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# PRESS DEPARTMENT OF STATE

January 28, 1981  
No. 25

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PRESS CONFERENCE  
BY  
THE HONORABLE ALEXANDER M. HAIG, JR.  
SECRETARY OF STATE  
Department of State  
Washington, DC  
January 28, 1981

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Loy Henderson Conference Room  
Washington, DC  
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SECRETARY HAIG: Good afternoon, ladies and gentlemen. I think it's the Judaëo-Christian Bible that says the universe was created in seven days and that even provided a day of rest. I tell you, it's been a very humbling week for me, and I feel very, very human.

As you know, this is the end of our first week in this Administration. It's been an extremely busy one. It's involved for me those all-too-short confirmation hearings on the Hill; (Laughter) it's involved efforts to put in place a number of our key team players down through and including assistant secretary level. I want you to know I've done that in all but two assistant secretary billets of about 30 involved, to say something or nothing about my personal staff and the Secretariat of the Department of State itself on the 7th floor.

It's been somewhat of an experience to discover first-hand the delays in bureaucratic obstacles associated with the clearance process, but I want you to know that I anticipate that each and every one of my nominees -- my nominees -- will ultimately be approved and hopefully confirmed in consultation with the Congress where appropriate.

It's also been a very busy week in a bureaucratic sense and I think I leave the week's experience again with an even enhanced appreciation for the role of the professional in this Department, because they're the ones that have to carry the burden during periods of transition, our in-place pros. They're the ones who have enabled me this week to establish inter-departmental working groups in every region of Departmental activity and in a number of key and urgent functional areas. I'm very pleased that this has been accomplished, primarily as a result of the team that was in place, when I came here, of professionals, with the help of an additional number of augmentees that I brought with me from the transition team.

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It has been a busy week also because, as you know, today we have our first official state visitor, Prime Minister Seaga from Jamaica. We have meetings scheduled next week with the President of Korea, to be followed by King Juan Carlos of Spain, and, of course, the Prime Minister of Great Britain, Mrs. Thatcher. I will be meeting Friday with the Canadian Foreign Minister here in the Department, and there are a number of other meetings scheduled with European foreign ministers. The first, of course, is Foreign Minister Francois-Poncet of France.

In addition to that, we found ourselves engrossed immediately and instantaneously with the problem of the return of our hostages, and I'm happy to say in hindsight, reflecting upon the events of this past weekend and this week and yesterday especially, that those events were carried out with what I consider to be the ultimate of appropriateness.

There has been some controversy this week about the so-called "agreements" which brought our hostages back to our shores at long last. I think it's important that those who analyze and assess the pros and cons of these agreements, which were arrived at under the most unprecedented and unusual conditions in our history, be recognized to be perhaps the most complex series of international agreements that I have been exposed to: Four agreements, nine Executive Orders, all requiring a host and array of regulations to implement.

I'm not an international lawyer and I'm not even a domestic lawyer -- although I've had a great deal of recent experience -- and I can tell you that analyzing and assessing the obligations of both sides with respect to these accords, agreements, Executive Orders, is going to take a great deal of time and effort by the most experienced of legal minds.

I would anticipate, and I reiterate, that the United States Government will fulfill its obligations in accordance with both international law and the accepted norms of domestic legal practice. The process is underway and has been underway within the Executive branch by those departments who are particularly expert in reviewing all of these obligations. And ultimately, of course, there will be assessments made with respect to how the other side also adheres to the obligations it has incurred in these accords.

I would like to get out front with respect to one or two issues in these accords. There has been speculation as to whether or not these accords provide for the resumption of the provision of military equipment to the Government of Iran, either that

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equipment previously purchased and contracted for, or perhaps additional equipment. Let me state categorically today, there will be no military equipment provided to the Government or Iran, either under earlier obligations and contractual arrangements or as yet unstated requests. ||

There were no discussions about the provision of armaments by the previous administration as it completed the accords in those anguishing last hours.

Secondly, as you know, one of the Executive Orders signed by President Carter relieved the obligation for the sanctions in trade. We have, in that regard, issued a warning or an advisory, if you will, about the undesirability of travel of American citizens to Iran; and, until further deliberations are made with respect to future commercial arrangements, it's my view that the most careful caution should be applied by American firms, large and small. |

Having said all of these things, it's your turn to have at me. I want to conclude by emphasizing that I hope in the period ahead to meet regularly here with this diplomatic press corps. It's a press corps that enjoys the reputation of being the sharpest and the meanest I know, and I welcome that because I think the kind of dialogue we will have here should be both enlightened and specific and pertinent. I welcome your questions.

