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LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 15 DOCUMENTS Public Papers of the Presidents Arms Control and Reduction Radio Address to the Nation. 19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1479 October 22, 1983

LENGTH: 955 words

... back again, "Nyet." And it's remained the same for all our new proposals, because the Soviets insist on a monopoly of longer-range INF missiles. They offer what can only be called "a filled option, " zero for us, hundreds of warheads for them. As I told the members of the United Nations, that's where things stand today. We will continue our efforts to make the Soviets heed the will of the world, stop stonewalling, and start negotiating ...

LEVEL 1 - 2 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Meeting With Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher of the United Kingdom

Remarks Following the Meeting.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1358

September 29, 1983

LENGTH: 1065 words

... reductions. He has put forward the latest proposals. Mr. Andropov has replied. I hope now that the proposals will be seriously discussed by the Soviet Union at the negotiating table. If they are not successful in reaching zero option, the cruise and Pershing missiles will be deployed by the end of this year. Our nerve is being tested; we must not falter now. That should not be the end of the negotiations. I hope and it is my earnest belief that they should continue, so that the deployment of a lesser number of weapons than the full total, provided, again, the Soviets will genuinely negotiate on balance.

We have also discussed, as the President indicated, the Middle East, and we're very conscious that although ...

LEVEL 1 - 3 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

United Nations

Address Before the 38th Session of the General Assembly.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1325

September 26, 1983

LENGTH: 3310 words

... peoples in both Europe and Asia, the time was ripe, for the first time in history, to resolve a security threat exclusively through arms control. I still believe the elimination of these weapons -- the zero option -- is the best, fairest, most practical solution to the problem. Unfortunately, the Soviet Union declined to accept the total elimination of this class of weapons.

When I was here last, I hoped that the critical Strategic Arms Reduction Talks would focus, and ...

... equal number on both sides between zero and 572. We recommended the lowest possible level. Once again, the Soviets refused an equitable solution and proposed instead what might be called a "half zero option" refuser for us and the solution will enter into serious but I still haven't given up hope that the Soviet Union will enter into serious negotiations.

We are determined to spare no ...

LEVEL 1 - 4 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Arms Control and European Public Opinion

Exchange of Letters With Former Chancellor Bruno Kreisky of Austria.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1263

September 12, 1983

LENGTH: 1534 words

... developed through extremely close cooperation with our NATO Allies, insist only on U.S-Soviet equality, a principle that the Soviet Union has so far refused to honor. When the Soviets made plain their apposition to the Allies we propose parity at the lowest possible level. The Soviets have said this is equally unacceptable. It is Soviet intransigence that is blocking progress.

While I know that some young people are opposed to the prospect of new weapons ...



LEVEL 1 - 5 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Meeting With Prime Minister Pierre Elliott Trudeau of Canada

Remarks Following the Meeting.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 615

April 28, 1983

LENGTH: 996 words

... II's and of the land-based cruise missiles is followed.

In other words, I've been encouraged by the steps that you've taken, Mr. President, in the past months when you proposed an interim solution different from the later when you proposed a series of confidence-building measures. I think these are all initiatives which we need in NATO so that our people will understand that we want peace and that we're not determined to escalate any arms ...



LEVEL 1 - 6 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Foreign Issues

Responses to Questions Submitted by Bunte Magazine.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 683

April 25, 1983

LENGTH: 4550 words

... most comprehensive set of proposals put forward by any American Government. We are committed to successful negotiations, and we believe there is a basis for agreement if the Soviets show equal seriousness.

Q. In addition to the zero - option, as an interim solution you recently suggested, under pressure from the European allies, to break the impasse at the Geneva Conference. How many SS-20 missiles would the Soviets now have to withdraw in order for the ...



LEVEL 1 - 7 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Domestic and Foreign Issues

Remarks in an Interview With Six Journalists.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 469

March 29, 1983

LENGTH: 5046 words

... in that direction but just didn't want to --

The President. Well, I want to point out that -- and by real intention, back when I made at the Press Club, public, the first statement about the zero - zero option, I very specifically said that we would negotiate in good faith on any legitimate proposal. Now, we had stated our goal and what it was that we would like to have.But I made that other statement deliberately so that it would not be ...



