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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

MASS DESTRUCTION TERRORISM STUDY

DECLASSIFIED

Authority *FRUS, DOCS ON GLOBAL
ISSUES 1973-76, VOL E-3 #223*

BY LM NARA DATE 9/29/23

September 17, 1975

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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Secretary Kissinger, in his May 12 speech in St. Louis, warned that "as nuclear weapons proliferate, nuclear catastrophe looms more plausible -- whether through design or miscalculation, accident, theft or blackmail." The Secretary's statement is a reflection of the increasing attention which senior government officials and congressional committees have paid in recent years to the potential for nuclear, chemical, and biological mass destruction terrorism.

There can be debate over the likelihood of a specific threat, the proclivities of a given terrorist group, or the ability of intelligence services, police activities and physical safeguards to thwart the administration of lethal agents. But there should be little question about the United States Government's interest in acting to develop contingency mechanisms for dealing with such threats should they occur.

The purpose of this study is to review the issues that can arise in managing the overall governmental response should terrorists use, or threaten to use, any agent of mass destruction. In this report we have defined mass destruction as a societally-deemed unacceptable level of loss -- in lives, property, or crucial institutions or facilities -- the threat of which could be sufficient to place governments or private interests under considerable pressure to accede to terrorist demands.

Since 1969 the world has witnessed a marked increase in terrorist activity. Supplied, financed and sheltered by legitimate nations, especially in the Near East, terrorist groups have greatly expanded their operations and have adopted bold tactics. In addition, there are indications of significant terrorist technical and political sophistication, as well as signs of international cooperation among terrorist groups. The proliferation of nuclear materials, sophisticated weapon systems, and the general attainability of lethal chemical and biological agents complicate this already alarming domestic and international problem.

According to the Interdepartmental Committee on Internal Security, "Gaps in US defenses against the threat of clandestine introduction of nuclear weapons are so numerous that it would be impractical to enumerate them all...The Committee believes that there is a burgeoning threat with respect to terrorist nuclear

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activity, both foreign and domestic." Since 1973 there have been at least eight actual international threats or actions related to nuclear materials or facilities. Although fewer incidents involving the use of dangerous chemical or biological agents have been reported, several of those posed threats of extreme danger. For example, a laboratory technician attempting to board and hijack a plane in New York recently was arrested with two bottles of hydrogen cyanide gas in his possession. In January 1972 two college youths were charged with conspiracy to commit murder in a plot to poison Chicago's water supply with "typhoid and other deadly bacteria." In November 1973 West German authorities received a similar threat to introduce anthrax into their water supplies.

The development of radiological weapons (except for the construction of a nuclear explosive), the synthesis of nerve agents, and the culturing of small amounts of biologicals are straightforward matters that are discussed in the open literature. Moreover, dangerous agents such as cobalt-60, the insecticide TEPP and specimens of anthrax are commercially available. It is worth pointing out, however, that culturing such biologicals is a hazardous activity for the amateur, and making large quantities takes considerable skill and equipment. Nevertheless, there are thousands sufficiently trained to do so.

It has been argued that safeguards and physical security will prevent unauthorized access to dangerous nuclear materials. But the US possesses no monopoly over nuclear technology and may be unable to insure the use or effective application of safeguards and physical security.

It has also been pointed out that biological and chemical agents, though readily attainable, have remained largely unused and therefore do not present a likely terrorist weapon. Yet as late as 1967 the Egyptians were reported to have used toxic agents against the Yemenites. Documentation of many other incidents of the use of biological and chemical agents since World War I exists. There are also reports that the Baader-Meinhof Group has threatened to use mustard gas against West German cities. In many respects, chemical and biological agents represent the terrorist's easiest avenue into the mass destruction arena. In contrast to the nuclear field, the control and safeguard of chemical and biological agents has not been given adequate consideration. Indeed, it is far easier to culture anthrax than it is to steal or fabricate a nuclear device. A fission device can cause far less damage than some biologicals. A 5 kt nuclear device could potentially kill 50,000 people if detonated in a dense population center. By contrast, an aerosol anthrax attack could destroy a million.

Finally, it has been posited that use of mass destruction weaponry would be counterproductive to terrorists -- alienating popular opinion and provoking possibly successful countermeasures. But most common terrorist tactics are also capable of producing these counterproductive effects, and indeed, many are calculated to do so. Mass destruction weaponry may also prove highly functional to anarchistic groups bent on causing shockingly destructive incidents. Even established terrorist groups such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) and the Japanese Red Army (JRA) have demonstrated their willingness to cause widespread death and destruction.

But successful terrorist extortion does not require actual terrorist use of such weapons. The mere possession of such agents by terrorists would focus widespread publicity on their cause and provide them significant political leverage. Arguments for the implausibility of mass destruction terrorism should therefore be reexamined. Although such threats may not be immediately pending, a false sense of security should be avoided.

Should we be confronted with an apparently serious threat of mass destruction, crisis managers will have to assess its credibility and understand the costs implicit in taking particular countermeasures. In essence, credibility assessment is a complex matter requiring intelligence, motivational, and technical information.

For example, should a known, politically motivated terrorist group threaten us with mass destruction unless we accede to their demands, the credibility question might focus primarily upon their resolve to carry out their threat rather than on attempts to verify the existence of their weapon. Such groups may have the technical capability to manufacture an agent of mass destruction but might lack the resolve to use it for fear of alienating popular support or provoking successful government retaliation. By contrast, if less well-catalogued terrorists were to make comparably difficult demands of us, we would not lose our interest in analyzing their motivation, but we might be most concerned about determining their technical ability to carry out the threat. But determining terrorist motivation and technical competence is only one of many problems; we must also evaluate the potential cost of our possible responses in each situation.

The government response to mass destruction threats can indeed be costly in a variety of ways: there may be monetary costs, political costs, risks to human life because of panic

created by a federal action, costs in terms of encroachment on civil liberties, etc. In every case, the potential costs of threat assessment or other actions to avert the execution of a mass destruction threat must be weighed against the costs of permitting the extortionists to obtain their objectives. It would be useful to set up a taxonomy based upon credibility and cost indicators. From this, we could derive some crude policy guidelines, a DEFCON system for terrorism.

Unfortunately, we cannot offer easy answers to the management questions implicit in confrontations with mass destruction extortionists. But we can take organizational and planning steps to meet such eventualities with improved efficiency and confidence.

Many federal agencies have developed expertise in the crisis management field. The FBI has been in the process of developing specific crisis management capabilities to handle or support local jurisdictions in the field of combating terrorism. ERDA's Emergency Action Team (EACT) operates on a 24-hour basis and is capable of mustering specialized personnel and equipment to assist in evaluating technical aspects of a nuclear or radiological threat. The DOD could provide material, technical and personnel assistance in the event of a nuclear, chemical or radiological incident in the US. The actual degree and nature of DOD involvement would depend upon the type of threat or incident. But should a DOD nuclear weapon be involved the Department's role would be sizable. Moreover, as these and other agencies have perceived the need to join forces in order to deal with such incidents, useful alliances have emerged. In the event of a domestic nuclear incident, guidelines for interagency, state and federal roles are currently being delineated by the Federal Preparedness Agency of GSA. Unfortunately, the same levels of experience and forethought have not been applied to the problems of chemical or biological threats. Nor has adequate attention been given to the problem of the vulnerability of certain high-leverage targets, such as vital communications facilities.

While certain limited capabilities presently exist within the federal government to deal with threats of mass destruction, important gaps in our management capacity remain. In particular, there is no central authority specifically charged with devising and executing plans for the government response to all terrorist mass destruction threats.

Because it may be difficult to coordinate the actions of federal agencies, state governments and local jurisdictions, a high-level crisis management structure to facilitate the government response is vital. In addition, many important decisions such as the payment of ransom or political concessions may have to be considered by the President. A high-level management body should act as a filter to prevent frivolous matters from reaching him and to assure that vital questions reach him immediately. Threat information, verification assessments, estimations of probable effects and alternative negotiating options should be rapidly assembled with the best expertise available. Because each threat situation would be likely to require a somewhat different array of experts, their rapid identification and immediate involvement is an essential requirement. A centralized crisis management office could serve as a point of contact and focus of activity for involved experts and resources throughout the US and abroad.

Even with vital resources assembled, communications established and roles and responsibilities defined, facing a mass destruction terrorism threat may still call for further modification in present US Government operating procedure.

New and innovative approaches to intelligence collection may be vital. In the event of a mass destruction threat the intelligence community would be called upon to perform the critical task of supplying background on the terrorists, locating them and their weapons, and assessing their capabilities and intentions. It may not suffice merely to expand and refine our own intelligence operations; we may have to look to informal arrangements with foreign intelligence agencies to meet our needs.

Thus far federal policy has been not to pay ransom, release prisoners, or otherwise accede to terrorist blackmail. However, this policy was developed without consideration of mass destruction threats. Such a strategy may prove viable when the lives of an ambassador, a handful of government personnel, or even a planeload of people are balanced against the larger risks of acceding to terrorist demands. But a credible mass destruction threat is of a vastly different order of magnitude from previous terrorist activities. Having assessed a threat to be credible, and having found ourselves unsuccessful in locating the extortionists and their weapons, a flexible bargaining policy toward terrorist demands may be our only means to prevent immediate catastrophe. As distasteful as

the proposition of acceding to terrorist demands appears, under certain conditions amendments to present policy in case of mass destruction threats may supply a vital operational alternative to crisis managers.

Government responses to threats of mass destruction terrorism could give rise to a variety of complex policy and legal issues. Programs for rewards for information or the payment of ransom must be considered. The responsibility of the federal government for local damages committed by terrorists as a result of federal action or inaction and the possibility of indemnification proceedings is another area for review. During the course of an emergency it may become necessary to conduct wide searches and even to deploy military resources in an attempt to limit the damage caused by mass destruction extortionists.

After a threat is verified as authentic, crisis managers will be concerned with formulating steps to meet the emergency. At some point in this process a critical psycho-political assessment of the threatening group's motivation, intentions and capabilities must be made, either intuitively by decision-makers on the spot, or with the assistance of prepared behavioral experts. The behavioral sciences have recently begun to make a significant contribution to the operational and theoretical aspects of dealing with violent behavior in individuals and groups, including terrorists. Although the state of the art may preclude absolute answers to many management problems, local police departments and the FBI have found the behavioral approach very useful.

Based upon these findings, a number of specific steps toward attaining a capability to respond to threats of mass destruction should be considered. These consist of clearly defined, special studies and arrangements within agencies -- possibly with NSC coordination. However, public knowledge of government studies or concerns about this topic could provoke undue alarm, stimulate hoaxes or possibly prompt real terrorist activity.

1. Certain biological agents appear to pose as great a threat to human life as thermonuclear weapons. They appear to be at least as effective and are easily available to terrorists. Chemical agents, while less potent, could also pose a serious threat. A more thorough study of potential hazards and needed response capabilities is indicated. The possibility of stricter control methods to restrict availability of dangerous biological and chemical materials and make them more easily traceable

should be considered. The need to broaden emergency response capability to cover chemical and biological hazards should be studied.

2. The establishment of a working group to advise the President and represent participating agencies during a credible mass destruction threat should be considered. This function might be fulfilled through a variety of mechanisms. Establishing it under the existing NSC-Under Secretaries Committee is one possibility. Formation of an NSC-level intergovernmental committee, such as the Washington Special Action Group (WSAG), or a bolstered Cabinet Committee to Combat Terrorism Working Group (CCCT/WG), to perform operational crisis management tasks, should be considered. In light of our need to be adequately prepared to cope with the problem of mass destruction terrorism, an analysis under NSC should be conducted to determine what course of action should be pursued to improve our current capabilities.

3. It would be necessary for whatever government entity is chosen to identify and locate vital personnel and resources quickly and discreetly. In this regard, working relationships with groups such as the FBI, ERDA, DOD and CCCT/WG, as well as with other appropriate agencies, should be developed. Readily available lists of experts with their locations, "on line" computerization, and sophisticated communications systems are also essential.

4. Sharing pertinent intelligence information with foreign sources (perhaps even including traditional opponents) as well as increased efforts to develop such information by US intelligence services may be a valuable initiative.

5. The problem of verifying the credibility of various threats calls for particular examination and planning. Questions of weapons design, availability of materials and personnel, logistics and delivery capability all bear directly on credibility. In this connection it may be useful to study new intelligence indicators and to generate new intelligence requirements. Covert assessment of the potential for diversion of fissionable materials from foreign reactors is one relevant task.

6. The ongoing efforts by ERDA, DOD and other agencies to develop improved sensing equipment for nuclear materials and to improve the physical security of nuclear weapons and materials are obviously relevant to our efforts in this field,

but other techniques especially suited to the terrorism problem may prove potentially useful. A careful assessment should be made of the use of advanced technology for nuclear weapons and material detection.

7. Bargaining with terrorists appears to pose especially sensitive problems. A more detailed policy inquiry into the problems of bargaining with terrorists should be made, recognizing the need for flexibility and ambiguity.

8. Existing law and policy considerations regarding emergency powers of the federal government should be reviewed with the aim of ensuring that the federal government can, when necessary, intervene and control a crisis situation involving threats of mass destruction. Work is under way in this area; however, further efforts may be appropriate to define -- even in a general way -- the characteristics of a potential threat which will distinguish responsibilities among federal, state, and local jurisdictions.

9. There is a substantial need for additional research in the behavioral assessment of terrorist threats. This research and the inclusion of properly prepared behavioral advisers on the crisis management team might also bolster the effectiveness of a government response to threats of mass destruction.

10. Efforts toward reaching international agreements providing for cooperation in meeting any threat should be intensified. For this purpose, informal bilateral agreements may be more feasible and more flexible than multilateral conventions. It is desirable to leave some room for political maneuvering in such agreements so as to allow flexibility when bargaining with terrorists. The Department of State should lead an interagency study to determine what initiatives can be taken in the international arena.

11. Development of terrorism analogues to political-military games could be useful in establishing guidelines for policy decisions, negotiation strategies, and resource planning. The Study Analysis and Gaming Agency (SAGA) has enormous experience in developing such gaming exercises and should be considered a valuable resource.

International Terrorism

November 1984

Background: Terrorism is the use or threatened use of violence for political purposes to create a state of fear that will aid in extorting, coercing, intimidating, or otherwise causing individuals and groups to alter their behavior. It becomes international in scope when the victims, perpetrators, and location of a terrorist incident or the means used to carry out the act involve more than one country.

Terrorism is a serious threat to the US and the world. The 5,175 terrorist incidents recorded worldwide from 1973 to 1983 left 3,689 people dead and 7,791 wounded. Forty percent of some 500 attacks in 1983 were directed at the US; 271 Americans were killed, 116 wounded--more casualties than in all of the preceding 15 years. The US is a prime target because our official and commercial presence overseas is extensive; our citizens and facilities are accessible to the public; our policies are directly opposed to the interests of many terrorist groups; we frequently support governments that terrorists are trying to destabilize; and the terrorists wish to challenge democratic values whenever possible.

The US Government's anti-terrorism program seeks to prevent terrorist incidents by preparedness and deterrence and to determine the appropriate course of action should such incidents occur. The US Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism is the executive branch organization that coordinates policy and programs. It is chaired by the Director of the State Department's Office for Counter-Terrorism and Emergency Planning and consists of representatives of the Departments of Justice, Defense, Energy, Treasury, and Transportation; the Central Intelligence Agency; the National Security Council; and the Office of the Vice President.

Increase in terrorism: In 1983, 37.2% of all incidents occurred in Western Europe, 25.6% in Latin America, 22.8% in the Middle East and North Africa, 7.8% in the Asia-Pacific region, 3.4% in Africa, 2.4% in North America, and only 0.8% in Eastern Europe and the Soviet Union. Diplomatic and government personnel of the US and other countries accounted for 48% of all terrorist victims in 1983; military personnel accounted for 18.4%, and business executives for 14.0%. The remainder were private citizens. Of the methods used in terrorist incidents worldwide, bombings accounted for 49.5%, armed attacks 15.2%, arson 14.3%, kidnappings 7.7%, barricades with hostages 2.4%, barricades without hostages 1.7%, and hijackings 1.7%. The methods used in the remainder of the incidents did not fall into any of these categories.

International terrorism is becoming increasingly frequent, indiscriminate, and state-supported. Countries that repeatedly support international terrorism are Iran, Syria, Libya, Cuba, and the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen. The Soviet Union provides heavy financial and material support to countries that sponsor international terrorism.

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State-supported terrorism has risen alarmingly--approximately 70 attacks in 1983. The support includes logistical aid, provision of weapons and training, granting of safe-havens, misuse of diplomatic pouches, and--in some cases--actual targeting of and supplying intelligence information about selected victims. The bombing perpetrated by North Korea that killed four South Korean cabinet ministers in Rangoon in 1983 is an example of state-supported terrorism.

US efforts to combat terrorism: The increase in international terrorism has led to an increase in US efforts to combat it. The President has signed the 1984 Act to Combat International Terrorism that authorizes a total fiscal year 1985 expenditure of \$356 million for enhanced security at high-threat US diplomatic posts abroad. Legislation recently approved by the Congress will also:

- Implement our obligations under the Montreal Convention (aircraft sabotage) and the UN Convention Against the Taking of Hostages; and
- Authorize payment of rewards for information leading to locating hostages and helping to resolve terrorist incidents.

We have established a US Anti-Terrorism Assistance Program to help friendly governments counter terrorism by training foreign delegations at US facilities in anti-terrorist policy, crisis management, hostage and barricade negotiations, airport security measures, and bomb disposal methods. Congress appropriated \$2.5 million for this program in 1983.

We have improved our intelligence-gathering and early warning capabilities.

We have increased coordination with our allies to implement international anti-terrorist agreements and assure the protection of diplomats and dignitaries in our respective countries. At the June 1984 London economic summit meeting, the leaders of France, the UK, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, Japan, Canada, and the US addressed problems created by abuse of diplomatic privileges and state support of terrorist activity. They released a Declaration on International Terrorism resolving to promote action through international organizations and within the international community as a whole to prevent and punish terrorist acts.

US policy: The US will not make concessions to terrorists. We will not pay ransom or release prisoners. We support other governments that take a similar stance. Governments, corporations, and individuals have a common interest in adhering to this policy because concessions breed further terrorist incidents. Should official US personnel be taken hostage in an incident condoned by a foreign government, we will take prompt and effective action through appropriate political or economic means.


Bulletin
Reprint

Combatting Terrorism

12
date? 1982...?
rec'd 14 Nov
from NSC



United States Department of State
Bureau of Public Affairs
Washington, D.C.





The Iraqi Embassy in Beirut was destroyed by a car bomb on December 15, 1981; 20 people were killed and another 100 were injured. (©Sygma)



Combatting Terrorism: American Policy and Organization

by Ambassador Robert M. Sayre

*Address before the
Third International Civil Aviation Security Conference
Washington, D.C., July 21, 1982*

Political violence and terrorism are not new. They have been with us since the dawn of recorded history. What is new is the speed with which people and ideas move. You can be in Washington tonight and Paris tomorrow morning. You can sit at your television set and have a front-row seat at the world soccer matches in Madrid. An assassin can attempt to kill the President of the United States on the streets in Washington or the Pope on the streets in Rome, and the television networks will bring the event to you simultaneously and in living color. Political terrorism used to be a national event that seldom had ramifications beyond national borders. Now any attack against any prominent figure or against a commercial aircraft or against an embassy is an international media event. Our ability to travel and communicate rapidly has made it so. Terrorism is international, and, as many say, it is theater.

I would like to be able to tell you that we are doing as well on controlling political violence generally as you are doing in controlling terrorist attacks against commercial aviation. But you are, in a sense, fortunate because you can put people and baggage through a single checkpoint. You can, of course, still be and are the victim of human er-

rors and poor procedures. You have done a remarkable job, at considerable expense, to maintain your safety record.

Unfortunately this is not the case for political violence and terrorism generally. We have no way of running all terrorists through a checkpoint or x-raying their baggage. Their methods of attack are myriad, they are clandestine, and they are elusive. They frequently change the names of their organizations and their passports, recruit new faces, send old faces off to different parts of the world, and generally try to confound and confuse the police and security organizations that governments create as defensive mechanisms.

The number of actual terrorist acts increases daily. Every day that passes brings to my desk in the Department of State a new batch of reports about planned terrorist attacks or attacks actually carried out. Diplomats are once again the principal target; and American diplomats are particularly high on the list of victims or intended victims. Some 15% of the operating budget of the Department of State goes to pay for protection of our personnel and facilities overseas, and the cost is rising. So while I would like to tell you that the situation



is getting better, I must honestly and candidly tell you that it is getting worse. What are we doing about it?

In truth our problems are not that much different from yours. We have a worldwide operating network and so do the airlines. The difference may be that we are in almost every country, sometimes in several places, whereas your networks are not as extensive. That is a difference in degree and not substance.

We must have an international consensus, and cooperation on security threats to our operation, and so must you.

We must have an understanding with individual governments on how terrorist attacks against us will be handled and so must you. There must be an understanding within our organizations from the President to the security man in the field on how we will react, both in a policy and operational sense, and I am certain that is the case with the airlines.

When a terrorist incident occurs outside the United States, we look to the host government to exercise its responsibility to protect persons within its jurisdiction and to enforce the law in its territory. During such incidents, we consult closely with the responsible government, and we offer all practical support to the government concerned.

When a terrorist incident against us is sponsored or directed by a nation, as an instrument of its own policy in an attempt to intimidate or coerce us, we will take all appropriate measures—be they diplomatic, political, economic, or military—to resolve the incident and to resist this form of international blackmail. So the United States has a clearly stated policy.

But a policy is no better than the determination or will to carry it out and the organization established to do so. The problem is international, so the first question is, how effective and determined is the international community?