QUESTION: Good afternoon, Mr. Secretary. Can you tell us whether the Reagan Administration is considering taking retaliation against Iran for taking of the hostages and its treatment of them; and, if so, what measures are being considered, such as the reimposition of the trade embargo?

SECRETARY HAIG: First, let me, early on in our dialogue, suggest that experience has taught me that speculation about future actions of that kind -- contingency planning -- in a public forum is frequently self-defeating because it ends up creating the kind of controversies that deprive one of the ability to do anything in the second place. So I'm going to avoid it. ||

I would emphasize again that the period ahead is going to clearly demonstrate the nature and character of the Iranian regime's post-hostage return attitude, there are additional American hostages in Iran -- one with a clear citizenship connotation -- and a host of other incurred obligations which make that question a little premature in the context of my answer.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, along that same line, however, but on a more general scale, yesterday the President, in welcoming the hostages, talked of swift and effective retribution in case of future incidents involving terrorism.

Can you supply us with any idea of the guidelines on that retribution? For example, will there be retribution in cases which do not involve another government? In other words, a free lance terrorist, if you will.

SECRETARY HAIG: I said, I think to somebody last night, that was consciously ambiguous, that statement. Consciously ambiguous in the sense that any terrorist government or terrorist movement that is contemplating such actions I think knows clearly what we are speaking of.

As you parse it out in the context of individuals or separatist movements or independence movements, of course, the problem is substantially different and the restraints and the ability to apply retaliatory action is sometimes not only constrained but uncertain. So I caveat it that way.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, could you give us your criteria for resuming arms control negotiations with the Soviet Union?

SECRETARY HAIG: This is a question upon which there's been a great deal of speculation and some questions to me in my confirmation hearings. I think President Reagan has stated repeatedly that the United States cannot contemplate negotiations or ratifications of arms control agreements exclusive of consideration of the conduct and the activities of the Soviet Union outside the sphere of arms control. That's the shorthand for linkage.

I don't think it would be appropriate for me today, in the context of future strategic arms limitations talks, to clarify further precisely how that principle will be applied. But, clearly, that principle will be applied.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, perhaps in relation to that, could you give us your judgment of developments within the past week or so in Poland -- whether Soviet forces remain in the state of readiness that were described a month ago by the Carter Administration -- and what your sense is at this point of the immediate future and Soviet action perhaps?

SECRETARY HAIG: Mr. Kalb, first let me clarify one prospect of your premised question. I think, following those early days in December when the state of readiness was somewhat heightened,

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there has been somewhat of a decline. That is not to suggest that Soviet forces and other Eastern European forces are not postured in such a way that they could react very, very quickly in Poland.

As you know, in early December, the North Atlantic Council of the NATO Alliance suggested in very clear language that any Soviet intervention in Poland would have the gravest consequence in the context of ongoing East-West relations, and that those consequences would be long-standing in time.

I know of nothing today that would cause this Administration or this State Department to depart from the strong affirmation of that view.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Poland. I understand that the Polish Government has indicated, at some level at least informally, that they do still wish to request a massive aid program from the United States. What is your inclination in terms of economic assistance?

SECRETARY HAIG: As you know, substantial assistance has already been provided in terms of loans for foodstuffs. I think it's important that we all recognize that the provision of either credits or cash or economic assistance to Poland today is not the answer to the problem.

We find a situation in which just debt servicing alone consumes half of the available assets. The problem involves internal reform within the Polish state, and it is up to the Polish Government and Polish authorities to work this out. That notwithstanding, we continue to feel a very important and sensitive sympathy for the people of Poland and their current plight, and we are considering what further steps could be taken.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, there has been a number of press reports this week about steps, or alleged steps, that you've taken to assert your predominance over the foreign policy bureaucracy. Could you --

SECRETARY HAIG: I was discussing that just the other day as the President was taking his first shower in the White House.

(Laughter)

QUESTION: Could you give us your concept, or what the agreed concept is, between yourself and the President of how the National Security Council will operate vis-a-vis the State

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Department so there is some clear sense of over what it is you are asserting predominance?

