIO
 W. HENSON MOORE, LA.
 CARROLL A. CAMPBELL, JR., S.C.
 WILLIAM M. THOMAS, CALIF.

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

March 15, 1983

DRAFT

The Honorable James R. Jones
 Chairman
 Committee on the Budget
 U.S. House of Representatives
 Washington, D.C. 20515

Dear Mr. Chairman:

This letter transmits the views and estimates of the Committee on Ways and Means, as required by section 301(c) of the Congressional Budget Act of 1974 on those aspects of the Federal budget for fiscal year 1984 which fall within the Committee's jurisdiction.

In making this report, the Committee on Ways and Means wishes to express its deep concerns about national economic conditions in fiscal years 1984 and beyond. Large budget deficits have been projected, and we believe that serious bipartisan efforts must be made by the Congress to address them.

I. Revenues. -- The Congressional Budget Office estimates FY 1984 revenues at \$654 billion. With the passage of H.R. 1900, revenues in fiscal year 1984 will increase by \$5.2 billion. The Committee anticipates that it will be possible to enact legislation raising an additional \$8.0 billion in revenues. Increases in revenues beyond this will be more difficult to achieve. As in prior years, this amount assumes \$100 million of miscellaneous revenue and tariff measures will be accommodated.

II. Outlays. -- The Committee on Ways and Means has jurisdictional responsibility over a broad range of programs with budget outlays classified in several different functional categories. With the anticipated passage of H.R. 1900, the Committee has already taken significant steps to reduce expenditures. Outlays will be reduced by \$3.2, \$3.7 and \$6.2 billion for fiscal years 1984 to 1986 respectively. H.R. 1900 extends the Federal Supplemental Compensation program (FSC) until September 30, 1983. The Committee anticipates an extension of the FSC program that will affect the fiscal 1984 budget. Because of changing economic conditions, however, it is unable to provide a cost estimate of

such an extension. The Committee also anticipates amendments to the other benefit programs under its jurisdiction that will increase function 500 and 600 expenditures by a total of \$0.5 billion in fiscal year 1984.

III. Public Debt Limit. -- The Congressional Budget Office estimates that the FY 1984 budget deficit will be \$197 billion under current law. In the absence of any legislative action to reduce spending or increase revenues, the total deficit (including off-budget entities) is estimated by the CBO to be \$218 billion which will require that the debt subject to statutory limit be increased to \$1.562 trillion for the period ending September 30, 1984.

IV. Tax Expenditures. -- The report on tax expenditures of the staff of the Joint Committee on Taxation which serves as the Joint Committee's report to the Budget Committee is appended to this letter and is designed to assist the Budget Committee in meeting its obligations under section 301(d)(6) of the Budget Act.

V. Additional materials. -- To assist the Budget Committee in carrying out its responsibilities and to help it in making assessments concerning the specific recommendations within the jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means, I am enclosing a copy of Ways and Means Committee Print 98-2 entitled, "Background Material and Data on Major Programs within the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means." In addition, I am also enclosing a copy of background document, "Description of the Administration's Fiscal Year 1984 Budget Recommendations Under the Jurisdiction of the Committee on Ways and Means." I hope you find this information useful. As always, the Members of this Committee and its staff are available to answer any questions you may have on any aspect of this report.

With warm regards, I am

Sincerely yours,

Dan Rostenkowski
Chairman

DR/st
Enclosures

cc: The Honorable Delbert L. Latta
Ranking Minority Member
Committee on the Budget

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: JIM BAKER
BILL CLARK
KEN DUBERSTEIN
DICK DARMAN
TOM REED

FROM: MAX FRIEDERSDORF *M.F.*

SUBJECT: MX Vote in House

Based on probability of the Presidential Commission on Strategic Forces recommending a deployment of 100 MX missiles in Minutemen silos and a strong research and development program on a small missile, my analysis of the vote situation in the House on such a proposal is as follows:

Votes needed to win: 218

- On the Republican side (166 members), a total of 140 favorable votes looks doable with an all out effort involving heavy Presidential activity.
- On the Democratic side (269 members), about 53 votes appear to be fairly solid with a total of 78 Democrats needed. Forty seven Democrats appear likely targets and we would need to pick up 25 of these potential votes to make our needed 78.

The effort appears to be uphill, but not hopeless. I think the vote would be close, within a handful of votes either way.

Members of House: 435
Needed to Win: 218

GOP

166 (Total no. of members)
140 (Doable supporters)

140 (GOP)
78 (Demo)
118 (Majority)

DEMOCRATS

269 (Total no. of members)
53 (Fairly solid base)

47 (POTENTIALS)
78 (Democrats required)
25 (Democrats required from POTENTIALS)

↙
2

I met with Les Aspin today and he agreed to meet with Tom Foley to ascertain an accurate head count of the House Democrats.

Aspin arranged a meeting today of the House Democratic Caucus with Democratic members of the President's Commission to drum up Democratic support.

The full Commission also met with the House Armed Services Committee today.

Individual soundings continue to be encouraging and Mo Udall indicated after my one-on-one with him today he supports the recommendation.

I pressed Aspin about the urgency of the head count, especially if we fail to work out a deal with Addabbo, which is being worked on a separate track.

cc: General Brent Scowcroft

MOWARD H. BAKER, JR., TENN.
JESSE HELMS, N.C.
RICHARD G. LUGAR, IND.
CHARLES MC C. MATHIAS, JR., MD.
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM, KANS.
RUDY BOSCHWITZ, MINN.
LARRY PRESSLER, S. DAK.
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI, ALASKA

CLAIBORNE PELL, R.I.
JOSEPH R. BIDEN, JR., DEL.
JOHN GLENN, OHIO
PAUL S. SARBAHES, MD.
EDWARD ZORINSKY, NEBR.
PAUL E. TSONGAS, MASS.
ALAN CRANSTON, CALIF.
CHRISTOPHER J. DODD, CONN.

United States Senate

COMMITTEE ON FOREIGN RELATIONS

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

JAB
FYI
for D.

EDWARD G. SANDERS, STAFF DIRECTOR
GERYLD S. CHRISTIANSON, MINORITY STAFF DIRECTOR

March 17, 1983

The Honorable Kenneth W. Dam
Deputy Secretary of State
Washington, D.C. 20520

Dear Ken:

When you met with the Senate Committee on Foreign Relations on March 11, I was pleased that you volunteered to provide the Committee a copy of the memorandum handed to Ambassador Adelman by Ambassador Rowny. You made the commitment in fact before we formally requested the memorandum and without hesitation or restriction. On March 14, your office delivered the memorandum to the Committee, as promised.

You will recall that the Members of the Committee present at our meeting with you on March 11 decided without objection to treat the memorandum as "committee confidential" in order to protect the individuals criticized in the memorandum.

Since then, a number of Members of the Committee have concluded that the memorandum, with the comments about individuals deleted, should be made public. No doubt some of the Members who oppose Senate confirmation of Ambassador Adelman's appointment feel that release of the memorandum may support their objections to the confirmation of Ambassador Adelman.


After having studied the memorandum and associated papers made available by your office, I come to a contrary conclusion. I firmly believe that the entire matter, and the handling of it by Ambassador Adelman, reflects absolutely no discredit on Ambassador Adelman. I believe further that public release of the memorandum, with the previously mentioned deletion of discussion of individuals, would serve to exonerate Ambassador Adelman from the charges made against his handling of it. The evidence suggests that Ambassador Adelman did not request the information from Ambassador Rowny and he appears to simply have passed on the memo to Robin West without any recommendation. Certainly it is clear that Ambassador Adelman did not make any personnel decisions as a result of the recommendations delivered by Ambassador Rowny.

Despite my belief that release of the materials would help Ambassador Adelman's nomination, I believe the Committee incurred an obligation when it offered to treat the memorandum as committee confidential. While our reason was solely to protect individual reputations we indicated that we would severely limit distribution of the memorandum, not just parts of it. Indeed, in asking Ambassador Adelman to turn over the memorandum and other inter-office memoranda voluntarily, given the committee subject, you apparently assured him that we had promised to handle it carefully in accordance with our assurance to you.

Certain other members of the Committee, however, do not share my concern about altering our understanding after the fact. I am, therefore, writing to request your views on release of parts of the materials submitted to the Committee. Specifically, a number of members have proposed that the Committee release the handwritten note by Ken Adelman to Robin West and the first two pages of the memorandum titled, "Talking Points for Meeting with Ken Adelman".

I would appreciate an early response.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script, appearing to read "Charles H. Percy". The signature is fluid and somewhat stylized, with a long, sweeping underline that extends to the right.

Charles H. Percy
Chairman

CHP:gas

NOMINATION OF KENNETH L. ADELMAN

MARCH 14, 1983.—Ordered to be printed

Mr. PERCY, from the Committee on Foreign Relations,
submitted the following

R E P O R T

together with

MINORITY AND ADDITIONAL VIEWS

The Committee on Foreign Relations, to which was referred the nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency, having considered the same, reports unfavorably thereon and recommends that the nomination not be confirmed.

COMMITTEE ACTION

The nomination of Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency was submitted by President Reagan to the Senate on January 26, 1983, and referred to the Committee on January 26, 1983. Mr. Adelman testified before the Committee on January 27, February 3, and February 24. At those hearings, the Members explored a number of significant arms controls subjects with Mr. Adelman in order to determine his qualifications for the job for which he had been nominated. The Committee met on February 16 for the initial consideration of action on the nomination.

Following discussion among the Members, it was clear that the Committee was closely split, with unfavorable action on the nomination likely if a vote was to be held. Accordingly, the Committee decided to delay final action on the nomination for one week to give the President a chance to rethink the nomination and consider withdrawing it.

At a press conference on the evening of February 16, the President made it clear that he continued to support the Adelman nomination.

At the request of Senator Cranston, the Committee heard the nominee for a third time on February 24 to question him about his negative views on arms control, as attributed to him in a 1981 article in the New York Daily News which did not come to the Committee's attention until February 16. Following the hearing, the Committee by a 8-9 vote, rejected a motion by Senator Percy to report the nomination.

favorably to the Senate. Voting for the motion were Senators Percy, Baker, Helms, Lugar, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, and Zorinsky. Voting against the motion were Senators Mathias, Pressler, Pell, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Tsongas, Cranston, and Dodd.

Subsequent to this vote, the Committee, by a vote of 14 to 3, approved a motion by Senator Baker to report the nomination negatively so that the full Senate would have an opportunity to consider the nomination. Those voting for the motion were Senators Percy, Baker, Lugar, Mathias, Kassebaum, Boschwitz, Murkowski, Biden, Glenn, Sarbanes, Zorinsky Tsongas and Dodd. Voting against the motion were Senators Pressler, Pell, and Cranston.

COMMITTEE COMMENTS

The Committee considered the nomination in terms of Congressional intent when it established the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency and set forth the duties and responsibilities of its Director and in terms of Mr. Adelman's suitability for the position. The Committee carefully assessed his background and experience, and attempted to ascertain his degree of commitment to arms control. In considering this nomination, the testimony Mr. Adelman gave the Committee, his government experience, his writings and his public statements were all taken into account.

CONGRESSIONAL INTENT WITH RESPECT TO ACDA

When it established the Agency in 1961, the Congress clearly intended ACDA and its Director to play a unique and very important role. In its report on the legislation which resulted in the creation of ACDA, the Committee on Foreign Relations stated that its purpose was—

to give impetus to the U.S. goals of a world which is free from the scourge of war and the dangers and burdens of armaments, in which the use of force has been subordinated to the rule of law and in which international adjustments to a changing world are achieved peacefully.

Congress envisaged the position of Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency as one of the most senior in the Executive Branch, at just under the Cabinet level. It is an Executive Level Two position—the equivalent of Deputy Secretary of State or Defense. Under the Arms Control and Disarmament Act of 1961 (PL 87-297), Congress intended the Director, with the support of the semi-autonomous Agency, to be the focal point for the development of vigorous and responsible arms control policies, and not the spokesman for arms control decisions made elsewhere. According to the statute:

DIRECTOR

SEC. 22. The Agency shall be headed by a Director, who shall serve as the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the President on arms control and disarmament matters. In carrying out his duties under this Act the Director shall, under the direction of the

Secretary of State, have primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters, as defined in this Act. He shall be appointed by the President, by and with the advice and consent of the Senate. No person serving on active duty as a commissioned officer of the Armed Forces of the United States may be appointed Director.

PAST ACHIEVEMENTS OF ACDA

Since its establishment just over twenty years ago ACDA's achievements in this regard have been impressive. There are today twenty-one bilateral and multilateral arms control and disarmament agreements, and in almost every instance ACDA has played a vital role in their development and successful conclusion.

