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Debate

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INDEX OF DISKETTE CONTENTS

DISKETTE: DEBATE Available: 92% Unusable: 0%

DOCUMENT NAME: allies
DOCUMENT TYPE: Document
COMMENT:

DOCUMENT NAME: arms
DOCUMENT TYPE: Document
COMMENT:

DOCUMENT NAME: crisis
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DOCUMENT NAME: leb and terr
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DOCUMENT NAME: mid east
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DOCUMENT NAME: peace
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DOCUMENT NAME: progress
DOCUMENT TYPE: Document
COMMENT: 10/16/84

DOCUMENT NAME: [relations *all revision - not erased*]
DOCUMENT TYPE: Document
COMMENT:

DOCUMENT NAME: soviet
DOCUMENT TYPE: Document
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OPENING STATEMENT

(While the format does not call for opening statements, the following is proposed as the first comment you make regardless of what the question is.)

I will respond to your question in a moment. Indeed I and my opponent will respond to about a dozen questions tonight. But in order for the American people to be able to put these answers into a coherent framework, I think it is worthwhile to establish a foundation -- a context. What are these fundamentals?

First, let us recall that the people look to their President to do certain basic things in foreign affairs:

- o Maintain peace and a stable military balance at the lowest level possible.
- o Negotiate solutions to disagreements peacefully.
- o Maintain an open trading system and try to foster economic development in the third world.
- o Do what we can to spread democracy where countries want and need our help.

These goals are probably shared by my opponent. The issue is that we espouse two very different ways of achieving them.

My approach is based upon the principles of strength, realism and a willingness to negotiate differences. My opponent's record -- AT LEAST UP UNTIL TONIGHT -- reflects just the opposite.

In addition to tonight's remarks from both of us, there is quite an extensive record of performance by both of us to help as you make your decisions.

Four years ago, I told you exactly what I would do. I would seek peace through strength, with realism and a willingness to negotiate. That's exactly what I have done. At the time, many said I would be impulsive in the use of force -- a cowboy. It's ironic to me that in recent days it has been my opponent who has criticized me for not using force after the terrorist attack in Lebanon. It is he who is calling for a military quarantine of Nicaragua.

Now, four years later, you got what you asked for:

- o We are at peace.
- o Our economy is healthy and we are leading the world out of depression.
- o The endless chain of collapsing countries from Afghanistan to Nicaragua has stopped -- not one square inch of territory has been lost. Indeed, we even got one back -- Grenada.
- o Our relations with friends in Europe and Asia has never been better.
- o Democracy is on the move in election after election with American help.
- o Respect for the United States is at an all time high.

In short, you got what you asked for -- peace through strength, realism and a willingness to negotiate. Predictable, steady, firm leadership.

To be fair, it was also clear 4 years ago what you could expect from my opponent. He has been consistent throughout his years in public life. He has been steadfastly against strength, voting against every major system designed to keep the peace -- the MX, the B-1, the Trident. He supported a treaty which would have allowed the Soviets to build another 10,000 warheads -- and he calls it arms control.

Lately he has begun to change his mind on some of these things. That's the difference between us. With me, what you saw 4 years ago is what you see today and what you will see tomorrow. And that means more peace through strength, more prosperity, more respect -- more steady determined leadership.

Now let me get to your question.

The Four Basic Themes

There are four mutually reinforcing ways to keep the peace:

- Through strength, ~~and~~ steadiness, *and willingness to negotiate.*
- Through the help of friends and allies.
- Through crisis prevention.
- Through the promotion of democracy, so that an environment conducive to peace can endure.

Although we have strong rebuttal material for the charges Mr. Mondale will level (on U.S.-Soviet relations, Central America and the Middle East), the core achievements of the Reagan record can be found in these themes. They deserve to be emphasized and reemphasized and can serve as answers, or partial answers, to many of the questions you will receive.

Tone and self-confidence will often be as important as substance in throwing back the challenge. We're militarizing Central America? Hardly. Nicaragua's armed forces are larger than all the others combined. Our policy is democracy. No Camp Davids? We've spent four hard years preserving Camp David and making it work against forces who wanted to tear it down. Talks with the Soviet Union? Our record is clear. But it takes more than talk. Or do you forget, Mr. Mondale, that the Carter-Brezhnev "kiss" of Vienna was followed by Afghanistan. Arms control? Of course we're for it. But your agreement was so one-sided it had to be withdrawn. And previous "arms control" allowed nuclear arms to increase by 500 percent. Now there's something awfully wrong with Mr. Mondale's version of arms control. And so on.

In stressing these themes, we refer frequently to the mess you inherited. Mondale will no doubt reply that the issue is your record and the future. Don't be thrown off-track. I recommend that you take the initiative and respond to this along the following lines: "Let's be clear at the outset. I am running on my record and my goals for the future. I'm not running on the back of Mondale-Carter failures. But part of my record consists of turning around the failures they left me. And if Mr. Mondale thinks I'm not going to honestly describe where we started -- and how far we've come -- he's mistaken." | ?

Should we have a challenge item on Central America.

?



TAB I

THEMES

Peace Through Steadiness and Strength

I believe peace can best be assured by steadiness and strength. Four years ago both were in short supply. Our strategic systems were aging and defense spending was at the lowest point in forty years. Readiness was low and morale was worse. We had no leverage for arms control. After all, what incentive could the Soviets have to talk as long as we appeared to be disarming ourselves? Finally, our strategic posture was crumbling around the world.

We've turned it around. Not one inch of territory has been lost to Soviet aggression. Indeed, Grenada has been recovered and the freedom fighters of Afghanistan show inspiring strength. Modernization is working. Our airmen will soon have a replacement for the B-52, a plane older than the pilots who fly them. Enlistments are up. Drug addiction is down. And readiness is steadily improving. I don't have to draw the bottom line, because you've guessed it already: men and women are proud to serve their country again and morale is terrific.

Why would anyone want to go back? Mr. Mondale wants to start canceling things again. Cancel the B-1. Stop strategic modernization. He wants you to believe we're squandering money on nuclear forces, but doesn't tell you that over four-fifths of the defense budget goes for people and conventional defense. Mr. Mondale talks about the future. I've built for it. I stood my ground and insisted that our defenses be refurbished. And it is precisely these strengthened defenses that future Presidents can rely on to keep the peace. I would never leave for them the weakened forces that were left for me.

It's not enough to be strong; you have to be steady. Mr. Mondale has said I'm preoccupied by security issues. What he's really saying is: I've refused to ignore them. We believe that if you take the security of your friends seriously, they'll return the favor. And we also believe that if you help them work at improving their security -- day in and day out -- you can build confidence and keep the peace. Be steady. Be persistent.

Mr. Mondale, on the other hand, is always discovering security threats too late. He did it in Afghanistan. And now he says he might quarantine Nicaragua. At what risk? With how many ships? Doesn't he realize our whole policy of help is aimed at preventing precisely this kind of escalation? More recently, Mr. Mondale's running mate discovered the American people were questioning where she stood on defense. She sought to reassure them by saying she could push the nuclear button as quickly as anyone else. That's not what being President is about.

Peace Through Allies and Friends

The United States cannot keep the peace alone. We need our friends and our allies. But they need something from us, too: reliability and a willingness to help solve problems.

Four years ago our position in the world had crumbled. The Soviets were moving boldly in Ethiopia and Yemen, improving their ability to choke off vital waterways. Iran fell in the face of American weakness and, not surprisingly, Afghanistan fell shortly thereafter. These failures were compounded by foolish threats to jerk troops out of Korea and by blowing hot and cold toward important NATO decisions. Our economy was a mess and we were dragging others down with us. Gas lines were frequent. And inflation was increasing. Emboldened by success abroad, the Soviets and their friends decided to transform Nicaragua and Grenada into instruments for subversion in our own hemisphere. Stopping this drift was thought to be unfashionable by the Mondale-Carter team. They thought talk was the answer, and spent more time heaping abuse on our friends than in helping them. Around the world our friends had the jitters; and around the world a crucial political question was being raised: Does it pay to be a friend of the United States?

We've turned that around. When the Soviets tried to intimidate NATO on Pershing missiles and arms control, we stood our ground: Either talks occur or the Soviet monopoly will be ended. Today the alliance is in better shape than ever and we can look forward to talking from a position of strength. Likewise, when six East Caribbean countries called for help over Grenada, we were there. Instead of quarreling with our friends over nuclear power, we're working with them on the real problem -- stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable parts of the world. When Saudi Arabia asked for help to deter Iran, we sent it. Gas lines have ended. When Sudan asked for warning aircraft to hold off Qadhafi, they were dispatched. When Egypt needed minesweeping forces, they came on time.

