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WITHDRAWAL SHEET

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection: CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER (CMC), NSC: Records **Archivist:** dlb

File Folder: Beirut Hostages (3 of 3)
Box 91131

Date: 91/13/99
Wills - F97-109/1

DOCUMENT NO. AND TYPE	SUBJECT/TITLE	DATE	RESTRICTION
1. Cable	Cable #040312Z Jul 85, 4 p. D 2/6/03 F97-109/1 #125	7/4/85	P1/F1
2. Cable	Cable #041713Z Jul 85, 3 p.	7/4/85	P1/F1
3. Cable	Cable #080851Z Jul 85, 2 p. #126	7/8/85	P1/F1
4. Memo	Joek Coyey to John Poindexter, re: BIA, 1 p. #127	7/8/85	P1/F1
5. Email	Robert McFarlane to Poindexter, re: Follow Up on the President's Wish..., 1 p. R 7/16/02 NLSF97-109/1 #128	7/8/85	P1/F1
6. Cable	Cable #061418Z Jul 85, 11 p. R 2/6/03 F97-109/1 #130	7/6/85	P1/F1
7. Cable	Cable #031710Z Jul 85, 2 p. R #131	7/5/85	P1/F1
8. Cable	Cable #031422Z Jul 85, 3 p. PART. #132	7/3/85	P1/F1
9. Cable	Cable #021750Z Jul 85, 2 p. R #133	7/2/85	P1/F1
10. Cable	Cable #061319Z Jul 86 7 p. PART. #134	7/6/86	P1/F1
11. Cable	Cable #061343Z Jul 85, 4 p. D #135	7/6/85	P1/F1
12. Cable	Cable #062036Z Jul 85, 3 p. R #136	7/6/85	P1/F1
13. Cable	Cable #061507Z Jul 85, 3 p. PART. #137	7/6/85	P1/F1
14. Cable	Cable #061334Z Jul 86, 4 p. PART. #138	7/6/86	P1/F1
15. Cable	Cable #052148Z Jul 85, 4 p. PART. #139	7/5/85	P1/F1

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RESTRICTION CODES

Presidential Records Act - [44 U.S.C. 2204(a)]

- P-1 National security classified information [(a)(1) of the PRA].
- P-2 Relating to appointment to Federal office [(a)(2) of the PRA].
- P-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(a)(3) of the PRA].
- P-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(a)(4) of the PRA].
- P-5 Release would disclose confidential advice between the President and his advisors, or between such advisors [(a)(5) of the PRA].
- P-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(a)(6) of the PRA].

C. Closed in accordance with restrictions contained in donor's deed of gift.

Freedom of Information Act - [5 U.S.C. 552(b)]

- F-1 National security classified information [(b)(1) of the FOIA].
- F-2 Release could disclose internal personnel rules and practices of an agency [(b)(2) of the FOIA].
- F-3 Release would violate a Federal statute [(b)(3) of the FOIA].
- F-4 Release would disclose trade secrets or confidential commercial or financial information [(b)(4) of the FOIA].
- F-6 Release would constitute a clearly unwarranted invasion of personal privacy [(b)(6) of the FOIA].
- F-7 Release would disclose information compiled for law enforcement purposes [(b)(7) of the FOIA].
- F-8 Release would disclose information concerning the regulation of financial institutions [(b)(8) of the FOIA].
- F-9 Release would disclose geological or geophysical information concerning wells [(b)(9) of the FOIA].

PENDING REVIEW IN ACCORDANCE WITH E.O. 13233

Ronald Reagan Library

Collection Name CRISIS MANAGEMENT CENTER, NSC: RECORDS

Withdrawer

CAS 4/17/2006

File Folder BEIRUT HOSTAGES (3)

FOIA

F97-109/1

Box Number 91131

ID	Doc Type	Document Description	No of Pages	Doc Date
8	CABLE	031422Z JUL 85 (#132)	3	7/31/85

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PAGE 01 OF 05 STATE 205262 C03/03 005243 NOD479
-----05/1738Z

INFO SSI-01 M-01 NSC-01 /003 A5 BDS
NSC E. O. POINDEXTER (BY COURIER) ADDED PER JCOLLINS, S/S, 7/5/85
M ADDED PER JCOLLINS, S/S, 7/5/85

-----04/0431Z

ORIGIN OFFICE NEA-01
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 CATB-01
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DESIRED DISTRIBUTION HONORED BY SWO

	<u>DIST AUTH BY</u>	<u>READ BY</u>	<u>DISTRIBUTED BY</u>
EXSEC	_____	_____	(S/S-1) _____
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BY	_____	DATE/TIME	_____

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DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By db NARA, Date 9/16/99

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

RONALD W. REAGAN LIBRARY

THIS FORM MARKS THE FILE LOCATION OF ITEM NUMBER 1 LISTED ON THE
WITHDRAWAL SHEET AT THE FRONT OF THIS FOLDER.

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PAGE 02 OF 04 BEIRUT 03997 041615Z

C02/02 005242 NOD481
EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W

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O 041713Z JUL 85 ZFF-4
FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3884

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, ASEC, AMGT, LE, US
SUBJECT: SAFETY OF AMCITS

REF: STATE 205262

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FOLLOWING IS RESPONSE TO REFTEL. SEPTTEL ADDRESSES EMBASSY STAFFING.

3. WE HAVE BEEN TELLING AMCITS IN WEST BEIRUT AND ESPECIALLY AUB AMCITS TO LEAVE SO OFTEN FOR SO LONG THAT WE DO NOT HAVE MUCH CREDIBILITY LEFT WITH THEM. THE NUMBERS ARE DOWN TO A HARD CORE THAT APPARENTLY ARE INCLINED TO HANG ON NO MATTER WHAT, EVEN THOUGH THEY ARE FRIGHTENED AND KNOW THE SCORE. NONETHELESS, WE ARE TRYING AGAIN BOTH DIRECTLY FROM THE AMBASSADOR TO RAJA AL-KHURI, ACTING PRESIDENT OF AUB, AND INDIRECTLY THROUGH ELIE SALIM WHO IS IN TOUCH WITH REMAINING AMCITS AT AUB AND OFFERING TO ORGANIZE THEIR SAFE DEPARTURE AS HE HAS FOR EARLIER GROUPS.

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NLS 197-109/1 #126

BY CVS NARA, DATE 2/6/03

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PAGE 03 OF 04 BEIRUT 03997 041615Z C02/02 005242 NOD481

4. SALIM TOLD AMBASSADOR THIS MORNING THAT HE HAD LAST NIGHT URGED RAJA AL-KHURI TO GET THE AMERICANS TO LEAVE

"BECAUSE THINGS COULD HAPPEN". AL-KHURI AGREED TO TALK TO EACH AUB AMCIT INDIVIDUALLY. SALIM ALSO TALKED TO PLIMPTON IN NEW YORK TO URGE HIM TO URGE AMCITS TO LEAVE (RECOMMEND DEPARTMENT DO THE SAME). SALIM SAID CALL TO AL-KHURI BY AMBASSADOR COULD HELP, BUT WARNED THAT AL-KHURI SHOULD CITE ONLY "EMBASSY AUTHORITIES" IN TALKING TO AMCITS, BECAUSE SOME OF THEM ARE "STUBBORN" AND MAY DIG IN EVEN HARDER IF THEY FEEL THE AMBASSADOR HIMSELF IS PRESSURING THEM.

5. AUB IS THE ONLY PARTICULAR GROUP OF AMERICANS THAT WE ARE AWARE OF AND CAN BE REASONABLY EXPECTED TO REACH. IT IS HARD TO IMAGINE THAT THE OTHERS NEED TO BE TOLD AGAIN THE SITUATION IS DANGEROUS AND THEY SHOULD LEAVE. THAT SAID, THE BEST WAY TO GET THE WORD OUT ONCE AGAIN TO ANY OTHER AMCITS WHO ARE IN WEST BEIRUT IS FOR DEPARTMENT SPOKESMAN TO MAKE PUBLIC STATEMENT REITERATING THAT U.S. BELIEVES THEY SHOULD LEAVE AS SOON AS THEY CAN MAKE ARRANGEMENTS TO DO SO. THIS WILL BE PICKED UP AND PLAYED HEAVILY IN MEDIA AND IT WILL HAVE ADDED WEIGHT COMING DIRECTLY FROM THE DEPARTMENT. THERE IS, OF COURSE, SOME RISK THAT THIS WILL DRAW THE TERRORISTS' ATTENTION EVEN MORE TO THOSE AMCITS REMAINING IN WEST BEIRUT, AND SOME MIGHT TAKE IT AS PRELUDE TO A U.S. MILITARY ACTION. BUT WE SEE NO OTHER WAY TO GET THE WARNING ACROSS YET AGAIN.

6. AS FOR REPORTERS, WE EARLIER DURING THE HIJACKING SENT MESSAGE TO DEPARTMENT POINTING OUT THAT REPORTERS ENJOYED NO IMMUNITY, AND THE DEPARTMENT SHOULD ISSUE WARNING TO THEM THROUGH THEIR HOME ORGANIZATIONS IN THE UNITED STATES SINCE WE HERE HAVE NO WAY OF KNOWING NAMES, NUMBERS AND LOCATIONS. WE STRONGLY URGE -- AGAIN -- THAT

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PAGE 04 OF 04 BEIRUT 03997 041615Z C02/02 005242 NOD481
THIS BE DONE. WE WILL CALL THE FEW WE ARE AWARE OF AND
WARN THOSE THAT CALL HERE AND ASK THEM TO TELL THEIR
COLLEAGUES. BUT THAT IS THE EXTENT OF WHAT CAN BE DONE
FROM HERE. (WE REMIND THE DEPARTMENT THAT THE LAST TIME
WE DID THIS IN WASHINGTON AND HERE VIS-A-VIS THE PRESS,
WE WERE ACCUSED OF TRYING TO MUZZLE THEM BY DRIVING THEM
OUT OF TOWN.) WE REPEAT: WE HAVE FEW PRESS CONTACTS
HERE BECAUSE THEY ARE PRACTICALLY ALL IN WEST BEIRUT AND
ARE NOT IN TOUCH WITH THE EMBASSY SINCE, AMONG OTHER
THINGS PER WASHINGTON INSTRUCTIONS, WE HAVE FROM THE
OUTSET OF THE HIJACKING AFFAIR REFERRED ALL QUERIES TO
WASHINGTON.
BARTHOLOMEW

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SYSTEM II PROFILE

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ID 8590759

UNCLASSIFIED UPON REMOVAL OF
CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 09 JUL 85 12

