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Table 7 (Continued)
Ballot by Constituencies

AGE (Continued)				
	Reagan (%)	Carter (%)	Anderson (%)	Undecided (%)
<u>60 - 64 Years of Age</u>				
Size of group:	8%			
Turnout probability:	62%			
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	43	41	13	3
June, 1980	39	41	9	11
Percentage point change	-4	0	-4	+8
<u>65 and Over</u>				
Size of group:	18%			
Turnout probability:	58%			
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	51	29	12	8
June, 1980	36	42	12	10
Percentage point change	-15	+13	0	+2
EDUCATION				
<u>Some High School or Less</u>				
Size of group:	21%			
Turnout probability:	33%			
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	40	44	10	5
June, 1980	34	45	9	12
Percentage point change	-6	+1	-1	-7
<u>High School Graduate</u>				
Size of group:	32%			
Turnout probability:	45%			
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	44	39	11	5
June, 1980	33	38	18	11
Percentage point change	-11	-1	+7	+6
<u>Some College/Vocational</u>				
Size of group:	25%			
Turnout probability:	52%			
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	41	39	14	7
June, 1980	41	24	26	10
Percentage point change	0	-15	+12	+3

Table 7 (Continued)
Ballot by Constituencies

=====				
EDUCATION (Continued)				
	Reagan	Carter	Anderson	Undecided
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<u>College Graduate</u>				
Size of group:	14%			
Turnout probability:	62%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	46	25	24	5
June, 1980	40	25	26	9
Percentage point change	-6	0	+2	+4
<u>Post-Graduate</u>				
Size of group:	8%			
Turnout probability:	67%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	37	24	31	7
June, 1980	30	33	33	4
Percentage point change	-7	+9	+2	-3
REGION				
<u>New England</u>				
Size of group:	7%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	52	30	16	3
June, 1980	40	30	19	11
Percentage point change	-12	0	+3	+8
<u>Mid-Atlantic</u>				
Size of group:	23%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	37	34	25	5
June, 1980	34	29	23	15
Percentage point change	-3	-5	-2	+10
<u>Great Lakes</u>				
Size of group:	25%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	37	37	21	6
June, 1980	31	40	22	7
Percentage point change	-6	+3	+1	+1

Table 7 (Continued)
Ballot by Constituencies

REGION (Continued)				
	<u>Reagan</u> (%)	<u>Carter</u> (%)	<u>Anderson</u> (%)	<u>Undecided</u> (%)
<u>Farm Belt</u>				
Size of group:	5%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	41	40	9	10
June, 1980	40	35	12	13
Percentage point change	-1	-5	+3	+3
<u>Mountain</u>				
Size of group:	5%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	52	25	18	5
June, 1980	43	24	29	4
Percentage point change	-9	-1	+11	-1
<u>Pacific</u>				
Size of group:	13%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	48	35	10	8
June, 1980	37	28	29	6
Percentage point change	-11	-7	+19	-2
<u>Outer South</u>				
Size of group:	11%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	48	39	10	4
June, 1980	34	41	12	13
Percentage point change	-14	+2	+2	+9
<u>Deep South</u>				
Size of group:	10%			
Turnout probability:	NA%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	45	44	4	8
June, 1980	48	35	8	9
Percentage point change	+3	-9	+4	+1

Table 7 (Continued)
Ballot by Constituencies

=====				
INCOME				
	<u>Reagan</u>	<u>Carter</u>	<u>Anderson</u>	<u>Undecided</u>
	(%)	(%)	(%)	(%)
<u>Under \$5,000</u>				
Size of group:	8%			
Turnout probability:	31%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	44	50	0	6
June, 1980	31	42	14	13
Percentage point change	-13	-8	+14	+7
<u>\$5,000 - \$9,999</u>				
Size of group:	14%			
Turnout probability:	31%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	38	42	15	6
June, 1980	28	49	13	10
Percentage point change	-10	+7	-2	+4
<u>\$10,000 - \$14,999</u>				
Size of group:	15%			
Turnout probability:	44%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	42	34	18	6
June, 1980	32	39	20	9
Percentage point change	-10	+5	+2	+3
<u>\$15,000 - \$19,999</u>				
Size of group:	16%			
Turnout probability:	50%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	45	40	11	4
June, 1980	36	36	19	9
Percentage point change	-9	-4	+8	+5
<u>\$20,000 - \$29,999</u>				
Size of group:	23%			
Turnout probability:	55%			
<u>D/M/I Survey</u>				
March, 1980	43	34	18	5
June, 1980	39	26	25	11
Percentage point change	-4	-8	+7	+6

Table 7 (Continued)
Ballot by Constituencies

INCOME (Continued)

	<u>Reagan</u> (%)	<u>Carter</u> (%)	<u>Anderson</u> (%)	<u>Undecided</u> (%)
<u>\$30,000 - \$39,999</u>				
Size of group:				9%
Turnout probability:				NA%
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	41	36	18	6
June, 1980	45	25	24	6
Percentage point change	+4	-11	+6	0
<u>\$40,000 or More</u>				
Size of group:				7%
Turnout probability:				NA%
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	56	18	21	5
June, 1980	48	13	28	11
Percentage point change	-8	-5	+7	+6
<u>Refused</u>				
Size of group:				7%
Turnout probability:				45%
D/M/I Survey				
March, 1980	NA	NA	NA	NA
June, 1980	30	33	21	16
Percentage point change	NA	NA	NA	NA

SECTION VII
STATE TARGETING 1980

SECTION VII
STATE TARGETING 1980

Outline of Strategy and Methodology

Phase I -- The States

The objective of Phase I targeting is to identify the "easiest" minimum of 270 electoral votes needed for a Reagan victory. Given the all-or-none rule of electoral vote allocation, any strategy of coalition building to secure 51% of the popular vote must be secondary to building a winning coalition of states with a minimum of 270 electoral votes.

At present, there is not a single region in the United States that need be conceded to Carter. Thus the campaign must be prepared to wage a campaign ocean-to-ocean and border-to-border. Further, the allocation of limited resources -- the candidate's time, money, and campaign professionals -- must be guided by the definition of the winning state coalition. With this in mind, Phase I targeting estimates the potential for a Reagan victory within each state together with each state's potential yield of electoral votes.

