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**Collection:** Executive Secretariat, NSC: System File: Records  
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# WITHDRAWAL SHEET

## Ronald Reagan Library

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| DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE            | SUBJECT/TITLE  | DATE               | RESTRICTION   |
|----------------------------------|--|--------------------|---------------|
| 1. memo                          | from Alton Keel to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff re Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missles (2pp)             | 12/29/86           | P5, P1        |
| 2. memo                          | from Alton Keel to the President re Initial JCS report on Eliminating Ballistic Missles (2pp) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #1  | 12/18/86           | P1            |
| 3. note                          | re synopsis of JCS Initial Progress Report (2pp) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #2   | n.d.               | P1            |
| 4. note analysis<br>4q. analysis | re Strategic Forces (2pp) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #3<br>re Non Strategic Forces 1p. P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #4   | n.d.               | P1<br>P1      |
| <del>5. memo</del>               | <del>from Casper Weinberger to the President re Post Reykjavik Activities - NSDD 250 (1p) (U.S.) A 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #5</del>                                     | <del>12/5/86</del> | <del>P1</del> |
| 6. report                        | re Initial Progress Report (20pp)  | n.d.               | P1, P5        |
| 7. memo                          | from Linton Brooks and Bob Linhard to Alton Keel re Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missles (2pp) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #6                              | 12/16/86           | P1            |
| 8. memo                          | from Linton Brooks and Bob Linhard to Alton Keel re Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missles (2pp) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #7                              | 12/10/86           | P1            |
| 9. memo                          | from Alton Keel to the President re Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missles (2pp) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #8  | n.d.               | P1            |
| 10. memo                         | to the Secretary of Defense and the Chairman, Joint Chiefs of Staff re Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missles (2pp) (partial) P 3/21/00 NLSF96-103 #9 | n.d.               | P1            |

### RESTRICTION CODES

**Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]**

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

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The President has seen

12/19

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SYSTEM II  
90821

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

December 18, 1986

Mr. President,  
If this pencil, you  
may want to glance  
at this before your  
meeting with Chiefs.  
AL-

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALTON G. KEEL AL-

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles

Issue

To respond to the initial input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles.

Facts

In NSDD-250 you tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, to develop a plan which would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, should the Soviets prove willing to join us in such an agreement. The initial JCS report has been received; a final report will be provided by January 31, 1987. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss the subject at their planned December 19 meeting with you.

Discussion

The initial JCS report (Tab B) covers the assumptions and methodology to be used in the final report. The initial report makes no recommendations. A synopsis of the key points raised by the JCS is at Tab A.

Generally the JCS report is a sound approach to a complex issue. There are, however, several areas of possible concern:

-- [REDACTED] If the final analysis confirms such a risk, they should be tasked to provide recommendations on arms control measures which would result in a safer phasing of reductions.

-- The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of your guidance [REDACTED]  
[REDACTED] Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of

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NLS F96-103 #1

By smf, NARA, Date 3/21/00

merit, which, while important aides to judgment, must not replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to insure that the analysis does not overlook

- The Joint Chiefs of Staff note that, in a world without ballistic missiles, the guidance provided in NSDD-13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base should be reevaluated. Their specific recommendations should be requested.
- The JCS elected to use levels for fiscal guidance which they (and we) believe to be overly optimistic. Alternate, more realistic levels are available; their use should be directed.
- The preliminary JCS report indicates

We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; we must understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

Once you have reviewed the synopsis at Tab A and heard the JCS discussion on December 19, I will, in your name, provide a response to the JCS initial report, making the points above.

Recommendation

OK

No

\_\_\_\_\_ That you review the synopsis at Tab A and skim the report at Tab B.

\_\_\_\_\_ That after you meet with the JCS, you authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the comments noted above.

Attachments

- Tab A Key Points from Report
- Tab B Initial JCS Report

Copy to: Vice President  
Mr. Regan

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SYNOPSIS OF JCS INITIAL PROGRESS REPORT

Basic Planning Assumptions. The basic purpose of the study is to determine those U.S. military forces which will permit a safe transition to a world without U.S. or Soviet ballistic missiles. The study makes the following general assumptions:

- U.S. arms control proposals presently on the table are accepted.
- The currently projected real growth in DOD spending actually occurs. The JCS note that this is overly optimistic and will bias the study toward favorable results.
- Soviet war aims remain unchanged. To meet their strategic nuclear war aims the Soviets will retain ICBMs as long as possible. In addition, by 1996 the Soviets could have 450-500 bombers, up to 1750 sea-launched cruise missiles, and improved air defense.
- Soviet military strategy (which views domination of the Eurasian land mass as central) will not change. Eliminating ballistic missiles will stress Soviet theater air forces; there is no good substitute for Soviet short range ballistic missiles.
- The Soviet target base (i.e. the targets the United States must hold at risk for deterrence) will be roughly comparable to today, with the exception of ICBMs.