TO MCFARLANE

FROM PLATT, N

11/12/99

DOC DATE 08 JUL 85

KEYWORDS LEBANON

AVIATION

SALIM, ELIE

TERRORISM

SYRIA

m 7-10

SUBJECT STATE CABLE RE CLOSING BEIRUT INTL AIRPORT

ACTION. NOTED BY MCFARLANE

DUE:

STATUS C FILES SII

FOR ACTION

FOR CONCURRENCE

FOR INFO

FORTIER

COVEY

TEICHER

MCDANIEL

NORTH

COMMENTS

REF#

LOG 8590752

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PAGE 01 OF 03 BEIRUT 04028 080853Z C19/19 006582 NOD546
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ACTION OFFICE NEA-01
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 INR-01
L-01 SP-01 CATB-01 MCTP-01 NSC-01 /019 A5 RSP

REPEATED TOSEC BY SWO
REPEATED CIA E.O. DCI BY SWO
NEA EYES ONLY RAPHEL; L E.O. SOFAER; M/CTP E.O. BORG
INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ; S/P EYES ONLY RODMAN
S/S PASS NSC E.O. POINDEXTER BY COURIER
NOT/NOT PASSED DAMASCUS BY SWO

RCM HAS SEEN

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EXSEC _____ (S/S-1) _____
DEPEXSEC _____ DATE/TIME _____

REPEATED TO _____
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SENSITIVE

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DECLASSIFIED
Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 9/16/99

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PAGE 02 OF 03 BEIRUT 04028 080853Z
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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC IMMEDIATE 3909

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DEPARTMENT PLEASE PASS DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, EAIR, LE
SUBJECT: CLOSING BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

REF: BEIRUT 4022

1. ~~S~~ ENTIRE TEXT.

2. ELIE SALIM CALLED ME 0930 LOCAL JULY 8. HE SAID HE HAD TRANSMITTED TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL "IN DETAIL" THE DEMARCHE I MADE ON BIA AND HIS RESPONSE (REFTEL). GEMAYEL CONFIRMED THAT WHAT SALIM SAID REPRESENTED HIS POSITION AS WELL.

3. I ASKED SALIM IF I COULD TAKE IT THAT I HAVE A GOL ANSWER TO MY DEMARCHE. SALIM REPLIED YES, THAT THE PRESIDENT HAD SAID THAT THE POSITION HE, SALIM, HAD TAKEN WAS HIS POSITION. THE PRESIDENT KNEW I WAS READY TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER WITH HIM AND DOES NOT THINK IT IS NECESSARY.

4. COMMENT: I AM NOT SURE WHETHER AND TO WHAT EXTENT GEMAYEL HAS OR WILL TAKE THIS UP WITH ANYONE ELSE

BY CS NARA, DATE 7/6/03
DECLASSIFIED
NLS 897-109, # 127

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Department of State

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PAGE 03 OF 03 BEIRUT 04028 080853Z

C19/19 006582 NOD546

IN THE GOVERNMENT. THAT SAID, WE HAVE THE ANSWER
OF THE PRESIDENT OF THE REPUBLIC TO OUR DEMARCHE,
AND WE HAVE NO REASON TO BELIEVE THAT ANY OF HIS
GOVERNMENTAL COLLEAGUES, LEAST OF ALL THE MUSLIM
MEMBERS, WOULD RESPOND ANY DIFFERENTLY. IF AND WHEN
OUR DEMARCHE BECOMES KNOWN, WE CAN EXPECT A GENERAL
OUTCRY HERE GOING WELL BEYOND THE REACTION TO THE
MEASURES WE ANNOUNCED FOR CLOSING BIA. END COMMENT.
BARTHOLOMEW

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NATIONAL SECURITY COUNCIL

July 8, 1985

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ACTION

MEMORANDUM FOR ADMIRAL JOHN M. POINDEXTER

FROM: JOCK COVEY

SUBJECT: Closing BIA

Attached is draft press guidance. It is longer than one would prefer, but the points we want to make are complex.

Note: This guidance specifies the specific minimum measures we would want the GOL to take.

- LAF in firm control
- Physical isolation from the surrounding areas
- Effective screening of passengers and cargo

In addition, the guidance states that we would be willing to assist -- technically and financially -- in the reestablishment of real Government control. This idea has not been cleared anywhere, but is worth considering. We could do it bilaterally, but it might go down better if we found a way to do it through ICAO or other international body.

RECOMMENDATION:

That you distribute this draft guidance at the 10:30 CPPG.

Approve _____ Disapprove _____

Attachment

Tab A Press Guidance

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NLS F97-109/1 #128

BY LOT, NARA, DATE 7/16/02

Jack Covey

From: NSRCM --CPUA
To: NSJMF --CPUA

LOOK AT THE NOTE
Date and time 07/08/85 09:07:06

501

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NOTE FROM: ROBERT MCFARLANE
SUBJECT: Follow up on President's wish to state our terms for BIA

The incoming reporting cable on Reggie's presentation to Salim underscores the need for us to lay down the conditions which would foreclose the need to close the airport e.g. 60L guarantee against any take-offs or landings of hijacked aircraft, establishing effective security against terrorist infiltration into BIA; effective airport screening of both personnel and cargo getting on or off aircraft etc. The President will want to see this today. Please bug Mike about this. Make it clear that the President doesn't necessarily expect that the 60L can do these things but the basis for our case will be more credible on the public record. We ought also feed this into today's press guidance.

cc: NSKS --CPUA
NSWRP --CPUA
NSWFM --CPUA
NSDRF --CPUA
PF1 Alternate PFs PF2 File NOTE PF3 Keep PF4 Erase PF5 Forward Note
PF6 Reply PF7 Resend PF8 Print PF9 Help PF10 Next PF11 Previous PF12 Return

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NLS F97-109/1 #129

BY LDT, NARA, DATE 7/16/02

CLOSURE OF BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

Q: What good does it do to retaliate against Lebanon for the TWA hijacking? What impact can a leaky economic boycott have on the kind of shadowy terrorists who hijacked that plane in Athens?

A. -- The one reliable weapon the civilized world has in a hijacking situation is isolation. The world over, hijackers are pariahs. Over the years, hundreds of terrifying situations have been resolved because the captors finally understood they had no where to go.

-- But three times in less than two weeks, terrorists used the unique situation at BIA to strip away even this one defense. Hijackers were able to use BIA like a pirate haven of centuries past. At BIA, they knew they were beyond the reach of any law.

-- This situation exists nowhere else in the world. True, there are places we believe the Government has been too lenient with hijackers. But nowhere else can hijackers count on active support. There has never been a situation like this before, not since the pirate plague was finally stamped out.

-- Thus, any aircraft taking off anywhere within reach of BIA is at special risk. This includes all of Europe and the Middle East, and much of Africa and South Asia. If a hijacker can elude the local authority's best efforts, he knows he is home free because at BIA there is no government or other authority ready and willing to treat hijacking as a crime to be isolated and dealt with.

-- BIA must be made off-limits to hijackers, just as every other airport in the world is. If it were under the firm control of the Lebanese Armed Forces and physically isolated so control could be maintained, and if there were effective screening of passengers and cargo, that would be a good start. We are prepared to help -- technically and financially -- to get real controls reestablished.

-- But Lebanon is a complex place. It could take time to bring BIA back under the rule of law. In the meanwhile, it remains an open invitation to yet a fourth, or fifth, or sixth piratical outrage. The next could come at any moment. We have urged that at the very minimum, the runways be shut down immediately, possibly with earthen berms that could be removed once the Government is again in control.

-- In the meanwhile, more in sorrow than in anger, we will continue to urge the civilized world to have nothing to do with BIA, as a first step in making BIA off-limits to hijackers and terrorists. We deeply regret the disruptive effect on the already troubled Lebanese economy. But we are even more profoundly distressed at the clear and present danger that this outlaw airstrip represents.

URGENT

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90752

THE WHITE HOUSE
WASHINGTON

Bob P.

Route to:

- Fortin

Covey

~~Taylor~~ Hoscy

McDaniel

North.

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PAGE 02 OF 12 BEIRUT 04022 00 OF 05 061455Z C02/02 006446 NOD521
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3902
INFO AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS IMMEDIATE

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E.O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, EAID, LE, SY
SUBJECT: SEEKING SYRIAN AND LEBANESE COOPERATION IN
CLOSING BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

REF: STATE 206046

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. BEGIN INTRODUCTION AND SUMMARY: FOREIGN MINISTER AND CURRENT PRESIDENTIAL ADVISOR ELIE SALIM CALLED ON AMBASSADOR AT HIS URGENT REQUEST 1100 JULY 6 AT PRESIDENT GEMAYEL'S INSTRUCTIONS TO INFORM AMBASSADOR "OFFICIALLY AND FORMALLY" OF GOL'S INTENTION TO TAKE ITS OPPOSITION TO U.S. EFFORT TO APPLY MEASURES AGAINST BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT TO THE ARAB LEAGUE. AFTER HEARING SALIM OUT, AMBASSADOR IN TURN SAID THAT HE HAD MESSAGE WHICH HE WISHED FORMALLY AND OFFICIALLY TO GIVE TO SALIM TO TRANSMIT TO PRESIDENT GEMAYEL; AMBASSADOR THEN PROCEEDED TO

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BY Cas

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2/6/03

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PAGE 03 OF 12 BEIRUT 04022 00 OF 05 061455Z C02/02 006446 NOD521
MAKE POINTS CONTAINED REFTEL ABOUT MAKING BIA
RUNWAYS UNUSABLE. SALIM SAID GOL COULD NOT DO IT.
HE EXPRESSED CONCERN ABOUT ANY SUBSEQUENT U. S.
ACTION TO MAKE RUNWAYS PHYSICALLY INOPERABLE.

AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD GIVEN SALIM MESSAGE HE
HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GIVE THE GOL AND THAT
POINT WAS GOL REPEAT GOL ACTION. AFTER ENSUING
EXCHANGE, SALIM SAID HE WOULD TRANSMIT U. S.
MESSAGE OFFICIALLY, FORMALLY, AND IMMEDIATELY
TO GEMAYEL. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT HE WAS
AVAILABLE TO PURSUE THE MATTER FURTHER WITH
GEMAYEL, BUT THAT HE DID NOT INTEND TO RAISE
THE MATTER WITH ANYONE ELSE, LEAVING IT TO
PRESIDENT TO HANDLE. END INTRODUCTION AND
SUMMARY.