Allocation decisions, which will follow as a second step, will be made in conjunction with each division's tactics and action plans, will be heavily based upon winnability and will produce an optimum strategy for building a winning coalition of states.

Targeting Elements

- Establish a data base of historical and current survey information coupled with the judgment of campaign professionals to profile each state.
- Provide interactive access to this data base, creating a dynamic environment capable of responding to the most current survey and/or professional judgement inputs.
- Identify Reagan base states -- those states where the probability of a Reagan victory is equal to or greater than 70%.
- Identify Carter base states -- those states where the probability of a Reagan victory is equal to or less than 30%.
- Prioritize the remaining states in decending order of their victory potential and segment them according to size (based on number of electoral votes) and region of the country (based on eight geopolitical groupings of the 50 states).
- Develop priority targets among large, medium and small states. Provide enough flexibility to generate two or more combinations of target states leading to the minimum required number (50% plus one electoral vote) of electoral votes from each state size category.

The following table examines the distribution of electoral votes by size of state. It also shows the minimum number of electoral votes needed within each size category to produce a victory (270 electoral votes).

Distribution of Electoral Votes

	<u>Number States</u>	<u>Number Of E.V.</u>	<u>Percent of Total E.V.</u>	<u>Minimum E.V. Needed to Win</u>
Large (20 or more E.V.)	7	211	39	105
Medium (10 or more E.V.)	13	161	30	81
Small (9 or less E.V.)	<u>31</u>	<u>166</u>	<u>31</u>	<u>84</u>
	51*	538	100	270

*includes D.C.

There are any number of possible state combinations within each size category that will produce the minimum number of electoral votes. Phase I targeting will identify the most likely combination of winning states within size category, given historical Republican performance, current survey data and professional judgement. Several alternative combinations of winning states with somewhat smaller probabilities of occurring will also be identified. This approach provides the campaign with some flexibility in establishing the final target list describing the coalition of winning states.

Method

Several criteria have been set for the design of Phase I targeting. First, it must be systematic in its coverage of the historical, demographic and political variables which will be used to profile each state. The creation of a state data base containing many such variables aids in meeting the first criterion. Second, Phase I targeting must be flexible in providing the campaign with more than one way to win the needed 270 electoral votes. Alternative combinations of base states and priority targets are produced by the system. Lastly, state targeting must be dynamic in accepting changes in current information from surveys and professional judgements quickly into the data file to produce alternative strategies. The Phase I system is designed to be interactive with its users.

The Phase I data base contains the following variables for each state:

- Number of electoral votes;
- Average percent Republican vote for President 1952 to 1976;
- Average percent Republican votes in all statewide races held in 1976 and 1978;
- Change in percent Republican vote for President 1972 to 1976;

- Percent Republicans in Congressional delegation;
- Percent change in the number of Republicans holding state legislative offices;
- Percent Reagan support from most recent survey;
- Percent Carter support from most recent survey;
- Percent Anderson support from most recent survey; and
- Professional judgment of Reagan's chances of winning (i.e. 6 out of 10).

All fifty states have been prioritized on these variables taken singly or in combination. The initial prioritizations reported here are based on the set of variables deemed most likely to produce the best estimates of Reagan victory potential. These estimates produce priority orderings for:

- All fifty states taken together;
- States within large, medium, and small size categories;
- States within geopolitical regions.

Results

The results presented in the following tables represent the initial effort at developing a comprehensive state targeting plan. Prioritization of states in each table reflects the contribution of three historical variables and one professional judgment variable. Hence, this run disproportionately reflects the contribution of:

- Average Republican vote in statewide races 1976 and 1978;
- Average Republican vote for President 1952 - 1976;
- Change in Republican vote percent for President 1972 to 1976.

In subsequent passes at the state data, other variables such as the survey data and updated political judgments will be tested with heavier emphasis placed on them. Hence, the reader should remember that the state priority lists generated in the following tables are based primarily on the history of Republican contests in each state.

Table 8 provides an overview of what we consider to be our "best coalition of states" right now, using the model and our political judgment. Table 9 and the following analysis reflect that "best coalition" based solely on the model. The key to the differences between the states listed on Table 8 and those on Table 9 are:

- We upgraded Texas on the basis of recent survey results, and
- We downgraded in priority states that, on the basis of current survey data, appear somewhat marginal -- Michigan, Wisconsin, New Jersey and Missouri.

Table 9 presents the lists of Reagan and Carter base states. Reagan base states total 86 electoral votes compared to 125 electoral votes in the Carter states. A quick perusal of the Carter base reveals a repetition of the 1976 Southern strategy with only a few omissions such as in Tennessee, Florida and Texas. At this point in the campaign it is highly problematic whether Carter can maintain the integrity of that Southern-based coalition. Nevertheless, the history of Republican statewide races in the South suggests that these states be identified with the Carter candidacy at least until more recent survey data proves otherwise.

Tables 10, 11 and 12 prioritize lists of large, medium and small states identifying each with a strategy that will target at least fifty percent plus one of the available electoral votes. The choice of fifty percent of the electoral votes in each state size category is arbitrary. Clearly it might be argued that the Reagan campaign should expect a higher proportion than fifty percent of electoral votes from

large and small states. Nevertheless, in this first attempt at state targeting, the fifty percent plus one vote allocation rule is used.

Table 10 presents a large state coalition that produces the minimum number of electoral votes. Historically, California and Illinois are the highest probable Reagan win states among the seven. Common sense suggests that Illinois may not be as certain in 1980 because of the Independent candidacy of John Anderson, a northern Illinois Congressman. However, recent survey data from the state suggests that Reagan is running well there. Four additional states are prioritized from which Reagan must win at least two. Of the four, recent survey data indicates that Texas may be the best opportunity. New York is not prioritized in this table. With the right combination of turnout and Anderson vote strength, New York could be a pleasant surprise.

Medium size states present a much tougher battleground for winning at least 50% of the electoral votes. Reagan needs to win the top four states listed in Table 11 -- including two states that are at best uncertain at present -- Wisconsin and New Jersey. Furthermore, the campaign has the challenge of winning three out of four states to garner the needed margin when all of these states voted for Carter in 1976.