Our economy is lifting the world out of depression. We're treating Israel the way we should have all along -- as a strategic ally. We didn't duck this one, like the past Administration. After KAL I went to Asia to ensure our friends we stood with them. Moreover, I didn't scare South Korea with talk of pullouts. I gave support. And today South Korea feels confident enough to talk to the North. We've also strengthened relations with China, but not at the expense of friends on Taiwan. If you travel to the region today you will hear one theme: "We're glad America is back as a partner in the Pacific." And indeed this is the same message you will hear around the world.

Peace Through Crisis Prevention

Coping with crises is important. But an even greater test of leadership is preventing them from happening at all. We've done this in case after case. Let me mention just four. As in the memorable Sherlock Holmes tale: These are the "dogs that don't bark." At least they don't bark in Mr. Mondale's campaign.

Gaslines. Americans no longer have to get up at 5:00 a.m. to wait in line for gas, despite the fact that the war between Iran and Iraq continues. This isn't just luck. It's because our presence has helped to keep the war from spilling over and affecting other suppliers. It's because we gave the Gulf states the tools to better defend themselves. It's because we rebuilt our petroleum reserve and encouraged others to do so. And it's because all of these actions combined to build confidence in the market.

Suez Mining. Recently, some radical force tried again. Knowing we had kept the Persian Gulf open, they tried to close the Red Sea -- other vital trade artery. Our friends in the region had enough confidence in us to ask for our help. We were there and our allies came with us. We got there fast. And got the job done without fanfare or incident.

Debt Crisis. Remember too -- a short while ago -- all those articles on the world's debt crisis. Remember as well those confident predictions that Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (with debt totalling over \$200 billion) would default and plunge the banking system into chaos. It hasn't happened. And, once again, it wasn't luck. At my request, the Secretary of the Treasury went to work with leaders of the world financial community to keep it from happening: not with bail-outs, but with sensible plans to promote greater financial stability. I didn't sit around studying the problem for two years. I saw the problem: and I fixed it.

Grenada. I acted in time to save our students on Grenada and to stop a brutal Marxist dictatorship from a beginning campaign of violence against the peaceful islands of the Caribbean. I made the decision to move myself, late at night when the request for help came. For two days I was criticized. But when it became clear what we prevented, when our students came home, I was praised. Mr. Mondale now says he thinks the decision was right. Though his running mate appears not to have made up her mind yet. Hindsight doesn't count for much when you're President, Mr. Mondale. You have to act in time. Before small problems turn into big ones.

Peace Through the Promotion and Defense of Democracy

We are working for peace around the world. In looking to the future we recognize that the growth of democracy is the surest foundation of all for a more peaceful world order. It's also the firmest guarantee of human rights. That's why I have worked hard to promote democracy, beginning with my speech in London and by holding an international conference on elections. And that's also why I have not hesitated to try to defend democracy when it is threatened. The Carter-Mondale administration believed in democracy, too; but they mistakenly thought it could be achieved by shouting at our friends, rather than helping them.

We've turned this approach around. And it's working. Our NATO ally, Turkey, has fought off terrorism and is restoring democratic rule. In our own hemisphere over 90 percent of the people are either living in democracies or in countries with a firm timetable toward democracy. Dictators are being replaced by popular leaders, as we are seeing in Grenada. Elections are being held in Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and other countries. In El Salvador, President Duarte has turned the tide and is taking courageous new steps to bring the rebels into the democratic process. Indeed, I can sum up our policy in the hemisphere in one word -- and that word is democracy.

Liberty's friends will fail, however, if we fail them. That's why we are helping others resist the crushing of free opposition in Nicaragua. And that's why we have worked so hard to be able to give assistance to those threatened by the Sandinistas, the PLO, the Cubans and the Soviets. The issue, Mr. Mondale, is not whether we're willing to send our good wishes, the issue is whether we care enough about democracy to help.

TAB II

FUTURE



The future should be an important question in any campaign. I have spent four years rebuilding American strength and reliability, creating prosperity, promoting democracy, and preventing crises. When I look to the future, I see more of the same. Am I supposed to be ashamed of this? Mr. Mondale says he's looking to the future too. But his vision of the future is largely a rerun of the past: tax the people, pull the string on our friends, stop our defense program and hope it will lead to arms control. Of course he dresses this up in the more sophisticated language of moratoria and dialogue, but the net result is the same. I'm not embarrassed to tell you my vision of the future will be built on the progress of the last four years. But he should be embarrassed to tell you his future is built on the failed concepts of four years ago.

Still, let me be precise in stating just some of the objectives I have:

- I want to see if we can't make the 80's the decade of democracy in this hemisphere. We're on our way, and I plan to offer new incentives for progress.
- I want to reduce nuclear weapons and move further away from doctrines of mutual annihilation. I want to use technology to increase conventional deterrence in NATO and to explore defenses against incoming missiles.
- I want to keep our own prosperity on track and see if we can't find some quiet ways to lift the economies of Europe further up with our own.
- We made some strides in curbing nuclear proliferation -- the first suppliers meeting in seven years -- and I want to build on this with new incentives for restraint and new penalties for safeguards violations.
- We've defused the world debt crisis, but in my second term I want to see if we can't find an enduring solution.
- I've convinced the other democracies that terrorism -- just like skyjacking -- cannot be solved until we work together. The foundation for that cooperation is in place. I want to break the back of the terrorist problem in my second term.
- We will continue to promote peace wherever it is threatened: in the Middle East, in South Africa, in the Gulf. Even if we cannot make peace overnight, we will try to prevent new hostilities.
- We've restored our alliances and friendships all over the world. But too many of our friends -- like Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan -- are still embroiled in disputes with one another. We would like to help stabilize partnerships around the world, by making a new and concentrated effort to solve some of the problems that keep our friends from working together.

TAB III

FOUR SPECIFIC CHALLENGES



Arms Control

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Mr. Mondale tells us we have had fifteen years of arms control before I came to office. Well, I appreciate the reminder. And let me remind him that in those fifteen years the world has witnessed a Soviet military buildup that is the largest in the history of the world -- including a more than 500 percent increase in missile warheads. Now something's wrong -- indeed, very wrong -- with this kind of arms control. The Democratic Senate of 1979 knew there was something wrong, too, because they refused to ratify the agreement the Carter-Mondale team brought to the table.

Getting an agreement is not the issue. We could probably sign an agreement tomorrow by giving the Soviets enough of what they want. The issue is getting a good agreement. And that means, among other things, a verifiable one. Mr. Mondale is so desperate for an agreement that he is ready to start freezing and agreeing to moratoria. But if he's talking about a mutual freeze -- and not just a unilateral one -- then how does he plan to verify it? For a fully verifiable mutual freeze is like asking for red-hot, solid ice -- you just can't get it. And even if you could, wouldn't it be better to work for real reductions? What about those one-sided moratoria as a sign of good will? John Kennedy tried that once, and admitted later he'd never make the same mistake again. Did President Carter's unilateral termination of the B-1 lead to Soviet reciprocation? Of course not. They pocketed the concession and went looking for another.

I want nothing more than to have as my legacy serious progress in nuclear arms control. Yes, I see the importance of this today more than ever. And that's part of the reason I've worked so hard to stop nuclear proliferation to unstable regimes, even as we waited for the Soviets to agree to talks. But the proposals I've put on the table have all been good ones. Mr. Mondale seems to think a proposal is no good unless the Soviets snap it right up. Mr. Mondale says my START proposal is unfair because it emphasizes Soviet heavy missiles. But these are the most destabilizing weapons in today's arsenal. Should I apologize for wanting an agreement to make things safer?

That gets us back to the core of the issue. I want arms control that makes us safer. That's the primary criterion by which I evaluate any arms control proposal, and -- by the way -- it's also my criterion for judging defense programs. That's why I want to explore new technologies that might one day give us some defense against incoming missiles -- missiles that might just as easily come from Libya or a terrorist group as from the Soviet Union. Mr. Mondale thinks it's wrong to even ask if we can defend ourselves. His answer is more of the same. Cosmetic agreements, and reliance on the threat to kill innocent civilians as a basis for strategy. That's a pretty gloomy future. Mr. Mondale's strategy won't end the arms race. It will only guarantee that the race remains one-sided -- with the Soviets racing ahead and us stumbling behind. I want agreements that are better. And I'm going to get them.

