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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

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DOCUMENT NO. & TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. transcript	Richard Burt off the record interview (5 pp)	8/8/83	C

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To: nls lt jf bfp dr jg gp icb lj rak pa pgh daw dlb

From: s/jf

The following items come from a background interview with David Gergen:

* National security adviser William Clark is taking a firmer hand in the development of foreign policy.

* Clark has a lot to learn, however. He is being blamed for failing to warn his White House colleagues and members of Congress about troop maneuvers in Central America.

* The President was "livid" about reports that Secretary of State George Shultz is losing influence and would have "come down like a ton of bricks" if asked about it at his press conference.

* White House officials assume that news of planned troop maneuvers in Central America was leaked by Pentagon officials who oppose it.

* White House officials were privately congratulating themselves this week for creating a torrent of news the Carter briefing book caper off the front pages.

Clark. When asked about Clark, Gergen volunteered that our "competitors" are also working on a Clark story this week. Presumably he means Time and Newsweek.

As evidence of Clark's emergence, Gergen points to these developments: (1) Clark put together the Kissinger commission and advocated troop maneuvers in Central America over Pentagon protests; (2) Clark appointed himself chairman of the new arms control task force, (3) Clark

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installed his deputy as special envoy to the Middle East and (4) Clark has begun lobbying on Capitol Hill.

Gergen views these actions as "a mark of growing self-confidence and comfort in the job." He adds: "He's become the man on top, in charge, in control. He's much more articulate on foreign policy issues than he used to be. He speaks out in a variety of meetings instead of deferring to his aides."

(NSC Spokesman Bob Sims concurred in this view. He said that Clark has decided to be a stronger overall manager of foreign policy. Sims notes that Bud McFarlane, whom Clark has relied upon for expertise and to work with Congress, will not be replaced. Instead, Clark intends to be a full-fledged presidential adviser and work more with Congress.)

Although McFarlane will not be replaced at the NSC, Gergen says that John Poindexter will pick up some of McFarlane's duties. A new man named Bob Kermit also has been helping out during the transition. Although McFarlane is supposed to report to Shultz, Gergen expects that he will actually continue to report to Clark.

Clark's ability to deal with members of Congress has often been questioned within the White House. Again this week he was being criticized by Baker and Duberstein for failing to tell them or members of Congress that the President had decided that U.S. troops should conduct military maneuvers in Central America. In Clark's defense, however, Gergen noted that the maneuvers became public

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sooner than anyone expected. They were leaked at the Pentagon by "someone trying to sabotage the program." White House officials are trying to identify the leaker.

Gergen subscribes to the view that Clark's growing influence will make U.S. foreign policy more conservative. This has been reflected in Central America, and Gergen thinks that McFarlane is "less pro-Israel" than Habib. But he notes that Clark is also intent upon getting some progress toward arms control. Clark intends to "bang heads" at the State Department and Pentagon on arms control. "He will be a catalyst to keep the process moving," says Gergen.

Shultz. Although the President insists that Shultz has not lost influence, Gergen thinks the Secretary of State may not be entirely happy with Clark's new role. He describes the situation this way: "All lines between the President and Shultz are very tight, very firm. Relations are good at the top, but there is some scuffling at the lower levels--assistant secretary and below."

Baker. White House officials still worry that Clark is trying to exclude Jim Baker from the decision-making. Baker was left out of the Kissinger commission selection and he was unaware of the decision on troop maneuvers. His aides are worried because Clark lacks the political savvy that Baker provides. But Baker has decided to keep his mouth shut about it for the time being. "We are very anxious to work this out," says Gergen.

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New Press Deputy. Treasury flak Marlin Fitzwater will soon be moved to the White House as a deputy press secretary concentrating on domestic affairs.

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SECURITY:STRATEG
DATE:08/04

QUEUE:RAKX-RAK
BY:

MSG:
INI:

OPR:RAK 08/04,10:22

TO: DAW (MLS, LT, DR, CP, SJF) ✓

FROM: RAK

RE: Reagan re-election strategy

The creation this week of a presidential task force on hunger is only the latest in a recent series of blatantly political moves by the White House designed to position Reagan for the 1984 campaign.

In devising his re-election strategy, Reagan has a distinct advantage over his modern predecessors: Even at this early stage, all White House tactics can be directed at the Democrats. As the first incumbent since Dwight Eisenhower not to face a challenge from within his own party, Reagan need not devote any time, money or energy to warding off a primary opponent. Hence, current White House political initiatives are largely pre-emptive, aimed at blunting those issues the Democrats are likely to use against Reagan next year.

Issues. The President's protracted education offensive exemplifies an issue which he somewhat successfully pre-empted from the Democrats, who were making an issue of Reagan's education budget cuts long before he discovered merit pay, etc. (Reagan will return to the education theme periodically; his next outing is set for August 24 in Los Angeles.) Hunger is another example. The administration's cuts in welfare programs and the rise in unemployment caused by the recession leave Reagan very vulnerable to

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charges that he lacks compassion for the disadvantaged. The commission on hunger--announced on the same day that the Census Bureau reported a 1982 increase in the percentage of Americans below the poverty line--is intended to soften the perception that Reagan is insensitive to the poor.

Agriculture Secretary Block's trip to the supermarket had the same purpose. You can judge for yourself how successful these actions are likely to be.

The environment. Another issue that will receive considerable White House attention in coming weeks is the environment. Interior Secretary Watt has toned down his anti-environmentalist rhetoric and scrubbed administration plans to raise revenue by selling federal property under Interior's control. Meanwhile, new Environmental Protection Agency chief Ruckelshaus has been given a long leash to pursue pro-environmentalist policies. For instance, he is pushing ahead with a crash study on acid rain, a problem that is of special concern to the Northeast. To call attention to the administration's commitment to the environment, Vice President Bush will sleep in a tent and go fishing and canoeing this weekend in Montana's Glacier National Park. (This is not a private vacation for Bush but part of his official duties, according to his press aide.) Such political strategists as Jim Baker and Mike Deaver believe Reagan can improve his environmental image considerably. As governor, Reagan won the support of California environmental groups by expanding park land. But

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Reagan's success on this issue, too, is likely to be marginal. A planned presidential address on the environment was downgraded to a Saturday radio speech because there was so little Reagan could say to please environmentalists.

Flags. On another issue, Larry Speakes this week raised the possibility that Reagan may reconsider his opposition to a federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King, now that the House has passed such legislation. My instincts tell me that before all is said and done Reagan will embrace the King holiday, especially if the bill makes progress in the Senate. Reversing his opposition is the kind of ploy characteristic of Reagan, and demonstrates his presidency's emphasis on style as a political weapon. The administration's recent week-long devotion to civil rights, which included the President's flimsy proposal to toughen the Fair Housing Act, is yet another example of style over substance that will mark the 1984 Reagan campaign. Polls still show that voters consistently like Reagan as an individual, even though they disagree with many of his policies. White House strategists will take advantage of this political strength by employing campaign tactics that will emphasize Reagan's personality, sometimes at the expense of issues.

Political summit. The re-election campaign is likely to reach the point of no return on August 21, when the President will meet in Los Angeles with Paul Laxalt, veteran Reagan political adviser Stu Spencer, pollster

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Richard Wirthlin, White House political director Ed Rollins, Baker, Deaver and others. My guess is that Nancy Reagan will be involved in this meeting, too. Don't look for Reagan to emerge from the session and declare himself a candidate. What is more likely is that he will continue to say that he hasn't made a final decision, but that he has authorized certain preliminary organizing be done in the event he does run.

The whole world will interpret this as a clear indication that he actually has decided to run. A formal announcement of his candidacy is not likely before mid-November, after the President returns from his trip to Asia (during which he will appear very presidential). In this way, Reagan hopes to have his cake and eat it, too. By maintaining the fiction that he hasn't made up his mind, Reagan hopes to minimize the perception that everything he does is politically motivated, while at the same time laying the groundwork for the campaign.