United States National Strategy to 1996 and Beyond. The study assumes the U.S. National Security Strategy will remain as set forth in NSDD-238. The initial report summarizes and restates the importance of deterrence and the need to maintain strong military forces. It makes the following assumptions and observations:




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NLS F96-103 # 2  
Amf NARA, Date 3/21/00



-- The period of transition to a ballistic missile-free world will require especial care.

Analytical Methodology. The analysis will use military judgement along with mathematical modeling. To comply with instructions in NSDD-250 to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, the capability of forces proposed in the study will be measured against the capability of SIOP 6C (today's strategic nuclear war plan). Specific analytical assumptions for strategic systems and non strategic nuclear forces are attached. A separate annex will deal with the contribution from highly compartmented programs such as stealth.

Completion. A baseline analysis will be submitted on 31 January. This will continue the current targeting policy set forth in NSDD-13 and will hold overall risk levels constant. Excursions and alternatives will be submitted subsequently if required.


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STRATEGIC FORCES

The baseline analysis of offensive strategic systems will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions and policies that follow:

-- Force exchanges will be conducted in accordance with current national policy stated in NSDD-13.



-- Notional capabilities will be used as provided by the Services for the analyses of highly compartmentalized programs to protect the programs security.

-- The overall defensive effectiveness will be analyzed parametrically by degrading probability to penetrate the defensive forces of each country.

-- A year-by-year (1987-1996) dynamic force-exchange analysis will be accomplished with several excursions and force mixtures to examine the damage expectancies achieved by fully generated and day-to-day alert forces.

-- Other factors to be examined are the incentives for a Soviet



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NLS F96-103\*3  
By smf, NARA, Date 3/21/02




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NON-STRATEGIC FORCES

The baseline analysis will be conducted in accordance with the assumptions and policies listed below. Because it was deemed unwise to base a plan on any allied capability that might logically disappear as a result of a bilateral agreement to eliminate offensive ballistic missiles, all assumptions are based on that premise.

- Both the United States and the Soviet Union commit to a yearly net capability drawdown rate. A linear drawdown rate will be used as a point of departure.
- U.S. nuclear warheads for all non-U.S. NATO nuclear capable ballistic missile weapon systems are considered for analysis until 1996.
- Soviet nuclear warheads for all NSWP nuclear capable ballistic missile weapon systems are considered for analysis until 1996.
- 
- For longer range INF (LRINF) missiles, it is assumed a separate LRINF treaty is in effect with the provision that LRINF missiles drawdown to a 100-weapon limit by 1991. These weapons are restricted to the United States and Soviet Asia for the United States and the Soviet Union, respectively. LRINF offensive ballistic missiles will be drawn to zero by 1996.
- For the shorter range INF (SRINF) missiles, the United States and the Soviet Union are limited to a level of approximately 130 weapons. The United States is allowed to convert PERSHING II to PERSHING 1b missiles, but must reduce them to zero by 1996. The Soviets must reduce SS-12/22 (SCALEBOARD) and SS-23 missiles to zero by 1996. Ground-launched cruise missiles with less than 925 km range could be deployed up to a limit of 130 SRINF weapons.
- Conventional and short-range nuclear forces (SNF) offensive ballistic missiles must also be drawn to zero by 1996. The U.S. Lance, Follow-On-Lance, and Army Tactical Missile System (ATACMS), and the Soviet SS-1 (SCUD), SS-21, and FROG, are all affected in the baseline case.
- The United States will continue to commit some nuclear-capable forces to the CINCS.

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NLS F96-103#4

By AMJ, NARA, Date 3/21/00

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THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE

SYSTEM II  
90821

WASHINGTON, THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA



5 DEC 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

SUBJECT: Post-Reykjavik Activities -- NSDD 250 (U)

(S) The attached JCS Initial Progress Report responds to NSDD-250 in which you tasked the JCS, under my direction, to develop a plan that would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996, should the Soviets be willing to join us in a verifiable agreement to that effect.

(S) The Joint Chiefs of Staff and I believe the analytical approach described in the attached report is sound and will serve to develop the best possible transition plan. The plan itself can be changed if there are improvements in current policy and strategy. We must also, as the plan suggests, be able to reduce the risk to the U.S. and our Allies from Soviet cheating.

(S) Also the attached material should prove useful in future considerations of a wide range of force development and arms control issues.

(U) At the least it is unclear whether the Soviet Union intends to accept the U.S. proposals. Therefore, our national security planning and military programming remain unaltered. With this in mind, the JCS will continue their work on the baseline.