GOL APPROACH TO ARAB LEAGUE

3. SALIM SAID THAT BECAUSE OF GROWING PRESSURES
WITHIN LEBANON, PARTICULARLY FROM "CERTAIN QUARTERS"
(I. E., MUSLIM LEADERS), THE GOL WITHIN THE NEXT
FEW DAYS WOULD BE ASKING FOR A MEETING OF THE ARAB
LEAGUE AT FOREIGN MINISTER LEVEL IN ORDER TO COMBAT
USG MEASURES AGAINST BIA. HE SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAD
ASKED HIM TO INFORM US OFFICIALLY AND FORMALLY IN
ADVANCE THAT GOL WAS MOVING IN THAT DIRECTION; THE
IN-ADVANCE NOTICE, SALIM SAID, WAS SPECIFICALLY
DESIGNED AS "AN ACT REFLECTING THE CONTINUED
FRIENDSHIP BETWEEN THE UNITED STATES AND LEBANON."

4. SALIM SAID GOL ENVISAGED GOING TO THE ARAB
LEAGUE TO ASK IT TO:

--USE ITS GOOD OFFICES WITH USG TO STOP ITS MEASURES
AGAINST LEBANON. (AMBASSADOR CORRECTED: "AGAINST
BIA, NOT AGAINST LEBANON." SALIM SHRUGGED AND

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NON-SECRET-NO



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Department of State

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PAGE 04 OF 12 BEIRUT 04022 00 OF 05 061455Z C02/02 006446 NOD521
REPLIED, "OKAY.")

--USE THEIR INFLUENCE WITH OTHER COUNTRIES TO TRY TO PERSUADE THEM NOT TO GO ALONG WITH USG IN THIS EFFORT.

--PROVIDE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL HELP TO LEBANON IF USG MEASURES ARE IMPLEMENTED AND PRODUCE ECONOMIC AND FINANCIAL SUFFERING IN LEBANON.

SALIM STRESSED THAT THE GOL IS CURRENTLY MAKING A GREAT EFFORT TO RESTORE BIA'S INTERNATIONAL CREDIBILITY AS A SECURE AIRPORT.

5. SALIM SAID HE WISHED TO SPEAK ALSO MORE GENERALLY ABOUT U.S.-LEBANESE RELATIONS. ON ONE LEVEL THE USG AND THE GOL REMAIN GOOD FRIENDS AND CONTINUE CLOSE COORDINATION AND BUSINESS AS USUAL. ON ANOTHER LEVEL, SALIM FELT, THE TWO COUNTRIES WERE DRIFTING APART MORE THAN EITHER WOULD WISH. HE FEARED THAT THE MEASURES THE U.S. WAS TAKING AGAINST BIA MIGHT CREATE A "POLITICAL DYNAMISM" IN THE U.S. AGAINST LEBANON, AND CREATE THE SAME "POLITICAL DYNAMISM" IN LEBANON AGAINST THE U.S., SIMILAR TO THE EXISTING ANTI-ISRAELI "DYNAMISM." SALIM STRESSED THAT IF THAT OCCURRED, IT WOULD BE EXTREMELY DIFFICULT FOR GEMAYEL TO FUNCTION AS HE HAS IN THIS POLITICAL ATMOSPHERE IN LEBANON. SALIM STRESSED THAT BOTH COUNTRIES NEED TO COORDINATE TO CONTAIN AND CHANNEL THE DAMAGE THAT WILL RESULT FROM U.S. MEASURES AGAINST THE AIRPORT AND WHICH, IF NOT CONTAINED, WILL SPILL OVER AND CREATE ANTI-LEBANESE FEELINGS IN THE U.S. AND ANTI-AMERICAN FEELINGS IN LEBANON. HE NOTED THAT SUCH FEELINGS ARE ALREADY BEGINNING TO ARISE EVEN IN THE CHRISTIAN COMMUNITY.

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6. THAT IS ONE REASON WHY, SALIM SAID, GEMAYEL TOLD HIM TO TELL AMBASSADOR ABOUT THE STEPS GOL IS³ TAKING.

7. SALIM SAID THERE SHOULD BE NO DOUBT IN THE U. S. MIND THAT GEMAYEL DOES INDEED FULLY UNDERSTAND THE SITUATION AT THE AIRPORT. SALIM SAID THAT GEMAYEL HAS IN THE LAST TWO DAYS DISCUSSED AT LENGTH WITH SYRIAN PRESIDENT ASSAD THE SITUATION AT THE AIRPORT AND IN WEST BEIRUT. GEMAYEL HAD STRESSED TO ASSAD THE NEED AND OPPORTUNITY FOR HIS HELP TO SPEED UP A RESUMPTION OF THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND TO BRING SECURITY TO WEST BEIRUT.

8. IN SHORT, SALIM SAID, THE PRESIDENT IS DOING EVERYTHING HE CAN TO IMPROVE THE SITUATION AND TO CONTAIN THE POLITICAL PROCESS AND ITS ANTI-AMERICAN OVERTONES. HE CITED SPECIFICALLY HARSH STATEMENTS BY PRIME MINISTER KARAMI AND EDUCATION MINISTER HUSS, AND COMPARED THEM WITH GEMAYEL'S STATEMENT EXPRESSING "REGRET" BUT NO CONDEMNATION ABOUT THE U. S. MEASURES.

9. SALIM SUMMED UP BY SAYING HE HAD COME TO ALERT US TO THE GOL DECISION TO GO TO THE ARAB LEAGUE AND TO DISCUSS HOW WE CAN CONTAIN AND LIMIT THE IMPACT OF CURRENT USG MEASURES AGAINST BIA FROM DEVELOPING INTO A BIGGER PROBLEM THAN EITHER SIDE WANTED.

CLOSING BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

10. AMBASSADOR THEN SAID THAT HE TOO HAD SOMETHING TO SAY TO SALIM OFFICIALLY AND FORMALLY THAT HE WISHED SALIM TO TRANSMIT TO GEMAYEL.

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11. AFTER SUMMARIZING FOR SALIM PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GEMAYEL WHICH AMBASSADOR HAD DELIVERED JULY 5, AMBASSADOR TOLD SALIM THAT HE HAS BEEN INSTRUCTED TO MAKE FOLLOWING POINTS TO GOL ON CLOSING BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. DRAWING UPON REFTEL, HE STRESSED NUMBER OF INCIDENTS AT BIA WHICH MAKE IT CLEAR THAT BIA HAS BEEN AND IS A CENTER FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES, AND THAT REINFORCE THE BELIEF THAT BIA WILL BE USED AGAIN IN THE FUTURE BY HIJACKERS IN THE SAME WAY. HE STRESSED THAT U.S. WOULD PREFER THAT LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, WITH SYRIAN SUPPORT, NOTING THE GEMAYEL-ASSAD EXCHANGE, GET FIRM CONTROL OF BIA AND SEAL IT OFF. WHEN AND IF THIS IS DONE, HE SAID, THE U.S. IS PREPARED TO WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES TO HELP THE GOL ESTABLISH MEASURES TO PREVENT TERRORISTS FROM EXPLOITING BIA.

12. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT THE PROBLEM IS THAT UNTIL THE GOL CAN EFFECTIVELY CONTROL THE AIRPORT AND THE SURROUNDING AREAS, THE ONLY EFFECTIVE PROTECTION IN THE SHORT TERM FOR PEOPLE TRAVELING ANYWHERE WITHIN RANGE OF BIA IS FOR BIA TO BE CLOSED DOWN AND ITS RUNWAYS MADE TEMPORARILY UNUSABLE BY AIRCRAFT.

13. SALIM IMMEDIATELY INTERJECTED, "YOU WANT TO STRIKE IT."

14. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT WE ARE TALKING ABOUT WHAT THE GOL MIGHT AND SHOULD DO, NOT ABOUT WHAT WE MIGHT OR SHOULD DO.

15. AMBASSADOR SAID THE ONLY EFFECTIVE SHORT TERM MEANS TO PREVENT ANOTHER TWA 847 EPISODE AND TO PROTECT INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS IS TO MAKE BIA

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INOPERABLE, FOR EXAMPLE, BY DISMANTLING THE
NAVIGATION FACILITIES, DISMISSING AIRPORT PERSONNEL,
AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, PUTTING NOT-EASILY REMOVABLE
OBSTACLES ON THE RUNWAYS SUCH AS EARTHEN BERMS,
DISABLED TRUCKS OR TANKS, STEEL CABLES, CEMENT
TRAFFIC BUMPS, DRAGON'S TEETH, ETC.

16. AMBASSADOR SAID WE HOPED GOL WILL AGREE TO TAKE
SUCH ACTION. HE NOTED GEMAYEL'S TELEPHONE CONVERSA-
TIONS WITH ASSAD CITED BY SALIM, AND SAID WE HOPE
SYRIA WILL ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST.

17. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IF THE GOL HAD ANY ADDI-
TIONAL IDEAS ON HOW TO PREVENT AIRCRAFT FROM
LANDING UNTIL IT COULD EXERT EFFECTIVE CONTROL
OVER THE AIRPORT AND WORK WITH US AND INTERNATIONAL
CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES TO ESTABLISH ADEQUATE
SECURITY AT BIA, WE WOULD WELCOME THEM.

18. SALIM RESPONDED THAT FOR THE GOL TO DO WHAT
WE WERE SUGGESTING IMPLIES THAT THE GOL HAS
EFFECTIVE CONTROL AT THE AIRPORT. SALIM STRESSED
IT DOES NOT HAVE IT AND THEREFORE, HE ASKED, HOW
CAN WE SAY THE GOL SHOULD DO THOSE THINGS?

19. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT WE DID NOT SEE
ANY OTHER WAY EXCEPT BY MAKING THE AIRPORT PHYSICALLY
INOPERABLE AS LONG AS THE GOVERNMENT DOES NOT
HAVE CONTROL.

20. SALIM OBSERVED THAT WHAT YOU ARE SAYING IS

THAT IF THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT DO IT, THEN SOMEONE
ELSE WILL. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED, "YOU SAID THAT,
NOT ME." SALIM SAID THAT IT WAS HIS OWN DEDUCTION
FROM WHAT THE AMBASSADOR HAD SAID THAT "YOU OR
YOUR FRIENDS MIGHT INTERFERE TO MAKE THE AIRPORT

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PHYSICALLY INOPERABLE." IN RESPONSE TO THAT
DEDUCTION, SALIM SAID, "I WANT TO MAKE A STATEMENT."