SECRETARY HAIG: I noticed there has been a number of dope stories along the airways on this subject. Let me assure you, most of those I have read, including the most recent, are totally without basis in fact.

Early on I brought some drafts which I had discussed and coordinated with Richard Allen to Mr. Meese, with Mr. Allen, with a view towards starting out with a straw man. This is not an experience I haven't been through before, and we have been in the process of coordinating this draft with the Secretary of Defense, who has a very keen interest, of course, and I would anticipate very shortly those drafts will be published in the form of Presidential directives which will implement a framework, if you will, in general for the conduct of national security policy-making plus day-to-day operational matters.

In that context, when I accepted this position, I was assured by President Reagan personally that I will be his chief administrator, if you will, and I use the term "vicar" -- and those of you who want to go back to the 1948 through 1951 Jackson Subcommittee hearings on this subject will discover what that term "vicar" meant -- for the formulation, the conduct and the articulation of American foreign policy.

I intend that the President's mandate to me be carried out, and I am confident that it will be.

QUESTION: Let me just follow that up. How do you perceive the NSC, then, operating? As primarily resolving disputes between this building and the Pentagon?

SECRETARY HAIG: I perceive that the interdepartmental mechanisms will prepare for the National Security Council, as constituted by the Act and the amendments of 1949 and whatever changes President Reagan may care to apply to that composition, to present options for decisions by the President within the forum of the National Security Council.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, I wonder what your plans are for opening up contact, not only with the Soviet Union but with the key countries in the Middle East. Do you have any travel plans to go either to Moscow or to Israel or Egypt or to Saudi Arabia?



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SECRETARY HAIG: I think it's a little too soon for me with respect to East-West, the U.S.-Soviet, to predict when there will be either meetings by myself or, more importantly, by President Reagan. There are a number of issues extant on the horizon today which I think need clarification before a constructive high-level dialogue would be justified.

On the other hand, having said that, it's essential that we maintain day-to-day and hourly communications with the Soviet Union. We're doing that through our regularly established diplomatic channels, and I intend to continue to exercise it. I've already on several key issues.

With respect to the Middle East in general, I have no finite plans for my own travel there, but I do anticipate -- as you know, we have a spring round in Europe, we have a number of watch pots, not the least of which was already touched upon here: Poland, which could justify earlier travel.

I look forward to visiting this hemisphere, Africa, the Middle East, and, of course, Asia and Europe as well.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, a few moments ago you talked about the President's statement yesterday at the White House, being framed conspicuously ambiguous, and then you went on to talk --

SECRETARY HAIG: No. Consciously.

QUESTION: Consciously ambiguous.

SECRETARY HAIG: It was conspicuously appropriate. (Laughter)

QUESTION: And you went on to say, so that, the words you used "terrorist organizations or terrorist governments would take heed." The phrase "terrorist government" I don't think has any precedent, does it? And my question is, has there been discussion in the State Department and the top level of the Administration of being able to brand governments like Iran terrorist governments with both diplomatic and economic consequences that would flow from that branding?

SECRETARY HAIG: Of course, there have been such discussions and they go on right now.

QUESTION: Could you amplify it?

SECRETARY HAIG: I think that is the criteria for a government that sponsors or undertakes or participates in terrorist activities.

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That is a nice handle to put on it: A terrorist government. And, as you know, there are public laws today passed by the Congress which prohibit the provision of armaments to terrorist governments.

So this is not a new term in Washington, and I think it's been applied sometimes in a very generous way and sometimes perhaps a less than generous way.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in terms of your reference earlier to your policy toward the shipment of arms to Iran, my recollection is that the earlier administration had taken the position that that which was in the pipeline, that which Iran had bought and paid for before the seizure of the hostages, would be considered part of the frozen assets; and, therefore, would be released.

Now you seem to be deliberately changing that policy. Do I understand that correctly? How much do you understand is involved?

SECRETARY HAIG: The figures are not really quite clear, if you're talking FMS cases, and we're trying to dig that out and it's taking some work. But it does not mean that the arms themselves have to be provided. If, in the ultimate conclusion of this thing, we feel the obligations incurred should be fulfilled, they will be fulfilled in my book by selling those arms and providing the cash to Iran. Selling them elsewhere. Some of them have already been sold, incidentally.