Relations with the Soviet Union

We seek stable relations with the Soviet Union based on reciprocity and restraint. We can succeed if we are steady and maintain bipartisan support. But we must learn from history and understand what works and what doesn't.

Mr. Mondale harps at talking. He thinks we should have talked more even though the Soviets have had three different leaders while I have been President. Communication is crucial, but there are times when talk doesn't help. Jimmy Carter met in Vienna for a famous summit with Brezhnev. The summit ended with a kiss. Six months later the Soviets invaded Afghanistan. And Carter-Mondale brought back an arms agreement their own Senate wouldn't approve. I've avoided the kiss. And I've avoided one-sided agreements -- and maybe that's why no new Afghanistans have occurred. The signals the Soviets get from me are clear. We're always ready to deal, but always on fair terms.

Yes, we want constructive relations. And I believe we are in the best position in decades to put U.S.-Soviet relations on a sound and enduring basis. This is because of our strength. And it is because the next Soviet leadership is certain to face a momentous choice between continued deprivation of its own people and a reordering of national priorities. We have no illusion we can change the Soviet system; that is their job. But we must understand what this process can mean for our own policy.

I draw from this two conclusions. First, we don't want to mislead the Soviets into believing they can avoid new priorities at home as a result of one-sided U.S. concessions and false detente. Where their policy leaves us no alternative, we are committed to compete. But, second, we won't turn away from small steps as long as they are forward ones -- not false ones. That is why we have focused on issues like confidence-building and the hot line even as the Soviet leadership underwent many changes. Only if we obey both rules can our policy succeed.

When Mr. Gromyko came to Washington, this was the message I gave him. If the Soviets are ready to solve problems, we will meet them halfway. We're looking for peace, not one-sided gains. And they had better be too.

Middle East

First, let's get rid of myths. We have a strategy for the Middle East. It's a strategy of strengthening moderates so they can resist extremists. That's why we've opposed Qadhafi. It's a strategy of deepening cooperation with Israel, so that Israel can have greater confidence and security. And it's a strategy of preventing drift toward a new war, while quietly building the conditions for future peace.

Peace in the Middle East cannot be imposed. Those who imply that it can are the same people who would deliver Israel to its enemies on a platter. There are times for reaching agreement, and times for doing the hard and thankless work of laying the foundation for future agreement. This is exactly what we have done.

I'm prepared to give President Carter credit for Camp David. But why does Mr. Mondale refuse to see all we have done to preserve that agreement against the forces that have tried to tear it down? It was my decision to put U.S. peace-keeping forces in the Sinai -- a decision greatly debated in the closing days of the Carter term -- that helped make Camp David stick.

I'm also tired of Mr. Mondale talking about the Middle East in a way that omits our crisis management in the Persian Gulf, our ending gas lines, our economic help for Israel, the growing recognition of Egypt, our support for moderates against Libya, our help for Sudan and our successful efforts to clear the Red Sea of mines. Let's not forget that the most important provision of Camp David is unwritten -- that it works only if the U.S. is active and engaged.

Lebanon and Terrorism

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Mr. Mondale has talked repeatedly about Beirut. But when people reflect on what he is saying I think they will quickly realize the point he thinks is his best, is readily his weakest.

We tried in Lebanon to do two things. First, to achieve a PLO pullout from Beirut without the need for an Israeli military attack that would have cost thousands of lives. We succeeded in that and our friends in the Middle East are safer because we did. Our second objective was to help the government of Lebanon strengthen itself so that it could establish control of its own country. That has been a disappointment.

But let's not miss the central point. Our country's strategy for promoting peace is based on helping others and on giving them the best possible chance. We can't impose peace. And we can't do for others what they are unable to do for themselves.

Our Marines went to Lebanon to give peace a chance -- and they did that. We understood the difficulties when we went in; and we understood when the circumstances demanded a change of course. Both actions required decisiveness. Yes, there truly are times when trying by itself counts for much. This was one such time. And our friends in the region know this.

Of course the repeated bombings are tragic. And of course in hindsight there is always more one wishes one could have done. Mr. Mondale apparently wants me to pillory people for not sitting in Washington second-guessing our officials in Beirut. Their lives were on the line. Does Mr. Mondale think they had some special incentive to downplay the threat? Our diplomats don't want to live in a bunker. And who can blame them? Terrorism, Mr. Mondale, is a global problem. In the last ~~30~~ months we've seen 37 attacks in 20 countries.

Solving the terrorist problem will require the same approach used in the Sixties to greatly reduce skyjacking. The threatened countries of the world have to band together and agree not to harbor terrorists and to help to track and apprehend them. This was my goal at the London Summit, and my message is taking hold.

Mr. Mondale suggests Lebanon means we weren't standing tall. But here again he misses the point. Standing tall doesn't mean guaranteed success. It means facing up to problems, rather than blaming them on the malaise of our own people; and it means accepting occasional setbacks as an inevitable price of trying to ensure a more stable world.

What about failure to retaliate?

Progress in Central America

Our policy in Central America is democracy. That's why we are supporting President Duarte, newly elected in El Salvador, and his reforms, and that's why we want democracy in Nicaragua. In fact, we want nothing more--and nothing less. There are troubles in the region. But we're trying to fix them. Mr. Mondale should realize this and stop assuming America is to blame.

I know all Americans shared my thrill this week at seeing President Duarte walk into the village of La Palma prepared to talk peace with guerrilla fighters who used to think they could shoot their way into the political process. Those guerrillas felt sure they would win before, because they thought the U.S. would sell its friends short. They were mistaken. President Duarte's walk couldn't have happened without our backing. And, likewise, the guerrillas wouldn't be talking if they thought we would run. You see Mr. Mondale, El Salvador is turning into a success. It's turning into another one of those issues like Grenada about which you will soon have to say: you were wrong.

Your charge that we have militarized the region is absurd. Three-fourths of our aid is economic. The fact is that Nicaragua has used Soviet and Cuban help to build the largest military machine in the history of Central America. They began this effort, as you well know, at a time when the Carter-Mondale Administration was announcing \$175 million in aid. Today, Nicaragua's armed forces are larger than those of all other Central American countries put together. Now that is militarizing! Nicaragua has 9,000 Cubans and we have 55 advisers in El Salvador.

You mentioned the mining. Well, the Sandinistas have betrayed international law and reneged on every promise they made to us and to their Latin neighbors. They attack their neighbors and now they hide behind law books to try to obscure this fact. We believe in law too and the most fundamental point of international law is the right of self defense. We cannot turn our backs on people trying to resist Sandinista oppression and to secure their freedom.

In El Salvador we are staying the course. Increasingly, the Congress of the United States--Democrat and Republican--supports this view. Over 90 percent of the funding I requested for next year has been approved. Mr. Mondale continues to criticize our effort, but I am proud of it. We are helping a young democracy, helping a man who was chosen in El Salvador's free election and who has already begun to take risks for peace. Human rights violations are in a steady and welcome decline. And, by the way, Vice President Bush gave himself far too little credit. His straight talk in El Salvador helped to turn this around. The communist guerrillas see their goals can't be achieved. We have given President Duarte the tools and he is doing the job.

Lou Cannon read the text, or part of the text, to Tom Simons in State. Simons says that he noted nothing about a summit meeting or about references to proposals in March and May. (He may not, however, have been read the full text.)

According to Simons, Cannon was exercised over the fact that Chernenko did not repeat a demand that U.S. missiles be withdrawn from Europe. However, Chernenko stated that the U.S. had "refused to remove the obstacles it had created," which has become standard of late.

Simons said that, in general, Chernenko replayed Gromyko's proposals at the UN and said that, if the President's position is not merely a tactical one, he (Chernenko) would not be found wanting.

During the verbal exchange with Doder, he listed the four steps needed in the following order:

(1) negotiations to prevent the militarization of space, including a moratorium from the date of the negotiations;

(2) nuclear freeze;

(3) ratification of TTBT and PNET

(4) non-first-use of nuclear weapons.

When he was asked if he was optimistic, he said that there are considerable possibilities for the improvement of relations and referred to the Soviet proposals. He added that "we see no serious businesslike steps" from the United States. He then went on to say that we "must translate the talks in Washington into practical steps."

