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February 27, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES

SUBJECT: Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy ✓

During the Cabinet meeting yesterday, the President requested that a Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy be established to review the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy Report which should be submitted to the Vice President. The Task Force was also requested to review the programs and policies of the Immigration and Naturalization Service. The President indicated that the Task Force would be chaired by the Attorney General with members to include the Secretaries of State, Labor, and Health and Human Services. In addition, a member of the White House staff will be designated to serve on the Task Force.

The President requested a report by April 3, 1981.

I will forward to each of you a copy of the report from the Select Commission on Immigration and Refugee Policy as well as any additional background materials we have available.

Craig L. Fuller
Director
Office of Cabinet Administration

cc: Martin Anderson
Ed Harper
Ed Gray
Richard Darman
Daniel Murphy
Richard Allen
Frank Hodsoll

Cribb FYI

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

CABINET ADMINISTRATION STAFFING MEMORANDUM

DATE: March 5, 1981 ✓ NUMBER: 126 CA DUE BY: _____

SUBJECT: Presidential Memo creating Task Force on Immigration & Refugee Policy

	ACTION	FYI		ACTION	FYI
ALL CABINET MEMBERS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Baker	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Vice President	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Deaver	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
State	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Allen	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Treasury	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Anderson	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Defense	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Garrick	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Attorney General	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Darman (<i>For WH Staffing</i>)	<input checked="" type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Interior	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Gray	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Agriculture	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	Beal	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Commerce	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
Labor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HHS	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>	_____	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>
HUD	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Transportation	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Energy	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Education	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
Counsellor	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
OMB	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
CIA	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
UN	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
USTR	<input type="checkbox"/>	<input type="checkbox"/>			
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Remarks: For President's Signature.

RETURN TO: Craig L. Fuller
Deputy Assistant to the President
Director,
Office of Cabinet Administration
456-2823

March 5, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: CRAIG L. FULLER

SUBJECT: Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy

During the February 26, 1981 Cabinet meeting you created a Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy to be chaired by the Attorney General.

The attached document is a Presidential Memorandum prepared for your signature. It will officially establish the Task Force, its members and its functions.

Attachment

MEMORANDUM FOR THE ATTORNEY GENERAL
THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

Following up discussion at the Cabinet meeting February 26, I hereby establish the Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy. The Task Force will be chaired by the Attorney General and include the Secretaries of State, Defense, Education, Labor, Health and Human Services, Transportation, the Treasury, and the Director of the Federal Emergency Management Agency. Frank Hodson will be the White House staff member of the Task Force.

The Task Force should review the entire range of immigration and refugee policies and programs and report back to me by the first week of May with recommendations or alternatives on the basis of which we can make progress. The Task Force's work should include consideration of new international approaches, the adequacy of the U.S. legal framework, and improved methods for control of illegal immigration and the handling of mass asylum or immigration crises. I have separately asked our White House staff and OMB to look at the question of Executive Branch organization to deal with these problems.

Please give the Attorney General your cooperation in this effort. Our review will require rapid action and close collaboration with the Congress.

(F)

Immigration & Refugees

- Pres. Memorandum

- The immigration and refugee issue will be before us this year.
 - The Governors of Arkansas and Florida have already approached us with their concerns.
 - The Vice President will receive tomorrow on my behalf the report of the Select Commission on Immigration & Refugee Policy.

- As I said in the Campaign, we must sustain the long standing American value of openness. But, we need also to recognize the adverse impact of sudden influx (as was the case last year vis-a-vis the Freedom Flotilla) on U.S. labor markets and on population.

- We need to review U.S. immigration and refugee policy generally and do this fairly quickly. Spring weather could bring an additional influx of Haitians. We must by July decide what to do about Cubans and Haitians already here.

- Because of the central responsibility of the Immigration & Naturalization Service, I would like to ask Justice to chair an interagency task force to review by the first week of April and report to me on our policies and programs in this area. The Task Force should include State, HHS, Labor and White House staff.

- I am separately asking our White House staff and OMB to look at the question of Executive Branch organization to deal with these problems.

and not be confined to
① existing programs

②
① Refugee Relief Programs
P. domestic & international

② the guide decision paper
③ - Justice says April 3rd too soon
Carroll April 3
and May 3

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

APRIL 9, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR CRAIG FULLER

FROM: KEN CRIBB *K.C.*

SUBJECT: IMMIGRATION TASK FORCE MEETING

The Attorney General requested that a meeting of the task force on immigration and refugees be scheduled for Wednesday, April 15, at 4 o'clock in the Roosevelt Room.

The Attorney General plans to distribute the materials for the meeting directly to task force members. As soon as I receive a copy of these materials, I will forward them to you.

Should Dick Darman staff this for the White House ?

cc: Missy Hodapp
cc: Karen Hart

SPECIAL ASSISTANT TO
THE ATTORNEY GENERAL



4/13/81

TO: Kenneth Cribb

FROM: David Hiller

Memorandum



Subject Immigration Task Force -- Cuban and
Haitian Materials

Date
April 10, 1981

To Task Force Members

From David Hiller, Special Assistant
to the Attorney General

There are enclosed the background materials sent today to the Cabinet.

The Policy Group of the Task Force will meet on Monday, at 4:00 p.m., in Conference Room A of the Department of Justice, to give final consideration to these materials.

The Cabinet will meet on Wednesday, April 15, at 4:00 p.m., at the Roosevelt Room of the White House to consider these issues.



Office of the Attorney General

Washington, D. C. 20530

April 10, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF STATE
THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE
THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION
THE SECRETARY OF LABOR
THE SECRETARY OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES
THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION
THE SECRETARY OF THE TREASURY
THE DIRECTOR OF THE OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT
AND BUDGET
THE DIRECTOR OF THE FEDERAL EMERGENCY
MANAGEMENT AGENCY
THE DEPUTY ASSISTANT TO THE PRESIDENT

FROM: THE ATTORNEY GENERAL

As your offices already have been advised, a meeting of the President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy is scheduled for Wednesday, April 15, 1981, at 4:00 p.m. at the Roosevelt Room in the White House.