Indeed it appears that the large and small states will have to be relied upon to produce more than their minimum share to make up the anticipated deficit in electoral votes from medium sized states.

Table 12 shows the winning coalition of small states. The campaign must win in all its small base states producing 71 electoral votes. The remaining votes should be easily obtained from any three of the four key target states.

Table 8
Recommended Coalition of Large, Medium and Small States

<u>Large States</u>		
1.	California	45
2.	Illinois	26
3.	Texas	26
4.	Ohio	25
5.	Pennsylvania	27
<u>Medium States</u>		
1.	Indiana	13
2.	Virginia	12
3.	Tennessee	10
4.	Florida	17
5.	Maryland	10
<u>Small States</u>		
1.	Idaho	4
2.	South Dakota	4
3.	Wyoming	3
4.	Vermont	3
5.	Utah	4
6.	Nebraska	5
7.	North Dakota	3
8.	New Hampshire	4
9.	Kansas	7
10.	Montana	4
11.	New Mexico	4
12.	Nevada	3
13.	Arizona	6
14.	Oregon	6
15.	Alaska	3
16.	Iowa	8
17.	Colorado	7
18.	Washington	9
19.	Maine	4

*Michigan
New York*

New Jersey

*Missouri
Wisconsin*

Large states:	149
Medium states:	62
Small states:	91
	<u>302</u>

* While Michigan and New York are not listed in the win coalition, all seven of the largest electoral states must be carefully monitored throughout the campaign to assess on an ongoing basis which five of the seven appear most winnable.

Table 9
Reagan and Carter Base States

Reagan Base States			Carter Base States		
	<u>E.V.</u>	<u>RR Win Rank</u>		<u>E.V.</u>	<u>RR Win Rank</u>
Idaho	4	1	Georgia	12	50
South Dakota	4	2	Arkansas	6	49
Wyoming	3	3	Alabama	9	48
Vermont	4	4	Mississippi	9	47
Utah	4	5	South Carolina	8	46
Nebraska	6	6	Hawaii	4	45
Indiana	13	7	West Virginia	6	44
North Dakota	3	8	North Carolina	13	43
New Hampshire	4	9	Louisiana	10	42
Kansas	7	10	Kentucky	9	41
Montana	4	1	Rhode island	4	40
New Mexico	4	12	Maryland	10	39
Nevada	3	13	Massachusetts	14	38
Arizona	6	14	Minnesota	10	31
Oregon	6	15	Washington D.C.	3	Not ranked
Alaska	3	16		<u>125</u>	
Iowa	8	18			
	<u>86</u>				

Table 10
 Large State Coalition Building Based
 On Electoral Votes

=====			
LARGE STATES			
<u>State</u>	<u># E.V.</u>	<u>RR Win Rank Within Category</u>	<u>RR Win Rank All States</u>
California	45	1	17
Illinois	26	2	19
Michigan	21	3	24
Ohio	25	4	26
Pennsylvania	27	5	27
Texas	26	6	30
New York	41	7	32

Total Large State E.V. = 211
 Minimum E.V. needed = 107

Combinations to reach 106 E.V.
 Must win: California 45
 Illinois 26
 71

Win 2 out of 4: Michigan 21
 Ohio 25
 Pennsylvania 27
 Texas 26

Minimum = 46
 Maximum = 53

Expected Electoral Vote Range:
 Minimum = 117
 Maximum = 124

Table 11
 Medium State Coalition Building Based
 On Electoral Votes



MEDIUM STATES

<u>State</u>	<u># E.V.</u>	<u>RR Win Rank Within Category</u>	<u>RR Win Rank All States</u>
Indiana	13	1	7
Wisconsin	11	2	20
Virginia	12	3	22
New Jersey	17	4	29
Minnesota	10	5	31
Missouri	12	6	33
Tennessee	10	7	35
Florida	17	8	36
Massachusetts	14	9	38
Maryland	10	10	39
Louisiana	10	11	42
North Carolina	13	12	43
Georgia	12	13	50

Total Medium State E.V. = 161
 Minimum E.V. needed = 82

Combinations to reach 81 E.V.
 Must win: Indiana 45
 12 Win 3 out of 4: Missouri
 10 Wisconsin 11 Tennessee
 17 Virginia 12 Florida
 New Jersey 17 Maryland 10
 Minimum = 32
 Maximum = 39

Expected Electoral Vote Range:
 Minimum = 85
 Maximum = 92

Table 12

Small State Coalition Building Based
On Electoral Votes

=====

SMALL STATES

<u>State</u>	<u># E.V.</u>	<u>RR Win Rank Within Category</u>	<u>RR Win Rank All States</u>
Idaho	4	1	1
South Dakota	4	2	2
Wyoming	3	3	3
Vermont	3	4	4
Utah	4	5	5
Nebraska	5	6	6
North Dakota	3	7	8
New Hampshire	4	8	9
Kansas	7	9	10
Montana	4	10	11
New Mexico	4	11	12
Nevada	3	12	13
Arizona	6	13	14
Oregon	6	14	15
Alaska	3	15	16
Iowa	8	16	18
Colorado	7	17	21
Washington	9	18	23
Maine	4	19	25
Connecticut	8	20	28
Delaware	3	21	34
Oklahoma	8	22	37
Rhode Island	4	23	40
Kentucky	9	24	41
West Virginia	6	25	44
Hawaii	4	26	45
South Carolina	8	27	46
Mississippi	7	28	47
Alabama	9	29	48
Arkansas	6	30	49
Washington D.C.	3	not ranked	not ranked

Total Small States E.V. = 166
Minimum E.V. needed = 84

Combinations to reach 82 E.V.

Must win: Idaho
 through
 Iowa

Win 3 out of 4: Colorado 7
 Washington 9
 Maine 4
 Connecticut 8

Minimum = 19
Maximum = 24

Expected Electoral Vote Range:
Minimum = 90
Maximum = 95

Phase II -- The Voters

Objective: Phase II targeting develops the strategy for carrying the campaign to neighborhoods containing key voter subgroups needed to build a winning Reagan coalition within each state. The underlying premise of this approach is that "birds of a feather flock together". In other words, targeted messages may be directed to particular voter subgroups based on where they live within their communities.

