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(Senator Glenn) 03/16/87-05/31/1987
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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: Baker, Howard H. Jr.: Files
 OA/Box: Box 4
 File Folder: Pakistan Nuclear Program (Sen. Glenn)
 03/16/1987-05/31/1987

Archivist: kdb
 FOIA ID: F1997-066/6, D. Cohen
 Date: 08/04/2004

DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. memo	William Graham to H. Baker, 1p	5/20/87	B1
2. memo (90493)	Frank Carlucci to Chief of Staff re 5/20/87 meeting with Pakistani Foreign Minister Khan (w/notations), 2p	5/18/87	B1
3. letter	transmittal of message from Gen. Zia to Reagan (w/notations), 3p	5/13/87	B1
4. talking points	for 5/20/87 meeting between Khan and Chief of Staff, 2p	n.d.	B1
5. note	SSS to Sue (w/note added), 1p	3/16/87	B1
6. memo (1852)	Carlucci to Chief of Staff re the latter's call to Sen. Glenn, 2p	3/16/87	B1

RESTRICTIONS

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- B-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- B-7a Release could reasonably be expected to interfere with enforcement proceedings [(b)(7)(A) of the FOIA].
- B-7b Release would deprive an individual of the right to a fair trial or impartial adjudication [(b)(7)(B) of the FOIA].
- B-7c Release could reasonably be expected to cause unwarranted invasion or privacy [(b)(7)(C) of the FOIA].
- B-7d Release could reasonably be expected to disclose the identity of a confidential source [(b)(7)(D) of the FOIA].
- B-7e Release would disclose techniques or procedures for law enforcement investigations or prosecutions or would disclose guidelines which could reasonably be expected to risk circumvention of the law [(b)(7)(E) of the FOIA].
- B-7f Release could reasonably be expected to endanger the life or physical safety of any individual [(b)(7)(F) of the FOIA].
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

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RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

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WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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
I

M.A.

Delivered today.
Extremely thin on
nuclear - except
a strong plea for
6-yr waiver.

EMBASSY OF PAKISTAN
2315 MASSACHUSETTS AVENUE N.W.
WASHINGTON D.C. 20005

May 13, 1987



AMBASSADOR OF PAKISTAN

Mr. President, Sir,

I am commanded by General M.Zia-ul-Haq,
President of the Islamic Republic of Pakistan, to convey
to you the following message:-

"Dear Mr. President,

It was a great pleasure to speak with
you on the telephone. I am writing this letter to
reiterate my deepest appreciation for the earnest
efforts being made by you personally and the high
officials of your Administration to secure Congres-
sional approval of the post87 Aid Package. I am
particularly grateful for the most opportune and
forceful intercession with key members of the
Senate Foreign Relations Committee which averted a
set-back to the programme.

Having closely followed the trend of
the Congressional debate on the issue, so vital to
our interests, we draw satisfaction and encourage-
ment from the broad consensus that continues to
exist in support of the basic rationale for a
revitalized friendship between our two countries
which has undoubtedly been a great partnership for
peace and progress.

The current Aid Package, by providing
major support to our development efforts and by
strengthening our defence capabilities, has enabled
us to withstand the dire consequences of the Soviet

See that
this is covered in
S's talks.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR 647-01016 #100

BY RUJ NARA DATE 5/24/11

intervention in Afghanistan. Pakistan has stood firm in the face of Soviet pressures and intimidation, in the secure knowledge of America's continuing support. If the Soviet Union is indeed reappraising its position in Afghanistan, the steadfast resolve of our two countries to uphold the legitimate rights of the heroic people of Afghanistan has surely been a key factor.

As we look to the future, with the South Asian region facing threats of instability, I see no substitute for our constructive and cooperative ties which, I am confident, will continue to be the mainstay of peace and security in the region. I, therefore, earnestly hope that the Congress will in the long-term strategic interests of our two countries, endorse the programme of economic and military cooperation that was worked out by the two governments last year for the 1987-93 period.

Mr. President, we are not oblivious to proliferation concerns in the United States. In fact, we are allies of all those who wish to avert the spread of nuclear weapons. In respect of our own region, Pakistan has put forward a set of six proposals to India to solemnise our separate declarations of non-nuclear intent into a binding international obligation. While a discriminatory imposition would not be acceptable to our people, I have no hesitation to reassure you that the Government of Pakistan will honour its commitments to the United States and will not produce any nuclear weapon.

I would like also to share with Your Excellency our concerns about the 2-year waiver recommended by the Congressional Committees. Liable to undermine confidence in the durability of our

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II

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90493
SYSTEM II

TALKING POINTS
for
The Chief of Staff
and
Pakistani Foreign Minister Yaqub Khan
May 20, 1987, 10:00 - 10:20 a.m.

- The President has successfully worked to strengthen relations with Pakistan. For the past six years, including the latest victories in HFAC and SFRC. Securing even the two-year waiver of the Symington Amendment was difficult due to continuation of certain activities by Pakistan in nuclear weapons program, about which key members of Congress are informed.

- Final Congressional approval of the present package is going to require more concrete, credible action than heretofore by the GOP to limit its nuclear program. This will also be necessary when the time comes for a decision on Presidential certification.