The purpose of that meeting is to address four categories of issues with respect to Cuban and Haitian migration to the United States.

Please find enclosed three documents: (1) the agenda for Wednesday's meeting; (2) a briefing paper on Cuban-Haitian issues; and (3) a set of papers containing additional background information for your further reference.

I look forward to seeing you on Wednesday.

Enclosures

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND
REFUGEE POLICY

Agenda Meeting
Wednesday, April 15, 1981, 4:00 p.m.
Roosevelt Room, The White House

- I. Summary of Activities of the Task Force Working Groups.
- II. Cuban and Haitian Matters.
 - A. Legal Status of Cubans and Haitians Already in the United States.
 - B. Disposition of Cuban Entrants Who Are Presently in Federal Detention.
 - C. Deterrence of Further Unlawful Migration Into South Florida.
 - D. Foreign Policy Regarding Cuba and Haiti.
- III. Schedule of Future Task Force Activities.

I. Cuban and Haitian Matters.

- A. What should the policy of the United States be regarding the legal status of the 130,000 Cubans and 30,000 Haitians who are presently classified as "Cuban/Haitian Entrant (status pending)"?

1. Background:

Approximately 130,000 visaless Cubans arrived in south Florida by boat between April and June of 1980. There are also approximately 35,000 Haitians in South Florida, and Haitians continue to arrive in substantial numbers. To date, of the 160,000 arrivals from Cuba and Haiti, at least 150,000 have been sponsored out to families and others. Cubans and Haitians are not allowed to leave processing areas without a sponsor.

The Carter Administration established a "Cuban/Haitian Entrant" concept for the Cubans and Haitians who arrived on or before October 10, 1980, and these aliens have been given permission to remain in the United States temporarily until July 15, 1981, through the use of the Attorney General's parole power under section 212(d)(5) of the Act, while a determination is made regarding their appropriate legal status.

The rationale for allowing the pre-October 11 Cubans and Haitians to remain temporarily was to give Congress a time in which to consider "Cuban/Haitian Entrant Legislation," which was submitted by the last Administration. This legislation would recognize the status of pre-October 11 Cubans and Haitians (except for those who have committed crimes). That legislation, which died in the last session of Congress, has not been reintroduced.

Without special legislation, Cuban arrivals may also apply for permanent resident status under the Cuban Adjustment Act of 1966, after they have been here for one year.

Most of the Cubans who came during 1980 are "admissible" and would be eligible for adjustment under the 1966 Act. In submitting the Cuban/Haitian Entrant status legislation to the 96th Congress, the last Administration proposed that P.L. 89-732 be repealed. However, the proposal was not considered by Congress.

2. Options:

a. Special Adjustment legislation for Cubans and Haitians.

Such legislation could provide for adjustment of status to permanent resident after two years, and repeal the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act.

The Act could be drafted to apply to Cubans and Haitians who entered the U.S. on or before October 10, 1980, or the date of enactment of the legislation. Alternatively, the legislation could provide that only 20,000 persons could be adjusted in any single year, relieving the administrative burden.

Pro

- o Avoids serious difficulty of conducting 160,000 hearings, and of repatriating 160,000 people, most of whom have been resettled throughout the United States.
- o Treats Cubans and Haitians similarly, avoiding claims of discrimination.

Con

- o Legalization of these persons may encourage further unlawful migration.
- o Adjustment may be inequitable with respect to other nationalities having some claim to adjustment, e.g., Mexicans.

b. The Cubans could be adjusted to permanent status under the 1966 Act, and the Haitians could be treated under special adjustment legislation.

Pro

- o The Administration would be treating the Cubans and Haitians equally, and the Cubans could be adjusted without further legislation.

Con

- o Once the Cubans were adjusted, much of the support for a legislative solution would wane, and the Haitians may be left in only their current temporary status.

- c. The Haitians could be considered for asylum on a case-by-case basis, and non-asylees could be excluded or deported.

Pro

- o This option would maintain the integrity of the existing statutory framework, permitting entry only of persons with a "well-founded fear of persecution."
- o Exclusion of undocumented aliens would relieve some of the disruption in south Florida.

Con

- o Adjudicating the claim of 35,000 Haitians would be extraordinarily costly and time-consuming.
- o It would be argued that the Haitians were being treated less well than the Cubans.

- d. The adjustment of Cubans and Haitians could be considered jointly with a policy of legalization of other undocumented aliens in the United States.

Pro

- o This would avoid the appearance that some violators of the immigration laws are being treated more favorably than others.

Con

- o General legalization legislation would not be considered, if at all, until other immigration proposals are developed, after the Cubans become eligible for adjustment under the 1966 Act this spring.
- o The continuing uncertainty surrounding the Cubans' and Haitians' legal status prevents their assimilation into the community.

- e. The Cuban/Haitian Entrants could be declared retroactively to be refugees within the meaning of the Refugee Act of 1980.

Either by legislation, or by administrative action following consultation with Congress, the entrants could be determined as a group to be refugees.

Pro

- o Adjusts entrants within an existing statutory framework.
- o Could be done administratively, following consultations with Congress.

Con

- o The Department of State believes that most of the Haitians are neither refugees nor asylees, and thus would not qualify under the 1980 Act.
- o The Refugee Act contemplates that ordinarily refugees will be determined to be such while outside the U.S.

- B. What should be the policy of the U.S. with respect to the Cuban entrants who remain in Fort Chaffee and other federal facilities?

Over 119,000 Cuban entrants have been released into the community under the sponsorship of voluntary organizations and are no longer in federal custody. Several thousand entrants have, for various reasons, not been sponsored. Pending exclusion of these persons, if that is sought, arrangements are necessary for their continued custody. Also, there is a preliminary question of the authority of the Government to detain these persons, if exclusion appears impracticable.

Lawsuits have already been brought challenging the detention of the Cubans. The Department of Justice believes that adequate authority to detain presently exists, at least pending efforts to remove the persons from the country.