Pollticking. The day after the political summit, Reagan begins a busy week of campaigning. Plans call for him to meet with Hispanic businessmen in Los Angeles, with Hispanic women in LA, to attend an education event in LA, to address the American Legion in Seattle and GOP women in San Diego. Earlier, on his way to the ranch (leaving Washington on August 12), Reagan will speak to the Hispanic Chamber of Commerce in Tampa, Fla., to the GI Forum in El Paso, and to the Veterans of Foreign Wars in New Orleans.

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Campaign staff. For several weeks there has been a consensus among Reagan advisers that Drew Lewis should become campaign manager. Laxalt will serve as campaign chairman. Rollins also will have a key role on the re-election committee. Baker and Deaver are likely to stay at the White House and exert strong control over the campaign from there. One possible upshot of the August 21 meeting may be to ratify the choice of five regional directors for the 1984 campaign. Their names already have been leaked to reporters.

The idea of establishing an "exploratory" committee as provided under federal election laws was ruled out some time ago. Instead, a re-election committee will be established, probably around mid-October, a few weeks before Reagan's formal announcement.

Polls. Because of the economic recovery, Reagan's standing in the polls has risen about 15 points since January. His approval rating is hovering in the mid-50s, with at least one poll (the Garth Analysis) showing that 58 percent of voters now approve of his handling of the Presidency. These numbers show that as the campaign begins, Reagan is in a relatively strong political position, certainly a much better position than was Jimmy Carter at this same point in his term.

Prospects. White House experts agree that Reagan's fortunes will rise or fall on the strength of the economy on election day. If the recovery continues at a good pace,

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Reagan will be hard to beat. But if the economy falters next year under a surge in interest rates caused by budget deficits--as Republican economist Alan Greenspan and others now are warning--Reagan will be vulnerable, indeed.

Another issue that poses grave political risks for Reagan is Central America. To begin with, the President is pursuing hard-line policies that lack broad public support. (The latest Washington Post-ABC poll shows 40 percent of Americans view Reagan's Central American policy as another Vietnam.) Add to this the fact that Reagan suffers from a longstanding perception among many voters, particularly women, that he is likely to start a reckless war. Although Reagan's tough stand in Central America may appeal to many men, it stirs fear among many women, and women will be a majority of voters in 1984. White House political thinkers fear that a shooting war involving U.S. troops in Central America would doom Reagan's re-election chances.

Longterm tactics. Looking ahead to next year's campaign strategy, the White House is likely to place heavy emphasis on reconstructing the 1980 coalition of ethnic Catholics, Midwest farmers, blue-collar workers, Southern and Western Democrats and conservative Republicans. Reagan pollster Wirthlin claims that the widespread loss of support for Reagan among blue-collar workers is being turned around by the recovery, and there are indications that Reagan again may travel to the Midwest and Northeast, areas he avoided during the recession. It is worth noting that Reagan got

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more Hispanic votes than expected in 1980, and he believes he can make inroads again with Hispanics, who are a key voting bloc in California, Texas and Florida. Tuition tax credits, opposition to abortion and a strong stand in Central America are positions that appeal to many Latin voters.

In addition, Reagan would, of course, like to eradicate the gender gap. But I see no evidence that he will have any success on this score. The gap has widened in the past several months, possibly because of tensions in Central America. My guess is that it will be a major liability for Reagan throughout 1984.

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To: mls lt jf bfp dr jg gp dcb lh rak pa pgn daw alb

From: sjf

The following items come from a background interview with

Robert Sims, spokesman for the National Security Council:

* William Clark's increased role in policy development for Central America, arms control and the Mideast means that Reagan is becoming more involved in these issues.

* Shultz' low profile irks White House aides. "I wish he were out in front. He's not a dynamic figure."

* The White House views recent proposals by Castro and the Sandanistas as evidence of "nervousness" caused by the planned U.S. troop maneuvers in Central America.

* U.S. officials are frustrated with the slowness of the Contadora Group. "They are a little more Latin than most North Americans would like."

* White House officials are optimistic about the prospects of obtaining an arms control agreement from the Soviets.

Shultz-Clark. Sims, who is as crafty in dealing with the press as his boss, William Clark, sought this week to soften what he said last week about Clark's increased role. Clark is skilled at creating publicity for himself, but he likes to maintain the reputation of a humble man who seeks no recognition for his considerable contribution. Thus Sims insisted that Clark's new role only reflects the interests of the President. It is not a power grab. Central America, arms control and the Middle East are "three key areas that have the President's personal attention." Clark is trying

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``to energize the system'' on these issues only because they interest Reagan. ``The policymaking has just moved to a new plateau.'' This is clearly the line he is giving to reporters who are catching up on the Clark story.

In reference to the arms control task force headed by Clark, Sims says that Clark simply wants to build upon the ``good work'' done by the interagency group. ``We've reached a point where that work can be built upon closer to the President--here in the White House,'' says Sims. ``And that means it's going to be chaired by Judge Clark.''

Likewise on the Middle East, Sims says the policy-making ``is getting to the point where the President is going to get more involved.'' He adds: ``It certainly isn't Clark. It's the President who is taking over. By sending his own aide, Bud McFarlane, to the Middle East, this ups the stakes for the President. It's a big gamble. But it doesn't mean that Clark is drawing power to the White House.''

Sims insists that Shultz's role has not been diminished by this shift. He insists Shultz and Clark agree on policy. But he concedes that some lower level people in the State Department and on the National Security Council staff are at odds as a result of what they perceive to be a shift in power from State to the White House. Sims himself took a shot at Shultz for maintaining too low a profile. This was not an unguarded remark. Clark clearly would like create a situation in which he is the true manager of foreign policy while Shultz is the spokesman. Clark seems irked that

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Snultz is competing with him for the lowest profile.

Coherence. As you might expect, Sims rejects criticism that U.S. policy in Central America and recent signs of easing tensions with the Soviet Union are inconsistent. He dismisses the grain agreement, the Madrid agreement and talks toward renegotiating the Polish debt as "peripheral." He adds: "You can't take a thing like grain--a fungible commodity readily available on the world market--and link it to every Soviet activity. We cannot wait until they get out of Afganistan, Central America and every other place before we do something in our best interest."

Central America. Sims became agitated when I pressed him to discuss the objectives of administration policy in Central America. He is very sensitive to right wing criticism of Reagan's willingness to negotiate with the Marxists. He is much more sensitive to right wing critics than to those in Congress who say that he is trying to overthrow the Sandanista government.

What the U.S. wants the Contadora group to negotiate is "one agreement that would resolve all outstanding regional issues." The U.S. would be opposed to bilateral agreements. But U.S. officials are disappointed with the actions of the Contradora group so far. "They're not exactly action-oriented," says Sims.

The goal of Stone's discussion with the Salvadoran rebels is to win their participation in elections. The first meeting had no agenda. The offer being put to Nicaragua is

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that the activity of the contras will "subside" if the flow of arms into El Salvador is halted.

Nevertheless, Sims says, Ronald Reagan will not be satisfied as long as Marxists control Nicaragua. "There would still be a question of the kind of society they have," he says. "This President would never be satisfied until they have some kind of democratic process."

But Sims refused to say whether the real objective of current U.S. policy is to stop the flow of arms into El Salvador or to install a new government in Nicaragua. "The President isn't going to be around long enough to get to that point, either in one year or five years," he said, "so why cross the bridge of 'what if'."

He was very emotional on the subject of Castro's offer to withdraw his advisers from Nicaragua. Here again, he is worried about criticism from the right wing. "We aren't going to respond to his statement at a press conference. We aren't going to overreact. We're willing to work with the Contadora group to see if he's serious. But we're not going to send a special mission to Havana. The President has responded in kind with a statement to the press. Instead of saying baloney, he's still a robber, crook and a drug pusher, willing to give him the benefit of the doubt. That's a major act of good will by the President."