International Cooperation

International organizations, including the United Nations, have sponsored a number of multilateral conventions which deal with particular terrorist crimes to bring them within the criminal law. The United States has strongly supported these efforts over the years.

The most widely accepted conventions are The Hague convention against

Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism

American Policy

The first action required of the Reagan Administration was a clear and unequivocal statement of policy.

At the very beginning of this Administration, President Reagan, in welcoming the Tehran hostages home, articulated U.S. policy on terrorism. He said: "Let terrorists be aware that when the rules of international behavior are violated, our policy will be one of swift and effective retribution."

We have publicly and repeatedly noted that the United States, when faced with an act of terrorism at home or abroad, will take all possible lawful measures to resolve the incident and to bring to justice the perpetrators of the crime. This policy is based upon the conviction that to allow terrorists to succeed only leads to more terrorism; if they are successful, they will be encouraged to commit more such acts.


We firmly believe that terrorists should be denied benefits from acts such as hostage-holding or kidnapping; thus the U.S. Government does not make concessions to blackmail. We will not pay ransom or release prisoners in response to such demands.

Ambassador Robert M. Sayre became the Director of the Department of State's Office for Combatting Terrorism in May 1982. He is also chairman of the Department's policy group on security policies and programs and contingency planning.

Mr. Sayre was born in Hillsboro, Oregon, on August 18, 1924. He received a bachelor's degree from Willamette (1949), a doctorate in law from George Washington University (1956), a master's degree from Stanford (1960), and an honorary doctorate in laws from Willamette (1966).

He joined the Department in 1949 as an intern. He later held assignments as international economist in the Bureau of Economic Affairs and the Bureau of Inter-American Affairs (1950-52), international relations officer in the latter bureau (1952-56), officer in charge of inter-American security and military assistance affairs (1956-57), chief of the political section in Lima (1957-60), and financial officer in Havana (1960-61).

He returned to Washington in 1961 to become President Kennedy's executive secretary of the task force on Latin America and also assisted in efforts that put together the Alliance for Progress. Other positions Ambassador Sayre has held have been officer in charge of Mexican affairs (1961-64), senior staff member of the National Security Council (1964-65), Deputy Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Affairs (1965-67), Acting Assistant Secretary for Inter-American Af-



fairs (1967-68), and a Foreign Service inspector (1974-75 and 1976-78).

He has held three ambassadorial posts—Uruguay (1968-69), Panama (1969-74), and Brazil (1978-82). Ambassador Sayre twice has been awarded the Department's Superior Honor Award (1964 and 1976). ■



hijacking and the Montreal convention against aircraft sabotage, which are now adhered to by over 100 states. The international community, through these conventions, has established the principle that aircraft piracy and sabotage, like the maritime piracy they so closely resemble, are universally abhorred international crimes.

Other conventions dealing with additional aspects of the terrorism problem are the New York convention on crimes against internationally protected persons, the Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, and the Convention on the Physical Protection of Nuclear Materials. These agreements establish the obligation among states party to them to submit for prosecution or extradition those alleged to have committed particular crimes.

The United States strongly supports the principle established in these conventions that those who commit terrorist crimes should be brought to justice in accordance with the law, and we continue to urge other nations to become parties to these important agreements.

The United Nations has also considered the effectiveness of the New York convention on attacks against diplomats and other internationally protected persons. The Secretary General has invited member states to submit reports this year for consideration by the United Nations on actions they have taken to carry out the convention. We welcome this continuing focus on attacks on diplomats which now account for more than half of all terrorist attacks.

In addition to these efforts in the international organizations, the economic summit seven—the United States, Canada, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, the United Kingdom, and Japan—enunciated a course of action against hijacking. In 1978 the heads of state and government of these seven nations adopted a declaration against hijacking. It was a commitment to take joint action by terminating air service to states which fail to live up to their obligations under The Hague convention on hijackers. Last year the Bonn declaration was implemented against Afghanistan for its conduct during and subsequent to the hijacking of a Pakistani aircraft in March 1981. The

No Concessions!

The Reagan Administration has adopted a firm policy to combat international terrorism. We will resist terrorist blackmail and pursue terrorists with the full force of the law. We will not pay ransom, nor release prisoners, and we will not bargain for the release of hostages. To make concessions to terrorist blackmail only jeopardizes the lives and freedom of additional innocent people. We encourage other governments to take a similarly strong stance. When U.S. citizens are taken hostage, we look to the host government to exercise its responsibility under international law to protect them, but at the same time we urge the government not to give in to terrorist blackmail. We are prepared to assist the host government should our aid be requested.

The basic philosophy underlying this policy is that concessions to terrorists only serve to encourage them to resort to more terror to obtain their political objectives, thereby endangering still more innocent lives. If terrorists understand that a government steadfastly refuses to give in to their demands and is prepared to live up to its international obligations to prosecute or extradite them, this will serve as a strong deterrent. We also encourage other governments to adopt a **no-concessions policy** since international terrorism is a phenomenon which crosses national boundaries. Our no-concessions policy is of little avail if Americans are taken hostage abroad and the host government concedes to the terrorists demands.

The current policy in dealing with hostage incidents involving U.S. diplomats and other officials represents an evolution from the handling of the first incidents in 1969 and 1970. Although our policy was not to give in to terrorists demands, there is a feeling by those who have analyzed those cases that the **principal concern** then was the **safe release of the hostages**, and any host government **concessions to the terrorists were acceptable if they contributed to that goal.**

By the time the U.S. Ambassador in Haiti was kidnapped by local terrorists in January 1973 and the U.S. Ambassador and the Deputy Chief of Mission were held hostage in Khartoum in March 1973 by Palestinian terrorists, a considerable hardening in the U.S. policy was apparent. Although the Ambassador to Haiti was released after local

authorities had made concessions to the terrorists, it is apparent that the United States had not been in favor of giving in to their demands. In connection with the Khartoum case, while it was still in progress, President Nixon said that "as far as the United States as a government giving in to blackmail demands, we cannot do so and we will not do so." He went on to say, "We will do everything that we can to get them released but we will not be blackmailed." One of the terrorist demands had been to release Sirhan Sirhan, the convicted assassin of Robert F. Kennedy.

The Ambassador, the Deputy Chief of Mission, and the Belgian Charge were killed in the Saudi Embassy in Khartoum by the terrorists. Among the terrorists' other demands had been the release of some particularly important terrorist leaders who had been captured and were being tried in Jordan. The terrorists in Khartoum repeatedly called for the release of these men, and, in the view of some analysts, the failure of the terrorists to obtain their release was the basic reason for the brutal assassination of these diplomats.

If a foreign government engages in acts of terrorism against the United States, the Administration has made it clear that the United States would respond effectively and vigorously using all appropriate resources at its disposal—diplomatic, political, economic, and military.

Because international terrorism affects most countries around the world, it is essential that all responsible governments adopt a common policy of not giving in to terrorist blackmail. This principle is already embodied in international conventions such as the widely accepted Hague convention on hijacking which establishes an obligation to either prosecute or extradite hijackers. Although there is a temptation to give in to the terrorists demands on humanitarian grounds to avoid the possibility of violence against the hostages, such a moral compromise is fleeting since a terrorist victory only encourages more acts which endanger additional innocent lives. No responsible government can allow itself to be dictated to by ruthless, criminal acts which endanger the lives of its citizens, citizens of other countries, and which threaten its authority. Compromise will prove transitory and over the long run will be detrimental to a country's efforts to cope effectively with the problem. ■

United Kingdom, France, and West Germany, the countries of the summit seven with bilateral air service with Afghanistan, gave notice that air links would be terminated this November. We continue to monitor the actions of countries during hijacking incidents and will

urge such actions in future cases where it would be appropriate.

At the bilateral level, we have consulted many countries on sharing information on terrorists and their plans. Such exchanges occur systematically, but we need to do more to assure that

Antiterrorism Cooperation Program

In April and May of 1982, Ambassador Robert M. Sayre, the Department of State's Director for Combatting Terrorism, testified before both Houses of Congress in support of a new program intended to be a major element of the President's program to combat and deter political terrorism. The proposal asks Congress to provide authority and funding for assistance to selected friendly governments by providing them with antiterrorism training, specialized equipment where appropriate, and by generally expanding the scope and type of intergovernmental cooperation. Specifically the Department asked the Congress to amend the Foreign Assistance Act to authorize antiterrorism assistance up to a level of \$5 million in FY 1983.

Both the House Foreign Affairs Committee and the Senate Foreign Relations Committee responded encouragingly to this proposal and recommended to their respective bodies that the program be approved. Edward Marks, a career Foreign Service officer and formerly U.S. Ambassador to Guinea-Bissau and Cape Verde and most recently of the National War College, was designated in December 1981 as the Department's Coordinator for Antiterrorism Programs.

As presently conceived, the program will begin by providing training courses in various antiterrorism skills and management techniques for the civil and police authorities of friendly developing countries subject to a terrorist threat. Training will be offered at existing U.S. Government institutions such as the FBI Academy (Quantico, Virginia), the Federal Law Enforcement Training Center (Glynco, Georgia), and the Federal Aviation Administration's Transportation Safety Institute (Oklahoma City). The training will include antiterrorist policy, government crisis management organization, incident management, hostage and barricade negotiations, airport security measures, bomb disposal, and dignitary and facility protection. The training and orientation will be designated primarily for senior officials responsible for antiterrorism policy and incident management, plus senior training personnel.

In addition, the U.S. Government will provide a limited amount of appropriate antiterrorist equipment to complement specific training programs.

The antiterrorism cooperation program has a number of objectives, all revolving around the perception that political terrorism is an international phenomenon which threatens individual countries as well as international society. Thus, it must be met by an international effort much in the way in which piracy was challenged and finally eliminated. The U.S. Government has a multifaceted antiterrorism program, important parts of which are directed toward creating the necessary international consensus. The antiterrorism assistance program shares that objective but is specifically directed toward enhancing the antiterrorist operating skills of relatively inexperienced governments and to expanding cooperation among all concerned governments.

This program will serve broader U.S. policy interests:

- Strengthen bilateral ties with friendly governments by offering this concrete assistance in an area of mutual concern;
- Assist governments, by improving their capabilities, to better protect U.S. diplomatic missions and other interests, including the American tourist; and
- Increase respect for human rights and improve the climate for them by reducing the terrorist threat to innocent third parties on the one hand, while helping governments deal with the terrorist threat by means of modern, humane, and effective antiterrorist techniques on the other.

Pending final authorization and approval by Congress for FY 1983, the Office for Combatting Terrorism is preparing implementation of the new program. By the time this article appears, selected posts will have been queried about the feasibility of their host governments participating in pilot projects. That inquiry will be followed by a circular telegram to approximately 15 other posts, initiating the participating country selection process for the antiterrorism assistance program's first full year of operation (FY 1983). ■

all members of the world community are aware of specific dangers. I wish to take this opportunity to assure you that when the United States learns that a terrorist act is being planned in any country around the world, we immediately inform the appropriate authorities of the country involved so that innocent lives may be saved. We do not and will not hold back such information. We hope that other countries will adopt a similar policy.

We have also discussed the coordination of policy responses to terrorism. We have urged other countries to adopt a policy similar to ours to deny terrorists the benefits they seek from their crimes and to bring the full force of law enforcement measures to bear on them.

Consultation and coordination of policies are only part of the solution. We have recently submitted legislation to the U.S. Congress which would authorize a program of antiterrorism assistance for foreign government law enforcement personnel. The Congress is now considering this proposal. If authorized, this program would enable us to offer training in antiterrorism security and management skills at our training facilities and to provide equipment, such as security screening devices for airports. Once legislation is passed, we will be contacting selected countries about the possibility of participation in this program. We consider this program as a way to assist countries that may want to learn our techniques of dealing with terrorists. But we also see it as an opportunity to learn by exchanging experiences with all countries that have been victims of terrorist attacks.

As I stated early in my remarks, a principal target of terrorists is the diplomat. Terrorists have recently turned their attention to foreign diplomats in the United States. We are, therefore, strengthening the protection we provide to foreign diplomats. We have introduced new legislation which will enable the Department of State to carry out its responsibilities more effectively and efficiently in cooperation with State and local authorities. We are hopeful that the Congress will act promptly on this proposal.

Although we have a strong set of policies and laws on terrorism agreed to by the international community, the international community has not been as



successful in working out arrangements to give effect to these policies and laws. The countries in Europe have their own working arrangements, and there are occasional conferences such as this one. But multilateral cooperation is extreme-

ly limited. If the world community is serious about combatting terrorism, then it needs to give more attention to working arrangements that will do that. For its part, the United States stands ready to cooperate to the fullest extent.

U.S. employees in Tripoli poured motor oil on the embassy's marble staircases to delay Libyan mobs from gaining access in December 1979.



State-Supported Terrorism

Unfortunately there are states which are directly involved in carrying out international terrorist acts. There are also states which find it in their interest to provide arms, training, and logistical support to terrorist organizations. Another problem, then, is that the community of nations needs to face forthrightly the fact that some of its members are promoting terrorism and others have a certain sympathy for terrorist organizations and condone what they do because they are of the same political philosophy and consider terrorism as an effective way to undermine their adversaries.

Bonn Declaration


In 1978 at the economic summit in Bonn, the heads of state and government of the United States, Canada, the United Kingdom, France, the Federal Republic of Germany, Italy, and Japan expressed their resolve to effectively combat international hijackings when they issued the Bonn antihijacking declaration.* In essence, the declaration states that any nation which does not prosecute or extradite hijackers in its territory will face the termination of air service by the seven nations. It does not specify what sentence a hijacker must receive but does require that he be tried under the laws of the apprehending nation (or extradited).

There is good reason to believe that the declaration has had a positive effect in reducing the number of international terrorist hijackings by its reaffirmation of the need of governments to live up to their international responsibilities to either prosecute or extradite hijackers. Obviously any multinational undertaking of this type faces differences in interpretation due to the different approaches and policies regarding terrorism. However, at the 1981 Ottawa summit, the seven governments provided a clear expression of resolve by giving Afghanistan notice that it faced sanctions due to the harboring of the hijackers of a Pakistani International Airlines aircraft.** This action will serve to place potential hijackers on notice that it will be difficult for them to find sanctuary.

*The Bonn declaration was published in the BULLETIN of Sept. 1978, p. 5.

**The Ottawa statement was published in the BULLETIN of Aug. 1981, p. 16. ■

U.S. Government Organization for Antiterrorism, Planning, Coordination, and Policy Formulation



The U.S. Government is organized in separate but parallel ways to deal with two distinct aspects of the problem of international terrorism—policy and incident management.

The principal vehicle for coordinating policy and programs is the Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism, the senior executive branch organization devoted solely to the problem of terrorism. Chaired by the Department of State, it is made up of representatives of the Departments of Justice /FBI (deputy chairman), Defense /JCS, Energy, Treasury, and Transportation; Central Intelligence Agency; National Security Council; and the office of the Vice President. The group meets frequently, generally twice a month, to insure full coordination among the agencies of the Federal Government directly involved in antiterrorism programs. The State Department representative, and chairman, is the Director of the Office for Combatting Terrorism.

The executive branch's response to the management of terrorist incidents is based on the "lead agency" concept. State has the lead in overseas incidents, Justice/FBI the lead in incidents of domestic terrorism, and the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) plays a key role in skyjackings of U.S. flag carriers within the United States.

go wrong →

When a terrorist incident occurs overseas, the State Department immediately convenes a task force under the direction of the Office for Combatting Terrorism to manage the U.S. response. The task force is physically located in the Operations Center of the State Department and is in operation 24-hours a day until the incident is resolved. It is composed of representatives from the appropriate geographic and functional bureaus in the State Department and from other agencies as necessary.

When Brig. Gen. James L. Dozier was kidnapped in Verona, Italy, on December 17, 1981, for example, an interagency task force was convened by the State Department within hours after the news of the abduction. In addition to the normal members of the task force, the Department of Defense and the Joint Chiefs of Staff were represented because of Gen. Dozier's military position. That task force remained in operation until Gen. Dozier's rescue on January 28, 1982. ■



U.S. Government Organization

What is the U.S. Government doing in both its operations and organizations to carry out the strong policy enunciated by President Reagan?

First, I am sure that you would agree that a key to dealing with the terrorist threat is good intelligence. We have recently strengthened significantly our ability to collect, analyze, and use intelligence on terrorism. We have also taken steps to improve the exchange of information with our friends and allies.

It is one thing to have intelligence; it is another to get policy officers to act on it. We have made organizational changes that improve our alert system and response capability. Certainly, on the intelligence side, we are in much better shape today than we were a year or two ago.

Second, soon after the Reagan Administration assumed office, it created an Interdepartmental Group on Terrorism—most of you would say interministerial—to serve as the policy formulation and coordination body for the government. It is composed of representatives of Federal agencies with direct responsibilities for combatting international terrorism. I am the chairman of that group. Since its inception it conducted a complete review of U.S. policy and proposed several initiatives. One of the gaps that needed to be filled was a clear operational arrangement to provide support to the President and other key decisionmakers during a major terrorist incident. This has been remedied, and we believe that we are now better organized to get prompt policy guidance so that we can respond swiftly and effectively to a terrorist incident.

The possible use of force to resolve an incident is another important aspect of our response capability. In the United States, most major cities have SWAT [special weapons and tactics] teams. Each district of the Federal Bureau of Investigation (FBI) has its own SWAT team. The rescue missions which were conducted at Entebbe, Mogadishu, and the Iranian Embassy in London last year, as well as a number of aircraft incidents, emphasize the need for an effective assault capability. The United

States has dedicated military forces for such a purpose. Although we consider the use of force in resolving a terrorist incident a measure of last resort, it is important to have these capabilities should they be needed.

Role of the Department of State

To many of you, terrorism is a domestic problem and you may wonder why the foreign office would head the Federal Government group on terrorism. The answer is quite simple: For the United States, most of the terrorist incidents have been directed against our diplomats or American interests overseas. The Department of State is the "ministry" in the United States most directly affected and best able to respond. We do have terrorist incidents in the United States and when they occur, it is the responsibility of the Department of Justice to take the lead and respond. As all of you attending this conference know, when it is the unique case of an aircraft, it is the responsibility of our Federal Aviation Administration (FAA).

As you might expect, the Department of State has taken many steps over the years to improve our security, especially overseas. We are now engaged in major improvements to many of our embassies which will provide better protection to both personnel and physical facilities. Some 15¢ out of every \$1.00 the Department spends on operations is for security. So it is no small matter to us. And other governments which have the responsibility for protecting American Embassies are spending again collectively as much as we do. It is my responsibility to assure that we recommend security policies and programs that provide a prudent level of protection. We are doing that.

Conclusion

We believe we have in place the policies, programs, and organization to deal with terrorism, but we are fully aware that there is much more to be done.

The international community must continue and strengthen its efforts to

cooperate more fully on terrorism. The international organizations in particular—the United Nations and the regional organizations—might consider additional conventions to outlaw terrorist tactics, such as assassinations and bombings, and bring these additional tactics under the "prosecute or extradite" obligation. The international community must give special emphasis to working arrangements that will give full effect to these policies and conventions. We are hopeful that we can implement our proposed antiterrorism training program beginning in 1983 and that it will make a significant contribution to more effective working relationships among civil authorities responsible for dealing with terrorism.

Individual countries should redouble their efforts to make clear that terrorism is an unacceptable method for achieving change. No matter what one's ideological preferences, a bomb in a train station or a threat of death against a plane load of civil air passengers is not an acceptable way to bring one's causes to public attention or to overthrow a government. An adequate response requires not only a better intelligence capability so that we are warned of possible terrorist acts, but that the machinery of government is organized from top to bottom so that we act promptly when a terrorist incident occurs. I believe that we in the U.S. Government are now prepared, but it will require constant vigilance, planning, and the exercise of our organizational system to have confidence that we can deal effectively with terrorist incidents.

We must work to establish a world in which peaceful change can occur without violence and terror. We must also be vigilant in our mutual efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. You have a particularly important part to play in prevention. I know that we will continue to work together toward this goal. In that effort, you can be certain that the United States is prepared to be a full and reliable partner. ■



A Jewish synagogue in Antwerp was bombed by the PFLP/SC on October 20, 1981, causing 2 deaths and 95 injuries.

(©Gamma)



Patterns of International Terrorism: 1981

Overview

Both the number of international terrorist incidents and the number of casualties resulting from incidents fell in 1981 (figure 1). Deaths caused by terrorist attacks dropped dramatically from 642 in 1980 to 173 in 1981. Despite this decline in the number of casualties, the long-term trend is toward more serious threats to human life. In 1970 about half the international terrorist incidents were directed against people and half were directed against property. In 1981, 80% of such incidents were directed against people.

Attacks against U.S. citizens also declined in number with fewer casualties, but all the U.S. fatalities in 1981 (as in 1980) were killed because of their nationality. In earlier years, most were victims of indiscriminate terrorist attacks that had little or nothing to do with their citizenship.

The trend toward a broader geographic spread of international terrorism continued in 1981; incidents occurred in 91 countries, more than in any previous year. Government-sponsored international terrorist attacks were mainly directed against Middle Easterners in the Middle East.

terrorism continued in 1981; incidents occurred in 91 countries, more than in any previous year. Government-sponsored international terrorist attacks were mainly directed against Middle Easterners in the Middle East.


Key Patterns in 1981

Types of Attacks. In 1981 international terrorists used a variety of methods to achieve their goals—including kidnapping, hostage taking, assassination, bombing, threats, and hoaxes (table 1). The number of serious incidents—kidnappings, major bombings, assassinations, and skyjackings—dropped. Although assassinations and assassination attempts dropped from 111 in 1980 to 70 last year, 1981 still had the second-highest total since 1968, when the United States began to record such incidents.