Q -- What about Chernenko's statement that the U.S. has made no practical steps toward peace?

RCM HAS SEEN

A -- I must say that such a statement sounds strange coming from a country which walked away from nuclear arms talks, refuses to go back, and even is fighting a war with one of its neighbors. But that aside, there is no foundation whatever for such a statement. We have made a whole series of practical proposals.

Of course, if Mr. Chernenko is looking for unilateral concessions, we have made none. And we will make none.

Mondale
miss strategy of threatening annihilation
with that past
RCM HAS SEEN
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Speakes

1. Mr. President, most of what you say deals with the past. Is it not fair to ask where you intend to lead us in the years ahead? What is your agenda? What are your priorities. Is the world going to be better off four years from now than it is today?

Followup: Mr. President, what makes you think the Soviets will suddenly change their tune and be reasonable with you next year? What is the core of your policy toward the Soviet Union?

Mr. Mondale, What are your foreign policy priorities for the future?

Followup: Is it your contention that the U.S. is weaker politically, militarily and economically on the world scene that it was four years ago?

2. Mr. President, your proposal for a defensive shield to protect the U.S. against nuclear attack takes the arms race into the heavens, is -- according to Mr. Mondale -- going to cost a trillion dollars and will require abrogation of the ABM treaty. Why do you believe this Star Wars initiative adds to U.S. security?

Followup: Why do we need a vulnerable heavy missile (M-X) and an expensive bomber (B-1) that will be obsolete almost as soon as it's operational -- why not put our resources on MIDGETMAN and STEALTH?

Mr. Mondale, Why don't you want a defense against ballistic missiles?

Followup: Do you think you could live up the responsibilities you'd have as Commander in Chief if America came under nuclear attack; and how likely do you think the prospects of that are?

Freeze
10
Mags
Carr
119

contrast SS-3000

low behavior
*ships - not any protest * action*

Wirthlin

1. Mr. President, you have often said that peace is best achieved through maintaining strength and firmness. You have also said that your opponent takes a fundamentally different approach based upon weakness and vacillation. Could you tell us more about why your approach is more likely to enhance peace than Mr. Mondale's?

Followup: Mr. President, you have made the promotion of democracy a major theme of your administration. Isn't that pretty much "motherhood?" Is there really any difference between you and Mr. Mondale and what can you really do anyway toward such an intangible goal?

Comp w/ H levels
Mr. Mondale, why is your approach to national security more likely to enhance peace than Mr. Reagan's?

NY - by same
Followup: What's wrong with peace through strength; do you think that the President's policy allows him to describe his approach that way more than yours does?

stealth - pub
2. Mr. President, you have said that an important part of keeping the peace is having good relations with allies. Mr. Mondale would probably agree with that. What makes you think U.S. relations with allies are so good now or that they would be any different under Mr. Mondale. Didn't the Carter Administration have pretty good relations with allies?

Followup: Your trade policy has caused friction with our allies. What can you do to restore a balance in foreign trade, reduce allied concern about the strong dollar, and avoid protectionism?

Mr. Mondale, did the Carter Administration have relations with our allies that were as good as the Reagan Administration's?

Followup: In what areas of alliance relationship would you improve on the Reagan Administration, and how?

Kirkpatrick

Will ask questions about:

- o Middle East
- o Central America

*Contractors
 Countries most affected
 agree*

*Cuba - Every admin
 has trees*

*walk in woods - keep
 over channel*

*Carth asked
about
SALT II
treaty*

*Mondale
No way
to prevent
SALT II*

*count - in acc.
SALT II
keep
peace/law*

Sims

1. Mr. President, How good are our intelligence capabilities, given the reports of failure in the Middle East and elsewhere, and what priority do you give human or covert activities as opposed to technical collection of intelligence from satellites, etc.

Followup: Our intelligence seems to be good enough to show that the Soviets have violated the SALT II treaty, as well as other agreements. In view of that violation and of your position that SALT II is a fatally flawed agreement, why are you continuing to observe it?

counting rule

Mr. Mondale, How good are our intelligence capabilities, did your administration participate in dismantling human or covert activities, and what priorities would you give to those?

Followup: What sort of person would you name CIA Director, and do you find fault with the current Director?

2. Mr. President, In an interview within the past few day, Mr. Chernenko cited several areas where "practical steps" by the U.S. would lead to progress. You and Mr. Mondale seem to agree that one of Chernenko's proposal, for a "no first use of nuclear weapons" policy, is unwise. But you differ on the others. Tell us what prospects there are for some "practical steps" in a second Reagan term on the other areas he cited: an agreement to prevent militarization of outer space, a nuclear freeze, a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and the ratification of the existing threshold test ban treaty and peaceful nuclear explosion treaty. Please be specific about each of these.

Followup: In your first debate, you were asked what question you'd like to ask your opponent. As a variation of that can you tell us what you think is the most important thing wrong with your opponent's approach to national security?

Mr. Mondale, What practical steps are your prepared to take toward an agreement to prevent militarization of outer space; a nuclear freeze; a comprehensive nuclear test ban treaty, and the unratified threshold test ban treaty and peaceful nuclear explosion treaty?

Followup: Do you think the Soviets have a favorite in our election, and if so, who and why?

*I'm
not
sure
why
didn't
you
know
about
that
Leave
Covert
to
Soviet*

POTENTIAL ADDITIONAL QUESTIONS
(Time Permitting)

1. Mr. President: Did you ever say that missiles on submarines can be recalled if there has been a miscalculation, or that you were surprised to find that the Soviets have most of their nuclear forces in land based missiles, or any of those other things Mr. Mondale has been bringing up to show that you are out of touch? If not, why are there such reports?
2. Critics say your decision to deploy nuclear cruise missiles aboard submarines constitutes an escalation in the arms race, and the Soviets now say they will respond with similar deployments. Do you believe these deployments add to U.S. security?
3. Did the Defense Department recommend withdrawing the Marines from Lebanon before the barracks bombing, and if so, why didn't you act on that recommendation?
4. Do you believe your CIA has done everything possible to help determine whether or not there was a Bulgarian or Soviet connection to the assassination attempt on the Pope?
5. When would you hope to meet at the Summit with Mr. Chernenko, and would you initiate such a meeting if elected?
6. Is America better off now in national security than four years ago?
7. Do you agree with George Bush that Marcos is a real democrat?
8. Defend your South Africa policy, please.
9. Would you expect to increase defense spending in a second term, since you didn't get all you asked for the first four years?
10. Wouldn't a more constructive diplomatic approach with Grenada's Maurice Bishop have averted the situation that required you to take military action there?
11. You talk about a 600 ship Navy, but isn't it true that 3 of the ships currently in our Navy were part of Reagan defense budgets?

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

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To:

Henry Kissinger
Hyatt Regency
151 E. Wacker Drive
Chicago, Illinois 60601

Attention:
Howard Farkas for Henry Kissinger

Control No. 101705294

*Donna Pettit
Federal Express
691-1901*

1552

The Four Basic Themes

There are four mutually reinforcing ways to keep the peace:

- Through strength and steadiness.
- Through the help of friends and allies.
- Through crisis prevention.
- Through the promotion of democracy, so that an environment conducive to peace can endure.

Although we have strong rebuttal material for the charges Mr. Mondale will level (on U.S.-Soviet relations, Central America and the Middle East), the core achievements of the Reagan record can be found in these themes. They deserve to be emphasized and reemphasized and can serve as answers, or partial answers, to many of the questions you will receive.

Tone and self-confidence will often be as important as substance in throwing back the challenge. We're militarizing Central America? Hardly. Nicaragua's armed forces are larger than all the others combined. Our policy is democracy. No Camp Davids? We've spent four hard years preserving Camp David and making it work against forces who wanted to tear it down. Talks with the Soviet Union? Our record is clear. But it takes more than talk. Or do you forget, Mr. Mondale, that the Carter-Brezhnev "kiss" of Vienna was followed by Afghanistan. Arms control? Of course we're for it. But your agreement was so one-sided it had to be withdrawn. And previous "arms control" allowed nuclear arms to increase by 500 percent. Now there's something awfully wrong with Mr. Mondale's version of arms control. And so on.