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QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, the Carter Administration had the policy of abiding by the conditions and terms of SALT II even though it was not ratified and said, and he said he hoped and expected the Soviet Union would do the same thing. Is that the policy of the Reagan Administration as well?

SECRETARY HAIG: We are in the process of reviewing this obligation which President Carter assumed in the context of our new responsibilities and ongoing Soviet activities around the globe. We would certainly hope that, in the period between now and the time a decision is made or a policy is adopted -- and this involves not only Soviet conduct worldwide, it involves the national security interests of the American people as we look at SALT II and SALT I and the potential future defense needs of this country. But I would hope that in the meantime, the Soviets would do nothing to exacerbate the kind of mutual restraint both sides should pursue.

QUESTION: Including SALT II?

SECRETARY HAIG: The Soviets, I leave that up to the Soviets to talk to, and they have recently, as I think you know.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as you know, there has been talk this week about the Middle East policy. First of all, how much can you tell us about that? How do you reconcile the State Department's definition of the PLO with President Reagan's definition? Do you expect to see the time when the Reagan Administration might talk to the PLO, and do you expect the Reagan Administration to ever recognize Jerusalem as the capital of Israel?

SECRETARY HAIG: Well, let me take that mind-bogglingly extensive sermon, which it would take, and compress it into several responses. First, President Reagan has stated -- every American President since 1975 has stated -- that we will neither recognize nor negotiate with the PLO for so long as they refuse to recognize the right of the State of Israel to exist, for so long as they refuse to accept the provisions of 242 and the other United Nations resolution. And having said that, I think that's a sufficient answer for a large portion of it.

With respect to Jerusalem as an entity, for 30 years, I think, the United States has felt that this is a matter that has international implications, and it should be a city that is not divided by barbed wire or imposed unilateral restraints. We don't welcome unilateral action that would make this kind of an international consensus impossible. It is the seat, after

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all, of three of our world's greatest religions -- Islam, Christianity, and Judaism -- and we would hope that ultimately, those hopes that we have had for Jerusalem will be realized with patient participation by all the parties involved.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, on Afghanistan, Giscard d'Estaing has suggested a conference to discuss non-intervention in Afghanistan as opposed to the status of Afghanistan. Do you regard this as a promising approach?

My second question concerns the grain embargo. Mr. Block today said he urged and desired it be lifted immediately. I wonder what your views are on that.

SECRETARY HAIG: First, with respect to yesterday's initiative by President Giscard, of course, we welcome any proposal that would bear fruit and result in the withdrawal of Soviet forces in Afghanistan.

We were informed of the French initiative before the fact. We have gone back with a number of questions seeking broadening and enlightening information about how this would be handled, especially in the context of other initiatives that are under way under the auspices of the United Nations. But in general, this is the kind of thing that we do welcome, and we would hope that it could proceed as a unifying, allied effort, and would also, as President Giscard suggested, include the views of the Islamic countries who have taken some initiatives in this area.

Your second question was --

QUESTION: -- concerning the grain embargo.

SECRETARY HAIG: The grain embargo. That was Freudian -- I didn't want to answer.

We have an inter-departmental review under way on this subject, the results of which have not been arrived at. In general, I would hope that in the future, we would not adopt sanctions against the Soviet Union or anyone else that would selectively punish one segment of the American domestic economy. But we are there today, and it's not so simple as it might sound if you are a representative of our agricultural sector.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, would you please give us your comment on the meeting between President Reagan and President Chun Doo Hwan of South Korea, and also give us your general policy toward North Korea. I understand that the United States Government proposed three-way talks with North Korea in 1979.

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SECRETARY HAIG: Well, I have not proposed any talks. I do not anticipate any until there has been a thorough review of the desirability of such talks, and they will be conducted against a backdrop of North Korean performance, conduct, and demeanor with respect to the desirability of and the hope for progress.

As you know, the Korean president will be visiting Washington next week. He has already, I believe, arrived on the West Coast. Somebody suggested, "Was this a deal for Mr. Kim?"

There were no deals -- no deals -- despite again some press speculation to the contrary. But we are very pleased to have the Korean president visit the United States as one of our first official visitors. It is not a state visit, but it is an official visit.

QUESTION: What is the significance of the meeting?

SECRETARY HAIG: The significance?

QUESTION: Yes.