1. Mentally Ill Entrants

Over 9,000 Cuban entrants have been treated within the psychiatric services at the resettlement camps. Many of these people reacted only temporarily to their dislocation and detention and did not require continuing care. However, about 600 entrants now at Fort Chaffee have been identified through the PHS screening process as having mental illnesses or disabilities which may require continuing care and treatment. In addition, more than 100 entrants with varying degrees of mental problems are being held in other Federal facilities.

Options:

- a. Place the mentally ill, retarded, or otherwise disabled entrants in suitable state and local facilities, retaining Federal legal and financial responsibility while they remain in those facilities. Establish a Federally-operated "back-up" detention facility to which entrants may be returned if they cannot be maintained in the non-Federal location.

The estimated cost of this recommendation is \$9.5 million in Fiscal Year 1981 and \$18.6 million in Fiscal Year 1982, not including renovation costs for the "back-up" facility.

- b. Establish and operate a Federal facility or facilities in which the entire population of mentally ill, disabled and retarded entrants can be provided with appropriate psychiatric care and treatment.

The creation of a Federal facility for the care of all 700 to 800 mental health cases (Option 2) would require more staff for both HHS and the Department of Justice than Option 1. No facility is immediately available and once identified would likely require a minimum of three to six months for renovation at a cost two to three times greater than for the "back-up" facility concept.

Recommendation:

The Interagency Task Force recommends that HHS continue efforts to find suitable placements for the mentally ill, retarded, and otherwise disabled in state and local facilities and that Federal "back-up" detention facilities be maintained for entrants who cannot be kept in suitable non-Federal locations. The Administration should endorse these efforts to facilitate the cooperation of governors and mayors.

2. What arrangements should be made for entrants who become mentally ill after they have been sponsored?

Background:

Over 119,000 Cuban entrants have been sponsored and are no longer in Federal custody. It can be expected that up to 10% may develop the need for mental health care.

Options:

1. Place sole responsibility for finding suitable mental health care on the sponsors and the voluntary agencies.
2. Encourage the sponsors and the voluntary agencies to find suitable mental health care in their communities; reassume Federal custody only under extraordinary conditions.
3. Revoke parole, reevaluate the mental status of the entrant in a Federal facility, and find a suitable mental health placement whenever a Volag requests it.

Recommendation:

The Interagency Task Force recommends that every reasonable effort be made to maintain the sponsorship with locally provided mental health care. Only for a limited number of cases should parole be revoked, returning the entrant to a Federal facility for evaluation and arrangements for appropriate care.

3. Persons continuing in detention at Fort Chaffee.

Statement of Issue: What should be done to prepare for the possibility that a significant portion of the Fort Chaffee population will be "unsponsorable"?

Background:

On April 1 there were 3,261 Cubans held at Fort Chaffee. Resettlement has been proceeding at the rate of about 200 per week since the beginning of January. During January 844 were resettled, in February 939, and in March 887. If this rate continues, the camp would close sometime in July, well within Governor White's requested deadline of the end of August.

There is a clear danger, however, that resettlement will not be maintained at the current rate. As the toughest cases are reached, it is possible that finding appropriate sponsors will become progressively more difficult.

Options:

1. Identify a new secure facility with the capacity to provide acculturation services and training for 800 to 1,000 anti-social entrants. Make initial preparations to adapt the chosen facility for this purpose.
2. Prepare to transfer the unsponsorables from Fort Chaffee to the Atlanta Federal correctional facility and use this site to provide appropriate acculturation services and training.
3. Maintain Fort Chaffee as a detention facility.

4. Persons believed to have been convicted of criminal offenses in Cuba.

Background:

With the arrival of the first boatload of Cubans on April 21, 1980, it became apparent that the Cuban authorities had emptied out their jails, placing prisoners on vessels bound for the United States.

INS officials found that of the 125,000 arrivals, 23,971 Cubans admitted having criminal backgrounds in Cuba. The Cubans who apparently have serious criminal backgrounds are being detained at various federal prison facilities. As of this date, there are 1,754 Cuban aliens detained at the Atlanta prison.

Options:

1. Detention of visaless entrants who are determined to have committed serious criminal offenses, pending diplomatic efforts to secure their repatriation.
2. Release Pending Exclusion. Absent a political solution, a policy of release along the lines of the Release/Review Plan previously developed may be an appropriate method of handling these Cuban detainees. The use of such a plan permits the Executive Branch of Government to judge releasability through established criteria (e.g., institutional adjustment, psychological evaluation) which minimize, to the fullest extent possible, the possibility that a person who poses a danger to the community will be released.
3. Detention in a minimum security camp. Another option would be to send all the detainees to a minimum security camp. That would probably satisfy the courts, at least for the present. Unfortunately, there are no suitable camps now available.

4. Forceable Repatriation. Another possible option is a military solution. The detainees with an extensive criminal background could be forcibly returned to Cuba by the United States military or could be released into Cuba through our military installation at Guantanamo. Such a strategy was considered by the Government during the prior Administration and was determined to be inadvisable. For national security reasons, elaboration of that option is beyond the scope of inquiry by the Task Force.

Recommendation:

Option 1. Pending renewed efforts to secure the agreement of the Government of Cuba to accept its nationals, detain those thought to have committed serious offenses in the Atlanta correctional facility.

C. What policy should the United States follow with respect to undocumented persons who arrive in the future?

1. Background:

The Immigration and Naturalization Service (INS) estimates that Haitians without visas have been arriving in south Florida at an average rate of approximately 1,500 per month since January, 1980. A few may be entitled to asylum under current law, but the vast majority of the Haitians appear to be either excludable or deportable, depending on their "entry" status, and not eligible for any relief now available under our immigration laws.

Deportation and exclusion proceedings are now being instituted against those Haitians who arrived on or before October 10, 1980. Most of the arriving Haitians have been released to sponsors under the Attorney General's parole powers.

Most of the arriving Haitians have been released to sponsors under the Attorney General's parole powers. Before November, 1977, it had been INS practice to detain visaless Haitians in custody pending a determination whether they could be admitted into the United States.