LEVEL 1 - 8 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Foreign and Domestic Issues

Interview With Henry Brandon of the London Sunday Times & News Service.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 424

March 18, 1983

LENGTH: 2220 words

... between us and what our view is, has proven that it's successful. Strategic Arms Reduction

Mr. Brandon. Talking about missiles, a number of European leaders, from Mrs. Thatcher to Chancellor Kohl, have been trying to persuade you -- still with the zero option as the ultimate goal -- to come forward with an interim solution. I gather that you are very seriously considering such a move.

The President. Well, let me say that this is a difficult thing to answer. And I'm sure they know this also, because we do stay ...

... acted unilaterally, we do recognize our responsibility as allies.

The difficulty in answering is that you can't talk openly about your strategy or what you're going to do. But I can only point to this fact, that from the very beginning when I announced the zero option, the total elimination of missiles, I said at the same time we will negotiate in good faith any legitimate or reasonable proposal, and that remains true today. But to get into a discussion of where you're ...

... missiles are beginning to be put in place in Europe, because then the Soviet Union will be under pressure to make concessions; the other that you should take the lead and come forward with something that proposes equality but is something less than zero option.

The President. Obviously, in discussing all the ramifications there are going to be people with different ideas than others and a variety of viewpoints as to timing or number or things of that kind. But there is total accord that the ultimate goal should continue to be the zero ...

LEVEL 1 - 9 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Domestic and Foreign Issues

Question-and-Answer Session With High School Students.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 305

February 25, 1983

LENGTH: 4974 words

... range weapons, as a deterrent to those that are there on the edge of Western Europe. And we have agreed to do that.

Now, so far, they have a monopoly. They are the only ones with the threat. We will deploy -- we're trying to get what I said was a zero -based option -- destroy theirs, and we won't produce any of ours. And at least we will have made the step of wiping out a whole system of nuclear weapons.

Now, I think they came to the table and are willing to talk because they don't want ...

LEVEL 1 - 10 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Domestic and Foreign Issues

Question-and-Answer Session With Members of the Sperling Breakfast Group.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 279

February 23, 1983

LENGTH: 8221 words

... n1 U.S. Representative to the Intermediate Range Nuclear Forces talks.

The President. No, because from the very beginning, before the Press Club when I made the first proposal about our INF policy and our desire, our goal to trying get zero gotion, total elimination of that class of weapons and wipe them out of the world. I also said then and have reiterated it many times that we, on the other hand, were going there to negotiate and would negotiate in good faith on any reasonable ...

LEVEL 1 - 11 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Meeting with Prime Minister Kare Willoch of Norway

Remarks to Reporters Following the Meeting.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 251

February 18, 1983

LENGTH: 692 words

... current issue is the question of disarmament and arms control, and in particular, the Geneva negotiations.

The Western goal remains clear. We want to reach a balance of forces in Europe with as few nuclear weapons as possible. The zero option with no intermediate nuclear weapons on either side is the optimum outpone with the that the U.S. will make all possible efforts to get an agreement with the Soviet Union as close to this optimum as possible. And to achieve this, ...

LEVEL 1 - 12 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

The President's News Conference of February 16, 1983

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 243

February 16, 1983

LENGTH: 5537 words

... try to make them feel the heat.

Larry [Laurence Barrett, Time]? Arms Control and Reduction

Q. Further on arms control, sir, since November of '81 your administration has stuck to the so-called zero option in the Interpretend that tack so far has just led to deadlock. There's been a good deal of debate inside the administration about offering a different position, one that might lead to more bargaining....

... us why?

The President. No, Larry, the situation is just exactly what George Bush was telling our friends in Europe it was, calling attention back to when I first, before the Press Club, introduced this proposal for zero option, that I said that we would negotiate in good faith any legitimate proposal that might be offered. Well, we still say the same thing. So far no legitimate counterproposal has been offered that would warrant negotiation or study. But we do believe that the zero option is the moral high ground in this situation, that the opportunity in that area to get rid of an entire class of weapons and release both the Soviet Union, the Eastern bloc, and Western Europe from the threat that is hanging over them ...

