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December 3, 1987

PRE- AND POST-SUMMIT COMMUNICATIONS PLAN

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 3, 1987

- o PRESIDENT PARTICIPATES IN HUMAN RIGHTS EVENT

- o 2:30 p.m. PRESIDENT INTERVIEW WITH TELEVISION ANCHORMEN
(30 minutes; 4 nets)

- o Secretary Shultz interviewed for West European pool
television

- o Assistant Secretary Ridgway interviewed on Worldnet and by
Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung

- o Ambassador Kampelman available for regional domestic media
interviews

- o Ambassador Nitze interviewed by foreign journalists in his
office

- o Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons and Deputy Assistant
Secretary Thomas available via satellite telephone hook-up to
East/West journalists

- o Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons to be interviewed by Des
Moines Register

- o Background briefing at the Foreign Press Center by:
 Ambassador Rowny
 Deputy Assistant Secretary Simons

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 4, 1987

- o 2:00 p.m. Backgrounder on regional issues in White House Briefing Room by:
 - Robert Oakley, NSC
 - Peter Rodman, NSC
 - Jim Kelly, NSC
 - Jose Sorzano, NSC

- o Assistant Secretary Ridgway to meet with Soviet and Soviet Bloc reporters

- o 3:30 p.m. Secretary Shultz speech to the Washington World Affairs Council

- o Assistant Secretary Ridgway interviewed on "MacNeil-Lehrer"

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 5, 1987

- o 11:00 a.m. Briefings at Summit Press Center (Commerce Department) by:
 - Marlin Fitzwater
 - Under Secretary Armacost
 - Assistant Secretary Ridgway
 - Assistant Secretary Schifter

(POOL TV COVERAGE, PIPED INTO WHITE HOUSE BRIEFING ROOM)

- o 12:06 p.m. THE PRESIDENT MAKES RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION. THE OVAL OFFICE.

- o Ambassador Matlock or Deputy Assistant Secretary of State Simons interviewed on CNN "Newsmaker"

- o VOA "Press Conference USA" with Assistant Secretary Ridgway (or Ambassador Nitze or Ambassador Kampelman)

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 6, 1987

- o Sunday Talk Shows:
 - ABC "This Week with David Brinkley": Secretary Shultz
 - CBS "Face the Nation": Ambassador Kampelman
 - NBC "Meet the Press": Senator Baker
 - CNN "Newsmaker": Former Secretary Carlucci
 - ABC "The Jennings/Koppel Report": Former Secretary Weinberger

- o 2:00 p.m. Background Briefing on U.S.-Soviet Educational, Cultural and Scientific Exchanges. Summit Press Center.

- o Demonstration in Lafayette Park. The Vice President and Senator Dole to attend. A Presidential message will be read.

- o PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN HOST RECEPTION FOR KENNEDY CENTER HONOREES.

- o THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN ATTEND KENNEDY CENTER GALA.

(POOL COVERAGE)

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8, 1987

- o 3:30 a.m. CBS "Nightwatch": Pre-taped interview with Senator Baker to air.

- o "CBS This Morning": Former Secretary Weinberger interviewed.

- o 10:00 a.m. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN GREET GENERAL SECRETARY AND MRS. GORBACHEV. SOUTH GROUNDS.

(PRESS POOL COVERAGE)

- o 10:30 a.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HOLD FIRST MEETING. OVAL OFFICE.

(POOL COVERAGE AT BEGINNING)

- o 12 noon THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV CONCLUDE MEETING. OVAL OFFICE.

(STILL PHOTOGRAPHERS ONLY)

- o 12 noon Marlin Fitzwater and Soviet Spokesman Gennady Gerasimov to brief at Summit Press Center.

- o 1:45 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV SIGN INF TREATY. EAST ROOM.

(POOL AND LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE)

- o 2:10 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV BROADCAST MESSAGES TO THE AMERICAN AND SOVIET PEOPLE.

(LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE)

- o 2:35 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV HOLD SECOND MEETING. OVAL OFFICE.

(CLOSED PRESS COVERAGE)

- o 3:00 p.m. Ambassador Glitman to hold on-the-record (but not for sound or camera) briefing on the INF Treaty. Summit Press Center.

- o State Department Call-out to Regional Newspapers and Radio Station Editorial Boards on INF Treaty.

TUESDAY, DECEMBER 8 (continued)

- o 3:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV CONCLUDE MEETING.
- o 4:30 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev meets with 50-60 members of Intellectual Community. Soviet Embassy.
- o 5:00 p.m. Marlin Fitzwater and Gennady Gerasimov to brief at the Summit Press Center.
- o Evening News Shows:
 - ABC "World News Tonight": Senator Baker
 - CBS "Evening News": Secretary Shultz
 - NBC "Nightly News": Secretary Carlucci
 - CNN: Secretary Carlucci
 - USIA "America Today": Ambassador Nitze
- o 7:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN HOST DINNER FOR GENERAL SECRETARY AND MRS. GORBACHEV. STATE DINING ROOM.