21. SALIM SAID THAT ONE THING THE USG MUST DO IS TO SENSITIZE AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION TO THE DIFFERENCE BETWEEN THE TEHRAN HOSTAGE AFFAIR AND THE TWA HIJACKING. HE SAID HE FEARED THAT AMERICAN PUBLIC OPINION IS "TRAUMATIZED" BY THIS COMPARISON IT SEES BETWEEN THE TEHRAN AND BIA EPISODES. AS A RESULT, HE SAID, A MINOR PROBLEM IN LEBANON HAS BEEN PROJECTED AS A MAJOR PROBLEM OF THE SAME TYPE AND MAGNITUDE AS THE SITUATION IN TEHRAN. SALIM STRESSED THAT GOL WANTED THE SAME OBJECTIVES THE USG WANTED--SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT. HE SAID THAT THE USG MUST EMPHASIZE TO THE AMERICAN PEOPLE THAT LEBANON IS NOT IRAN, AND HERE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE, GOVERNMENT, AND STUDENTS ARE NOT AGAINST THE U.S.; THE DISTINCTION MUST BE MADE. IT IS ALSO NECESSARY, HE SAID, TO SEPARATE THE LEBANESE PEOPLE AND LEBANON ON THE ONE HAND FROM A SMALL GROUP ACTING IN LEBANON ON BEHALF OF FOREIGN GOVERNMENT. SALIM SAID IT WOULD BE HELPFUL IF THE USG COULD MENTION OTHER COUNTRIES; HE SAID U.S. KNEW WHO ORGANIZED TERRORISM IN LEBANON, WHO FINANCED IT, SUPPORTED IT.

22. IN ADDITION, SALIM SAID, THE U.S. WAS "USING A HUGE TANK TO KILL A BIRD," AND IN DOING SO WILL KILL MUCH ELSE TOO. ANY SUCH ACTION BY THE U.S., HE SAID, WOULD ENHANCE THE "POLITICAL DYNAMISM" IN LEBANON AGAINST THE U.S. AND WILL MAKE IT EXTREMELY DIFFICULT

FOR GEMAYEL, HIMSELF, AND FRIENDS OF THE U.S. IN WEST BEIRUT, TO WITHSTAND ALL THE ANTI-U.S. PRESSURE. SALIM SAID THAT THIS COMPLEX SITUATION MUST BE HANDLED WITH GREAT WISDOM IN ORDER NOT TO DESTROY EXISTING LEBANESE GOOD WILL TOWARD THE U.S.



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23. THE PROBLEM IS, SALIM SAID, ONCE YOU START ANY SUCH ACTION, HOW DO YOU STOP THE DETERIORATION. WILL IT LEAD TO CLOSING OF THE EMBASSY, FOR EXAMPLE, HE ASKED. SALIM STRESSED WE WOULD BE ENTERING INTO A DARK TUNNEL WHERE THINGS CAN GET OUT OF HAND. SALIM SAID HE FEARED IN THIS PROCESS THAT THE ENEMY OF THE U.S. WOULD BECOME THE FRIEND OF THE U.S., AND AMERICA'S FRIENDS ITS ENEMIES.

24. IN THE BROADEST SENSE, SALIM SAID, HIS CONCERN WAS NOT ABOUT THE GOL GOING TO THE ARAB LEAGUE OR EVEN ABOUT THE U.S. ACTIONS AGAINST BIA. HIS CONCERN WAS WHERE THIS PROCESS WOULD STOP. HE SAID THAT DEMOCRACY AND FREEDOM IN LEBANON ARE BEING PUNISHED AND ONCE THE PROCESS HAD STARTED IT COULD NOT BE REVERSED.

25. AMBASSADOR SAID HE HAD GIVEN SALIM THE MESSAGE HE HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO GIVE GOL AND THAT CONCERNED ACTIONS WE BELIEVED GOL REPEAT GOL SHOULD AGREE TO TAKE. AMBASSADOR SAID HE WANTED TO ADDRESS SIMPLY THE POINTS HE HAD MADE TO SALIM ABOUT NEED FOR GOL ACTIONS, NOT THE DEDUCTIONS AND INFERENCES SALIM WAS MAKING ABOUT POSSIBLE FUTURE ACTIONS BY OTHERS.

26. IN THE FIRST PLACE, AMBASSADOR SAID, THERE HAD BEEN A NUMBER OF U.S. STATEMENTS, AS REFLECTED IN THE PRESIDENT'S LETTER TO GEMAYEL, WHICH SAID SPECIFICALLY THE HIJACKERS DID NOT REPRESENT LEBANESE OR LEBANON; DISTINCTIONS HAVE BEEN DRAWN BETWEEN LEBANESE AND THOSE WHO WERE TERRORISTS.

27. HAVING SAID THAT, HE HAD TO SAY THAT DURING

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THE HIJACKING CRISIS HE HAD ARGUED AND PLEADED WITH LEBANESE LEADERS TO SPEAK OUT AGAINST THE HIJACKING AND THE HIJACKERS. "I HAVE TO TELL YOU," AMBASSADOR SAID, "MY SCORE CARD WAS NOT VERY GOOD."

28. AMBASSADOR WENT ON TO SAY THAT WHILE HE COULD UNDERSTAND SALIM'S DISMAY ABOUT THE IMPACT IN THE U. S. OF THE TWA HIJACKING, COULD SALIM IMAGINE WHAT THE IMPACT OF ANOTHER ONE WOULD BE? HE ASKED, "DO YOU KNOW WHAT THE STAKES ARE FOR LEBANON; I MEAN FOR EVERYONE?" HE STRESSED THAT HE WAS SPEAKING NOT ONLY FOR THE U. S., BUT FOR THE ENTIRE INTERNATIONAL COMMUNITY. HE STRESSED THAT IT WAS IN LEBANON'S INTERESTS ABOVE ALL THAT THERE NOT BE ANOTHER HIJACKING. HE SAID GEMAYEL HAD TO GO TO BARRI AND TO JUMBLATT TO STRESS THAT LEBANON COULD NOT AFFORD ANOTHER HIJACKING, AND THEREFORE MUST MAKE THE BLOCKING ARRANGEMENTS AT BIA TO PHYSICALLY BLOCK THE AIRPORT.

29. SALIM CAME BACK STRONGLY, STATING THAT "IF THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT WERE TO TAKE THESE MEASURES, IT WOULD MEAN THAT THE GOVERNMENT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTING THE VERY POLICY IT OPPOSES; IT WOULD BE IMPLEMENTING U. S. GOVERNMENT POLICY, I. E., CLOSING THE AIRPORT. OBVIOUSLY THE GOVERNMENT CANNOT DO IT."

30. SALIM ALLUDED AGAIN TO GEMAYEL'S DISCUSSIONS WITH ASSAD ABOUT THE NEED FOR SECURITY IN WEST BEIRUT AND AT THE AIRPORT, EXPRESSING HIS HOPE THAT ASSAD IN THE UPCOMING MEETINGS WITH LEBANESE MUSLIM LEADERS WILL RESTART THE POLITICAL PROCESS WHICH COULD PRODUCE SECURITY AT THE AIRPORT. HE SAID GOL WAS NOW IN A "FUNNY SITUATION"; IT RECOGNIZES THE DANGEROUS SITUATION AT BIA AND YET IT HAS TO OPPOSE THE USG PUBLIC STAND, "WE

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CANNOT BE IN COMPLICITY WITH YOU TO CLOSE IT."

31. AMBASSADOR STRESSED AGAIN THAT WE PREFER THAT LEBANON, THE GOVERNMENT, THE AUTHORITIES, WITH SYRIAN HELP, GET FIRM CONTROL OF THE AIRPORT, SEAL IT OFF, PREVENT INFILTRATION OF TERRORISTS, AND WITH HELP FROM US AND THE INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES, ESTABLISH A SECURE AIRPORT. THAT IS WHAT WE PREFER, AMBASSADOR STRESSED. UNTIL THAT IS THE CASE AND IN THE SHORT RUN, AMBASSADOR SAID, THE ONLY EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR TRAVELERS ON PLANES WITHIN RANGE OF BIA IS TO PHYSICALLY CLOSE IT OFF. AMBASSADOR SAID THAT IT SEEMED TO HIM THAT THE U.S. CAN ASK THE GOL TO AGREE TO TAKE THESE MEASURES BECAUSE OF THE STAKES INVOLVED: THE PROTECTION OF INTERNATIONAL TRAVELERS, AND THE STAKES FOR THE INTERESTS OF LEBANON AND OF THE LEBANESE THEMSELVES, INCLUDING BARRI AND JUMBLATT, WHO HAVE AS MUCH TO LOSE AS ANYONE IF NOT MORE.

32. SALIM ASKED HOW THE U.S. PLANNED TO HANDLE THE PROBLEM OF TERRORISTS MORE GENERALLY, OBSERVING THAT STRIKING AT ITS MANIFESTATIONS AT BIA WAS SIMPLY AN INFINTESIMAL PART OF THE TERRORIST

THREAT. AMBASSADOR RESPONDED THAT WE ARE WORKING ON A WHOLE RANGE OF MEASURES, AND THAT BIA WAS ONLY PART OF A WIDER ACTION AGAINST TERRORISTS. HE CITED SUCH MEASURES AS INCREASING SECURITY AT AIRPORTS, STRICTER MEASURES AGAINST HIJACKERS, ESTABLISHING BETTER INTELLIGENCE, ETC. HE STRESSED, HOWEVER, THAT THERE IS A REAL IMMEDIATE PROBLEM AT BIA THAT MUST BE DEALT WITH. HE NOTED THAT MANY LEBANESE RECOGNIZE THAT BIA IS TOTALLY OUT OF CONTROL AND IS A SAFE HAVEN FOR TERRORISTS. HE STRESSED THAT WE ARE NOT LOOKING AT MEASURES TO

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PUNISH LEBANON OR THE LEBANESE; WE ARE HOPING
THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL AGREE TO WORK TO
SOLVE THE PROBLEM. SALIM RESPONDED THAT HE
HOPED THAT IT WOULD NOT BE THE WRONG ELEMENTS
WHO WOULD END UP BEING PUNISHED AND THAT WE
WOULD BE HELPING PRESERVE LEBANON'S WAY OF LIFE
AND NOT DESTROYING IT.