Targeting Elements

- Identify traditional Republican strength areas for reinforcing Reagan's candidacy;
- Surface areas of weak Republicans and ticket-splitters to activate latent Reagan support and neutralize Anderson's appeal;
- Focus on metropolitan, blue collar, ethnics to maximize potential cross-over of traditional Democratic voters;
- Identify rural areas in the non-south to identify pockets of disaffected farmers and former Carter voters -- particularly those who have voted Republican in the past;
- Target the potentially disaffected white Southern Protestant voter to reinforce our foothold in the South;
- Respond by identifying for direct mail, the coalition base subgroups of key voter types such as:
 - . Family age adults (35 - 54)
 - . Working women
 - . College graduates

Phase II targeting of the voters will be carried out in conjunction with RNC and the RCC who will provide access to congressional district and county data files.

SECTION VIII

CARTER'S 1980 CAMPAIGN: WHAT CAN WE EXPECT?

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Introduction

The political observer views future political events through a mirror more darkly clouded than most. But by carefully examining statements made by Carter's political operatives, by assessing the form and substance of the Carter/Kennedy primary battle, and by listening to what the Carter advisors are stating that they believe 1980 will have in store for them, we are afforded a glimpse of the likely nature and thrust of Carter's 1980 Fall campaign.

It appears most likely that:

- Carter and his administration will use fully the political power of the Presidency in their attempt to win re-election for the incumbent.
- There will be no hesitancy to mount extremely personal attacks on Ronald Reagan.
- While Carter himself may remain above the fray of personal attacks early in the contest, his own "positive" positions will be carefully crafted to give added emphasis to the negative charges his surrogates and media will make against Ronald Reagan.

"man of force"

The Carter strategists have long held that Carter's 1980 race will likely be a come-from-behind effort. Reviewing some key campaigns in 1978, which featured Democrats who did come from behind to win (Hugh Carey of New York, Brendan Byrne of New Jersey, and Ella Grasso of Connecticut), Carter's operatives have concluded that negative campaigning (broadcasting an opponent's shortcomings even more than emphasizing one's own virtues) works in elections, now more so than ever before. They believe that all of the winners who had to come

from behind to win did so on the basis of negative campaigns. Given that, they view their task as making their opponents, Ronald Reagan and John Anderson, the issues in 1980. Thus it is not surprising that the Carter strategists have stated publicly that, "We expect this to be the most negative media year we have ever seen." (Wall Street Journal, May 30, 1980.)

Even if Carter and Reagan were running neck and neck early this Fall, we could still expect that a strong, negative and highly personal campaign would be directed against Ronald Reagan. Carter's record in office has denied him use of the traditional Democratic theme song of the economy and of how the Republicans would foul things up. Present issues offer little more help to Carter. Taxes, inflation, interest rates, rising unemployment, the voters' desire for a stronger defense, the balanced-budget fever, and the anti-government push all work for Reagan and against Carter. More than ever, the electorate questions Carter's very capacity to lead. So, to beat us in November, Carter's task seems to be clear: Reagan must be demonized.

The Pennsylvania primary presents the most dramatic and perhaps most parallel case of how the Carterites will attempt to use the media and their candidate to make Ronald Reagan the issue. Gerald Rafshoon took a page straight from the Gerald Ford campaign of 1976 and used "man in the street" interviews to deliver some effective and very negative anti-Kennedy messages. Rafshoon showed assorted people saying that Kennedy was, "liberal, a big spender, and wrong on welfare." The personal attack surfaced in one commercial that deals subtly with character:

MAN: "I don't think Kennedy is qualified to be President."

WOMAN: "I don't think he has any credibility."

WOMAN: "I don't believe him."

WOMAN: "I just don't think he's big enough for the job."

MAN: "I don't trust him."

WOMAN: "You're taking a chance with Kennedy."

WOMAN: "I'm going to vote for Carter because I think he's best qualified."

MAN: "Carter's got his hands full with Kennedy. He's got his hands full with the country and the economic situation. He's got his hands full with Iran and Afghanistan. He's not doing a bad job."

MAN: "Between Kennedy and Carter, I would definitely go with Carter myself. I trust him."

These ads appeared during the last week of the Pennsylvania campaign. Kennedy, up to that point, had been steadily lengthening his lead over Carter. At that juncture, according to Pat Caddell, Kennedy held a nine-point lead over Carter.

After the introduction of the above "man in the street" ads, there was a sharp increase in the number of people who believed that Kennedy could win the nomination; but over the next few days voters began expressing concerns about Kennedy's character. Furthermore, Carter's survey research showed that the Democratic voters in Pennsylvania were once again listing "trustworthiness" as the main factor in their vote choice and tied this trait more heavily to Carter than to Kennedy. On election day the contest ended in a dead heat. Carter successfully made Kennedy the issue.

We can also expect Carter to mount a positive campaign concerning his experience, and his achievement in bringing peace to the Middle East. In this regard, the President will avoid harsh attacks on Reagan until late in the campaign. Most of the early negative salvos that will be launched against us will come from Carter surrogates. He will concentrate on "being Presidential." Clearly his trip to Europe was designed to further this positive image by casting the President in some of the ceremonial leadership roles on the international scene.

We should expect more of the same. His "positive" campaign will be designed to highlight the negative attacks. Consider the following ad used early in the primary season against Kennedy:

"President Carter. He's a solid man in a sensitive job."

"Husband, father, President -- he's done all three jobs with distinction."

"A man brings two things to a presidential ballot. He brings his record and he brings himself. Who he is, is frequently more important than what he has done. In the voting booth, the voter must weigh both record and character before deciding. Often it's not easy. And this voter winds up asking -- is this the person I really want in the White House for the next four years?"

The above reflects the classic interplay between President Carter's positives -- his character, the family man, etc. -- against the underlying weakness which Ted Kennedy did not overcome in 1979-80 -- questions about his character.

If the Democratic primary provides any kind of guide concerning the nature, scope and thrust of Carter's campaign, we must conclude that he and his people will be aggressive, thorough, disciplined, and extremely well-versed in practical politics; they will not hesitate to play hardball and resort to a slashing personal attack on Reagan.