Both Castro and the Sandanistas "reacted to fleet maneuvers and the show of consistency by the President" in their recent conciliatory statements. "Cuba's got a lot to

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think about--how much can they bite off. If Reagan hadn't done it (decided on troop maneuvers in Central America), we wouldn't have a six-point peace proposal from the Sandanistas. It reflects a nervousness on their part. If we keep giving them the benefit of the doubt, of course, I don't know how long they will stay nervous. If the fish is on the hook, you want to keep them there."

U.S.-Soviet Relations. White House optimism about an arms control agreement stems from the view that the U.S. has staked out a good negotiating posture. "At this point the administration, we are on the way to achieving a military buildup and we have put our economic house in order," said Sims. "We are at a point now where we are ready to negotiate with the Soviets from a position that gives us some leverage." According to Sims, the turning point came last spring when the Soviets were unable to influence the German elections.

He expressed confidence that the Soviets will respond to our current proposals. However, White House aides have abandoned the view that the START talks hold more hope for progress than INF. Reason: The Soviets failed to seek a side-agreement on confidence-building measures. They now view the two negotiations as equally tough.

Sims indicated that the U.S. does not intend to table another proposal when the INF talks resume later this year. "Why should we make a new proposal? They rejected our last proposal, so we told them to pick a number--any number--and

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they didn't. The problem with the U.S. has been that we don't have enough patience. We have the leverage. We have to keep it." (I did not have enough time to engage him in a discussion of the obvious question--whether Reagan's leverage might be reduced by his apparent desire to get an agreement before the 1984 election.)

Sims says that Clark took control of arms control policy because he sees the "true test" of Reagan's policy approaching with the scheduled deployment of missiles in Europe. "This fall is going to be a time of considerable activity. The policy may be reaching a critical point. We're getting to the main event. We're going to be looking for ways to use our leverage." He mentioned that Shultz will be meeting with Gromyko in New York in November. He noted that there is growing congressional interest in arms control. Reagan "has not rule in or rule out" the proposal for a meeting with Andropov at the United Nations.

Chad. "Our focus is clearly on our consultations with the French. It is a French-Libyan problem, not a U.S-Libyan problem. Of course, it would be very unfortunate for the U.S. if the Libyans succeeded." U.S. officials view the situation as "quite serious, maybe critical." But it was not critical enough to dissuade them from moving the USS Coral Sea to the Caribbean. He adds: "The French intelligence is good. They don't seem to be convinced it is a critical situation."

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STORY:GERGEN
TIME: FMT:

QUEUE:RAKX-RAK
HJ:

MSG:

INI:

OPR:RAK 108/05,29:27

TO: MLS, LT, JF, BFP, DR, JG, GP, DCB, LH, SJF, PA, PGR,
LAW, ILE

FROM: RAK

RE: Background-only ivus with Ed Meese and David Gergen

Political summit. Both Meese and Gergen report that Reagan is having "strong second thoughts" about holding the big political strategy meeting in Los Angeles on August 21. "I have the feeling he will cancel it," says Gergen. The reason: Reagan feels the planned meeting has taken on a larger significance than he intended, that it would raise public expectations and increase pressure on him to declare his re-election intentions sooner than he would like. Gergen complains that the meeting was planned simply as a "political update" for Reagan, but because word of it leaked to reporters, the session is being portrayed as a "decision-making" meeting. In addition, too many of Reagan's political advisers now are urgently seeking invitations to the meeting. What was conceived as a meeting of six or eight close aides now has mushroomed to more than 20. Says Meese, "All this hoopla [in the press] would put pressure on the President to answer questions about his plans....He has his own very good sense of timing about when to announce." For months Reagan has frustrated his aides by seeking to delay the date of his announcement.

Meese and Gergen both emphasize they still have not doubts that Reagan will run again. If the meeting is cancelled, it

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will be for tactical reasons only. Meese also confirms reports that a re-election committee will be organized around the middle of October, with Reagan's formal announcement to come in November after he returns from Asia.

Women. The President felt he received a warm reception from the group of businesswomen to whom he apologized for the snafu over touring the White House. Gergen, who sees himself as enlightened on women's issues, believes the cave-man joke was taken the wrong way by Polly Magenwald. "Men, generally speaking, having a harder time [than women] understanding why that remark could be taken as degrading...and there's a generational difference there, too," says Gergen, referring to the fact that Reagan has old-fashioned ideas about women. Gergen blames the snafu on East Wing aides who oversee the visitors' office. (It was the woman who heads the visitors' office who turned away the businesswomen.)

Shultz. Interestingly, both Gergen and Meese used the same term to describe Marvin Kalb's report that Shultz is considering resigning: "Bullshit." Meese says the report "has not credibility whatsoever." But Gergen says, off the record, that Clark is "relishing" his newfound publicity "which is coming in cascades."

Martin Luther King. Meese says "it is too early to tell" whether Reagan will reverse his opposition to a federal holiday honoring King. I interpret this to mean that Reagan

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is likely to embrace the holiday, especially if it makes progress in the Senate.

Greenspan. "If there's one thing that Alan Greenspan has demonstrated, it's that he is independent of the White House," says Gergen. Greenspan's publicly stated view that the economy will falter next year "clearly did not help us."

Hispanics. Richard Wirthlin's polls show that Reagan is in "unreasonably good shape" with Hispanics and stands a chance of making more inroads. This explains why Reagan appears before Hispanic groups so regularly. Gergen won't discuss numbers, but he says Reagan is doing as well among Hispanics as he did in 1980, when he received more than 30 percent of the Latin vote.

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THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

STORY:SONEN2
MA:60 RMT:

QUEUE:JFY-JF
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08/08,11:16

August 6, 1983

To: MLS (LT, LH, JNW, SJF)

From: JF

Off-record: Helmut Sonnenfeldt, Brookings scholars who is former counsellor to State Department and confidante of Shultz:

Reports that Shultz contemplating quitting: Sonnenfeldt, who had lunch with Shultz Friday,, said these are nonsense and stem mainly from misrepresentation by Soctty Reston. When he was winding up interview with Reston recent, Shultz recalled that when he--Shultz--first came to Washington as Secretary of Labor Reston had given him two pieces of advice. The first I forget.. The second was that when he finished as Labor Secretary he should get out of Washington and not hang on as so many do. Shultz said I didn't follow the first but did follow the second--left and went immediately to San Francisco. Later Reston phoned John Hughes and asked whether Shultz was seeking to send a signal. Hughes checked, phoned Reston and said nothing of the kind--that Shultz merely was passing pleasantries. Reston still did a column speculating on Shultz' desire to leave and then Marv Kalib hardened it. Shultz may not be interested in remaining if Reaganb is reelected but Sonnenfeldt says there's not the slightest hint that he intends to leave before.

Far from giving any hint of desire to quit, Sonnenfeldt said that Shultz talk a good deal about the reorganization

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at State. He is appointing Ron Spiers as underscretary for management. When Hal asked why he was dumping on Spiers, Shultz said that he was in fact drecruiting Spiers for what he considers a key jjob because he is deternined to get a grip on the State Department and get it properly managed.