Among the most important are the Limited Test Ban Treaty of 1963, which obligated the United States, the Soviet Union and Great Britain to conduct future nuclear tests underground, thus sparing the world from additional radioactive pollution of the earth's surface, waters and atmosphere by the parties; the 1978 Nonproliferation Treaty, which serves to prove the good faith of the more than 100 nations which have foresworn the nuclear weapons option; the Seabed Arms Control Treaty, the Outer Space Treaty, the Antarctic Treaty, and U.S. adherence to the two protocols of the Treaty of Tlatelolco—which collectively banned nuclear weapons from the ocean seabed and floor, outer space, Antarctica and Latin America; the Environmental Modification Convention; the ABM Treaty, and the SALT I Interim Agreement, which encouraged nuclear stability and reinforced deterrence.

These treaties reflect the continuing consensus of the past twenty years that responsible arms control agreements are in the nation's strategic and security interest. They are a credit to Democratic and Republican Administrations alike, and to the willingness of each Administration to carry forward the work of its predecessor. They could not have been achieved without a strong commitment to arms control by successive presidents or without the astute and often painstaking efforts of highly professional ACDA directors and their competent, dedicated staffs.

Since its creation, the post of ACDA Director has been filled by such distinguished and experienced Americans as William Foster, Gerald Smith, Fred Ikle, Paul Warnke, George Seignious, Ralph Earle, and Eugene Rostow.

MR. ADELMAN'S QUALIFICATIONS

In assessing Mr. Adelman's qualifications, the Committee weighed carefully his relevant activities and writings, and his previous experience in the field of arms control. The Committee attempted to ascertain whether he had the necessary background, experience, and understanding of the field of arms control essential for any ACDA Director. The Committee spent numerous hours in three hearings and two business meetings in a conscientious effort to decide whether Mr. Adelman is the right choice for Director.

The majority of the Committee found Mr. Adelman to be unqualified to be Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency.

Mr. Adelman has served for the past year and a half as Deputy Permanent Representative of the United States to the United Nations. In that capacity he has coordinated the United States Delegation to the United Nations Second Special Session on Disarmament and headed the United States Delegation to the First Committee, which deals with arms control matters.

At the United Nations, his duties involved less the development of arms control politics than their explanation and defense. Neither the Second Special Session on Disarmament nor the First Committee can be considered forums for the formulation of serious arms control policy. The First Committee engages largely in political debates.

In fact, the United Nations Committee on Disarmament in Geneva is the primary United Nations forum for arms control activities, and the U.S. delegation is headed by a different ambassador.

Furthermore, in none of the earlier periods of his government service did Mr. Adelman have responsibility directly related to arms control policy. In 1976-77, he was an assistant to Secretary of Defense James Schlesinger and supervised preparation of the Secretary's annual report to Congress. In 1975 he worked briefly in congressional relations at the Agency for International Development. Earlier, in 1968-72, he served with the Department of Commerce and various parts of the domestic security agencies. In his years of non-government employment, Mr. Adelman has been a scholar and a writer. In 1972-75 he lived and worked in Zaire, returning to the United States to complete his doctorate. In 1977-81, he was associated with the Stanford Research Institute.

Mr. Adelman asserted that he had "devoted my entire adult life" to foreign policy and national security issues, including arms control. With respect to arms control, the hearing record did not bear out this assertion.

Mr. Adelman also pointed to his writings as demonstration of his background in arms control issues. Review of the 116 articles in 52 different journals which he cited to the Committee reveal, however, that most of his published work deals with other issues such as Southern Africa. Of the relatively few that bear directly on arms control or national security, two are critiques of SALT II; two criticize the tactics used by SALT II supporters in bolstering ratification (one is a condensation of the other), one focuses on U.S. strategic policy and posture; and a number deal with issues involving U.S. allies. Mr. Adelman asserted, "I do not think there is any scarcity of material about what I believe in on arms control." In expressing the view that his views were "clear" he mentioned having written articles on arms control in "The best journals of the United States" which he identified as: The Wall Street Journal, The American Spectator, Foreign Affairs, Foreign Policy, The New York Times, Harpers and The New Republic. Of these, his arms control articles have appeared only in the first two.

Mr. Adelman's writings suggest a greater concern with the politics of arms control than with its substance. He failed, in the hearings before the Committee, to demonstrate an understanding of the issues. Often at the first hearing, when the Committee expected Mr. Adelman to offer knowledgeable and professional judgments in response to questions, he professed either not to have thought about them or not

to have strong opinions about them; in other instances he said that he would have to look into the matter before responding, or that the matter lay outside the range of his responsibilities at the United Nations. Among the more surprising of these answers were the following:

When Senator Pell asked whether nuclear war could be limited, Mr. Adelman said, "I have no—honestly, Senator Pell, I just have no thoughts in that area, and I will tell you why. I think it would be such a time of extreme human stress and extreme conditions that I think any predictions on what leaders around the world would do in that kind of situation would just not be accurate or not be based on anything that I know." When Senator Pell asked whether the societies could survive, he replied, "So, again, I am sorry to tell you that I just have no strong opinion on that."

When Senator Helms asked him what the United States' response would be if the Soviets offered to have a verifiable elimination of nuclear weaponry altogether, Mr. Adelman responded that that thought was something "I just have never thought about in my life, and I would have to really look at that and explore it."

When Senator Cranston asked whether the Soviets are violating the terms of SALT II, Mr. Adelman said, "That is not an area I have looked into. It is not an area I am knowledgeable about at all." Senator Cranston pressed him on the question of possible Soviet cheating on SALT II and Mr. Adelman said, in effect, that one has to know exactly what the treaty requires. Asked whether he knows all that, he responded, "No, I do not, Senator."

Senator Cranston asked whether a freeze on the testing and deployment on strategic nuclear weapons is verifiable. Mr. Adelman replied, "On the testing and deployment, I do not know, Senator."

Mr. Adelman subsequently tried to remedy the impression which these statements had made on the Committee. For instance, he told Senator Pell that in any "nuclear exchange, the tendency would be toward escalation", that such exchange would be "horrendous", and that there would be no winners. He refused at both sessions to say whether either side would prevail, although he eventually agreed, in response to further questioning, that neither side could accomplish the dictionary definition of "prevail": to "gain ascendancy, win mastery, or triumph." He also attempted to justify his earlier inability to respond to Senator Helms' question about verifiable elimination of nuclear weapons by saying that he had been puzzled as to how such a goal could be accomplished in a bilateral negotiation.

On the question of SALT II and specifically whether the Soviets are adhering to its provisions, he was willing at the second session to say that no President has found the Soviets in "clear violation" of SALT, but he avoided saying whether, in his judgment, the Soviets have violated SALT.

Mr. Adelman further told Senator Sarbanes that the United States should not undercut SALT, since it sets a climate for real reductions in the Strategic Arms Reduction Talk (START). Asked why the climate would not be improved by ratification, Mr. Adelman gave the curious answer that SALT II, a treaty of limited duration, would become the "supreme law of the land" and would set "precedents for future treaties."

Mr. Adelman refused to specify how long, in the absence of ratification, the United States should continue to adhere to the SALT II guidelines, so long as the Soviets do so. He indicated that the decision should be left to the discretion of the Executive Branch. When Senator Barbanes asked: "To what extent do you think the President ought to be able by a commitment to a unilateral course of action, in effect, to exclude or preclude the involvement of the Congress in the very important issue of arms controls?" Mr. Adelman said he would have to turn to legal counsel for an answer.

Mr. Adelman was reluctant to speak forthrightly about the degree of his support for other arms control treaties and negotiations, despite extensive questioning by Committee Members. This was particularly notable with respect to the discontinued Anti-Satellite Weapons Talks and the yet-unratified Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties.

Senator Pressler was concerned by the failure of the Administration to resume the bilateral United States-Soviet Anti-Satellite Weapons Talks (ASAT) initiated by the previous Administration. Mr. Adelman supported the concept of keeping anti-satellite talks in a multilateral forum, the Committee on Disarmament in Geneva, and maintained that "there is some doubt whether such bilateral negotiation would be productive." As Senator Pressler pointed out, only the Soviet Union possesses ASAT weapons and only the United States will soon possess them. Senator Pressler added: "Moreover, it seems somewhat disingenuous for the nominee to suggest that we are actively negotiating ASAT's in Geneva, when, only last summer, the United States resisted efforts to create a space arms control working group in Geneva."

Senators Percy, Pressler, Pell, Cranston and other Members have urged the Administration on numerous occasions to seek Senate consent to ratification of the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions Treaties. Mr. Adelman at first avoided offering a direct answer to questions about his own position, eventually indicating that he does not support ratification of the treaties in their present form. Consistent with the decision already taken by the Administration, he maintained that the verification provisions should be expanded. He insisted, in response to Members' questions, that this can be accomplished without renegotiation of the treaties themselves. Some Members have noted that the two treaties contain valuable and unprecedented provisions for data exchanges, and in the case of the PNE Treaty, on-site inspection, and that reopening of the verification issues, solved to the satisfactions of the Nixon and Ford Administrations, would needlessly jeopardize the treaties. Mr. Adelman said nothing to indicate he shares those concerns.

Mr. Adelman repeatedly expressed a desire for deep reductions in nuclear arms, but had not specific suggestions for such controls or limitations. Senator Biden questioned him as to the value of arms control in small increments within a framework. Mr. Adelman said, "... if you ask for baby steps, then you are going to get baby steps." In the final hearing, Senator Mathias questioned him on the value of arms control steps other than deep reductions and was able to draw from Mr. Adelman agreement that prohibition of the encryption of telemetry, on-site inspection when important, exchange of

seismic data, and establishment of data bases and exchanges of information are good steps, even when not accompanied by reductions in arms. In the end, however, Members were left to wonder whether Mr. Adelman's commitment to deep reductions would merely serve to justify opposition to more modest, but still beneficial arms control agreements.

When asked about agency staffing, Mr. Adelman offered answers which did not reassure Members as to how future decisions would be made. While he denied that there would be a "house cleaning" or "purge," he made it clear that final decisions on key personnel would not be in his hands.

Apart from Mr. Adelman's position on issues, a marked change took place in his approach between the first and second hearings. At the February 16 hearing, he asserted that he had earlier been "too cautious." Senator Tsongas asked him whether anybody had advised him to change his strategy. At first Mr. Adelman indicated that the decision that he had been "too cautious" was based on media reports. When pressed as to whether he was advised to change his strategy, he said, "The general consensus was that I was too timid, that people said to be more myself. So in that sense the answer is yes, the people did advise me of that." Asked by Senator Tsongas to recall the briefings he had had the previous week, he said, "I cannot think of one briefing that I have had on any of the subjects today that have come up that I had over the last week. I reviewed the materials, like I said, last week. And like I said this morning, these are areas that I have written about and dealt with." Asked how much time he had spent with relevant officials in the past week on the hearings and confirmation, Mr. Adelman said, "Very little. Most of the time I have been reading by myself at an apartment in town." He noted that he had been out of town several days and told the Committee, "I cannot think of briefings." Following discussions with his advisors at lunch, he disclosed that he had been helped by two so-called "murder boards"—two-hour question-and-answer sessions—before the second hearing. Whatever the case, the February 16 appearance reflected extensive preparatory work during the previous week.

In sum, Mr. Adelman sought throughout the second hearing to remedy the impression created at the first hearing of lack of information, ambiguity and confusion, but with limited success. He sought to clarify his earlier responses but remained vague and evasive on a number of major issues.

The third and final hearing, held on February 24 at the request of Senator Cranston, was intended to define more precisely Mr. Adelman's views, with particular reference to statements attributed to him in a May 24, 1981, column in the New York Daily News by Mr. Kenneth Auletta. The column was brought to the Committee's attention following the second hearing as a result of a recent column by Mr. Richard Reeves drawing attention to the May 24, 1981, Auletta article. The Committee also heard from Mr. Auletta, who appeared in response to a Committee subpoena. Both witnesses testified under oath.

There were two points at issue in the hearing. First, was the Auletta article based on an interview with Mr. Adelman? And second, were the views attributed to him by Mr. Auletta indeed Mr. Adelman's?

When the Auletta article came to public attention following the second hearing, Mr. Adelman issued a statement in New York suggesting that the interview had never taken place, a contention he repeated to the Committee on February 24. His central point was:

I have no recollection of ever granting Mr. Auletta an interview. I do recall participating in a seminar with him at the Lehrman Institute and recall seeing him several times in that forum since then.

The majority of the Members concluded that Mr. Adelman's denials do not stand up to scrutiny. Mr. Auletta produced telephone records to support his contention that the interview had taken place just prior to publication of the May 1981 article. Furthermore, when Senator Johnston established that Mr. Adelman had indeed granted Mr. Auletta an interview on December 16, 1982, Mr. Adelman replied that his earlier denial of "ever granting" an interview to Auletta was meant to refer only to the May, 1981, interview.