We can review the following basics of Carter's 1980 presidential campaign:

- Jimmy Carter's use of the political power of the presidency;
- his most likely positive themes;
- his most likely negative themes; and
- his pre-emption strategy.

Jimmy Carter's Use of the Political Power of the Presidency

The political resources of the President are myriad. Carterites are aware of that power and will use it fully.

Timing Events and the Media

The Office of the President holds the focus of television's "unseeing eyes." Thus Carter is afforded open and abundant opportunity not only to make news, but to be news. This bestows, of course, tremendous political advantage.

Major world events generally override everyone's timetable -- including the President's. But not always. The President can jog and influence the timing, or at least the announcement, of certain key events that have strong political impact.

For example, during the primaries, Wisconsin turned out to be a state of great importance for the Carter campaign. The strong protest vote against Carter that surfaced in New York and Connecticut provided Kennedy with some much needed momentum. Not too many weeks after the Wisconsin date, Pennsylvania loomed as another potential New York. Thus it was imperative that Carter run well in Wisconsin or Kennedy's momentum might well have proved unstoppable.

Surveys taken shortly after New York showed Carter with a rather comfortable lead in Wisconsin. But public opinion on Carter's handling of the crisis in Iran began to go sour, and several days before the primary the President's own surveys showed that his lead was beginning to collapse. In the words of his pollster, Pat Caddell, "The Iranian thing was clearly a problem. The President's rating on his handling of Iran was declining."

It appears that privately there were signs that an agreement was near which would transfer control of the American hostages out of the hands of the militants; but publicly the impression earlier that week was just the opposite.

Thus, out of desperation, Carter acted to turn things around. He personally met with a group of newspaper representatives and television network anchorpersons to let them know that an agreement was forthcoming. Furthermore, on election day in Wisconsin, the President summoned reporters to his office just after 7 a.m. -- precisely in time for the network morning news shows -- to proclaim that the latest news from Iran that morning was most "positive." There is no question that the "good news" provided exactly the stimulus Carter needed to win Wisconsin. Quoting Caddell again, "When it was made clear over the weekend that there was going to be some progress, that bumped the race up for us....It went from a lead of 15 to 18 points to a win of almost 30 points." Kennedy was stopped.

We cannot underestimate the power of the President to control news events to his political advantage. He can and will exercise this power adroitly.

Just as Ted Kennedy faced a rather unpleasant Tuesday morning surprise, so we should be well prepared to have some kind of Jimmy Carter surprise dumped in our laps in late October.

What kind of surprises would be most helpful to Carter? An analysis of the potential impact of events on Carter's popularity shows that the events most helpful to him, in order of their impact, are:

- a reduction in the rate of inflation;
- a release of the hostages held by the Iranian militants;
- withdrawal of Soviet troops from Afghanistan; and

- a reduction in the federal income tax of 10% each year for a period of three years.

We might also anticipate some kind of Carter peace initiative in the Fall. The reverse side of the coin shows future events which would most impair Carter's popularity. In order of importance, they are:

- further escalation of the inflation rate;
- failure to secure the release of the American hostages held by the Iranian militants;
- a sharp increase in gasoline prices; and
- increases in unemployment.

How can we neutralize Carter's October Surprise?

- The key campaign personnel, as the press affords opportunities, should begin to sprinkle their conversation with talk about their expectation of Carter's October Surprise.
- We know it is not beneath Carter to try anything, regardless of the consequences, if such action might better posture him as "presidential" and "in control." Our objective is to precondition the American people so that they will see such October maneuverings in a more cynical perspective.
- It is important that we simply raise the probability and spur people to their own imaginings about what the October Surprise might be. We do not need to volunteer any of our own ideas about what that Surprise might be -- at least not for the time being. Keep it open-ended, speak of it frequently, and get people to start anticipating some blatant Carter political move using the powers of his presidency.

Even though Carter has a lot of presidential power levers to pull, at times (thanks to the press) he pulls them too awkwardly and too blatantly.

The Venice Summit: An Example of Presidential
Political Puffery Gone Awry

Jimmy Carter's recent trip to Europe commanded the attention of the media, but because of mildly critical media comment and the fact that much of the press viewed this summit as a "nothing event," it generated few if any political assets, and some liabilities, for Carter. The event itself revealed a weakening of solidarity between the United States and its principal allies since the summit meeting in Tokyo a year ago. This did not reflect well on the President. Nor was he flattered by the press's invidious comparisons between himself as lacklustre and West Germany's Chancellor Helmut Schmidt as strong and charismatic.

Hence, while this particular event fell short politically for Carter, it does reflect both the extent to which a President, even an unpopular President, can command the attention of the media, and the extent to which the media, in turn, can soften that political impact when the President overplays his hand.

Thus, all of the key members of the Reagan team should recognize that the press speaks with the loudest voice of all to the average voter and is, therefore, by itself, one of the smallest but clearly one of the most important, of all our constituencies. They must be treated by our campaign as such. They alone can blunt Carter's manipulative press/media adventures.

Grantsmanship

Jimmy Carter may well have overplayed his hand in using the spending power of the White House so blatantly in the primaries. This may afford us an opening to keep him on the defensive and thus sensitize him against using the grant-making power of an incumbent President to defeat a challenger in the general election.

Some cases in point:

- Just prior to the crucial Florida vote, an electric cooperative in the Sunshine State was granted a billion-dollar loan just two months after the application was filed. Such loans normally take at least a year to process.
- Similar cases of "grantsmanship" turned up in Illinois, New Hampshire, Maine, Massachusetts, and Wisconsin at primary times.
- Ohio was perhaps impacted by the Carterites more heavily than any other state. It was the only big state that Carter carried on June 3rd. Part of that success might be attributed to a \$1.4 million shopping mall; \$50 million to the recession-stricken Youngstown/Warren area, including, in one congressional district, an \$829,000 community block grant, three summer youth recreation grants, an award to a local college, plus an announcement that a local historical society had been added to the national register. The White House largesse in some cases went too far -- it announced a \$9 million grant to Dayton for highway improvements, funds that community had already received.
- We can neutralize Carter's use of the presidential purse in the Fall by selecting spokespersons to review his record of grantsmanship. Further, all presidential grants-in-aid should be monitored regularly and, where these are applied "politically," that fact should be made known publicly.
- Carter can and should be painted as the most politically motivated President of modern times.