(POOL COVERAGE OF ARRIVAL, PRESIDENT'S
REMARKS AND TOAST)

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9, 1987

- o Morning News Shows:
ABC "Good Morning America": Ambassador Kampelman
"CBS This Morning": The Vice President
NBC "Today": Assistant Secretary Ridgway
CNN: Secretary Shultz
USIA "America Today": Director Adelman

- o Morning. General Secretary Gorbachev to meet with Congressional Leadership. Soviet Embassy.

- o 10:30 a.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO HOLD THIRD MEETING. OVAL OFFICE.

(POOL COVERAGE AT BEGINNING ONLY)

- o 12:00 noon Marlin Fitzwater and Gennady Gerasimov to brief at the International Press Center.

- o 12:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV CONCLUDE MEETING.

- o 1:00 p.m. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev attend luncheon hosted by Secretary and Mrs. Shultz. State Department.

(POOL COVERAGE ARRANGED BY STATE)

- o Afternoon. THE PRESIDENT INTERVIEWED BY CONSERVATIVE COLUMNISTS. OVAL OFFICE.

- o 3:30 p.m. Mrs. Reagan to host a private tea and tour for Mrs. Gorbachev. Residence.

- o 4:00 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev to meet with representatives of the American Newspaper Publishers Association. Soviet Embassy.

- o 5:00 p.m. Marlin Fitzwater and Gennady Gorbachev to brief at the Summit Press Center.

WEDNESDAY, DECEMBER 9 (continued)

- o Evening News Shows:
 - ABC "World News Tonight": Secretary Shultz
 - CBS "Evening News": Secretary Carlucci
 - NBC "Nightly News": Senator Baker

- o 7:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN ATTEND DINNER HOSTED BY GENERAL SECRETARY AND MRS. GORBACHEV. SOVIET EMBASSY.

(POOL COVERAGE OF RECEIVING LINE AND TOASTS)

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10, 1987

- Morning News Shows:
ABC "Good Morning America": Secretary Shultz
"CBS This Morning": Senator Baker
NBC "Today": The Vice President
CNN: Ambassador Kampelman
USIA "America Today": Ambassador Glitman

- 9:00 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev to meet with Vice President Bush at Soviet Embassy.

(POOL COVERAGE)

- 9:15 a.m. General Secretary Gorbachev and the Vice President to have breakfast meeting with selected Americans. Soviet Embassy.

(POOL COVERAGE)

- 10:30 a.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV TO HOLD FOURTH MEETING. OVAL OFFICE.

(STILL PHOTOGRAPHERS ONLY)

- 12 noon THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV CONCLUDE MEETING.

- 12:00 noon Marlin Fitzwater and Gennady Gerasimov brief at the Summit Press Center.

- 12:05 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN AND GENERAL SECRETARY AND MRS. GORBACHEV ATTEND WORKING LUNCH. OLD FAMILY DINING ROOM.

(POOL COVERAGE AT BEGINNING)

- 2:00 p.m. THE PRESIDENT AND GENERAL SECRETARY GORBACHEV MAKE DEPARTURE STATEMENTS. SOUTH GROUNDS.

(POOL AND LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE)

- 3:00 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev to host meeting with industry and business community. New Soviet Embassy.

THURSDAY, DECEMBER 10 (continued)

- o 3:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT PARTICIPATES IN HUMAN RIGHTS DAY EVENT. OVAL OFFICE.

(POOL COVERAGE)

- o 4:00 p.m. Background Briefings at Summit Press Center by Senior Administration Officials on:
 - o Human Rights
 - o Bilateral Issues
 - o Regional Issues
 - o Arms Control

- o 5:30 p.m. General Secretary Gorbachev to hold press conference. New Soviet Embassy.

(POOL AND LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE)

- o 8:00 p.m. General Secretary and Mrs. Gorbachev depart. Andrews Air Force Base.

(POOL AND LIVE TELEVISION COVERAGE)

- o 9:00 p.m. PRESIDENT TO ADDRESS THE NATION. OVAL OFFICE.

FRIDAY, DECEMBER 11, 1987

- o Morning News Shows:
ABC "Good Morning America": The Vice President
"CBS This Morning": General Powell
NBC "Today": Ambassador Kampelman or Secretary Carlucci
CNN: General Powell
USIA America Today: Ambassador Kampelman

- o 9:30 a.m. THE PRESIDENT MEETS WITH MEMBERS OF CONGRESS.
CABINET ROOM.

- o 1:30 p.m. THE PRESIDENT ADDRESS REGIONAL PRESS BRIEFING.
ROOM 450 EOB.

- o General Powell backgrounder with magazines

- o Afternoon. THE PRESIDENT AND MRS. REAGAN DEPART FOR CAMP
DAVID.

SATURDAY, DECEMBER 12, 1987

- o 12:06 p.m. THE PRESIDENT MAKES RADIO ADDRESS TO THE NATION.
CAMP DAVID.