Mr. Adelman did not deny giving the interview. He denied remembering it and was curiously unwilling to agree that it could have occurred. Accordingly, there was absolutely no basis for the Committee to conclude that the interview had not occurred or that Mr. Auletta had fabricated six pages of detailed notes.

With respect to the accuracy of the Auletta article in attributing certain views on arms control to Mr. Adelman, the Committee focused especially on three quotations in the article:

I can't think of any negotiations on security or weaponry that have done any good.

"One reason not to rush into negotiations", Adelman continues, "is that in a democracy these negotiations tend to discourage money for defense programs. The public says, 'Why increase the military when we're negotiating with the Russians?'"

Representing a common feeling within the Reagan Administration, Adelman says the major reason to enter into arms negotiations is to placate our allies and American public opinion. "My policy would be to do it for political reasons," he says. But: "I think it's a sham."

The Committee also considered the following additional quotation attributed to Mr. Adelman, which the Reeves column cited from the Auletta interview in answer to a question whether negotiations for political reasons would not then be deliberately disregarding European opinion:

Yes. We should be negotiating just for political reasons. . . . I would have sent someone on Jan. 21 (1981) to Helsinki for negotiations—very low-key—and never mention it again. If anyone brings up the subject, you can say, "We have a guy over there."

In his New York statement and in testimony before the Committee, regarding the quotation attributed to him referring to arms control negotiations as a "sham", Mr. Adelman said, "I do not recall making any such statement at any time in my life." He also asserted that

"parts of those notes, widely quoted, do not reflect my views then or now. My statements, widely reported, are not consistent with my views."

Mr. Adelman said repeatedly that the views attributed to him in the article were not an accurate reflection of his views "then or now."

He made much of the alleged inconsistencies between Mr. Auletta's notes, the published interview, and his own thoughts, but agreed, under questioning, that some of the alleged quotations are consistent with his views—for instance, with respect to deep reductions and the need for defense efforts.

In an effort to explain this inconsistency in his denial, Mr. Adelman said the denial was "very precise and accurate" in its use of the term, "widely quoted." Thus, it was determined, his precise denial was of the use of the term "sham", to describe arms control negotiations.

CONCLUSION

The exhaustive hearings established, in our view, that Mr. Adelman is not qualified to hold the important position of ACDA Director. His interest in arms control was revealed to be more general than specific, his familiarity with the broad range of arms control issues limited, his background in twenty years' history of negotiations shallow, his approach political rather than substantive.

He consistently shied away from proposing constructive arms control initiatives, confining himself to advocacy of deep cuts and real reductions without indicating how these can be achieved or what other steps might be taken. Mr. Adelman's emphasis on deep reductions and very little else indicates, at best, a narrowly focused view of the potential value of arms control. At worst, it may mean he intends to ally himself with those who would establish impossible standards in negotiations with the anticipation of failure.

His writings on arms control seem more designed to condemn the efforts of others than to offer fresh new concepts. The few ideas he did offer were taken from articles written four years ago—ideas that were not unique at that time, having been accepted in principle by the previous Administration, and adopted by the current Administration.

His testimony confirmed suspicions that he does not regard on-going efforts to achieve mutual, verifiable arms control agreements in a number of areas as an important aspect of strategic planning, but is rather inclined to see them, first of all, as an impediment to expansion of the defense budget. He did not display the informed, coherent, professional approach to these highly complex questions that the nation needs in the Director of ACDA.

The hearings revealed that he does not understand the relative roles of Congress and the Executive Branch in arms control as he demonstrated when he said he would need to consult legal counsel on the question of whether Congress has a role in continued adherence to agreements absent ratification.

Senator Glenn made this point.

If the Administration is serious about arms control, an excellent way to prove it would be to nominate a director of ACDA of an acceptable political outlook who also had stature and respect in the arms control and national security commu-

nity and had a commitment to achieving strong, effective and verifiable arms control measures. From his testimony, it is clear that not even Mr. Adelman thinks of himself in such terms. He describes himself as a "contact point" for negotiations and told the Committee he would be one of many in the room when arms control decisions were made.

We deeply regret that the President chose to overlook the clear consensus of the Committee, expressed in the 15-2 vote on February 16 to delay consideration of the nomination, that Mr. Adelman's name be withdrawn in favor of a nominee with greater experience and commitment in arms control matters. There are a number of distinguished Americans whose views may differ on certain questions but who are alike in their competence and professionalism.

The President chose not to avail himself of this opportunity. As a result, concerns as to the prospects for arms control have been reinforced, rather than allayed. Such a situation benefits neither the President nor the country.

Addressing the importance of this particular nomination Senator Dodd told the Committee:

It is simply a fact of life that from the President to the Secretary of State to the Secretary of Defense to the National Security Advisor, the common denominator among them is their lack of firsthand, in-depth experience in the arms control field. Regrettably, the nomination of Kenneth Adelman to be Arms Control Director is all too consistent with this pattern.

There is a broad concern in the world about the direction of U.S. arms control efforts and disquiet at home, about the Administration's commitment to achieving responsible arms control agreements in the context of our overall strategic policy.

As Senator Mathias pointed out to the Committee:

If the United States is to convince our own people, let alone our allies in Europe, that there is a better and a safer, and a surer way, then our spokesman on arms control must be both convinced and convincing. He must speak from expert knowledge and from conscience. His record must be consistent and credible. If not, emotion may swamp reason and sentiment may replace policy in a dangerous passage of history.

However capable and accomplished a citizen Mr. Adelman may be, we have concluded that he is not qualified, in the words of the statute, to be "the principal adviser to the Secretary of State, the National Security Council, and the President on arms control and disarmament matters" and, under the director of the Secretary of State, to have "primary responsibility within the Government for arms control and disarmament matters." We urge the Senate to sustain this judgment. Republicans and Democrats alike must be concerned to ensure that our nation has the leadership to carry forward the continuing efforts to achieve arms control and arms agreements that truly serve the national interests.

MINORITY VIEWS OF SENATORS PERCY, BAKER, HELMS, LUGAR, KASSEBAUM, BOSCHWITZ, MURKOWSKI

By tradition and precedent, the Senate customarily honors the President's right to select high officials whom he believes can best implement his administration's policies and decisions. Only in those instances in which a nominee is found to be clearly unqualified or unsuited for a position of special trust and responsibility should the Senate refuse to consent to the President's choice. We believe that Ambassador Adelman should be confirmed to the position of Director of the ACDA.

In this context, we believe that the scope of the Committee's inquiry into the nomination of Ambassador Kenneth L. Adelman to be Director of the U.S. Arms Control and Disarmament Agency (ACDA) should properly have been limited to one basic question: Is Ambassador Adelman qualified to perform the responsibilities of the Director of ACDA as enumerated in the Arms Control and Disarmament Act.

There can be no doubt that President Reagan wants Ambassador Adelman to be the new ACDA Director. On repeated occasions in recent weeks, the President has voiced his unequivocal support for and complete confidence in Ambassador Adelman.

With respect to the nominee's qualifications, we note the impressive list of high-level bi-partisan endorsements which were communicated to the Committee during our hearings. Ambassador Kirkpatrick wrote the Chairman a letter of February 1 stating that Ambassador Adelman had done "a first class" job as her principal deputy. Secretary of State Shultz on February 15 also assured the Committee that he has absolute confidence in Ambassador Adelman's abilities. At a seminar in Boston on February 18, Dr. Eugene Rostow, the previous ACDA Director, praised Ambassador Adelman, saying he was well versed in nuclear affairs. Dr. Rostow has also indicated that in 1981 he had invited Ambassador Adelman to be his Deputy at ACDA.

Before the February 24 vote, Senator Percy advised the Committee that he had been contacted by President Ford, former Secretary of State Kissinger, former Secretary of Defense Rumsfeld, Dr. Robert Goldwyn, former aide to President Ford, who worked intimately with Ambassador Adelman, and other prominent Americans who conveyed their full support for the nominee. In light of these strong recommendations from officials and former officials, many of whom have dealt directly with Ambassador Adelman in various capacities, we were disappointed that a clear majority of the members of the Committee did not share our conclusion that the nominee is fit for this position.

We believe the President considers the arms control process to be an essential element of our national security, and he has obviously determined that Ambassador Adelman will be an able and effective

advocate for that process. The President knows Ambassador Adelman personally and has worked closely with him on a number of occasions. Ambassador Adelman was a member of the President's transition team and served as his personal representative during the release of the U.S. hostages from Iran. Moreover, Ambassador Adelman was the principal American diplomat involved in our participation in the U.N. Second Special Session on Disarmament.

In part, the controversy over Ambassador Adelman's qualifications stemmed from the nominee's testimony at his first hearing. In his own words, he was "too cautious" in declining to offer an opinion on a range of important questions pertinent to arms control and national security. However, his testimony at the second and third hearings demonstrated a broad and comprehensive understanding of the arms control process—its history, its problems, and its future. A number of Committee Members publicly commended the nominee following these appearances.

As we understand it, a principal objection on the part of the Members who voted against the nomination concerns Ambassador Adelman's alleged lack of personal commitment to the arms control process. Clearly, if Ambassador Adelman does not believe in arms control, he should not be confirmed. Based on his testimony and extensive writings, however, we are convinced that he believes that meaningful arms control is an extremely important national objective.

Some confusion over Ambassador Adelman's position has resulted from his various criticisms of the SALT II Treaty. In this regard, however, Ambassador Adelman simply shares reservations expressed by President Reagan, Members of this Committee, and many other Americans in and out of the Administration. It is simply not accurate to interpret his criticisms of the SALT Treaties as indicating a lack of support for arms control. Indeed his strong advocacy of meaningful reductions in nuclear weapons suggests just the opposite.

As evidence of his long held belief in the importance of arms control, Ambassador Adelman's 1978 article can be cited in the Wall Street Journal entitled, "Can There Be a SALT III?" Ambassador Adelman testified that he is as comfortable today with the views expressed in the August 1978 Wall Street Journal article as he was when he wrote it. In the article, Ambassador Adelman wrote: "Technological and political forces compel a new generation of nuclear arms negotiations, one quite distinct from SALT I and SALT II in three key respects." First, Dr. Adelman recommended that rather than just limiting missile launchers and bombers, arms control must take on other destabilizing problems, such as missile accuracy, killer satellites, and increased warhead fractionalization. This is not the voice of a person who does not believe in the process of arms control.

Second, Dr. Adelman suggested that the type of weapons included in negotiations should be expanded to encompass intermediate-range nuclear systems based in Europe. In this sense, Ambassador Adelman anticipated the INF negotiations that the United States, in consultation with its NATO Allies, launched two years later. Lastly, Dr. Adelman stated that "the number of actors on the stage of nuclear arms negotiations must likewise be enlarged." To the degree that our NATO Allies are closely consulted before and after each INF negotiating round, this recommendation has also been implemented.

Since 1978, Ambassador Adelman has reiterated his support for arms control in a number of writings (See e.g., "The Seven Lessons of SALT", *The American Spectator*, December 1979; "Rafshooring the Armageddon", *Policy Review*, Summer 1979; Statement of Ambassador Adelman to the U.N. First Committee, October 27, 1981, "U.S. Arms Control Objectives".) Ambassador Adelman's views in these articles may differ from those of some arms control advocates. Nevertheless they articulate a basic belief in the need for arms control, and acknowledge that past approaches to achieving real arms control are not sacrosanct and should be subject to close examination.

Therefore, based upon Ambassador Adelman's testimony to the Committee expressing his views on arms control and taking into account his published writings on arms control over the past five years, we conclude that Ambassador Adelman has a sincere belief in the need for arms control and will be an effective advocate as the ACDA Director to achieve real arms reductions.

A second objection raised during the Committee hearings involved the nominee's alleged lack of relevant job experience. Here, too, we strongly disagree with the opinion of those Senators who voted against the nomination. As previously mentioned, Ambassador Adelman came before the Committee as the second-ranking U.S. official at the U.N. As Deputy Representative, the nominee headed the U.S. delegation to the Committee on Disarmament, coordinated the U.S. participation in the Second Special Session on Disarmament, and represented Ambassador Kirkpatrick in National Security Council meetings on START and INF.

Prior to serving at the U.N., Dr. Adelman was employed at the Departments of Defense, State and Commerce and worked as senior political analyst at the Stanford Research Institute. At the Department of Defense, he served as a Special Assistant to Secretary Rumsfeld, thereby gaining a firsthand knowledge of the national security decision-making process. In his career outside government, Dr. Adelman compiled a lengthy list of publications on foreign affairs, defense and arms control topics, including several critiques of the SALT II Treaty and the SALT process.