33. SALIM ASKED TO WHOM ELSE THE AMBASSADOR
PLANNED TO DELIVER THIS MESSAGE. AMBASSADOR
RESPONDED THAT HE WAS IN THIS CONVERSATION
FORMALLY AND OFFICIALLY PASSING IT TO THE
PRESIDENT OF LEBANON, THAT HE WAS PREPARED TO
DISCUSS IT FURTHER DIRECTLY WITH GEMAYEL IF
GEMAYEL SO WISHED, BUT THAT HE DID NOT INTEND
TO RAISE IT WITH ANYONE ELSE. SALIM RESPONDED
THAT HE UNDERSTOOD AND WOULD IMMEDIATELY PASS
THE MESSAGE TO GEMAYEL.

34. COMMENT: I PLAN NO FURTHER DEMARCHES TO THE
LEBANESE ON THIS SUBJECT UNLESS THEY CONTACT ME. THE
MESSAGE HAS BEEN DELIVERED TO THE GOL AND IT IS FOR THEM,
STARTING WITH GEMAYEL, TO DECIDE WHAT TO DO IN RESPONSE
AND WHO ON THE LEBANESE SIDE SHOULD BE INVOLVED. AS
SALIM'S RESPONSE INDICATES, GOL ALMOST CERTAINLY WILL

NOT BE ABLE TO AGREE AND IMPLEMENT THE PROPOSED MEASURES
AND WILL FEAR MILITARY ACTION AGAINST BIA. BARTHOLOMEW

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CLASSIFIED ENCLOSURE(S)

RECEIVED 06 JUL 85 12

TO POINDEXTER

FROM PLATT, N

*dlb
9/16/93*

DOC DATE 03 JUL 85

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KEYWORDS: ISRAEL

LEBANON

TERRORISM

SUBJECT: STATUS OF ATLIT PRISONERS

ACTION: PREPARE MEMO FOR MCFARLANE DUE: 09 JUL 85 STATUS S FILES PA

FOR ACTION

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


National Security Council
The White House

System # I

Package # 5368

	SEQUENCE TO	HAS SEEN	DISPOSITION
Bob Pearson	_____	_____	_____
William Martin	_____	_____	_____
John Poindexter	<u>1</u>	<u>J?</u>	_____
Paul Thompson	_____	_____	_____
Wilma Hall	_____	_____	_____
Bud McFarlane	<u>2</u>	<u>M</u>	_____
William Martin	<u>3</u>	<u>P</u>	_____
NSC Secretariat	<u>4</u>	_____	<u>A</u>
Situation Room	_____	_____	<u>As indicated by JPM</u>



I = Information A = Action R = Retain D = Dispatch N = No further Action

cc: VP Regan Buchanan Other _____

COMMENTS

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ACTION OFFICE NEA-01
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INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ; S/P EYES ONLY RODMAN; L EYES ONLY SOFAER

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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 9/16/99

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NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL, IS, LE, US
SUBJECT: ATLIT PRISONERS

REF: (A) STATE 202113, (B) STATE 200336,
-- (C) STATE 200321

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE PASSED THE FURTHER INFORMATION REGARDING THE PROCEDURE FOR HANDOVER OF ATLIT DETAINEES TO NIMROD NOVIK JULY 3. BY THE TIME WE REACHED NOVIK THE RELEASE OF 300 DETAINEES THROUGH NAQURA HAD ALREADY BEEN ACCOMPLISHED, BUT WE TOLD HIM WE ASSUMED THE SUGGESTION FOR AN ALTERNATIVE ROUTE MIGHT STILL BE RELEVANT FOR FUTURE RELEASE.

3. NOVIK SAID THE FACT THAT PASSING THE DETAINEES DIRECTLY TO SYRIA THROUGH THE GOLAN WAS A LEBANESE IDEA REFLECTING SECURITY CONCERNS CHANGED THE COMPLEXION OF THE ISSUE. THE ISRAELIS PREVIOUSLY HAD ASSUMED THAT THE PURPOSE OF HANDING THE DETAINEES TO SYRIA WAS TO GIVE SYRIA A PUBLIC RELATIONS BONUS. HENCE, NEITHER RABIN NOR PERES HAD SHOWN ANY GREAT ENTHUSIASM WHEN NOVIK BROACHED

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BY CL NARA, DATE 2/6/03

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THE IDEA. NOVIK ADDED THAT HE DIDN'T KNOW WHETHER THE ISSUE HAD BEEN RAISED AT THE CABINET MEETING JULY 1 WHICH DISCUSSED THE DETAINEE RELEASE.

4. NOVIK WAS WILLING TO RAISE THE ISSUE WITH GOI LEADERS AGAIN WITH REFERENCE TO FUTURE RELEASES. BUT HE SAID HE WOULD ONLY DO SO (1) IF THERE WAS STILL INTEREST IN THE WAKE OF TODAY'S RELEASE, AND (2) IF WE COULD GIVE HIM FURTHER INFORMATION ABOUT WHO IN THE LEBANESE GOVERNMENT HAD ORIGINATED THE IDEA, AND WHAT THE "SECURITY CONCERNS" WERE WHICH HAD MOTIVATED IT.

5. NOVIK'S GUESS WAS THAT THE CABINET WOULD TURN DOWN THE IDEA IN ANY CASE, BUT THAT DEPENDED ON HOW STRONG A CASE COULD BE MADE. FLATEN

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CATB-01 NSC-01 /011 A5 RSP

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ADDONS BY NPLATT, S/S, 7/3/85

03/1435Z

INFO SS-04 /004 A5 SIK
FLASH ALERT: S/S-CBUSCH, 1035

//////////////////SPECIAL CAPTION//////////////////

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NIEZH
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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
By dlb NARA, Date 9/16/99

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NODIS - TREAT AS SPECIAL CAPTION


FOR S/S - PLATT ONLY

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, PREL, LE, SY

SUBJECT: RECOMMENDATIONS FOR MOBILIZING ASAD ON BEHALF
-- OF OUR INTERESTS

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. WE START FROM THE ASSUMPTION THAT OUR PRIORITY GOALS ARE: A) TO OBTAIN THE SAFE RELEASE OF THE REMAINING AMERICAN AND OTHER KIDNAPPEES, AND B) TO ENCOURAGE SYRIA'S CAMPAIGN TO BREAK HIZBALLAH. 

3. WE ARE LIMITED IN WHAT WE OURSELVES CAN DO 
 CANNOT

INFLUENCE THE IRANIAN GOVERNMENT TO HARNESS HIZBALLAH EXCESSES. ONLY THE SYRIANS APPEAR TO BE ABLE TO DEAL BOTH WITH HIZBALLAH AND THE IRANIANS, THOUGH THEY DO NOT FIND THE TASK EASY OR PLEASANT. 

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By CIS, NARA, Date 2/6/03
NLS F97-107/1 #132

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
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
PAGE 03 OF 04 DAMASC 04170 031424Z

C11/11 003436

NOD461



4. WE KNOW [REDACTED] THAT THE TWA HIJACKING HAS MADE THE SYRIANS EVEN MORE AWARE OF THE HIZBALLAH DANGER. [REDACTED]



5. THE KEY TO SYRIA IS, OF COURSE, PRESIDENT ASAD AND THE ONLY WAY WE CAN SEE OF APPROACHING ASAD IS THROUGH A NEW LETTER FROM PRESIDENT REAGAN. IN THIS LETTER THE PRESIDENT CAN MAKE A FRESH START WITH THE OBSERVATION THAT HE HAS NOW HAD AN OPPORTUNITY TO TALK PERSONALLY WITH THE VICTIMS OF THE TWA HIJACKING AND THAT HE HAS BEEN SHOCKED BY THE STORIES HE HAS HEARD FROM THEM OF THEIR BRUTAL TREATMENT BY THE HIZBALLAH TERRORISTS WHO BEAT AND KILLED ONE OF THEIR NUMBER. IN THIS CONTEXT HE COULD EXPRESS HIS GRATITUDE TO PRESIDENT ASAD FOR HIS AND SYRIA'S EFFORTS WHICH HAVE

SHORTENED THE ORDEAL OF THE TWA HOSTAGES AND BROUGHT ABOUT THEIR RELEASE. THIS EVIDENCE OF ILL TREATMENT MAKES IT ALL THE MORE URGENT THAT ACTION BE TAKEN TO

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PAGE 04 OF 04 DAMASC 04170 031424Z C11/11 003436 NOD461
OBTAIN THE RELEASE OF THE OTHER HOSTAGES IN THE HANDS OF
HIZBALLAH. WE ARE AWARE OF THE FOREIGN MINISTER'S
STATEMENT THAT THE CAMPAIGN TO OBTAIN THEIR RELEASE IS
CONTINUING AND WE HOPE PRESIDENT ASAD WILL DO EVERYTHING
IN HIS POWER TO BRING AN END TO THEIR SUFFERING AND
OBTAIN THEIR FREEDOM. THIS COULD BE FOLLOWED BY ANY
GENERAL STATEMENT ON TERRORISM THAT IS DESIRED ALONG
WITH SOMETHING ON THE NEED TO DENY BEIRUT AIRPORT TO
TERRORISTS AND HIJACKERS. THE SYRIANS WOULD BE PLEASED
TO KNOW THAT THERE MIGHT BE SOME OTHER WAY TO DEAL WITH
THE BEIRUT AIRPORT PROBLEM, SUCH AS SYRIA AND THE U. S.
APPROACHING THE LEBANESE AUTHORITIES ALONG PARALLEL
LINES.

6. ADDENDUM:

(COMMENT: THIS REINFORCES OUR BELIEF THAT NOW
IS THE TIME FOR PRESIDENT REAGAN TO URGE ASAD TO OBTAIN
THE RELEASE OF THE SEVEN KIDNAPPEES. FOR THIS
MESSAGE TO BE EFFECTIVE, IT MUST BE ACCOMPANIED BY A
WARM EXPRESSION OF GRATITUDE FOR HIS ROLE IN OBTAINING
THE RELEASE OF THE TWA HOSTAGES.) EAGLETON

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PAGE 01 OF 03 STATE 202113

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ADDONS PER NPLATT, S/S, 7/2/85

S/S PASS NSC - EYES ONLY POINDEXTER - VIA COURIER

L: E. O. SOFAER; INR: E. O. ABRAMOWITZ; S/P: E. O. RODMAN

-----02/1832Z

ORIGIN OFFICE NEA-01

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 CATB-01

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By *dlb* NARA, Date *9/10/97*

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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PAGE 02 OF 03 STATE 202113
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L: MKOZAK
S/S: JCOLLINS
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NEA: RHPelletreau
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NODIS
E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PREL. IS. LE, US
SUBJECT: ATLIT PRISONERS

REF: A) STATE 200336; B) STATE 200321

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. INITIAL REACTION FROM NOVIK SUGGESTS THAT THE GOI MAY BE WILLING TO CONSIDER THE SUGGESTION THAT ATLIT DETAINEES BE RELEASED DIRECTLY TO THE SYRIANS ON THE GOLAN RATHER THAN ACROSS THE INTERNATIONAL BORDER WITH LEBANON. WE WILL NEED TO RESPOND SHORTLY TO THE SYRIANS AND THEREFORE HOPE TO RECEIVE ISRAELI VIEWS AS SOON AS POSSIBLE.