... Yeah. Arms Control and Reduction

Q. Mr. President, back to the missiles in Europe. The message that Vice President Bush seemed to bring back and that we heard from him on television last week was that they do support your zero option proposal, but since it has gotten nowhere that they would very much like the consideration of a so-called interim move toward less progress. Coming out of your spokesman in the past 2 or 3 days seems to be a very hard line against that, and I wonder, don't you think that is making it politically more difficult for the NATO leaders to --

The President. No, what he came back with was support expressed for our zero option. And what he also did -- there's no question about, they wanted to know whether, you know, we're going to be willing to talk other issues -- and he pointed out to them my original statement, and that has been our position. If somebody wants to present another offer, we'll negotiate in good faith with this.

G. Well, if I may follow up, since you zero option, Mr. Andropov made a counter-proposal which has been rejected here. Doesn't that leave a lot of



19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 243

NATO leaders feeling like the ball should be in your court if there is going to be some --

The President. Well, no, when you -- you know, ...

LEVEL 1 - 13 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Digital Equipment Corporation

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Employees at the Manufacturing Plant in Roxbury, Mass.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 115

January 26, 1983

LENGTH: 1376 words

... missiles in enough number to be based in Western Europe as a deterrent to those weapons. And I proposed, a year ago last November, that we sit down with the Russians and see if we couldn't negotiate a zero option -- that they give up all of theirs, and we won't put any in Western Europe -- and free that whole area of the world from that threat that is hanging over them.

Now, so far, they've only met us halfway. They're ...

LEVEL 1 - 14 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Second Anniversary of the Inauguration of the President

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters.

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 76

January 20, 1983

LENGTH: 2525 words

... a deterrent. But we have said it would make a lot more sense if we simply, rather than two sides facing each other there with these missiles poised at each other, if we simply went to a zero option.

Now, they've agreed halfway with that. They want us to remain at zero, and they're willing to trim a few of their warheads if we will.

Lesley [Lesley Stahl, CBS News].

Q. I have two questions. ...

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LEVEL 1 - 15 OF 15 DOCUMENTS

Public Papers of the Presidents

Arms Control and Reduction

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters

19 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 49

January 14, 1983

LENGTH: 2937 words

... arms reduction, because it is the most important problem facing this generation.

Q. Sir, could you comment on reports that have circulated in recent days that sometime after the German elections, you might explored alternatives to your zero - zero option and START megotiations?

The President. No, and here you're getting dangerously into an area that can't be opened to discussion, which is the tactics of negotiating and the strategy of negotiating. If you discuss that openly, then there is no strategy, and you've tied your hands with regard to ...

LEVEL 1 - 1 OF 3 DOCUMENTS Public Papers of the Presidents Recommissioning of the U.S.S. New Jersey Remarks at the Ceremony in Long Beach, Calif. 18 Weekly Comp. Pres. Doc. 1669

December 28, 1982

LENGTH: 2183 words

... on both sides at the same time we cut conventional forces in Europe to balanced levels. And I may say, the news in encouraging. The Soviet Union has met us halfway on the zero option. They've agreed to zero on our part. [Laughter]

We can't shut our eyes to the fact that, as the Soviet military power increased, so did their willingness to embark on military adventures. The scars are plainly evident in a ...



struggle against the ian nature; that with will prevail and those will not be forgotten. e, I'd like to mention ie Holocaust. He is a so be a survivor.

ears when the world was happening, there is-heroes who risked we people, often total amps. In Assisi, Italy, the entire population ding Jews throughout

b when I was in Denthe Raybill's Society ition, the largest celeof July, our American United States, and I

the Nazi occupation e order came out for heir Jewish neighbors, ane appeared on the of David.

who I think must be ll was Raoul Wallen-1, at incredible risk, ls. And on this day of especially recall this , as some suggest, let 'Il be forgotten long rg is forgotten. mind on this special

man family now faces it kind of holocaust ay the remembrance 's inhumanity to man to seek a just and elves and our poster-

u all for being here

oke at 1:39 p.m. in hite House. Ouestion-and-Answer Session With Reporters on Domestic and

Foreign Policy Issues April 20, 1982

The President. I'm kind of surprised to be over here on the side. I thought that in the event of rain they were going to have me up there under the roof and—[laughter].

Q. Share and share alike.

 \tilde{O} . With us out here, sir?