2. Options:

Several strategies to recommence enforcement of the immigration laws are possible. The principal variables in the approach are (1) whether or not to interdict visaless aliens on the high seas, (2) whether or not to detain undocumented aliens who arrive in the United State pending deportation, and (3) whether procedures for the determination of admissibility into the United Statea can be expedited.

a. Interdiction at Sea.

With respect to the Haitians, the interdiction would occur in the strait between Haiti and the Bahamas, some distance from the southern coast of Florida. In accordance with treaty obligations, refugee claims would be adjudicated on board a vessel by a team from State and INS, before returning a claimant to Haiti.

Pro

- o Would deter further maritime migration.
- o Would curtail the flow of liens into south Florida and eliminate time-consuming administrative and judicial proceedings.

Con

- o Without legislation, the legal authority of the Coast Guard is uncertain.
- o The program would cost \$10-20 million annually and at least in the short run would divert substantial Coast Guard resources from other missions.
- o The program is hazardous and could require the use of force, including deadly force.
- o The program could further de-stabilize the Government of Haiti.
- o Intercepting Haitian boats could set a bad precedent for the Southeast Asian nations faced with Indochinese "boat people."
- o There could be unfavorable reaction from Black Caribbean and African nations that might view the policy as racially motivated.

Recommendation:

If interdiction is decided upon, legislation should be enacted granting such authority to the Coast Guard.

b. Detention of undocumented aliens pending exclusion.

This was the policy of the United States prior to 1977. Since the policy was abandoned, the flow of unlawful entrants has increased substantially.

If this option is chosen, suitable facilities would have to be prepared.

Pro

- o Would deter further migration.
- o Would reduce the continued disruption of south Florida.
- o Would prevent aliens from absconding to interior prior to exclusion hearings.
- o Would avoid the cost of social services incurred for aliens released into the community.

Con

- o Would cost an estimated \$20-30 million per year, with one-time start-up costs of \$10 million.
- o Risk that capacity to detain would be exceeded, e.g., if there were a mass influx or if exclusion proceedings were enjoined by a court.
- o Domestic political reaction of Haitian advocacy groups and the community where facility is located.
- o Could be viewed by some as racially motivated.

c. Option Packages.

Option A. Status Quo (No interdiction--Low detention).
This option results in release of 1250 aliens into the community per month. Detention costs are \$7 million. Welfare and resettlement costs of \$37.5 million annually. Total cost of \$44.5 million.

Option B. Low interdiction--High detention.
No aliens would be released into the community. Interdiction would be 15% effective and cost \$10 million per year. Detention would cost \$50 million per year. No welfare or resettlement costs. Total cost \$60.4 million.

Option C. Medium interdiction--Medium detention.
No aliens would be released into the community. Interdiction would be 40% effective and cost \$15 million (existing ships). Substantial decline in other CG missions. Detention would cost \$38 million annually. No welfare costs. Total cost of \$53 million.

Option D. High interdiction--Low Detention.
No aliens would be released. Interdiction would be 85% effective and cost \$45 million annually, with diversion of current CG missions. Detention would cost \$7 million. No welfare costs. Total cost of \$52 million.

d. Procedural Reform.

Exclusion and deportation proceedings have been subject to lengthy delay. The current statutory scheme affords an alien a quasi-judicial hearing and a right of administrative and judicial appeal, all of which occurs after a time-consuming referral of an asylum claim to the Department of State.

Recommendation:

That the Department of State and Justice consult regarding reform of exclusion and asylum procedures, including legislation authorizing summary determinations of admissibility.

e. Legislation needed to deter violation of the immigration laws, arising from the Cuban flotilla.

In the course of the Mariel boatlift of 1980, it became apparent that certain of the civil and criminal statutes intended to deter people from bringing undocumented aliens into the United States were, in the circumstances of the Mariel boatlift, inadequate in a number of respects. These provisions include criminal penalties and the forfeiture of boats and other conveyances used to bring the aliens to the United States.

Recommendation:

That the Department of Justice, together with Treasury, prepare a package of proposed amendments to cure these weaknesses in the enforcement statutes.

D. Foreign Policy.

1. How should the U.S. address illegal immigration of Cubans via third countries?

Background:

Since the beginning of the Cuban Revolution in 1959 Cubans fleeing Castro's regime via third countries were welcomed into the U.S. and many were granted political asylum or refugee status. Cubans benefitted from legislation which granted political asylum to people fleeing Communist oppression, regardless of how they arrived in the U.S. The Refugee Act of 1980 placed yearly limits on the number of refugees (including Cubans) that could be admitted into the U.S. Politically, the welcome that Cubans traditionally received disappeared in the wake of the Mariel boatlift, which also created a political backlash affecting the broader Cuban-American community.

Options:

- a. Inform third countries that many Cuban emigrants do not qualify for U.S. visas, and that the third country will be expected to permanently resettle those who cannot enter the U.S. Return those Cubans apprehended for illegal entry into the U.S. to the country from which they left.
- b. Accept the relatively low level of Cuban illegal migration via third countries in order to reduce the legal and administrative costs of processing them for exclusion and deportation.

Recommendation:

That we discourage other governments from accepting Cubans that they do not plan to permanently resettle, and that we return to them Cubans who enter the U.S. illegally from their territory.

2. Do foreign policy considerations permit the United States to seek to expand its operations in Havana to permit full-scale immigrant visa processing and, under certain conditions, a resumption of refugee processing? If so, should it be done in a narrow context, or through wider bilateral negotiations with that government?

Background:

The Cuban Government has adopted a liberal emigration policy which could allow as many as one million Cubans to leave Cuba. Twenty-eight thousand Cubans are now registered at USINT Havana to immigrate to the United States under the family preferences set forth in our immigration law. With the present staff at USINT, which is fixed at 20 Americans by agreement with the Cuban Government, we can process only three to five thousand applications per annum through FY 1982. Because all processing was stopped during the months USINT was occupied in 1980, such a large backlog of Immediate Relative cases developed that they absorb all the processing time of the current staff. Under the law, however, as many as 20,000 of the preference applicants could also be granted visas if the visa unit were expanded. However, if Castro maintains a free emigration policy, some illegal migration will probably continue.