- o CNN "Newsmaker": Assistant Secretary Schifter interviewed

SUNDAY, DECEMBER 13, 1987

- o Sunday News Shows
 - ABC "This Week with David Brinkley": General Powell
 - CBS "Face the Nation":
 - NBC "Meet the Press": Vice President Bush
 - CNN "Newsmaker": Senator Baker

- o Op-Ed pieces:
 - Secretary Shultz -- New York Times
 - Secretary Carlucci -- Washington Post
 - General Powell -- Los Angeles Times

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

December 3, 1987

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMINISTRATION SPOKESPERSONS

FROM: MARION C. BLAKEY *MCB*
DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC AFFAIRS

SUBJECT: SUMMIT AND INF ISSUES

Attached for your information and use are Talking Points that explain the President's position on arms reduction in the upcoming INF talks.

If you have any questions concerning these materials, please feel free to contact the White House Office of Public Affairs at (202) 456-7170.

Thanks very much.

December 3, 1987

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

THE PRESIDENT'S RESOLVE: PAYING DIVIDENDS FOR PEACE

THE INF TREATY

"I believe our strategy for peace will succeed.... The Soviet Union has thus far shown little inclination to take this major step to zero levels (on INF). Yet I believe ...that as the talks proceed...the Soviet leaders will see the benefits of such a far-reaching agreement."

--- President Reagan
November 22, 1982

President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Mikhail Gorbachev will soon sign an historic agreement eliminating an entire class of U.S. and Soviet intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles.

The President's long-term resolve on arms reduction is paying dividends for peace.

- o At the outset, President Reagan established as one of his highest priorities the achievement of deep, equitable, stabilizing, and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arsenals. He was convinced such reductions would be a vital component in the effort to reduce the risk of war.
- o On November 18, 1981, the President first proposed his "zero option" plan for INF, the basis for the present agreement. He was prepared to cancel deployment of U.S. Pershing II and ground-launch cruise missiles in Europe if the Soviets would dismantle their SS-20, SS-4, and SS-5 missiles.
- o On May 9, 1982, the President announced his plan for significant reductions in strategic forces (START). The U.S. has proposed 50 percent reductions in U.S. and Soviet strategic nuclear forces.
- o These two major proposals, strengthening our strategic deterrent, and our investigation -- through the Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) -- of ways to move deterrence increasingly to reliance on defenses, form the cornerstone of President Reagan's national security strategy.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o Though an agreement on INF is now at hand and the Soviets have expressed a desire to accelerate strategic arms reduction negotiations (START), the road to progress has not been an easy one. Some 6 years have passed since the President announced his zero option proposal for INF. Three Soviet leaders have passed away during this period.
- o While many applauded the President's arms reduction strategy in those early days, some skeptics viewed his proposals as too extreme or as mere "propaganda ploys," advanced only because the President "knew" the Soviets would "never" accept them.
- o President Reagan held fast to his belief that his was the course that would lead to meaningful arms reductions.
 - He understood that a "freeze" on deployment of nuclear weapons, as was proposed by some in Congress in 1982, would merely have preserved certain dangerous imbalances of nuclear forces in favor of the Soviets at the time.
- o The Soviets walked out of the INF talks in 1983 and refused to set a date for resumption of the recessed START talks. It was not until January 1985, when they finally became convinced their ploy would not work, that the Soviets agreed to return to the talks.
 - Two key factors contributed to the Soviet return to the negotiating table: NATO unity on INF and the U.S. SDI program.
- o At the Geneva Summit of November 1985, President Reagan's perseverance began to pay off. General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to the principle of an interim agreement on INF and to the principle of a 50 percent reduction in strategic nuclear arms (START).
- o Further progress was achieved at the October 1986 meeting of President Reagan and Mr. Gorbachev in Iceland. The U.S. and the Soviet Union made major progress toward an INF agreement and also agreed on certain key aspects of a 50 percent strategic nuclear arms reduction agreement.
- o However, Mr. Gorbachev linked agreement in these areas to his terms on the President's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI), which would have effectively killed the program, perpetuating the Soviet advantage in strategic defenses and America's vulnerability to Soviet missiles.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o President Reagan held firm to his position that where the security of the American people and our allies is involved, no agreement is better than a bad agreement.
- o During the September 1987 visit of Soviet Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, The Soviets agreed in principle to conclude an INF agreement. Yet, in late October, Mr. Gorbachev refused to set a date for the Summit, saying he was "not comfortable" in coming to Washington to sign an agreement in the absence of U.S. concessions on the Strategic Defense Initiative.
- o Again, President Reagan held firm and Mr. Gorbachev soon reconsidered and agreed to the December Summit.
- o The impending step in our efforts to build a more secure peace is clearly the result of President Reagan's vision and resolve.
 - The President established clear objectives and held to them.
 - By modernizing our strategic deterrent, keeping our strong commitment to SDI, and strengthening NATO's posture of deterrence and defense, the President has provided the basis for significant progress in other areas as well.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

THE INF TREATY

"Achievements like (the INF Treaty) are not the result of wishful thinking, nor are they made more likely by loud proclamations of a desire for peace. Lasting progress derives from hardnosed realism, strenuous effort, and firmness of principle. I can assure you that any treaty I sign will be realistic and in the long-term interest of all members of the (NATO) alliance."