In the first part of 1981, the number of skyjackings was high, but after a few well-publicized failures, their incidence declined. In March a Pakistani commercial airliner was hijacked first to Afghanistan and then to Syria by the Pakistan Liberation Army (PLA). The resulting release of prisoners in Pakistan, combined with publicity and eventual freedom for the terrorists, probably encouraged other, less-successful attempts. An Indonesian plane was also seized in March and taken to Thailand where all the terrorists were killed by Indonesian forces, and the hijacking of a Turkish plane to Bulgaria was foiled by the pilot and passengers. Fewer incidents occurred during the rest of the year, apart from several attempts by East Europeans to hijack planes to the West. One dramatic exception was the simultaneous hijack-

Figure 1

International Terrorist Incidents



ing of three planes from Venezuela via Central America to Cuba, where the hostages were released. The total number of skyjackings reported in 1981 was 32, four less than the previous year. Caution is indicated in using these figures, however, as the United States suspects far more incidents may have occurred in Eastern Europe than the United States has recorded.

Location of Attacks. Figures for 1981 confirm a clear trend toward a greater geographic spread of international terrorism.

1970	48 countries
1975	57 countries
1980	76 countries
1981	91 countries

The great majority of incidents, however, continued to occur in a few areas where conditions facilitate publicity and in some cases provide greater safety for the perpetrators—Western Europe, Latin America, the Middle East, and North America. More incidents occurred in the United States than in any other country, but Argentina, Lebanon, West Germany, France, and Italy were also sites of frequent terrorism.

Victims. In 1981 citizens of 77 countries were the victims of international terrorist incidents, more than in any previous year since January 1968. As in past years, U.S. citizens were the primary target, followed by those of the United Kingdom, U.S.S.R., France, Israel, Turkey, and Iraq. Attacks or threats against citizens of these seven countries accounted for more than 60% of the 709 incidents (including threats and hoaxes) recorded in 1981. Incidents directed against U.S. citizens or facilities totaled 258 last year.

In terms of who or what is attacked, there are several clear and ominous trends. In 1970 about half of the incidents were against people, the rest against property. Now, 80% are directed against people. Diplomats are the foremost category; the number of attacks against them rose from an average 165 per year during 1975-79 to 409 in 1980 and then dropped to 368 in 1981, when they constituted more than half of all victims. This is due in part to the rising number of attacks sponsored by

Table 1
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Incidents, 1981, by Category

Type of Event	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	U.S.S.R./ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa
Kidnapping	0	10	6	0	1
Barricade-hostage	3	13	12	0	1
Bombing ^a	12	25	89	1	9
Armed attack	0	7	2	0	1
Hijacking ^b	4	9	2	8	1
Assassination ^c	2	7	30	4	3
Sabotage	0	0	1	0	0
Exotic pollution	0	1	0	0	0
Subtotal	21	72	142	13	16
Bombing (minor)	12	33	52	2	6
Threat	15	18	15	6	6
Theft, break-in	1	4	5	0	0
Hoax	34	17	18	3	1
Other ^d	5	12	17	1	3
Subtotal	67	84	107	12	16
Total	88	156	249	25	32

Type of Event	Middle East/ North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Unkown	Total
Kidnapping	5	0	0	0	22
Barricade-hostage	3	0	0	0	32
Bombing ^a	33	1	0	0	170
Armed attack	15	0	0	0	25
Hijacking ^b	3	5	0	0	32
Assassination ^c	20	3	1	0	70
Sabotage	0	0	0	0	1
Exotic pollution	0	0	0	0	1
Subtotal	79	9	1	0	353
Bombing (minor)	13	4	0	0	122
Threat	7	6	0	0	73
Theft, break-in	2	1	0	0	13
Hoax	6	5	1	0	85
Other ^d	22	2	0	1	63
Subtotal	50	18	1	1	356
Total	129	27	2	1	709

^aBombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility.

^bHijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

^cIncludes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

^dIncludes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

governments, which tend to single out enemy diplomats, dissidents, and prominent exiles living abroad. Businessmen, mostly U.S. citizens in Latin America,

were the victims in 12% of the incidents, and military personnel were involved in about 9%. Attacks against military personnel constitute one of the fastest growing categories.



Terrorist Groups. A total of 113 groups claimed credit for international terrorist incidents in 1981, down slightly from the high of 128 in 1980. These numbers are undoubtedly inflated: some groups create cover names to avoid responsibility for a particular action, others use them to commemorate an anniversary, and common criminals create still others to mislead investigators. The terrorists represented 86 nationalities, but, as in the past, Palestinians, Armenians, West Germans, and Central Americans were responsible for the majority of incidents.

Terrorist Events Causing Death or Injury. Only about one-fourth as many people were killed in terrorist attacks in 1981 as in the previous year—173 compared with 642. The number injured also dropped, but not as dramatically (figure 2). The patterns were, however, similar to previous years. Assassination attempts and bombings accounted for the majority of attacks that involved casualties, and most of these incidents occurred in Western Europe and the Middle East. Terrorists appear to have been more careful in selecting their targets, and more than half of such attacks resulted in harm only to the intended victim, whereas in the past innocent bystanders were much more often the victims.

Attacks that produced casualties occurred in 56 countries. The greatest number took place in Lebanon, where many of the Middle Eastern terrorist groups are headquartered and where

Categories of Terrorist Incidents

Kidnapping

Seizure of one or more victims, who are then moved to a hideout.

Barricade-Hostage

Seizure of a facility with whatever hostages are available; their release is made contingent on meeting terrorists' demands.

Bombing

Major bombing—use of any type of explosive or incendiary device for terrorist purposes, including those delivered through the mail, when significant damage or casualties occur or a terrorist group claims responsibility.

Minor bombing—same as above except that there are no casualties and little or no damage, and no group claims responsibility.

Armed Attack

An attempt to seize or damage a facility, with no intent to hold it for negotiating purposes.

Hijacking

An attempt to seize an airplane, ship, or other vehicle, with whatever hostages may be in it, to force some action—movement to another country and /or agreement by the authorities involved to some terrorist demand.

Assassination

An attempt, whether or not successful, to kill a preselected victim, usually with small arms or bombs. Letter bombs are excluded from this category, although, in at least some cases, there probably is a specific intended victim.

Sabotage

Intentional destruction of property by means other than bombing.

Exotic Pollution

Use of exotic substances—atomic, chemical, or biological—to contaminate material; for example, the introduction of mercury into oranges shipped from Israel.

Threat Hoax

The stated intent by a terrorist group to carry out an attack, or a false alert to authorities about a coming terrorist attack by a named group.

These incidents serve terrorists' purposes in that they tend to alarm and intimidate potential victims, their parent states and organizations, and often the local populace. They usually cause facilities to be evacuated, absorb the time of investigative authorities, and generally disrupt the work of the threatened group.

Well over half the recorded threats and hoaxes are directed against U.S. citizens—673 out of a total of 1,081 threats and 78 out of 143 hoaxes. This is at least partially attributable to the fact that the United States has much more information about such incidents than it does about threats or hoaxes directed against other nations' citizens. Moreover, much of the information on such incidents directed against foreigners is derived from their reports to U.S. authorities about such attacks in the United States—frequently at the United Nations.


Theft, Break-In

Illegal entry into a facility to intimidate or harass its owners.

Other

Includes sniping, shootouts with police, arms smuggling, and credible reports of plotting a terrorist attack that is subsequently foiled or aborted. In all cases a terrorist group is named. ■

Figure 2
Deaths and Injuries Due to International Terrorist Attacks



responsibility for security is fragmented. Included in the Lebanese total are a number of Iraqi and Iranian attacks on each other's diplomats.

Fifty-eight terrorist groups claimed responsibility for attacks that produced casualties in 1981, compared with 49 in 1980. The Armenian and Palestinian groups were responsible for most of these attacks. Nationalities most victimized changed little from 1980: Americans were most numerous among casualties, followed by Israelis, Britons, Iraqis, and Iranians.

Attacks Against U.S. Citizens. A total of 258 international terrorist incidents were directed against U.S. citizens or property during 1981—slightly more than in most previous years but not as many as in 1978 and 1980. There were nine kidnappings, 14 assassination attacks, and 91 bombings of U.S. property—about the same as in 1980. Threats dropped significantly from 50 to 29, but hoaxes rose from 25 to 51 (tables 2 and 3 and figure 3).

A new and ominous development is that all the Americans killed by international terrorist attacks in 1980 and 1981 were assassinated because of their nationality. In earlier years, most Americans killed in such incidents were victims of indiscriminate attacks that had little or nothing to do with their nationality. Moreover, at least one terrorist group, the Red Brigades, is known to have shifted to less well-protected U.S. officials after initially planning to attack a closely guarded target.

Seventy-two international terrorist groups took credit for attacks against Americans in 1981. The Colombian leftist group—April 19 Movement (M-19)—claimed the largest number. The Red Army Faction (RAF) and its sympathizers in West Germany and terrorist groups in El Salvador, Guatemala, and Peru also carried out a significant number of attacks against Americans.

In addition to nongovernment-sponsored terrorist attacks in 1981, the United States was confronted by Libyan leader Qadhafi's threat to assassinate President Reagan and other senior U.S. Government officials and to attack U.S. facilities abroad.

Table 2
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens and Property, 1981, by Category

Type of Event	North America	Latin America	Western Europe	U.S.S.R./ Eastern Europe	Sub-Saharan Africa
Kidnapping	0	8	1	0	0
Barricade-hostage	0	2	0	0	0
Bombing ^a	4	21	21	0	1
Armed attack	0	5	0	0	0
Hijacking ^b	4	6	2	4	0
Assassination ^c	0	5	3	0	0
Sabotage	0	0	1	0	0
Subtotal	8	47	28	4	1
Bombing (minor)	5	16	17	0	1
Threat	3	8	7	2	2
Theft, break-in	0	1	2	0	0
Hoax	6	15	15	3	1
Other ^d	1	8	8	1	2
Subtotal	15	48	49	6	6
Total	23	95	77	10	7

Type of Event	Middle East/ North Africa	Asia	Pacific	Unkown	Total
Kidnapping	0	0	0	0	9
Barricade-hostage	0	0	0	0	2
Bombing ^a	0	0	0	0	47
Armed attack	2	0	0	0	7
Hijacking ^b	1	4	0	0	21
Assassination ^c	5	1	0	0	14
Sabotage	0	0	0	0	1
Subtotal	8	5	0	0	101
Bombing (minor)	2	3	0	0	44
Threat	3	4	0	0	29
Theft, break-in	2	1	0	0	6
Hoax	6	4	1	0	51
Other ^d	6	1	0	0	27
Subtotal	19	13	1	0	157
Total	27	18	1	0	258

^aBombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility.

^bHijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

^cIncludes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

^dIncludes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

In 1981, 17% of incidents directed against Americans resulted in at least one casualty. Six Americans were killed and 31 wounded in international terrorist attacks in 1981. These numbers

are slightly lower than in the last few years. This is partially due to good fortune; the number of attempted violent attacks has not decreased.



All six U.S. citizens killed in 1981 were assassinated in Latin America, where more than one-third of the incidents directed against Americans occurred. While the attacks were no more frequent than in 1980, the number in each year was higher than in any previous year. Five assassination attacks, eight kidnappings, 37 bombings, and four skyjackings that involved U.S. citizens were recorded in Latin America during the year.

- In El Salvador 15 incidents took place, including a series of armed attacks against the U.S. Embassy in March and April and the murder of two Americans in January.
- In Guatemala there were 14 attacks, including five kidnappings and the murder of three U.S. citizens.
- In Costa Rica a bomb destroyed a van carrying Marine guards to the U.S. Embassy, injuring three guards and their driver.
- In Colombia the M-19 carried out eight attacks on Americans during the year, including the murder of a kidnapped missionary.
- In Peru the U.S. chancery and the ambassador's residence were bombed on August 31.

A total of 30 attacks were directed against U.S. personnel and property in West Germany during 1981—more than in any other year. They were carried out by RAF members or sympathizers and included an attempt to assassinate Gen. Frederick Kroesen (commander, U.S. forces in Europe) as well as numerous bombings of U.S. facilities. The last bombing of the year, on August 31 at Ramstein AFB, damaged the headquarters building and injured 18 people, including a U.S. brigadier general.

The Broader Picture

Since the United States began recording international terrorist incidents in 1968, a number of broad patterns have emerged. Some are relatively unchanging, such as the distribution of terrorist incidents—where Western Europe, Latin America, and the Middle East continue to account for about three-fourths of all incidents (figure 4). Almost half of the incidents recorded since 1968 have occurred in only nine countries. The

Figure 3

International Terrorist Attacks on US Personnel and Facilities, 1981





Figure 4
Geographic Distribution of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81



greatest number were recorded in the United States (partly because information is better); other nations with a large number of incidents include Argentina, Italy, France, West Germany, Iran, Turkey, Greece, and Israel. These are convenient locations for terrorist operations, and in many cases the incident did not even involve citizens of the country in which the event occurred. Fewer than 20% of the events in France involved French terrorists, for example, and an even smaller portion of the victims were French nationals.


Over the past 14 years, more than 20% of all international terrorist incidents occurred in Latin America, and the number in that region has been increasing faster than in other parts of the world. More attacks were recorded in 1980-81 than in any other 2-year

period since 1968, primarily reflecting the spillover of increased domestic violence into the international arena. In most cases, the attacks were carried out by indigenous groups against foreigners in an attempt to discredit or undermine the local regime. In some cases the attacks were by rightwing groups against foreigners who were thought to sympathize with antigovernment forces.

From 1968 through 1981, the United States recorded 1,512 international terrorist incidents in the Middle East and North Africa. The number of attacks in the region was highest in 1978 (reflecting increased anti-American activity in Iran), remained high in 1979 and 1980, and declined somewhat in 1981. As in Latin America, much of the international terrorism is a spillover from domestic violence; Iran in 1978 is a good example. Most of the attacks in that region were carried out by Middle Eastern terrorists, and about half were directly at other Middle Eastern citizens. Responsibility was claimed by 151 different terrorist groups—mostly Palestinian.¹

While citizens of almost every country have been victimized by international terrorism, most incidents have been directed against those of only a few countries (figure 5). U.S. records show that between 1968 and 1981, citizens of 131 different countries were victimized by international terrorism; attacks against U.S., Israeli, U.K., West German, French, and U.S.S.R. nationals ac-

Figure 6
Type of Victim of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81



count for more than 60% of all the incidents. Americans were by far the most often targeted.² Of the 7,425 attacks recorded, 38% were directed against U.S. citizens. This reflects the wide geographic spread of American interests and the fact that U.S. citizens are regarded as symbols of Western wealth and power.

Each year, between 35% and 45% of all the international terrorist incidents are directed against U.S. personnel or property. The second-highest number of incidents against any single country has consistently been far less—about 10% of the total. Usually either Israel or the United Kingdom has been the second most victimized country. In 1979,

however, it was France and in 1980, the Soviet Union.

Diplomats have been the foremost target of terrorist incidents, accounting for nearly 40% of the total (figure 6). Businesses and businessmen are the second most frequent victims. Since 1968 almost one-fourth of the incidents were directed against business, especially U.S. business in Latin America. The number reached a high in 1978 and declined thereafter—in part because of increased security, improved operating procedures in high-risk areas, and, most importantly, a shift in focus by many terrorist groups.

Although military personnel are not as large a segment of the victim population as diplomats or businessmen, the United States has recorded 600 terrorist attacks (fewer than 10% of the total) against them. The number of attacks against the military is increasing at the greatest rate.

The pattern of terrorist events that produce casualties appears to be changing. In 1,614 such incidents (figure 7), 3,841 people were killed and 8,298 wounded. Bombings and assassinations account for more than 70% of the attacks that produced casualties. Bombings have always been the most prevalent, perhaps the most serious being the December 15, 1981, bombing of the Iraqi Embassy in Beirut, which killed at least 55 and injured another 100.

In recent years, however, assassination attempts have increased dramatically, especially from 1977 to 1980.


1968-76	20 (annual average)
1977	34
1978	54
1979	65
1980	111
1981	70

This increase is attributable to the fact that several countries—Libya, Syria, and Iran among them—have increasingly used their military and intelligence services to carry out terrorist attacks against foreign diplomats or their own exiles.

U.S. citizens have been the victims of only 20% of all attacks that produced casualties, while suffering more than 40% of all international terrorist incidents. U.S. businessmen have been the primary target of casualty-producing at-

Figure 5

Nationality of Victims of International Terrorist Attacks, 1968-81







Figure 7
International Terrorist Incidents That Caused Casualties



tacks, but attacks on U.S. diplomats and military personnel have increased at a faster rate in recent years.

Over the period 1968-81, attacks on Americans that produced casualties occurred in 69 countries, most frequently in Argentina, Iran, and the Philippines. More than 155 terrorist groups claimed responsibility for one or more attacks. The Argentine Montoneros and Iranian and Palestinian groups have been the most prominent perpetrators.

In 1981, for the first time, the United States has grouped terrorist incidents into more serious and less serious categories. As shown in figure 8, the number of serious incidents—such as kidnappings, the taking of hostages, assassination attacks, and major bombings—rose rapidly in the early 1970s, remained fairly steady between 1974 and 1979, then jumped to new highs in 1980-81. Less serious incidents have fluctuated more widely. The peak year for relatively minor incidents, 1978, saw a drop in serious incidents. Minor bombings and threats account for more than 80% of the less serious incidents.

The trend of serious international terrorist incidents involving U.S. citizens or property has shown little variation (figure 9). It peaked in 1975, declined thereafter, only to rise somewhat in the past 2 years. Less serious incidents account for most of the year-to-year variation in total incidents involving the United States.


Terrorist Groups

More than 670 groups have claimed credit for at least one international attack since the United States began keeping statistics in 1968. This number is undoubtedly inflated: some of these are cover names for organizations wishing to deny responsibility for a particular action, and some have probably been used by common criminals to throw off investigators or by psychotics seeking public recognition. The list includes the names of nations that conduct international terrorism such as Libya and Syria, insurgency groups that use terrorist tactics, separatist groups such as the E.T.A. (a Basque group), and nihilist groups such as the RAF and the Japanese Red Army. It includes leftwing groups, rightwing groups, anti-American groups, anti-Soviet groups, environmentalist groups, and even religious groups. They represent the spectrum of ideologies, classes, cultures, and races.

The annual number of groups that claim credit for attacks has increased markedly since the United States began keeping statistics. For example, 49 groups claimed credit for attacks in 1970, rising to 111 groups by 1975, and 128 groups by 1980. It dropped slightly to 113 in 1981.

While some terrorist groups have dropped out of sight during the 14-year period, a large number have persisted. They are well organized, with a dedicated core of well-trained and highly motivated terrorists. Moreover, they usually have at least some popular sup-

Figure 9
International Terrorist Attacks on US Personnel and Facilities, 1968-81




port. Although the Provisional Irish Republican Army (PIRA) is primarily a domestic terrorist group that conducts operations in Northern Ireland, U.S. records show that the PIRA and its sympathizers have conducted more international terrorism than any other group. The PIRA has launched attacks from several countries, and the attacks have involved citizens from at least 15 countries, although the majority were against British nationals.

The Black September Organization has carried out the second-largest number of attacks, most of them in Europe and the Middle East, targeted against Israelis and moderate Palestinians. Other Palestinian groups—particularly the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP), the PFLP-General Command, and the Black June Organization (BJO)—have conducted terrorist incidents during the past 14 years. Together, the Palestinian groups perpetrated more international attacks than any other movement. U.S. records show 9% of all terrorist attacks (almost 700) have been carried out by Palestinians.

Other significant groups that have been active in international terrorism are the Montoneros, the Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia (ASALA), the Basque Fatherland and Liberty, the M-19, and the RAF. Among the states most active in carrying out international terrorist attacks are Libya, Iran, Syria, and Iraq.

Figure 8
International Terrorist Incidents, 1968-81



Activities of Significant Groups in 1981

The United States recorded 113 terrorist groups that claimed credit for international attacks during 1981. The terrorists represented 86 nationalities, and, as in the past, Palestinians, Armenians, Germans, Salvadorans, and Guatemalans carried out the most attacks.

Armenian Secret Army for the Liberation of Armenia. ASALA carried out more international attacks during 1981 than any other terrorist organization. Its primary targets in the past have been Turkish diplomats and diplomatic facilities, but, under cover names, ASALA has attacked Swiss interests in retaliation for the arrest of ASALA members, and, using the name Orly Organization, it has attacked French interests in retaliation for the November arrest of an Armenian carrying a false passport at Orly Airport. ASALA carried out 40 attacks in 11 countries during the year. Although most of the attacks were bombings against French and Swiss property, the most serious were attacks against Turkish diplomats. These included the September 24 seizure of the Turkish Consulate in Paris and the assassination of Turkish diplomats in Switzerland, Denmark, and France.

Palestinian Terrorists. Palestinian terrorists have not been as active in international terrorism in recent years as during the mid-1970s. In 1981 some radical Palestinian groups resumed international terrorist attacks. Palestinian terrorists carried out a total of 49 attacks during 1981; groups such as the May 15 Organization, Black June Organization, and the PFLP-SC (Special Command) were the most active. This is far more than recorded in 1979 or 1980 but about the same as during the mid-1970s. The attacks were committed in 14 countries. Most of the incidents were bombings, six were assassination attempts, five were armed attacks, and one was a rocket attack.