In stressing these themes, we refer frequently to the mess you inherited. Mondale will no doubt reply that the issue is your record and the future. Don't be thrown off-track. I recommend that you take the initiative and respond to this along the following lines: "Let's be clear at the outset. I am running on my record and my goals for the future. I'm not running on the back of Mondale-Carter failures. But part of my record consists of turning around the failures they left me. And if Mr. Mondale thinks I'm not going to honestly describe where we started -- and how far we've come -- he's mistaken."

Peace Through Steadiness and Strength

The surest path to peace is steadiness and strength. FDR, Truman, Kennedy and Scoop Jackson all understood this. My opponent never has. His voting record on defense was more than bad. It placed him in the far-left wing of the Democratic party. If all his votes against modernizing our defense had been passed, America today would be impotent in the world. Four years ago when our defenses had fallen into terrible neglect, when defense spending reached the lowest point in forty years, readiness was low, and morale was worse, he was still resisting doing what needed to be done. We had no leverage for arms control, because the Soviets saw we were disarming ourselves. And we saw Communist takeovers in a new country every year between 1977 - 1980.

Well, we've turned all that around. Not one inch of territory has been lost to Soviet aggression. Grenada has been set free and the freedom fighters of Afghanistan show inspiring strength. Modernization is working. Our airmen will soon have a replacement for the B-52, a plane older than the pilots who fly them. Enlistments are up. Drug addiction is down. And readiness is steadily improving. America has regained strength, confidence and respect. Our young men and women are proud to serve their country again and they're the best we've ever had.

Why would we want to go back? Mr. Mondale would go right back to canceling things again. Cancel the B-1. Stop strategic modernization. His proposals reflect what Senator John Glenn has called "a fundamental lack of support for an adequate national defense." He wants you to believe we're squandering money on nuclear forces, but doesn't tell you that over four-fifths of the defense budget goes for people and conventional defense. Mr. Mondale talks about the future. I've built for it. I stood my ground and insisted that our defenses be strengthened. And it is these strengthened defenses that future Presidents can rely on to keep the peace. I would never leave for them the weakened forces that my opponent left for me.

It's not enough to be strong; you have to be steady. Mr. Mondale has said I'm preoccupied by security issues. What he's really saying is: I've refused to ignore them. We believe that if you take the security of your friends seriously, they'll return the favor. And we also believe that if you help them work at improving their security -- day in and day out -- you can build confidence and keep the peace. That is happening today; it wasn't happening four years ago.

My opponent, on the other hand, is always discovering security threats too late. He did it in Afghanistan. And now he says he might quarantine Nicaragua. At what risk? With how many ships? Our whole policy of help is aimed at preventing precisely this kind of escalation? More recently, Mr. Mondale's running mate discovered the American people were questioning where she stood on defense. She sought to reassure them by saying she could push the nuclear button as quickly as anyone else. That's not what being President is about.

Peace Through Allies and Friends

The United States cannot keep the peace alone. We need our friends and our allies. But they need something from us, too: reliability and a willingness to help solve problems.

Four years ago our position in the world had crumbled. The Soviets were moving in Ethiopia and Yemen, strengthening their ability to choke off vital waterways. Iran fell in the face of American weakness and, then Afghanistan fell. These failures were compounded by foolish threats to jerk troops out of Korea, by blowing hot and cold toward important NATO decisions. Our economy was a disaster and we were dragging others down with us. Gas lines, runaway inflation, 21½ percent interest rates and collapsing growth -- but my opponent was wringing his hands saying there was no solution. The Soviets and their friends decided to use Nicaragua and Grenada as staging areas for subversion in our own hemisphere. Stopping this drift was thought to be unfashionable by the Mondale-Carter team. They thought talk was the answer, and spent more time heaping abuse on our friends than in helping them. Around the world our friends had lost confidence in America, and more and more were asking: Does it pay to be a friend of the United States?

Well we've turned that around. When the Soviets tried to intimidate NATO on Pershing missiles and arms control, we stood our ground: Either talks occur or the Soviet monopoly will be ended. Today the alliance is in much better shape than if we'd followed my opponent's policy of unilateral concessions in return for vague hints of Soviet goodwill. And, now, we can look forward to talking from a position of strength. Likewise, when six East Caribbean countries called for help over Grenada, we were there. Instead of quarreling with our friends over nuclear power, we're working with them on the real problem -- stopping the spread of nuclear weapons to unstable parts of the world. When Saudi Arabia asked for help to deter Iran, we sent help. Gas lines have ended. When Sudan asked for warning aircraft to hold off Qadhafi, they were dispatched. When Egypt needed minesweeping forces, they came on time.

Our economy is leading the world out of recession. We're treating Israel the way we should have all along -- as a strategic ally. We didn't duck this one, like the past Administration. After KAL I went to Asia to ensure our friends we stood with them. Moreover, I didn't scare South Korea with talk of pullouts. I gave support. And today South Korea feels confident enough to talk to the North. We've also strengthened relations with China, but not at the expense of our friends on Taiwan. If you travel to the region today you will hear one theme: "We're glad America is back as a partner in the Pacific." And that's the same message you will hear around the world.

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Peace Through the Promotion and Defense of Democracy

We are working for peace around the world. In looking to the future we recognize that the growth of democracy is the surest foundation of all for a more peaceful world order. It's also the firmest guarantee of human rights. That's why I have worked hard to promote democracy, beginning with my speech in London and by holding an international conference on elections. And that's also why I have not hesitated to try to defend democracy when it is threatened. The Carter-Mondale administration said it supported democracy, too; but they mistakenly thought it could be achieved by shouting at our friends, rather than helping them.

We've turned this approach around. And it's working. Our NATO ally, Turkey, has fought off terrorism and is restoring democratic rule. In our own hemisphere over 90 percent of the people are either living in democracies or in countries with a firm timetable toward democracy. Dictators are being replaced by popular leaders, as we are seeing in Grenada. Elections are being held in Argentina, El Salvador, Honduras, Costa Rica and other countries. In El Salvador, President Duarte is turning the tide, taking courageous new steps to bring the rebels into the democratic process. And the reason he can is that we have provided him the support he needed to negotiate from strength. My opponent would not have held firm. I can sum up our policy in the hemisphere in one word -- and that word is democracy.

Liberty's friends will fail, however, if we fail them. That's why we are helping others resist the crushing of free opposition in Nicaragua. And that's why we have worked so hard to be able to give assistance to those threatened by the Sandinistas, the PLO, the Cubans and the Soviets. The issue, Mr. Mondale, is not whether we're willing to send our good wishes, the issue is whether we care enough about freedom and democracy to help.

Peace Through Crisis Prevention

Coping with crises is important. But an even greater test of leadership is preventing them from happening at all. We've done this in case after case. Let me mention just four. As in the memorable Sherlock Holmes tale: These are the "dogs that don't bark." At least they don't bark in Mr. Mondale's campaign.

Gaslines. Americans no longer have to get up at 5:00 a.m. to wait in line for gas, despite the fact that the war between Iran and Iraq continues. This isn't just luck. It's because our presence has helped to keep the war from spilling over and affecting other suppliers. It's because we gave the Gulf states the tools to better defend themselves. It's because we rebuilt our petroleum reserve and encouraged others to do so. And it's because all of these actions combined to build confidence in the market.

Suez Mining. Recently, some radical force tried again. Knowing we had kept the Persian Gulf open, they tried to close the Red Sea -- another vital trade artery. Our friends in the region had enough confidence in us to ask for our help. We were there and our allies came with us. We got there fast. And got the job done without fanfare or incident.

Debt Crisis. Remember too -- a short while ago -- all those articles on the world's debt crisis. Remember as well those confident predictions that Brazil, Argentina, and Venezuela (with debt totalling over \$200 billion) would default and plunge the banking system into chaos. It hasn't happened. And, once again, it wasn't luck. At my request, the Secretary of the Treasury went to work with leaders of the world financial community to keep it from happening: not with bail-outs, but with sensible plans to promote greater financial stability. I didn't sit around studying the problem for two years. I saw the problem: and we're fixing it.

Grenada. I acted in time to save our students on Grenada and to stop a brutal Marxist dictatorship from a beginning campaign of violence against the peaceful islands of the Caribbean. I made the decision to move myself, late at night when the request for help came. For two days I was criticized. But when it became clear what we prevented, when our students came home, I was praised. It took Mr. Mondale 18 days to decide that maybe our students had been in danger, and we were right to take action. Though his running mate appears not to have made up her mind yet. Hindsight doesn't count for much when you're President, Mr. Mondale. You have to act in time. Before small problems turn into big ones.

