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**Collection:** Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files  
**Folder Title:** Saudi Arabia  
**Box:** 4

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## WITHDRAWAL SHEET

### Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files  
 OA/Box: Box 4  
 File Folder: Saudi Arabia

Archivist: kdb  
 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen  
 Date: 08/10/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. note	Frank Carlucci to Reagan, 1p <i>D 1/10/11 F97-066/6 #151</i>	7/27/87	B1
2. cable	252043Z JUL 87, 4p <i>PART. 3/17/06 F97-066/6 #152</i>	7/25/87	B1
<del>3. letter</del>	<del>Reagan to King Fahd, 2p</del> <i>R 5/24/11 F97-066/6 #153</i>	<del>9/16/87</del>	<del>B1</del>

#### RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE  
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

<DIST>

SIT: EOB VAX

<PREC> IMMEDIATE <CLAS> ~~SECRET~~

<OSRI> RUEHRH <DTG> 252043Z JUL 87

<ORIG>FM AMEMBASSY RIYADH

<TO>TO RUEHC/SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 5350  
INFO RUEKJCS/JCS WASHDC  
RUEKJCS/SECDEF WASHDC  
RUCJACC/USCINCCENT MACDILL AFB FL  
RUHGBAA/COMIDEASTFOR  
RUEHWW/GULF WAR COLLECTIVE

<SUBJ>SUBJECT: FURTHER COOPERATION IN MINE SWEEPING  
- OPERATIONS

<TEXT>BT

~~SECRET~~ SECTION 01 OF 02 RIYADH 07381

EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE

C O R R E C T E D COPY (PARA 11 DISTANCE VICE DISTRUST)

E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR

TAGS: MARR, PREL, KU, SA, US

SUBJECT: FURTHER COOPERATION IN MINE SWEEPING  
- OPERATIONS

REF: STATE 229357

1. (~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.)

~BEGIN SUMMARY~

2. SUMMARY: ON JULY 25 AT 1515 CHARGE AND GENERAL FARRINGTON PRESENTED A REQUEST TO PRINCE SULTAN FOR SAUDI MINE-SWEEPERS AND OTHER ASSETS IN SUPPORT OF U.S. ESCORT ACTIVITIES IN THE GULF. IN AN HOUR LONG DISCUSSION, PRINCE SULTAN EXPRESSED RESERVATIONS ABOUT FURTHER USE OF SAUDI FACILITIES AND ASSETS [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] NEVERTHELESS, HE PROMISED A CONSIDERED RESPONSE WITHIN A FEW DAYS, AND MAY BE OPEN TO FURTHER U.S.-SAUDI-KUWAITI DISCUSSION.

3. CHARGE DELIVERED TALKING POINTS PROVIDED IN REFTEL AND THE FOUR SPECIFIC REQUESTS WHICH HE ASKED PRINCE SULTAN TO DELIVER TO KING FAHD.

4. CHARGE, AS INSTRUCTED BY TELEPHONE, STRESSED THAT THE U.S. WAS NOT REPEAT NOT LOOKING FOR A LONG-TERM COMMITMENT FROM THE SAUDIS AND THAT WE UNDERSTOOD THE SENSITIVITIES INVOLVED, PARTICULARLY DURING THE PILGRIMAGE. CHARGE EXPRESSED THE PERSONAL OPINION THAT THE "RISKS SHOULD REMAIN MANAGEABLE" PARTICULARLY IF IRAQ RESTRAINS ITSELF FROM ATTACKS ON IRANIAN TARGETS AND COOPERATIVE ACTIONS ARE TAKEN TO DEAL WITH THE IMMEDIATE PROBLEM OF MINES.

5. PRINCE SULTAN WAS OPEN AND ANIMATED IN HIS RESPONSE. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAUDI ARABIA HAD NOT WANTED TO INVOLVE ITSELF IN THE CONFLICT. SAUDI MINESWEEPERS ARE NEEDED TO GUARD SAUDI ARABIA'S EXTENSIVE COASTAL WATERS AND PORTS.