SECRETARY HAIG: I think it is vitally important. For the period since the end of World War II, with the enhanced rejuvenation in the early fifties, Korea has been a friend, partner, and intimate participant in western security relationships. Because of some static in a recent period, it's important that we clarify the air. I would not want anyone to suggest, as some have, that this is politically motivated because of upcoming elections in South Korea. Not at all. The American tie, if you will, is not an issue in these elections.

QUESTION: Traditionally, it has been considered that you, North America and the Soviet Union keep their own areas of influence all over the world. How can this be understood now that the Soviet Union has extended its presence to Latin America and Afghanistan?

What element would North America consider to maintain the strategic interests of your country in Latin America?

SECRETARY HAIG: Well, now, I'm glad I asked you. I don't think my own past expressions on this subject need too much clarification before this group. I think it's clear that we have been witnessing an unprecedented -- at least in character and scope -- risk-taking mode on the part of the Soviet Union, not just in this hemisphere but in Africa as well.

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We have seen in that process the exploitation of the Cuban proxy, and I can assure you that this is the subject of utmost concern to this Administration, it is a subject which will be high on the priority of our national security and foreign policy agenda.

I would suggest also that an additional subject related intimately to this, in the conduct of Soviet activity and in terms of training, funding, and equipping, is international terrorism. International terrorism will take the place of human rights, our concern, because it is the ultimate of abuse of human rights. And it's time that it be addressed with greater clarity and greater effectiveness by western nations and the United States as well.

QUESTION: May I follow that up? In that context, we have just had the Libyans move into Chad, and now apparently beyond doubt, Cuban activity in El Salvador. What does your Administration intend to do about either of those?

SECRETARY HAIG: We're looking very, very carefully at the recent Libyan incursion into Chad and the implications of that incursion, not only to Chad and the people of Chad, but to the surrounding states as well. We view it as a grave turn of events. I'll leave it there.

QUESTION: Can I follow that up? Did you mean to say that you were not interested in human rights per se in non-Communist areas? I'm not sure what you meant by terrorism by Communist countries should replace concern about human rights.

SECRETARY HAIG: I'm talking about in functional, priority areas. It's been my view that human rights is an essential and fundamental aspect of American foreign policy and domestic policy, and as such, when you remove it from the main stream of fundamental policy-making and give it an extraordinary role in organizational terms, you frequently result in distortions that probably put in jeopardy the well-meaning objective you seek to achieve. So I would like to see some organizational change in the period ahead -- no de-emphasis, a change in priorities.

The greatest problem to me in the human rights area today is the area of rampant international terrorism -- on both sides of the Iron Curtain. And as one looks at the menu of those who have been most disturbed by it, it's surprising that the Soviet Union itself has been victimized by it. But be that as it may, they today are involved in conscious policies, in programs, if you will, which foster, support and expand this activity, which is hemorrhaging in many respects throughout the world today.

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QUESTION: Can I just follow my own question? Does that mean organizationally, you will be trying to drop the kind of human rights input that went into foreign military sales?

SECRETARY HAIG: I would anticipate that each and every regional policy director in this Department will have human rights high on his agenda in his across-the-board assimilation and assessment of what is in the vital interests of the American people and this country.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, this country has just gone through a great celebration of the return of the hostages from Iran. I really have two questions about it: First, do you yourself have any lessons which you have drawn from this 14-month long ordeal of this government and people? And secondly, is it a proper inference, as some have drawn, that the swift and effective retribution would necessarily mean some downgrading for the concern of the personal safety of those who may be involved in some future hostage-taking episode?

SECRETARY HAIG: No, not at all, to answer the last part of your question first. Not at all -- precisely the opposite. And I would suggest that you talk to the hostages about this, some of our former prisoners of war who have been, let's say, caught up in this debate.

With respect to my own observations, I've been here a week. I, of course, sat as a private citizen in the private sector, and anguished as I think all of us did with this situation. I would have some immediate observations of a general nature, but I prefer to hold up on those. We've got a number of people worried about the issue. There is some congressional interest in it. We're going to participate with them to the degree they wish to explore it. But I prefer to defer on that at this time.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, in view of your decision yesterday to recall Ambassador White from El Salvador, can you tell us whether or not you made a decision that he is to be retained? And secondly, also in view of your commitment to human rights, whether or not you will be considering abandoning aid to El Salvador?

SECRETARY HAIG: Abandoning aid --

QUESTION: -- to the Government of El Salvador?