The May 15 Organization and the PFLP-SC were active in 1981. The former carried out attacks against Israeli targets in Europe, including bomb attacks on the embassies in Vien-

Table 3

International Terrorist Attacks on U.S. Citizens and Property, 1968-81, by Category

Type of Event	1968	1969	1970	1971	1972	1973	1974	1975
Kidnapping	1	3	25	19	5	22	14	23
Barricade-hostage	1	0	4	0	1	3	2	1
Bombing ^a	13	31	29	37	44	28	80	71
Armed attack	1	4	3	5	10	8	6	7
Hijacking ^b	1	5	12	4	4	0	1	2
Assassination ^c	3	3	10	2	4	4	2	8
Sabotage	0	0	0	3	3	1	0	1
Subtotal	20	46	83	70	71	66	105	113
Bombing (minor)	36	62	106	105	100	79	79	41
Threat	11	12	51	51	71	77	19	19
Theft, break-in	0	3	15	8	1	3	4	3
Hoax	0	0	1	0	0	0	0	0
Other ^d	4	1	10	9	12	11	9	5
Subtotal	51	78	183	173	184	170	111	68
Total	71	124	266	243	255	236	216	181

Type of Event	1976	1977	1978	1979	1980	1981	Total
Kidnapping	8	7	8	8	10	9	162
Barricade-hostage	2	3	0	6	7	2	32
Bombing ^a	54	63	42	35	39	47	613
Armed attack	8	5	12	10	11	7	97
Hijacking ^b	5	4	3	15	20	21	97
Assassination ^c	15	6	7	10	18	14	106
Sabotage	1	0	0	1	0	1	11
Subtotal	93	88	72	85	105	101	1,118
Bombing (minor)	71	72	133	91	58	44	1,077
Threat	53	22	161	47	50	29	673
Theft, break-in	1	0	7	4	13	6	68
Hoax	0	0	0	1	25	51	78
Other ^d	13	13	23	28	27	27	192
Subtotal	138	107	324	171	173	157	2,088
Total	231	195	396	256	278	258	3,206

^aBombings where damage or casualties occurred, or where a group claimed responsibility.

^bHijackings of air, sea, or land transport.

^cIncludes assassination or attempt to assassinate where the victim was preselected by name.

^dIncludes conspiracy and other actions such as sniping, shootout with police, and arms smuggling.

na and Athens and on El Al offices in Italy and Turkey. It also claimed credit for the bombing of a Cypriot cruise ship in Haifa, Israel. The PFLP-SC carried out a series of bombings in the Middle East and is believed responsible for the October 20 bombing of a synagogue in Belgium.

The Black June Organization (BJO), a radical Palestinian group which opposes political settlement with Israel and Palestine Liberation Organization leader Arafat's moderate policies, was also very active during 1981. It targeted moderate Palestinians, Israelis, and non-Israeli Jews. On September 23, BJO launched a hand grenade attack on the offices of an




Israeli shipping line in Cyprus. BJO killed moderate Palestinian leaders on June 1 in Brussels and on October 9 in Rome. (This is the group that attempted to assassinate the Israeli Ambassador in London on June 3, 1982, an incident that preceded the Israeli invasion of Lebanon.)

Provisional Irish Republican Army. The PIRA was more active in 1981 than in most previous years. It retaliated for the attempted assassination of Bernadette Devlin McAliskey with the murder of Sir Norman Stronge and his son.

PIRA expanded the tactic of prisoner hunger strikes. After a 66-day fast, Bobby Sands died on May 5. He was the first and most widely publicized PIRA militant to die in 1981. Nine other PIRA and Irish National Liberation Army (INLA) members died after unsuccessful attempts to gain prisoner-of-war status for the terrorist inmates. After the failure of the hunger strikes, the PIRA intensified its campaign of violence in England. In October and November it claimed credit for bombing facilities in London, mailed several bombs to British facilities, kidnapped the son of a wealthy Irish businessman, and attempted to assassinate the Commanding General of the British Royal Marines. PIRA sympathizers destroyed British cars in West Germany, bombed a British cultural center in Greece, attacked British targets in Portugal, and threatened British facilities in Switzerland.

Red Army Faction. The RAF in 1981 launched a series of attacks against the U.S. presence in West Germany despite a series of setbacks in 1980. The RAF had been rebuilding its operational structure for some time, and in an attempt to capitalize on the controversy over NATO nuclear weapons modernization plans and "squatters' rights" in West Berlin, the RAF and its sympathizer groups carried out numerous attacks.

The RAF or its supporters claimed credit for numerous attacks during the year. It firebombed U.S. military facilities in Frankfurt and Wiesbaden. It attempted to bomb the U.S. library in West Berlin and the Dow chemical plant in Dusseldorf. On August 31, the RAF



exploded a car bomb at the U.S. Air Force Headquarters at Ramstein. It attempted to assassinate U.S. Gen. Frederick Kroesen on September 15, firing two rocket-propelled antitank weapons at Kroesen's car; one missed, and the other hit the trunk. The car was severely damaged, but no one was seriously injured. Sympathizer groups

During 1981 Irish terrorists imprisoned in Northern Ireland carried out hunger strikes "to the death." Ten prisoners died.

Skyjacking

Since January 1968, there have been 684 attempted skyjackings, representing about 9% of all terrorist attacks since that date. According to U.S. records, those attempts have resulted in at least 50 fatalities and 400 injuries. More than one-third of the hijackers demanded passage to Cuba. Nearly 40% of the planes hijacked belonged to U.S. carriers (such as Eastern, National, and TWA).

The number of attempted skyjackings reached a high in 1969-70, declined slightly in 1971-72, then decreased by half in 1973, and has remained fairly constant since then. These decreases are easily traced to increased public awareness of and concern for this threat. The 1970 multiple skyjacking by Palestinian terrorists was the catalyst for international concern which resulted in The Hague and Montreal conventions on aerial hi-

jacking. In January 1973, the full screening of boarding passengers and luggage inspection was instituted in the United States and, to a lesser extent, at international airports in other countries; that year the number of skyjacking attempts was half that of the previous year. The U.S. Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) reports that more than 20,000 firearms have been confiscated since the institution of these security measures.


Of the 684 skyjacking attempts since 1968, 108 have been designated terrorist skyjackings, meaning they were politically motivated. More than one-third of these resulted in casualties (212 dead and 186 wounded). Terrorist skyjackings originated in 43 countries and terminated in 47 countries, most of them in Latin America, Western Europe, and the Middle East. Forty-eight terrorist groups


claimed the credit, almost half of them Palestinians and Latin Americans.

Between 1973 and 1980, terrorists averaged five skyjacking attempts a year. There was a significant increase in 1981, partly attributable to the Pakistan Liberation Army's (PLA) successful skyjack in March, which probably encouraged other attempts. As of May 31, 1982, there have been four terrorist skyjackings, suggesting a decrease from the 1981 total.

Terrorists achieved logistic success in 70% of their attempts between January 1968 and June 1982. (Logistic success does not mean that ancillary demands were met; it simply notes whether the skyjacker was able to divert the plane to a destination selected by the terrorist.) ■

Terrorist Skyjackings by Region, January 1968-June 1982*





also attacked West German and U.S. targets in Germany and other European countries. The Black Block bombed two U.S. military facilities near Frankfurt and attempted to bomb the railroad line to the Rhein/Main airbase. Others bombed the U.S. Consul General's office and a military base near Frankfurt and U.S. military facilities in Kassal, Wiesbaden, and West Berlin. They also attacked a West German Consulate in Switzerland and the U.S. Embassy in Sofia.

Red Brigades. Despite some setbacks early in the year, the Red Brigades broadened their targets to include foreign nationals in 1981. The confessions of Patrizio Peci, the arrest of RB planner Mario Moretti, and increased government antiterrorist activity contributed to pressure on the RB.

The RB claimed credit for numerous attacks during the past year—the assassination of a hospital director in Milan, a prison warden in Rome, and four police officials. The RB kidnapped three individuals, murdering one and releasing the other two after holding them for lengthy periods. In retaliation for Peci's testimony, the RB kidnapped and killed his brother and shot one of his defense attorneys. During the year, the RB also wounded 12 victims, bombed four facilities, and robbed a bank in Rome.

On December 17, RB kidnapped U.S. Army Brig. Gen. James Dozier from his home in Verona, Italy. Italian authorities subsequently arrested more than 300 suspects and uncovered large amounts of weapons and supplies in the search for Dozier and subsequent counterterrorist operations. On January 28, 1982, Italian officers rescued Dozier from a safehouse in Padua.

Basque Fatherland and Liberty. In Spain, the ETA-PM (Political-Military) and the ETA-M (Military), both Marxist-Leninist-oriented Basque separatist organizations, continued their campaign of violence against the Spanish Government. They also targeted citizens from six other countries in Spain, including threats to bomb the U.S. airbase near Torrejon.

Early in January the government granted greater autonomy for the Basque region in an attempt to decrease

tension, but this did not stop the terrorists; they claimed credit for many attacks during the next few months. Near the end of January, the terrorists fired antitank weapons at government buildings in two Basque cities, kidnapped a prominent citizen in Bilbao, and kidnapped and murdered the chief nuclear engineer at the Lemoniz power plant in northern Spain. During the same month, the Spanish police rescued unharmed a prominent doctor who had been kidnapped in Madrid and was being held in northeast Spain by ETA-PM for a U.S. \$2 million ransom.

On February 20, in a coordinated operation, the ETA kidnapped the honorary consuls to Spain from Austria, El Salvador, and Uruguay. The consuls were held for a week, and the attack received widespread publicity.

On February 23, the ETA-PM announced its intention to abandon terrorism. Shortly thereafter the ETA-M increased its terrorist campaign. In February and March, it bombed facilities, attacked police patrols, and assassinated prominent members of the Spanish Government. A few months later the ETA-M carried out another series of attacks, which included assaults on police and Civil Guard facilities and bombings of the Spanish electric company.

April 19 Movement. The Colombian April 19 Movement (M-19) carried out 11 international terrorist operations in 1981, including bombings, hijackings, and one kidnapping. All of the incidents occurred in Colombia and almost all were targeted against the United States. A faction of the group kidnapped a U.S. citizen, and after weeks of negotiations and threats his body was found in an abandoned bus in Bogota.

The M-19 attempted large-scale military operations on March 8 and 11, launching amphibious attacks on three remote villages in southern Colombia. Government forces killed or captured most of the terrorists. M-19 suffered another major setback when a truckload of sophisticated weapons, including rocket grenades and machineguns, was captured by the Colombian border guard.

Marxist-Leninist Armed Propaganda Unit. In Turkey the MLAPU, a faction of the Turkish People's Liberation Party/Front, the most anti-U.S. of all the leftist groups in Turkey, was responsible for the deaths of seven Americans in 1979 and one in 1980. MLAPU killed no Americans in 1981 and had very little success in other terrorist attacks during the year.

Since imposition of martial law in September 1980, the Turkish military government has killed or arrested a number of MLAPU members, raided safehouses, and executed convicted MLAPU members. Although the group suffered setbacks during the year, it was

U.S. Business Can Call for Help

The Department of State's Threat Analysis Group can provide brief unclassified oral evaluations to U.S. business representatives on the potential terrorist threat in countries around the world. Call (202) 632-6308.

During an international terrorist incident involving U.S. interests, a State Department task force coordinates the U.S. response. Businessmen, whose operations may be affected by that crisis, may telephone the Office for Combatting Terrorism to be put in direct contact with the task force. Call (202) 632-9892. ■

able to conduct some terrorist operations, both against the U.S. presence in Turkey and against the Turkish Government. On January 22, the MLAPU attempted to assassinate two U.S. soldiers as they walked to a bus stop. On April 6, the MLAPU claimed credit for an attack on a U.S. military vehicle. Although the vehicle was hit by machinegun fire a number of times, no one was seriously injured. The terrorists who carried out this attack were arrested in a raid on a safehouse the following day.

Special Cases—Guatemala and El Salvador. In Guatemala and El Salvador, prolonged domestic strife has created fertile soil for terrorism, both domestic and international. Terrorism is a major tactic of both leftwing and rightwing groups in El Salvador. Of the

five leftwing groups forming the Farabundo Marti National Liberation Front (FMLN), the Popular Liberation Forces (FPL) is the strongest and largest. Groups operating under the rubric FMLN or FPL claimed responsibility for most of the attacks in 1981, including 18 attacks on U.S. personnel or facilities and 10 attacks on the embassies or private facilities of other Central American countries. Among the incidents involving U.S. citizens was a series of attacks on the U.S. Embassy during March and April. Other attacks on Americans in El Salvador included the bombing of the Exxon compound, a Hardees restaurant, and the Citibank facilities.

Rightwing terrorists were also active in El Salvador, with most attacks against other Salvadoran citizens. On January 3, the head of the agrarian reform program and two U.S. advisers were assassinated by three terrorists while at a dinner meeting at the Sheraton Hotel in San Salvador. Two men arrested in connection with this case have ties with extreme rightwing groups opposed to Salvadoran land reform.

In Guatemala terrorism figured as a major tactic of the right, the left, and the Guatemalan Government. U.S. files contain records of 27 international terrorist attacks in 1981. These include bombings, kidnappings, and four assassination attempts. While most of the international attacks were carried out by leftwing groups such as the Guerilla Army of the Poor, two U.S. citizens were assassinated by rightwing groups. Thirteen of the attacks were directed at American personnel and property. Other victims of international terrorism in Guatemala included citizens of Japan, Australia, Canada, the United Kingdom, Spain, and Honduras.

Among the most publicized assassinations were two U.S. missionaries working in Guatemala and a U.S. businessman, who had been kidnapped in December 1980 by leftwing guerrillas during an attempted rescue by the Guatemalan police. Numerous bombings of foreign facilities were recorded, including the Pan American headquarters, the Honduran airline office, the American Chamber of Commerce office, an Eastern Airlines plane on the ground, the Chevron oil depot in

Guatemala City, the British Consul's office, and a U.S.-owned hotel. Other incidents included the murders of an Italian and a Spanish priest working in the area and the kidnapping of an Australian and a U.S. citizen for ransom.

State-Sponsored International Terrorism

Nations support international terrorist groups or engage in terrorist attacks to influence policies of other countries, to establish or strengthen regional or global influence, and, in some cases, to eliminate or terrorize dissident exiles and nationals from adversary countries.

Many countries are reluctant to condemn states that support or engage in international terrorist activities when those activities are cloaked in the mantle of anti-imperialism. Other countries tolerate state-sponsored terrorist activities because they fear economic or other forms of retaliation by the sponsoring states.

U.S. records list 129 terrorist attacks conducted directly by national governments, but this figure almost certainly understates the incidence of state-sponsored terrorism. More than 80% of the 129 attacks took place in 1980 and 1981, and almost 40% were assassinations or attempted assassinations. This is roughly six times the percentage of assassinations recorded in non-state-sponsored terrorist attacks. State-sponsored attacks were more lethal than other terrorist incidents, 44% resulting in casualties—a total of 60 persons injured and 61 killed. A majority of these attacks occurred in the Middle East, were carried out by Middle East nations, and were directed against expatriates and diplomats from Middle Eastern countries.

The pattern of state-sponsored international terrorist incidents in 1981 was similar to that of 1980. The 44 attacks occurred in 20 different countries, but almost half were in Lebanon. The attacks were directed against citizens from 17 countries, half of them from the Middle East. Incidents included kidnappings, bombings, assassinations, and armed attacks against embassies or other facilities. During 1981, 21 victims were killed and 28 wounded in state-

sponsored international terrorist attacks.

Soviet Union. The Soviets provide training, arms, and other direct and indirect support to a variety of national insurgent and separatist groups. Many of these groups commit international terrorist attacks as part of their program of revolutionary violence. Moreover, some of the individuals trained and equipped by the Soviets make their way into strictly terrorist groups with little revolutionary potential.

Moscow maintains close relations with and furnishes aid to governments and organizations that directly support terrorist groups. In the Middle East, for example, the Soviets sell large quantities of arms to Libya. The Soviets also back a number of Palestinian groups that openly conduct terrorist operations. In Latin America, the Soviet Union and Cuba appear to be pursuing a long-term coordinated campaign to establish sympathetic Latin American regimes. The Cubans, and more recently the Soviets, clearly support organizations and groups in Latin America that use terrorism as a basic technique to undermine existing regimes. In other parts of the world, especially Africa, the Soviets have supported guerrilla movements and national liberation organizations that engage in terrorism.

Libya. Support of terrorist groups has been an element of Libya's foreign policy under Qadhafi since the mid-1970s. Qadhafi has been linked by overwhelming evidence to terrorist attacks and assassinations in Western Europe, the United States, and the Middle East and is known to support terrorist groups and liberation movements worldwide. After the Gulf of Sidra incident, when the United States shot down two Libyan fighters which were attacking U.S. naval forces in international waters, Qadhafi threatened to assassinate President Reagan and other senior U.S. Government officials. The 1981 records contain information on 13 attacks by Libyan assassination squads.

South Yemen. The Government of the People's Democratic Republic of Yemen has supported international terrorism since the late 1960s. It provides camps and other training facilities for a number of leftist terrorist groups.



The Government of South Yemen has not participated directly in international terrorist attacks, however, and South Yemeni citizens have been involved in only six incidents since 1968.

Syria. As a major supporter of radical Palestinian groups, Syria has provided training, logistic support, and use of diplomatic facilities to groups that are willing to do its bidding. Syria supports Palestinian elements that engage in international terrorism, including the BJO, which targets moderate Palestinian leaders as well as Israeli interests.

Iraq. During the past 3 years, the Iraqi Government has reduced support to non-Palestinian terrorists and placed restrictions on many Palestinian groups, moving closer to its moderate Arab neighbors.

Iran. Despite its radical, anti-Western policies, its support for Islamic fundamentalists, and widespread government terrorism within Iran, the Khomeini regime provides only limited support to international terrorist groups. U.S. records list 24 international terrorist attacks carried out directly by the Iranian Government in 1980 and five in 1981. All of the attacks in 1981 occurred in Beirut and were directed primarily against Iraqi diplomats. Most Iranian-sponsored attacks on Iraqi targets in Lebanon not undertaken by the Iranian Government were carried out by Lebanese Shiite militia members.

Cuba. Havana openly supports and advocates armed revolution as the only means for leftist forces to gain power in Latin America. Cuba also supports organizations and groups in Latin America that use terrorism to undermine existing regimes. The Cubans have played an important role in facilitating the movement of men and weapons into Central and South America, providing direct support in the form of training, arms, safe havens, and advice to a wide variety of guerrilla groups.

¹These groups were more active in the early 1970s.

²The proportions are skewed by the fact that much better information exists on incidents that involve the United States. ■

U.S. Business as a Target

Types of Attacks

International terrorists have used almost every type of violence against U.S. business personnel and facilities, ranging from telephone threats to murder. The United States has recorded 645 bombings, 61 kidnappings, 29 assassination attempts, and 23 armed attacks since January 1968.

Bombing. This is a preferred terrorist method in part because explosives are relatively easy to obtain, difficult to trace, and normally involve little personal risk to the perpetrators. This common type of attack occurred in 38 countries—the greatest number in Argentina, Iran, Italy, and Mexico. While almost 70% of all incidents recorded were bombings, the majority of them did not cause significant damage.

Seizure. Since 1968 there have been 94 attacks in which U.S. business personnel were taken hostage against the satisfaction of monetary or political demands. Almost two-thirds of these seizures were kidnappings, but such incidents also included skyjackings and hostage-barricade situations. The largest annual total of kidnappings and hostage seizures was 21 in 1981, almost four times the annual average for the 1968–81 period. Almost 60% of them occurred in Latin America, with the greatest number of incidents in Argentina, Guatemala, and Colombia. Financial demands were most often made for the release of the hostages, but other ultimatums included the release of imprisoned terrorists, publicity for a political statement, and/or a safe getaway for the captors. In over 75% of the hostage takings, the terrorists were able to achieve at least some of their demands.

Assassination. Although handgun assassinations of U.S. business representatives overseas are rare, they attract media attention, require a response from the local government, and have a strong impact on local business operations. Most incidents of this type have taken place in Argentina and Guatemala.

Types of Companies Targeted

The U.S. companies that have been the targets of terrorism range from well-known giants of international business to small enterprises. They included oil companies (Chevron, Mobil, Exxon, Gulf, and Texaco), banks and financial enterprises (Chase Manhattan, Chemical Bank of New York, Bankers Trust, Citibank, Bank of America, and American Express), and companies associated in the public mind with the "American way of

life" (Coca-Cola, Pepsi-Cola, Colgate-Palmolive, Ford, Chrysler, Macy's, Sears Roebuck, and McDonald's). Slightly less popular targets were airlines (Pan American), engineering firms (Bechtel), agricultural equipment companies (John Deere), and high-technology enterprises (IBM, Burroughs, and Honeywell).

Incidents Resulting in Casualties

Attacks that cause casualties are almost always perpetrated by experienced terrorist organizations, provoke a response from the highest levels of government and corporate management, and command worldwide media attention.

The United States recorded 144 terrorist attacks on U.S. business personnel in 1968–81 that caused injuries or death. Such incidents occurred in 31 countries, mostly Argentina, Iran, the United States, the Philippines, Mexico, and Guatemala. Sixty terrorist groups claimed credit. Bombings and assassinations accounted for 75% of the attacks resulting in casualties.

Location of Incidents

Since 1968 incidents of international terrorism against U.S. business personnel and facilities have occurred in 56 countries, more than 40% of them in only six countries. The greatest number were in Argentina, primarily because the Montoneros routinely targeted U.S. business interests during the early and mid-1970s. In the United States and Italy, the attacks were usually carried out by foreign terrorists, while in Argentina, Iran, Mexico, and Guatemala, the incidents were almost always the work of indigenous groups. Terrorist groups in Latin America carried out attacks as symbolic action against U.S. power, wealth, and influence in the region or in an attempt to undermine the local regime.

As with all terrorist attacks, incidents involving U.S. business are often carried out where they will receive the most publicity, and the large urban areas of Western Europe provide the perfect setting.

International Terrorist Groups

A total of 98 terrorist groups have claimed credit for attacks against U.S. businesses during the past 14 years. The Montoneros have claimed more responsibility than any other group.