It is clear that Ambassador Adelman possesses the requisite experience and intellectual prowess needed for this post and shares the President's perspective on arms control policy. His experience and skill are necessary qualifications for acting as a high-level Presidential advisor, but they are not necessarily sufficient. It is equally important that the individual be known to the President and enjoy his full trust and confidence. We believe that Ambassador Adelman meets both of these criteria.

We regret that for some Members of the Committee, the vote on Ambassador Adelman's nomination became a referendum on President Reagan's overall arms control policy. We do not believe that this linkage should be established, but for those who have or may be considering the nomination by this criterion, important progress has in fact been made in arms control during the last two years. Even the last few weeks, there has been a remarkable and underappreciated sequence of positive U.S. actions.

In START, our negotiators have successfully drawn from the Soviets a proposal that goes well beyond the position the Soviets were

willing to take two years ago. The Soviet START proposal, which would require a 25 percent reduction in their strategic forces, offers cuts far deeper than those negotiated in SALT II and, we might add, far deeper than might be achieved were a nuclear freeze agreement to be negotiated.

In INF, the Soviets have formally indicated their willingness to dismantle at least some SS-20s where before they were insisting on keeping what they have. Vice President Bush's trip to Europe set the stage for new movement in these talks, and on February 22, President Reagan announced that the United States would accept any INF agreement that met four conditions: equality of U.S. and Soviet forces, no compensation for British and French systems, no shifting of Soviet INF systems from Europe to Asia, and effective verification.

Last month in Geneva, the United States submitted a draft treaty for the global destruction of all chemical weapons stockpiles and production facilities over a ten-year period. The Administration also decided last month to move ahead with the Threshold Test Ban and Peaceful Nuclear Explosions treaties. President Reagan has decided that the United States should ratify these treaties as soon as a new protocol strengthening verification can be negotiated. If the Soviets agree, these negotiations can be underway in a matter of weeks.

Thus, we believe that the Administration is moving with determination to establish a constructive and stabilizing arms control framework with the Soviet Union. We are particularly pleased to know that Secretary Shultz and Deputy Secretary Dam have committed themselves to being actively involved in this paramount issue. Ambassador Adelman, backed by the able staff at ACDA, will thus be joining a very accomplished team.

The Auletta Article. Much attention has recently been generated by a May 24, 1981 article written by Mr. Ken Auletta of the New York Daily News entitled "Ron's foreign policy: the posturing is the policy." We do not believe that the article should be particularly relevant to Ambassador Adelman's confirmation given the numerous writings on the public record. However, we feel compelled to discuss the article because of the extensive coverage given to it.

On February 24 the Committee met a third time to receive testimony from Ambassador Adelman and from Mr. Auletta. The hearing was held at the request of Senators Pell and Cranston after they became aware of the Auletta article which purported to quote Ambassador Adelman on his arms control views. In this article, Mr. Auletta wrote that Ambassador Adelman told him that arms control negotiations with the Soviets are a "sham." Apparently, Senators Pell and Cranston believe that if Ambassador Adelman had made this statement, it somehow proved that he is not an advocate of arms control and, therefore, not qualified to serve as the ACDA Director. Simply put, we do not believe Ambassador Adelman considers arms control a "sham."

During the course of his testimony on February 24, Ambassador Adelman maintained consistently under oath that he had no recollection of having been interviewed about arms control in May 1981 by Kenneth Auletta nor of having used the word "sham" in that purported interview.

He testified that he did not learn of the existence of the Auletta article until January 23, 1983, approximately twenty-one months after its publication and that had he known of its existence when published he would have denied that the alleged quotes reflected his opinions on arms control. He specifically testified that he does not consider arms control a "sham."

Under questioning by Committee members, Mr. Auletta admitted that this same May 23, 1981 article did not quote Ambassador Adelman's full views on arms control as they were purportedly expressed to him. Mr. Auletta testified that although Ambassador Adelman had said to him twice during the purported interview that "we are willing to have a meaningful reduction in nuclear weapons," he had not included this information in the May 24, 1981 article.

Ambassador Adelman testified during the February 24 hearing that his views on arms control are well-known and have been consistent in supporting the principle of arms control. He noted that although he felt SALT II was inadequate that this should not be interpreted to mean he does not support arms control. On this point Ambassador Adelman testified: "I have written extensively that I did not think SALT II was a real arms control package that reduced weapons, that increased stability, that saved money, that were thoroughly verifiable, and that was the statement I have written, I have discussed, and I feel strongly about." He added that even Kenneth Auletta's notes of the purported May 1981 interview quote him as saying that he would be willing to "go into negotiations ready to give up a great deal—a real reduction in nuclear weapons if the Soviets are willing to."

In conclusion, we do not believe that the February 24 hearing with Ambassador Adelman and Mr. Auletta provided any grounds for reversing our earlier stated opinion that the nominee is competent and qualified and that the nomination should be confirmed by the Senate.

CHARLES H. PERCY.
HOWARD H. BAKER, Jr.
JESSE HELMS.
RICHARD G. LUGAR.
NANCY L. KASSEBAUM.
RUDY BOSCHWITZ.
FRANK H. MURKOWSKI.

ADDITIONAL VIEWS OF SENATOR EDWARD ZORINSKY

I approach the nomination of Ambassador Kenneth Adelman to be the Director of the Arms Control and Disarmament Agency with a good measure of sympathy. As the former Mayor of Omaha, Nebraska, I understand the importance for any executive of having his choice of persons to assist him. When that executive is the President of the United States, it would seem the importance would be all the greater. However, my practice as the Mayor of Omaha—and I still believe it to be a good one—was to withdraw nominations which became embroiled in controversies. There simply are too many qualified individuals in this populous nation to doggedly insist that only one of them can do the job. Moreover, controversies of this sort only point to the obvious: the nominee is not the best choice because the effectiveness of any policy is to an important extent dependent on the effectiveness of the person expressing and representing that policy.

The President, however, has seen fit to insist upon his choice. That is his right. A majority of my colleagues apparently have concluded that Ambassador Adelman's claims to being an arms control advocate are insincere. That is their right. I have decided to accept Ambassador Adelman's representations that he will seek earnestly to achieve arms control agreements, notwithstanding interpretations of his previous writings and statements to the contrary.

Where does that leave us? It leaves us two and one-half years into an administration with no significant progress on arms control, no ACDA director, and no high administration official with any appreciable expertise in arms control. It also leaves us with our European allies restive, the Soviets in gear, and our nation soon facing the vagaries and distractions of an election year—a particularly inauspicious climate for concluding arms control agreements.

Whether liberal or conservative, hawk or dove, pro-freeze or anti-freeze, we ought all to agree that arms control is a paramount national interest, and we ought to get on with it. There should be no excuse for this Administration's failure to do so, and in any event, the Senate should not be responsible for giving them an excuse. Consequently, it is my recommendation that the Senate accede to the nomination of Ambassador Adelman, and that he and the President get us some results.

EDWARD ZORINSKY.

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON



March 15, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JIM BAKER
ED MEESE
HELENE VON DAMM

THRU: KEN DUBERSTEIN *Ken D.*
FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *MB*

Congressman Gene Snyder (R-Kentucky), Ranking Republican Member on the Public Works Committee, and Congressman Gene Taylor (R-Missouri), Ranking Republican Member on the Post Office and Civil Service Committee, have both strongly recommended we consider former Congressman Jim Cleveland (R-New Hampshire) for the position of Administrator of the Environmental Protection Agency.

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

March 14, 1983

TO: EDWIN MEESE
JAMES BAKER
MICHAEL DEAVER

FROM: KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN *Ken D.*

SUBJECT: Commodity Futures Trading Commission

It is my understanding that Bob Price has been withdrawn as the Republican nominee for the Commodity Futures Trading Commission. It is my further understanding that Personnel will submit to you on Wednesday, the name of Seeley Lodwick as the alternate candidate. This is to advise from a legislative point of view, that Lodwick's nomination would be warmly received in the U.S. Senate.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 12, 1983

"OK -
new.
I'll help you on the
procedural vote."

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER III

FROM: Kenneth M. Duberstein

SUBJECT: Recommended Telephone Call on Kasten
Withholding Amendment

Senate consideration of the Jobs bill is deadlocked over the Kasten amendment repealing the 10% withholding on interest and dividends enacted as part of the Tax Equity and Fiscal Responsibility Tax Act of 1982. Kasten is determined to get a vote on this amendment and the Senate leadership and Senator Dole are determined to prevent this measure from being passed. The President has indicated that he will veto this or any other measure containing this provision.

Kasten has at least 51 co-sponsors on his amendment. In addition, 9 have indicated publicly they support it and at least 5 more are privately supporting. The leadership will be entering a procedural motion (either a direct tabling motion or tabling a motion appealing the ruling of the chair that the amendment is non-germane to this bill) to dispose of the amendment. We must obtain a simple majority of those present and voting to prevail on this motion.

Senator Baker has requested White House assistance in obtaining the necessary votes. I am recommending that you call Senator Tower to obtain his firm support for the leadership motion. Following is some background material on Senator Tower's situation and some recommended talking points. This call should be made before mid day on Monday, March 14, 1983.

Senator Tower

Senator Tower is a co-sponsor of the Kasten bill. He is from a state that has substantial banking interests and is under a great deal of pressure to support repeal. He is also up for re-election and is sensitive to the considerable volume of mail that has been generated in support of repeal.

He has indicated to White House legislative affairs that he would be supporting a leadership procedural motion but he could not vote against Kasten on an up or down vote. We must make certain that this is current position and that he will hold to it.

TALKING POINTS

1. Before we get into the merits of the question, it is clear that the Senate is engaged in a major test of the Republican leadership. Senators Baker and Dole and the President are engaged in a struggle with the banking community over the most efficient means of collecting taxes already owed. We Republicans are going to face many tough issues this year. Since this particular issue is framed as a test of the Republican leadership, we can't afford to lose it.
2. On the merits, there is no question that the 10% withholding is the most equitable and efficient means of collecting taxes already owed the Federal Government. The Congress so decided last year. Their action corrected many problems pointed out by the banking industry and left all savers with easy means of claiming the allowed exemptions. To bow to this misleading and erroneous public relations campaign would be a grievous error for the Congress.
3. The President, furthermore, is outraged that the banking industry has mounted this campaign. He is prepared to fight it on any front. He has said that he will veto any measure that contains a repeal of the withholding provision.
4. Now is not the time to delay enactment of the jobs legislation. Unemployment compensation should not be put at risk by the disputed inconvenience of some bankers. Americans are beginning to count on the jobs that will be started by this legislation. The political consequences of delaying are going to be disastrous for all of us.
5. The President needs your support on this issue. You know his commitment -- now he needs yours.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 8, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

THRU: KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN *K.D.*

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *MO*
DAVID L. WRIGHT *dlw*

SUBJECT: Farm Credit Legislation

Farm credit bills appear to be on a fast track in both the House and Senate. It is now possible that legislation may be cleared for Presidential action prior to the Easter Recess and prior to the completion of Congressional action on the First Budget Resolution.

USDA's analyses of (1) the bill cleared by the Senate Agriculture Committee on March 3rd (S. 24) and (2) the bill which is scheduled for House Agriculture Committee markup on March 10th (H.R. 1190) are attached. It is likely that the final version will be somewhere in-between.

In view of the President's State of the Union commitment to "work individually with farmers with debt problems to help them through these tough times" in combination with general concerns with so-called "bail out" bills, we wanted you to be aware of these developments.

cc: Edwin Meese III
David Stockman
Edwin L. Harper

Huddleston Bill - S. 24 - Emergency Agricultural Credit Act of 1983

Reported out of Committee March 3, 1983.

- A. Provide for deferral of payments on farm loans and moratorium on foreclosures for certain Farmers Home Administration (FmHA) borrowers.
- B. Provide additional FmHA operating loan funds to be allocated for farmers who are refused credit from their traditional lenders.
- C. Raise the loan limit on FmHA farm operating loans from \$100,000 to \$300,000 for direct loans and from \$200,000 to \$400,000 on guaranteed loans.
- D. Reauthorize the economic emergency direct loan program.
- E. Require the FmHA to use funds allocated for limited resource borrowers.
- F. Require FmHA loans to be rescheduled or reamortized at the original rate of interest on the loan, if that rate is lower than the current interest rate.

Estimated Costs

- (a) One year: \$353 million cost to borrow lost receipts; Treasury to borrow \$4-6 billion in market depending on size of participation in program. Long-term permanent cost: \$1.2-2.3 billion depending on participation rate.
- (b) No cost.
- (c) No cost, but means fewer loans, larger size.
- (d) Currently \$600 million guarantee program not implemented for lack of authorizing language. This provision reauthorizes program and guarantees of \$600 million and adds \$600 million in direct loans.
- (e) \$5 million.
- (f) \$200 million.