Options:

- a. Implement a full-scale immigrant visa program by seeking Cuban Government concurrence to increase the staff at USINT to process all Cubans eligible for U.S. visas, within the statutory limitations on immigration without seeking any other concession from Cuba. (Increasing USINT's staff requires Cuban Government concurrence.)
- b. Negotiate a bilateral agreement with Cuba which would allow us to return those Cubans excludable under U.S. law and increase our staff enough to: process the cases of those entitled to apply for visas, and perhaps renew refugee processing in Havana.

Recommendation:

Provided U.S. policy permits such negotiations, that we resume talks with the Cubans to provide for full-scale immigrant visa and refugee processing in Havana, combined with the return of Cubans excludable under U.S. law.

That we maximize issuance of immigrant visas to immediate relatives at USINT with existing resources in order to minimize incentive for illegal migration.

3. Could ICM or other existing international organizations find new homes outside Haiti for substantial numbers of would-be Haitian migrants?

Background:

Haiti's eroded and mountainous terrain cannot support its 6 million people, 80 percent of whom live in rural areas. A high birth rate and stagnation in economic development combine to aggravate this demographic imbalance. ICM has begun talks with the GOH on the possibility of establishing a program to provide for orderly emigration.

Options:

- a. To support and encourage potential international programs to provide resettlement opportunities for Haitians.
- b. To discourage emigration as a solution to Haiti's problems.

Recommendation:

Support and encourage international resettlement programs through ICM or other appropriate organizations.

4. Would a significant reduction or cut-off of aid affect the Haitian migrant flow to the U.S.?

Background:

For humanitarian reasons the U.S. reinstated an aid program in Haiti in 1973, and has allocated \$70 million to it in the last 8 years. The PL 480 food programs currently amount to about \$20 million a year and \$8.6 million in development assistance projects is proposed for FY 1982. There is no direct evidence, however, linking aid levels to migration rates.

Options:

- a. To cut off all economic aid to Haiti.
- b. To continue to provide humanitarian assistance, especially food aid, to avert acute food shortages.

Recommendation:

To continue to provide assistance at present levels for humanitarian, not migration-related reasons.

5. Does the U.S. have an interest in seeing a resolution of the Haitian-Bahamian dispute over the treatment of the Haitians living in the Bahamas?

Background:

Between 10,000 and 20,000 Haitians are living illegally in the Bahamas (pop. 250,000). The illegals, many of whom have resided in the Bahamas for years, exacerbate Bahamian unemployment, strain social services and have become a political problem for the GCOB. In the past, some Haitians have fled the Bahamas to the U.S. during the GCOB's periodic crackdowns. In February the GOH ceased accepting back deportees from the Bahamas in protest against a nocturnal roundup of illegal Haitians.

Options:

- a. To attempt actively to broker a resolution to the dispute.
- b. To avoid direct involvement.

Recommendation:

That we avoid direct involvement at this time if possible. Disturbing the impasse could result in more substantial migration to the U.S.

6. Could the flow of illegal Haitian entrants to the U.S. be reduced significantly by substantial economic assistance?

Background:

Haiti is the poorest country in the hemisphere, with a per capita income under \$300. Increased economic assistance has been proposed as a means to improve economic opportunities within Haiti and reduce the incentive to migrate.

Options:

- a. To make a major long-term commitment to Haiti's economic development in order to reduce the incentive to migrate.
- b. To rely on PL 480 food aid to avert short-term problems due to shortages in essential commodities.

Recommendation:

That the Administration concentrate on using economic assistance to alleviate acute short-term problems.



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

April 17, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Education
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency
The Deputy Assistant to the President

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Task Force
on Immigration and Refugee Policy

I have attached a Memorandum of Decision reflecting the actions of the Immigration Task Force at the meeting of April 15, 1981, on the subject of Cuban and Haitian migration to the United States.

The next meeting of the Cabinet members of the Task Force will be held on Wednesday, April 22, 1981, at 3:00 p.m., at the Roosevelt Room of the White House. The agenda of the meeting is attached. Other materials will follow.

William French Smith
Attorney General

MEMORANDUM OF DECISION

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY
APRIL 15, 1981, 4:00 p.m.
ROOSEVELT ROOM, THE WHITE HOUSE

Attendees:

Messrs. Smith, Schweiker, Swoap, Svahn, West, Walker, Enders, Trent, Clohan, McConnell, Hodson, Ms. Taft, Ms. Anderson.

The President's Task Force on Immigration and Refugee Policy met on the subject of undocumented Cuban and Haitian migration into the United States. Consideration was given to options and recommendations to be forwarded to the President on May 4, 1981.

1. The Legal Status of Cubans and Haitians Present in the United States

The Task Force agreed to recommend that the Administration propose legislation providing that Cubans and Haitians who were known to the INS as of a date to be determined could apply to the Attorney General to adjust their status to that of permanent residents, after residing in this country for two years. The proposed legislation also would repeal the 1966 Cuban Adjustment Act.

It was further agreed that adjustment legislation would be proposed by the Administration only in conjunction with measures adequate to assure that the continued flow of undocumented aliens into this country is substantially curtailed. These recommendations would be reviewed when the Task Force has considered the issue of the legal status of other undocumented aliens residing in the United States.

2. Administration Policy as to Undocumented Aliens Who Arrive in the Future.

It was agreed by the Task Force that the Administration should prepare and pursue a policy to deter the continued migration of undocumented aliens into South Florida. Such a policy would include a combination of the following:

a. Detention Pending Exclusion.

Undocumented aliens would be detained pending a determination of their admissibility into the United States, a practice that had been followed by the Government until 1977. It was noted that while the cost of maintaining large-scale detention facilities are substantial, the cost of welfare services and resettlement incurred where entrants are placed into the community are of comparable magnitude.

b. Interdiction at Sea.