5. THE PRINCE EMPHASIZED THAT HE WOULD PASS ON

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NLS F97-0666 #152  
By LOI, NARA, Date 3/7/06



THE U.S. REQUEST TO THE KING AND THAT IT WOULD RECEIVE CAREFUL CONSIDERATION. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. SULTAN MENTIONED THAT THE MINESWEEPING ACTIVITIES WERE COSTLY, BOTH POLITICALLY AND MONETARILY.

[REDACTED]

8. THE CHARGE POINTED OUT TO THE DEFENSE MINISTER THAT

[REDACTED] MINING PRESENTS DIFFICULTIES, BECAUSE CONFIRMATION OF THE ACTUAL AGGRESSOR IS DIFFICULT. THE CHARGE SAID THAT "IT IS OUR EXPECTATION THAT PRESSURE FROM THE UNITED NATIONS SECURITY COUNCIL WILL HAVE A GREATER LONG TERM EFFECT ON IRAN THAN A MILITARY STRIKE." HE ASSURED SULTAN THAT THE U.S. HAS THE NECESSARY ASSETS TO DEAL WITH THE MINING BUT IN THE SHORT TERM WE NEEDED THE ASSISTANCE OF SAUDI ARABIA.

9. SULTAN SAID HE WOULD STUDY THE POINTS (WHICH WERE PROVIDED IN WRITING AT THE END OF THE MEETING) AND GIVE THE U.S. AN ANSWER WITHIN A FEW DAYS.

[REDACTED]

BT  
#7381  
BT  
SECRET SECTION 02 OF 02 RIYADH 07381  
EXDIS - MILITARY ADDEES HANDLE AS SPECAT EXCLUSIVE  
CORRECTED COPY (WORD CHANGED)  
CHANGE WORD PARA 11 LINE 2 TORD DISTANCE VICE DISTRUST  
E.O. 12356: DECL:OADR  
TAGS: MARR, PREL, KU, SA, US  
SUBJECT: FURTHER COOPERATION IN MINE SWEEPING

[REDACTED]



[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
11. GENERAL FARRINGTON [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] SAID THAT [REDACTED] DISTANCE WAS THE KEY FACTOR AND WAS THE REASON WHY THE U.S. NEEDED LAND BASED SUPPORT FACILITIES. HE POINTED OUT THAT WE HAD ASKED KUWAIT TO PUT MORE "COUNTERMEASURES" PEOPLE IN PLACE, BUT WE HAD MET WITH RELUCTANCE. FARRINGTON SAID THESE COUNTERMEASURE TEAMS NEED A POINT OF OPERATION, SAUDI ARABIA OR KUWAIT, BUT THE MOST EFFECTIVE COUNTERMEASURE WAS THE SAUDI MINESWEEPERS. GENERAL FARRINGTON POINTED OUT THAT THIS IRANIAN MINING WAS AS MUCH A THREAT TO SAUDI SHIPPING AND PORTS AS TO KUWAIT.

12. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

13. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

14. THE CHARGE TOLD SULTAN "THAT WE RECEIVED A GREAT DEAL OF SUPPORT FROM BOTH BAHRAIN AND KUWAIT, AND WE WOULD CONTINUE TO ASK FOR IT. [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] THE CHARGE REPEATED HIS REQUEST FOR A HIGH LEVEL MEETING BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES, KUWAIT, AND SAUDI ARABIA THAT WOULD PROVIDE AN OPPORTUNITY FOR A FRANK EXCHANGE BETWEEN THE THREE PARTIES.

15. IN CONCLUSION, SULTAN RECONFIRMED THAT HE WOULD RAISE THE ISSUE WITH THE RIGHT PARTIES AND RESPOND TO THE U.S. WITHIN "A FEW DAYS".

16. COMMENT: ALTHOUGH SULTAN RECEIVED OUR SPECIFIC REQUESTS FOR SAUDI MINESWEEPERS WITH CLEAR RESERVATIONS, HE KEPT THE DOOR OPEN FOR FURTHER DISCUSSIONS. SULTAN OBVIOUSLY FEELS CONSTRAINED [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]  
[REDACTED]

[REDACTED] HE CLEARLY FEELS THAT THE SAUDIS HAVE DONE THEIR PART. WALKER

<SECT>SECTION: 01 OF 02 <SSN> 7381 <TOR> 870726091744 MSG000175598264  
<SECT>SECTION: 02 OF 02 <SSN> 7381 <TOR> 870726092009 MSG000175598408

THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 14, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR SENATOR BAKER  
KENNETH M. DUBERSTEIN  
THOMAS C. GRISCOM  
RHETT B. DAWSON  
M. MARLIN FITZWATER  
FRANK C. CARLUCCI  
COLIN L. POWELL  
ROBERT OAKLEY

FROM: WILLIAM L. BALL, III 

Attached letter on Saudi Arms sales, f.y.i.