Jones-Coleman Bill - H.R. 1190 - Emergency Agricultural Credit Act of 1983

Scheduled for mark-up March 9-10, 1983.

- A. Increases operating loan limits from \$100,000 to \$200,000 on direct loans and from \$200,000 to \$400,000 on guaranteed loans.
- B. Extends subsequent loan eligibility in emergency disaster loan program.
- C. Increases the period of rescheduling of operating loans from 7 to 15 years. Rescheduled or reamortized loans bear lower of current rate or original loan rate.
- D. Emergency disaster program must be administered on an individual evaluation basis rather than an areawide designation.
- E. 20 percent of funds earmarked for limited resource borrowers.
- F. One-year deferral/moratorium on loan repayments.
- G. Reauthorizes Economic Emergency lending program for \$600 million in direct loans and \$600 million in guaranteed loans.
- H. Sets up a "Guaranteed Farm Loan Program Unit" to oversee all loan guarantees made by FmHA on loans by "designated lenders."
- I. \$200 million of loan funds earmarked for new borrowers.

Estimated Costs

- (a) No cost; could result in fewer loans in larger amounts.
- (b) Short-term cost \$1.2 billion in loans each subsequent year - no long-term cost - loans made at cost of money and repaid.
- (c) Estimated cost \$200 million.
- (d) No program cost. Some increases in administrative cost. Difficult to administer.
- (e) \$5 million in interest subsidy.
- (f) \$4-6 billion in short-term Treasury borrowing depending on participation rate. Long-term permanent cost \$1.2-2.3 billion.
- (g) Currently \$600 million guarantee program not implemented for lack of authorizing language. This provision reauthorizes program and guarantees of \$600 million and adds \$600 million in direct loans.
- (h) Administrative cost only.
- (i) No cost.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 5, 1983

MEMORANDUM TO: JIM BAKER
FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN *K.D.*
SUBJECT: Arms Sale to Jordan

Attached is a listing of the 50 cosponsors of S.R. 72, which expresses the sense of the Senate that:

1. The United States should not sell advanced fighter aircraft, mobile anti-aircraft missiles, or any other advanced arms to Jordan under present conditions, in which Jordan continues to oppose the Camp David peace process and purchases arms from the Soviet Union, and in which such sales jeopardize both the security of Israel and progress toward peace in the Middle East.
2. The United States should ensure that Israel retains its qualitative military edge over any combination of Mideast confrontation.
3. The United States should focus its efforts on bringing Jordan into direct peace negotiations with Israel.

I know Bill Clark has spoken with the Senate Republican Policy Committee several weeks ago on this issue, prior to the time that there were 50 cosponsors.

We will need to get going on the strategy on this issue before it gets out of hand. Guidance, please.

Attachment

SENATE RESOLUTION 72

RELATING TO ARMS SALES TO JORDAN

REPUBLICANS (14)

Heinz
Boschwitz
Packwood
Cohen
D'Amato
Danforth
Grassley
Hatch
Hawkins
Kassebaum
Pressler
Specter
Stafford
Weicker

DEMOCRATS (36)

Hart	Lautenberg
Byrd	Levin
Baucus	Matsunaga
Biden	Metzenbaum
Bingaman	Mitchell
Boren	Moynihan
Bradley	Pell
Bumpers	Proxmire
Burdick	Pryor
Chiles	Riegle
Cranston	Sarbanes
DeConcini	Sasser
Dixon	Zorinsky
Eagleton	
Exon	
Ford	
Glenn	
Heflin	
Hollings	
Huddleston	
Inouye	
Jackson	
Johnston	

to the observance of all religions in the Soviet Union, those aimed specifically at Judaism are especially severe. Synagogues have been closed, contact with other religious groups are forbidden, no seminary exists to train clergy, Jewish religious texts have been confiscated, and no Jewish literature may be published or distributed. The private teaching of Hebrew—the only language common to all Jews everywhere—has been outlawed. It is virtually impossible for Jews to pass on the rituals and traditions of Judaism to younger generations. As a result, the Jewish religion could face extinction in the Soviet Union.

The worsening situation for Soviet Jews has led hundreds of thousands to apply to emigrate. And yet the number of Jews allowed to leave the Soviet Union has rapidly diminished. Only 2,688 Soviet Jews emigrated last year, the lowest level since 1971 when truly effective emigration began. This represents a decrease of a staggering 95 percent in the past 3 years. In addition, the approximately 300,000 Soviet Jews awaiting exit visas face increasingly severe governmental harassment. Many have been fired from their jobs and some scientists have been advised that their academic degrees have been or will be revoked. Only in Hitler's Germany have the academic degrees of Jews been revoked.

There are a multitude of individual examples—documented cases—of hardship, of separated families, and of persecution. The Helsinki accords, which the Soviet Union signed, requires respect for the rights of religious and ethnic groups. They also forbid Governments from holding people who want to emigrate and rejoin their families. Minority rights are also guaranteed in the Soviet Constitution, the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights, and the Universal Declaration on Human Rights. The Soviet Union, however, continues to blatantly ignore these agreements.

The persistence of an international voice of outrage against the treatment of Soviet Jews must continue. Our message helps sustain the hope and courage of Jews who face vicious oppression day after day. It also reminds the Soviet Union of our concern for the plight of these people.

I ask my colleagues to lend their voices to this cause by cosponsoring and supporting the resolution Senator MITCHELL and I are introducing today—and thereby demonstrate to the Soviets our commitment to do whatever we can to halt their anti-Semitic activities. ●

SENATE RESOLUTION 71—HONORING THE TWELFTH ANNUAL MODEL SENATE OF STETSON UNIVERSITY AND THE CENTENNIAL OF STETSON UNIVERSITY

Mr. CHILES (for himself and Mrs. HAWKINS) submitted the following res-

olution; which was referred to the Committee on the Judiciary:

S. RES. 71

Whereas one hundred years ago, Henry A. DeLand founded DeLand Academy, which later became Stetson University;

Whereas Stetson University has grown from a small academy to a first class university with alumni who have served at all levels of government;

Whereas Stetson University, for the past twelve years, has sponsored a United States Model Senate, allowing students from Florida and the southeastern United States an opportunity to learn about the performance of the United States Senate by portraying Senate Members;

Whereas through the model Senate students learn to draft bills, work on committees, and understand the internal workings of the United States Senate;

Whereas each year the Model Senate has had outstanding support from fine men and women who now serve or have served in the United States Senate;

Whereas opportunities like the Model Senate help to direct the future of aspiring political personalities; and

Whereas the Model Senate is an educational program that promotes better government by encouraging student participation in legislative affairs: now, therefore, be it

Resolved, That the United States Senate recognizes and honors the Twelfth Annual Model Senate of Stetson University and the University in its centennial year marking the founding of Stetson University.

● Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, this week Florida's Stetson University is holding its 12th Annual Model Senate. To mark the 12th Annual Model Senate and the centennial of the founding of Stetson University, I am submitting, along with Senator HAWKINS, this Senate resolution. Speakers for the model senate have included Senators BAKER, BRADLEY, BUMPERS, BYRD, HAWKINS, INOUE, KASSEBAUM, MATHIAS, and myself. Former Senators Sam Ervin, Richard Stone, and Spessard Holland have also served as speakers. Senator Holland was the first speaker and is credited with helping the program get off the ground. This year's keynote address will be delivered by Senator DAVID PRYOR from Arkansas.

Started in 1971 under the auspices of Dr. Wayne Bailey, chairman of Stetson University's Political Science Department, the model senate has grown to include students from colleges and universities all over the Southeastern United States. The program includes 3 days where conditions of the U.S. Senate are recreated with 75 to 100 students playing the roles of actual Senators. The model senate has been guided in its 12-year history by Dr. Floyd Riddick, former U.S. Senate Parliamentarian. Participants choose key leaders and the approximate Republican-Democratic balance is preserved. The model senate involves over 150 students each year, many of whom go on to become active in government and politics. It is with great pleasure that I offer this resolution to honor such an effective educational tool patterned after the U.S. Senate.

Stetson has more to be proud of than the model senate. This university is celebrating the 100th anniversary of its founding. Started in 1883 by Henry DeLand as DeLand Academy, it was renamed Stetson University in 1889 in honor of hat manufacturer John E. Stetson. Chartered in the same year as a university by the Florida State Legislature, Stetson has grown into one of the State's foremost schools and has achieved a number of firsts in its 101 years. Stetson had the first music school in Florida and the first business school in the State. The university was one of the first, if not the first, to admit women as students in Florida and had the first forensic and debate program in the State. Added to this list of firsts is Stetson's victories in the State's first baseball championship and first men's and women's basketball championships. One of Stetson University's students, Benjamin Hulley, was awarded the first Rhodes Scholarship given in the State of Florida. Stetson's first 100 years have been filled with many achievements and I extend to the university best wishes for the next 100 years. ●

SENATE RESOLUTION 72—RELATING TO ARMS SALES TO JORDAN

Mr. KENNEDY (for himself, Mr. HENZ, Mr. HART, Mr. BOSCHWITZ, Mr. BYRD, Mr. PACKWOOD, Mr. BAUCUS, Mr. BIDEN, Mr. BINGAMAN, Mr. BOREN, Mr. BRADLEY, Mr. BUMPERS, Mr. BURDICK, Mr. CHILES, Mr. CONNOR, Mr. CRANSTON, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. DANFORTH, Mr. DE CONCINI, Mr. DIXON, Mr. EAGLETON, Mr. EXON, Mr. FORD, Mr. GLENN, Mr. GRASSLEY, Mr. HATCH, Mr. HAWKINS, Mr. HEFLIN, Mr. HOLLINGS, Mr. HUDDLESTON, Mr. INOUE, Mr. JACKSON, Mr. JOHNSTON, Mr. KASSEBAUM, Mr. LAUTNERBERG, Mr. LEVIN, Mr. MATSUNAGA, Mr. METZENBAUM, Mr. MITCHELL, Mr. MOYNIHAN, Mr. PELL, Mr. PRESSLER, Mr. PROXMIRE, Mr. PRYOR, Mr. RIEGLE, Mr. SARBANES, Mr. SASSER, Mr. SPENCER, Mr. STAFFORD, Mr. WEICKER, and Mr. ZORINSKY) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Foreign Relations:

S. RES. 72

Whereas Israel is a stable, democratic and reliable ally of the United States;

Whereas the security of Israel is in the national interest of the United States;

Whereas Jordan continues to oppose the Camp David peace process;

Whereas Jordan has aligned with Iraq whose government is committed to the destruction of Israel;

Whereas Jordan is purchasing advanced weapons from the Soviet Union;

Whereas the sale of advanced arms to Jordan would jeopardize the security of Israel and increase the overall instability of the region;

Whereas promises to sell advanced U.S. arms to Jordan set the stage for an unnecessary and divisive confrontation with Congress; and

Whereas an escalation of the arms race in the Middle East is contrary to the interests of the United States, Israel and Jordan.

Resolved, it is the sense of the Senate of the United States of America, That—

1. The United States should not sell advanced fighter aircraft, mobile anti-aircraft missiles, or any other advanced arms to Jordan under present conditions, in which Jordan continues to oppose the Camp David peace process and purchases arms from the Soviet Union, and in which such sales jeopardize both the security of Israel and progress toward peace in the Middle East.

2. The United States should ensure that Israel retains its qualitative military edge over any combination of Mideast confrontation states.

3. The United States should focus its efforts on bringing Jordan into direct peace negotiations with Israel.

Mr. KENNEDY. Mr. President, I am pleased to join with Senators HEINZ, HART, BOSCHWITZ and 47 other Senators in introducing a Senate resolution opposing the sale of advanced weapons to Jordan and calling on Jordan to enter direct peace negotiations with Israel. A similar resolution was introduced in the past Congress.

All of us hope that recent public reports will be borne out, and that Jordan is reconsidering its past opposition to the Camp David peace process and direct peace negotiations with Israel. For many years, I have strongly urged King Hussein, both publicly and privately, to engage in such negotiations with Israel. I am confident that all the sponsors of our resolution today will enthusiastically welcome such a development—as will all people who support the cause of peace around the world. As our resolution makes clear, our first priority must be peace, not another escalation of the arms race in the Middle East.

Reintroduction of our resolution at this time, supported by a majority of the newly elected Senate, should be clear notice to the administration of our determination to enhance the Middle East peace process and to oppose destabilizing arms sales in that volatile region of the world.