--- President Reagan
November 4, 1987

The INF Treaty to be signed by President Reagan and Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev will eliminate -- for the first time in history -- an entire class of U.S. and Soviet nuclear weapons: intermediate-range nuclear force (INF) missiles. This is the first agreement in history to actually reduce, not simply limit, the buildup of nuclear weapons. Furthermore, almost four deployed Soviet warheads will be eliminated for every one the U.S. eliminates.

- o Arms reduction treaties such as INF are not an end in themselves, but rather a key element of President Reagan's strategy to ensure our national security.
- o Through arms reductions, the President seeks to enhance strategic stability at lower levels of military forces, thus reducing the risk of conflict.
- o Such reductions will establish a foundation of mutual restraint and responsibility that will help us build a safer world.

The main provisions of the INF Treaty call for:

- o Elimination of all U.S. and Soviet ground-launched INF missiles (range: 300-3400 miles) within three years after the treaty enters into force;
- o A ban on all production and flight testing of treaty-limited systems; and
- o Cessation of all training, repair, storage, or deployment of treaty-limited items after elimination is completed.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

The INF Treaty is in the security interests of the U.S. and our allies.

- o The Soviets will eliminate over 1500 deployed INF nuclear warheads -- the U.S. will eliminate about 400. Both sides will also destroy hundreds more non-deployed INF missiles and launchers.
- o The treaty bans any future deployment of Soviet INF missiles, including its newly developed ground-launched cruise missile (GLCM). Deployment of Soviet GLCMs would have seriously complicated NATO's air defense situation.
- o Removal of Soviet INF will enhance NATO's ability to reinforce its conventional forces by eliminating Soviet weapons of choice against key NATO ports and airfields.
- o The Treaty affirms the principle of asymmetrical reductions to achieve equal U.S.- Soviet levels which is an important precedent for future arms control negotiations in both the nuclear and conventional fields.

The INF Treaty is consistent with the long-held United States position in key areas of the negotiations. This success is a direct consequence of President Reagan's steadfast commitment to real arms reductions and the solid support of our NATO allies for these objectives:

- o Longer-range INF missiles (LRINF): Since formal talks with the Soviet Union began in November 1981, the U.S. has sought to eliminate all U.S. and Soviet LRINF missile systems. This was the President's original "zero option" proposal. In July 1987, the Soviets finally agreed to eliminate these systems;
- o Shorter-range INF missiles (SRINF): Since the negotiations began, the U.S. has insisted that an INF agreement must constrain shorter-range INF missiles to prevent circumvention of an accord on LRINF missiles by a Soviet buildup of SRINF systems. The Soviet agreement to eliminate all SRINF missiles is an integral part of the INF accord and satisfies this U.S. requirement. (The U.S. has no SRINF systems.);
- o Reductions on a global basis: The U.S. has long insisted that any limitations on INF missiles must be global to prevent the transfer of the threat from one region to another. The Soviets have accepted this in the context of global elimination of both categories of U.S. and Soviet INF missiles, a concept known as "global double zero;"

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o Equality between the U.S. and U.S.S.R. on all rights and limits;
- o Bilateral Negotiations to Include Only U.S. and Soviet Systems: Throughout the negotiations, the U.S. made clear that bilateral agreements between the U.S. and the Soviets cannot constrain our allies' or other countries' forces, nor affect existing programs of cooperation with our allies. The INF Treaty is true to this principle; and
- o No Adverse effect on NATO's Conventional Forces -- above all on dual-capable (nuclear and conventional) aircraft.

The INF Treaty is a triumph for the NATO alliance.

- o The success of the INF negotiations has been made possible by Western determination to adhere to NATO's 1979 "dual track" decision to respond to Soviet SS-20 deployments through deployment of U.S. longer-range INF missiles, while seeking to negotiate with the Soviets to reach an INF balance at the lowest possible level.
- o NATO steadfastness has paid off -- the INF Treaty achieves the elimination of the special threat to NATO security posed by Soviet INF missiles. This includes the elimination of triple-warhead Soviet SS-20 missiles which have been targeted against our friends and allies both in Europe and Asia.
- o NATO has enhanced the credibility of its deterrence by demonstrating convincingly to the Soviets that it has the political will to make and stand by the tough decisions necessary to ensure its security.

Finally, and most importantly, the INF Treaty is not based on trust in the Soviets, but on the most stringent verification regime in the history of arms control. (see "INF VERIFICATION")

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

INF VERIFICATION

"Any new treaty will contain iron-clad provisions for effective verification including on-site inspection of facilities before and during reductions and short-notice inspections afterward."

--- President Reagan
November 4, 1987

The INF Treaty contains the most stringent verification regime of any arms control agreement in history.