The People's Revolutionary Army (Argentina) also conducted numerous attacks during the mid-1970s, but this group has not carried out an attack against U.S. business since 1976. ■



These cars, belonging to U.S. employees, were burned inside the embassy compound in Islamabad, Pakistan, when mobs over-ran that facility in November 1979.

(Department of State)



Terrorist Target: The Diplomat

by Frank H. Perez

*Address before the
conference on terrorism sponsored
by the Instituto de Cuestiones Internacionales,
Madrid, Spain, June 10, 1982*

The worldwide terrorism phenomenon of the past decade and a half has impacted most severely on our Western democratic societies. The brutal tactics of terrorist groups, whether from the far left or right, have served to erode democratic institutions and civil liberties in many parts of the world. Democracies have found it difficult to cope with the tactics of terrorism and in some cases, have been tempted to respond by a turn to authoritarian political structures. Terrorism also has adversely impacted diplomatic relations between nations—even friendly ones.

Attacks on the Rise

In Beirut the French Ambassador is gunned down by terrorists. Several months later, a French employee of the embassy and his pregnant wife are found shot to death in their apartment. A car bomb explodes in the French Embassy compound killing 12 and injuring 25. Turkish officials are killed in Los Angeles and Boston and another is wounded in Ottawa. The Turkish Consulate in Paris is seized. The U.S. Charge in Paris narrowly escapes assassination.

An Israeli attache is assassinated in Paris only 3 months after an American military attache is shot to death while on his way to the embassy. In London the Israeli Ambassador lies critically wounded in the hospital after being shot through the head by a terrorist. In Guatemala the Brazilian Embassy is seized. These are only some of the more recent examples of growing terrorist attacks against diplomats.

The dramatic worldwide increase in both the number and seriousness of terrorist attacks against diplomatic personnel and facilities during the past decade has adversely affected the conduct of diplomacy. In 1970 there were 213 attacks on diplomats from 31 countries. By 1980 this number had risen to 409 attacks on diplomats from 60 countries—an increase of almost 100%. The number of attacks on diplomats as a percentage of total terrorist attacks has also increased from 30% in 1975 to 54% in 1980. Unfortunately this trend exhibits no sign of abating.

World attention has focused on the fact that diplomacy has become a high-risk profession. Some 20 ambassadors from 12 countries have been assassinated (including five U.S. Ambassadors—more than the number of U.S. generals killed in the Vietnam war). Between 1968 and mid-1981 there were 370 international terrorist attacks which



caused death or personal injury. During 1980 alone, there were 50 such incidents, more than in any previous year. All together, 381 diplomats have been killed and 824 wounded between 1968 and 1982. Even more ominously, assassination attempts, which have been increasing steadily over the past 10 years, reached an alltime high in 1980. The number of kidnappings and hostage barricade situations has also increased. Bombings are still the most frequent form of attack, however, since they involve little risk of capture to the terrorist, and explosives can be acquired fairly easily.

The number of groups carrying out terrorist attacks has also grown almost every year. Since 1968 a total of 102 terrorist groups have claimed responsibility for terrorist attacks. In all, diplomats from 108 countries have been victims of attacks, and the embassies of 38 countries have been seized by terrorists. The level of violence of attacks has also increased.

During the early years of the 1970s the terrorist threat to diplomats was primarily from low-level, small-scale violence. In recent years we have also witnessed an increase in mob violence. Between 1970 and 1980 there were some 70 forcible incursions into diplomatic facilities. However, more than

50% of these occurred after the takeover of the U.S. Embassy in Tehran, which suggests that the success achieved there created a model for other terrorist groups to emulate. The potential dangers of such acts were borne out when 39 people, including several Spanish diplomats, were killed when the Spanish Embassy in Guatemala was seized in 1980.

Why the Diplomat?

All terrorist attacks involve the use of violence for purposes of political extortion, coercion, and publicity for a political cause. The terrorist uses his victims as tools to achieve these goals, regardless of the fact that those targeted are rarely directly associated with the area of political conflict. Although some may argue that attacks against diplomats are senseless, in the mind of the terrorist it is a calculated act with deliberate political goals and objectives.

Diplomats are highly visible and desirable targets for several reasons, including their symbolic value and the psychological impact created. Attacks against diplomats evoke a response from the highest levels of two governments—

that of the diplomat attacked and that of the host country. Terrorists are also able to command worldwide media attention for the duration of the incident. Terrorist groups single out diplomats perhaps because they perceive that in order to obtain the publicity they seek, they must strike at these increasingly more visible and symbolic targets.

Terrorist attacks on diplomats almost always are perpetrated by well-trained and experienced terrorist organizations. These groups are well organized and are seeking specific political goals. For example, two Armenian terrorist groups have conducted a campaign of terror directed against Turkish diplomats in revenge for alleged atrocities which were committed over 60 years ago. Some 20 Turkish diplomats and members of their families have been killed in recent years by Armenian terrorists in numerous countries, for example in Spain, where in 1978 the Turkish Ambassador's wife, her brother, and their chauffeur were killed. We in the United States have not been immune to the violence perpetrated by Armenian terrorist organizations. In January of this year the Turkish Consul General in Los Angeles was gunned down and the honorary Turkish Consul in Boston was murdered in a similar fashion in early May. Earlier a car bomb was detonated in front of the Turkish U.N. mission injuring several people.

Deputy Director, Office for Combatting Terrorism

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His most recent overseas service was in Brussels as the Political Adviser to the U.S. Mission to NATO and in Geneva as the State Department member of the SALT II delegation with the rank of minister. Earlier he served as a member of the Department of State's Policy Planning Staff and as an office director in the Bureau of Intelligence and Research. He was in the National War College class of 1966. Mr. Perez retired from the U.S. Air Force Reserve in 1968 with the rank of Lt. Col. ■



An Increasing Toll

Terrorism unfortunately has taken its toll on state-to-state relations. Relations between countries can be adversely affected if one country believes that another is failing to provide adequate protection to its diplomats or to live up to its responsibilities. For example, Franco-Turkish and Franco-Spanish relations have suffered because of a perceived laxity in French prosecution and extradition of terrorists. The Dominican Republic Embassy seizure in Bogota in 1980 by the April 19th Movement (M-19), in which 15 senior diplomats were held for 61 days, caused considerable strains in relations between the Government of Colombia and some of the countries whose ambassadors




were held hostage. The recent slayings of Turkish officials in the United States interject strain in an otherwise close U.S.-Turkish relationship.

Also, sponsorship of terrorist acts by one country against another can seriously disrupt diplomatic intercourse and normal relations. Last year, for example, Colombia suspended diplomatic relations with Cuba because of its training in Cuba of Colombian M-19 terrorists. One of the principal reasons for expelling Libyan representatives from Washington was the continuing support by the Qadhafi regime to international terrorist activities, including those directed against U.S. officials. U.S. relations with other countries and groups have been adversely affected by their sponsorship of acts of international terrorism, such as the Letelier assassination in Washington carried out by Chilean agents and the continued resort to international terrorism by various elements of the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO). The disastrous effects of the seizure of American diplomats on U.S.-Iranian relations need no further elaboration.

Countries whose diplomats have been victimized represent a wide range of ideologies, geographic locations, sizes, and wealth. However, all attacks on diplomats have one element in common: All terrorist attacks are acts of political violence. The terrorist is seeking to redress a political grievance, overthrow a political system, or publicize a political point of view. I was a firsthand witness to the events in Bogota which occurred when the M-19 held diplomats from 15 countries hostage in the Embassy of the Dominican Republic for 61 days, demanding publicity for their cause, freedom for imprisoned members of their organization, and ransom. Although the Government of Colombia did not accede to the major terrorist demands, the terrorists did obtain widespread publicity for their cause. A relatively obscure terrorist organization was suddenly catapulted into the international spotlight and thereby increased greatly its prominence within Colombia and internationally.

It is the symbolism of the individual terrorist act, and not necessarily the act itself, which gives it significance. The terrorist uses the act to make a political statement to the target (which is not the

ROCKET ATTACK ON U.S. AMBASSADOR'S MOTORCADE BEIRUT, LEBANON - 1940 Hrs, AUGUST 27, 1980



(SY/Threat Analysis Group)

Security Enhancement Program

victim) and to the world at large. Thus, U.S. diplomats who were held in Tehran for 444 days were used as pawns to advance political objectives internally of the group that held them as well as to achieve objectives with regard to the U.S. Government and to the rest of the world.

While the functions of representation, negotiation, and intelligence gathering continue, embassies are now conducting diplomacy in the face of an increasingly violent environment under conditions never before experienced. The level of security surrounding diplomatic personnel and facilities has been increased to unprecedented levels in an attempt to deter terrorist attacks. As embassy security has become more stringent, it has become more difficult to conduct diplomatic business in a normal fashion. Many embassies now resemble military installations, surrounded by high walls and barbed wire. Buildings are equipped with automatic tear gas dispensers, ballistic glass, and closed-circuit TV. Visitors are searched and made to pass through metal detectors under the scrutiny of armed guards. Embassy personnel are often transported in armored vehicles.

The cost of protecting diplomats abroad has also soared. The Department of State now spends annually about 14% (around \$140 million) of its entire budget on security, and this figure has been rising steadily. This is in addition to protection provided to U.S. diplomatic facilities and personnel overseas by host governments which would cost us an additional \$200 million annually if the U.S. Government had to provide it.

While precautions are certainly necessary, the effect has been a reduction in access and a corresponding reduction in the level of communications between diplomats and the host country, in particular, the people of the country. Diplomats are finding it increasingly difficult to function well in this environment.

Enhanced Security Measures

In 1980, for the first time since 1968 when the U.S. Government first began keeping statistics on terrorism, U.S. diplomats surpassed U.S. businessmen

A dimension has been added to the problem of securing U.S. Embassies in the 1980s—the need to cope with the threat of mob violence. The Department of State's security enhancement program must be aimed at preventing U.S. Embassies from being destroyed, personnel taken hostage or killed, and national security information compromised. Security planning must take into account the possibility that the host government will not provide meaningful protection before the attack or send timely relief during the attack but may even encourage, support, or sponsor the hostile action. Public access controls alone are not sufficient to deny rapid mob penetration into buildings.

In addition to the threat of overt action, U.S. diplomatic installations must be recognized as prime targets of espionage activity by hostile intelligence services. Surreptitious entry into a mission is a constant threat, as is the danger of the placement of electronic surveillance equipment.

The main thrust of the security enhancement program is to establish, at those posts considered most threatened, an environment that will provide the greatest possible degree of safety and security—control barriers; guards and receptionists; bullet-resistant materials, electronically operated locks,

alarms, and communications equipment; package inspection equipment, defensive equipment, and closed circuit TV; perimeter protection in the form of fences, walls, and gates; lighting; reinforcement of entrances, windows, walls, and other exterior features of the building; internal controls; tear gas systems; safe havens which are fire resistant and resist forced penetrations; fire safety equipment; and emergency power and destruction equipment.

Initially proposed as a 5-year program which would cost approximately \$200 million, the Congress appropriated a total of \$42 million for FY 1980 and 1981. Additional appropriations have been requested of \$25 million each for FY 1982 and 1983. Improvements at several posts have already been completed. Major security improvements are to be made at a total of 70 of the most threatened U.S. diplomatic missions, and significant steps are being taken on security at another 55 posts. ■

The U.S. Embassy in San Salvador is heavily fortified—a bunker is on the roof, steel plates reinforce the balconies, a high wall surrounds the building, and armed guards patrol the area. Another high wall circles the entire compound.



(Donna Gigliotti, STATE Magazine)



as the most frequent victims of terrorist attacks overseas, in spite of the fact that U.S. businessmen greatly outnumber U.S. diplomats. To deal with this problem, the United States has undertaken a rigorous campaign to enhance the security of our personnel and facilities overseas. Primarily we are attempting to reduce the vulnerability of our diplomatic missions by constructing perimeter defenses, building secure safe havens to which staff can retreat in the event of an attack, improving access controls, and installing nonlethal entry denial systems. Other protective measures involve added guards, armored cars, and the like. All State Department employees are also required to attend a seminar on "Coping with Violence Abroad" in order to make them aware of security problems and educate them on how to reduce their vulnerability. Intelligence collection and analysis on terrorist groups has been accorded a much higher priority and has paid off in terms of alerting us to possible attacks against our diplomatic personnel and facilities.

Need for International Cooperation

If we are to deal more effectively with this problem over the long run, better international cooperation will be required. While diplomats from the United States, Israel, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, Cuba, and Turkey have been the most frequent targets, terrorism is a complex and universal problem shared by all nations of the world. Virtually no state has been left unaffected by terrorism. Nations must work together to take steps to deter and prevent terrorist violence from escalating. Such necessary steps include a greater exchange of information on terrorists and their movements, tighter controls on the movement of weapons and explosives, and more efficient extradition procedures for accused terrorists.

The international community must also develop a consensus that acts of terrorism should be outlawed and that those who commit them should be brought to justice. The international community took a major step in this regard in 1973 when it adopted the U.N. Convention on the Prevention and

Terrorism and the Foreign Service

In 1981 more than 13,000 people took the written examination for entry into the Foreign Service—about 1,000 more than in 1980. The number of applicants for the 1982 exam, to be given in December, indicates that the numbers will continue to increase. Despite the fact that the U.S. diplomat is a prime target of international terrorists, thousands of talented and able young Americans have not been deterred from seeking a career in the Foreign Service.

Terrorism is, however, a fact of life for those in the service. Families may not accompany employees to some diplomatic posts because of the danger of terrorism. It may be too dangerous to travel in certain areas of other countries because of the threat of ter-

rorism. Obviously assignments to such posts are not always desired—but the posts are staffed.

Foreign Service personnel understand that they are members of a disciplined service and agree that they will serve where they are needed. In addition efforts are made to compensate them for the dangers. They may receive as much as 25% additional pay for assignments to designated high-risk areas. They also benefit from the protection of the Department's security program.

The Department of State recognizes its obligation to provide the most effective representation abroad of the interests of the United States, regardless of terrorism or any other obstacle. ■

"Coping With Violence Abroad"

Most U.S. Government civilian employees serving abroad share one common experience—attendance at the Department of State's seminar on "Coping With Violence Abroad." Presented by the Department's Foreign Service Institute 37 times annually, it attracted more than 3,000 persons in 1981; attendance in 1982 certainly will be higher.

The seminar represents a program which has been in effect since the early 1970s. At that time, when terrorism was first recognized as a problem for U.S. Government operations abroad, the State Department sent mobile training teams to a number of diplomatic posts to brief employees on techniques to minimize the risk of becoming a victim of terrorist acts. The Department then developed a 1-day program in Washington, "The Terrorism Course," for its employees going overseas. That program evolved into a 2-day seminar on "Coping With Violence Abroad" in January 1981.

Early in 1982 it was determined that the seminar could be presented more effectively by splitting it into two parts. One day (in Washington) addresses problems of general concern, such as government policy with regard to terrorism, the effect of terrorism on families, surveillance recognition, hostage

survival, and explosive devices. The second segment, to be in operation by October 1982, will be taken at the employee's post and will deal with more specific problems in the particular area using video cassette training aids prepared by the Foreign Service Institute. This new approach is designed to give new arrivals (all U.S. Government employees and their adult families, regardless of parent agency) at the 253 Foreign Service posts useful information directly related to circumstances where they live and work.

In its various forms, the seminar has been taken by more than 5,000 people. Their comments and reactions have been a major impetus to the continuing reappraisal of the seminar from the point of view of both form and content. A number of persons who took the course and later found themselves in a terrorist situation have stated that they found the information they received in the seminar to have been particularly helpful. Those of the hostages held in Tehran who had taken some version of the earlier course reported that they remembered vividly hostage survival techniques and stated that the information was beneficial to them during their captivity. ■

Punishment of Crimes Against Internationally Protected Persons, Including Diplomatic Agents, commonly referred to as the New York convention. Adhering states must either extradite or prosecute persons alleged to have committed violations of the convention. The conven-

tion's effectiveness, however, has been hampered by the fact that only 53 nations have ratified it.

Recognition of the problem has continued with the adoption of the 1979 U.N. Convention Against the Taking of Hostages, which now has been ratified



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telligence information concerning potential terrorist activities or other threats directed against U.S. Government employees or installations, coordinates protective detail movements throughout the Washington, D.C., area, and provides details with threat-related intelligence concerning the people under protection. (2) The *Threat Analysis Group* researches and analyzes intelligence produced by the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence communities and monitors terrorist activities and related security problems. It also provides intelligence assessments for security planning, selection of preventive and protective measures, and overall security decisionmaking.

Protective Liaison maintains liaison with local, State, and Federal law enforcement and intelligence agencies and the foreign diplomatic and consular corps. It also conducts physical security surveys of foreign diplomatic facilities, when requested, and protective security briefings for foreign dignitaries and security personnel; notifies the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA) and the U.S. Customs Service of the travel of foreign dignitaries, particularly if they are accompanied by armed security personnel; and arranges for the special security needs of foreign diplomatic missions arising from threats, incidents, or official diplomatic functions.

Overseas Operations

Foreign Operations Division develops and implements security programs for the protection of personnel, property, and classified and controlled information at U.S. Foreign Service posts. This includes coordinating post security programs; serving as the point of contact for the regional security officers; reviewing and critiquing emergency planning documents, security surveys, and serious incident reports; and preparing briefings for ambassadors and other senior U.S. Government personnel. It also supervises the U.S. Navy Seabees and the Marine security guards.

Regional Security Officers formulate contingency plans to cope with bomb threats, acts of terrorism, riots and demonstrations, and internal defense; conducts security surveys of official office buildings and residences; provides protective services for potential targets of terrorist organizations, maintaining liaison with local and U.S. law enforcement and intelligence authorities; conducts counterterrorist training and indoctrination programs; and provides operational supervision of the Marine security guards.

Marine Security Guards are enlisted members of the U.S. Marine Corps who are specifically selected and trained for duty at



U.S. diplomatic posts. There are presently 119 Marine security guards detachments located throughout the world. Their primary function is the protection of personnel, property, and classified material. They are also responsible for controlling access by the public to those diplomatic or consular establishments, often using sophisticated technical equipment; for serving as key members of a post's internal defense team; and for maintaining control of emergency communications networks, particularly after normal office hours.

Seabees (U.S. Navy Construction Personnel) are assigned to the Department of State to perform surveillance over construction work and for performing maintenance and construction in sensitive areas.

Technical Services Division plans and administers programs related to the technical defense of Foreign Service establishments against electronic penetration, surreptitious entry, and terrorist attack (utilizing security equipment such as alarms, closed circuit TV systems, locking hardware and remote-controlled locking systems, bullet-resistant materials, intercom systems, metal detectors, package inspection, document destruction equipment, tear gas dispensing systems, and other special protective equipment). It also provides the expertise to formulate policy for technical and physical security, weapons, and personnel protective measures.

Armed Department of State security agents accompany U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton in El Salvador.

Security Enhancement Group provides continuity for all physical security improvements to be made under the security enhancement program. In general it provides trained and experienced personnel for the survey teams that determine what is needed and make recommendations for improvement, develops and tests improved physical security materials and equipment, establishes physical security standards, and coordinates with other offices of the Department concerning these projects.

Education and Training Staff conducts counterterrorism courses for security professionals and other U.S. Government employees, including terrorism, hostage negotiations, and hostage rescue operations; the senior officers counterterrorism briefing; firearms training; counterterrorism, security enhancement, investigations, and guard forces; dignitary protection; and instruction for foreign national guard forces, chauffeurs, and police escorts on dignitary protection, firearms, explosives recognition and emergency response, and emergency driving techniques. It also provides professional training to new special agents of the Office of Security, regional security officers, Marine security guards, and Seabees and is a major contributor to the Department's seminar on "Coping With Violence Abroad." ■

by 17 nations; 22 ratifications are required before the convention enters into force. In 1980 the General Assembly adopted a Resolution on Measures to Enhance the Protection, Security and Safety of Diplomatic and Consular Missions and Representatives, which was reaffirmed last year.

The New York convention and other international agreements relating to the protection of diplomatic personnel and premises are steps in the right direction of establishing an international consensus and body of law outlawing crimes against diplomats. However, they must be strengthened and built on to establish norms of behavior by seeking to discourage nations who would condone and support terrorists and terrorism and to encourage nations to take more seriously their obligations to protect diplomats.

Obligation of Nations

All nations have an obligation to provide protection for diplomats accredited to them. The universally accepted Vienna convention requires states to "take all appropriate steps to prevent attack" on the "person, freedom or dignity" of foreign diplomatic and consular personnel. A violation of this obligation, regardless of the cause, is always disturbing. Of particular concern, however, is state complicity or acquiescence in acts of terrorism directed against diplomatic personnel and facilities. State-sponsored and -supported terrorism, whatever the target, is the most egregious form of terrorism. But when the target is the representative of another country, the act takes on an entirely new dimension and we see an erosion of the principle of diplomatic inviolability.

The Libyan Government is one which has engaged in targeting for violence the diplomats of other countries, specifically the United States. For example, the Government of Libya was behind the sacking of the U.S. Embassy in Tripoli. Last November, Sudanese authorities successfully thwarted a Libyan plot to plant explosive devices in the American Club in Khartoum. The bombs, consisting of two stereo speakers each packed with 20 kilograms of plastic explosives, were intended to explode on a weekend evening when the club would be filled with the families of U.S. Em-

Department of State Security Program

The operational arm of the Department of State against terrorism is the Office of Security. Its primary function is to provide protective security for the personnel and facilities of the agency and the Foreign Service in the United States and abroad and for the protection of certain high-level foreign dignitaries. (Protection of visiting chiefs of state and heads of government is the responsibility of the Secret Service.)

The Office of Security is headed by a Deputy Assistant Secretary, assisted in Washington by a deputy director and four assistant directors. The Deputy Assistant Secretary is assisted abroad by associate directors in specific geographical regions.