Over the past year, reports have circulated with disturbing persistence that the Reagan administration is considering the sale of advanced arms to Jordan. These reports include the possible sale of fighter aircraft such as the F-5G or F-16, portable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles and laser-guided bombs. The F-5G, which is being redesignated the F-20A, is a highly capable aircraft, built to carry Sidewinder missiles, and also capable of carrying bombs and other ordnance. It could be readily integrated into the AWACS system which, under the administration's misguided policy, is being sold to Saudi Arabia. The shoulder-fired Stinger missiles have never before been transferred outside of NATO; they can be carried and used by individual soldiers—and they can be seized by terrorists.

Sales to Jordan of this sophisticated weaponry would significantly increase

the military threat against Israel. With its fast scramble time, short takeoff and landing characteristics, high acceleration and maneuverability and superior ground attack capabilities, the F-5G would greatly enhance Jordan's ability to participate in a surprise Arab air attack on Israel.

The Arab States give high priority to strengthening their air forces, and Jordan is the state with the best geographic position to spearhead a combined Arab attack on Israel; Jordan shares the longest border with Israel and has airfields closest to key targets in Israel. Amman is barely 50 miles from Jerusalem.

Provision of the F-5G or other advanced aircraft will increase the likelihood of escalation of conflict between Israel and Jordan, make it more difficult for Jordan to stay out of any future Middle Eastern conflict, and destabilize the already delicate balance of power in the Middle East.

In addition, Jordan has continued to acquire advanced weapons, including surface-to-air missiles, from the Soviet Union. Its forces have received military training on Soviet territory and from Soviet technicians in Jordan. These Soviet ties raise serious questions about the security of any high technology weapons supplied by the United States to Jordan. Sales such as those proposed by the administration could undermine not only Israeli but also American security.

The Congress has repeatedly expressed concern to the administration on this issue. In February 1982, 33 Senators wrote President Reagan to express concern over disturbing reports that the administration might transfer F-16 and mobile Hawk air-to-ground missiles to Jordan. Subsequently we introduced two Senate resolutions opposing such sales, and the resolution we are introducing today parallels these efforts. In 1982 and again in 1983, a majority of the Senate sponsored our resolution.

Jordan obviously has its own legitimate security needs. But what is needed now from the United States is not more sophisticated arms for Jordan, but more sophisticated diplomacy in bringing Jordan into the Camp David peace process. The administration should be concentrating its resources on a vigorous effort to engage Jordan in direct peace negotiations with Israel. This is a far more promising avenue for lasting peace in the Middle East.

Mr. HEINZ. Mr. President, last May Senator KENNEDY and I, together with a majority of the Senate, submitted a resolution expressing opposition to the sale of advanced weapons to Jordan. Today, we are resubmitting this resolution, again with a majority of the Senate in support.

As March 1 approaches, the date of King Hussein's self-imposed deadline for his decision on whether or not—or on what terms—to participate in the Mideast peace process, we are all anx-

ious to find a way to persuade the King to join the peace negotiations. Our focus on his potential role is appropriate. Without question, the King is not only a valuable addition to advancing the peace process, but also a necessary element. Further progress is unlikely to be made without him. Despite his importance, however, we must be certain that the means we employ to bring the parties to the bargaining table are consistent with our national security interests and those of our long-standing friend and ally, Israel, and with achievement of our ultimate goal: a just and lasting peace.

It is no secret that King Hussein wants American arms. Although no sale has been formally announced, the administration has discussed, without necessarily committing itself, a variety of difficult weapons systems with the Jordanians. The clear signal sent has been that advanced weapons would be more easily obtained were Jordan more cooperative in participating in the construction of peace agreements. My concern is that the administration, in its zealous pursuit of peace, will interpret token conciliatory gestures by Jordan as real movements toward peace, and thereby provide a still uncooperative Jordan with highly sensitive weapons that both endanger Israel's security and do not, in fact, bring us one step closer to peace.

Such a sale would produce multiple ill effects. Clearly, it would threaten Israel whose security is in our national interest. Although it is difficult to discuss specific weapons systems in the absence of a specific sale, persistent rumors have suggested some highly advanced arms, some of which have never been sold outside of NATO, are being considered. The list of weapons discussed has been said to include advanced fighter aircraft, including the F-5G, or F-16, portable Stinger anti-aircraft missiles, Sidewinder air-to-air missiles, and laser-guided bombs. The F-5G, built to carry Sidewinders as well as bombs and other ordnance, can also be integrated into the AWACS system being sold to Saudi Arabia. The Stinger missiles, never before sold outside of NATO, can be carried and used by individual soldiers, and therefore could be more readily seized by terrorists.

Second, as I have stated before, I am greatly disturbed by the counterproductive policy trend this sale would reinforce; that is, trying to buy peace with weapons of war. Both logic and experience show this policy to be unsuccessful. From an a priori standpoint, it just does not make sense to add weapons to an already extremely volatile area; we would merely be increasing the chance of violence, as well as escalating its extent when it does occur.

Furthermore, in practice, this policy has been as unfruitful as logic would predict. In 1978, when the Carter administration first proposed a major

arms sale to Saudi Arabia, it was hinted that such a sale would make the Saudis more amenable to suggestions for peace talks. Having sold the Saudis both F-15's and then the AWACS in 1981, we still find them unceasingly intransigent. They have not only remained opposed to any negotiations, but have also vented their hostility at the most trivial opportunity. At this year's World's Fair, for example, an event designed to promote world understanding, the Saudis distributed maps that designated the land where Israel now stands as part of Jordan.

King Hussein's lack of cooperation, though less trivial, has been no less injurious to hopes of peace. At the time of the signing of the Camp David accords, on which President Reagan's proposals are based, the King expressed vehement opposition. He strengthened his ties with Iraq and the PLO, both sworn enemies of Israel and promoters of terrorism. In addition, he has, in the past, asked for his friends—the Soviets to mediate peace talks rather than the United States.

Most frustrating, though, is the King's habit of appearing to soften his stance only later to resume his intractable position. He has continually aroused our hopes with his apparent willingness to cooperate, then disappointed us with a variety of excuses. Most recently, he has cited doubts about America's ability to obtain Israel's withdrawal from Lebanon as another explanation for his hesitancy.

Of course, we cannot lay all the blame for that problem at the King's door. We must guard against our tendency to attribute the King with more independence than he actually enjoys. The King wants to act in the interest of the Arab States collectively, and his own political position gives him little choice. Yet the Arab States' inability to reach a consensus has helped to cause the King's apparent unreliability. Moreover, his hesitancy to enter negotiations concerning PLO autonomy without a mandate from that organization is understandable. Unfortunately, recent events have further complicated the King's task; though the PLO's traditional intransigence has softened somewhat, the problem of a mandate has been complicated by factionalism within its ranks. Thus, it is becoming increasingly unclear from whom the King should seek his mandate and for whom such a mandate will hold validity. The PLO executive committee seems to have regrouped in Algiers, only to deny King Hussein a mandate to negotiate on its behalf.

In any case, with the King's past record of noncommitment, an arms sale at this time without any definite assurance would be a gamble with terrible odds.

In the final analysis, though, it is essential to examine why the King, a careful and astute politician, may finally be warming toward President Reagan's peace initiative. Could it be

that the King is only interested in obtaining American weapons? Last January 10, an article in the Washington Post suggested to the contrary. It reported that the King's "new thinking is said to reflect growing fears generated by the greatly accelerated pace of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories, the perceived threat of Israeli aggression against Jordan's East Bank and other threats to the Kingdom he has ruled for decades."

Thus it appears the King is searching for ways to insure Jordan's national security. Seeking that through an arms sale would be illusory, at best. But, by providing arms to Jordan we enhance the King's idea of security, thereby providing a disincentive to find real security through lasting peace. Our irony is that we may have finally found the King at a point where he believes peace is his country's most attractive option; an arms sale at this time would only serve to offer him a destructive alternative.

Finally, it is only fair to acknowledge that the King's reluctance to negotiate may stem at least partly from doubts about the outcome of the negotiations. A weapons sale would not bridge major fissures that could prove to be impassable once both sides begin talking. For example, though the King is now discussing President Reagan's suggestion of Palestinian autonomy on the West Bank and Gaza, the King has never retracted his demand for the establishment of a Palestinian homeland, an entity precluded by the Reagan plan, as well as by Israeli Government policy. Jordan must enter negotiations as a state committed to peace, willing to compromise, not as a reluctant participant brought to the table by a weapons sale.

For these reasons, at the present time, I oppose an arms sale to Jordan without an adequate commitment by Jordan to enter the peace process. Such a sale endangers the security of Israel, destabilizes a volatile area, and impedes our most important objective: the creation of a just and lasting peace.

● Mr. LAUTENBERG. Mr. President, I join today in sponsoring this Senate resolution opposing the sale of sophisticated weapons to Jordan. When one examines the situation in the Middle East, one is struck by the role Jordan could play in seeking peace in the region. But Jordan has refused. Instead, Jordan continues to stand by while others actively seek peace. Arms should not be Jordan's reward.

Anwar Sadat sought peace with Israel. Israel welcomed him, and the Camp David process ultimately brought peace between Israel and Egypt. I think we all share the hope that there also can be peace between Israel and Jordan. But it cannot come while King Hussein passively stands by. Hints are not enough. The United States must require of Jordan a real and tangible commitment to peace with Israel.

Until that is forthcoming, the sale of sophisticated arms to Jordan must be seen as a menacing threat to Israel, our stable, reliable, and democratic ally—and a threat to peace.

For these reasons, I believe that the Congress should express its opposition now to any proposal to sell sophisticated weapons to Jordan. ●

● Mr. PRYOR. Mr. President, I have joined with other Senators today to express my concern over the prospect of a request for a substantial sale of arms to Jordan in the next few months.

In this matter, we may be putting the cart before the horse since King Hussein requested no arms during his recent visit to the United States and President Reagan has not proposed a sale at this time. But I think a signal from the Congress can be useful at this time as an indication of our concern over the rising level of arms in the Middle East and the death and destruction that will inevitably result from the abundant availability of land and air weapons in that region.

According to Andrew J. Pierre, author of "The Global Politics of Arms Sales," over three-fourths of all purchases of arms by Third World nations were by Middle Eastern countries, and the United States bears the major responsibility for arms buildups around the world since we have supplied 45 percent of all arms aid to the developing nations. That is a heavy moral responsibility that we share along with the Soviet Union, France, and Great Britain.

President Reagan has reversed the Carter administration policy of reducing the level of arms sales and has made such sales a centerpiece of our foreign policy. I hope that the Congress of the United States will use all the power at its disposal to refute the Reagan policy and restore some sanity and foresight to our military assistance programs.

Thus, while I recognize Jordan's crucial role in establishing peace in the Middle East and the importance of continued good relations with that country, I want to put the President on notice today that any future arms sales proposals will receive a close and critical scrutiny by the Congress. ●

● Mr. CHILES. Mr. President, I am pleased to join Senator KENNEDY and others today in sponsoring this resolution opposing the sale of advanced arms to Jordan.

Since we first got wind that President Reagan was considering such a sale, we have been able to discourage him from pursuing the idea. Our efforts last year ranged from letters to the President to the introduction of a resolution of disapproval. This time around, we have over half the Members of the Senate signed on as co-sponsors. It is my hope that sustained opposition here in Congress will kill the proposal.

Selling sophisticated weapons to Jordan at this time is ill-advised, to say the least. Not only would it pose a threat to Israel's security, but it would also send a very wrong message to the Arab world.

I am particularly concerned that the administration wants to deal with the Jordanians in this way, when they have not agreed to participate in the peace process. At a time like this, it makes absolutely no sense to sell them advanced weapons. All we accomplish by doing that is to destroy some of their incentive for making peace.

The hopes for a just and lasting peace in the Middle East do depend to a large extent on Jordan. Hopefully, King Hussein can be convinced to step forward. I think he has the capacity to do so, but there is no reason to even consider selling him arms until he does.

The proper pattern was set by the late Anwar Sadat. By going to Israel and offering peace, he set the stage for friendship with the United States. That friendship has brought Egypt many rewards. If King Hussein is looking for similar rewards, let him also come forward—without preconditions—in pursuit of peace.●

● Mr. BINGAMAN. Mr. President, I am pleased to be an original cosponsor of the resolution introduced today by Senator KENNEDY opposing the sale of advanced weapons to Jordan, supporting Israel's security, and urging efforts to bring Jordan into direct peace negotiations with Israel.

I want to commend the principal cosponsors of this resolution, Senators KENNEDY, HEINZ, HART, and BOSCHWITZ, for taking this initiative both in the last Congress and again here today. I am convinced that the sale of advanced weapons to Jordan will only contribute to further instability in the Middle East. Further, we should not be rewarding Jordan for its failure thus far to engage in the search for peace in the Middle East through direct negotiations with Israel.