3. YOU SHOULD CLARIFY TO THE GOI THAT THIS PROPOSAL CAME ORIGINALLY FROM THE LEBANESE, NOT THE SYRIANS. AND WAS

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SAID TO BE BASED ON SECURITY CONCERNS. ALSO, OUR LEGAL REVIEW HAS DETERMINED THAT THE GENEVA CONVENTION WOULD NOT PROHIBIT A TRANSFER OF THE DETAINEES THROUGH SYRIA. THE CONVENTION ADDRESSES THE END RESULT -- RETURN TO LEBANON - BUT NOT THE MEANS OF TRANSFER. SHULTZ

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PAGE 01 OF 08 DAMASC 04200 00 OF 03 061458Z C02/02 006437 NOD522
-----07/1847Z

INFO SSI-01 NSC-01 /002 A5 DDP
NSC ADDED PER BMCKINLEY, S/S, 7/7/85
NSC EYES ONLY POINDEXTER

-----06/1629Z

ACTION OFFICE MCTP-01
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 NEA-01
INR-01 L-01 SP-01 CATB-01 /018 A5 DDP

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REPEATED CIA E.O. DCI

L E. O. SOFAER; S/P E. O. RODMAN

M/CTP EYES ONLY BORG; NEA EYES ONLY RAPHEL; INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ

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By dlb NARA, Date 9/16/95

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PAGE 02 OF 08 DAMASC 04200 00 OF 03 061458Z C02/02 006437 NOD522
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

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By AS, NARA, Date 7/6/02


NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, LE, SY, US
SUBJECT: BUSH/KHADDAM LETTER AND SEEKING SYRIAN
-- COOPERATION IN CLOSING BIA

REF: STATE 206046

1. ~~SECRET~~ - ENTIRE TEXT. 0

2. SUMMARY:





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COUNTERED WITH TALKING POINTS AND URGED SYRIAN SUPPORT
FOR OUR DETERMINED EFFORTS TO CLOSE DOWN THE BIA SAFE-
HAVEN. [REDACTED] I ASKED FOR ALTERNATE
SYRIAN PROPOSALS. [REDACTED]

--ON A MORE POSITIVE NOTE, KHADDAM THANKED VP BUSH FOR
HIS LETTER AND ASKED THAT I CONVEY HIS REGARDS TO
BOTH THE VICE PRESIDENT AND THE SECRETARY.

--REFERRING TO PRESIDENT REAGAN'S "COMMITMENTS" BY
TELEPHONE TO PRESIDENT ASAD (NOTE: WE HAVE NOT YET
RECEIVED READOUT ON THIS EXCHANGE), [REDACTED]

END SUMMARY.

3. EARLY SATURDAY MORNING, JULY 6, I ASKED FORMALLY
FOR AN APPOINTMENT WITH KHADDAM. HE SAW ME AT 1300
LOCAL (OUR EXCHANGE ON THE SEVEN AMERICAN KIDNAPPEES
BY SEPTEL). INTERESTINGLY, BARRI HAD JUST LEFT
KHADDAM'S OFFICE WHEN I ARRIVED.

4. KHADDAM GREETED ME BY JOKING THAT SINCE THE LAST
TIME WE HAD SPOKEN, THE USG HAD (BY ASKING HIM TO
MEDIATE THE TWA HIJACKING) CAUSED HIM TO GO 17 DAYS
WITHOUT ANY SLEEP. I SAID WE WERE AWARE OF HIS PERSONAL
EFFORTS AND HANDED HIM VICE PRESIDENT BUSH'S LETTER
(STATE 205260), WHICH THE TRANSLATOR READ TO KHADDAM IN
ARABIC.

5. KHADDAM ASKED ME TO CONVEY HIS THANKS TO VICE
PRESIDENT BUSH FOR HIS LETTER, [REDACTED]

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[REDACTED]

6.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

7. I SAID I WAS AWARE OF NOTHING WHICH SHOULD GIVE THE SYRIANS ANY CONCERN THAT THIS WOULD NOT IN FACT HAPPEN.

[REDACTED]

[REDACTED]

I SAID I WOULD REPORT HIS REMARKS TO WASHINGTON.

8. TURNING TO THE BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT ISSUE, I TOLD KHADDAM I HAD BEEN INSTRUCTED TO DISCUSS THIS PROBLEM WITH HIM IN THE HOPE THAT IT WOULD BE POSSIBLE TO COOPERATE WITH SYRIA IN FINDING A SOLUTION. I NOTED THAT ALL OF US MUST RECOGNIZE A GRAVE PROBLEM

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EXISTS. SYRIA ITSELF DOES NOT SEND CIVILIAN AIRCRAFT

THERE [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I NOTED

THAT OTHER AIRPORTS HAVE HAD SEVERE HIJACKING PROBLEMS, BUT BEIRUT IS UNIQUE IN THAT GROUPS WHO ARE POTENTIAL HIJACKERS ACTUALLY CONTROL AT LEAST PART OF THE AIRPORT. THE USG WOULD PREFER, AND ASSUMES SYRIA WILL AGREE, THAT THE GOL SHOULD GAIN ABSOLUTE CONTROL OF BIA AND SEAL IT OFF TO PREVENT ACCESS BY DISRUPTIVE ELEMENTS. IF THIS CAN BE ACHIEVED, THE USG STANDS READY TO WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION AUTHORITIES TO ASSIST THE GOL IN ESTABLISHING WAYS TO PREVENT INFILTRATION OF TERRORIST ELEMENTS.

9. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I SAID OUR

IMMEDIATE GOAL IS TO PREVENT THE AIRPORT FROM BEING USED BY TERRORISTS. AS TO WHAT CAN BE DONE AFTER THAT, WE SOLICIT SYRIAN VIEWS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I

RESPONDED THAT THIS WAS OUR INTENTION--WE WANT TO CREATE A REGIME FOR THE AIRPORT WHICH WOULD SATISFY INTERNATIONAL CONCERN.

10. I EMPHASIZED THE URGENCY WITH WHICH THE USG REGARDS THIS QUESTION. IT WILL TAKE SOME TIME TO CREATE SUCH A REGIME OF SECURITY. FOR THE SHORT TERM, WE BELIEVE THE RUNWAYS SHOULD BE DISABLED TO PREVENT LANDINGS, E.G. BY ERECTING BARRIERS. [REDACTED]

[REDACTED] I SAID THAT

CLEARLY THIS WAS A GOL RESPONSIBILITY. AMBASSADOR BARTHOLOMEW WOULD BE DISCUSSING OUR IDEAS WITH GOL AND WE HOPE THAT SYRIA, TOO, WILL BE IN CONTACT

WITH THE LEBANESE.

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11.



13. I NOTED THAT WE ARE WORKING INTENSIVELY WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS ON NARCOTIC PROBLEMS. WHAT DISTINGUISHES THE BIA ISSUE IS THAT THE GOL IS NOT IN CONTROL OF

ITS AIRPORT. GROUPS SUCH AS HIZBALLAH ARE ABLE TO USE

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THE BIA FOR THEIR OWN PURPOSES, WHICH IS A MAJOR DESTABILIZING FACTOR WITHIN LEBANON AND TOTALLY CONTRADICTORY TO SYRIAN EFFORTS TO ESTABLISH A STABLE LEBANESE REGIME. I REPEATED THAT WE WOULD LIKE TO FIND WITH SYRIA AREAS OF GENERAL AGREEMENT, EVEN IF WE CANNOT AGREE ON THE MEANS WHICH SHOULD BE USED TO PURSUE OUR LONG-RANGE GOALS IN LEBANON.

14.

15. I REITERATED THAT WE ARE NOT ACTING AGAINST LEBANON, BUT RATHER AGAINST GROUPS WHOSE GOALS ARE ANTIPATHETIC TO ALL LEBANESE.

16. I SAID AGAIN THAT IT WAS IMPORTANT FOR SYRIA TO UNDERSTAND THAT OUR PURPOSE IS TO PREVENT THE AIRPORT FROM BECOMING A SAFEHAVENOR SUCH AS HIZBALLAH. TO DO OTHERWISE IS SURELY IN NO ONE'S INTEREST

I POINTED OUT THAT WHAT WE HAVE SO FAR UNDERTAKEN HAS BEEN IN DIPLOMATIC CHANNELS. SYRIA MUST UNDERSTAND THAT WASHINGTON IS RESOLUTE IN ITS BELIEF THAT THE AIRPORT MUST BE SECURED.

I SAID THAT SYRIA HAD OBVIOUSLY OPINIONS AND INTERESTS WITH REGARD TO BIA. THESE MATTERS AFFECT US ALL.

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[REDACTED]

17. I RESPONDED THAT KHADDAM WAS FOCUSING ON ALLEGED US PRESSURE. WE CANNOT REMOVE AN IMPRESSION OF "PRESSURE." WE ARE SIMPLY SAYING WHAT WE BELIEVE MUST BE DONE. WE ARE ALSO UNDER PRESSURE. HIZBALLAH INTENDS MORE HIJACKINGS. THERE ARE US CITIZENS ON AIRCRAFT FLYING THROUGHOUT THE MIDDLE EAST; ALL ARE THREATENED AS LONG AS BIA REMAINS A SAFEHAVEN. WE DO NOT SEEK REVENGE, BUT WE ARE DETERMINED TO DEAL WITH THIS PROBLEM. IF SYRIA HAS BETTER IDEAS, WE WOULD LIKE TO HEAR THEM

[REDACTED]

18. COMMENT BY SEPTTEL.

19. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. EAGLETON

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PAGE 01 OF 05 DAMASC 04202 00 OF 02 061556Z C02/02 006440 NOD525
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INFO SSI-01 NSC-01 /002 A5 DDP
NSC ADDED PER BMCKINLEY, S/S, 7/7/85
NSC EYES ONLY POINDEXTER

-----06/1616Z

ACTION OFFICE MCTP-01
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 NEA-01
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REPEATED CIA E.O. DCI BY SWO
L E.O. SOFAER; S/P E.O. RODMAN
M/CTP EYES ONLY BORG; NEA EYES ONLY RAPHEL; INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ
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By dkh NARA, Date 9/16/97

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PAGE 01 OF 04 STATE 206711 TOSEC 130078 C03/03 006436 NOD535
-----07/1839Z

INFO SSI-02 NSC-01 /003 A5 DDP
NSC ADDED PER BMCKINLEY, S/S, 7/7/85
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INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 M-01
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EXECUTIVE SECRETARY

By dlr NARA, Date 9/10/99

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DRAFTED BY: NEA/ARN: MACASEY

APPROVED BY: P: MARMACOST

NEA/ARN DLMACK

NEA: RWMURPHY

NEA: RHPELLETREAU

M/CTP: DLONG

S/S: BMCKINLEY

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS PRIORITY
AMEMBASSY KUWAIT PRIORITY
CIA WASH DC PRIORITY 4409
USDEL SECRETARY IMMEDIATE

~~C O N F I D E N T I A L~~ STATE 206711 TOSEC 130078

NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, LE

SUBJECT: REMAINING SEVEN HOSTAGES: ICRC INVOLVEMENT

1. ~~C~~ ENTIRE TEXT

2. PLEASE DELIVER THE FOLLOWING MESSAGE FROM THE ACTING SECRETARY TO ICRC PRESIDENT ALEXANDER HAY ON AN URGENT BASIS. THERE WILL BE NO SIGNED ORIGINAL.