*Sip.*

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BY amp, NARA, DATE 3/21/00

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Date December 29, 1986

Subject: JCS Report

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| THE SECRETARY OF TRANSPORTATION<br>400 7th Street S.W.  |      |      |      |                         |
| MANAGER, NATL COMMUNICATIONS<br>SYSTEM (NCS), Room 4125<br>8th & SO Courthouse Rd., Arlington, VA |      |      |      |                         |
| THE SECRETARY OF HHS<br>200 Independence Avenue, NW, Room 615F                                    |      |      |      |                         |
| THE SECRETARY OF HUD<br>451 7th Street SW, Room 10000   |      |      |      |                         |
| THE SECRETARY OF EDUCATION<br>400 Maryland Avenue, SW, Room 4181                                  |      |      |      |                         |

DATE, TIME & SIGN THIS RECEIPT & RETURN TO: BT MERCHANT, SITUATION ROOM, WHITE HOUSE

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

SYSTEM II  
90821  
Add-on

ACTION

December 16, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL



FROM: *[Signature]*  
LINTON BROOKS/BOB LINTHARD *[Signature]*

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles

**SIGNED**

We have reviewed the initial JCS report on eliminating ballistic missiles (Tab B). The report primarily covers the assumptions and methodology JCS will use and establishes a January 31 date for submission for the final product. We believe January 31 to be realistic and acceptable.

After our meeting with you, we have revised the package to include five issues:

- Whether our arms control position requires modification to take in to account the possibility of Soviet retention of hard-target kill ICBMs to the last possible minute.
- The JCS narrow interpretation of the guidance in NSDD-250  

- The need to reevaluate the guidance provided in NSDD-13 on the priority used to allocate weapons to the target base.
- The use of the FYDP as fiscal guidance.
- The contrast between the heavy dependence 

In view of both the intrinsic importance of the subject and the political importance of the President being seen as interested in the JCS recommendations, we believe a short synopsis of the initial report should be provided to the President. Tab I has been drafted for this purpose. Sending this to the President will also help prepare him for his December 19 meeting with the JCS, where we understand this report will be discussed. After that meeting we believe it would be appropriate for you to send a memorandum to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense making the points on SLCM and military judgment noted above. A suggested memorandum for this purpose is at Tab II; the memorandum to the President at Tab I seeks his approval for this course of action.

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NLS F96-103 #6

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By *[Signature]*, NARA, Date 3/21/00

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the initial JCS input and a synopsis thereof to the President for his review.

Approve (X) \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That after Presidential review, and unless the December 19 meeting reveals any reason to reconsider, you sign the memorandum at Tab II approving the JCS approach but noting the specific concerns discussed above.

Approve (R) \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

*bc* *FD* Bill Cookell, John Douglass and Mike Donley *MD* concur.

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
- Tab A Key Points from Report
- Tab B Initial JCS Report
- Tab II Memorandum to CJCS/Secretary of Defense

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SYSTEM II  
90821

NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL  
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20506

ACTION

December 10, 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR ALTON G. KEEL

FROM: LINTON BROOKS/BOB LINHARD *Lint BK*

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic Missiles

We have reviewed the initial JCS report on eliminating ballistic missiles (Tab B). The report primarily covers the assumptions and methodology JCS will use and establishes a January 31 date for submission for the final product. We believe January 31 to be realistic and acceptable.

The report raises three issues requiring your conscious addressal, two of which we believe should result in additional guidance. The issues are:

-- The JCS have used the approved FYDP as a guide to future budgets. The Chiefs note, correctly, that although this reflects the fiscal guidance of NSDD-250, it is extremely optimistic to believe such levels will survive the scrutiny of the budget process. The Chiefs believe that using these unrealistically high TOAs will significantly bias the analysis toward favorable results. While the Chiefs are almost certainly correct, we recommend no action be taken on this point. We should not, acting in the President's name, provide formal sanction to a view that the President's out year fiscal predictions are unrealistic. While fiscal considerations may bias the analysis in a favorable direction, that will only serve to counteract the unfavorable bias introduced by the preconceptions of many of the working level analysts that eliminating ballistic missiles is "too hard."