# United States Senate

WASHINGTON, DC 20510

September 11, 1987

President Ronald Reagan  
White House  
1600 Pennsylvania Avenue  
Washington, D.C.

Dear Mr. President:


We are writing to express our deep concern over indications that your Administration may soon again request substantial sales of sophisticated arms to Saudi Arabia. We urge you to reconsider this proposal.

We have expressed to you on previous occasions our opposition to such a proposed sale. We do not believe it wise to reward Saudi behavior, which has so frequently harmed U.S. national security interests, with another sale of sophisticated arms. The Saudis have not given substantial assistance to U.S. forces attempting to keep Persian Gulf sea lanes open; they have not made substantial efforts to achieve progress in the peace process; they continue to fund terrorist organizations like the P.L.O.


There are a number of crucial issues before Congress which will require bipartisan cooperation if they are to be resolved this Fall. A new, and we believe, unwarranted Saudi arms request would force an unnecessary and unproductive confrontation between Congress and the White House. We feel constrained to oppose it vigorously.

With best wishes,


Sincerely,



Alan Cranston




Bob Packwood



Dennis DeConcini



Al D'Amato



Frank Lautenberg



THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

September 16, 1987

Dear King Fahd:

Prince Bandar has conveyed your concern about the situation in the Gulf. Let me say at the outset that the United States, as I and my predecessors have affirmed, considers the stability and security of Saudi Arabia to be vital to the national security interests of the United States.

As you know, our decision to accept Kuwait's request for our protection of its oil tankers was taken in order to demonstrate to the member states of the GCC and to Iran that the latter would not succeed in its attempts to intimidate states of the Gulf or to impede the flow of oil through the Strait of Hormuz. In a larger context we sought to assure that the Soviet Union did not gain a strategic advantage as the result of the current unsettled situation in this area of vital interest to the United States.

It was not our intention to provoke Iran, nor to take sides in the Iran-Iraq war. Nevertheless, we recognized that there were risks involved, not only for ourselves but for the states in the area. We are very heartened by the strong support which Saudi Arabia and the GCC states generally have shown for our efforts to work with them for shared objectives in the region. We especially appreciate the assistance which Saudi Arabia has offered to our military forces in the area as they undertake this serious mission, as well as the leadership role it has taken with other GCC states and within the Arab League.

You will recall the strong position which the United States took in support of Saudi Arabia beginning in May 1986 when Iran deliberately

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

singled out Saudi flag vessels in the Gulf for attack. Subsequently, we sought to be helpful when Iran used the pilgrimage in 1986 to cause further problems. We were impressed by the work of Saudi security forces in the uncovering of Iran's attempts to smuggle arms into Saudi Arabia through the use of innocent pilgrims as they attempted to perform their sacred duty.

We intend to continue to support the stability and security of Saudi Arabia. Secretary Weinberger will be visiting you shortly at my request to explore in greater detail further measures we and Saudi Arabia might take to enhance our cooperation.

In addition to problems of the Gulf, I hope very much we will find ways to coordinate our approaches on other formidable problems, particularly Lebanon, Syria and the peace process. I have already written to you about Afghanistan, where Soviet political initiatives and pressure upon Pakistan pose problems for our common objectives. As in the past, I value your wise counsel and you can be sure that your cooperation is important to our planning on these issues.

In closing, I want to reassure you that U.S. policy in the Gulf continues to place the greatest emphasis on the security and stability of our friends in the face of Iranian intimidation. We will continue to work closely with you in this regard.

Sincerely,

A handwritten signature in cursive script that reads "Ronald Reagan". The signature is written in dark ink and is positioned to the right of the typed name "Ronald Reagan".

Fahd ibn Abd al-Aziz Al Saud  
Custodian of the Two Holy Mosques  
King of the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia  
Riyadh