Shultz vs. Clark: Sonnenfeldt says that Shultz feels strongly that the NSC should play strong role in centralizing and coordinating policy. He has no problem with that. The problem stems partly from the fact that tthe NSC staff, while individually compotent, is an amorphous mass and therefore not really capable of playing this coordinating role. On arms control, Shultz did not object to having Clark head an arms control panel but the problem now is that with the departure of Bud McFarlane for the Mideast job there's no one at NSC qualified to manage arms control. McFarlane understood the complex issues, was good at dealing with Congress. Ron Lehman of NSC staff is smart on arms control but too young and low level to really play the same role. Clark himself doesn't have a grasp of the issues. Clark has a staff of about 45 but there is no strong manager to provide the kind of support that Kissinger had. If Clark wants to manage foreign policy he really is unable to do it because he lacks the essential support staff and he needs it more than most given his own inadequacies in foreign affairs. Clarks' influence on foreign policy derives almost entirely from his access to and relationship with the President rather than from his

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knowledge of the issues or did the substantive contribution that he or his staff make to the shaping of policy. This is in contrast with the influence of Kissinger and Brzezinski, both of whom were knowledgeable in foreign affairs and had strong staffs. On Clark's staff, Jack Matlock, State Department Soviet and Eastern European specialist, will help but he won't fill gap left by McFarlane departure.

At recent briefing of Reagan on how Soviets look at world Matlock made a competent, professional, State-Department-type presentation. Then young Lencowzski (spig) the NSC Soviet expert, made a presentation that may have appealed to Reagan's predilections but was wildly distorted. The Russians are 10 feet tall but also they are about to suffer from a heart attack. They can't be trusted and we really can't do business with them because they're always out to deceive. That may be true, says Sonnenfeldt, but that doesn't mean we can't do business with them or that if we are at all sensible we have to lose.

Another problem is the tendency of Clark to run into Reagan with raw intelligence which may or may not be accurate. The duty of officer in the crisis center may underline some intriguing item that comes into the White House as raw intelligence and the tendency is to rush in to present it to President before it's been checked out. That creates all kinds of problem. This is not new--Rostow used to do it with Johnson and State Department was distressed

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then.

Shultz too low profile: Sonnenfeldt said that he told Shultz that he did have a problem because he was so low key, low profile and that he had to assert himself more, project himself more in public. It's true too that Shultz is very concerned about being a teamplayer and that this may lead him to take less of a stand than he should for fear of appearing that he's not a team player. Shultz says that he doesn't feel he has any problems with Clark as far as differences over policy are concerned; his problem is with Pentagon, which is not new.

Arms control: Rowny was stupid when he came out of a White House meeting with Reagan and told reporters that while there had been progress in START there would be no breakthrough until the INF issue is resolved. By so doing he encourages critics to bring pressure on Reagan to make concessions on INF as the only way of opening the door to agreement in START. If Rowany was authorized by Clark or Ron Lehman (NSC arms control aide) to say that, they must have their head up their aa--.

As for Nitz, he was irresponsible by taking the initiative to discuss the walk-in-the-woods formula that would exclude Pershing 2's as part of an agreement. The Soviets weren't ready to accept the kind of figures suggested in that proposal and apparently weren't prepared to accept 90 SS-20s in Asia as compensation for the British-French forces. Now the Russians are saying that the US

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never formally proposed the walk-in-the-woods formula. Nitze now is pulling another walk-in-the-woods ploy-- discussing ideas with his Soviet counterpart that are not yet officially approved US proposals. Nitze is obsessed with the notion that the West Germans will not go through with the Pershing deployment and that we had better make the best deal we can get with the Soviets. Sonnenfeldt says that Nitze in 1927, as a Dillon, Reed officer, went to Germany and predicted an early collapse. When it came a couple of years later he became convinced that he had an unusual insight into German affairs and he's still operating on that assumption. The danger in all this is that the Soviets will pocket the offer of no Pershings in the walk-in-the-woods formula and then go on bargaining from there. State Department officials are worried because they fear that if we give up the Pershing deployment we could sink the whole INF plan.

(END)

STORY:NOFZIGE
MA:60 FMT:

QUEUE:JWM-JWM
HJ:

MSG:
INI:

OPR:JWM ;08/09,10:39

TO: RAK (DR, SJF DAW)
FROM: JWM

Re: Breakfast with Lyn Nofziger--Background for Re-Elect,
Tomorrow, Whispers)

Shooting Script for 2d Term Announcement: Reaganites trying to milk the event for every ounce of drama, TV coverage etc. Between October 1-15, Reagan backers will announce formation of a committee to be headed by Edward Rollins, head of White House office on political affairs, who will leave job to direct day-to-day operations of committee. Of course, Paul Laxalt will remain the top spokesman as general chairman of the Republican Party.

To meet the legal requirements of approving or rejecting the committee within 15 days, Reagan will permit the committee to go forward with its work "literally as he gets on the plane" for a trip to the Far East.

Upon Reagan's return from the foreign trip, aides are thinking of a "presidential" sort of formal announcement. Nothing definite yet. Nofziger favors a White House speech to a gathering of Republican leaders, workers etc. in East Room. That gets the ball rolling officially.

Work through primary period: Rollins, joined by Lee Atwater of White House political office (he'll also leave government payroll. Indeed, Baker intends to shut down the Rollins-Atwater operation although Nofziger thinks it is a big mistake to do so. Jim Lake, now a lobbyist and formerly a Reagan aide in 1980 who got bounced along with John Sears and Charles Black after the Iowa caucus, will be the press contact and Nofziger is really burned up about that because "he's one of the guys who shot me down."

Jim Baker will be the principal liaison within White House and obviously will direct Rollins. Nofziger figures Rollins will be subject to a lot of second guessing, including Baker, Deaver and others (including Lyn Nofziger-JWM,).

Nofziger is disappointed that only Benjamin Fernandez, the California millionaire, is running in the GOP primaries now. He wishes a tougher opponent like Senator Bob Packwood of Oregon or some well-known right winger would be in the race. "It would give us a chance to sharpen up our troops for the general election." (WHISPER)

Throughout the primary period, RR will be largely a Rose Garden candidate (although not in the general when Air Force One will be leaving Andrews quite a bit.) He'll speak largely at fund raising functions for the party and its candidates, particularly the Senate. (Nofziger is worried, as are some others, that RR could be re-elected but the Republicans could lose the Senate because GOP has several vulnerables and the Democrats have none. (WHISPER.))

Joe Rogers, the wealthy Nashville developer, will come aboard as chief fund raiser. Reaganites like him. Some

(MORE)

regional coordinators will be named such as Roger Stone in Northeast and New England, Lou Kitchen in the South, John Roussetot in the Far West. Roger Moore will come aboard as counsel, and Fay Buchanan, Pat's sister, as treasurer. He figures the staff should be kept as small as possible because things always get out of hand when you bring in too many players at an early date.

In late spring and early summer, more of the biggies will be coming aboard. Drew Lewis will probably ease out of his cable TV job in New York to be campaign manager. Stuart Spencer, the veteran consultant from California, will be available for counsel. (Later, Spencer will be the "man on the plane", the key man to keep RR from making mistakes and the master strategist. Nofziger agrees with others that Spencer will be very important to the campaign and will be calling a lot more shots than meets the eye. WHISPER.) Nofziger also will be there in some capacity, although he prefers the trouble-shooter role and will primarily link up with the old line Reaganites "who trust me because of our longtime connections." Mike Deaver, because he has a big hand in "controlling the body" and is close to Mrs. Reagan, will have major role in scheduling etc. Nofziger doesn't see Ed Meese or Bill Clark playing major, out--front roles although they'll have some policy plug-ins. Richard Wirthlin, RR's pollster of long standing, will be available and will have a hand in strategy etc.

Money raising will go on in earnest before and during the primary season even though RR has no major opponent at this time and no one expects any surprise there. GOP has to get ready for the matching money. (Nofziger doesn't expect RR to turn down campaign matching funds even though the President has opposed the checkoff system. "We're going to go with it. You can't keep beating a dead horse." WHISPER)

Nofziger sees a mixture of old line Reaganites and more moderate officeholders serving as state chairmen. Over 20 are already signed on and ready to go. Example of old line Reagan contact: Tommy Thomas in Florida. Governors such as Lamar Alexander of Tennessee will be in on the act. There are some quarrels going on in such states as Illinois, where Governor Thompson and Don Totten dislike each other, and in Texas where there is a battle royal going on for direction of the committee. (RAK could possibly mention this as an example of feuding between conservative and moderate wings, but egos have as much or more to do with it.)