The search for peace, for political stability, and economic vitality, must be our first and foremost task in the Middle East, as in other troubled regions like Central America and southern Africa. Our emphasis should be on bringing the rivals in these conflicts together in direct negotiations and on aiding the economic recovery of these countries as peace is restored.

Sophisticated arms transfers of the sort apparently being discussed within the administration in the case of Jordan seldom contribute to political stability and never advance the economic revitalization of these regions. My cosponsorship of this resolution reflects in part this broader concern about our arms transfer policy to the Third World.●

● Mr. SARBANES. Mr. President, I have joined in sponsorship of Senate Resolution 72, to assure the security of Israel, to further peace in the Middle East, and to oppose the sale of

advanced arms to Jordan. This resolution carries forward the commitment of Senate Resolution 406, which was introduced nearly 1 year ago in the 97th Congress in response to unwarranted statements by the Secretary of Defense with respect to the sale of sophisticated arms, including the Hawk mobile missile system, to Jordan.

Those statements were made in an airport interview apparently without regard to the delicate balance in the Middle East, despite the continuing refusal of King Hussein to participate in peace negotiations within the framework of Camp David, and in clear contravention of the 1975 agreement carefully worked out between the Congress and the President to preclude the sale of the Hawk anti-missile system. They were made on the Secretary's own initiative, without prior consultation with the Congress and in the absence even of any request from the King of Jordan.

This year's resolution, like last year's, is intended to make plain the strong commitment of the Senate to support a just and lasting peace in the Middle East, a peace that will be accomplished only through direct negotiations among the parties directly concerned, and the equally strong opposition of the Senate to any steps that will make such negotiations more difficult to achieve. The sale of sophisticated military equipment to Jordan at this time will impede, not promote, the peace process. It is no more likely to induce Jordan to participate in good-faith negotiations than the sale of advanced military equipment to Saudi Arabia has caused the Saudis to moderate their intransigent position.

Furthermore, it is important to remember that Middle East States hostile to Israel have a very significant quantitative advantage in the weapons at their disposal. In the face of that threatening arsenal, Israel has had to rely, and has been encouraged to rely, on the qualitative superiority to aggression, and Israel's security depends on it. The sale of technologically advanced weapons system to Saudi Arabia in 1978, and again in 1981, introduced a new and destabilizing factor into the military equation in the Middle East. A sale of comparable importance to Jordan would further erode the qualitative margin which is essential to Israel's survival and would only make more difficult the task of bringing about fruitful negotiations for peace.

Mr. President, as the resolution states, the sale of sophisticated military equipment to Jordan would "jeopardize both the security of Israel and progress toward peace in the Middle East"; it would undermine Israel's "qualitative military edge over any combination of Mideast confrontation states"; and it would divert the energies and attention of our own Nation from the urgent task of "bringing Jordan into direct peace negotiations

with Israel." For these reasons, I join in sponsoring Senate Resolution 72.●

SENATE RESOLUTION 73—RELATING TO TARGETING OF JOBS LEGISLATION

Mr. SPECTER (for himself and Mr. Dixon) submitted the following resolution; which was referred to the Committee on Labor and Human Resources:

S. RES. 73

Whereas, our nation's rate of unemployment is over 10 percent, and persists at record levels, leaving over 11.4 million Americans out of work; and,

Whereas, the unemployment level is much greater in some states, even exceeding 50 percent in some localities; and,

Whereas, our economy is undergoing profound structural changes, creating high levels of long-term unemployment and causing many traditional manufacturing and heavy industries to severely curtail production; and,

Whereas, the ongoing recession has produced approximately four million dislocated workers whose skills are no longer appropriate for existing or emerging employment opportunities; and,

Whereas, millions of families have suffered tragically from the burden of unemployment and many individuals, unemployed through no fault of their own, have become so discouraged that they are no longer seeking work; and,

Whereas, traditional anti-recessionary approaches have often compromised their effectiveness in providing jobs in high unemployment areas at the expense of parochial interests: Therefore be it

Resolved, It is the sense of the Senate that, any jobs program or other form of anti-recessionary assistance be targeted to areas of high unemployment, and

Further, that any such program or assistance provide special aid to the long-term unemployed and dislocated workers.

Mr. SPECTER. Mr. President, I rise today to request that the Senate, in legislating a jobs bill, give priority to those areas of the country that have suffered the most.

The President has forwarded a proposal to provide assistance for creating jobs. Congress must now decide what action to take and how this money is to be allocated. The temptation to manufacture pork-barrel measures which serve special interests only must be resisted. If we are to offer effective assistance to meet the critical needs of the many unemployed individuals throughout this country, the Congress must enact legislation that is targeted to reach the economic casualties of this ongoing recession.

In this regard, the Congress should approach this bill with its priorities firmly in place; assistance must be granted to regions that have incurred the most severe stress as a result of the recession. Many people, including the President, have been encouraged by the Department of Labor's most recent release of unemployment statistics. These numbers indicate that the jobless rate declined from 10.8 percent to 10.4 percent in January 1983. While this is positive news, it does not reflect

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 3, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JACK SVAHN

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *MB*
NANCY RISQUE *Nancy*

SUBJECT: Legislative efforts to change Title IX

In light of the Supreme Court ruling last week, Claudine Schneider (R-RI) has introduced legislation to change the wording in Title IX. The House voted last November, 414-8, in favor of her resolution expressing support for a "comprehensive" Title IX.

Claudine is requesting our support for her resolution. She says that select Democrats will attempt to move an omnibus bill that changes a lot of civil rights laws. We will give you an assessment of activity on this later this week. In the meantime, would you take a look at this and give us guidance?

cc: Jim Baker ✓
Mike Deaver with attachments



Claudine Schneider

2ND DISTRICT, RHODE ISLAND

For Immediate Release:
March 1, 1984

For Further Information
Steven Provost 225-2735

SCHNEIDER INTRODUCES BILL

~~TO REVERSE TITLE IX SUPREME COURT DECISION~~

U.S. Rep. Claudine Schneider today introduced in the House legislation to reverse Tuesday's Supreme Court ruling that Title IX of the Education Act Amendments is limited only to those educational programs or activities which are directly funded by the federal government.

Title IX provides that "no person in the United States shall, on the basis of sex, be excluded from participation in, or denied the benefits of, or be subjected to discrimination under any education program or activity receiving Federal financial assistance." The Schneider bill would amend Title IX by inserting the term "or institution" after the phrase "educational program or activity." The change will make it clear to the courts that the sex discrimination statute should apply to all programs or activities within any institution receiving any form of taxpayer support.

In introducing the bill today, Schneider said "Tuesday's decision was one of the most shocking and disturbing civil rights rulings in recent history. The decision means that students in a guidance office or history course which is not directly subsidized by the federal government have no recourse whatsoever if they feel they are being discriminated against. The implications of this decision could be felt at every school and by every young woman in America. The next time the colleges and school districts of this country feel budget pressures, it will be the programs designed for women--whether in athletics, vocational training, or admissions--which feel the brunt of the budget scalpel. Title IX is the only federal law on the books prohibiting sex discrimination in education and the Supreme Court took the teeth out of the law on Tuesday."

Schneider continued, "I, for one, do not believe that the American people want to return to the days when women needed SAT scores 40 to 50 points higher than men to enroll in our prestigious schools. Last November, 414 members of the House voted in favor of my resolution expressing support for a comprehensive Title IX. My hope is that that same bipartisan coalition will rally behind the legislation I am introducing today. If we can achieve passage quickly, and then turn our attention to the Senate, we can successfully reverse the damage done by yesterday's action, and continue the effective federal role in guaranteeing equal opportunity in education for our daughters and granddaughters.

A copy of the Schneider bill and list of original cosponsors is attached.

98th CONGRESS
2nd SESSION

(Original signature of Member)

H.R.

5011

Insert title here

To clarify the intent of Congress in adopting Title IX of the Education Amendments of 1972, to prohibit any educational institution which receives any federal assistance, direct or indirect, from discriminating on the basis of sex, to provide that federal departments and agencies may terminate or deny all federal financial assistance to any educational institution which discriminates on the basis of sex, and to protect women against sex discrimination by educational institutions receiving any form of federal financial assistance.

IN THE HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

....., 19.....

Insert sponsor's names here

Mrs. Schneider (for herself, Mr. Simon, Mr. Cheney, Ms. Snowe, Ms. Johnson, Mr. Frenzel, Ms. Martin, Mr. Jeffords, Mrs. Burton, Mr. Frank, Mr. Bedell, Mr. Fish, Mr. Evans (of Iowa), Mr. Green, Mr. Rinaldo, Mr. Shannon, Mr. Boehlert, Mr. Hillis, Mr. Udall, Mr. McKinney, Mr. Gilman, Mr. Leach, Mr. Bilirakis, Mr. Rodino, Mr. McKernan, Mr. Carper

introduced the following bill; which was referred to the Committee on

A BILL

1 Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of the United
2 States of America in Congress assembled,

1. That 901 (a) of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1681 (a))

2. is amended by

3. Inserting after "assistance" the following: "or by an
4. educational institution."

5. Sec.2. Section 902 of the Education Amendments of 1972 (20 U.S.C. 1682)

6. is amended --

7. (1) in the first sentence, by deleting "any education program or
8. activity" and inserting in lieu thereof "educational program, activity
9. or institution",

10. (2) in the first sentence, by striking "such program or activity" and
11. inserting in lieu thereof "such program, activity or institution", and

12. (3) by amending clause 1 to read as follows:

13. "(1) by the termination of or refusal to grant or to
14. continue assistance to any educational institution, or to
15. any recipient under an educational program or activity, as
16. to which there has been an expressed finding on the record,
17. after opportunity for hearing or failure to comply with
18. such requirements but such a term or refusal shall be limited
19. to the particular political entity, or part thereof, or
20. educational institution or other recipient as to which such
21. a finding has been made, or"

22.

23.

24.

25.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1983

NO

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER

THRU:

KEN DUBERSTEIN *KD*

FROM:

M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *MO*

SUBJECT:

ATTACHED LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN SAM GIBBONS (D-FL)

Gibbons wanted me to make sure you were aware of his interest in your accepting his invitation. My recommendation regardless of your decision on the trip is that you give Sam a call at your earliest convenience to express your appreciation for his interest.

JAB III

The reason, I'm told, why he's inviting you has nothing to do with your charm, good looks, personality, etc.. He needs a plane!

Ken

B. Canale called me on the - tell JAB

DAN ROSTENKOWSKI, ILL.
JAMES R. JONES, OKLA.
ED JENKINS, GA.
THOMAS J. DOWNEY, N.Y.
DON J. PEASE, OHIO
KENT HANCE, TEX.
CECIL (CEC) HEFTEL, HAWAII
MARTY RUSSO, ILL.

GUY VANDER JAGT, MICH.
BILL ARCHER, TEX.
BILL FRENZEL, MINN.
RICHARD T. SCHULZE, PA.
PHILIP M. CRANE, ILL.

EX OFFICIO:
BARBER B. CONABLE, JR., N.Y.

JOHN J. SALMON, CHIEF COUNSEL
A. L. SINGLETON, MINORITY CHIEF OF STAFF

DAVID B. ROHR, SUBCOMMITTEE STAFF DIRECTOR

COMMITTEE ON WAYS AND MEANS

U.S. HOUSE OF REPRESENTATIVES

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20515

SUBCOMMITTEE ON TRADE

February 25, 1983

Mr. James A. Baker III
Chief of Staff
The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Jim:


The Subcommittee on Trade of the Committee on Ways and Means has scheduled a trade mission to the Far East during the period of the congressional Easter recess, March 25 through April 4, 1983. The tentative itinerary of the trip includes stops in Seoul, South Korea, Tokyo and Nagasaki, Japan. We anticipate that about eight Members of the Committee will make the trip.

As we are all aware, trade problems with Japan will continue to dominate in the foreseeable future and Japanese imports will be a major element of continued trade deficits. Since our continued attention to U.S.-Japan matters is crucial, we intend to follow up and support those issues addressed by Ambassador Brock during his recent trip to Tokyo. Also, our visit to South Korea is designed to acquaint Members with the extraordinary manufacturing capability and the rapidly developing economy in South Korea. We anticipate meetings with heads of state and key industry leaders in each country, as well as visits to industrial sites.

With this in mind, I would like to extend an invitation to you to join us on this mission. I know the Members would very much appreciate this opportunity to get to know you. Your presence would certainly enhance our delegation.

I would appreciate your consideration of this invitation and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Sam M. Gibbons
Chairman

SMG/FPC

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 26, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER

THRU: ✓ KEN DUBERSTEIN

FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. 