At this juncture, it appears that Jimmy Carter will develop, and run on, several "positive" themes, such as "turning the tide...", "don't change horses...", "the experienced and known is better than the inexperienced and the unknown," or "Carter, the man of peace" (while we have had many problems over the last four years, we have not had a war).

Each of these themes will be discussed briefly below.

Turning the Tide

Carter has already launched one campaign theme that he may continue to use up until the November election. It implies that while the economic statistics are not on his side yet, the economic "trends" are changing for the better, and further, through his meetings with world figures he hopes to demonstrate that he knows more about foreign policy than Reagan or Anderson.

Carter stated in his first (openly admitted) political rally in Ohio that, "In every area of change, in every area of challenge, in every area of danger, because of our courage and our strength, America is turning the tide."

In spite of a recent, rather sharp reduction in the consumer price index, this particular theme may fall very flat. But it does cater to a belief held by a large bloc of the electorate that the future can be better under a strong and effective leader. By declaiming these pro-America feelings, Carter also provides a vehicle to turn any criticism of his administration into a form of "running down America." The tag line on the "tide has turned" theme will probably be, "Look, we've had a tough period. But if we get through it, then we will be prepared for a real productive burst through the 1980's."

Carterites, in short, expect that by playing to people's sense of "patriotism and realism," voters will realize that one cannot blame the landlord and bang on the pipes when in trouble or when something goes wrong.

The "turning the tide" theme parallels a likely second theme that Carter will adopt -- namely, that he has had four years of experience, that he is a "known quantity," and therefore much safer than someone with less experience whose abilities are also less known.

The President of the United States Has
the Toughest Job in the World

In 1969, the Democratic candidate for mayor of New York, Mario Procaccino, was running against an immensely unpopular incumbent by the name of John Lindsay. Lindsay beat Procaccino by running on a single theme from the beginning to the end of his campaign:

"It's (mayor of New York) the second toughest job in America."

Lindsay, through endorsements and advertisements, delivered the message that the job was simply too big for Procaccino. That message got through; Lindsay was re-elected.

It would appear that Carter is attempting to take a leaf directly from John Lindsay's political handbook. Carter has said many times that the presidency is the toughest job in America. This position "explains" some of Carter's failures with the line, "I've made tough decisions, politically unpopular decisions, for what is best for America in the long run." It can also be used to juxtapose the enormity of the job against the shortcomings of an opponent. Thus Carter's stand can depict the Governor as much less than presidential, which ties in to all of the negative campaign rhetoric (discussed below) which his surrogates will launch against us.

Jimmy Carter: A Man of Peace

In an effort to sharply contrast the abilities and experience of Carter with Reagan, the Carter campaign will emphasize his "accomplishments" and attempt to drape their man with the "mantle of peace." Carter will make the case that he has pushed hard to get the hostages back, strengthened the NATO alliance, penalized the Soviets because of their incursion into Afghanistan, and is making some important progress in the Mideast.

The skill with which Carter can wear this mantle may be dependent upon how the world stands in the Fall of 1980. More specifically, if further peace agreements are reached between Egypt and Israel, this will give credibility to Carter's claim. On the other hand, if international tensions run high, that claim may come back to bite Carter.

- Governor Reagan should point out repeatedly that long-term prospects for real and enduring peace in the world depend directly on our economic and military strength and the prestige of America abroad. All three have suffered terribly under the Carter Administration.
- Surrogates from our foreign policy advisory group should take on strongly and critically Carter's claim that the world is more "peaceful" now than it was in 1976 because of his actions.
- Nevertheless, all of us should keep in mind that our strength and the voters' major interest lie in coming to grips with our economic problems. Our major media efforts and communication resources should focus on this issue, not on countering Carter's peace strategy.

Positive Themes with Negative Twists

Carter will select his own positive themes not solely on their own merits, but also on the basis of how much contrast they provide for the negative attacks that Carter's campaign will mount.

Thus Section IX, which deals with Carter's attack strategy, should be viewed from this double point of view. Consider the following: "A man of peace" can be used by the Carterites, unless we are careful, to portray Reagan as someone who would as easily face a nuclear showdown as court his girlfriend on the front porch swing. In similar fashion, the Governor's "inexperience" will be contrasted with Carter's experience in "turning the tide."

However, the Carterites will also employ some outright negative attack lines in the campaign. We must consider them just as carefully.

The Elements of Jimmy Carter's Attack Strategy

Carter's battle plan calls initially for the President to assume the high road while leaving his surrogates to viciously attack us.

We can expect Ronald Reagan to be pictured as a simplistic and untried lightweight (dumb), a person who consciously misuses facts to overblow his own record (deceptive) and, if President, one who would be too anxious to engage our country in a nuclear holocaust (dangerous).

To reinforce Carter's constituency, which has been badly frayed by the primary battles and his leadership failures, we can expect his campaign to use two additional themes -- namely that Ronald Reagan is a "captive of the Right Wing," and also "anti-union, anti-Black, and anti-elderly."

Ronald Reagan is Simplistic and Naive

A top Carterite strategist predicted recently that, "The whole thrust of our media this Fall will be to paint Ronald Reagan as dangerous and stupid."

The Carter campaign has for some time been researching every public statement Reagan has made to gather ammunition for that tactic. We should be thoroughly prepared for a vicious and heavy attack on the Governor's competence.

Ronald Reagan is Deceptive

Over the past four years one of the strongest political assets maintained by the Governor has been his record in California. The fact that Nader (a close confidante of the White House) would launch such an early attack on that record presages what we can expect in the Fall, and reflects the importance the Carterites attach to it.

The Governor's record must be our high ground. We do not give it up to any attack. Nader and Carter, by attacking the Governor's accomplishments in Sacramento, are attempting to satisfy two objectives: first, damage one of the Governor's major political assets and, second, raise questions about his honesty and credibility.

Even if we run a picture-perfect campaign from this moment on, we can expect the California record and the Governor's "deceitfulness" to be major targets for the Carter surrogates.