~~SECRET~~

DECLASSIFY ON: OADR

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DECLASSIFIED
NLRR F97-0666 #701 RW
BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11
9/25/12

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-2-

- All we've achieved together could be jeopardized by continuing developments in Pakistan: (a) uranium enrichment above five percent (5%); (b) illegal procurement in the U.S. (and elsewhere) for the nuclear weapons program; (c) high-explosives testing. Past actions are becoming better known, here and abroad, and harming GOP credibility. Urgent action needed before more revelations come out; sanctions of some kind a possibility despite GOP support for Afghan Resistance. (FYI: Our intelligence estimates that Pakistan is not developing a hydrogen bomb but is working on a fission device.)
- President mentioned these in January letter to President Zia, as in several earlier communications. No concrete, credible action yet. Zia's May 13 letter is very disappointing. President needs more when time comes to certify again in October on Pak program. Illegal procurement actions can be especially explosive with Congress and public, yet they continue. Why?

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THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

3/16/87

Sue:

In the safe is a secret memo dealing with a Congressional phone call that Senator Baker is going to make. Note that this letter seems to be related.

DECLASSIFIED

SSS

3/25 Sue reported that Ball asked HHB not to place this call. Related correspondence from Achamma Chendersekaran dated 3/12/89 bluesheeted today to NSC.

DECLASSIFIED

NLRR F97-016616#102

BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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1852


THE WHITE HOUSE

WASHINGTON

March 16, 1987

INFORMATION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE CHIEF OF STAFF

FROM: FRANK C. CARLUCCI 

SUBJECT: Your Call to Senator Glenn

The President will be responding to Senator Glenn's letter. Your call will help clarify for the Senator how the Administration is approaching the Pakistan nuclear program, overall non-proliferation policy on the post-'87 security assistance program for Pakistan, and our support for the Afghan Resistance.

The key point is that the Administration has not sacrificed non-proliferation because of Afghanistan. We have made some progress, despite the regional complications caused by Indian nuclear program, and are currently trying even harder--as Glenn knows from talking to Ambassador Hinton. However, a suspension of military assistance would undo what has been gained, encourage accelerated Pak (and Indian) nuclear development, and increase risks of regional conflict. It would also seriously endanger continued Pak support for the Resistance and call into question U.S. reliability in tough situations.

Talking Points:

- The President wants to reply to you personally. He has not sacrificed U.S. policy on non-proliferation for the sake of protecting our policy in Afghanistan.
- Both non-proliferation and Afghanistan are important to this Administration. Both have global implications. Our record is a strong one on both issues.
- For example, the President has personally laid down markers on Pak nuclear restraint when President Zia came to Washington in December 1982. These have been adhered to by the Pakistanis. The GOP has not manufactured, tested or transferred a nuclear weapon, nor has it gone in for unsafeguarded reprocessing of plutonium, despite its capability to do so.

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BY RW NARA DATE 5/24/11

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- As you know, Pak reactions on nuclear issues are partly determined by what India does. We have had some success with India but less than with Pakistan.
- The President sent Under Secretary Armacost and Don Fortier on a special mission to India and Pakistan in September 1985 to press the GOP and the GOI to prevent advent of nuclear weapons in South Asia. The December 1985 verbal agreement between Gandhi and Zia on non-attack on nuclear facilities (which would mean another Indo-Pak war) was partly a direct result of our effort.
- As you know from talking to Armacost and Ambassador Hinton, we are pressing Pakistan even harder--and in public--to come to grips with the problems of credibility and controls. Our focus is on enrichment and a cessation of non-nuclear testing. The President has also sent a letter to PM Gandhi urging cooperation and Armacost is talking to the Soviets about the problem.
- Stopping military assistance at this point when the Soviets are increasing military pressure (296 violations of Pak airspace between January 1 - February 28) will only cause the Pakistanis to drop support for Afghanistan.
- Furthermore, it will speed up Pak efforts to go to nuclear weapons, as happened under Carter Administration cut-off in 1979.
- We want to work with you on nuclear non-proliferation, especially in South Asia. However, we do believe that a suspension of current military assistance on holding up the new six-year program for Pakistan would be a serious mistake for non-proliferation and for Afghanistan.

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strategic cooperation, it is likely also to be exploited by our adversaries. Already Moscow is alleging that the U.S. is applying pressure on Pakistan. Furthermore, the Government would be embarrassed because the short waiver would be construed as a demonstration of lack of US support for the democratic process in Pakistan.

The adverse impact of a 2-year waiver would also send the wrong signal to the Soviet which, believing that the US commitment to present policy to be liable to change, might decide to postpone review of present policy.


I, therefore, request you, Mr. President, to maintain the efforts of your Administration towards seeking a full 6-year waiver in respect of the post-87 programme. This would greatly reinforce growing public confidence in the commitment of the United States to Pakistan and further invigorate our quest for regional harmony and stability.

With profound regards,

Yours sincerely,

General
M. Zia-ul-Haq"

Please accept, Mr. President, the assurances of my highest consideration.



(Jamsheed K.A. Marker)

Mr. Ronald W. Reagan,
President of the United States of America,
The White House,
Washington, D.C. 20500