The verification procedures insisted on by President Reagan reflect his longstanding concern that any arms control agreement must be effectively verifiable if it is to improve stability and to make a lasting contribution to peace and security. The President made it clear he would settle for nothing less and has achieved this goal.

The President had three basic verification objectives for the INF agreement:

- o First, to ensure confidence in the agreement;
- o Second, to deter Soviet violations of the treaty by increasing the likelihood that such violations would be detected; and
- o Third, to permit timely detection of any Soviet violations so that we can take appropriate measures to protect U.S. and allied security.

The key elements of the INF verification regime include:

- o Exchange of comprehensive data on treaty-limited systems;
- o Initial "baseline" on-site inspections to check number of missiles and launchers;
- o On-site inspections to verify elimination of treaty-limited systems, and verify that INF-related activity has ceased at declared sites;
- o Short-notice, on-site inspection of declared INF facilities suspected of illegal activity during the three-year reductions period and for ten years afterward;

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o A prohibition on interference with verification by satellite photography (national technical means [NTM]);
- o For 13 years after the INF Treaty enters into force, the U.S. will continuously monitor, with permanent on-site American personnel, the factory where Soviet SS-20 missiles have been assembled and where the Soviets now assemble SS-25 intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs), which are similar in some ways to SS-20s; and
- o The Soviets must, on short notice, open to satellite photography (NTM) former SS-20 bases used for SS-25s.

The comprehensiveness of the INF verification regime has positive implications for future arms reduction agreements as well.

- o Above all, it sets a positive precedent for our verification demands in a strategic arms reduction regime (START), although the different conditions of START will require a different regime.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

THE IMPORTANCE OF SDI

"What is totally unacceptable...is the Soviet tactic of holding...reductions hostage to measures that would cripple our Strategic Defense Initiative.... We won't bargain away SDI."

--- President Reagan
November 4, 1987

President Reagan's Strategic Defense Initiative (SDI) offers our best hope of a safer world -- where our security and that of our allies would no longer rest on deterrence through the threat of mass annihilation.

The Reagan Administration has had a well-defined strategy for countering the threat posed by the Soviet offensive nuclear buildup. Our goal is to build a safer peace and to ensure a stable strategic balance over the long term.

This strategy has three key elements:

- o Modernization of our strategic deterrent because, to keep the peace, we still rely on the threat of retaliation with nuclear weapons;
- o Pursuit of deep, equitable, and effectively verifiable reductions in U.S. and Soviet nuclear arms; and
- o The search, through the U.S. Strategic Defense Initiative, for a safer and morally preferable means to deter war, by increasing reliance on defenses to enhance our security.

SDI is a research and technology program to demonstrate, by the early 1990s, the feasibility of effective defenses against ballistic missiles for the U.S. and our allies. The most promising concepts involve layered defenses for intercepting an attacker's missiles in all phases of their flight -- boost, mid-course, and terminal.

- o Our commitment to SDI is firm. As the President has stated: "SDI is not a bargaining chip. It is a cornerstone of our security strategy for the 1990s and beyond. We will research it. We will develop it. And when it is ready, we'll deploy it."

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

SDI serves a number of vital purposes:

- o Through SDI, we seek a defensive means of deterring aggression based on systems protecting the U.S. and our allies against ballistic missile attack.
- o SDI helped to bring the Soviets back to the nuclear arms negotiating table in early 1985, after their late-1983 walkout.
- o SDI underwrites the integrity of any new arms agreements by diminishing Soviet incentives to cheat. The record of Soviet violations of past arms control agreements makes this especially important.
- o SDI provides a strong incentive to the Soviets to agree to the President's proposal to reduce strategic arms by 50 percent.
 - Even if 50 percent strategic arms cuts are achieved, SDI will remain essential in persuading the Soviets to reduce further.
- o Finally, SDI is insurance against an accidental missile launch or possible future ballistic threats -- nuclear, conventional, or chemical -- from outlaw countries.
- o The potential benefits of SDI far outweigh the dollar costs. Expenditures for SDI from fiscal years 1984 through 1988 will amount to about \$12 billion, or approximately \$13.00 per year for each American citizen -- a small price to pay for a safer future.

The importance of SDI is underscored by the Soviets' long-standing and extensive strategic defense programs.

- o In contrast to our own far more modest expenditures, the Soviets have spent roughly \$200 billion on their strategic defense programs over the last ten years, roughly the same as they have spent on their strategic offensive forces.

The Soviets' programs include:

- o The world's only anti-ballistic missile defenses, surrounding Moscow, which the Soviets are steadily improving;
- o Construction of a large, phased-array radar near Krasnoyarsk, in violation of the 1972 Anti-Ballistic Missile Treaty; and

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o Research, development, and testing, including a \$1 billion annual program on laser weapons -- employing some 10,000 skilled scientists and engineers.

We cannot let the Soviets have a monopoly on strategic defenses.

- o Possessed by both sides, strategic defense systems can be stabilizing and reduce the threat of war. Possessed by the Soviets alone, such systems would threaten peace by undermining the credibility of our deterrent.