3. DEAR PRESIDENT HAY: ICRC'S HIGHLY SUCCESSFUL EFFORTS ON BEHALF OF THE TWA HOSTAGES PROMPTS THE U.S. TO SOLICIT

BY AS NLS
DECLASSIFIED
797-1091/136
NARA, DATE 2/6/03



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PAGE 03 OF 04 STATE 206711 TOSEC 130078 C03/03 006436 NOD535
ICRC'S ASSISTANCE ONCE AGAIN. AS YOU MAY KNOW, WE HAD

HOPED TO SECURE ALONG WITH THE TWA HOSTAGES THE RELEASE OF SEVEN OTHER AMERICANS WHO HAVE BEEN MISSING IN LEBANON DURING THE PAST YEAR AND A HALF. THERE WAS GREAT DISAPPOINTMENT IN THE ADMINISTRATION THAT THIS WAS NOT POSSIBLE, DESPITE OUR EFFORTS. THE SAFE RETURN OF THOSE SEVEN MISSING AMERICANS REMAINS A TOP PRIORITY.

WE ARE GRAVELY CONCERNED ABOUT THE WELFARE OF THE SEVEN, SOME OF WHOM HAVE BEEN IN CAPTIVITY SINCE MARCH OF LAST YEAR. ESCAPED HOSTAGE JEREMY LEVIN RECOUNTED TO US THAT HE WAS CHAINED TO A RADIATOR IN SOLITARY CONFINEMENT FOR A FULL YEAR. I WOULD BE GREATLY ASSURED, AS WOULD THE FAMILIES OF THOSE BEING HELD, IF THE ICRC COULD OBTAIN ACCESS TO THE CAPTIVES ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS, IN ORDER TO ASSURE THEIR WELL-BEING.

BY WAY OF BACKGROUND INFORMATION, WE HAVE BEEN IN REGULAR CONTACT WITH SENIOR LEBANESE GOVERNMENT OFFICIALS, AS WELL AS WITH KEY POLITICAL AND RELIGIOUS LEADERS THERE, AS PART OF OUR EFFORT TO SECURE THE RELEASE OF THE SEVEN. IN ADDITION, WE HAVE BEEN IN CONTACT WITH OTHER GOVERNMENTS WE BELIEVE ARE IN A POSITION TO BE HELPFUL. THOSE CONTACTS ARE CONTINUING.

THE RECURRING DEMAND OF THOSE HOLDING THE SEVEN IS FOR THE RELEASE OF 17 DAWA PARTY PRISONERS INCARCERATED IN KUWAIT, WHERE THEY WERE TRIED AND CONVICTED FOR THE 1983 BOMBINGS OF FRENCH, U.S., AND KUWAITI INSTALLATIONS THERE. THREE OF THE PRISONERS WERE SENTENCED TO DEATH FOLLOWING THE TRIAL IN MARCH 1984. THAT SENTENCE MUST BE CONFIRMED BY THE KUWAITI EMIR BEFORE IT CAN BE CARRIED OUT. AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE TWA HIJACKING, U.S. POLICY IS CLEAR WE CANNOT CONCEDE TO TERRORIST DEMANDS, NOR CAN WE PRESSURE OTHERS TO DO SO.

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WE HAVE STRONG REASON TO BELIEVE THAT AT LEAST SIX OF THOSE SEVEN ARE ALIVE. OUR UNCERTAINTY REGARDING THE SEVENTH DERIVES FROM A COMPLETE LACK OF ANY INFORMATION REGARDING HIM SINCE HIS DISAPPEARANCE SIX MONTHS AGO. WE HAVE NOT BEEN ABLE TO OBTAIN ANY CONFIRMATION ABOUT HIS WHEREABOUTS, NOR HAS ANY GROUP CLAIMED TO BE HOLDING HIM.

WE ARE CONVINCED THAT ICRC'S EFFECTIVE INVOLVEMENT IN ASSURING THE WELFARE AND THE SUBSEQUENT RELEASE OF THE TWA HOSTAGES SET A FAVORABLE PRECEDENT WHICH CAN SERVE AS A BASIS FOR AN ICRC ROLE IN ASSURING THE WELFARE OF THOSE AMERICANS WHO CONTINUE TO LANGUISH IN CAPTIVITY. SINCERELY, MICHAEL ARMACOST, ACTING SECRETARY.

4. SEPTEL PROVIDES YOU WITH THE NAMES, DATE OF DISAPPEARANCE AND OTHER PERSONAL DATA REGARDING THE SEVEN AMERICANS. YOU SHOULD PROVIDE THIS INFO TO PRESIDENT HAY ALONG WITH THE LETTER. PLEASE REPORT HIS RESPONSE.

5. MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ARMACOST



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PAGE 01 OF 04 BEIRUT 04023 061508Z C02/02 006447 NOD523

-----07/1910Z

INFO SSI-01 NSC-01 /002 A5 DDP
NSC ADDED PER BMCKINLEY, S/S, 7/7/85
NSC EYES ONLY POINDEXTER

-----06/1640Z

ACTION OFFICE MCTP-01
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 NEA-01
INR-01 L-01 SP-01 CATB-01 /018 A5 DDP

REPEATED TOSEC BY SWO
REPEATED CIA E. O. DCI
L E. O. SOFAER; S/P E. O. RODMAN
M/CTP EYES ONLY BORG; NEA EYES ONLY RAPHEL; INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ
NIACT ALERT: DIST0AUTHKBY READ BY DISTRIBUTED BY
DISTRIBUTION PER BMCKINLEY, S/S

EXSEC _____ (S/S-1)
DEPEXSEC _____ DATE/TIME

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By dlb NARA, Date 9/16/95

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PAGE 02 OF 04 BEIRUT 04023 061508Z C02/02 006447 NOD523
DESTRUCTION TO THE DIRECTOR, S/S-1, ROOM 7241, TEL. 632-2976.

EXECUTIVE SECRETARY
DEPARTMENT OF STATE

ACTION NODS-00

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 W

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FM AMEMBASSY BEIRUT
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 3907

~~SECRET~~ BEIRUT 04023

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NLS 197-109/1 #137
By CNS, NARA, Date 2/4/03

NODIS

FOR ARMACOST AND MURPHY FROM BARTHOLOMEW

E.O. 12356: DELC: OADR
TAGS: PTER, LE
SUBJECT: DISCUSSIONS WITH BARRI ON THE SEVEN

REF: STATE 206629

1. ~~S~~-ENTIRE TEXT.

2. FIRST OFF, TWA 847 WAS NO UNMITIGATED SUCCESS FOR BARRI AND HE HAS BEEN TAKING A RELATIVELY LOW PROFILE SINCE THE HOSTAGES WERE RELEASED. HE WILL NOT BE EAGER TO "GET UP FRONT" ON THE SEVEN (AND COULD EVEN DUCK CONTACT WITH ME, AS HE WAS DOING BEFORE THE TWA HIJACKING) AND THE QUESTION IS HOW BEST TO PUSH HIM.

3. THAT SAID, I HAVE RESERVATIONS ABOUT ASKING BARRI TO TELL THE CAPTORS "WE ARE WILLING TO TALK AS WAS THE CASE WITH THE TWA HIJACKING." HE AND THE CAPTORS ARE LIABLE TO INFER THAT WE WANT BARRI TO PLAY THE SAME ROLE.


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AS "MEDIATOR"; OR THAT WE ARE READY TO TALK DIRECTLY
WITH THE CAPTORS; AND THAT WE ARE READY TO DEAL ALTHOUGH
WE SAY "WE CANNOT ACCEDE TO DEMANDS."



5. WITH BARRI, WE SHOULD CONCENTRATE ON HIS OWN INTEREST IN ASSERTING HIS AUTHORITY AND REPEAT AND SOLVING A PROBLEM THAT TAINTS AMAL AND THE SHIAS AS WELL IN THE EYES OF THE WHOLE WORLD. HE SHOULD BE PUSHED TO ACT ON THIS AND ON HUMANITARIAN GROUNDS. WE SHOULD AVOID SAYING ANYTHING THAT COULD APPEAR INSTEAD TO INVITE HIM TO REPLAY THE DOUBLE GAME VERSION OF "MEDIATOR".

6. I WOULD ALSO EMPHASIZE THE LINE OF BARRI'S SELF INTEREST OVER THE POINT THAT THE AMERICAN PEOPLE EXPECT HIM TO FREE THE SEVEN. HE IS NOT IN THE SAME POSITION ON THE SEVEN THAT HE WAS IN THE TWA AFFAIR.

7. FINALLY -- AND NEED IT BE REPEATED -- ONCE AGAIN, THE MOST PROMISING LINE ON THE SEVEN IS THROUGH THE SYRIANS, DIRECTLY WITH THE CAPTORS AND WORKING WITH BARRI.