It was agreed that the Administration would propose legislation expressly authorizing the Coast Guard to conduct such operations, but that the Department of Transportation would promptly set forth in writing its reservations as to the advisability of this policy.

c. Reform of Exclusion Proceedings.

It was agreed that the Departments of State and Justice would consult regarding reform of exclusion and deportation procedures, including legislation authorizing summary determination of admissibility.

d. Civil and Criminal Enforcement Legislation.

It was agreed that the Department of Justice, together with Treasury, would prepare a package of legislative amendments to cure various weaknesses in the civil and criminal enforcement statutes that were evident during the 1980 Cuban boatlift.

3. The Cuban Entrants Who Remain in Custody in Federal Facilities.

a. The mentally ill entrants.

It was agreed that HHS would undertake to place the entrants in suitable state and local facilities, while retaining federal legal and financial responsibility for these persons. A federally-operated "back-up" detention facility would be maintained to which the entrants could be returned if they could not be cared for in a non-federal location. In instances where entrants become mentally ill after sponsors have been found, the sponsors and voluntary agencies would be encouraged to find suitable care, and the Federal Government would reassume custody only if necessary.

b. The Entrants Who Remain at Fort Chaffee.

It was agreed that HHS would continue to try to find sponsors for the entrants at Fort Chaffee, and that the Task Force working group would immediately conduct an inventory of other suitable facilities.

c. The Cuban criminals.

It was agreed that entrants who are believed to have committed serious criminal offenses in Cuba would continue to be detained in the federal correctional facility in Atlanta pending review of possible diplomatic efforts to secure their repatriation to Cuba.

4. Foreign Policy Considerations.

The Department of State indicated that resumed negotiations with the Government of Cuba on the subject of the repatriation of the Cuban criminals, mental patients, and social misfits, were unlikely in the near future. The Department of State will undertake to review whether, in view of these circumstances, it would be advisable for the Attorney General to request that the issuance of immigrant visas to Cuban nationals by the U.S. interest section in Havana be discontinued.

5. Future Task Force Business.

The Attorney General indicated that the Task Force meetings in the next three weeks would consider the subjects of illegal immigration, immigrant admissions, and refugee and asylum policy.



Office of the Attorney General
Washington, D. C. 20530

April 20, 1981

MEMORANDUM FOR: The Secretary of State
The Secretary of Defense
The Secretary of Education
The Secretary of Labor
The Secretary of Health and Human Services
The Secretary of Transportation
The Secretary of the Treasury
The Director, Office of Management
and Budget
The Director, Federal Emergency
Management Agency
The Deputy Assistant to the President

FROM: Kenneth Starr, *KS*
Counselor to the Attorney General

SUBJECT: Meeting of the President's Task Force
on Immigration and Refugee Policy,
Wednesday, April 22, 1981, 3:00 p.m.,
Roosevelt Room, The White House

There is attached a substantive agenda of options
for consideration by the Task Force at Wednesday's meeting,
generally on the subject of illegal immigration.

Thank you.

II. Illegal Aliens: Those Already Here and the Flows.

Illegal entry into the United States is viewed by the public and the Congress as the most serious among the various immigration issues. Its general causes are the pressures of poverty and population in certain Latin American and Asian countries, the ease of travel and entry into the United States, and the availability of employment in the U.S. without regard to the legal status of workers.

The number of illegal immigrants in the United States is uncertain but believed to be between 4 and 6 million, about half of whom are thought to be Mexican Nationals. Other significant proportions come from Jamaica, the Dominican Republic, El Salvador, Haiti, and other Latin American and Asian nations. Illegal immigration occurs either through surreptitious entries between ports of entry along the United States border, by overstays of persons who enter legally, or by the use of fraudulent documents. During fiscal year 1979, 1,069,400 illegal aliens were apprehended, a dramatic increase from the 50,000 apprehended in 1964.

Illegal immigrants once were concentrated in agricultural employment in the Southwest, but now reside in all regions of the U.S. and increasingly work in the service, light industry, and other non-agricultural sectors of the economy.

The fiscal effects of illegal aliens are disputed. However, most studies indicate that illegal aliens tend not to participate in cash-assistance programs, but do place substantial burdens on public educational and medical services. Illegal aliens in the non-agricultural sectors appear largely to comply with tax payment obligations.

The effect of illegal immigration on U.S. labor markets is likewise uncertain, but there is probably some displacement of U.S. workers, primarily the less-skilled, and some depressing effect on the wages of these workers.

A. The Stock of Illegal Aliens Already Here.

The 4-6 million illegal aliens who now reside in the United States are without legal status under our laws. Various proposals have been advanced which would legalize at least some portion of these people in order to eliminate the undesirable consequences of large numbers of permanent "out-castes." A program of legalization could be styled in a number of ways, but generally would authorize those aliens who could prove their continuing residence in the United States for a specified number of years to become lawful permanent residents and, eventually, citizens.

Those aliens who did not qualify for legalization either could be deported, or might be authorized to reside temporarily in the United States and later be required to return to their homeland.

ISSUE NO. 1. Should the United States legalize the illegal aliens who now reside in this country?

PRO

- o Acknowledges that mass deportation of illegal aliens would be extraordinarily costly, would involve administrative and judicial delay, and could violate the rights of many citizens and lawful permanent residents.
- o Would eliminate a large disenfranchised, fugitive class that is unable to rely upon legitimate institutions for redress of grievances or care, and is easily exploited by unscrupulous employers and others.
- o Prevents undue hardship for illegal aliens who have developed "equities" in the United States, including investments and long-standing employment.
- o If accompanied by firm enforcement measures, would help restore integrity of immigration law enforcement.
- o Large "out-caste" group places strain upon social fabric.
- o Enables collection of accurate data about illegal migration that could be used to prevent future flows.
- o Retains aliens in the labor force upon whom U.S. employers may have come to depend.

CON

- o Legalization is a grant of "amnesty" and as such rewards unlawful conduct.
- o Would not curtail illegal immigration, and could encourage further illegal migration by raising expectations of recurring amnesty.
- o Would result in increased legal immigration by relatives of those who are legalized.
- o Will encourage some aliens to stay who would otherwise return to their home countries.
- o Will increase demand for health, welfare, and education services.