Foreign Policy and the Future

The future is the central question in any campaign. We have spent four years putting America back together rebuilding American strength and reliability, creating prosperity, promoting democracy, and preventing crises. Today, America is at peace and our economy is in one piece. When I look to the future, I see stronger American leadership for peace, freedom and prosperity. Mr. Mondale says he's looking to the future too. But his vision of the future is a rerun of this failed past: tax the people, pull the string on our friends, stop our defense program and hope it will lead to arms control. Of course he dresses this up with rhetoric about strength and commitment, but the net result is the same. I'm not embarrassed to tell you my vision of the future will be built on the progress of the last four years. But he should be embarrassed to try to convince you any future can be built on the failed concepts of four years ago.

Still, let me be precise in stating just some of the objectives I have:

- I want to see the 80's the decade of democracy in this hemisphere. We're on our way, and I plan to offer new incentives for progress.
- I want to reduce nuclear weapons and move further away from doctrines of mutual annihilation. I want to use technology to increase conventional deterrence in NATO and to explore defenses against incoming missiles.
- I want to see our economic expansion continue to build by lowering further the tax rates on our people. This will strengthen even more American economic leadership in the world, helping lift the economies of other nations.
- We made some strides in curbing nuclear proliferation -- the first suppliers meeting in seven years -- and I want to build on this with new incentives for restraint and new penalties for safeguards violations.
- We've defused the world debt crisis, but in my second term I want to see if we can't find an enduring solution.
- I've convinced the other democracies that terrorism -- just like skyjacking -- cannot be solved until we work together. The foundation for that cooperation is in place. I want to break the back of the terrorist problem in my second term.
- We will continue to promote peace wherever it is threatened: in the Middle East, in South Africa, in the Gulf. Even if we cannot make peace overnight, we will try to prevent new hostilities.
- We've restored our alliances and friendships all over the world. But too many of our friends -- like Greece and Turkey, India and Pakistan -- are still embroiled in disputes with one another. We would like to help stabilize partnerships around the world, by making a new and concentrated effort to solve some of the problems that keep our friends from working together.

Arms Control

Mr. Mondale tells us we have had fifteen years of arms control before I came to office. Well, I appreciate the reminder. And let me remind him that in those fifteen years the world has witnessed a Soviet military buildup that is the largest in the history of the world -- including a more than 500 percent increase in missile warheads. Now something's wrong -- indeed, very wrong -- with this kind of arms control. The Democratic Senate of 1979 knew there was something wrong, too, because they refused to ratify the agreement the Carter-Mondale team brought to the table.

Getting an agreement is not the issue. We could probably sign an agreement tomorrow by giving the Soviets enough of what they want. The issue is getting a good agreement. And that means, among other things, a verifiable one. Mr. Mondale is so desperate for an agreement that he is ready to start freezing and agreeing to moratoria. But when he talks about a mutual freeze -- and not just a unilateral one -- then how does he plan to verify it? Mr. Brzezinski, the National Security Advisor of his Administration has stated that this would be impossible. And even if you could, wouldn't it be better to work for real reductions? What about his unilateral moratoria as a sign of good will? John Kennedy tried that once, and admitted later he'd never make the same mistake again. Did President Carter's unilateral termination of the B-1 lead to Soviet reciprocity? Of course not. They pocketed the concession and went looking for another. But Mr. Mondale, unlike President Kennedy, has not learned from history.

I want nothing more than to have as my legacy serious progress in nuclear arms control. Yes, I see the importance of this today more than ever. And that's part of the reason I've worked so hard to stop nuclear proliferation to unstable regimes, even as we waited for the Soviets to agree to talks. But the proposals I've put on the table have all been good ones. Mr. Mondale seems to think a proposal is no good unless the Soviets snap it right up. When they don't, or walk out of negotiations he blames America first. Mr. Mondale says my START proposal is unfair because it emphasizes Soviet heavy missiles. But these are the most destabilizing weapons in today's arsenal. Should I apologize for wanting an agreement to make things safer?

That gets us back to the core of the issue. I want arms control that makes us safer. That's the primary criterion by which I evaluate any arms control proposal, and -- by the way -- it's also my criterion for judging defense programs. That's why I want to explore new technologies that might one day give us some defense against incoming missiles -- missiles that might just as easily come from Libya or a terrorist group as from the Soviet Union. Mr. Mondale thinks it's wrong to even ask if we can defend ourselves. His answer is more of the same. Cosmetic agreements, and naive reliance on the threat to kill innocent civilians as a basis for strategy. That's a pretty gloomy future. Mr. Mondale's strategy won't end the arms race. It will only guarantee that the race remains one-sided -- with the Soviets racing ahead and us stumbling behind. I want agreements that are better. And I'm going to get them.

Middle East

First, our strategy for the Middle East is one of strengthening moderates so they can resist extremists. That's why we've opposed Qadhafi. It's a strategy of deepening cooperation with Israel, so that Israel can have greater confidence and security. And it's a strategy of preventing drift toward a new war, while quietly building the conditions for future peace.

Peace in the Middle East cannot be imposed. Those who imply that it can are the same people who would deliver Israel to its enemies on a platter. There are times for reaching agreement, and times for doing the hard and thankless work of laying the foundation for future agreement. This is exactly what we have done.

I'm prepared to give President Carter credit for Camp David. But we have preserved that agreement against the forces that have tried to tear it down. It was my decision to put U.S. peace-keeping forces in the Sinai -- a decision greatly debated in the closing days of the Carter term -- that helped make Camp David stick.

I'm also tired of Mr. Mondale talking about the Middle East in a way that omits our crisis management in the Persian Gulf, our ending gas lines, our economic help for Israel, the growing recognition of Egypt, our support for moderates against Libya, our help for Sudan and our successful efforts to clear the Red Sea of mines. Let's not forget that the most important provision of Camp David is unwritten -- that it works only if the U.S. is active and engaged.

Lebanon and Terrorism

Mr. Mondale has talked repeatedly about Beirut. But when people reflect on what he is saying I think they will quickly realize the point he thinks is his best, is readily his weakest.

We tried in Lebanon to do two things. First, to achieve a PLO pullout from Beirut without the need for an Israeli military attack that would have cost thousands of lives. We succeeded in that and our friends in the Middle East are safer because we did. Our second objective was to help the government of Lebanon strengthen itself so that it could establish control of its own country. That has been a disappointment.

But let's not miss the central point. Our country's strategy for promoting peace is based on helping others and on giving them the best possible chance. We can't impose peace. And we can't do for others what they are unable to do for themselves.

Our Marines went to Lebanon just as the French, British and Italian forces did, to give peace a chance -- and all of us did that. We understood the difficulties when we went in; and we understood when the circumstances demanded a change of course. Both actions required decisiveness. Yes, there truly are times when trying by itself counts for much. This was one such time. And our friends in the region know this.

Of course the repeated bombings are tragic. And of course in hindsight there is always more one wishes one could have done. Mr. Mondale apparently wants me to pillory people for not sitting in Washington second-guessing our officials in Beirut. Their lives were on the line. Does Mr. Mondale think they had some special incentive to downplay the threat? Our diplomats don't want to live in a bunker. And who can blame them? Terrorism, Mr. Mondale, as we've seen repeatedly in Italy, Germany and more recently in England, is a global problem. Since the first of September there have been over 40 terrorist attacks by no less than 13 terrorist groups against the citizens and property of twenty nations.

Solving the terrorist problem will require the same approach used in the Sixties to greatly reduce skyjacking. The threatened countries of the world have to band together and agree not to harbor terrorists and to help to track and apprehend them. This was my goal at the London Summit, and my message is taking hold.

Mr. Mondale suggests Lebanon means we weren't standing tall. But here again he misses the point. Standing tall doesn't mean guaranteed success. It means facing up to problems, rather than blaming them on the malaise of our own people; and, yes it means accepting occasional setbacks as an inevitable price of trying to ensure a more stable world.

US-Soviet Relations

In coming to office in '81 it seemed to me that several historic events had occurred during the seventies which had to be taken into account in shaping our policies toward the Soviet Union.