*New FYDP compares to OMS/DOD compares to June FY86*

-- The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of the guidance

[REDACTED]

Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of merit. Such numerical measures are important aides to judgment, but must not be allowed to replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to insure that the analysis does not overlook

[REDACTED]


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By *AMT* NARA, Date *3/21/00*

-- The preliminary JCS report indicates



We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; it will be important to understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

In view of both the intrinsic importance of the subject and the political importance of the President being seen as interested in the JCS recommendations, we believe a short synopsis of the initial report should be provided to the President. Tab I has been drafted for this purpose. Sending this to the President will also help prepare him for his December 19 meeting with the JCS, where we understand this report will be discussed. After that meeting we believe it would be appropriate for you to send a memorandum to the Chairman and the Secretary of Defense making the points on SLCM and military judgment noted above. A suggested memorandum for this purpose is at Tab II; the memorandum to the President at Tab I seeks his approval for this course of action.

Recommendation

That you sign the memorandum at Tab I forwarding the initial JCS input and a synopsis thereof to the President for his review.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

That after Presidential review, and unless the December 19 reveals any reason to reconsider, you sign the memorandum at Tab II approving the JCS approach but noting the importance of military judgment (as opposed to pure operations analysis) and of dealing with arms control aspects of the SLCM problem.

Approve \_\_\_\_\_ Disapprove \_\_\_\_\_

Attachments

- Tab I Memorandum to the President
  - Tab A Key Points from Report
  - Tab B Initial JCS Report
  - Tab II Memorandum to CJCS/Secretary of Defense
- Bill Cocke *bc*, John Douglass and Mike *WD* Daley concur.



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SYSTEM II  
90821

THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR THE PRESIDENT

FROM: ALTON G. KEEL

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles

Issue

To respond to the initial input from the Joint Chiefs of Staff on the transition to a world free of offensive ballistic missiles.

Facts


In NSDD-250 you tasked the Joint Chiefs of Staff, under the supervision of the Secretary of Defense, to develop a plan which would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballastic missiles by 1996, should the Soviets prove willing to join us in such an agreement. The initial JCS report has been received; a final report will be provided by January 31, 1987. In addition, the Joint Chiefs of Staff will discuss the subject at their planned December 19 meeting with you.

Discussion

The initial JCS report (Tab B) covers the assumptions and methodology to be used in the final report. The initial report makes no recommendations. A synopsis of the key points raised by the JCS is at Tab A.

Generally the JCS report is a sound approach to a complex issue. There are, however, two areas of possible concern:

-- The JCS are using a narrow interpretation of your guidance

  
Using this criteria will invariably drive the analysis in the direction of numerical measures of merit. While such numerical measures are important aides to judgment, they must not replace the considered military judgment of the JCS. In particular it will be important to insure that the analysis does not overlook

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
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-- The preliminary JCS report indicates



We are committed with the Soviets to seeking a solution to the problem of sea-launched cruise missiles; we must understand the relationship between such a solution and the military sufficiency of our strategic forces in a world without ballistic missiles.

Once you have reviewed the synopsis at Tab A and heard the JCS discussion on December 19, I will, in your name, provide a respond to the JCS initial report, making the two points above.

Recommendation

OK

No

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That you review the synopsis at Tab A and skim the report at Tab B.

\_\_\_\_\_

\_\_\_\_\_

That after you meet with the JCS, you authorize me to respond in your name, approving the initial report subject to the two comments noted above.

Attachments

Tab A      Key Points from Report

Tab B      Initial JCS Report

Copy to: Vice President  
Mr. Regan

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SYSTEM II  
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THE WHITE HOUSE  
WASHINGTON

MEMORANDUM FOR THE SECRETARY OF DEFENSE  
THE CHAIRMAN, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF

SUBJECT: Initial JCS Report on Eliminating Ballistic  
Missiles (U)

The President has reviewed the JCS initial progress report responding to NSDD-250 in which the President tasked the JCS, under the direction of the Secretary of Defense to develop a plan that would support, fully and safely, the negotiated elimination of offensive ballistic missiles by 1996. The assumptions and methodology set forth in the initial report are approved. *LSY*

The President appreciates both the thorough report and the valuable discussion of the subject during his most recent meeting with the Joint Chiefs of Staff. Based on that report and discussion he wishes to emphasize the following two points:

-- The initial report notes that the Joint Chiefs of Staff, in seeking to hold overall levels of risk generally constant, intend to measure the capability of forces proposed in the plan against those of SIOP Revision 6C. While such quantitative measures are immensely important, the President stresses that, in a world without ballistic missiles, the adequacy of deterrence may be far more of a subjective military judgment of the overall net effect of such a change, especially one in which many of the most critical factors may not be analytically quantifiable using today's tools. Thus he reemphasizes the great value he will place on the personal military judgment of the Joint Chiefs of Staff in preparing such a plan for ballistic missile free world.

-- The President notes that [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] The President agrees with the need for diversity in our strategic forces and with the

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By amf NARA, Date 3/21/00

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The January 31, 1987 date for submission of the baseline plan is approved. (U)

FOR THE PRESIDENT:

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