1983 Federal Budget

The President. Listen. This afternoon, as you know, representatives of the administration and the Congress are sitting down for an important round of discussions on the budget. And I think all Americans have an interest in the outcome.

It's my fervent plea that—and hope that from these meetings there will soon come a balanced, bipartisan package that will help to revive our economy. And I think the economy is now poised for a recovery. Inflation has fallen sharply, and I hope we'll have more good news on that front this Friday. There's also evidence that interest rates are softening. I know of nothing that would be a greater tonic for the economy right now than for the Congress and the White House to come together on a plan that would lower the deficits and create new jobs.

This morning I met with the Republican leadership in the Congress and then later spoke by phone with Speaker Tip O'Neill. To both of them I delivered the same message: So long as we can reach consensus on a budget plan that is balanced and commands bipartisan support, I'm personally prepared to go the extra mile.

And now your questions.

Q. Mr. President, Senator Laxalt indicated earlier today that he felt that compromise agreement will have to include some kind of tax increases. He was careful to say tax increases that didn't disturb your basic tax program—

The President. Yes.

Q. ——cuts in costs of living, for social security as well as other things, and defense cuts. Now, can you go along with that?

WH

The President. Well, those are the very things that I know the group is discussing, but I am going to reserve the position I think I should—and that is not to comment on the specifics in what they're talking about until they come with a consensus on a balanced program.

Q. But, Mr. President, how can you agree to any kind of tax increases without violating your "no tax increase" pledge, even if it's a surtax combined with a minimum income tax or some kind of energy tax?

The President. Well, now, wait a minute. I think, if you'll remember, always I pointed out that there were areas for changes in the taxes, government revenue, that we would seek, that in some instances were correcting unjustified tax breaks and so forth. And I've always emphasized that what I'm talking about is that tax program of ours which is based on providing an incentive, both for individuals and business—the business tax cuts, the across-the-board, 3-year cuts in personal income tax.

Now, I have not changed on that. That, as I stand. They started in—remember, we presented a package of some \$13 billion with our budget in proposed ways of raising additional revenues. Now, what they've done from there with that package I'm waiting to see.

Q. But, sir, just to follow up, does the surtax somehow violate that incentive package that you've supported and won last year?

The President. Well, again, let's see what we come up with in the interest of a balanced program.

Situation in the Falkland Islands

Q. Mr. President, if Argentina attempts to invoke the Treaty of Rio, sir—if Argentina attempts to invoke the Treaty of Rio, what will our position be? And what do we do?

The President. Well, they have voted to take this up, I believe, on Thursday, that they're going to take this matter up that Argentina has asked about. e in that.

the Speaker is going to me. He had not met ocratic representatives part of this discussion eting with them this urse, I can always hold Ie told me once that friends, so I might just

him this morning, sir. ou might get together

because he had not yet ple. So, I told him that Republican leadership to had been a party to

did you give the Retimetable? Is it as crult says it is, that you

, the essence of time is of the economy right rates staying up there. ouraging that various ps are taking steps to the announcement on · automobile manufacing to lower them for ng a gentleman in Inmade money available percent-or 4 points terest rates and now r group in Ohio-a id done this back in ncrease in the sales of f those regions. That is indicating thatthat Chase Manhattan with something like 52

let's see. When other

nd Islands

British Government

proposals Secretary

k from Buenos Aires Is Mr. Haig's effec-

at an end?

t is not. He's done a let me just lay one thing to rest now regarding some of the rumors that have gone on. This idea of whether or not we've endangered any prestige of ours in doing what we've done—I think we would have lost prestige if we had not been willing to undertake this job of trying to broker an agreement between these two parties and forestall violence. And however it may turn out, my only regret would be if it didn't work.

Q. Are you as hopeful now, sir, as you were a day ago?

The President. What?

Q. Are you as hopeful now as you were before Mr. Haig returned?

The President. It's very difficult. All I can tell you is, there have been some changes made; they've been relayed to the United Kingdom.

1983 Federal Budget

Q. Mr. President, back on the subject of the budget, do you plan this week, sir,

Deputy Press Secretary Speakes. This will have to be the last question, John [John Palmer, NBC News], please.