B. The Future Flows of Illegal Migration.

An estimated 1 to 2 million persons enter the United States illegally each year. Because of persons returning to their home countries, the net annual inflow of illegal aliens may be in the range of 1 million. Approximately 92% of all deportable aliens who are apprehended come from Mexico, although the U.S.-Canada border is thought to be an important entry point for illegal aliens from the Caribbean and Asia.

Ultimately, any effort to control illegal immigration must deal with the U.S. employment opportunities which motivate illegal migration. There are two basic alternative strategies; (1) pursue strict enforcement measures to close off employment opportunities, or (2) regularize the flow of aliens through a temporary worker status.

1. Enforcement Strategies.

ISSUE NO. 2. How should the United States reduce the attraction of employment opportunities for illegal aliens?

OPTION A. Increase enforcement of existing statutes, such as the Fair Labor Standards Act (FLSA), that penalize employers for minimum wage and worker safety violations, thus reducing incentives to hire illegal aliens.

PRO

- o Would focus enforcement in areas where illegal aliens most adversely affect wages and conditions of employment.
- o Would directly enhance enforcement of minimum wage and worker safety laws.
- o Would rely on existing statutory framework and enforcement capability of the Department of Labor.
- o Would not require new means of worker identification.

CON

- o Would not directly deter employment of illegal aliens, and would not deter employment of illegals at all where hired under lawful conditions.
- o Would enhance the attractiveness to aliens of employment in the United States.

OPTION B. Enact Legislation Prohibit Employers From Knowingly Hiring Illegal Migrants.

It is presently not unlawful for an employer to hire illegal aliens. The Select Commission recommended that legislation be enacted that would prohibit their employment. If employer sanctions were imposed, a variety of penalties would be possible, including civil fines, injunctions, and criminal penalties.

PRO

- o Would substantially reduce the "pull" factor encouraging the illegal migration.
- o Protects U.S. workers from displacement by illegal aliens and from depressing effects upon wages and working conditions.
- o No sanction applied to the alien appears likely to curtail the inflow.

CON

- o Any program likely to be effective would impose burdensome costs of administration and compliance on the government and employers.
- o Unless coupled with a Temporary Worker program, would disrupt established pattern of employment.
- o Enforcement would lead employers to discriminate against persons who appear "foreign" in speech or appearance.
- o Enforcement mechanisms, including means of worker identification, would invade the privacy of individuals and threaten civil liberties.
- o Possibly would not be an effective deterrent to hiring illegal aliens. Some employers may simply view the penalty as a cost of doing business. Enforcement would probably affect only the larger employers, leaving unaddressed the marginal employers, which may include most offenders.
- o Would not address the "push" factors of poverty and political instability.

ISSUE NO. 3. How should employers verify the lawful status of prospective employees in order to comply with an employer sanction law?

A principal issue in any employer sanctions scheme is the means of determining whether a prospective employee is eligible to be hired. If there is not an easy way for an employer to satisfy his legal obligations, he will prefer not to hire persons who appear foreign and risk a penalty. Moreover, it would be unfair to penalize employers who, without some worker identifier, could not reasonably know whether a person is an illegal alien. A number of means of identification exist.

OPTION A. Employer determination on the basis of currently existing forms of identification only; spot-check review by INS.

PRO

- o Would be the least costly of the various options.
- o Could be implemented immediately.
- o Would not significantly threaten civil liberties.

CON

- o Would be extremely susceptible to evasion, because of insecurity of existing documents -- fraud, theft, duplication, counterfeiting, etc.
- o Risk of penalty will encourage employers in doubtful cases to discriminate against those who appear foreign.

OPTION B. Use of a "secure" Social Security Card as worker eligibility card.

PRO

- o Would yield substantially better results than OPTION A with only moderate cost.
- o Would employ an already existing card with wide public use and acceptance, avoiding perception of a new national identity card.
- o Ease of compliance by employer would create little incentive to discriminate in employment.

OPTION C. Call-In Data Bank and Work Eligibility Number.

This option is among the most costly and would require a substantial period of time to implement. The system would require enrolling the entire work force and making a determination of eligibility for each worker. The absence of a card makes the option somewhat less costly than OPTION B.

PRO

- o The system would be reasonably secure against evasion.
- o There would be little incentive for discrimination by employers.
- o The absence of a card lessens any threat to civil liberties.

CON

- o Absence of a card increases problem of evasion by use of number issued to others.
- o Would be costly to administer.
- o Long period of time required for implementation.

OPTION D. Create a New Work Eligibility Card.

PRO

- o Would be reasonably secure against evasion.
- o Would be little incentive to discriminate.

CON

- o Would pose more of a civil liberties concern than OPTION C.
- o Would be costly and require a long period of time to implement.

ISSUE NO. 4. What Should be the Overall Level of Resources Committed to INS Enforcement Efforts?

Illegal migration has increased steadily in the last several years, although the amount is somewhat uncertain. INS apprehensions of illegal aliens, which provides some indication, have increased from 160,000 in 1967 to over 1,050,000 in 1979.

The Select Commission recommended that INS funding levels be increased by approximately 50% overall, including significant increases for Border Patrol personnel and equipment.

- OPTION A. Maintain the currently budgeted levels of enforcement activity.
- OPTION B. Implement the INS Mission Plan with selective program increases for immigration enforcement activities. Estimated cost \$20 million.
- OPTION C. Request a comprehensive increase for INS enforcement programs along the lines of the Select Commission recommendation.

2. Temporary Worker Program.

The migration of Mexican workers was briefly authorized during World War I. In the course of the bracero program, which lasted from 1942 to 1964, almost 5 million Mexican workers were employed in agriculture in the Southwest. Under the current H-2 Program, approximately 30,000 temporary workers are admitted each year, principally from Caribbean nations.