Ronald Reagan as President Would Be Too Close to the Nuclear Button

The Carterites will undoubtedly try to make the Governor appear dangerous because of his apparent "shoot-from-the-hip" approach to international affairs and his otherwise hardline stand on Communism and the Soviet Union. This thrust will highlight the fact that Reagan may well unwittingly take the country into a nuclear war and, further, stress his inflexibility and narrow ideological views on most international issues. To sum up:

- Jimmy Carter practices piranha politics -- he eats his opponents alive. Beneath that sanctimonious guise is the heart and mind of a street fighter. He'll do anything to win. We must expect the worst. We must expect the Carterites to attack Reagan, his competence, his record as Governor, his inconsistencies, his total record, his lack of national experience, and his tendency to, on occasion,

make an unthinking comment. They will portray him as dumb, dangerous and deceptive.

*Counterpunch
Team*

- This means that we must be prepared.
- Reagan's record must be combed so that WE know exactly what it is. Every radio script, every column, every article, every available speech must be scrutinized.
- We need to establish definitive positions on the issues of overriding concern.
- In response to attacks on the Reagan record, we must stand on it and talk positively about it. We should recruit defenders of it from both parties, who would avoid nit-picking defenses on details, but who would reinforce the point that he was indeed a good governor. He did keep budgets balanced. He did reform welfare. He did reform mental health care. He was fair to the schools and colleges. He did return money to the people whenever possible. He did work to maintain and restore the environment. He was a good governor -- we must repeat it and repeat it and repeat it through the mouths of every prominent Californian we can find. We should dig out the articles all the papers ran on his governorship -- pull the best statements and use them, especially in brochures and direct mail efforts.
- The Governor cannot afford any new mistakes, misstatements of fact, warlike declarations, jokes or remarks that can be twisted to an interpretation of racist, sexist or any other "ist."
- What should the candidate and senior staff do about these attacks?
 - . Not give them any further ammunition.
 - . Ignore the attacks and point out how bad Carter is. The campaign should have its positive materials about the Governor out in advance of any attacks. His positions on the major issues need to be set soon. Our comparisons of the two men, perhaps in the form of fact books on Carter and Reagan, need to be prepared and distributed soon.
- The key staff needs to be alert to any misstatements or distortions on the part of Carter or Anderson and then go and beat our breasts like mad.
- We cannot be casual about this, we cannot be careless. We must be ready to move quickly, but without panic. Any decision as to how to respond or what to do must be

carefully considered in every case by the policy group, and then assigned to the appropriate divisions for the required responses to be carried out immediately. We cannot afford to lose opportunities or let attacks be accepted by the press and the public as facts.

Ronald Reagan: Captive of the Republican Right Wing

Two recent events highlight the potential schism between our campaign and the extreme Right -- the decision not to purge Bill Brock from the chairmanship of the Republican National Committee, and the mounting pressure to pre-empt our choosing Howard Baker as the vice presidential nominee. Consequently, the Right has become more shrill and more visible.

One potential thrust of the Carter campaign will be to build onto the perception that Ronald Reagan is simplistic and naive -- an affable, easy-going lightweight -- the impression that he is surrounded and controlled by Right Wing forces who would run the country according to their own narrow ideological dictates. One political writer (Joseph Kraft) went so far as to describe this particular mix of qualities as ones that would "make a President a prisoner of a determined minority."

The reverse side of this coalitional coin will also be played by Carter. This entails attacking Reagan in a fashion that will reinforce the pieces of the traditional Democratic coalitional bloc that in the past has been so important to Carter's base by claiming Ronald Reagan in anti-union, anti-Black and anti-elderly.

Ronald Reagan: Anti-Union, Anti-Black, and Anti-Elderly

The Carter camp is already amassing ammunition to support the contention that, when the record is closely scrutinized, Ronald Reagan has little to offer the blue collar workers. Without question, the

Governor's "anti-labor" views on the minimum wage, labor law revision, and applying the anti-monopoly laws to labor unions as well as business, will be strongly touted to unionists and the rank and file.

We can fully expect the Carterites to remind the elderly of Reagan's past call for "voluntary" Social Security. This line of attack could be damaging because we have already lost some support among the older voters, primarily because our tax cut position offers no returns for those on zero incomes and thus affords no economic relief for those most hurt by rising prices -- the elderly who are on fixed incomes.

We should also expect the powers of the presidency to be brought to full force to shore up Carter's strength among Hispanics and Blacks. The recent multi-million dollar grant to Miami was only for openers.

- As we follow through on the strategies to strengthen our support among all Republicans and then begin to reach out to the Independents, and blue collar and soft Democrats, some of the sting in the charge, "a captive of the Right Wing," will dissipate.
- However, we must do more than this. Reagan must address and persuade the moderates and Ticket-Splitters that his presidency offers hope beyond ideology, promise beyond party. He must be viewed as a man capable of leading the entire nation.
- The selection of a "moderate" vice president would do more to lay the charge of "ideological captive" to rest forever than any other decision we make or position we espouse.
- We must defuse the anti-union, anti-Black and anti-elderly charge by developing positions, consistent with the Governor's beliefs, that speak convincingly to these groups about problems of their special interest:
 - . a workable urban policy;
 - . a program that will offer some economic hope to the elderly who have been so squeezed by Carter's inflation; and

- . policies that have some economic payoff for the working men and women of this country.
- The Governor and the other campaign spokespersons should attack Carter regularly for his failures to meet the needs of these groups.

Carter's Pre-emption Strategy

The Carterites, in addition to running on both positive and negative campaign themes, will also attempt to pre-empt our base issue strengths.

Stewart Eisenstadt, President Carter's chief domestic advisor, has already announced that the high interest rates and Carter's austerity program of the last few months were designed to meet only "short-term needs." "Now," he said, "we can turn to what have always been the long-term objectives of Carter's Administration -- invigorate the free market, reduce credit controls and encourage strong expansion of our productivity." Furthermore, Treasury Secretary G. William Miller said recently that, while it is unlikely that a tax program will develop in Congress this year, it is possible.