General: This leads us to the convention in Dallas next August. Bill Timmons, the Washington lobbyist and former White House congressional liaison, will be the major RR operative there. Timmons, however, will not play any role at his own election in the general election campaign.

Of course, from this point, the campaign will have a different focus because the Democratic ticket will have been nominated. (Not from Nofziger: I think the major

(MORE)

figures then will be Laxalt, Lewis, Spencer and Baker.)

Other: Asked about the recent struggle between Baker and Clark for power in the White House, Nofziger suggests that Clark can't force Baker out if he wanted to. "The sides are Baker, Deaver and Nancy on one side and Clark and Meese on the other. Nancy tips the balance." (Whisper)

Lyn thinks the White House is overreacting on the women's issue "although it can be problem if we keep reacting to it and giving it more publicity." (He obviously doesn't think much of Deaver's role in this situation.) He thinks RR will need upwards of 35 percent of the Hispanic vote although he refers to it as Mexican. He thinks RR is in good shape with the Cubans in Florida. He believes that Mexicans and blacks do not have that much in common and it will be difficult for them to forge a coalition against RR. Issue differences in his view are ERA, abortion, "macho" on defense. He believes Hispanics can be won over the jobs and economy issue.

He is a little worried about RR's move to the center lately on several issues because he wants the President to maintain that hard core base of support. At the same time, he thinks RR has shown in the past that he can move to the center "without changing one word of campaign rhetoric."

Why Reagan people worry about John Glenn? "Glenn is a little like Reagan. He can make mistakes but no one seems to get hot under the collar about him. (WHISPER)

Nofziger had predicted that Gary Hart could be the Democratic sleeper. He admits botching that one and says he's startled that Hart has done such a lousy job of firing up Democrats for his campaign.

Nofziger claims the feud between him and Jim Baker will be set aside for the election. "I disagree with Baker on a lot of things and believe he's hurt the President. But I think he wants him to win just as badly as I do." He expects some feuding as a matter of course during the campaign but thinks it will come from lower echelon types and not the major players. JWM

(END)

STORY:LEWIS
MA:60 FMT:

QUEUE:JWM-JWM
HJ:

MSG:
INI:

OPR:JWM ;08/09,15:54

TO: RAK (DR, SJF)
FROM: JWM

Re: Interviews with Frank Fahrenkopf, GOP national chairman, and Drew Lewis for Re-elect story)

Fahrenkopf (on the record except where noted) spells out precisely the money plan for the Reagan re-elect committee. First, the RNC isn't going to be impartial. At its January meeting, there was an unanimous endorsement of the President's re-election so they can fall back on that. In addition, Fahrenkopf makes it clear the RNC will be building "on its most valuable asset--the President."

The money drive for the Reagan re-elect committee will be timed with his official announcement in mid-November. At the time, some two million pieces of mail will be going out seeking help. The other GOP fund raising groups--the RNC, Senate Campaign and House Campaign committees--will be leaving the field to the Reagan Re-elect group for one month. Fahrenkopf thinks this drive could bring in most of the 16 million dollars being sought. "If it takes another bite (of direct mail), we'll be prepared to do it."

The final primary budget figure for Reagan Re-elect is 26 million with 16 million raised from the public, 10 more in public matching funds and an additional six million for administrative cost.

Why all the money with only token primary opposition? Money will be spent on organization, a big effort to do well in the primaries even with only that token opponent and a big advertising campaign to help spread the President's message. In other words: A warmup for the troops for November.

Fahrenkopf says RR's name will be on all the primary ballots.

One of the problems Paul Laxalt will have to decide: The Reagan campaign chairmanship in 10 to 15 states where Reaganites and other Republicans are in a fight over the job. Some examples: Illinois, Texas and Georgia. Fahrenkopf says the call will be Laxalt's.

Background: The GOP chairman believes Mondale is going to win despite the soaring of Glenn in the polls. He thinks Mondale's candidacy is far better suited for the primary haul, witness the AFL-CIO accelerating its date for backing a candidate. Glenn, he figures, may be a better general election candidate but Mondale has so much more going for him in the primaries.

Lewis, now head of Warner-Amex Cable in New York, confirms again that he expects to be able to break away from his job to be RR's campaign manager. He wants to come in as late as possible but events may press him into action earlier than he wants. Mid 1984 is likely.

Lewis sees the other top players as Senator Paul Laxalt,
(MORE)

for all the obvious reasons and particularly his easy access to RR. He sees a sharing of responsibility in the White House with Baker, Deaver, Meese and Clark all getting in on the act. He seems to disagree with Nofziger, arguing that Meese and Clark will have a big say-so on issues because of their involvement in policy matters. He thinks Deaver will have a role on "scheduling on what Reagan wears." (How is that for a putdown?) Lyn Nofziger will have a big hand in personnel, meaning you can count on Lyn to make sure many old line Reaganites are playing prominent roles. Wirthlin is in there, too, because of his closeness to RR over the years on polling matters.

Beyond the primary: He sees a major role for Stuart Spencer because "everyone realizes Stu has top drawer ability and stays cool in the heat of a campaign." Stu will ride the campaign plane with RR to keep him from making mistakes and will be available for consultation.

Reagan chairmen have already been targeted in over 20 states and are ready to charge when RR gives the word. Mixture of governors, veteran RR people, party warhorses.

Lewis says the Republican National Committee will get a larger role now, presumably because a reliable Frank Fahrenkopf is in charge instead of a bumbling Richard Richards.

(END)

STORY:DEAVER
MA:60 FMT:

QUEUE:NRD-NRD
HJ:

MSG:

INI:

OPR:PAE

;08/10,16:59

TO: MLS, LT, JF, BFP, DR, JG, GP, DCB, LH, JWM, SJF, PA,
PGH, DAW, DLB

FROM: RAK at the White House

RE: BACKGROUND-ONLY IVU WITH MIKE DEAVER

FALL POLITICS. Deaver lays out the following gameplan for the fall: On October 15, papers will be filed with the Federal Election Commission establishing the Reagan re-election committee. No name yet for the committee. White House political aide Ed Rollins will be named political director of the committee, and the political office at the White House will be shut down completely.

On November 1, one day before leaving for a 15-day, five-nation trip to the Far East, Reagan will file the necessary FEC papers making him a legal candidate. After returning from Asia in mid-November, he will formally announce his candidacy, probably during a prime-time television address to the nation. The re-election committee would have to pay for the air time. Deaver asserts that most Americans will not regard Reagan as a candidate "until they hear the President himself telling them he is running again." Hence, the Asian trip will not appear as political as it would if Reagan announced his intentions before the trip.

While at the ranch in August, Reagan and Nancy undoubtedly will reconcile their views about his re-election plans, says Deaver. "I'm sure they will have plenty of time to talk on the back of a horse at the ranch." Deaver believes

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the Reagans still have not discussed future plans in detail, but both support a re-election bid. Also while at the ranch, Reagan will confer by phone with Paul Laxalt (who will be in Nevada), Jim Baker (who will be in Texas), Deaver (who will be vacationing at Lake Tahoe), Stu Spencer and others. Deaver describes these planned phone calls as "informal talks" that will replace the cancelled Los Angeles political summit.

CAMPAIGN STAFF. Reagan's top campaign aides will largely be "a lot of the old-time gang." Laxalt will be committee chairman and Drew Lewis will be named campaign manager after the GOP convention. Veteran Reagan political adviser Stu Spencer will come on board full time. Lyn Nofziger is likely to serve as a "consultant" to the committee official.