O. Excuse me?

Mr. Speakes. This will have to be the last question.

Q. Why?

Q. Why?

Q. Mr. President, do you plan to meet with Speaker O'Neill? Will you ask him this week for a meeting to try to wrap up this whole budget process?

The President. Well, I don't think that it's a case of one of us asking the other or not. I think—and there's no way to project whether it'll be this week. It's when that group that is meeting comes to both of us and says that they have a consensus on a package that they believe is balanced and merits now our taking a look at it from the standpoint of getting together.

Q. Senator Baker, sir, says now is the time.

The President. What?

Q. Senator Baker said today he felt now was that time.

The President. Well, I think that "now" was a kind of figure of speech thing meaning that now, in this immediate period, to break this logjam and get the economy

moving again.

Ground Zero Movement; Soviet President Brezhnev

Q. Mr. President, do you think that Ground Zero is detrimental to this country, and are you going to meet with Brezhnev in October?

Mr. Speakes. I would never cut Ms. Thomas [Helen Thomas, United Press International] off.

Q. And she has a followup. [Laughter] The President. Science (Second Science)

Q. And Brezhnev.

Q. And meeting with Brezhnev later, sir. The President. I have to be heart and soul in sympathy with the people that are talking about the horrors of nuclear war and the fact that we should do everything we could to prevent such a war from happening. As a matter of fact, it's my understanding the leader of Ground Zero, however, does not believe in the freeze.

A freeze, yes, but after, as we've said so many times, a verifiable, substantial reduction to bring us down to parity and at a reduced number.

I would hope that some of these people, however, who are insisting on some of these things would realize that I'm with them as to the need to do something to lessen the possibilities of nuclear war. But I would also ask them to consider that no matter how sincere and well intentioned, only in this position do you have all the facts necessary to base decisions on action. And, therefore, I would ask their trust and confidence that feeling as sincerely as I do, the same as they feel, that they would allow us to take the actions that we think are necessary to lessen this threat.

Now, with regard to Mr. Brezhnev, I would still hope that he would come, because it is arms reduction that is being discussed at the United Nations in June. And I would hope that he would find it possible to be there and that we could have a meeting—but not in any sense that that would replace a later summit meeting, full summit meeting, in which there would be adequate preparation on both sides for such a meeting.

Q. For October?

all. No, I'm very curious; I'd like to know. But also, I'm going to be settling for results. And that's why each one of you was enlisted—leaders from every walk of life who have to solve these problems every day.

Government can provide opportunity. It can pave the way. But ultimately, it is individuals like yourselves who brave new horizons, expand freedom, and create better lives for us all.

Your success will be measured by how much and how well you marshall the private resources of America in the service of community development. I'm told that Americans perform some \$100 billion worth of labor every year for volunteer organizations across the country, and that's in addition to the \$47 billion they contribute in cash to charitable and religious organizations.

The country is bursting with ideas and creativity, but a government run by central decree has no way to respond. People want to play a part in building a better America, and you can show the way. You are their colleagues, their friends, and you can talk with them and work with them just as I want to talk and work with you.

I will also be speaking out on this subject, working with the Cabinet to refocus the resources of government so they encourage private initiatives instead of discouraging them.

When I spoke to the National Alliance of Businessmen [Business], I mentioned several outstanding models of corporate responsibility and community spirit. But for every one I mentioned, I know there are a hundred more, just as good. Find them. Spread the word. Help 230 million Americans get organized. Help us create new leadership at the State and local level, a new Alliance for Progress here at home. Help us put America's future back in the people's hands.

I know your Chairman, Bill Verity, has excellent ideas on how these things can be done. And each of you brings expertise and experience to our enterprise as well. We look to you, we appreciate you and, most of all, we're counting on you. We're confident that this task can be done and that your task force is the group to do it.

So, again, a heartfelt thanks. And maybe you can cure the misconception that has existed since a few years ago, when an immigrant to this country who had become a very successful farmer, died and left his estate—it was not in seven figures at all but left his estate to the government, the United States Government, for what this country had done for him.

And when the State took its share of the estate in estate taxes, the Federal Government sued that it was tax-free and that this shouldn't be allowed. And what you can cure is the fact that the Federal Government won that case on the basis that it was a charitable organization. [Laughter]

Thank you.