We should be prepared to have Carter try to pre-empt our best issues, and certainly the tax cut issue is one of those. We can expect Carter's people to severely criticize the form of this and similar ideas. Miller said, for example, "The tax cut proposal by the Republican presidential hopeful Ronald Reagan is irresponsible; it's Barnum and Bailey economic policy." Nevertheless, they will adopt the substance of our tax cut proposal by taking the position that they have a "responsible tax message" that will "encourage investment, work against inflation, and accomplish some targeted efforts to build recovery into the economy."

SECTION IX
CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

SECTION IX CAMPAIGN OBJECTIVES AND STRATEGIES

Introduction

Section IX is an inventory of campaign objectives and strategies. The objectives are derived from the previous eight sections of the plan. Each objective is keyed to some other section and/or subsection for its justification and elaboration. The idea here is to specify the most important campaign objectives and give some indication of the strategies that might be adopted to achieve those objectives. This inventory constitutes the frame of reference which other members of the RFP team can use to augment, alter and append as they develop their individual tactics and action plans.

Given the nature of presidential campaigning, it is not possible -- or indeed appropriate -- to treat these objectives as exhaustive or all-inclusive. As other members of the campaign team formulate the action plans for their respective areas of responsibility, new objectives and strategies will surface and be included into the overall plan for common referencing. The plan will be updated by changing circumstances in the campaign dynamics and in the national political environment. For example, changes in the plan will be necessary because of changes in (1) John Anderson's candidacy, (2) the attack strategies of Jimmy Carter, (3) the domestic and international political environment, (4) expansion or contraction of the Reagan coalition, (5) the national issue agenda, and (6) state targeting. Elements of the plan will alter as new survey data become available, as information and evaluations come from the regional and state political directors, and when the full thrust of the media plan starts to have its effect.

The objectives and strategies that follow are based on the premise that the over-arching goal of the campaign is to build an electoral vote coalition base large enough to win 270 electoral votes for Ronald Reagan in November. The targeted states and constituencies to be included in the base should be those most easily motivated, and/or least expensively attracted, to Governor Reagan's candidacy. Further, the resources needed to appeal to particular voter constituencies should be allocated on the basis of where these constituencies are (i.e., which states) and whether their contribution to the Reagan base means the difference between winning or losing the state. The winner-take-all formula of the electoral college system, the Anderson factor, and the need to secure 270 electoral votes to win without throwing the race into the House of Representatives suggest that campaign objectives, strategies and action plans be designed to win in the targeted states the support of a sufficiently large and inexpensively-attracted coalition base.

Key: The Current Political Environment -- Volatility
and Fluidity of the Voters

Objective: Plan for the fact that the election will be won in the last 20 days of the campaign.

Strategy:

- Reserve a critical mass of campaign resources for re-allocating or selected targeting during the last 20 days of the campaign.
- Select the most readily available media for communicating messages to newly-targeted constituencies and states.
- Prepare a plan for targeting approximately 10,000 to 20,000 voters in critical swing states, for example, Ohio, Michigan or New York.
- Identify surrogates for selected issues who can be rapidly mobilized during the last 20 days.
- Establish an inventory of messages for targeted states in the last 20 days and specify which messages will be used over the radio and which on television.
- Develop contingency plans for (a) a rebound by Carter late in the campaign, and (b) a complete fade out of the picture by Anderson.

Key: The Current Political Environment --
Carter's Incumbency

Objective: Take steps to offset the advantages of incumbency.

Strategy:

- Do not hesitate to confront the President on the Administration's record, his use of the office for political purposes, his inability to handle the Congress, and generally to provide the necessary national leadership.
- Pressure Carter to come out of the White House and explain the performance of his Administration.
- Never underestimate the significance of incumbency and the President's ability to control the timing of critical political events and/or government policies and programs. Prepare media messages to counter attempts by the Administration to use the office to gain political advantage during the late stages of the campaign.
- Pre-emption of the issue agenda is the most effective way of countering the power of incumbency. Use major speeches by Governor Reagan to set the issue agenda, thereby forcing the Administration to play catch-up. Pre-program the announcement of major Reagan policy disclosures.

Key: The Current Political Environment --
The Anderson Factor

Objective: Prepare alternative contingency strategies to cope and adjust to the Anderson candidacy.

Alternative contingency strategies must be developed at different stages of the campaign to cope with the Anderson candidacy because of the uncertainty created by the Congressman's challenge. The most critical factors to adjust to are the longevity of his candidacy and the level of Anderson's appeal. Since it is not clear how long Anderson can stay in the race, which ballots he will be on, or whether his financial base can be maintained, alternative strategies will have to be developed at different stages of the campaign, depending on how Anderson is weathering the storm.

Strategy:

- Monitor, through survey research, the degree to which Anderson is drawing his vote support away from the Reagan and/or Carter bases.
- Develop contingency plans for Anderson dropping out of the race very late in the campaign.
- If Anderson's ballot support is between 10-15%, then the strategy ought to be to attack Anderson vigorously because of his defection from the Party and his inconsistent voting record, and to point out that he would be a president without a party base in Congress.
- If Anderson is garnering between 19-28%, then the Reagan strategy should be to attack Anderson on the issues, without elevating the importance of his candidacy too much by giving it too much attention or directing too many resources toward it. Let the Carter campaign assume the principal burden of challenging Anderson.
- If Anderson's challenge picks up momentum and he reaches a national vote support between 29-35%, then every effort should be made to attack him directly as a candidate without a political base, with no linkages in Congress if elected, with an inconsistent record in Congress, and with

making an "end run" of the normal process of securing a nomination after he was defeated in the primaries. We should challenge any state ballots where he may still not be on the ticket, work to secure the election of Republicans to the House of Representatives, and re-allocate campaign resources into the eight major states where Anderson is strongest.

Key: Reagan Ballot Strength --
Reagan Win Constituencies (Table 5)

Objective: Halt the erosion in support for Governor Reagan among the 65-and-older subgroup.

Strategy:

- Identify and present to those voters on fixed incomes and/or the elderly programs which will ease their concern over their present economic straits.
- Governor Reagan should give an agenda-setting speech in Miami, explaining the tax cut proposals and the accompanying economic policies which will deal with the economic problems of the elderly and fixed-income citizens.