8. I WILL TRY A HARD RUN AT BARRI -- ASSUMING HE DOES NOT DUCK CONTACT -- ONCE I HAVE YOUR REACTION TO POINTS

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BARTHOLOMEW

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-----07/1857Z
INFO SSI-01 NSC-01 /002 A5 DDP
NSC ADDED PER BMCKINLEY, S/S, 7/7/85
NSC EYES ONLY POINDEXTER

-----06/1648Z
INFO L-01 SP-01 /002 A5 DDP

-----06/1543Z
ACTION OFFICE NEA-01
INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 INR-01
CATB-01 MCTP-01 /016 A5 DDP

REPEATED TOSEC BY SWO
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NIACT ALERT: 1130 BMCKIN Y S/S

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997
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ACTION NODS-00

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FM AMEMBASSY DAMASCUS
TO SECSTATE WASHDC NIACT IMMEDIATE 1937
INFO AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

S E C R E T DAMASCUS 04201

NODIS

DECLASSIFIED IN PART
NLS 197-10911-138
By OKS, NARA, Date 2/6/03

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR
TAGS: PTER, PREL, US, SY, LE
SUBJECT: KHADDAM ON THE SEVEN AMERICAN KIDNAPPEES

1. SECRET - ENTIRE TEXT.

2. SUMMARY:



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END

SUMMARY.

3. WHEN I SAW KHADDAM ON JULY 6, I DISCUSSED AT SOME LENGTH WITH HIM THE REMAINING AMERICAN AND OTHER KIDNAPPEES IN LEBANON (OTHER SUBJECTS BY SEPTTEL).

4. I TOLD KHADDAM THAT DESPITE SOME INACCURATE PRESS STORIES, JUST AS THE USG HAD MADE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE TWA HOSTAGES AND THE ATLIT PRISONERS, WE WILL MAKE NO LINKAGE BETWEEN THE ATLIT PRISONERS AND THE SEVEN REMAINING KIDNAPPEES.

5. I RECALLED THAT FOR MORE THAN A YEAR WE HAVE DISCUSSED WITH THE SYRIANS OUR INSISTENCE ON THE IMMEDIATE SAFE RELEASE OF THE KIDNAPPEES OF ALL NATIONALITIES IN LEBANON. WHILE SOME HAVE BEEN CONVINCED OF SYRIA'S EFFORTS ON THEIR BEHALF, OTHERS POINT OUT THAT THE LIST KEEPS LENGTHENING. FURTHER, IN THE AFTERMATH OF THE TWA AFFAIR, AND NOW THAT WE KNOW OF THE BRUTALITY OF THE HIZBALLAH HIJACKERS, IT SEEMS EVEN MORE INHUMANE THAT THE SEVEN SHOULD LINGER IN THE HANDS OF SUCH UNCIVILIZED INDIVIDUALS. I RECALLED THAT LEVIN HAD REPORTED HE HAD BEEN CHAINED FOR ONE YEAR AND BRUTALIZED IN OTHER WAYS. I RECALLED THAT FOREIGN MINISTER SHARA' HAD ADVISED ME TWO DAYS AGO TO BE PATIENT. FRANKLY, HOWEVER, THIS ADVICE IS NOT SUFFICIENT.

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[REDACTED]

7. I RECALLED THAT DURING THE TWA NEGOTIATIONS, WE HAD UNDERSTOOD THAT THE SYRIANS NOW HAVE HAD DIRECT CONTACT WITH THE HIZBALLAH. WILL THIS HELP IN THEIR CURRENT EFFORTS?

[REDACTED]

8.

[REDACTED]

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9. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. EAGLETON

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C02/02 006221 NOD494

-----06/1752Z

INFO SSI-01 NSC-01 /002 A5 DDP

NSC COPY CUT 7/6/85 BY SWO PER CSOLOMON, S/S

-----05/2157Z

ORIGIN OFFICE NEA-01

INFO SWO-01 SSO-01 SSS-01 SSI-01 SS-04 S-02 D-01 P-01 INR-01

L-01 MCT-01 SP-01 OCT-01 CATB-01 /019 A5 RSP

S/S PASS NSC EYES ONLY POINDEXTER VIA COURIER

INR EYES ONLY ABRAMOWITZ; S/P EYES ONLY RODMAN; L EYES ONLY SOFAER

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EXSEC _____

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Department of State Guidelines, July 21, 1997

By dlb NARA, Date 9/16/99

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C02/02 006221 NOD494

INFO LOG-00 ADS-00 /000 R

DRAFTED BY: NEA/RPELLETREAU: SMB/CF

APPROVED BY: P: MARMACOST

L: ASOFAER

NEA: RWMURPHY

M/CT: GBAILEY

S/S: JFCOLLINS

S/S-O: SKREBS

NEA/ARN: DMACK

NSC: JPOINDEXTER

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AMEMBASSY BEIRUT IMMEDIATE

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NODIS

E. O. 12356: DECL: OADR

TAGS: PTER, EAID, LE, SY

SUBJECT: SEEKING SYRIAN AND LEBANESE COOPERATION IN
CLOSING BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT

1. (~~SECRET~~ ENTIRE TEXT.)

2. AS EMBASSIES ARE AWARE, US HAS NOW LAUNCHED A
CAMPAIGN TO ATTRACT INTERNATIONAL SUPPORT FOR CLOSING
DOWN BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT. EVEN ASSUMING,
HOWEVER, THAT WE ARE SUCCESSFUL IN PERSUADING OTHER
NATIONS TO CEASE CIVIL AIR TRAFFIC BETWEEN THEIR AIRPORTS
AND BIA, THE AIRSTRIP AT BIA WILL CONTINUE TO BE USABLE
BY AIRCRAFT OF VARIOUS SORTS AND PARTICULARLY AIRCRAFT
UNDER THE CONTROL OF HIJACKERS. IN ORDER TO PREVENT BIA
BEING USED AS A SAFEHAVEN FOR HIJACKED AIRCRAFT, IT MAY
BE NECESSARY TO PHYSICALLY DISABLE THE AIRPORT IN SUCH
WAY THAT PLANES WILL BE UNABLE TO LAND. THIS CAN BE DONE

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CIS 2/6/03

By _____, NARA, Date _____

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
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BY DESTROYING PORTIONS OF THE RUNWAY AND ESSENTIAL NAVIGATION FACILITIES, OR BY PLACING ENOUGH PHYSICAL OBSTACLES ON THE RUNWAY TO ENSURE AIRCRAFT WILL NOT BE ABLE TO USE IT.

3. IT WOULD BE PREFERABLE FOR LEBANESE AUTHORITIES TO ACT ON THEIR OWN TO SEAL OFF BIA AND RENDER IT UNAVAILABLE TO TERRORISTS. SINCE THE GOL IS PROBABLY UNABLE TO DO SO IN THE NEAR TERM, LEBANON AND SYRIA TOGETHER SHOULD CONSIDER TAKING ACTION TO DISABLE BIA RATHER THAN RESORT TO MILITARY ACTION FOR THIS PURPOSE.


YOU WILL BE ABLE TO DETERMINE MOST APPROPRIATE OFFICIALS WITH WHICH TO RAISE THIS SUBJECT. ONE SUCH OCCASION MIGHT BE WITH SYRIAN VICE PRESIDENT KHADDAM WHEN PRESENTING HE VICE PRESIDENT'S MESSAGE. YOU MAY DRAW ON THE FOLLOWING TALKING POINTS:

-- IT IS CLEAR THAT BEIRUT INTERNATIONAL AIRPORT HAS LONG BEEN A CENTER FOR TERRORIST ACTIVITIES AGAINST CIVIL AVIATION. THUS FAR IN 1985 ALONE, 6 HIJACKINGS HAVE BEGUN, ENDED, OR PASSED THROUGH BIA. THERE WERE 3 IN 1984, ONE EACH IN 1982 AND 1981, AND 5 IN 1980. THERE HAVE BEEN A TOTAL OF 36 SUCH INCIDENTS GOING BACK TO 1970. THE SUCCESSFUL USE OF BIA BY THE TWA HIJACKERS REINFORCES THE LIKELIHOOD OF BIA BEING USED YET AGAIN IN THE SAME WAY IN FUTURE HIJACKINGS.

WE WOULD PREFER THAT LEBANESE AUTHORITIES, WITH SYRIAN SUPPORT, GAIN FIRM CONTRTOL OF BIA AND SEAL IT OFF FROM

THE REST OF THE CITY. WHEN THIS IS DONE, THE USG STANDS READY TO WORK WITH INTERNATIONAL CIVIL AVIATION

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AUTHORITIES TO ASSIST THE LEBANESE IN ESTABLISHING MEASURES TO PREVENT INFILTRATION INTO BIA OF TERRORIST ELEMENTS WHO WOULD SUPPORT A HIJACKING OR CARRY ON OTHER ACTIVITY INIMICAL TO AIR SAFETY.

-- UNTIL SUCH TIME AS THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON CAN EFFECTIVELY EXERT ITS AUTHORITY OVER THE AIRPORT AND SURROUNDING AREAS, THE ONLY EFFECTIVE PROTECTION FOR AIR TRAVELERS IN THE MIDDLE EAST REGION IN THE SHORT TERM IS FOR BIA TO BE CLOSED DOWN AND ITS RUNWAYS BE RENDERED TEMPORARILY UNUSABLE BY AIRCRAFT.

-- SUCH DISABLING COULD BE ACCOMPLISHED BY DISMOUNTING NAVIGATIONAL FACILITIES, TEMPORARILY DISMISSING AIRPORT PERSONNEL, AND, MOST IMPORTANTLY, PLACING NOT EASILY REMOVABLE OBSTACLES ON THE RUNWAYS.

-- MOST EFFECTIVE AND LEAST EASILY MOVABLE OBSTACLES MIGHT BE THE CONSTRUCTION OF EARTHEN BERMS ACROSS THE RUNWAYS. PLACING DISABLED TRUCKS, TANKS OR OTHER HEAVY EQUIPMENT ON RUNWAYS WOULD BE ANOTHER POSSIBILITY.

STANCHIONS ON EITHER SIDE OF RUNWAYS WITH STEEL CABLES, CEMENT TRAFFIC BUMPS WITH GLASS OR DRAGONS TEETH IMPLANTED ARE ADDITIONAL POSSIBILITIES.

-- WE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON WILL AGREE TO TAKE SUCH ACTION

A

-- WE HOPE THAT THE GOVERNMENT OF SYRIA WILL ENCOURAGE AND ASSIST THE GOVERNMENT OF LEBANON IN TAKING SUCH ACTION.

-- WE WOULD APPRECIATE ANY ADDITIONAL IDEAS WHICH THE

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GOVERNMENTS OF LEBANON AND SYRIA MAY HAVE TO ACHIEVE THIS
OBJECTIVE.

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4. BEIRUT MINIMIZE CONSIDERED. ARMACOST

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