Note: The President spoke at 1:02 p.m. in the State Dining Room at the White House.

Interview With Joseph Rice of the Cleveland Plain Dealer November 30, 1981

Libya

Mr. Rice. Mr. President, there were reports recently that Libya had sent people to the United States to assassinate both yourself and other top government officials. Do you give any credence to these reports? And exactly how far will your administration go in dealing with people, such as Qadhafi, who obviously hate the United States? The President. Well, we're studying right now our economic relations with them. I think he has made it obvious that he is against most of the things that we're trying to achieve, such as peace in the Middle East, appealing to the moderate Arab nations, and so forth.

As to his threats personally against me, I think in view of the record, you can't dis-

The President. No, I can't say that there is. I intend to, before this meeting, talk to the Department of Transportation, Secretary of Transportation, about PATCO. I have to call your attention again that they had plenty of warning. They were informed in the negotiations that the strike, if they took one after they'd threatened, it was illegal, that they themselves had taken personal oaths, and that there was no way that we could stand by and not recognize that the law had been broken. So, what we informed them was that they might call it a strike, but in reality they were quitting their jobs.

Now, I think a great consideration we must have—we're not trying for vengeance or anything else of that kind, but I do think that there must be great consideration given to those who did continue to work.

Mr. Rice. You cannot see then offering any PATCO striker his job back then?

The President. I'd be very happy to hear any suggestions that they may have, but I also feel that they ought to recognize that the people they represent, the members of their unions, are the employers of public servants. And when there's a strike, it's a strike against them, the people.

And labor once recognized that. I've a little background in labor myself, but when public employees first began to organize, unionize, organized labor said they would help them only if public employee unions put in their constitutions that they would not strike.

Mr. Rice. Mr. President, are you ruling out then any chance that they might get a job back, if that's brought up by labor?

The President. No.

1984 Candidacy

Mr. Rice. You made a reference tonight to the senior Senator from Ohio, John Glenn, who has been in New Hampshire and other States testing the waters. I wonder in your own mind, sir, what your current thinking is about whether you'll run for reelection and exactly how formidable an opponent you view Senator Glenn as.

The President. Oh, I don't know. He's very popular in his own State. I meant my line humorously.

As for myself in 1984, I don't think about it, because I set a policy for myself when I was Governor for 8 years—well, the second 4 years didn't matter. But I said that there would be no consideration of political matters in any decision that our administration had to make, because the minute you do that then you begin compromising in your own mind. And I said we would meet every issue simply on the basis of was it right or wrong for the people.

So, as far as 1984 is concerned, the only time I consider it is when I'm worrying about what the deficit will be by 1984.

Nuclear Force Negotiations

Mr. Rice. The arms control talks, sir, began today in Geneva. Do you expect the current round of negotiations to produce anything substantive, or is it more likely to lead to a summit meeting with yourself and President Brezhnev?

The President. Well, I don't think the two are related in that way. I've not ruled out a summit meeting. As a matter of fact, I think that's something that has to be thoroughly prepared for. But I am very hopeful about these negotiations.

It is the first time in a great many years that we will have met with them on supposed arms limitation—I prefer to call it arms reduction—when we ourselves were not unilaterally disarming. The Russians could sit at the negotiating table, and they didn't have to give up anything. We were doing it to ourselves. And this time, with our determination to rebuild our military, I think they may find they have a reason to want to meet us halfway on disarmament.

And so, as I say, I'm hopeful that—I think it would be particular for the world and for Europe if those missiles planted there near the MATCI border, in that vicinity—able to hit every population center in Europe—if those were taken out and we did not have to counter them by poising the same kind of missiles aimed at their country.

Mr. Rice. Mr. President, thank you very much.

Deputy Press Secretary Speakes. You know, one thing we ought to point out on this State—money for the State governments, that the first relief that they will

Oct. 2 / Administration of Ronald Reagan, 1981

for Cancer Biology at the Salk Institute in California. He is an art patron and founded the Hammer Galleries, Inc. (New York City), and continues to be a major supporter of the Los Angeles County Museum of Art. Dr. Hammer graduated from Columbia University (B.S., 1919; M.D., 1921). He is married, has one son, and resides in Los Angeles, Calif. He was born May 21, 1898, in New York City.