SECRETARY HAIG: You mean the aid that was recently just modified by the Carter Administration?

QUESTION: Yes.

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SECRETARY HAIG: No, I don't anticipate any termination in the aid to El Salvador based on the recommendations of our Ambassador and our own assessment of the reforms that have been under way by the government there. As a matter of fact, it may go just the other way.

I have asked Ambassador White back for consultation -- and I don't make it a habit of consulting with preconceived conclusions.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, when and how do you intend to proceed that peace talks between Israel and Egypt, and does the Administration intend to invite to the United States President Sadat and Prime Minister Begin, and when?

SECRETARY HAIG: I don't think I would want to inject any sense of urgency in our view of this matter. We have and continue to support the Camp David Accords and the peace process that was launched under those accords, and we will continue to abide by that in consultation with the parties, not only the signatories but those with a direct interest in the outcome. And I think that's enough for now. We're in the process of reviewing the situation. In that process, we perhaps will come up with a timetable that makes some sense, but I need to have some discussions with the parties concerned first.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, returning to Latin America for a moment, the Carter Administration was talking to the Cubans pursuing an idea whereby the Cubans would take some of the criminal and mentally-ill people who came over on the boatlift back in return for our agreement to accept 100,000 people over the next three years.

Senator Childs has sent you a letter opposing that. Could you comment on that concept, on what you think our relations with Cuba ought to be and what we should talk to them about on this issue?

SECRETARY HAIG: I would not like to break any new ground on that subject today other than to remind you that the previous administration undertook some efforts to get agreement with the Cuban Government on this subject of the return of ill and other kinds of refugees who came here. Those talks collapsed; they were a total failure due to the lack of cooperation of the Cuban Government, and that's just another issue that is going to be put into the calculator which will ultimately lead to a reassessment of our policies towards Cuba.

QUESTION: Could you comment on that concept, on taking on taking non-criminal and non-mentally ill people in exchange for their taking back people who are --



SECRETARY HAIG: This is an extremely delicate subject, as you know, with strong views held on both sides of that issue by well-meaning people. And this is the kind of an issue that before I break new ground on it or express my views, I'd like to consult with the appropriate committees of the Senate and the House and to be sure I am espousing the views of the new administration and President Reagan, and that's not so today.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, how do you anticipate that the severe spending constraints on this Administration will play out on the foreign policy, and particularly the foreign aid area?

SECRETARY HAIG : I'm very concerned about it -- I'm concerned about it from two points of view. First, I'm concerned about the economic situation that has brought the necessity for even greater austerity upon us. And I leave that to other members of the Administration and the President himself to address, and I know he will; but we are in a serious situation requiring austerity.

Secondly, I've been concerned -- and we are in the process now of consulting with Mr. Stockman in OMB on this subject, and I'm talking about AID, our own security assistance, and I hope that we are going to be able to get a recognition that both foreign assistance and foreign security assistance is sometimes a very cost-effective vehicle for insuring that the ideals and interests of this country are carried out effectively abroad.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, as a strategist and a politician, how do you see the defense cooperation between the United States and Europe, especially from the viewpoint of burden-sharing in the light of the increasing threats in today's world?

SECRETARY HAIG: Again, I have a long litany of comments on this over five years, and I don't like to depart from it, and that is that I would like to see all of us do more. But I would also like to see an enlightened appreciation here in the United States and among our own people for the great contribution that our effective participation in the alliance brings to our security.

I think it was Jim Schlesinger some years ago who had a study done that suggested that if we did not have the NATO alliance and the security assets it brings to the American people, we would have to double the gross allocation of our national product for defense to provide a comparable security capability. I don't know whether that's correct or wrong. I suspect it is a very modest assessment.

I have also suggested that if you go back to 1970 to date, cutting out last year's increases, largely legislatively mandated by the American Congress, European contributions in the gross have been going up about 22 percent since 1970; American contributions for defense in NATO have gone down by about 13 percent. The point of departure in 1970 was very bad. The United States was carrying far more of the overall share, but that was a legacy of the birth of the alliance itself. I think sometimes we get too impatient and get bludgeoning people who are doing the best they can in very austere economic circumstances, too. What we have to find is a way for everyone to do more -- and I include Japan in that.

QUESTION: Mr. Secretary, thank you very much.

SECRETARY HAIG: Thank you.

(The press conference was concluded at 3:46 p.m.)

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