No final decisions on state chairmen have been made, says Deaver, because those choices will have to be approved by Reagan, and he isn't discussing such details at this time. Deaver confirms the names of the five regional directors already reported but he notes that those decisions are not final, either, until Reagan clears them.

THE PRIMARY SEASON. Reagan will enter every Republican primary. "I'm sure he'll have his name on every ballot," says Deaver. How much travel Reagan will do during the primaries has not been decided. Deaver notes that Reagan has refrained from discussing such matters with his aides. Nor has it been decided in which states he might

(MORE)

concentrate his time, such as in the Midwest and the Northeast, as has been speculated.

CONSTITUENCY GROUPS. The address the gender gap, Reagan is considering a "major speech" in the next several weeks to unveil his long-awaited legislative package to assist women. This is the package promised by Reagan in his State of the Union speech in January. The White House is clearly concerned about the gender gap but Deaver notes that "half of it is caused by the President's higher popularity among men." Reagan will continue to woo Hispanics but Deaver notes that pollster Richard Wirthlin believes Reagan is reaching his peak in popularity among Latin voters.

The White House also is considering an economic offensive similar to Reagan's successful education blitz. Says Deaver, "At this point you just do your best to get across your point of what you've done for all the people--blacks, Hispanics and women. The improving economy helps everyone. We need to let women know that we have given them more buying power."

CAMPAIGN CONFLICTS. Deaver dismisses concerns about building friction between Baker and Nofziger, the moderates and the old guard, etc. "All of these people have worked together before and we won."

ASIA TRIP. Deaver has just returned from an advance trip to arrange the Asian trip. He describes it as his most grueling experience, including past campaigning. Reagan will travel 29,230 miles and spend 60 hours in the air.

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(Whisper?) The shortest leg of the trip is a seven-hour flight. How will Deaver keep Reagan from collapsing?

“There will be a lot of exciting things on the schedule to keep his spirits up. I’m not worried about him. He travels well, and that plane (Air Force One) is well equipped to keep him rested.”

(END)

STORY:SPEAKES
MA:60 FMT:

RAKX-RAK
HJ:

MSG:

INI:

OPR:RAK

;08/11,09:46

TO: MLS, LT, JF, BFP, DR, JG, GP, DCB, LH, JWM, SJF, PA,
PGH, LAW, DLB

FROM: RAK

RE: Background-only ivu with Larry Speakes

Re-election campaign. Jim Baker and Paul Laxalt have discussed with Reagan each of the personnel decisions that have been made in recent weeks regarding who will be in charge of what at the re-election committee. In typical Reagan fashion, the President is simply rubber-stamping his aides' decisions. "It works like this," says Speakes. "Laxalt and Baker go to him and say, 'This is what we've decided. Let us know if you have any objections.'" With the exception of the cancelled political meeting in Los Angeles, Reagan has not held up any of the campaign organizing. Speakes doubts Reagan's sincerity when he repeatedly tells his aides in private that he hasn't made up his mind yet.

Primaries. Tentative plans call for Reagan to spend one day a week on the road campaigning during the primary season, but he will not necessarily campaign in states where primaries are being held at that time. Instead he will concentrate on states that are likely to become the battleground during the general election. This is one obvious advantage of not having a primary opponent. Speakes ticks off California, Texas, Florida, New York, Illinois, Ohio, Connecticut, New Jersey and Washington as key states

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that will command Reagan's attention during the primary and general campaigns. He notes that the South could become a real challenge if John Glenn is the Democratic nominee. Reagan also will spend considerable time in the Midwest farm belt, as he did in 1980, but probably not until the fall campaign.

Hispanics. Speakes reports that polling by Richard Wirthlin in 1980 showed that Reagan received 38 percent of the Hispanic vote, far better than average for a Republican candidate. And because of Reagan's heavy attention to Hispanics in recent weeks, "we're running ahead" of the 1980 figure. Speakes also notes that Hispanics are a growing political bloc. The White House believes Reagan will benefit in part from the drive to register 1 million new Latin voters.

Blacks and women. "As far as blacks are concerned, there's not much hope," says Speakes. "We're looking at moderate whites" instead. Reagan's moves toward the center on civil rights and his possible support for a federal holiday honoring Martin Luther King are directed at whites, not blacks.

After the President's debacle in apologizing to the businesswomen's group last week, there is growing concern in the White House that Reagan is exacerbating the gender gap by giving it so much attention. "The more we talk about it the worse it gets," says Speakes. [Whisper?] It is worth noting that many conservatives are accusing Reagan

(MORE)

of kowtowing to women.

Whittlesey. Senior White House aides regarded as stupid Faith Whittlesey's public attack on the news media and some church leaders over Reagan's Central American policy. But Speakes says a decision was made not to dump on Whittlesey for her indiscretion. He notes wryly that the only person in the White House who may agree with Whittlesey is the President himself. My guess is that Whittlesey will not become a permanent fixture at the White House.

(END)

STOPY:CHAD
MA:68 FMT:

QUEUE:SJF-SJF
HJ:

MSG:

INI:

OPR:SJF

;08/11,10:57

To: jf (mls lt bfp dr jg gp dcb lj rak pa pgh daw dlb)

From: sjf

Re Chad--Will U.S. Marines Return to the Shores of Tripoli?

On deep background, Geoffrey Kemp of the National Security Council staff says the U.S. would intervene unilaterally in Chad only if it appeared that the Libyans were beginning to move into Sudan.

As things now stand, the U.S. will not intervene militarily unless it does so in conjunction with the French. "This is a French responsibility," he said. "I'm not sure that we're prepared to intervene unilaterally, but we'd be willing to support them."

Kemp noted that the U.S. will soon have an unusually strong military force in the area and could respond quickly.

If Sudan were threatened, said Kemp, the U.S. would probably intervene militarily without France. In that case, the U.S. would act in conjunction with Egypt and at the invitation of the government in Sudan.

Short of U.S. military involvement, there is a long list of things that the U.S. would be willing to do to help the government in Chad. All of them are of the same magnitude as the actions already taken. "There is a list of things we could do, but I have not looked at the list."

There is no apparent risk of a superpower confrontation, however. Referring to the Soviets, he said: "To the best of our knowledge, they are not in this one."

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As usual, U.S. officials are having trouble discerning the intentions of the government in Paris. "They appear to be reassessing the situation around the clock in Paris," he says. "There is some confusion within the administration here over what the French are up to. We are getting a divided picture. There's a division between the military and Mr. Cheysson. The military is less reluctant than Cheysson to use force to stop it."

(END)

STORY:MEESE
NA:60 IMT:

QUEUE:RAKX-RAK
HJ:

MSG:
IMI:

OPR:RAK ;08/11,11:06

TO: MLS, LT, JF, BFP, DR, JG, GP, DCB, LH, JWM, SJF, PA, ✓
PGH, DAW, DLB

FROM: RAK

RE: Background-only_ivu_with_Ed_Meese

Campaign. As soon as the Reagan re-election committee is established in mid-October, it will begin raising money, mostly by direct mail. Meese says Reagan will not be appearing at many fundraisers this fall. With his trip to Asia and other events already on his schedule, he won't have the time. Although a name for the committee has not been chosen, Meese says the title will include VP Bush's name, too. State chairmen are being lined up in several states but no final decisions have been made.

Meese, Jim Baker, Mike Deaver and Judge Clark will remain at the White House right through election day, "and perhaps even afterward," says Meese with a chuckle. Never a fan of Clark, Meese asserts that the judge will have very little role in the campaign, except as an adviser to the President on national-security matters. Paul Laxalt "will have a much greater role in setting the direction of the campaign than he did in 1980." It is clear that as Reagan's longtime confidant Laxalt will be the number-one power in the campaign. Thus far Baker and Laxalt have been working together harmoniously, but Laxalt is likely to overrule Baker when it comes to choosing between Bush-type moderates and Reaganite conservatives to run various state

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campaigns and handle other duties.