-- This would be devastating to Western security.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

INF IS ONLY A BEGINNING

"We will continue to pursue the goal of arms reduction, particularly the goal that the General Secretary (Gorbachev) and I agreed to: a 50 percent reduction in our respective strategic nuclear arms.... We look forward to a time when things we now regard as sources of friction can become examples of cooperation between ourselves and the Soviet Union."

--- President Reagan
September 21, 1987

The INF agreement is a step toward a more secure peace, but only a first step. In the continuing effort to achieve a safer world, the Reagan Administration, along with our allies, has engaged the Soviet Union and other Warsaw Pact states on a wide range of arms reduction issues.

Strategic nuclear arms, conventional forces, chemical weapons, nuclear testing, and defense and space are all being addressed with the Soviets and with other countries.

Strategic Nuclear Arms (START)

- o President Reagan places the highest priority on efforts to reach an equitable and effectively verifiable agreement with the Soviets for deep reductions in strategic nuclear arms (START).
- o The President places particular emphasis on reductions in the most destabilizing of nuclear arms -- fast-flying ballistic missiles, especially large, intercontinental ballistic missiles (ICBMs) with multiple warheads.
- o At the 1985 Geneva Summit, Soviet General Secretary Gorbachev agreed to the principle of a 50 percent reduction of strategic nuclear arms. In Iceland last year, the two leaders reached major new areas of agreement on the nature of a strategic reduction regime.
- o On May 8, 1987, the U.S. presented a draft treaty at the START negotiations in Geneva. The U.S. draft treaty reflects the basic areas of agreement reached by President Reagan and General Secretary Gorbachev in Iceland and provides for roughly 50 percent reductions in strategic offensive nuclear arms to equal levels for both sides.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o The U.S. draft treaty provides a solid basis for the creation of a fair and durable START agreement.
- o President Reagan believes a START agreement could be reached next year, but only if the Soviets apply themselves with the same seriousness as the United States and only if the Soviets drop their insistence that we accept measures that would kill or cripple SDI.
- o The President has made it clear that because of the importance of SDI to the future security of the U.S. and our allies, the program must move forward.

Conventional Forces and Chemical Weapons

- o At their Iceland meeting in June 1987, NATO foreign ministers set as a priority the effort to redress the serious imbalances in conventional forces and chemical weapons in favor of the Warsaw Pact.
- o Western security has long been threatened by Warsaw Pact conventional superiority based primarily on massive, forward-deployed, offensively configured Soviet armored forces in Eastern Europe. The conventional imbalance derives not only from Eastern numerical superiority in key categories of combat capability, but also from geographic and other non-quantitative advantages.
- o Today, as a result of the unilateral restraint exercised by the U.S. and the intensive Soviet chemical weapons modernization program, there is a serious East-West imbalance in these weapons. The Soviets possess a formidable, modern arsenal including what is by far the world's largest chemical weapons stockpile, while the U.S. capability -- largely unusable and dating from the 1940s and 1950s -- has lost much of its deterrent value against first use of chemical weapons.
- o The Reagan Administration is addressing these concerns by seeking U.S. and NATO force improvements, pursuing the East-West Mutual and Balanced Force Reductions (MBFR) negotiations in Vienna, seeking Warsaw Pact agreement on a mandate for new conventional stability negotiations covering for the first time the entire area from the Atlantic Ocean to the Ural Mountains, and pursuing an effective ban on chemical weapons.
- o During the September visit of Foreign Minister Shevardnadze, both sides agreed to work with their respective allies to move forward with dispatch in the Vienna talks on the mandate for new conventional stability negotiations.

WHITE HOUSE TALKING POINTS

- o Substantial progress has been made on U.S.- U.S.S.R. bilateral data exchange regarding chemical weapons. Both sides have recognized the goal of an effective, verifiable global ban on chemical weapons.

Nuclear Testing

- o President Reagan is committed to seeking effective and verifiable agreements with the Soviets on nuclear testing limitations that could strengthen security for all nations.
- o At the conclusion of his September visit, Foreign Minister Shevardnadze and Secretary of State George Shultz issued a statement agreeing to begin before December 1, 1987, full-scale stage-by-stage negotiations on nuclear testing.
- o As the first step in these negotiations, the two sides will agree upon effective verification measures which will make it possible to ratify the U.S.- U.S.S.R. Threshold Test Ban Treaty of 1974 and the Peaceful Explosions Treaty of 1976.
- o The first round of these negotiations was held in Geneva from November 9-20, 1987. The two sides agreed to visit each other's nuclear test sites in early 1988 to familiarize themselves with the conditions and operations at those test sites. The negotiations will resume thereafter.