SUBJECT: ATTACHED LETTER FROM CONGRESSMAN SAM GIBBONS (D-FL)

Gibbons wanted me to make sure you were aware of his interest in your accepting his invitation. My recommendation regardless of your decision on the trip is that you give Sam a call at your earliest convenience to express your appreciation for his interest.

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JAMES R. JONES, OKLA.
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THOMAS J. DOWNEY, N.Y.
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February 25, 1983

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The White House
Washington, D.C. 20500

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I would appreciate your consideration of this invitation and look forward to hearing from you.

Sincerely,



Sam M. Gibbons
Chairman

SMG/FPC

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Faith

Here's the list of House
Republicans re War Powers
Resolution. Vote likely
Wednesday or Thursday.

Appreciate your help.

Ker D.

CC: Tim Baker

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Ed Rollins

Here's a list of House
Republicans re War Powers
Resolution. Vote likely
Wednesday or Thursday.
Appreciate your help
with these guys.

Thank

fer D

cc: Jim Baker

Gene Snyder (Kentucky)
Hillis (Indiana)
McCollum (Florida)
Myers (Indiana)
Dickinson (Alabama)
Bill Young (Florida)
Emerson (Missouri)
Hammerschmidt (Arkansas)
Bartlett (Texas)
Tauke (Iowa)
Weber (Minnesota)
Bereuter (Nebraska)
Hopkins (Kentucky)
Rogers (Kentucky)
T. Coleman (Missouri)
Loeffler (Texas)
Davis (Michigan)
Sensenbrenner (Wisconsin)
Taylor (Missouri)
Archer (Texas)
Chandler (Washington)
Frenzel (Minnesota)
Dewine (Ohio)
D. Crane (Illinois)
Stump (Arizona)
Paul (Texas)
Dannemeyer (California)
Pursell (Michigan)
C. Miller (Ohio)
Ridge (Pennsylvania)
McKernan (Maine)
Chappie (California)
Craig (Idaho)
D Young (Alaska)
H. Brown (Colorado)
Gradison (Ohio)
Coughlin (Pennsylvania)
D. Martin (New York)
McCain (Arizona)
J. Hansen (Utah)
Moorehead (California)
Daub (Nebraska)
Gregg (New Hampshire)
Roukema (New Jersey)
Regula (Ohio)
D. Smith (Oregon)
Jeffords (Vermont)
Green (New York)
Kramer (Colorado)
L. Williams (Ohio)

Conable (New York)
Kasich (Ohio)
Roberts (Kansas)
P. Crane (Illinois)
L. Martin (Illinois)
McKinney (Connecticut)
Burton (Indiana)
Shumway (California)
Schneider (Rhode Island)
Conte (Massachusetts)
Horton (New York)

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

RECOMMENDED TELEPHONE CALL
(to be made by Jim Baker)

TO: SENATOR STEVE SYMMS (R-IDAHO)

DATE: Tuesday, February 22, 1983

RECOMMENDED BY: Kenneth M. Duberstein

PURPOSE: To discuss tax withholding provisions.

BACKGROUND: Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho) is strongly opposed to the withholding provisions on interest and dividends as well as tip income. He has written the President on this issue (letter attached) and asked to speak to the President by phone to discuss his concerns. Symms voted for both withholding provisions, although he says that even then he felt it was a mistake. He says we cannot balance the budget on the backs of the savers and waitresses and has indicated that he will join in leading the charge for repeal of withholding.

TOPICS OF
DISCUSSION:

1. Steve, the President asked me to call you on this matter of the withholding provisions. He has seen your letter on this subject, and I have advised him of your strong personal feelings as well as your follow-up phone call.
2. There is a large, well-organized campaign going on for repeal of withholding, and I don't doubt that you have been hearing a lot about this from your constituents.
3. Specific points on withholding:
 - Purpose is to ensure that the government collects taxes due on the approximately \$20 billion of interest and dividends which go unreported each year.

- Repeal of withholding would increase deficit by \$26 billion through Fiscal Year 1988. Better to collect taxes already owed than to impose new taxes.
 - Most older Americans exempt; also includes protections for low income and small investors.
 - Taxpayers can adjust for overwithholding or reduce estimated tax payments to minimize effect on investment yield.
 - Wherever possible, law provides for maximum flexibility.
4. A good deal of the concern about withholding is really a result of incomplete information and inflammatory statements on the part of groups who seek repeal.
 5. The President feels very strongly that withholding should not be repealed, and he will vigorously oppose any attempts to do so. I know this is an important issue to you personally, and I hope you would be willing to review the facts again. I am sure Don Regan and others would be glad to work with you in this regard.

DATE OF SUBMISSION: February 21, 1983

ACTION _____

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 21, 1983

TO: JIM BAKER

FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN

SUBJECT: Phone Call to Senator Steve Symms (R-Idaho)
on the Subject of Tax Withholding Provisions

Senator Symms strongly advocates repeal of the withholding tax on interest and dividends as well as withholding on tip income.

He has written a letter to the President on this subject (copy attached), and has followed up with a call to my office requesting an opportunity to speak with the President directly about this issue. I suggest that you might want to return this call to Symms and have attached some suggested talking points for use in this phone call. We should get back to Symms before releasing our reply to Senator Dole on this issue.

*Jim - he called Pear & really wants
an RR call. Suggest you do it -- sorry
about that. Thank.*

Ken D.

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

February 17, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR: JIM BAKER
FROM: KEN DUBERSTEIN *Ken D.*
SUBJECT: Ken Adelman's nomination

Based on our discussions with Senators Baker and Percy and others, I would recommend several actions to maximize the chances for Ken's confirmation. Clearly it will take an all out, carefully coordinated effort.

1. The optimum path is for the nomination to be reported favorably by the Foreign Relations Committee as early as next Tuesday. To do this, we must get Pressler or Mathias to vote affirmatively (and keep the remaining Republicans and Zorinsky with us). Because of his public comments, Mathias will be more difficult (if not impossible) to turn around. We would recommend that Secretary Shultz talk promptly and compellingly with Senator Mathias.

We would recommend that Henry Kissinger be enlisted to discuss the importance to the world situation of Ken's confirmation with Larry Pressler. Kissinger is our best shot at this time with Larry. Henry will have to be well briefed on Larry's concerns and interests.

2. If we are unable to get a favorable vote from the committee on the nomination, we could pursue an unfavorable report of the committee (Baker and Percy think this is doable) or follow the discharge resolution route (would take a majority of the full Senate, would be subject to filibuster and would be exceedingly difficult).

We would recommend, if a favorable committee report is unachievable, that we pursue quickly getting the committee to report Ken's nomination unfavorably. In coordination with Baker, Percy and the State Department, we can begin putting this in place immediately..

The battle would then turn to the full Senate where the outcome is far from certain. The Democrats may, in their caucus, make this into a party line position. Several moderate Republicans (Specter, Durenberg, Weicker Cohen Rudman, etc) will be exceedingly difficult to convince. We need to avoid Senators jumping on a bandwagon of opposition stemming from what occurred yesterday in Foreign Relations and the subsequent press stories.

Swift action to prevent a stampede is necessary. We recommend that the State Department (Powell Moore's operation), in coordination with our office, immediately contact in person (or by phone over the weekend) 1) all possible Democratic affirmative votes (Johnston, Stennis, Nunn, Boren, Jackson, etc.) and 2) every Republican Senator.

The objective is to determine where they are on the nomination and convince them to commit to vote for Adelman. Based on these results, we would then be in a position no later than Monday to pinpoint additional follow up contacts by other officials.

We need to move quickly.

Guidance, please.

cc: Pam Turner

MEMORANDUM

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

February 16, 1983

JAB III
FYI.
per D.

TO: KEN DUBERSTEIN
THRU: PAM TURNER
FROM: NANCY KENNEDY WK
SUBJECT: Gene Atkinson

On February 1, Senators from States bordering the St. Lawrence Seaway wrote to Helene, urging Oberlin be retained as Administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. The letter arrived on February 4, after the President decided on Atkinson. Attached is a copy of that letter and Helene's response.

When I met with Jim Cannon yesterday, I told him of the compromise offered to Emery to create and name him Deputy Administrator. Jim called Congressman David Martin and talked to his Administrative Assistant. Martin accepts the compromise and Jim urged Martin to talk to Emery to urge him to accept. Jim said he would also talk to D'Amato. I told him of the joint letter to Helene, and he felt, regardless of their desire for a midwesterner, Atkinson would be confirmed. Jim said, "Pittsburgh is far enough west."

Also, it is my understanding that Oberlin is being offered a job at the Federal Maritime Commission, which should help stave off some criticism.

The Commerce Committee, which will consider this nomination, has had no indications from its members, pro or con, on Atkinson's potential nomination.

All of this information has been shared with Personnel.

cc: B. Oglesby

Pracy
TT
Chris Hicks

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

Thank you for your letter of February 1, 1983 recommending the reappointment of David W. Oberlin as Administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation.

Your letter, which was received on February 4, arrived after the President had made his tentative decision to nominate someone other than Mr. Oberlin for that position. The nomination will be made after the security clearance process.

Please be assured, however, that Mr. Oberlin was given serious consideration. The President's decision not to renominate Mr. Oberlin should in no way be taken as a negative comment on Mr. Oberlin's performance. By all accounts he has done a fine job as Administrator. The President and Secretary Lewis simply felt that, after 14 years, it is an appropriate time for a change in the position of Administrator.

You can be sure that the new Administrator will be committed to building upon Mr. Oberlin's achievements, and to expanding the contribution made by the Seaway to the economies of the Great Lakes States.

Sincerely,

Helene von Damm
Assistant to the President for
Presidential Personnel

United States Senate

WASHINGTON, D.C. 20510

February 1, 1983

Helene von Damm, Director of
Presidential Personnel
Old Executive Office Building
Washington, D.C. 20500

Dear Helene:

We, as Senators from the Western Great Lakes States, would like to strongly recommend the renomination of David W. Oberlin as Administrator of the St. Lawrence Seaway Development Corporation. It is our understanding that his term will expire in February of this year and we want to be certain that you are aware of his unique qualifications for this position.

As you are undoubtedly aware, our states are suffering to a very great extent the ill effects of our depressed economy. The St. Lawrence Seaway is an integral part of our states' transportation systems, and the management of the Seaway is very important to the economy of each of our states. The Seaway, by virtue of its structure and geography, is saddled with inherent disadvantages as a transportation system and Mr. Oberlin has consistently succeeded in minimizing these problems.

The Administrator's position itself is unique in many ways. It requires an excellent manager because of its limited budget, as well as an excellent statesman because of the delicate managerial partnership that must be maintained with the Canadians. Dave has fulfilled both of these roles admirably.

Finally, we are very concerned about the continuity of purpose that has been achieved by the Lake interests and by the States bordering them. We have worked hard to achieve the recognition that we deserve as this nation's "fourth seacoast" and we believe that Dave Oberlin's reappointment will contribute materially to that end.

We have enclosed a small sampling of the letters that we have received in support of Dave's renomination. We hope that you will give his candidacy your serious consideration and we

Helene von Damm
February 11, 1983
Page Two

look forward to hearing from you about this matter at your
earliest convenience.

Sincerely,

Durenberger, Dave
Sen MN
(0080)

Richard
Richard Lugar

David
David Bonior
Boschwitz, F
Sen MN
(0000)

Richard Lugar

Robert Kasten, Bob
Bob Kasten
Sen WI
(0100)

Paul H. Sen

Metzenbaum, H
Howard Metzenbaum
Sen OH
(0110)

Alan J. Dixon

Levin, Carl L
Carl Levin
Sen MI
(0120)

Donald
Don Ruge

Glenn, John
John Glenn
Sen OH
(0130)

(R)
Wm. Proxmire
Sen WI

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

January 21, 1983

MEMORANDUM FOR JAMES A. BAKER, III

THRU: KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN *KMD*
FROM: M. B. OGLESBY, JR. *MO*
SUBJECT: Congressman Bill Dickinson (R-Alabama)

Bill Dickinson was invited, but could not attend, the Presidential meeting with select House Members to discuss a budget freeze. *(The Bergquist mtg.)*

Dickinson does not favor an across-the-board budget freeze for FY '84, particularly as it relates to defense.

However, he does believe that further defense reductions beyond the recently announced \$11.3 billion should be forthcoming either from the Administration or the Congress. He is of the opinion there is duplication in weapons systems, e.g. cruise missile and B-1B bomber and MX and D-5, a luxury we cannot afford.

Dickinson, as the ranking Republican on Armed Services, appreciates knowing that senior white House staff is interested in his views. It would be a helpful stroke if you called Bill to 1) solicit his views on the defense budget, and 2) reassure him that we are counting on his help and leadership.