- o First was the outcome of the Vietnam war which had affected the perspectives of allies and adversaries on our reliability.
- o Second was the substantial effect of the trends in the strategic military balance which headed in a direction of advantage to the Soviet Union.
- o Third was the effect that this change in the balance was having in the behavior of the Soviet Union--their greater willingness to take risks to expand their influence--from Afghanistan to Nicaragua.
- o Fourth was the decline in our economic strength at home with all it implied for our ability to muster the resources for an activist foreign policy and the demonstration effect it carried concerning our ability to solve problems generally.

The aggregate effect of these strategic changes was, in my judgment, to create a clear risk that we would be severely challenged by the Soviet Union through their miscalculation of our firmness and resolve. Accordingly I set to work to do a number of things--to restore our economic health; to restore the military foundation of deterrence and to restore the cohesion in our alliances. Just as important was the need to foreswear the tendency of the past four years toward making unilateral concessions which could only have been taken by the Soviets as a signal of continued decline and weakness. For at bottom we must accept that historically American leaders have only succeeded in fostering constructive behavior by the Soviets when they have bargained from strength.

I believe this approach has produced results.

- o Soviet expansionism has been checked--no additional countries have fallen.
- o No crises have occurred.
- o The allies have felt the support essential to resisting Soviet advances. Our relations in Europe and Asia have never been stronger.

o And the fact that we are behind them has given vulnerable friends the confidence to take risks to consolidate their interests.

- South Korea is talking to North Korea.
- President Duarte is able to talk to the insurgents.
- King Hussein has recognized Egypt.
- South Africa and Angola are moving toward accommodation.

All this through firm, steady leadership. The world has become a safer place. Do we really want to go back to the days of unilateral concession and of weakness. Surely not.

Lebanon and Terrorism

We were in Lebanon to do a number of important things. To prevent a war between Israel and her neighbors. We did that. Second, to get the PLO out of Beirut without the need for an Israeli military attack that would cost thousands of lives. We did that. Third, to prevent massive bloodshed of innocents. For fifteen months we did that; and who can say how many lives were saved? Finally, we were there to help the government of Lebanon strengthen itself. Here, we met with our greatest disappointment.

But let's not miss the central point. Our country's strategy for promoting peace is based on helping others and on giving them the best possible chance. We can't impose peace. And we can't do for others what they are unable to do for themselves. Our Marines went to Lebanon just as the French, British and Italian forces did, to give peace a chance. We understood the difficulties when we went in; and we understood when the circumstances demanded a change of course. Both actions required decisiveness.

Of course the repeated bombings are tragic. And of course in hindsight there is always more one wishes one could have done. Mr. Mondale apparently wants me to pillory people for not second-guessing our officials in Beirut. Their lives were on the line. Does Mr. Mondale think they had some special incentive to downplay the threat? Our diplomats don't want to live in a bunker. And who can blame them? Terrorism, Mr. Mondale, as we've seen repeatedly in Italy, Germany and more recently in England, is a global problem. Since the first of October there have been over 40 terrorist attacks by no less than 13 terrorist groups against the citizens and property of twenty nations.

Solving the terrorist problem will require the same approach used in the Sixties to greatly reduce skyjacking. The threatened countries of the world have to band together and agree not to harbor terrorists and to help to track and apprehend them. This was my goal at the London Summit, and my message is taking hold. I proposed a counter-terrorist legislative package and three of the most important items were recently approved by Congress.

Let me make one final point. Remember always the basis of America's interest in the Middle East. Forty years ago, half of the world's Jews were murdered. We resolved that must never happen again. This was in our mind when we came to help in Lebanon, and it remains in our mind as we try to curb the Qadhafis and the Khomeinis and other radical forces in the Middle East. The terrorists who attacked our Embassy said they did so because of our support for Israel. Well, that support will never change.

Mr. Mondale suggests Lebanon means we weren't standing tall. But here again he misses the point. Standing tall doesn't mean guaranteed success. It means facing up to problems, rather than blaming them on the malaise of our own people; and, yes it means accepting occasional setbacks as an inevitable price of trying to ensure a more stable world.

THEMES

- o We are more secure today than four years ago and more respected.
 Soviet or Soviet-backed takeovers succeeded in a new country each and every year between 1977 and 1980. This has been stopped since then. Freedom is on the march around the world, not on the run. Our deterrent strength has been restored. As President Kennedy said in his Inaugural Address: "We dare not tempt them with weakness. For only when our arms are sufficient beyond doubt, can we be certain beyond doubt that they would never be employed."

- o Getting an arms control agreement is simple, getting a good one is something else. If you want an agreement for agreement's sake, we could then just sign the Soviet proposals. But getting an arms control agreement for America's sake, one that reduces arms, takes time, patience and **bipartisan support -- not partisan attacks.** Arms control is too important to become a political football.

- o Chances for progress in U.S.-Soviet relations and arms control are much improved, if the Soviets are willing. But we need to stop negotiating with ourselves so much and start negotiating effectively with the Soviets.

- o Mr. Mondale is running more against the Carter/Mondale Administration on defense issues and its record of neglect of America's defenses than he is running against the Reagan Administration's restoration of American strength. On this, I'm right with him.

- o Mr. Mondale likes to blame America first, rather than to blame the real culprits.
 He seeks to blame the dedicated career American security officers rather than the vile terrorists who blow up American Marines on an international peacekeeping mission or American diplomats trying to bring about peace in the Middle East, for the ills of Lebanon; to blame the freely elected Salvador government rather than the Marxist Sandanistas in Nicaragua for the ills of Central America; and to blame the American arms control team rather than the Russians who walked away from the nuclear talks for the ills of arms control.

- o Defense and arms control are both key elements of national security policy. You can't have sound arms control without a sound defense. The Carter/Mondale Administration tried to have arms control without a strong defense. It didn't work. We got the worst of both, with America in decline and losing respect around the world.

ON THE DEFENSE

- o Why no arms control agreement? (1) The Soviets walked out. Should we beg for an agreement when they're not even willing to enter the room? (2) They walked out because NATO held firm on the INF decision made during Carter/Mondale Administration. (3) There is no problem having an arms control agreement any time; the easiest way is to sign Soviet's proposal. But, we don't want an agreement for agreement's sake, but an agreement for the country's sake, and for the world's sake -- one that really does reduce nuclear weapons. (4) There have been three Soviet leaders in three years; the unending leadership crisis has stagnated progress on the Soviet side.

- o Why not accept the "walk in the woods"? The Soviets, not us, turned it down flat. The Soviet Ambassador to INF has publicly stated that this proposal was, in his words, a "blind alley from the start." We wanted to keep this door open, but the Soviets slammed it shut.

- o Why the MX? (1) High-level bipartisan Commission, including several of your advisors, concluded that we need some MX for now, until we can move to more stabilizing forces. Maybe you ought to ask your own advisors about it. (2) Besides, five Presidents have supported the MX and you (Carter/Mondale) proposed 200 MXs, in a much more expensive basing mode. I've proposed 100 in a cheaper mode.

- o Why are you the first President since Hoover not to meet with his Soviet counterpart? (1) There have been three Soviet leaders -- Brezhnev, Andropov, and Chernenko -- and all three have been ailing during our Administration; (2) All the while, I've supported a summit where real progress can be made, not one for political show; (3) Talk about private sessions with Foreign Minister Gromyko.

- o Why the anti-satellite (ASAT) testing? (1) This program started during Carter/Mondale Administration, not during this Administration. But, I agree it's needed. Now, however, you are flip-flopping; (2) Soviets have had operational ASAT program since 1971. We're just now testing one to keep deterrence strong; (3) Besides we have told Soviets we are willing to discuss limits on space systems, without preconditions, as they themselves proposed. The Soviets couldn't take yes for an answer.

- o Why SDI and militarizing the heavens? We should try to rid ourselves of this horror of nuclear weapons hanging over the world. The public -- people of all ideological stripes -- agree on this. Frankly, I don't know if defenses will prove possible. But we would be awfully neglectful if we did not do research to see what we can do. Wouldn't it be nice if eventually humankind could live without this dread fear hanging over our heads?

- o Why the harsh rhetoric: "evil empire," etc. (1) Should we hide our revulsion and civilized standards when the Soviet Union, or any other state for that matter, invades its neighbor like Afghanistan, shoots down a civilian airliner, hides away and abuses its Nobel prize winners like A. Sakharov, and keeps Russian Jews from emigrating to Israel? (2) This does not mean we can't and shouldn't work with that same government on issues of some mutual interest, like reducing regional tensions and arms control.