Domestic Concerns

Domestic Operations Division plans and administers security programs designed to protect the property and personnel of the Department of State. It conducts security surveys on buildings (guards, alarm systems, access control systems, and closed circuit TV systems); makes arrangements for high-level diplomatic functions, conferences, news events, and high-level visits to the Department of State; oversees preparation of contingency plans; conducts surveys of foreign diplomatic missions, as requested, and at the residences of certain high-ranking State Department officials; and investigates any threats or incidents that occur within the Department or Foreign Service buildings.

Secretary's Detail is responsible for the protection of the Secretary of State anywhere in the world. It is also responsible for the protection of his residence(s) and family, as required.

Dignitary Protection Division provides protection to foreign dignitaries (other than chiefs of state or heads of government) and their families while they are visiting the United States. It also protects selected U.S. officials traveling or assigned abroad, including certain ambassadors in high-threat areas. (The protection of foreign consular personnel in the United States would become an added duty of this division under legislation now pending before the Congress. The legislation would authorize the Department to reimburse State or local police when they are requested to provide extraordinary protection to foreign consular personnel. The Secret Service now provides protection for foreign diplomats stationed in Washington, D.C., and, under an arrangement between the Secret Service and the New York City Police Department, the latter provides protection to diplomatic missions in New York City on a reimbursable basis.)

Command Center has two functional sections which provide a 24-hour, 7-day-a-week emergency operations center, communications to and from protective details, a worldwide security communications network, and threat assessment capability. (1) The *Watch Officer Group* disseminates in-

Marine Corps guards are vital elements to the security of U.S. diplomatic missions.



(International Communication Agency)



telligence information concerning potential terrorist activities or other threats directed against U.S. Government employees or installations, coordinates protective detail movements throughout the Washington, D.C., area, and provides details with threat-related intelligence concerning the people under protection. (2) The *Threat Analysis Group* researches and analyzes intelligence produced by the U.S. intelligence and counterintelligence communities and monitors terrorist activities and related security problems. It also provides intelligence assessments for security planning, selection of preventive and protective measures, and overall security decisionmaking.

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(International Communication Agency)

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Technical Services Division plans and administers programs related to the technical defense of Foreign Service establishments against electronic penetration, surreptitious entry, and terrorist attack (utilizing security equipment such as alarms, closed circuit TV systems, locking hardware and remote-controlled locking systems, bullet-resistant materials, intercom systems, metal detectors, package inspection, document destruction equipment, tear gas dispensing systems, and other special protective equipment). It also provides the expertise to formulate policy for technical and physical security, weapons, and personnel protective measures.

Armed Department of State security agents accompany U.S. Ambassador Deane Hinton in El Salvador.

Security Enhancement Group provides continuity for all physical security improvements to be made under the security enhancement program. In general it provides trained and experienced personnel for the survey teams that determine what is needed and make recommendations for improvement, develops and tests improved physical security materials and equipment, establishes physical security standards, and coordinates with other offices of the Department concerning these projects.

Education and Training Staff conducts counterterrorism courses for security professionals and other U.S. Government employees, including terrorism, hostage negotiations, and hostage rescue operations; the senior officers counterterrorism briefing; firearms training; counterterrorism, security enhancement, investigations, and guard forces; dignitary protection; and instruction for foreign national guard forces, chauffeurs, and police escorts on dignitary protection, firearms, explosives recognition and emergency response, and emergency driving techniques. It also provides professional training to new special agents of the Office of Security, regional security officers, Marine security guards, and Seabees and is a major contributor to the Department's seminar on "Coping With Violence Abroad." ■

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bassy staff and other Americans. Bombs of this size could have completely destroyed the club, killing or maiming scores of people, including third-country diplomats who use the club. We know that these devices were prepared by Libyan intelligence officers assigned to a Libyan People's Bureau in a neighboring country and that a Libyan intelligence officer personally insured that the bombs were loaded on a flight to Khartoum.

Outlook

This is a bleak picture of the current situation regarding diplomats and terrorism. What can be done to alleviate this problem? The problem is one of increasing intensity and the future, unfortunately, does not look any brighter. Attacks on diplomats have proven to be extremely cost effective for the amount of worldwide attention they generate and for that reason they are likely to continue.

Obviously, we will have to continue to do more of what we have been doing (e.g., more and better intelligence and more effective security measures and procedures), although one eventually reaches the point of diminishing returns. At the same time, like-minded nations must intensify ways of improving cooperation among themselves with a view to reducing the disruption caused by terrorism to international relations and stability, particularly with regard to the protection of diplomatic premises and staff.

Governments which sponsor or condone acts of terrorism against diplomats must be made to understand that such conduct will not be tolerated by the international community. Likewise, everything possible must be done to bring to justice swiftly those perpetrators of heinous crimes against the civilized world. The challenge of preventing attacks against diplomats and the disruption of diplomatic intercourse must be a topic high on the agenda of the world community. ■

Guidelines for U.S. Government Employees Taken Hostage

U.S. Government personnel serving abroad are expected to be mature, responsible, and patriotic individuals for whom the concept of service has a real and personal meaning.

Individuals who are taken hostage should be aware that their captors may seek to exploit them. Their captors may be seeking information to be used to the detriment of the United States or of their fellow hostages, and are likely to use information obtained from one captive when interrogating another. Individuals should consequently be guided by the knowledge that whatever they say may be used to mislead or punish their colleagues and that their actions may result in reprisals.

Captured individuals should not discuss sensitive aspects of the work of their fellow hostages. They should not divulge classified

or sensitive information. They should not sign or make statements or take actions which they believe might bring discredit to the United States.

The decision to attempt escape rests with the individual concerned. However, the decision should be consistent with the considerations set above.

Hard and fast rules are not always helpful, and the U.S. Government recognizes that the ability of individuals to resist extreme pressure differs. But to the extent possible one must help one's colleagues and avoid exploitation. Sound judgment is essential.

Approved June 24, 1982
by the Secretary of State ■

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TASK FORCE ROUTING SHEET

Date of Receipt | 30 Sept | Router's Initials | RE

Remarks: The Marine Corps' response to the DoD memo.

Holloway	A	I	
Peck	A	(I)	
Coy	A	(I)	Ch
Boink	A	(I)	
Cole	A	(I)	Cole
Daly	A	(I)	Daly
Earl	A	I	
Hutchings	A	(I)	But
McMunn	A	(I)	M
Jamiese	A	I	
	A	I	
	A	I	
	A	I	

Deadline Date: Return to Bob Earl after routing

Incoming Chrono File:

Data Base Keyword(s):

Filer: Out

Subject Working File:

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

onomic Origins of the Constitution; Andrew McLaughlin, A Constitutional History of the United States; J. T. Main, The Anti-Federalists: Critics of the Constitution, 1781-1788; Clinton Rossiter, The Grand Convention.]

ALFRED H. KELLY

CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES

PREAMBLE

WE THE PEOPLE of the United States, in Order to form a more perfect Union, establish Justice, insure domestic Tranquility, provide for the common defence, promote the general Welfare, and secure the Blessings of Liberty to ourselves and our Posterity, do ordain and establish this Constitution for the United States of America.

ARTICLE I

Section 1. All legislative Powers herein granted shall be vested in a Congress of the United States, which shall consist of a Senate and House of Representatives.

Section 2. The House of Representatives shall be composed of Members chosen every second Year by the People of the several States, and the Electors in each State shall have the Qualifications requisite for Electors of the most numerous Branch of the State Legislature.

No Person shall be a Representative who shall not have attained to the age of twenty five Years, and been seven Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State in which he shall be chosen.

Representatives and direct Taxes shall be apportioned among the several States which may be included within this Union, according to their respective Numbers, which shall be determined by adding to the whole Number of free Persons, including those bound to Service for a Term of Years, and excluding Indians not taxed, three fifths of all other Persons. The actual Enumeration shall be made within three Years after the first Meeting of the Congress of the United States, and within every subsequent Term of ten Years, in such Manner as they shall by Law direct. The Number of Representatives shall not exceed one for every thirty Thousand, but each State shall have at Least one Representative; and until such enumeration shall be made, the State of New Hampshire shall be entitled to chuse three, Massachusetts eight, Rhode-Island and Providence Plantations one,

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Connecticut five, New-York six, New Jersey four, Pennsylvania eight, Delaware one, Maryland six, Virginia ten, North Carolina five, South Carolina five, and Georgia three.

When vacancies happen in the Representation from any State, the Executive Authority thereof shall issue Writs of Election to fill such Vacancies.

The House of Representatives shall chuse the Speaker and other Officers; and shall have the sole Power of Impeachment.

Section 3. The Senate of the United States shall be composed of two Senators from each State, chosen by the Legislature thereof, for six Years; and each Senator shall have one Vote.

Immediately after they shall be assembled in Consequence of the first Election, they shall be divided as equally as may be into three Classes. The Seats of the Senators of the first Class shall be vacated at the Expiration of the second Year, of the second Class at the Expiration of the fourth Year, and of the third Class at the Expiration of the sixth Year, so that one third may be chosen every second Year; and if Vacancies happen by Resignation, or otherwise, during the recess of the Legislature of any State, the Executive thereof may make temporary Appointments until the next Meeting of the Legislature, which shall then fill such Vacancies.

No Person shall be a Senator who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty Years, and been nine Years a Citizen of the United States, and who shall not, when elected, be an Inhabitant of that State for which he shall be chosen.

The Vice-President of the United States shall be President of the Senate, but shall have no Vote, unless they be equally divided.

The Senate shall chuse their other Officers, and also a President pro tempore, in the Absence of the Vice-President, or when he shall exercise the Office of President of the United States.

The Senate shall have the sole Power to try all Impeachments. When sitting for that Purpose, they shall be on Oath or Affirmation. When the President of the United States is tried, the Chief Justice shall preside: And no Person shall be convicted without the Concurrence of two thirds of the Members present.

Judgment in Cases of Impeachment shall not extend further than to removal from Office, and disqualification to hold and enjoy any Office of honor, Trust or Profit under the United States: but the Party convicted shall nevertheless be liable and subject to Indictment, Trial, Judgment and Punishment, according to Law.

Section 4. The Times, Places and Manner of holding Elections for Senators and Representatives, shall be prescribed in each State by the Legislature thereof; but the Congress may at any time by Law make or alter such Regulations, except as to the Places of chusing Senators.

The Congress shall assemble at least once in every Year, and such Meeting shall be on the first Monday in December, unless they shall by Law appoint a different Day.

Section 5. Each House shall be the Judge of the Elections, Returns and Qualifications of its own Members, and a Majority of each shall constitute a Quorum to do Business; but a smaller Number may adjourn from day to day and may be authorized to compel the Attendance of absent Members, in such Manner, and under such Penalties as each House may provide.

Each House may determine the Rules of its Proceedings, punish its Members for disorderly Behaviour, and, with the Concurrence of two thirds, expel a Member.

Each House shall keep a Journal of its Proceedings, and from time to time publish the same, excepting such Parts as may in their Judgment require Secrecy; and the Yeas and Nays of the Members of either House on any question shall, at the Desire of one fifth of those Present, be entered on the Journal.

Neither House, during the Session of Congress, shall, without the Consent of the other, adjourn for more than three days, nor to any other Place than that in which the two Houses shall be sitting.

Section 6. The Senators and Representatives shall receive a Compensation for their Services, to be ascertained by Law, and paid out of the Treasury of the United States. They shall in all Cases, except Treason, Felony and Breach of the Peace, be privileged from Arrest during their Attendance at the Session of their respective Houses, and in going to and returning from the same; and for any Speech or Debate in either House, they shall not be questioned in any other Place.

No Senator or Representative shall, during the Time for which he was elected, be appointed to any civil Office under the Authority of the United States, which shall have been created, or the Emoluments whereof shall have been increased during such time; and no Person holding any Office under the United States, shall be a Member of either House during his Continuance in Office.

Section 7. All Bills for raising Revenue shall originate in the House of Representatives; but the Senate

may propose or concur with Amendments as on other Bills.

Every Bill which shall have passed the House of Representatives and the Senate, shall, before it become a Law, be presented to the President of the United States; If he approve he shall sign it, but if not he shall return it, with his Objections to that House in which it shall have originated, who shall enter the Objections at large on their Journal, and proceed to reconsider it. If after such Reconsideration two thirds of that House shall agree to pass the Bill, it shall be sent, together with the Objections, to the other House, by which it shall likewise be reconsidered, and if approved by two thirds of that House, it shall become a Law. But in all such Cases the Votes of both Houses shall be determined by yeas and Nays, and the Names of the Persons voting for and against the Bill shall be entered on the Journal of each House respectively. If any Bill shall not be returned by the President within ten Days (Sundays excepted) after it shall have been presented to him, the Same shall be a Law, in like Manner as if he had signed it, unless the Congress by their Adjournment prevent its Return, in which Case it shall not be a Law.

Every Order, Resolution, or Vote to which the Concurrence of the Senate and House of Representatives may be necessary (except on a question of Adjournment) shall be presented to the President of the United States; and before the Same shall take Effect, shall be approved by him, or being disapproved by him, shall be repassed by two thirds of the Senate and House of Representatives, according to the Rules and Limitations prescribed in the Case of a Bill.

Section 8. The Congress shall have Power To lay and collect Taxes, Duties, Imposts and Excises, to pay the Debts and provide for the common Defence and general Welfare of the United States; but all Duties, Imposts and Excises shall be uniform throughout the United States;

To borrow Money on the credit of the United States;

To regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian Tribes;

To establish a uniform Rule of Naturalization, and uniform Laws on the subject of Bankruptcies throughout the United States;

To coin Money, regulate the Value thereof, and of foreign Coin, and fix the Standard of Weights and Measures;

To provide for the Punishment of counterfeiting the Securities and current Coin of the United States;

To establish Post Offices and post Roads;

To promote the Progress of Science and useful Arts, by securing for limited Times to Authors and Inventors the exclusive Right to their respective Writings and Discoveries;

To constitute Tribunals inferior to the supreme Court;

To define and punish Piracies and Felonies committed on the high Seas, and Offences against the Law of Nations;

To declare War, grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal, and make Rules concerning Captures on Land and Water;

To raise and support Armies, but no Appropriation of Money to that Use shall be for a longer Term than two Years;

To provide and maintain a Navy;

To make Rules for the Government and Regulation of the land and naval Forces;

To provide for calling for the Militia to execute the Laws of the Union, suppress Insurrections and repel Invasions;

To provide for organizing, arming, and disciplining, the Militia, and for governing such Part of them as may be employed in the Service of the United States, reserving to the States respectively, the Appointment of the Officers, and the Authority of training the Militia according to the discipline prescribed by Congress;

To exercise exclusive Legislation in all Cases whatsoever, over such District (not exceeding ten Miles square) as may, by Cession of particular States, and the Acceptance of Congress, become the Seat of the Government of the United States, and to exercise like Authority over all Places purchased by the Consent of the Legislature of the State in which the Same shall be, for the Erection of Forts, Magazines, Arsenals, dock-Yards, and other needful Buildings;—And

To make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any Department or Officer thereof.

Section 9. The Migration or Importation of such Persons as any of the States now existing shall think proper to admit, shall not be prohibited by the Congress prior to the Year one thousand eight hundred and eight, but a Tax or duty may be imposed on such Importation, not exceeding ten dollars for each Person.

The Privilege of the Writ of Habeas Corpus shall not be suspended, unless when in Cases of Rebellion or Invasion the public Safety may require it.

No Bill of Attainder or ex post facto Law shall be passed.

No Capitation, or other direct, Tax shall be laid, unless in Proportion to the Census or Enumeration herein before directed to be taken.

No Tax or Duty shall be laid on Articles exported from any State.

No Preference shall be given by any Regulation of Commerce or Revenue to the Ports of one State over those of another: nor shall Vessels bound to, or from, one State, be obliged to enter, clear or pay Duties in another.

No Money shall be drawn from the Treasury, but in Consequence of Appropriations made by Law; and a regular Statement and Account of the Receipts and Expenditures of all public Money shall be published from time to time.

No Title of Nobility shall be granted by the United States: And no Person holding any Office of Profit or Trust under them, shall, without the Consent of the Congress, accept of any present, Emolument, Office, or Title, of any kind whatever, from any King, Prince, or foreign State.

Section 10. No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation; grant Letters of Marque and Reprisal; coin Money; emit Bills of Credit; make any Thing but gold and silver Coin a Tender in Payment of Debts; pass any Bill of Attainder, ex post facto Law, or Law impairing the Obligation of Contracts, or grant any Title of Nobility.

No State shall, without the Consent of the Congress, lay any Imposts or Duties on Imports or Exports, except what may be absolutely necessary for executing its inspection Laws: and the net Produce of all Duties and Imposts, laid by any State on Imports or Exports, shall be for the Use of the Treasury of the United States; and all such Laws shall be subject to the Revision and Controul of the Congress.

No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, lay any Duty of Tonnage, keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another state, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay.

ARTICLE II

Section 1. The executive Power shall be vested in a President of the United States of America. He shall hold his Office during the Term of four Years, and, together with the Vice-President, chosen for the same Term, be elected, as follows.

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Each State shall appoint, in such Manner as the Legislature thereof may direct, a Number of Electors, equal to the whole Number of Senators and Representatives to which the State may be entitled in the Congress: but no Senator or Representative, or Person holding an Office of Trust or Profit under the United States, shall be appointed an Elector.

The Electors shall meet in their respective States, and vote by Ballot for two Persons, of whom one at least shall not be an Inhabitant of the same State with themselves. And they shall make a List of all the Persons voted for, and of the Number of Votes for each; which List they shall sign and certify, and transmit sealed to the Seat of the Government of the United States, directed to the President of the Senate. The President of the Senate shall, in the Presence of the Senate and House of Representatives, open all the Certificates, and the Votes shall then be counted. The Person having the greatest Number of Votes shall be the President, if such Number be a Majority of the whole Number of Electors appointed; and if there be more than one who have such Majority, and have an equal Number of Votes, then the House of Representatives shall immediately chuse by Ballot one of them for President; and if no Person have a Majority, then from the five highest on the List the said House shall in like Manner chuse the President. But in chusing the President, the Votes shall be taken by States, the Representation from each State having one Vote; A quorum for this Purpose shall consist of a Member or Members from two thirds of the States, and a Majority of all the States shall be necessary to a Choice. In every Case, after the Choice of the President, the Person having the greatest Number of Votes of the Electors shall be the Vice-President. But if there should remain two or more who have equal Votes, the Senate shall chuse from them by Ballot the Vice-President.

The Congress may determine the Time of chusing the Electors, and the Day on which they shall give their Votes; which Day shall be the same throughout the United States.

No Person except a natural born Citizen, or a Citizen of the United States, at the time of the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be eligible to the Office of President; neither shall any Person be eligible to that Office who shall not have attained to the Age of thirty five Years, and been fourteen Years a Resident within the United States.

In Case of the Removal of the President from Office, or of his Death, Resignation, or Inability to discharge the Powers and Duties of the said Office,

the Same shall devolve on the Vice-President, and the Congress may by Law provide for the Case of Removal, Death, Resignation or Inability, both of the President and Vice-President, declaring what Officer shall then act as President, and such Officer shall act accordingly, until the Disability be removed, or a President shall be elected.

The President shall, at stated Times, receive for his Services, a Compensation, which shall neither be increased nor diminished during the Period for which he shall have been elected, and he shall not receive within that Period any other Emolument from the United States, or any of them.

Before he enter on the Execution of his Office, he shall take the following Oath or Affirmation:—"I do solemnly swear (or affirm) that I will faithfully execute the Office of President of the United States, and will to the best of my Ability, preserve, protect and defend the Constitution of the United States."

Section 2. The President shall be Commander in Chief of the Army and Navy of the United States, and of the Militia of the several States, when called into the actual Service of the United States; he may require the Opinion, in writing, of the principal Officer in each of the executive Departments, upon any Subject relating to the Duties of their respective Offices, and he shall have Power to grant Reprieves and Pardons for Offences against the United States, except in Cases of Impeachment.

He shall have Power, by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, to make Treaties, provided two thirds of the Senators present concur; and he shall nominate, and by and with the Advice and Consent of the Senate, shall appoint Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, Judges of the supreme Court, and all other Officers of the United States, whose Appointments are not herein otherwise provided for, and which shall be established by Law: but the Congress may by Law vest the Appointment of such inferior Officers, as they think proper, in the President alone, in the Courts of Law, or in the Heads of Departments.

The President shall have Power to fill up all Vacancies that may happen during the Recess of the Senate, by granting Commissions which shall expire at the End of their next Session.

Section 3. He shall from time to time give to the Congress Information of the State of the Union, and recommend to their Consideration such Measures as he shall judge necessary and expedient; he may, on extraordinary Occasions, convene both Houses, or either of them, and in Case of Disagreement between them, with Respect to the Time of Adjournment, he

may adjourn them to such Time as he shall think proper; he shall receive Ambassadors and other public Ministers; he shall take Care that the Laws be faithfully executed, and shall Commission all the Officers of the United States.

Section 4. The President, Vice-President and all civil Officers of the United States, shall be removed from Office on Impeachment for, and Conviction of, Treason, Bribery, or other high Crimes and Misdemeanors.

ARTICLE III

Section 1. The judicial Power of the United States, shall be vested in one supreme Court, and in such inferior Courts as the Congress may from time to time ordain and establish. The Judges, both of the supreme and inferior Courts, shall hold their Offices during good Behaviour, and shall, at stated Times, receive for their Services, a Compensation, which shall not be diminished during their Continuance in Office.