EAST Room - White House

Remarks and a Question-and-Answer Session With Reporters on the Announcement of the United States Strategic Weapons Program October 2, 1981

The President. As President, it's my solemn duty to ensure America's national security while vigorously pursuing every path to peace. Toward this end, I have repeatedly pledged to halt the decline in America's military strength and restore that margin of safety needed for the protection of the American people and the maintenance of peace.

During the last several years, a weakening in our security posture has been particularly noticeable in our strategic nuclear forces—the very foundation of our strategy for deterring foreign attacks. A window of vulnerability is opening, one that would jeopardize not just our hopes for serious productive arms negotiations, but our hopes for peace and freedom.

Shortly after taking office, I directed the Secretary of Defense to review our strategy for deterrence and to evaluate the adequacy of the forces now available for carrying out that strategy. He and his colleagues, in consultation with many leaders outside the executive branch, have done that job well. And after one of the most complex, thorough, and carefully conducted processes in memory, I am announcing today a plan to revitalize our strategic forces and maintain America's ability to keep the peace well into the next century.

Our plan is a comprehensive one. It will strengthen and modernize the strategic triad of land-based missiles, sea-based missiles, and bombers. It will end longstanding delays in some of these programs and introduce new elements into others. And just as important, it will improve communications and control systems that are vital to these strategic forces. This program will achieve three objectives:

-It will act as a deterrent against any Soviet actions directed against the American people or our allies;

-It will provide us with the capability to respond at reasonable cost and within adequate time to any further growth in Soviet forces;

—It will signal our resolve to maintain the strategic balance, and this is the keystone to any genuine arms reduction agreement with the Soviets.

Let me point out here that this is a strategic program that America can afford. It fits within the revised fiscal guidelines for the Department of Defense that I announced last week. And during the next 5 years, the entire cost of maintaining and rebuilding our strategic forces will take less than 15 percent of our defense expenditures. This is considerably below the 20 percent of our defense budget spent on strategic arms during the 1960's, when we constructed many of the forces that exist today. It is fair to say that this program will enable us to modernize our strategic forces and, at the same time, meet our many other commitments as a nation.

Now, let me outline the five main features of our program.

First, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to revitalize our bomber forces by constructing and deploying some 100 B-1 bombers as soon as possible, while continuing to deploy cruise missiles on existing bombers. We will also develop an advanced bomber with "stealth" characteristics for the 1990's.

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he Secretary of Debomber forces by ing some 100 B-1 ible, while continunissiles on existing evelop an advanced characteristics for Second, I have ordered the strengthening and expansion of our sea-based forces. We will continue the construction of Trident submarines at a steady rate. We will develop a larger and more accurate sea-based ballistic missile. We will also deploy nuclear cruise missiles in some existing submarines.

Third, I've ordered completion of the MX missiles. We have decided, however, not to deploy the MX in the racetrack shelters proposed by the previous administration or in any other scheme for multiple protective shelters. We will not deploy 200 missiles in 4,600 holes, nor will we deploy 100 missiles in 1,000 holes.

We have concluded that these basing schemes would be just as vulnerable as the existing Minuteman silos. The operative factor here is this: No matter how many shelters we might build, the Soviets can build more missiles, more quickly, and just as cheaply.

Instead, we will complete the MX missile which is much more powerful and accurate than our current Minuteman missiles, and we will deploy a limited number of the MX missiles in existing silos as soon as possible.

At the same time, we will pursue three promising long-term options for basing the MX missile and choose among them by 1984, so that we can proceed promptly with full deployment.

Fourth, I have directed the Secretary of Defense to strengthen and rebuild our communications and control system, a much neglected factor in our strategic deterrent. I consider this decision to improve our communications and control system as important as any of the other decisions announced today. This system must be foolproof in case of any foreign attack.

Finally, I have directed that we end our long neglect of strategic defenses. This will include cooperation with Canada on improving North American air surveillance and defense, and as part of this effort, I've also directed that we devote greater resources to improving our civil defenses.