Defense and Space

- o At the Defense and Space talks, the U.S. has endeavored to discuss with the Soviets how, if we establish the feasibility of effective strategic defenses (SDI), the U.S. and U.S.S.R. could jointly manage a stable transition to a deterrence based increasingly on defenses rather than on the threat of retaliation by offensive nuclear weapons.
- o In an effort to reach agreement with the Soviets on Defense and Space, the U.S. has made a number of constructive proposals. Many differences continue to separate the two sides, however, including Soviet efforts to place restrictions on the SDI program that go beyond those in the existing Anti-Ballistic Missile (ABM) Treaty. The U.S. has made it clear that it will not accept any restrictions on SDI beyond those actually agreed to in the ABM treaty.

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Date: 12/4/87

FOR: *Tom Galscom*

FROM JACK L. COURTEMANCHE

- Action
- Your Comment
- Let's Talk
- FYI

from the Soviets -

Tuesday
December 8th

4:30 p.m.

LIST OF PARTICIPANTS OF THE MEETING OF
M.S.GORBACHEV WITH THE REPRESENTATIVES
OF AMERICAN PUBLIC FIGURES

American Participants:

1. Mr. McGeorge BUNDY
2. Dr. Daniel L. BRATTON
3. Mr. Cyrus VANCE
4. Mrs. Pamela HARRIMAN
5. Mr. Erwin GRISWOLD
6. Mr. Thomas GITTINS
7. Dr. William GRAHAM
8. Mr. Arthur Macy COX
9. Bishop CLEMENT
10. Mr. George F. KENNAN
11. Admiral Gene LAROCQUE
12. Mr. Robert S. McNAMARA
13. Ms. Karen MULHAUSER
14. Mrs. Patricia MONTANDON
15. Dr. Henry KISSINGER
16. Mr. Peter PETERSON
17. Mr. Willian Green MILLER
18. Ms. Phyllis V. ROBERTS
19. Mr. John RANDOLPH
20. Mr. Brent SCOWCROFT
21. Mr. Wayne SMITH
22. Mr. Alan THOMSON
23. Mr. William W. WINPISINGER
24. Mr. Paul WARNKE
25. Mr. Thomas WATSON Jr.
26. Mr. J.W. FULBRIGHT
27. Mr. Gus HALL
28. Rabbi SCHNEIER
29. Miss Susan EISENHOWER

30. Mr. Robert ADAMS
31. Dr. David BALTIMORE
32. Dr. Seweryn BIALER
33. Dr. Jerome WIESNER
34. Mr. David HAMBURG
35. Dr. Richard GARWIN
36. Prof. John Kenneth GALBRAITH
37. Dr. Tom COCHRAN
38. Mr. Stamatios KRIMIGIS
39. Dr. Bernard LAWN
40. Prof. Wassily LEONTIEF
41. Dr. Wolfgang PANOFSKY
42. Dr. Frank PRESS
43. Mr. Isador I. RABI
44. Prof. Carl SAGAN
45. Dr. Jeremy J. STONE
46. Dr. Alvin TRIVELPIECE
47. Dr. George WALD
48. Dr. Frank von HIPPEL
49. Mr. Marshall SHULMAN
50. Dr. Sidney DRELL
51. Mr. John DENVER
52. Mr. Robert De NIRO
53. Mrs. Bel KAUFMAN
54. Mr. Norman COUSINS
55. Mr. Norman MAILER
56. Mr. Paul NEWMAN
57. Miss Yoko ONO
58. Mrs. Joyce Carol OATES
59. Mr. Sidney POLLACK
60. Mr. William STYRON

Soviet participants;

1. Mr. Eduard SHEVARDNADZE
2. Mr. Alexander YAKOVLEV
3. Mr. Anatoly DOBRYNIN
4. Mr. Vladimir KAMENTSEV
5. Mr. Sergei AKHROMEEV
6. Mr. Anatoly CHERNYAEV
7. Mr. Valery BOLDIN
8. Mr. Nikolay KRUCHINA
9. Mr. Yuri DUBININ
10. Mr. Georgy ARBATOV
11. Mr. Abel AGANBEGYAN
12. Mr. Evgeny VELIKHOV
13. Mr. Vladimir KUDRYAVTSEV
14. Mr. Evgeny PRIMAKOV
15. Mr. Roald SAGDEEV
16. Mr. Sergei ZALYGIN
17. Mr. Mikhail ULYANOV

PUBLISHERS,
EDITORS AND REPRESENTATIVES OF MASS MEDIA

Wednesday
December 9th

4:30 p.m.

1. Mrs. Cornilia Bessie Harper & Row Publishers
2. Mr. Michael Bessie
3. Mr. Stewart Richardson Publisher, "Richardson and Steirman"
4. Mr. Nicholas Veliotes President, Association of American publishers
5. Ms. Betty Smith President International Publishers
6. Mr. Gerard Piel Chairman Emeritus Scientific American
7. Mr. Martin Tash Chairman of the Board Plenum Publishing Corporation
8. Mr. Robert L. Bernstein Chairman of the Board & President Random House
9. Mr. David Cohen Collins Publishers
10. Mr. Alberto Vitale President Bantam-Doubleday-Dell Publishing Inc.
11. Mr. Jason McManus Time Incorporated
12. Mr. Richard M. Smith Editor-in-Chief, Newsweek
13. Mr. Max Frankel Editor-in-Chief The New York Times
14. Mr. Mortimer B. Zuckerman Publisher U.S. News and World Report
15. Mr. Stephen B. Shepard Editor-in-Chief Business Week
16. Mr. John Quin Editor-in-Chief USA Today
17. Mr. R.E. Turner President, WTBS
18. Mr. T. Murphy Chairman of the Board, ABC

Thursday
December 10th

3:00 p.m.