Nancy. Reagan and Nancy are likely to make a final decision while at the ranch. ``In his own mind he will have made his decision by the time he gets back to Washington'' in early September.

Hispanics. Meese reports that it is ``very likely'' that while in El Paso on Saturday Reagan will announce a ``coordinated program'' to aid American businesses along the Mexican border that have been hurt by the devaluation of the peso. The program was presented to Reagan this week by an administration task force. Reagan will name an interagency group headed by the Commerce Department to do such things as expedite applications for Small Business Administration loans, to speed up economic-development grants and loans and to take whatever other actions are necessary to assist failing businesses. This is another example of Reagan's efforts to woo Hispanic voters.

Chad. The U.S. will hold the line on its military involvement in Chad and continue to prod the French to play a larger role. The American AWACS planes remain on the ground in Sudan because they are of no use unless there are French fighter planes to direct.

Guatemala. While disavowing any American support for the coup, Meese notes that new strongman Mejia is likely to be ``more predictable'' in his opposition to Marxists than was Rios-Mont. ``Because of his religious fervor...some questioned [Rios-Mont's] commitment'' to combatting Marxist

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influences.

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STORY:BAKER
MA:SO FMT:

QUEUE:RAKX-RAK
HJ:

MSG:
INI:

OPR:RAK

;08/11,17:19

TO: MLS, IT, JF, BFP, DR, JG, GP, DCB, LH, SJF, PA, PGH,
JWM, LAW, DLB

FROM: RAK

RE: Background-only_ivu_with_Jim_Baker

Re-election campaign. Baker is fairly cautious in outlining tentative plans for the campaign, noting repeatedly that the President has approved very little of his advisers' plans. Reagan still tells his aides he hasn't made up his mind, but Baker has no doubt that he will run. Baker expects Reagan to "let us know his decision sometime between September 1 and October 15."

Baker and Paul Laxalt strongly believe that October 15 is the "latest comfortable date" for the re-election committee to be organized. In their view, the committee must launch its direct-mail appeal and other fundraising activities early and then get out of the market to allow the Senate and House Republican campaign committees and the Republican National Committee time to start raising money.

But Baker is fearful that Reagan may not share this view. He notes that Reagan is leery about being a legal candidate while he is in Asia, which would be the case if the committee is created on October 15, because a candidate has only 15 days to accept or disavow a committee once it has filed papers with the FEC. Reagan always has been more concerned than his political advisers that everything he does will be seen as politically motivated once he becomes

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a candidate. Hence, Reagan may insist that the committee not be created until after he returns from the Far East in mid-November. That, in turn, would push his formal announcement up to early December.

The most likely forum for an announcement is a ``a low-key Oval Office address`` during prime time, instead of ``a Cecil B. De Mille production with a cast of thousands`` of loyal Reagannites.

Primaries. Tentative plans call for the committee to raise 9 million to 12 million dollars, above administration costs, and receive an equal amount in federal matching funds. That would provide a maximum primary budget of 24 million.

The President ``will need to have a presence in important primary states,`` but don't look for him to spend a lot of time on the road next winter. Baker notes that ``governmental actions`` timed to coincide with important primaries is a more effective way for an incumbent to campaign during the primary season.

General election. Baker points out that although Reagan scored an electoral landslide in the South in 1980, he won the region by only 5 percentage points. The South is not Reagan's natural base in the way that the West is. ``The South will be a very crucial battleground, as it was in 1980, only more so in 1984 because of increased black voter registration.`` Reagan's drive to appeal to Hispanics is intended to help counter the anticipated increase in black-

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voter participation in the big southern states.

(END)

To: jf (mls lt dr bfp jg gp lh daw jwm rak pa pgh alb)

From: sjf

Reagan's New Foreign Policy Offensive

President Reagan is preparing for some bold new foreign policy initiatives over the next six to eight months in hopes of scoring major successes on three fronts--Central America, the Middle East and arms control.

These new initiatives are being developed under the guidance of national security chief William Clark, who has recently taken control of policy making on key issues.

Clark's intention is to "let Reagan be Reagan" in foreign policy--to assert the power of the U.S. wherever it is being challenged. But he also wants to make sure that the administration seizes the opportunity to negotiate an arms control agreement just prior to deployment of new missiles in Europe.

"Ronald Reagan's instinct is to be bold," says an official. "Clark is making it possible for him to act on his instincts. The more pragmatic approach that we've been taking in the last year has been lacking in boldness."

In Central America, we've already seen evidence of Reagan's new boldness--the beginning of troop maneuvers.

In the Middle East, the decision to send Robert C. McFarlane is being portrayed as the first step toward more active involvement by the President. "By sending his own aide, Bud McFarlane, to the Middle East, this ups the stakes for the President," says an aide.

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In arms control talks, Reagan's aides feel confident that they can win an INF agreement by proceeding with the deployment of new missiles in Europe. "We are at a point where we are ready to negotiate with the Soviets from a position that gives us some leverage," says an aide. That is why Clark is heading a new arms control task force.

Officials say Clark is asserting control over these matters because he thinks the State Department has been dragging its feet, acting too cautiously to satisfy the President. For example, he thinks State missed a chance last September to get all foreign forces out of Lebanon.

Nor has the Pentagon been as cooperative as Clark and the President would like. Although Clark is more atune to the views of Weinberger than to those of Shultz, he thinks the Pentagon has been stalling on arms control. He intends to "bang heads" at the Pentagon to produce a better strategy for arms reduction. He also was burned by Pentagon leaks of the military maneuvers in Central America.

What Clark and Reagan are seeking is a foreign policy triumph to be touted in the 1984 election campaign. So far, Reagan's lovefeast with U.S. allies at Williamsburg is the highlight of his personal diplomatic record.

It's too early to judge whether this new strategy will succeed. Administration officials think that the boldness they have demonstrated in Central America is beginning to pay off. Offers by Castro and the Sandanistas to negotiate a regional solution in Central America are viewed as direct

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result of military maneuvers in the area.

The risks are great too—particularly since the architect of this strategy, Clark, has so little experience in foreign policy. Clark's critics in the White House fear he is too naive to be taking matters into his own hands. They fear that a major foreign policy disaster is inevitable.

“We're entering the crucial period—the next six to eight months,” says an official on deep background. “It's going to be a very high risk period.”

Clark. There is no question that Clark's recent actions reflect the desires of the President. “It certainly isn't Clark—it's the President who is taking over,” says an aide. The President has become frustrated with his lack of success in foreign policy and he has instructed Clark to take charge of the big issues.

Clark's assertion of power has stirred resentment among other Reagan officials, both inside the White House and at the State Department. National Security Council staffers are elated by it, however.

It was once thought that Clark's increased influence would lead to a more hardline foreign policy. This proved to be slightly inaccurate, however, since Clark has also been responsible for recent gestures of friendship toward the Soviets—including the Madrid agreement and the long term grain agreement. Clark's hardline views have been tempered by his desire to produce tangible results for the President. His long suit is management. “Clark's strength

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is that he gets things done," says an aide. He stresses action, even over ideology. Thus his approach to foreign policy is more expedient than most of us expected.

Still, Clark reinforces Reagan's hardline views. Clark's National Security Council staff is also populated with ideologues. Their influence is reflected in the current talk about boldness in meeting challenges to U.S. power.

Clark is more than an "honest broker" of ideas put forth by State, Defense and the CIA. His management of foreign policy is "not content-free," as one official said on deep background. But he still depends heavily on others. To illustrate: If Clark prefers the Pentagon point of view on a particular subject, he brings someone representing the Pentagon viewpoint into the Oval Office to brief Reagan. That way, Clark can also escape blame for his mistakes. Although he favored the Pentagon position, he can always blame the Pentagon if the policy fails.