Section 2. The judicial Power shall extend to all Cases, in Law and Equity, arising under this Constitution, the Laws of the United States, and Treaties made, or which shall be made, under their Authority;—to all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls;—to all Cases of admiralty and maritime Jurisdiction;—to Controversies to which the United States shall be a party;—to Controversies between two or more States;—between a State and Citizens of another State;—between Citizens of different States;—between Citizens of the same State claiming Lands under Grants of different States, and between a State, or the Citizens thereof, and foreign States, Citizens or Subjects.

In all Cases affecting Ambassadors, other public Ministers and Consuls, and those in which a State shall be Party, the supreme Court shall have original Jurisdiction. In all the other Cases before mentioned, the supreme Court shall have appellate Jurisdiction, both as to Law and Fact, with such Exceptions, and under such Regulations as the Congress shall make.

The Trial of all Crimes, except in Cases of Impeachment, shall be by Jury; and such Trial shall be held in the State where the said Crimes shall have been committed; but when not committed within any State, the Trial shall be at such Place or Places as the Congress may by Law have directed.

Section 3. Treason against the United States, shall consist only in levying War against them, or in adhering to their Enemies, giving them Aid and Comfort.

No Person shall be convicted of Treason unless on the Testimony of two Witnesses to the same overt Act, or on Confession in open Court.

The Congress shall have Power to declare the Punishment of Treason, but no Attainder of Treason shall work Corruption of Blood, or Forfeiture except during the Life of the Person attainted.

ARTICLE IV

Section 1. Full Faith and Credit shall be given in each State to the public Acts, Records, and judicial Proceedings of every other State. And the Congress may by general Laws prescribe the Manner in which such Acts, Records and Proceedings shall be proved, and the Effect thereof.

Section 2. The Citizens of each State shall be entitled to all Privileges and Immunities of Citizens in the several States.

A Person charged in any State with Treason, Felony, or other Crime, who shall flee from Justice, and be found in another State, shall on Demand of the executive Authority of the State from which he fled, be delivered up, to be removed to the State having Jurisdiction of the Crime.

No Person held to Service or Labour in one State, under the Laws thereof, escaping into another, shall, in Consequence of any Law or Regulation therein, be discharged from such Service or Labour, but shall be delivered up on Claim of the Party to whom such Service or Labour may be due.

Section 3. New States may be admitted by the Congress into this Union; but no new States shall be formed or erected within the Jurisdiction of any other State; nor any State be formed by the Junction of two or more States, or Parts of States, without the Consent of the Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.

The Congress shall have Power to dispose of and make all needful Rules and Regulations respecting the Territory or other Property belonging to the United States; and nothing in this Constitution shall be so construed as to Prejudice any Claims of the United States, or of any particular State.

Section 4. The United States shall guarantee to every State in this Union a Republican Form of Government, and shall protect each of them against Invasion; and on Application of the Legislature, or of the Executive (when the Legislature cannot be convened) against domestic Violence.

ARTICLE V

The Congress, whenever two thirds of both Houses shall deem it necessary, shall propose Amendments to this Constitution, or, on the Application of the Legislatures of two thirds of the several States, shall call a Convention for proposing Amendments, which, in either Case, shall be valid to all Intents and Purposes, as Part of this Constitution, when ratified by the Legislatures of three fourths of the several States, or by Conventions in three fourths thereof, as the one or the other Mode of Ratification may be proposed by the Congress; Provided that no Amendment which may be made prior to the Year One thousand eight hundred and eight shall in any Manner affect the first and fourth Clauses in the Ninth Section of the first Article; and that no State, without its Consent, shall be deprived of its equal Suffrage in the Senate.

ARTICLE VI

All Debts contracted and Engagements entered into, before the Adoption of this Constitution, shall be as valid against the United States under this Constitution, as under the Confederation.

This Constitution, and the Laws of the United States which shall be made in Pursuance thereof; and all Treaties made, or which shall be made, under the Authority of the United States, shall be the supreme Law of the Land; and the Judges in every State shall be bound thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to the Contrary notwithstanding.

The Senators and Representatives before mentioned, and the Members of the several State Legislatures, and all executive and judicial Officers, both of the United States and of the several States, shall be bound by Oath or Affirmation, to support this Constitution; but no religious Test shall ever be required as a Qualification to any Office or public Trust under the United States.

ARTICLE VII

The Ratification of the Conventions of nine States, shall be sufficient for the Establishment of this Constitution between the States so ratifying the Same.

done in Convention by the Unanimous Consent of the States present the Seventeenth Day of September in the Year of our Lord one thousand seven


hundred and Eighty seven and of the Independence of the United States of America the Twelfth
In witness whereof We have hereunto subscribed our Names,

G^o Washington—Presid^t
and deputy from Virginia


- New Hampshire { John Langdon
Nicholas Gilman
- Massachusetts { Nathaniel Gorham
Rufus King
- Connecticut { W^m Sam^l Johnson
Roger Sherman
- New York Alexander Hamilton
- New Jersey { Wil: Livingston
David Brearley.
W^m Paterson.
Jona: Dayton
- Pennsylvania { B Franklin
Thomas Mifflin
Rob^t Morris
Geo. Clymer
Tho^s FitzSimons
Jared Ingersoll
James Wilson
Gouv Morris
- Delaware { Geo: Read
Gunning Bedford jun
John Dickinson
Richard Bassett
Jaco: Broom
- Maryland { James M^cHenry
Dan of S^t Tho^s Jenifer
Dan^l Carroll
- Virginia { John Blair—
James Madison Jr.
- North Carolina { W^m Blount
Rich^d Dobbs Spaight.
Hu Williamson
- South Carolina { J. Rutledge
Charles Cotesworth Pinckney
Charles Pinckney
Pierce Butler.
- Georgia { William Few
Abr Baldwin




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ACHILLE LAURO

The above documents were not referred for declassification review at time of processing

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- B-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA]
- B-2 Release would disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA]
- B-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA]
- B-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA]
- B-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA]
- B-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA]
- B-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA]
- B-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA]

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

U.S. IMMIGRATION POLICY AND THE NATIONAL INTEREST

As a "new immigration" confronts this country with characteristics quite different from immigration of the past, American policy responses must be molded from a new appreciation of the changing global environment.

BY GEORGES FAURIOL


The security of the United States has suffered in the past as a result of the government's impotency in the face of massive illegal immigration, and it will continue to suffer as the situation increasingly worsens. Employment levels, domestic political cohesion, national resources, and the global standing of the United States can all be adversely affected by the current state of U.S. immigration policy. If these concerns are not addressed forthwith, there is a real danger that relative government inaction will be followed by public overreaction.

One of the primary reasons for the lack of attention paid to effective immigration policy in the past is the sensitivity of the subject. After all, the imageries of the United States as a nation of immigrants are both powerful and accurate. The very fabric of American society has been affected by it. However, these imageries most likely refer to a world environment that no longer exists. The extent of annual illegal immigration into the United States—approximately 650,000 in lean years—and the political, economic, and social ramifications suggest a dangerous anomaly. A gap has developed between the symbols of a "nation of immigrants" and the realities of the "huddled masses yearning

to be free."

In focusing on the significance of immigration policy to the national interest of the United States, it is necessary to note two aspects of current U.S. immigration policy that adversely affect the security and development of other nations. The "drain" of skilled professionals and proponents of political freedom from many Third World nations, encouraged in large part by U.S. immigration policy, undermines the human pool of political and economic talent of those countries. Conceivably, it enriches our own. The irony is that the economic and political changes required of Third World countries are likely to be delayed if migration to the United States remains an integral aspect of Third World development policy.

Looking over the horizon, the implications of this for the United States are serious though uncertain. As this country speeds toward the twenty-first century, one has to express considerable alarm at the laid-back attitude regarding migration flows to American shores. The linkage with foreign policy and national security is not always a direct one; it is a delicate process, and, above all, one difficult to articulate. To dismiss a relationship between immigration and foreign and security



politics suggests ignorance of the interrelationships present in the world today—a world whose future trends will not always be favorable to the United States.

A GLANCE TO THE FUTURE

Few politicians see any political capital in the immigration policy issue. As an editorial writer in *The Journal of Commerce* put it recently, "Immigration policy has little appeal for most politicians. While they are not unaware of the disastrous long-run consequences of doing nothing, they see nothing but grief in taking action now." Current U.S. immigration policy is a national disgrace. The beneficiaries of this policy remain politically powerful, unwilling to put aside narrow, special interests for the national good. Those pushing for reform, while enjoying overwhelming public support, do not have sufficient financial or organizational clout to effectively translate this support into action.

The long-run implications of our current "head in the sand" attitude about maintaining de facto open borders are indeed serious. They go to the heart of our security as a nation, our domestic political unity, our economic prosperity, and our role in the international system. Illegal immigration is by its very nature causing pressures beyond those associated with heavy immigration flows in particular and population growth in general.

Opposition to "open borders" or support for immigration reform has for too long been erroneously characterized as representative of a return to "nativism," of an emerging racism. This has led to an unwillingness to examine the more serious and important aspects of U.S. immigration policy.

Though we cannot predict the future, we can, with a certain amount of common sense, glance toward the turn to the twenty-first century and see what the national landscape would look like without modification of U.S.

immigration policy. It is from this perspective that immigration policy should probably be shaped. This involves not only an examination of the effects of illegal immigration today but, more importantly, forecasting what the future will bring if the pressures persist.

First, what portion of the 800 to 900 million new job seekers in the developing world between 1980 and 2000 will the United States be forced to accept as a result of porous borders?

Second, will the 15 million Americans earning minimum wages, who compete directly with many illegal aliens for employment, be better or worse off if the system of illegal immigration continues and worsens?

Third, will respect for the laws of the United States, for the integrity of its national sovereignty, be strengthened by perpetuating a weak system of immigration law enforcement?

Fourth, will creation of enclaves of often second-class citizens, speaking only their native tongue, contribute to the political and linguistic cohesion of the country?

Fifth, will the blurring of the distinction between citizen and non-citizen, between lawful and unlawful resident, undermine the integrity of the electoral process and the legal fabric that holds the nation together?

Sixth, will immigration at current levels (nearly 1.5 million annually) contribute to the energy security of the United States, when projections indicate that the growth from legal immigration alone from 1982 to 1992 could consume an amount of energy costing \$88 billion annually?

Seventh, will the addition of tens of millions of immigrants to the country over the next few generations improve our chances to conserve our natural resources, reduce our foreign oil dependence, and secure a high standard of living at a sustainable resource use rate?

Finally, will U.S. foreign policy remain coherent and independent and able to best serve the national interest if the decisions concerning who enters

this country and uses its resources are strongly influenced by other governments and their populations?

These are serious questions. To dismiss them is shortsighted and would, in fact, suggest that the United States has the luxury of choice and time regarding immigration policy concerns. The new international environment of the 1980s, the recent energy crises, the vulnerable American hold on the global financial system, and the changing structure of the United States domestic economy may imply the opposite. The manner in which immigration and refugee considerations interact in the above mix cannot be underestimated.

Without sovereign control over national borders, the United States can lose control over the size and nature of its labor force, population size, and linguistic and political unity. Furthermore, the size of the nation's population will determine the adequacy of natural resources and the extent to which damages to the environment can be mitigated. This in turn will influence the productivity of the economy and the ability of the United States to compete successfully internationally. Finally, U.S. foreign policy may be greatly undermined by a continuation of the currently fluid nature of immigration policy; foreign powers will increasingly use the emigration threat to induce U.S. concessions or threaten retaliation should the United States move to strengthen its immigration statutes.


The nature of immigration policy can most likely no longer remain the exclusive domain of current dominant special interests. All things considered, immigration policy must be related to broad economic, demographic, and foreign policy themes. As was pointed out in "Illegal Immigration: Challenge to the United States" (a report of the Immigration Policy Panel of the Economic Policy Council of the UNA-USA, December 1981), "Control over entry by noncitizens is one of the two or three universal attributes of nation states."

While much attention has been paid to the domestic economic impacts of immigration, little has been said concerning its relationship with the emerging international economic and political context in which the United States finds itself. In addition, the disruptive effects of uncontrolled immigration on the political unity of the nation has also largely been ignored. The evidence is very strong that the international push factors generating illicit and legal immigration are among the most powerful contemporary factors in international affairs. Thus, the context in which traditional or historical migration to the United States has occurred is no longer relevant to the current global situation. The myths of the past must be discarded for the realities of the present.

U.S. international economic policy and success in competing overseas will depend in large part upon increases in U.S. economic productivity, including a highly trained work force, and increased business investment. Immigration, both legal and illegal, may in the future create a permanent underclass of unskilled workers, many of whom will remain unemployed.

Also, there is a concern that the growing use of racial or ethnic political power blocs in the United States will foster a divisiveness within American society. This issue is not stated here lightly. Since the 1970s, for example, bilingualism has become a highly visible public agenda in schools, governments, and media. Its relationship with present trends of large migration flows of people from Spanish-speaking countries is obvious. Ethnic power group manipulation of U.S. foreign policy is nothing new. Will a nation divided along ethnic or linguistic lines be a united nation, able to carry on a bipartisan and consistent foreign policy?

Finally, uncontrolled immigration is resulting in foreign countries using migration as a foreign policy weapon. Cuba and Vietnam, most notably, have sent their political dissidents, criminals, and espionage agents to the



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United States in the knowledge that the U.S. government is currently unable to control immigration into this country. Furthermore, hostile governments are patently aware of the destabilizing effects such influxes may have on the "recipient countries," thereby enabling them to create a massive liability for their opposition.

**THE NEW MIGRATION:
THE POPULATION BOMB
REDISCOVERED**

Because of the rich folklore surrounding the question of immigration, it is difficult to come to grips with the new realities that confront the United States. As a result, current U.S. immigration policy remains rooted in the convenient mythology of the nineteenth century.

When the United States was empty, with no functional frontiers, it needed immigrants to fill the continent. Those days are gone, yet the myth lingers on. The vast continent is now filled with migrants from every corner of the globe. America's bounty has been replaced by dramatically high unemployment, scarce supplies of natural resources, severe problems of economic productivity, and divisions within the social fabric.

So, too, has the entire world changed. Instead of 1 billion, the world population now exceeds 4.8 billion. The Brandt Commission and the Global 2000 Report have warned of the growing incompatibility between increased numbers of people, the supporting natural resource base, and environmental deterioration. Endemic poverty, historically unprecedented levels of unemployment, and related political and civil unrest are emerging as major world forces, with massive international migration a prominent result.

In the developing world, there are over 3.5 billion people. The populations of Panama, Costa Rica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Nicaragua, and Honduras, for example, have grown from 9 million in 1950 to nearly 25 million today; by the year 2000, the numbers will have swelled to 40 million and then to 70 million by the year 2025. The potential migrants to the United States through the rest of the century have already been born; over the next two decades, they will emerge into the labor force of the Third World nations with an explosive power far beyond anything previously experienced by humankind. Those people born between now and the end of the century are simply the tidal wave of the labor force explosion of the twenty-first cen-

ture.

The annual growth in the populations of the Third World nations from which illegal and legal immigrants are coming has not receded—in fact, the annual increase in both overall population and the labor force has continued to increase in gross numbers throughout this period. For example, in 1963 it was projected that Mexico's population by 1980 would grow to 70.6 million; the actual number reached was nearly 72 million, not including the suspected 3 to 4 million Mexicans living in the United States illegally. With respect to the labor force, the region of Central America and the Caribbean as well as South America is adding 4.5 million people to its labor force every year. Though the region has only one-third the overall GNP the United States has, it adds twice as many workers to its working-age population every year.

Even in the face of these increas-


ingly worrisome push factors, important elements of American society continue to press for open borders. For example, Atlantic Richfield's executive vice-president, Ralph Cocks, states that, because Mexico has "all that population growth," they must have an outlet. The United States, says Cocks, "is a natural outlet in that we will have a labor shortage in the next two decades." Similarly, the United Methodist's Council of Bishops has requested that the United States impose no numerical limitations on immigration from Mexico and Canada, make all public services available to illegal residents, and allow employers to continue to hire those unlawfully in the United States. In addition, the Institute for Policy Studies is organizing what it terms "Third World communities" in the United States around immigration issues, asserting that people have the "right to emigrate" to the United States. In

effect, these organizations, and many like them, are threatening the security of the United States.


IMPLICATIONS FOR THE UNITED STATES

There is undisputed evidence that the flow of both legal and illegal immigration, including border crossings and overstays, is increasing dramatically. For example, twenty years ago, the total number of apprehended aliens seeking admission to the United States was under 40,000 per year. By 1970, that number had grown to over 260,000, and by the end of 1983 had grown in excess of 1.3 million. It is indicative of the unfortunate state of current U.S. immigration policy that the number of agents on duty at any one time actively seeking to stop illegal migration has gone up only marginally throughout this same period.

U.S. Population Projections at Varying Levels of Immigration



U.S. Unemployment Projections at Varying Levels of Immigration



Both of the graphs above show five different immigration scenarios. The upper line represents the case where 2 million immigrants settle in the United States annually. The second and third line represent annual immigration levels of 1.6 to 1.1 million, respectively. The Environmental Fund (TEF) is convinced that the number of immigrants falls within the shaded area. The fourth line represents the case where half a million immigrants stay each year. The bottom line represents the hypothetical case of zero net immigration; though not a realistic scenario, this line shows how natural increase alone affects population growth and unemployment.

Note that these graphs are projections, not predictions. In all likelihood, the pressure for high unemployment would trigger measures to prevent joblessness from rising to the levels shown above.

Source: QUIC DATA

One of the more unfortunate assumptions concerning illicit migration is the view that it is largely a Mexican-United States phenomenon; although apprehensions along the U.S. border are concentrated in the Southwest and predominantly involve Mexico, illegal immigrants come to the United States from at least sixty different countries, according to the 1978 report of the Select Committee on Population and Immigration policy. Although the U.S.-Canadian border is only lightly patrolled, apprehensions of illegal immigrants in this sector are up 70 percent over 1982 levels, with people from China, West Germany, Greece, Haiti, Poland, Nigeria, Canada, and Latin American nations apprehended.

Legal immigration has continued to grow as well, with legal Mexican migration more than doubling from 70,000 in 1973 to 150,000 in 1983. Overall, legal immigration reached the 800,000 mark in 1980 and has since topped 600,000 in each of the following years, a 50 percent increase over the average increase in population attributed to immigration for the decade of the 1970s.

The implications of such growth for the demographic future of the United States is vastly more serious than most observers have acknowledged. The U.S. population, while projected to grow to 250 million by the year 2000 without immigration, will reach nearly 270 million with an annual immigration rate of 600,000. These numbers also assume a continued low U.S. fertility rate (1.8). If U.S. fertility rates climb to 2.0, however, the U.S. population will grow to nearly 270 million even with zero net immigration. Despite the awareness among most Americans of the need to exercise responsible parenthood and the trend toward limiting family size to two children or less, immigration is effectively cancelling the positive impact such a fertility reduction would otherwise have.

The massive impact immigration can have on the ultimate size of the

U.S. population can be seen when projected out to the year 2080, a century hence: without immigration exceeding emigration, the U.S. population would be about 250 million and declining; but with immigration at 2 million a year, the population would be 558 million and growing rapidly. (An often overlooked point is that most projections of U.S. population growth made by the U.S. Bureau of Census, and thus viewed as official, assume immigration at 400,000 annually and emigration at 150,000 annually. The emigration numbers are purely speculative; there are no data on emigration from the United States which justify the assumption that such a large number of Americans are migrating abroad, particularly on a permanent basis. The population numbers also assume that recent immigrants will maintain a fertility rate similar to the U.S. native population, an assumption not warranted by the facts.)

NATIONAL POLITICAL COHESION

Much of the debate concerning illegal immigration has centered on the displacement of extant American workers and tax revenues which are foregone. However, there are unique dimensions to the current immigration that have the potential to severely disrupt the political cohesion of the country. Illegal immigration, by virtue of its current size, and because of its concentration among Hispanics, is leading to three fundamental conflicts within American society.

First, the push for bilingual education has centered on the interest and needs of the Hispanic population in the United States. This issue raises a much broader issue. As columnist and political commentator Tom Braden wrote in *The Washington Times* on August 23, 1983:

Do we want a country unified by a common tongue? Or do we want a country made separate

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but equal by having to deal in two?

I worry about it. Is it prejudice that reminds me that, throughout two hundred odd years, we have been the gainers by having only one?

Second, there is increasing recognition of the potential political clout of the Hispanic population. As a result of high native fertility and large-scale legal and illegal immigration, the U.S. Hispanic population is increasing rapidly. By virtue of the size of the population, attempts can be made to secure political favors. (The National Council of La Raza has claimed that Hispanics will be the largest minority in the country by 1990 and, by virtue of this supposition, should be accorded substantial political benefits.) This can foster a tendency to cater to "Hispanic" interests as somehow distinct from those of other Americans. And to the extent to which the political clout of Hispanics is fueled by open-ended illegal immigration, U.S. sovereignty over its borders can conceivably be influenced by the political expediency of ethnic politics.

Third, a related but perhaps even more profound development flows from the growing numbers of illegal immigrants. Because political representation and the disbursement of substantial amounts of federal funds is based upon population, the 1980 census made major efforts to include illegal immigrants. To the extent that illegal immigrants increase the population of any particular state, their relative political representation is increased, as is their receipt of federal dollars. This suggests a skewed system in which there might be little incentive for states to work against the inclusion of illegal immigrants or for the reform of immigration statutes, if by the presence of large numbers of illegal immigrants they gain in tax revenues and political clout.

The viability of the nation depends upon an informed electorate and the absence of deep cultural or lingual

THE POLITICAL USE OF ILLEGAL ALIENS HAS INCLUDED ATTEMPTS BY CERTAIN STATES, PARTICULARLY CALIFORNIA, TO MAKE MAJOR EFFORTS TO REGISTER ILLEGAL ALIENS TO VOTE. THIS HAS SIGNIFICANT IMPLICATIONS FOR THE FUTURE OF AMERICAN DEMOCRACY.



threat to that unity, particularly when it is associated with pressures to provide bilingual education in America's primary school systems. Bilingualism does not strengthen the ability of groups to communicate with each other and build social cohesion. As commentator Eric Sevareid has said, bilingualism could "produce greater strain on this country than black-white relations."