1. Mr. C. E. Acker
2. Mr. Robert Anderson
3. Mr. Dwayne Andreas
4. Mr. William Andrews
5. Mr. Rand Araskog
6. Mr. James E. Burke
7. Mr. D. Wayne Calloway
8. Mr. Simon Chilevich
9. Mr. John Chrystal
10. Mr. Lodwick M. Cook
11. Mr. James E. Cunningham
12. Mr. Douglas D. Danforth
- 12-a Mr. Armand Hammer
14. Mr. Richard E. Heckert
15. Mr. Edward L. Hennessy
16. Mr. Barron Hilton
17. Mr. Thomas A. Holmes
18. Mr. James R. Houghton
19. Mr. Charles E. Hugel
20. Mr. Michael V. Forrestal
21. Mr. Michael Eribourg
22. Mr. James H. Giffen
23. Mr. Guilford Glazer
24. Mr. Morris R. Greenberg
25. Mr. John H. Gutfreund
26. Mr. Allen F. Jacobson
27. Mr. Ross Johnson
28. Mr. David Kearns

30. Robert D. Kennedy
31. Mr. Donald R. Keough
32. Mr. Walter C. Klein
33. Mr. Thomas Labreque
34. Mr. William E. LaMot
- 35 Mr. Robert J. Lanigan
36. Mr. Leonard Lauder
37. Mr. Robert H. Malott
38. Mr. Richard J. Mahoney
39. Mr. Whitley Mc Millan
40. Mr. Hamish Maxwell
41. Mr. John J. Murphy
42. Mr. Ara Oztemel
43. Mr. Donald E. Peterson
44. Mr. John A. Petti
45. Mr. Robert McCollum Price
46. Mr. David Rockefeller
47. Mr. Felix Rohatyn
48. Mr. Steven J. Ross
49. Mr. Arnold Saltzman
50. Mr. Charles Sanford Jr.
51. Mr. Henry Schacht
52. Mr. George A. Schaefer
53. Mr. Robert A. Schoellhorn
54. Mr. S. J. Silas
55. Mr. Edson Spenser
56. Mr. William P. Stiritz
57. Mr. David Svanson
58. Mr. Barry F. Sullivan

59. Mr. Alexander B. Trowbridge

60. Mr. R.E. Turner

61. Mr. Richard D. Wood

62. Mr A.W. Clausen

63. Mr James Robinson

Thursday
Dec. 10th

10:30 am

— Mrs. Gorbachev —

LIST OF THE REPRESENTATIVES OF
ARMENIAN GENERAL BENEVOLENT UNION
(December 10, 10.30-11.00 a.m.)

1. Mr. Alex MANOOGIAN
2. Mrs. Marie MANOOGIAN
3. Mrs. Louise Simone MANOOGIAN
4. Mr. Andrew SHAHINIAN
5. Mrs. Alice SHAHINIAN
6. Mr. Calouste SOGOIAN
7. Mrs. Emma SOGOIAN

Wednesday Dec. 9th

1:00 p.m.

LUNCHEON
AT THE STATE DEPARTMENT, HOSTED BY THE
SECRETARY OF STATE

From the Soviet Side:

1. Mikhail S.GORBACHEV
2. Raisa M.GORBACHEVA
3. EDUARD A.SHEVARDNADZE
4. Alexander N.YAKOVLEV
5. Anatoly F.DOBRYNIN
6. Vladimir M.KAMENTSEV
7. Sergei F.AKHROMEEV
8. Anatoly S.CHERNYAEV
9. Valery I.BOLDIN
10. Nikolay E.KRUCHINA
11. Albert I.VLASOV
12. Alexander A.BESSMERTNYKH
13. Vladimir A.KRYUCHKOV
14. Yuri V.DUBININ
15. Liana Z.DUBININA
16. Teimuraz G.STEPANOV
17. Sergei P.TARASENKO
18. Victor P.KARPOV
19. Alexei A.OBUKHOV
20. Georgi A.ARBATOV

21. Vitali S.GUSENKOV
22. Abel G.AGANBEGYAN
23. Evgeny P.VELIKHOV
24. Vladimir N.KUDRYAVTSEV
25. Evgeny M.PRIMAKOV
26. Roald Z.SAGDEEV
27. Stepan A.SITARYAN
28. Nikolai F.CHERVOV
29. Sergei P.ZALYGIN
30. Mikhail A.ULYANOV
31. Evgeny G.KUTOVOY
32. Sergei B.CHETVERIKOV