Shultz. Reagan's relationship with Shultz is apparently unaltered by the actions of Clark. Insiders say Shultz has sometimes gone into the Oval Office to convince the President to reverse a course of action recommended by Clark. But Clark's influence far outweighs that of Shultz because Clark is in the Oval Office many times each day.

No one knows for sure whether Shultz is irritated by Clark's heightened role. Some people think he's more upset that he has let on. But Shultz is a team player, as was apparent when he went to Syria in early July on a mission

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that was bound to fail. Like Reagan, he is a man of great equanimity. Perhaps he's waiting for the tide to turn. Some White House officials think the recent stories of Clark's increased influence will help to turn the tide.

National Security Council staffers note with false generosity that even though Clark has taken over the big issues, there are many smaller issues that continue to preoccupy the Secretary of State. "On routine matters, economic matters and crisis-related issues, he's right in there," says one official on deep background.

The above analysis is based on interviews with Bob Sims and Geoffrey Kemp on the National Security Council staff and White House aides Dick Darman and David Gergen. I have submitted separate memos on the Sims and Gergen interviews. The Sims memo is particularly helpful on the subjects of Central America and arms control. Attached are the comments of Kemp and Darman:

Kemp, an NSC expert on the Middle East, offered the following observations on deep background:

McFarlane's mission. McFarlane has retained his position on the National Security Council staff for one major reason: It gives him an easy way out if his Middle East mission fails.

According to Kemp, McFarlane is simply testing the waters in the Middle East. There is apparently little confidence within the NSC that McFarlane can succeed. Thus the question of his replacement has not yet been discussed.

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``It's too early to tell whether this is going to be a full time job,`` says Kemp. ``It was thought that since August is a slow month and since Bud would have less to do because Congress is away, that he should be sent. There may not be enough going on over there to require two people--one here and one there. So the question of who replaces Bud hasn't come up.``

Right now, McFarlane's mission is bogged down in trying to negotiate an agreement between opposing factions inside of Lebanon. ``He's doing fireman work in Lebanese domestic policy,`` says Kemp. Yet McFarlane did have some success in Syria. ``At least he's proved to be an accredited guy that Assad will talk to.``

In McFarlane's absence, Clark meets every morning at 7:30 a.m. with all of the senior directors of the National Security Council staff. Previously, the meeting included only McFarlane and a few other top people.

Kemp says there is no truth to the rumor that Clark and McFarlane had a falling out. But he confirms the rumor that McFarlane wants to run for Congress and felt that being Middle East envoy would raise his public profile.

State vs. NSC. Kemp confirms reports that Clark has taken over the major policy matters because the President is impatient with foot-dragging by the State Department.

As an example, Kemp cites recent events in the Middle East. Last October, Reagan demanded a timetable for Israeli withdrawal from Lebanon. The President felt there was an

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opportunity at that point, following the massacre in the Palestinian camp, to get all foreign troops out of Lebanon.

“But this became subverted by Habib’s eclectic diplomacy,” says Kemp. “Habib got bogged down in negotiating an agreement instead of a withdrawal.

Meanwhile, the Syrians got ignored. Instead of the high-risk bold option we chose namby-pamby low-risk negotiations.” To Habib’s credit, says Kemp, he kept warning the State Department that he was unable to go to Syria. He told them many times “you gotta get someone else” to go to Syria. But he was ignored.

Also, Kemp says there is “almost as much frustration with the Pentagon” in the White House as there is with the State Department. For example, he notes that the Pentagon fought the idea of sending U.S. forces into Lebanon as part of the peace-keeping force.

Clark’s Influence. “Clark’s strength is that he gets things done,” says Kemp. He says that Clark is determined to produce the kind of foreign policy that Reagan wants.

It’s Reagan’s desire to have a bolder foreign policy. “Ronald Reagan’s instinct is to be bold. Clark is making it possible for him to act on his instincts. The more pragmatic approach that we’ve been taking in the last year has been lacking in boldness. There were clearly things that we could have done, but no one wanted to take the risks. His view is that in regional conflicts, we should take control or get out.” This view provides consistency

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to Reagan's foreign policy, he says. "What they do have is a very consistent approach based on an inherent belief in the power of the United States."

Kemp is clearly pleased by Clark's actions. "There has been an enormous swing in power from the days when I was advised that I would have more influence by taking a desk job at State than by working for Dick Allen," he says.

Richard Larman, assistant to the president, makes the following observations--also on deep background:

Shultz vs. Clark. Three reasons why Shultz has failed to take control of foreign policy: "(1) The natural tendency of the National Security Council staff to seek to dominate foreign policy, (2) the fact that ideologues (on the NSC staff) are naturally skeptical of someone who stresses negotiation and who says that issues are complicated and that these things take time, and (3) he has been a victim of a physical disadvantage. Unlike Clark, he cannot drift into the Oval Office several times a day."

"Sometimes Shultz has prevailed on certain issues, but that doesn't shape the tone and thrust of foreign policy," says Larman. Although Clark seldom puts forth his own opinion, says Larman, he can affect Reagan's decisions by the gloss he puts on the recommendations and intelligence that comes from outside sources. "He lays out the options he likes and then says, 'Of course, State thinks such and such.'"

Although he acts like an honest broker, his presentation of the options is "not content-free."

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Clark is bringing Central America, the Middle East and arms control to "a very crucial stage" that will test his expertise in foreign policy, says Darman. "We're in the crucial period over the next six to eight months." Clark's ability is about to be tested. On all three fronts, "all of the hard questions are about to be introduced." Darman adds: "It's going to require more substantial depth, and an understanding of the finer points. It's going to be a test of flexibility versus ideology."

Darman is hoping that all of the stories about Clark's larger role will help Shultz to become stronger. He notes that newspaper stories often bring about a solution to a problem. He says that Clark "started being more collegial" following the stories in which he was criticized for operating in a vacuum at the White House.

Off the record, Darman notes that Shultz "has not tried to forge an alliance with the people in the White House who could help him--the pragmatists. "We've been waiting, but he's never called us."

Objectives. Darman agrees that U.S. objectives in Central America are not clear. That's because administration officials do not agree on the objectives. He sees nothing wrong with their disagreement at this stage. "It's possible to agree on a set of next steps you would be taking whether your objective is A, B or C." Darman himself questions whether Stone's mission in Central America is "a fraud for domestic political purposes or if

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it's intended to succeed--you don't know whether it's real until you face a potential choice." In the Middle East, however, "you cannot afford to be doing anything but genuinely trying."

McFarlane. Darman is glad to see McFarlane gone. He says that McFarlane was responsible for failing to inform other White House officials of things that were being planned by the National Security Council. He was often a bottleneck in the bureaucratic process. In addition, he says, "Clark depended too heavily on McFarlane."

Clark. Darman is a severe critic of Clark. He claims to be genuinely upset that someone with as little expertise as Clark is holding the most powerful staff jobs in the White House. "The image of Reagan as someone who hates detail and relies too heavily on mini-memos--that's not Reagan, that's Clark," says Darman. Clark's job will always be secure, however, because it depends entirely on a personal relationship with the President. "His job is secure because it in no way depends on his capacity to perform," says Darman. "His recommendations are always in someone else's name. If something goes wrong, he blames it on them. Clark also is careful never to get involved in anything that makes him look bad. He readily defers to others who know more than he does. For this reason, Darman predicts that Clark will find someone else to do his work on Capitol Hill. In his most recent trip to Capitol Hill, Clark was viewed by members of Congress as being "uninformed and

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uncommunicative." Darman adds: "I think he senses that
and won't try it again."

Note: Darman cannot be quoted. Kemp can be quoted only as
an administration official."

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