It is suggested that a Temporary Worker program could channel into a legal program of temporary admissions what would otherwise be a flow of illegal aliens. The purpose of such a program would be to normalize already-existing labor relations between the U.S. and Mexico. A number of proposals have been made to admit substantial numbers of foreign workers to the United States for purposes of employment on a temporary basis. The proposals vary considerably, depending upon (1) whether they require some initial certification of need within the relevant labor market, (2) whether the alien's right of residence depends upon his continued employment with his initial employer, and (3) whether the program is undertaken unilaterally by the U.S. or is negotiated with the sending nations.

The Select Commission recommended against any substantial expansion of temporary worker admissions.

ISSUE NO. 5. Should the United States Substantially Expand Admissions of Temporary Workers?

PRO

- o Would bring all workers within the full protection of U.S. wage and labor laws, while giving employers access to a low-skilled labor force.
- o Would provide legal protections to foreign workers without their establishing permanent attachments in the U.S.
- o Would avoid the disruption of production in areas that have grown dependent on foreign labor, which would otherwise result from strict enforcement.
- o Would avoid the price increases that would result from loss of low-wage labor.
- o Acknowledges the natural historic patterns of labor migration between the U.S. and Mexico.

CON

- o May encourage further unlawful migration because of employer recruitment efforts and increased U.S.-Mexican association, as was true of the bracero program.
- o Would depress wages and working conditions for Americans in low-wage occupations.
- o Would be viewed as undercutting union labor organization.
- o Would be costly to administer and would require an extensive enforcement system.
- o Would create a permanent, if rotating, underclass of foreign workers in our society.

PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON
IMMIGRATION AND REFUGEE POLICY

Agenda of Issues
Wednesday, April 22, 1981, 4:00 p.m.
Roosevelt Room, The White House

I. Illegal Aliens.

A. Background.

1. Introduction to key components of dealing with illegal aliens, e.g., amnesty, employer sanctions, temporary workers, ID cards.
2. Discussion of relationship of enforcement to the above.

B. Options to deal with illegal aliens.

1. Status Quo
 - i. No amnesty
 - ii. No temporary worker program
 - iii. Enforcement
 - no employer sanctions
 - no identification cards
 - no enhancement of border control
2. Temporary workers
 - i. No amnesty
 - ii. New expanded temporary worker program
 - iii. Enforcement
 - Discussion of range of enforcement options, including whether or not to introduce employer sanctions; identification cards; enhanced INS border enforcement; need to administer and enforce temporary workers program.
3. Open
 - i. Amnesty
 - ii. New expanded temporary worker program
 - iii. Enforcement
 - Discussion of enforcement options with reference to need for stronger enforcement or need for employer sanctions, given the perceived invitation for illegal migration after amnesty is granted.
4. Amnesty
 - i. Amnesty
 - ii. No new temporary worker program
 - iii. Enforcement
 - Discussion of enforcement options with reference to strong need for order enforcement or need for employer sanctions given the perceived invitation for illegal migration after amnesty is granted.

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EDUCATION
1974-1976

OXFORD UNIVERSITY
Junior Fellow at St. Antony's College; Co-Chairman of the St. Antony's College Constitutional Revision Commission.
Fellowships: English Speaking Union Fellowship; Cyril Foster Award; St. Antony's College Merit Award.

1969-1973

UNIVERSITY OF VIRGINIA
Juris Doctor degree, received June, 1973. Executive Editor of the Virginia Journal of International Law.
Master's degree in American History, received August, 1970. Thesis: The Trescott Mission to Chile: A Failure in American Diplomacy.
Governor's Fellowship Recipient.

1964-1968

PRINCETON UNIVERSITY
B.A. degree, received June, 1968. Certificate of Distinction in American Civilization. Thesis: George F. Kennan at the National War College: A Year in the Formation of the Containment Policy.

WORK
EXPERIENCE
1980-Present

Assistant Counsel, Newsweek, Inc., 444 Madison Avenue, New York, New York.
One of two attorneys handling all Newsweek corporate, litigation and libel problems.

1976-1980

Winthrop, Stimson, Putnam & Roberts, 40 Wall Street, New York, New York.
Associate Attorney; General Corporate - S.E.C. compliance (Securities Act of 1934), including experience in drafting and reviewing forms and documents required to be filed by various corporations (Proxies, Form 10-K, and Annual Reports); experience in private placements and tender offers; Pollution Control Revenue Bonds and Municipal Bonds; general securities experience (public offerings).
Litigation - research, court and disposition attendance in large antitrust litigation.
Administrative - legislation drafting. Secretary and Treasurer of the St. Antony's College Trust, Oxford University, in the U.S.A.

1974

Consultant to the Chancellor, The State University of New York - drafting legal and non-legal materials for the first Soviet-American undergraduate exchange program.

1973-1974

U.S. Department of State Cultural Exchange Program (IREX) in Moscow, U.S.S.R.
Studied Soviet-American trade.

1972-1973

Executive Editor of the VIRGINIA JOURNAL OF INTERNATIONAL LAW - position entailed chief editing and publishing responsibilities.

1972

(Summer)

Dunnington, Bartholow & Miller; Chrysler Building East, New York, New York.
Legal work in the corporate and litigation fields.

1971

(Summer)

Markbys, Moorgate, London Wall, London, England (British Solicitors' firm).
Legal work in the international corporate area.

1968-1969

World History teacher, Sequoia High School, Redwood City, California.

PUBLICATIONS

Review, "The Soviet Union and the Law of the Sea," 25th Reading Guide 1 (1972).

"The Soviet Trial of Daniel and Sinyovsky: The Case History of Transgression of Substantive International Human Rights without Procedural Remedy," 12 Virginia Journal of International Law 390 (1972).

Contributor, Stanley Foundation Conference, Law of the Sea Section, 1973.

"Soviet-American Trade, 1972-1974: A Summary," 15 Virginia Journal of International Law 39-71 (1974-75).

"The Application of Section One of the Sherman Act to East-West Trade," 11 Case Western Reserve Journal of International Law 117-138 (1979).

PERSONAL
INFORMATION

Interests and Relaxations: Tennis, Squash, Reading, Music, History.

Married. One Child. Excellent health.