This plan is balanced and carefully considered—a plan that will meet our vital security needs and strengthen our hopes for peace. It's my hope that this program will prevent our adversaries from making the mistake others have made and deeply regretted in the past—the mistake of underestimating the resolve and the will of the American people to keep their freedom and protect their homeland and their allies.

Now, I can only remain here for a few minutes. And I will do so for just a few questions that might deal with the statement or with policy. But for all the technical matters, I am going to turn you over to Secretary [of Defense] Cap Weinberger.

Yes, Helen [Helen Thomas, United Press International].

Q. On that, would we be ready to use these new systems as bargaining chips in arms talks with the Soviets?

The President. Oh, I think everything having to do with arms, Helen, would have to be on the table.

Q. Mr. President, when exactly is this "window of vulnerability?" We heard yesterday the suggestion that it exists now. Earlier this morning, a defense official indicated that it was not until '84 or '87. Are we facing it right now?

The President. Well, I think in some areas we are, yes. I think the imbalance of forces, for example, on the Western front, in the NATO line—we are vastly outdistanced there. I think the fact that right now, they have a superiority at sea.

Q. Mr. President, if there is or will be a "window of vulnerability," why is the MX any less vulnerable if it's in silos, the location of which the Soviets presumably already know, unless we were going to launch on their attack?

The President. I don't know but what maybe you haven't gotten into the area that I'm going to turn over to the Secretary of Defense.

I could say this: The plan also includes the hardening of silos so that they are protected against nuclear attack. Now, we know that is not permanent. We know that they can then improve their accuracy, their power, and their ability, but it will take them some time to do that, and they will have to devote a decided effort to doing that.

Q. So this is a way then of buying time, sir?

The President. In a way, of narrowing that "window of vulnerability."

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Q. Mr. President, some people already are saying that your decisions are based to a large extent on politics, domestic politics, so let me ask you about two points: One, that you never considered the racetrack system because it was proposed by Jimmy Carter, and you didn't want to have anything to do with something that he had proposed; and, two, that you're not basing the MX in Utah and Nevada because of opposition from the Mormon Church and your good friend, Senator Paul Laxalt.

The President. Sam [Sam Donaldson, ABC News], I can tell you now, no, the entire study of the basis for basing-I got tangled up there with two words that sounded so much alike-the MX missile was a very thorough study of all those proposals that had been made. And actually, I could refer you to the Townes Commission [Panel], their study and their report that we would not have an invulnerable missile basing by doing that; that all they would have to do is increase the number of targeted warheads on that particular area and take out the whole area; and while it would force them to build additional missiles, we would be just as vulnerable as we are in the present Minutemen.

Q. Laxalt didn't persuade you, sir? The President. No, no.

Q. Mr. President, your predecessor killed the B-1 manned bomber because he said it couldn't penetrate Soviet air defenses. The Soviets can make a lot of progress in radar between now and 1986. Can you guarantee that the B-1 could penetrate Soviet air defenses, and is it the best plane as a cruise missile launch platform?

The President. I think, again, you're getting in—I think that my few minutes are up—[laughter]—and I'm going to turn that question over to Cap. I think I know the answer to it, but I do believe that you are getting into the kind of questions that he is properly—

Q. Well, could you tell us why you decided to build the B-1 as opposed to your predecessor's decision not to build it? Do you think it can penetrate Soviet air space?

The President. We have to have it, because between the aging B-52 and the bomber we are developing, the newer bomber, there is too long a time gap in there and would leave us a very lengthy, vulnerable period. And the B-1 is designed not just to fill that gap, but it will then have a cruise missile carrying capacity later, in which it will still be worth the cost of building and worth having.

But now, I'm going to turn it over to Cap here for the rest of the questions.

Note: The President spoke at 2 p.m. in the East Room at the White House.

The Townes Panel was organized by the Department of Defense to study alternative basing modes for the MX missile system.

Nomination of Jean Broward Shevlin Gerard To Have the Rank of Ambassador While Serving as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization October 2, 1981

The President today announced his intention to nominate Jean Broward Shevlin Gerard to have the rank of Ambassador while serving as United States Permanent Representative to the United Nations Educational, Scientific and Cultural Organization.

In 1977-81 Mrs. Gerard was an attorney with the law firm of Cadwalader, Wickersham and Taft of New York, where she specialized in international law.