- o Why did the Soviets walk out of arms negotiations under Reagan? (1) They did so because we and all of NATO refused to be intimidated and to walk away from the INF policy set during Carter/Mondale Administration; (2) I'd like to ask Mr. Mondale:
 - o Should this Administration have walked away from this NATO-wide decision on INF?
 - o Should we have accepted an agreement giving hundreds of these warheads to the Soviet side and zero on our side?
 - o Would the American people have accepted such a lop-sided deal?

- o Why the new emphasis on compliance? Why go public with all these reports of Soviet violations? It shows again that this Administration is not serious about arms control. (1) You cannot be serious about arms control without being serious about compliance. (2) The American public wants arms control but the American public wants to know whether the Soviets are meeting their commitments. Facing these facts strengthens the arms control process.

- o Is Reagan Administration sincere about arms control? (1) We put forward the most elaborate agenda on arms control ever, in START, INF, MBFR, CD, CDE; (2) To be serious about arms control is to have an agreement that really reduces nuclear weapons (START) or eliminates an entire class of nuclear weapons altogether (INF), not one that legitimizes an arms buildup by both sides (SALT II); (3) You (Carter/Mondale) broke off all arms negotiations when the Soviets invaded Afghanistan; I have not cut off talks despite the outrage we felt at the shooting down of the KAL airliner.

- o Is the President not involved in arms control? I've had _____ National Security Council meetings on nothing else but arms control, and every week there's material to go over.

- o Why did the Reagan Administration cut off nuclear testing negotiations and opposes a comprehensive test ban?
(1) Carter/Mondale Administration halted these negotiations after Afghanistan; we didn't. (2) Just last month at the United Nations, I invited the Soviets to measure our coming nuclear tests and we would do likewise on theirs, to get off the dime on this. As with so many aspects of arms control, we're waiting for the Soviets to respond positively. I don't believe the U.S. should grovel meanwhile, or lower our guard.

ANSWERS TO QUESTIONS

QUESTION: WHY DID YOU SO ALLOW SOVIET-AMERICAN RELATIONS TO WORSEN THAT WE HAVE FOR THE FIRST TIME HAD NO ARMS CONTROL AGREEMENTS CONCLUDED DURING AN ADMINISTRATION?

ANSWER: FIRST I HAD TO REBUILD AMERICAN DEFENSE AND END SOVIET NUCLEAR SUPERIORITY OVER THE TERRITORY OF OUR ALLIES. WE'VE NOW DONE BOTH, SO NOW I WILL NEGOTIATE WITH THE SOVIETS, THE OTHER SUPERPOWER, FROM OUR NEW POSITION OF STRENGTH AND FIRMNESS. WE ARE READY TO GO PART WAY, IF THE SOVIETS ARE, TO LOWER THE RISK OF NUCLEAR WAR BY ACCIDENT OR MISCALCULATION. WHEN MR GROMYKO AND I AGREED TO NEGOTIATE, WHEN I RECEIVED HIM AT THE WHITE HOUSE, BOTH OF US KNEW THAT NEITHER OF US WOULD SELL THE STORE. WE SHALL WORK FOR A FAIR, VERIFIABLE BARGAIN WHICH WILL CUT, NOT FREEZE, NUCLEAR WEAPONS AND THUS HELP ENSURE PEACE IN OUR TIMES.

QUESTION: WHY ARE YOU LETTING THE SITUATION IN CENTRAL AMERICA DRIFT TOWARD ~~AN~~ U.S. MILITARY INVOLVEMENT THERE IN AN OPENENDED GUERRILLA STRUGGLE?

ANSWER: WE ARE DOING JUST THE CONTRARY. BY SUPPORTING EL SALVADOR'S STATESMAN-PRESIDENT, DUARTE, WITH MILITARY AND ECONOMIC AID IN HIS STRUGGLE AGAINST BOTH THE DEATH SQUADS AND THE CUBAN-SPONSORED GUERRILLAS, WE HAVE HELPED HIM BEGIN NEGOTIATIONS WITH THE GUERRILLAS, ON A PLATFORM OF BALLOTS IN A FREE ELECTIONS, NOT BULLETS IN AN ENDLESS GUERRILLA STRUGGLE. AND WE AND ITS NEIGHBORS HAVE HELPED BRING NICARAGUA TO NEGOTIATE ABOUT WHAT THEY PROMISED: FREE ELECTIONS AND A FREE SOCIETY. THAT IS WHAT THE SANDINISTAS PROMISED THE NICARAGUAN PEOPLE, AND THAT IS WHAT, AND ALL ^{STIA} /WHAT, WE WANT.

QUESTION: HOW DO YOU EXPLAIN THAT ONCE AGAIN AMERICANS WERE KILLED IN THE ~~THE~~ BOMBING OF OUR EMBASSY IN BEIRUT?

ANSWER: IRANIAN-SPONSORED TERRORISM IS OUR ENEMY, JUST AS IT WAS THE ENEMY OF THE CARTER-MONDALE ADMINISTRATION WHEN OUR EMBASSY IN TEHRAN WAS TAKEN HOSTAGE. IT IS NOT, AND SHOULD NOT BE, A PARTISAN ISSUE. WE HAVE DONE MUCH, AND WE SHALL DO MORE, IN OUR STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM. WE SUPPORT ISRAEL MORE THAN THE CARTER-MONDALE ADMINISTRATION DID. WE SHALL, WITH THEM AND THE MODERATE ARAB STATES, CONTINUE OUR STRUGGLE AGAINST TERRORISM AND FOR PEACE AND SECURITY.

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QUESTIONS—J

QUESTION: WHY HAVE YOU GOTTEN INFO BED WITH SOUTH AFRICA'S ABHORRENT APARTHEID REGIME INSTEAD OF PUSHING THEM TOWARD REFORMS, AS DEMOCRATS ALWAYS HAVE?

ANSWER: NO RESPONSIBLE AMERICAN, REPUBLICAN OR DEMOCRAT, CONDONES, DEFENSES, OR WANTS TO HELP APARTHEID. IT IS REPUGNANT TO AMERICAN TRADITIONS, VALUES, AND BELIEFS. BUT WE THINK THAT OUR POLICY OF CONSTRUCTIVE ENGAGEMENT IN SOUTHERN AFRICA, WHICH AIMS TO GET ALL FOREIGN FORCES, ESPECIALLY SOVIET AND CUBAN, OUT OF THE REGION, AND WHICH NO LESS AIMS TO ENCOURAGE SOUTH AFRICA TO EXTEND REPRESENTATION TO ITS NON-WHITE POPULATIONS, IS MAKING PROGRESS, AND THE CARTER-MONDALE AFRICAN POLICY DID NOT. IT IS X EASY TO BLOW THE TRUMPETS AT THE WALLS OF THE SOUTH AFRICAN JERICHO, BUT SOUTH AFRICA IS A STRONG, INDEPENDENT STATE. WE MUST WORK WITH THEM, NOT SHOUT AT THEM, FOR REFORMS THERE.

QUESTION: WHY DO YOU NOT PROTECT THE AMERICAN WORKER AGAINST CHEAP, UNFAIR FOREIGN COMPETITION?

ANSWER: THE LAST FOUR YEARS HAVE SHOWN THAT AMERICA CAN, WANTS TO, AND IS COMPETING, FAIR AND SQUARE, IN THE WORLD, AND AMERICA IS WINNING THE COMPETITION. WE CANNOT STOP THE HITECH REVOLUTION, THE GREATEST REVOLUTION OF OUR TIMES, BUT WE CAN SWIM ON ITS TIDE TO TRIUMPH. AMERICANS ADAPT MORE EASILY, AND COMPETE MORE SUCCESSFULLY, THAN DO ANY OTHER PEOPLE. WE BELIEVE IN COMPETITION, WE WANT IT, AND WE WILL DO BETTER AT IT THAN ANYONE -ELSE. WHAT WE NEED FOR IT IS BETTER SKILLS THROUGH BETTER EDUCATION, ENCOURAGEMENT OF ENTREPRENEURIAL TALENT, AND FAITH IN OUR OWN HITECH FUTURE. WHAT WE DO NOT NEED IS BEMOANING AND TRYING TO STOP THIS REVOLUTION, FOR THAT WOULD GUARANTEE THAT WE ~~WOULD~~ WOULD LOSE THE KEY HITECH RACE. BUT AMERICANS ARE NOT LOSERS. WE CAN AND WILL WIN.