BLURRED CITIZENSHIP AND THE ILLEGAL IMMIGRANT

1980 may be remembered by future historians as a watershed date in American history. For the first time, the U.S. government made a major effort to include illegal immigrants in the National Census. The census not only influences the distribution of federal tax dollars but is fundamental to the apportionment process which determines the number of representatives each state is entitled to have in the U.S. Congress. During the process of a lawsuit brought by the Federation for American Immigration Reform to block this inclusion, it was pointed out that the inclusion of millions of illegal aliens in the census would deprive certain states of representatives to which they otherwise would be entitled, while other states would unfairly gain additional representatives.

Unfortunately, an end to illegal immigration and the curtailment of legal immigration to reasonable levels may be perceived in the future as a threat by the beneficiaries of this growing political clout. Illegal immigration, to the extent that it fuels an increasing number of insular ethnic groups, becomes a tool with which to persuade government policymakers to look favorably upon the demands of ethnic organizations, which could include the maintenance of open borders. This has been most notably demonstrated by the recent action of Tip O'Neill, speaker of the U.S. House of Representatives, in pulling the Immi-

divisions among its people. Illegal immigration, to the extent that it fosters the establishment of communities of persons unable or unwilling to converse in English, can foster just such divisions. The problem of a large ethnic group, repeatedly fueled by massive immigration—whether legal or illegal—detached from the mainstream U.S. population by language and custom, "could affect the social stability of the nation," says William A. Henry III in *Time* (June 13, 1983). He continues:

The disruptive potential of bilingualism and biculturalism is worrisome: millions of voters cut off from the main sources of information, millions of potential draftees inculcated with dual ethnic loyalties, millions of would-be employees ill at ease in the language of their workmates.

According to a study prepared by the Twentieth Century Fund, bilingual education, on which the U.S. government spends nearly \$200 million annually, does not assist in creating a better society but just the opposite. "Anyone living in the United States who is unable to speak English cannot fully participate in our society, its culture, its politics" says the Fund's task

force, recommending that funds currently being used for bilingual education be used to assist non-English-speaking children to learn to speak, read, and write in English. Congressman Kiki de la Garza expressed this concern in testimony before the U.S. Supreme Court: "Uncontrolled immigration is threatening the quality of education we can provide our children. . . . Many alien immigrant children have little if any command of the English language and little familiarity with our American customs and traditions, making personalized attention very important," thus placing great burdens on the local school.

Bilingualism fueled by massive immigration flows has unintended consequences as well. In Miami, many of the city's blacks are unable to find work because they do not speak Spanish, a prerequisite for holding a job in many Miami area hotels, stores, and restaurants.

Since its birth, the United States has sought to maintain a linguistic unity. Our founding fathers were well aware of the conflicts and disunity which were bred by religious and linguistic differences. The United States has been blessed with a common language through which political, social, and economic discourse can be conducted. Illegal immigration is a grave

gration Reform Bill off the House calendar. (He has since changed his mind, and the bill is back on the calendar.)

By including illegal immigrants in the census, the U.S. government legitimizes the use of illegal immigration itself as a political tool for the advancement of certain interests in American society. This is certainly not without significant implications for the future of American democracy. The political use of illegal aliens has included attempts by certain states, particularly California, to make major efforts to register illegal aliens to vote. **During the Carter administration, the Justice Department informally ruled that it saw no legal reason why illegal aliens could not vote even in federal elections!**

It is clear that the right to vote has to be synonymous with the rights of citizenship. Once the distinction becomes blurred between the rights reserved for Americans as opposed to those enjoyed by any newcomer who happens to be lucky enough or careful enough to enter the United States illegally and remain here, the very notion that the United States should have immigration statutes, let alone the right to enforce them, is undermined. The concept of "de facto citizens" implies a legal situation in which the United States has both a political and a moral imperative to grant the rights and privileges enjoyed by the rest of American society to those entering illegally. This is an uncomfortable situation, to say the least.

IMMIGRATION AND EMPLOYMENT: DISQUIETING TRENDS

This country retains a chronically high unemployment rate. To the surprise of many, immigration has become a disquieting factor in American economic life: **although 2 million new jobs were created each year during the 1970s, half of them went to legal and illegal immigrants;** at the same time, unemployment among Hispanics, blacks,

teenagers, and women climbed to between 12 and 22 percent. One has to speculate as to the ways this affects the very foundations of this nation.

Critics contend that Americans have always made good use of its immigrant labor to do its "dirty work." This contention, however, evades the issue: is the United States to perpetuate the working conditions that surround this "dirty work" simply to attract illegal immigrants? What happens when such illegal immigrants wish to move on to better paying positions? Does the United States simply increase the flow of further illegal immigrants to take their place? Should the United States continue to tolerate the impact the presence of such an illicit work force has on U.S. workers and the consequent use of tax-supported services that such toleration entails? Is it in the national interest to perpetuate a situation in which the terms of labor competition are "who will work the longest hours, for the lowest pay, and under the most arbitrary conditions?" These are all serious questions.

In the meantime, the assumption that illegal immigration is predominantly a problem of the agricultural sectors of the U.S. economy stubbornly clings to the national conscience. Most internal enforcement of U.S. immigration statutes takes place in agricultural areas, where legal restrictions have not yet limited the impact the Immigration and Naturalization Service can have. In widespread areas of the U.S. economy, little if any attempt has been made to arrest the employment of illegal immigrants. As a result, the problem fades from public view, is ignored by the media, and only occasionally pierces the national conscience.


While the myth endures, the evidence is markedly to the contrary. A 1979 San Diego County study found that the overwhelming number of working illegal immigrants were in construction, manufacturing, retailing, and service industries, with only 7 to 8 percent in agricultural work. (These data are confirmed by over a decade of

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INS enforcement efforts at employment sites around the country.) In the same study, it was found that between 60 and 80 percent of the illegal immigrants were holding jobs which Americans would take, with 90 to 93 percent of all construction and manufacturing jobs held by aliens falling into that category.

- In one survey in Chicago, illegal immigrants were found to average \$9,000 a year, while in Denver the average wage was over \$13,000. These people work in "electronics and plastic companies, foundries, meat-packing plants, rubber products manufacturers, snack food and candy producers, and the like," attests John Crewdson of the *New York Times*.
- **One-third of all the workers in commercial construction in Houston have been found to be illegally employed, earning from \$4.00 to \$9.50 per hour, or up to \$20,000 annually, according to a Rice University study in January 1982.**
- In Elgin, Illinois, the Illinois Department of Labor had no trouble filling openings left after Immigration and Naturalization Service agents arrested sixty-nine workers earning between \$3.50 and \$14.00 per hour; within hours, hundreds of local residents applied for these jobs, all of which were filled within three days.
- As a result of "Operation Jobs," conducted during the spring of 1982, important additional information became available on the extent of illegal immigration and its impact on employment. Though the average wage of those immigrants apprehended was \$4.81 per hour, in both Denver and Chicago wages reached as high as \$10.00 per hour.

There may be a small kernel of truth in the assertion that some unskilled jobs which Americans will not

The lowest curve shows what will happen to U.S. population in the next few decades if U.S. fertility (TFR) is 2.0—close to the Census Bureau's best guess—and if immigration and emigration are brought into balance. The middle and upper curves reflect net annual immigration of 1 and 2 million, respectively. The shaded areas show the effect of a 10 percent higher fertility rate.



do are those taken or filled by illegal immigrants. The major reason for the poor working conditions and poor wages for these jobs is that these conditions are maintained illegally; the general impression is that illegal immigrants holding these jobs will not complain due to fear that they will be turned over to the U.S. Border Patrol or Immigration and Naturalization Service. For while it is illegal for these individuals to work in the United States, it is not illegal for U.S. employers to hire them. Thus, the very illegality of the immigrants contributes to the maintenance of the very working conditions that cause U.S. workers to shun such employment.

One of the chief problems the United States faces is a work force trained for a number of tasks which are declining in demand, while at the same time new technologies and trading needs require different employment skills and knowledge. As entry-level jobs decrease, particularly as automation increases, the kind of jobs most attractive to immigrants, especially illegal immigrants, will not be available, further exacerbating the competition between and among entry-level job-seekers in American society. The potential cost of such competition is substantial. If but 2 million Americans are displaced, the annual cost (in

transfer payments) is estimated to be \$14 billion. If indeed up to 3.5 percentage points of our national unemployment rate stems from the presence of illegal immigration, then much of the immigration debate appears shallow and beside the point—if any other single factor in American society could be identified with unemployment of such magnitude, it would be at the top of the national political agenda. Regrettably, immigration policy is not.

FREE LUNCH MYTHOLOGY: TAXES AND IMMIGRATION

It is widely assumed that illegal immigrants seldom use social services and, thus, contribute a greater amount of tax revenues than they receive in benefits. Furthermore, it is asserted that, despite any displacement impact such immigrants may have on U.S. labor force employment, their contributions to the tax base of the society are sufficiently large so as to justify their continued presence within American society.

Evidence is accumulating that points to the conclusion that illegal immigrants may in fact utilize transfer payment services as readily as Americans. Tax-supported services such as sanitation, public transportation, edu-

cation, environmental cleanup, municipal services—including fire and police protection—and a host of other related services are all utilized by people living in America simply by virtue of their presence here.

In this context, one of the more prevalent myths with respect to illegal immigration is the contention that these workers pay substantial amounts of taxes but receive relatively little in the form of transfer payments such as food stamps, Social Security, or Medicare. However, recent evidence strongly suggests that the extent of the use of transfer payment services is far greater than was previously assumed. First, displaced American workers cost the U.S. treasury substantial amounts of revenue, both in lost taxes and transfer payment benefits. Second, a certain percentage of illegal immigrants work completely off the books and avoid paying taxes altogether. Third, to the extent that illegal immigrant workers are paid below the minimum wage, tax receipts that are collected are reduced. Fourth, a certain percentage of the income of illegal immigrant workers is sent to their native lands, which results in a reduction in purchases and spending in the United States and, consequently, a further reduction in tax revenues. Finally, many illegal immigrant workers have been found to file fraudulent tax returns, claiming dependents in excess of the number allowed and receiving funds when taxes are already underpaid.

Illegal immigrants incur other costs to society as well. In some instances, as with health and educational services, the costs can be particularly heavy due to the low-income characteristics of the illegal alien population. For example:

- A screening of applicants for AFDC food stamps in Los Angeles found 17,000 individuals who withdrew their application when told that the INS would be notified—of those who persisted in applying, 90 percent were found to be illegal immi-

grants.

- In Illinois, it was found that 45 percent of applicants for unemployment insurance were illegal immigrants.
- Los Angeles County concluded that 1.1 million illegal aliens were costing the county over \$629 million annually to educate and provide judicial, health, and other county services.
- Health care costs are escalating as illegal immigrants bear children in U.S. hospitals: in 1981, 81 percent of all children born in just one Denver hospital were to illegal aliens. The resultant health-care costs are enormous.
- For every 1 million Americans that are unemployed, it costs the federal government nearly \$25 billion in lost tax revenues, lost economic activity, and increased expenditures for such things as unemployment compensation, food stamps, and welfare. With only 3 million illegal immigrants considered employed in positions which could eventually be opened up to unemployed Americans, the cost to the American taxpayers would be \$75 billion. Professor Donald Huddle of Rice University has estimated that, for every one hundred illegal immigrants employed in the United States, seventy U.S. workers are displaced. Every displaced U.S. worker costs \$7,000 in transfer or support payments.

U.S. FOREIGN POLICY, NATIONAL SECURITY, AND THE NEW IMMIGRATION

Already the issues of immigration and refugee policies have acted as substantial destabilizing forces in the already precarious North-South relationship. These issues feed on the larger issues of Third World poverty, population

growth, hunger, war, and revolution. For example, the countries of El Salvador, Honduras, and Nicaragua will double their populations in twenty-two years at present rates of growth. The labor force of these three countries alone will double between 1975 and 2000 to 13 million. Poverty, hunger, unemployment, and illiteracy remain serious problems, primarily as a result of an explosive growth in numbers far beyond the capacity of these nations. Add to this archaic political institutions, external ideological influences, and a poor natural resource base, and the ingredients for turmoil and civil conflict are abundant. As General Maxwell Taylor has warned, "If Central America today is an inviting pond to communist fishermen, under the conditions forecast it will offer them a well-stocked lake."

There is a vicious cycle of poor economic and political conditions in the Third World, and a consequent steady stream of migration to the United States. One may argue that present American immigration policy creates this vicious cycle through a lack of enforcement measures which then encourage and simplify Third World immigration to the United States.

Uncontrolled immigration may be undermining U.S. foreign policy in three further areas: (1) the inability of the United States to control its national borders directly weakens its national security; (2) the failure of the United States to adopt an enforceable immigration policy is leaving it open to international coercion; (3) the traditional ability of the United States to provide a haven for victims of political oppression is impaired by the massive amount of illegal immigration, the majority seeking to improve their economic status, entering the country every year.

UNENFORCED BORDERS. It is often said that illegal immigration from the Third World acts as an important safety valve to relieve the population pressures there. Unfortunately, such a

view obscures more important issues concerning U.S. national security. For example, while it is undeniably important that the United States maintain productive diplomatic relations with Mexico, in the words of the Economic Policy Council of the UNA-USA, one has to realize that "an unenforced border with Mexico is an unenforced border with the world."

Lacking enforceable immigration statutes, the United States faces pressure from the developing nations that will increase dramatically over the next two decades, just as it has over the past two. As migration increases, its ability to undermine the security of U.S. allies increases significantly as well. Already Somalia, Thailand, and Pakistan have been the recipients of massive movements of those fleeing civil war, political turmoil, and economic difficulty. Such refugee populations are seriously straining the civil and social order of these nations. Engendered as such problems are by the Soviet Union and others, it does not appear likely that these exodus will be curtailed over the next generation. In fact, hostile countries will continue to find it convenient to expel dissidents and "bad" elements from their own societies, thereby at the same time creating further difficulties for their opposition.

INTERNATIONAL COERCION. The extent to which U.S. foreign and domestic policy can be manipulated by foreign governments, some openly hostile to U.S. interests, by the use of large-scale illegal immigrant flows, needs to be addressed. Because of its laxity with respect to enforcing the sovereignty of its own borders, the United States finds itself in a vulnerable position. How often will the United States, in the future, find itself reacting to the actions of a foreign power in a manner that is injurious to our society? Would countries threaten to cut off the flow of petroleum should the United States decide to enforce or strengthen its immigration statutes? Would Poland threaten to tighten the

WOULD VIETNAMESE OFFICIALS CONTINUE TO EXPLOIT THE DESIRE OF THEIR OWN PEOPLE TO EMIGRATE, BLEEDING THEM OF PRECIOUS LIFE SAVINGS, BECAUSE THEY KNOW THE UNITED STATES WOULD ACCEPT THEM, NO QUESTIONS ASKED?



grip of martial law unless the United States agrees to accept a greater number of "Polish dissidents"? Would Vietnamese officials continue to exploit the desire of their own people to emigrate, bleeding them of precious life savings, because they know the United States would accept them, no questions asked? Does the United States accept whatever criminals the Cuban government deems it does not want simply because some among the group claim to be political refugees?

Will nations everywhere find in the United States a convenient refuge for its domestic dissidents or political opponents, thus eliminating a potential wellspring of political democracy? Does this country wish to continue to be met with threats from foreign governments wishing to get rid of people they find inconvenient? And how much leverage will this country have with other governments in efforts to have them accept their fair share of refugees and immigrants when they know that the United States itself has no effective means of controlling immigration?

REFUGEE POLICY. Refugees have become one of the more dominant trends in international migration. Along with the traditional element of political refugees have been added

those people fleeing civil disturbance, wars, revolutions, coup d'etats, and generally poor economic conditions. Unfortunately, debate about refugee policy usually concerns domestic economic and political impacts with little discussion of the international considerations involved. U.S. refugee policy is in part a foreign policy issue; its importance will increase as the number of refugees in the world, almost 13 million in 1981, continues at present or higher levels.

Ambassador H. Eugene Douglas, U.S. coordinator for refugee affairs, has articulated the need to differentiate between immigrants, both legal and illegal, and refugees. He contends that it is essential that the United States establish a definition by which to determine who is a refugee, and therefore entitled to certain kinds of assistance, and who is an immigrant

and therefore not entitled to refugee assistance. There lies a crucial distinction between refugees and immigrants, between the victims of political oppression and the victims or escapees from economic circumstances.

The foreign policy of the United States requires that this country be able to extend to those politically persecuted a safe haven. This is a traditional and humanitarian aspect of U.S. policy, which most Americans associate with the best aspects of American society. In order to preserve this essential aspect, however, there is a need to maintain a foreign policy which has as one of its objectives, according to Douglas, "the protection of its frontiers from excessive illegal immigration." He argues further that the key is a policy which acknowledges the need for restricted entry while preserving the concept of refugee asylum.

CONCLUSION


The national security of this nation depends upon its domestic strength and international stability. This strength requires an ability to control national borders, the maintenance of an independent foreign policy, a prosperous economy, and a cohesive domestic political environment. Uncontrolled migration is undermining this strength. Unchecked immigration, whatever its impact on labor and wage rates, does not just affect the unskilled and marginal job markets. Its impacts, because of its sheer numbers and because of its illegality, affects the very

CONTINUED ON PAGE 26

Before coming to Georgetown University's Center for Strategic and International Studies in 1976, Georges Fauriol was associated with the Foreign Policy Research Institute, USIA, and worked at the Inter-American Development Bank. At CSIS, he currently directs the Center's Cuba Project and other CSIS Caribbean Basin efforts, as well as the Immigration and the National Security project. Dr. Fauriol is the author of several publications, including Guatemala and Central America's Northern Flank, and The Foreign Policy Behavior of Caribbean States.



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IMMIGRATION POLICY

CONTINUED FROM PAGE 14

fabric of American society, U.S. national security, cultural, political, and linguistic unity, economic well-being, and international standing.

The question is not whether a change in the foreign policy aspect of U.S. immigration will come but, rather, when and how it will come. There exist at least three possible scenarios: (1) the immigration policy status quo, slowly overwhelmed by events and forces that have already prompted cries of alarm, results in a radical policy departure in the form of total immigration restriction; (2) a laissez-faire approach to immigration problems results in fundamental alterations of U.S. society—a substratum of illegal aliens grows and an uneasy modus vivendi is found—and the United States is no longer a modern

democracy but instead resembles the political order of the Greek city-state democracies; (3) between the extremes of one and two, a constructive response to the global immigration problem is found, resulting in a redirection of U.S. immigration policy as guided by a rational calculation of the national interest.

What is at issue is the need to discriminate among millions of potential immigrants, many equally deserving of consideration for entry into the United States. This implies a foreign policy agenda coupled with a difficult moral one. The demographic revolution of the past generation has delivered the most explosive growth in the labor force the world has seen to date. As this characteristic of the new immigration confronts this country, so must American policy responses be molded from a new appreciation of the times, of the changing global environment.

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corrected 19 Feb

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OFFICE OF THE VICE PRESIDENT
WASHINGTON

10 February 1986

MEMORANDUM FOR: VADM JOHN POINDEXTER, NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL
AMBASSADOR ROBERT OAKLEY, DEPARTMENT OF STATE
MR. J. ROBERT MCBRIEN, DEPARTMENT OF TREASURY
MR. NOEL KOCH, DEPARTMENT OF DEFENSE
MR. LOWELL JENSEN, DEPARTMENT OF JUSTICE
MR. MATTHEW Z. SCOCOZZA, DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION
MR. CHARLES ALLEN, CENTRAL INTELLIGENCE AGENCY
LTGEN JOHN H. MOELLERING, JOINT CHIEFS OF STAFF
MR. OLIVER REVELL, FEDERAL BUREAU OF INVESTIGATION
MR. FRED F. FIELDING, THE WHITE HOUSE
DR. ALTON KEEL, OFFICE OF MANAGEMENT AND BUDGET

SUBJECT: Public Report of the Task Force on Combatting
Terrorism


Attached is a draft copy of the Public Report for your review and comment. The goal of our public report is to educate American citizens on the national program and to inform them of the work of the Task Force. We have set a tight schedule to permit the Vice President's office to release the report on Thursday, February 27, 1986.

Comments are due to the Task Force office no later than 12:00 p.m., Friday, February 14, 1986.


J. L. Holloway
J. L. Holloway, III
Admiral, USN (Retired)
Executive Director
Vice President's Task Force
on Combatting Terrorism

Attachment
Public Report

VICE PRESIDENT'S TASK FORCE ON TERRORISM
WORKING GROUP MEETS TO DEFINE TERM



CALDWELL



ARNOLD ROTH

AN EMERGENCY MEETING OF THE PRESIDENT'S ANTITERRORISM,
HOSTAGE RETRIEVAL, AND WALL-BANGING COMMITTEE

From the Progressive.



DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY
OFFICE OF THE SECRETARY
WASHINGTON, D.C. 20220

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August 7, 1986

TO: BOB EARL
NSC STAFF

Enclosed for your possible use/historic interest are three documents authored by Bob Kupperman when he was with ACDA:

Preparing to Meet the Terrorist Threat,
May 1977 (~~SECRET/FRD~~)

Executive Summary, Mass Destruction
Terrorism Study, September 17, 1975
(~~SECRET~~)

Near-Term Potential for Serious Acts of
Terrorism, April, 1976 (~~SECRET/EXDIS~~)
(Vol. 1, I don't believe there was a
2d volume).

Best regards,

Bob McBrien